

PREPARING FOR PEACE AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

BY

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PREPARING FOR PEACE AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

by

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Foreign policy broadly addresses U.S. interest; however, identification of interests has not necessarily translated into effective policy. Nothing demonstrates this deficiency more aptly than the failure of successive administrations to understand the difficulty associated with identifying limited objectives that facilitate coalition building and maintenance, with bringing rogue states and non-state actors to battle – diplomatically or militarily, or with developing plans to resolve conflict in a manner that promotes lasting peace. To correct this, the Obama administration must do a better job identifying vital American interests in an era of globalization and interconnectedness, and clearly linking policy to the defense of those interests. The whole of government must be organized and adequately resourced to execute post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, the administration must be discriminating and able to succinctly articulate the rationale behind post-conflict reconstruction and nation building ventures.

PREPARING FOR PEACE AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

American foreign policy and strategic thought are still largely shaped by our notions of big wars and the expectations of them.¹ Unfortunately, America's fixation on big war undermines critical thought related to the evolving nature of war and the numerous implications for the U.S. government (USG) approach to maintaining global stability and economic prosperity. Foreign policy broadly addresses U.S. interest; however, identification of interests has not necessarily translated into effective policy. Nothing demonstrates this deficiency more aptly than the failure of successive administrations to understand the difficulty associated with identifying limited objectives that facilitate coalition building and maintenance, with bringing rogue states and non-state actors to battle – diplomatically or militarily, or with developing plans to resolve conflict in a manner that promotes lasting peace. To correct this situation, the Obama administration must do a better job than previous administrations in identifying vital American interests in an era of globalization and interconnectedness and clear link policy to the defense of those interests. The whole of government must be organized and adequately resourced to execute post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, the administration must be discriminating and able to succinctly articulate the rationale behind post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building ventures. The nation cannot afford to attempt to do everything, everywhere. The United States must work with its many "international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."²

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has engaged in at least 17 reconstruction and stabilization (R & S) efforts with an average of two to three of those activities occurring concurrently. “Weak, impoverished, [failing and] failed states, not militarily robust regimes are seen by many as the new challenge to peace and international order... unsuccessful post-conflict transitions in such states are a threat to U.S and global security.”³ Building the capacity of government ministries and institutions is critical to ensuring the affected state can eventually assume responsibility for delivering basic services to its population and sustain the effort to rebuild the country.

A wide variety of U.S. departments, agencies, activities, and international organizations, including the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Justice, USAID, the UN, and the World Bank, have played significant roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, in the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan for R & S operations, U.S. efforts to build host nation governance capacity have been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching direction. In order to promote greater efficiency and effectiveness, the USG should articulate a comprehensive policy concerning the mechanisms and approaches for integrating and coordinating its effort. On the interagency level, these mechanisms will help ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and that all elements of national power, including military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, and development assistance, are focused effectively on achieving American policy objectives.

This paper will review an historical perspective of American post-conflict reconstruction, relevant national security guidance, and impediments that have resulted in inefficient and ineffective post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. It will look at Department of Defense efforts to change its cultural aversion to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations and address the implications of de facto DoD (particularly U.S. Army) leadership of USG stability operations worldwide. In closing, it will provide situation specific options that can be used to designate the USG lead agency for R & S operations and advocate changes designed to better support effective organization for, planning for and execution of reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Over the past eight years, the body of work related to post-conflict reconstruction has grown considerably. Unfortunately, authors, policy makers and planners have used the term nation building imprecisely to include peace keeping, stabilization, reconstruction, development, complex operations and post-conflict transitions. Since this paper relies on contributions from scholarly works, the Departments of Defense and State directives, and concepts from other government agencies, the term post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization will be used in a similar generic fashion. "Defined in the broadest possible way, nation building involves aid and support to civil society to rebuild the shattered economy, provide livelihoods, create social and political structures, and introduce democracy. The process of democratization is about not just holding elections but creating institutions and a culture of tolerance and a shared responsibility among rulers and citizens alike."⁴

Reconstruction and Stabilization: An Historical Perspective

Those desiring to gain an appreciation of the internal friction the U.S. government has experienced related to reconstruction and stabilization throughout its brief history can simply review America's move toward assuming the mantle of global leadership in the 20th Century. "While there was very little in President Woodrow Wilson's statements before November 1918 on the ending of the war about what we might call 'reconstruction', what is striking in American liberal thinking about postwar settlement is how much emphasis was put on economic issues in general."⁵

