Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars
Abstract
The U.S. Army officer corps has not seriously debated the content of the many doctrinal field manuals (FM) published over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, FM3-0, Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations). Though these manuals have been successfully pushed through the bureaucratic lines of the Army's senior leadership, few other officers raised questions about the wisdom of employing American military power to build nations where none exist or where an American military presence is not wanted. Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a process that proposes its use as an instrument of nation building in the most unstable parts of the world. Nation building, rather than fighting, has become the core function of the U.S. Army. The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine "is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous" with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier's repertoire. The implication of this doctrine is that the Army should be transformed into a light infantry-based constabulary force designed to police the world's endless numbers of unstable areas. The concept rests on the assumption that the much-touted "surge" in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA516894
Entities
People
- Gian P. Gentile
Organizations
- National Defense University