The earliest notions of reconstruction were based on trade, commerce and national economies. Like their nineteenth century European liberal predecessors, leading American political thinkers "believed that commerce had a far more profound effect than war in improving states and peoples with them, Cobden's 'peaceful penetration'. As Spain and Portugal had conquered by commerce, so had Holland, then Great Britain, and now would the United States."⁶ In contrast to its conservative European predecessors, America did not see reconstruction as an opportunity to embed itself in the territory for the purposes of domination and colonization – two aspects of European foreign policy that resulted in the subjugation of conquered peoples and led to the many negative connotations of the word occupation.⁷ For many in the United States and Britain, reconstruction was focused on domestic issues. One of the main lessons learned from the Great War appears to have been that "the organisational power that the state had shown during the war could be carried on into the peace."⁸

In July 1944, ten months prior to the end of the war in Europe, the delegates of 44 countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to establish the policies and rules that would govern the post-World War II international monetary system. The Bretton

Woods conference, officially known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial conference, resulted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).⁹

Leery of vague and open-ended commitments, Professor Philip Noel-Baker complained the concept behind the term reconstruction lacked clarity of purpose.

Noel-Baker sought to pin down the concept more clearly to two major elements – the ‘restoration of pre-war efficiency [and] ... reconstruction of the economic mechanisms of manufacture, credit, purchase and sale, transport ...’ This translated, he said, into a necessary involvement of ‘citizens of the countries involved ... [plus] government action ... [plus] international action by governments working together – this is the real experiment.’¹⁰

The outcome of Bretton Woods was a prototype for the American liberals under Roosevelt’s wartime administration of what was to become a New Deal for Europe.¹¹ President Roosevelt was more than happy to start the process that eventually led to vast amounts of capital being raised to help European states, victors and losers, back onto their feet.¹² While American reconstruction funds under what was ultimately labeled the Marshall Plan began flowing in 1949, those funds were only a fraction of the total resources provided by Europeans and Americans for “nation-building” on the continent.

Reconstruction and stabilization operations can be enormously expensive endeavors. In October 2008, using figures obtained from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Amy Belasco, a specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget estimated the total cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations since 9/11 to be \$864 billion. Using CBO projections, she stated funding for Iraq, Afghanistan and the GWOT could total about \$1.3 to \$1.7 trillion for FY2001-FY2018.¹³ While not technically correct

accounting of foreign assistance costs, there are many politicians and ordinary citizens who consider the entire cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to be nation-building or reconstruction and stabilization related expenses. With the global recession and double digit U.S. unemployment, many question the appropriateness of spending any additional money to stabilize and rebuild either country. They are especially eager for Iraq, an oil-rich country, to assume responsibility for its own reconstruction and development. They are wary of assertions by the Karzai government that American soldiers and vast sums of money will be required to stabilize Afghanistan for at least an additional 15 years. Attitudes such as these are reflective of a war-weary society that has historically been inherently isolationist and skeptical of the entangling commitments of peacekeeping, nation-building and stability operations.

The End of Cold War Stability

Equally relevant to the discussion of American attitudes toward reconstruction and stabilization efforts is the impact of the Cold War on U.S. strategic thinking and culture. The Cold War defined how America perceived itself and its role in world affairs. Foreign policy was framed in the context of global ideological and military competition and confrontation with the Soviets. Consequently, the Cold War also prescribed how America dealt with other nations – its allies, friends and potential adversaries.

Instead of bringing global peace and thereby reducing the need for America to maintain a large military force, the end of the Cold War unleashed long-suppressed conflicts of identity. As the decade of the 1990s progressed, America found itself increasingly acting as a global policeman attempting to protect the international political and economic systems it established in the aftermath of World War II. As a result, American attitudes toward reconstruction and stabilization operations grudgingly began

to change. In 1999, President Clinton was able to claim that the most expensive of reconstructions is cheaper than the cheapest of wars and receive full public recognition for the logic of his remark except from the extreme conservative wing of the Republican Party.¹⁴ Academic debates concerning the definition of American interests and the threats to national security were prevalent until September 11, 2001, when a terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon fundamentally altered U.S. strategic thinking forever. While major combat operations with a “near peer” competitor might be the most dangerous threat to American national security, the “lesser included threat” posed by terrorists are now pose the most likely threat to Americans and American interests for the foreseeable future.

NSPD-44 and Creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

President George W. Bush entered office espousing a “realist” grand strategy of great power politics and national interests.¹⁵ He sought to stay away from nation-building and liberal humanitarianism. In 2002, it was not clear whether he was happy to get involved in the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.¹⁶ Ahmed Rashid, author of the 2008 book *Decent into Chaos* which chronicles the failure of U.S. nation-building efforts in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian, believes the Bush administration's fight priority after the Afghan war ended was declaring victory, getting out, and moving on to Iraq.¹⁷ However, the situation in the Southern Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq quickly demonstrated to the administration that underdevelopment, misery, tyranny and conflict are threats to the United States – its people, territory and allies – because they engender the spreading of radical or extremist ideology and violence. Given that perception of reality, the inability of the Department of State to lead effectively the USG reconstruction and stabilization effort in Iraq highlighted two critical problems related to

the execution of American Foreign policy – the general lack of deployable civilian capacity throughout the U.S. government, and the ineffective nature of interagency planning related to post-conflict operations – that President Bush had no choice but to take measures to rectify.

The United States has been well served by military forces that are adequately designed, equipped, and trained to fight wars, but are far less well-prepared for engaging in the fight for peace.¹⁸ Civilian capabilities are needed to plan and work in tandem with U.S. military forces when they are engaged in combat or peacekeeping operations. This will allow the military to concentrate on those activities for which they should be responsible.¹⁹ A civilian capability for stabilization and reconstruction is needed as well for those situations where there is no military combat role, but the United States engages because it is in our security interests to assist a failing state.²⁰

“The international community is not ... adequately organized to deal with governance failures. [America] must have a strong civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability in order to provide assistance that will achieve a sustainable peace.”²¹ The United States and its partners must organize themselves in a way that addresses this security challenge head on by committing to make long-term investments of money, energy and expertise.²² Recognizing the inefficient and ineffective manner with which the U.S. government approached post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction during the first five years of his presidency, George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). He stated,

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies,

and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.²³

By issuing NSPD-44, the President placed the responsibility for coordinating and leading USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts squarely on the Department of State. The directive charges the Secretary of State with the responsibility for coordinating and leading integrated United States Government efforts to prepare for, plan, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. This new responsibility includes a requirement to “coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”²⁴

Promulgation of NSPD-44 led directly to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (Fig.1) to serve as the State Department’s lead agent for its newly assigned, interagency integration responsibilities. Its task is to develop a civilian response force capability that is agile, flexible, and scaleable and which operates from a reliable and institutionalized management structure rather than ad hoc arrangements.²⁵ The core functions of S/CRS are to focus attention on preventative measures and planning for countries at risk of instability, identify and plan responses to post-conflict situations, lead and manage civilian



Figure 1: S/CRS Organizational Structure²⁶

response teams in the field and in Washington, and coordinate USG participation in multilateral operations (see Fig. 2).²⁷

According to information available on the S/CRS web page, the role of S/CRS is to coordinate interagency processes “to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and to coordinate preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities.”²⁸

	Mechanism– SUPPLY Function – DEMAND	S/CRS Staff	State Response Corps (Embassy)	Other USG Agencies & Bureaus	Civilian Reserve	Global Skills Network (USG contracts, etc.)
Coordination	Civilian Planning	Lead	Supplement	Participate	Supplement	Supplement
	Washington Coordination	Lead	Supplement	Participate	Supplement	Supplement
Diplomacy	Field Diplomacy	Coordinate	Lead	Participate	Participate	Supplement
	Program Mgmt. & Design	Coordinate	Participate	Lead	Participate	Supplement
Implement- ation	Program Delivery	Monitor	Supplement	Lead/Monitor Contractors	Rapid Response	Sustained Effort

Participate = Participate regularly; Supplement = May provide individuals

Figure 2: Response Mechanisms and Functions: Coordinated Responsibilities.²⁹

Unfortunately, S/CRS appears to be more focused on the task of conflict prevention than on the other tasks of planning for, leading and managing the USG response to post-conflict situations. S/CRS has spent considerable time developing planning tools, such as the Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation, and planning ongoing operations. However, this has come at the expense of spending time to develop plans for future missions. S/CRS has not yet developed any contingency plans.³⁰ There is a high probability that the focus on conflict prevention is tacit acknowledgement that S/CRS is undermanned, underfunded and lacks sufficient bureaucratic clout to effectively carry out the other daunting tasks it was assigned in NSPD-44, namely leading interagency planning, coordination and management of worldwide post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006

The authors of the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) correctly contend that conflict in the 21st Century will arise for a variety of reason. Included among the causes of conflict are competing claims over land and natural resources, external aggression, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, ethnic or religious hatred, and poor governance.³¹ Left unchecked, discontent will fester until it manifest itself as the instability and violence that results in failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned spaces that can be used as safe havens by a multitude of unsavory characters, transnational terrorists, and criminal organizations.

In the cover letter of the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, President Bush identified the vital interest of “protecting the security of the American people” as a most solemn obligation his strategy was designed to promote.³² One can deduce from reading the 2006 NSS that President Bush considered failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned spaces as direct threats to American interests, at home and abroad. While the document contains ideologically based language that can unquestionably be labeled a call to crusade – advocating the promotion of freedom and democracy as an alternative to tyranny and despair – it also emphasizes the critical importance of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Five years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to have demonstrated clearly to President Bush that while military involvement may be necessary to stop violent conflict, future peace and stability are contingent upon restoring order and rebuilding the fabric of society.

Transformational Diplomacy, Strategic Plan for FY 2007-2012

During his second inaugural on January 20, 2005, President George W. Bush spoke of supporting the growth of democratic movements and institutions everywhere

with the goal of ending tyranny.³³ In support that foreign policy vision, Secretary of State Rice advocated “bold, transformational diplomacy that seeks to support individual citizens who are committed to freedom, as well as to engage with other partner governments on an official state to state basis.”³⁴

Weak and failed states and those emerging from conflict pose one of today’s greatest security challenges. States are most vulnerable to collapse in the time immediately before, during, and after conflict. Ungoverned spaces become breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, weapons proliferation, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes and can destabilize an entire region. Subjected to dire conditions and deprived of basic services, people become susceptible to the exhortations of demagogues and hate-mongers.³⁵ Our concerns once flowed from the strength of determined opponents; now our concerns flow as often from the weaknesses of other states, which spawn adversaries we must strain even to detect before they strike.³⁶

After eight years at war, and considerable effort to win the peace, it is widely recognized that “[c]reating indigenous capacity—whether it is in health, education, free press, workforce training, agriculture, law enforcement, or governance—is key to long-term progress, the stable development of civil society, and firm and friendly bilateral/multilateral relationships.”³⁷ Interestingly though, while the Department of State strategic plan for FY 2007-2012 broadly links the organization’s strategic goals to tasks articulated in the 2006 national security strategy, it fails to directly mention or provide any detailed guidance related to planning, coordinating or implementing reconstruction and stabilization operations. This glaring omission is indicative of the State

Department's continuing inability to provide effective leadership in this critical interagency effort.

Impediments to Organizing an Effective Interagency Approach

While the inefficiency of USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts during the past two decades is widely recognized, the underlying causes have been inadequately studied and debated to facilitate necessary changes. However, there is a growing body of scholarship focused on potentially the four most critical issues requiring attention. In addition to the lack of deployable civilian foreign assistance capacity, Congressional support for post-conflict reconstruction is noticeably lacking. A brief review of Congressional budget appropriations for foreign assistance or post-conflict stabilization efforts over the last 10 years highlights an unwillingness to provide the Department of State the funds required to create the capacity necessary for success. The final two impediments to effective organization for an interagency approach to reconstruction and stabilization are an administration's inability to articulate what assistance the U.S. government would like from its allies and partners and an historical preference within the Department of Defense (specifically the Army) for kinetic, major combat operations.

Since the successful examples of the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II, the United States has under-invested in the civilian capabilities needed to partner with its military forces to achieve overall success in complex operations.³⁸ Stability operations are often long and dirty, with undefined goals and even murkier outcomes. "The operations create cultural challenges for civilian agencies, which are generally not optimized for long-duration overseas missions in less-than-permissive environments."³⁹ President Bush's 2004 decision to give such responsibility to the Department of Defense in Iraq reflects the reality that without a well-staffed and

resourced office in the State Department, with appropriately high level authority and access to principals in the Department, other agencies, and the White House, the President will not be able to rely on the State Department to carry out the essential tasks in countries emerging from conflict or undergoing civil strife.⁴⁰

“Complex operations [which include post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization activities] encompass six broad categories of missions, with 60 associated tasks, 48 of which in five categories are probably best performed by civilians.”⁴¹ In a recent article, Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin argue that “five thousand deployable, active-duty government civilians and 10,000 civilian reserves would be needed to perform these 48 tasks on a sustained basis in one large, one medium and four small contingency construct.”⁴² This requirement substantially exceeds current executive branch planning assumptions that call for 250 active-duty civilians and 2,000 civilian reservists.⁴³ While the State Department’s initiative in establishing the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was laudable, it has also been completely inadequate given the magnitude of the task.

In their 2009 work on improving capacity for reconstruction and stabilization, Bensahel, Olikar and Peterson question why there is a lack of civilian capacity to carry out post-conflict operations if the USG truly believes civilians are better suited than military personnel to manage and implement the range of tasks requiring special skills. Their answer is:

The reasons are rooted in the fact that although stabilization and reconstruction have become integrated into how the United States views warfare and national security, the institutions of government were structured during the late Cold War era, when these issues were a lower priority. Thus, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—the government agencies best capable, in terms

of both mission and capacity, of carrying out nonmilitary stabilization and reconstruction tasks—are not configured for effective, large-scale, rapid deployment.⁴⁴

In nearly every operation from Somalia to Iraq, a lack of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities has left military forces performing tasks for which they do not have a comparative advantage and has extended the duration of their deployments. “The unreadiness of the U.S. Government for future complex operations is not just a question of numbers. While the military has done much over the past 8 years in terms of doctrine and training, civilian agencies still lack doctrine, training, or education programs to prepare their expeditionary cadres for complex operations.”⁴⁵

The lack of civilian capacity in the Department of State and other government agencies is a significant impediment to implementation of an effective interagency approach to post-conflict reconstruction that must be corrected, but it is not the most serious impediment. Funding for foreign aid in 1949 was roughly equal to the DoD budget at the time, but U.S. spending on international security and development programs was by 2006 just one-thirteenth the size of the Pentagon budget, even excluding the costs of the war in Iraq.⁴⁶ Without a doubt, the lack of Congressional support and dedicate funding for the State Department’s foreign assistance programs is a serious issue that undermines American foreign policy initiatives.

The main roadblock to enhancing the State Department’s stabilization and reconstruction capacity has been resources.⁴⁷ Rather than developing the capacity to fulfill their role of leading the USG effort in post-conflict operations, the civilian departments and agencies saw their skills and resources decline in the face of a strong cost-cutting mood in Congress that extended over decades. USAID was compelled to reduce its Foreign Service and Civil Service staff from about 12,000 personnel during

the Vietnam War to some 2,000 today. Other civilian departments of government had few incentives to contribute personnel to national security missions.⁴⁸ During his 2004 testimony before the Senate committee on Foreign Relations, former Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre stated his belief that Congressional non-support of foreign assistance programs inhibits “our [USG] ability to ensure that programs—such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), deploying emergency justice teams, quick start projects to jumpstart basic services and economies, and support for national constituting processes and civil administration needs—are started quickly, to avoid longer term repercussions.”⁴⁹

Post-conflict operations continue to be funded through supplemental budget requests, outside the regular budgeting process.⁵⁰ Senator Richard Lugar believes:

One stopgap measure that Congress did pass in fiscal year 2006, overcoming historical congressional skepticism of such pools of funding, was the authority to transfer up to \$100 million from the Pentagon to the State Department for boosting the civilian response to particular trouble spots... this artful legislative relocation overcame the persistent congressional tightfistedness toward foreign assistance relative to DOD programs. Still this is a 1-year authority, and the money does not provide the long-term perspective to improve the State Department’s capacity to respond to complex emergencies.⁵¹

Members of Congress may recognize the value of the work done by the State Department, and some selected programs, but the Foreign Affairs budget (Account 150) is seldom defended against competing priorities.⁵² “Without the appropriate authorities and resources, it will not be possible to do what is required.”⁵³

In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened to continue to push his forces south into Saudi Arabia. In doing so, he threatened to gain control of the Saudi oil fields that provided “the life blood” of the global economy. President George H. W. Bush (Bush 41) took a stand in opposition to Hussein’s actions and was

very effective in creating a coalition of nations that eventually evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait in an humiliating defeat. Almost 13 years later, citing evidence that Saddam Hussein was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, his son, President George W. Bush (Bush 43) was able to cobble together a “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq and decapitated its political leadership and institutions. Even though both situations ultimately resulted in the United States achieving its immediate strategic objectives, each demonstrated the inability of U.S. administrations to effectively articulate what America wants or needs from its allies and partners.

Typically, the United States entertains offers for assistance rather than requesting particular types of help.⁵⁴ The reactive practice of awaiting offers of assistance has a critical implication for U.S. capability planning. It forces planners to prepare conservatively, assuming that no other nations or alliances can be counted on to help (or at least that one cannot plan on what they might bring).⁵⁵ One could argue that this situation has developed because the technological capabilities of the U.S. military have grown at a rate that even America’s closest allies cannot match. Whether or not that is the underlying cause, passively waiting for offers of assistance has proven to be an inefficient, if not ineffective, way to obtain the capabilities required to execute success reconstruction and stabilization operations. Instead, the USG lead, presumably the Department of State, should determine what capacity is resident in U.S. allies and prospective partners and what we want U.S. allies and prospective partners to do in support of post-conflict reconstruction. “Counting on others’ capabilities certainly incurs risk for the United States, should support fail to materialize. Nevertheless, these

planning factors should be understood by policymakers who ultimately need to weigh relative costs and risks in planning future capabilities.”⁵⁶

The last impediment to effective organization for an interagency approach to reconstruction and stabilization that must be addressed deals with the U.S. military’s bias toward kinetic force-on-force combat. Inside the Department of Defense and across the USG, there is a tendency to equate the military with warfighting to the exclusion of other critical roles it can fulfill in support of American foreign policy. Collectively, the Department of Defense has historically demonstrated a preference for major combat operations and an abhorrence of nation-building / peacekeeping operations. Ask anyone in the Army why it exists, and you will almost certainly receive the answer, “to fight and win the nations wars.” Members of the Marines, Navy and Air Force may not use exactly the same words, but the sentiment reflected in their response will be identical. It will be focused on the next big war. The answer will most assuredly not extol the importance of reconstruction or stability operations.

In the summer of 2003, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld endorsed a plan to close the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute – the government’s only organization dedicated to the reconstruction and stabilization – ostensibly as a cost saving measure. Even though Secretary Rumsfeld later reversed his decision, former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith in a Time magazine interview with Mark Thompson, correctly identified the decision as reflective of Army priorities. He went on to concluded the United States was “in danger of losing in Iraq because we haven’t figured out how to do postwar missions.”⁵⁷ In reality, it may have been more correct to conclude the United States was in danger of losing in Iraq not because we

had not figured out how to do postwar missions, but because the Department of Defense believed those tasks belonged to other U.S. government departments and agencies. It is easy to understand why the Department of Defense is so focused on winning the next conventional battle. However, its inherent bias toward major combat operations has habitually undermined preparation to conduct stability operations, proper coordination to integrate interagency activities, and the potential synergistic effect of combining efforts with non-governmental organizations.

As the United States prepared to enter World War II, the military discovered it had virtually no capacity to manage the areas it would likely have to occupy. The Army did not even have a field manual on occupation management before 1940. A senior general was not appointed to plan overseas occupation operations until 1942--the same year the Army created staff officer positions for division (and higher) units to advise commanders about civil affairs and established its first military government school. Even then, the military undertook its occupation duties only reluctantly.⁵⁸ In Europe after World War II, Army tank battalions and artillery brigades were ill-suited to the conduct of occupation duties.⁵⁹ Most troops lacked training in many critical security tasks such as conducting investigations, arrest, detention, search and seizure, interrogation, negotiation, and crowd control. It was not until months after the occupation started that the Army began to field constabulary units that were better designed to conduct a range of security tasks.⁶⁰ Eventually, U.S. constabulary forces grew proficient and served successfully. However, they were soon disbanded and replaced by conventional military units more appropriate to the tasks of fighting Cold War battles.⁶¹ During World War II, the military closely followed its tradition (as much as

possible) of divesting itself of non-combat tasks. Traditionally, the Services preferred to establish a "firewall" between civilian and soldier activities to prevent civilian tasks from becoming an overwhelming drain on military resources. As a result, there was scant cooperation between the Pentagon and other federal agencies or non-governmental organizations.⁶²

Changing the Cultural Aversion to Stability Operations and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

If the United States is going to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the current era of persistent conflict, the "warfighting only" culture of the Department of Defense must change. The U.S. Army in particular must change its collective aversion to stability operations, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building. Post-conflict activities are an integral part of any military campaign in which U.S. forces seize territory, either to free an occupied country, as with Kuwait in 1991, or to dispose of an enemy regime, as during the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan.⁶³ The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.⁶⁴ Such missions are not "optional" operations; they are an integral part of any military campaign.⁶⁵ Stability operations must be viewed as necessary activities conducted to establish order that advances national values and interests.

In 1914, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison is purported to have uttered the words, "The American Army has become the all-around handy man of the government ... You may be called upon at any time to do any kind of service in any part of the world ... You must do it, and you must do it well."⁶⁶ In November 2005, recognizing this

situation has not changed fundamentally in approximately 100 years, Acting Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations). The directive established stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.”⁶⁷ It acknowledged formally that stability operations are missions equal in importance and priority to combat operations. Every Department of Defense organization and activity was constrained to account for stability operations in its doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. Equally important, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which was updated and republished as Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 in September 2009, also assigned the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility to identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development.⁶⁸

Since DODD 3000.05 was first published, considerable thought has supported the Defense Department’s identification and development of necessary SSTR capabilities. In October 2008, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*. FM 3-07 provides the doctrinal foundation required “to achieve unity of effort through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but remains consistent with, and supports the execution of, a broader ‘whole of government’ approach as defined by the United States Government (USG).”⁶⁹ The manual is part of the Army’s acknowledgement that its middle and senior level military and civilian leaders need to gain a greater understanding of and appreciation for the complexities of reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Approximately one year later, the U. S. Institute for Peace,

working in collaboration with the U. S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, published *Guiding Principles for Reconstruction and Stabilization*⁷⁰ to provide USG planners and policymakers with a comprehensive framework designed to facilitate building sustainable peace in the aftermath of conflict, violence and war. While both books will undoubtedly advance intellectual preparation to participate in future reconstruction and stabilization activities, greater effort is required within the Department of Defense and across the entire USG to change attitudes about post-conflict reconstruction and to bring about an effective interagency approach to such tasks.

Consequences and Implications

Recognizing the Department of Defense will continue to lead stabilization and reconstruction operations by default if development of its SSTR capabilities continues to outpace the development of similar capabilities in the State Department and USAID, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen have been vocal advocates over the last 18 months of increased funding to build of State Department capacity. Nonetheless, both men continue working to ensure the military is “prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”⁷¹ The U.S. government has not invested in the civilian capabilities necessary to preclude overreliance on the military during reconstruction and stabilization efforts. This is true even in areas of civilian strength, such as governance and judiciary reform, where deployable capacity is small and an ability to operate in non-permissive environments is even rarer.⁷² In their work *Planning for Stability Operations*, Kathleen Hicks and Eric Ridge say this situation forces Department of Defense planners to face a seemingly impossible dilemma. “Either they must remain

squarely in the support lane, risking the inability to succeed in complex stability operations if others cannot effectively lead on key tasks, or they must venture more broadly into the development, counterterrorism, and governance realms, risking significant military overreach, in order to hedge against the potential lack of civilian capacity.”⁷³

“For better or worse, DoD is America’s most viable first responder ... when contingency events involve major violence or conditions exceed the capacity of US government agencies or foreign partners.”⁷⁴ The leadership of the Department of Defense appears to have heard and taken Nathan Freirer’s question, “if not you [DoD], then who?”⁷⁵ to heart. The Defense Department has taken strides to expand its authority to deploy its own civilians. It is making adjustments throughout the department that will facilitate more effective post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations, whether or not a sufficient pool of civilians from other USG agencies deploy to the contingency location. Nothing in the tone or language of DoDD 3000.05 (published in 2005) and DoDI 3000.05 (published in 2009) appears to concede to the Department of State or the S/CRS the authority and leadership role prescribed by President Bush in NSPD-44 and subsequently retained by President Obama.

The Department of Defense has substantially greater resources and capacity to execute its varied authorities than any other department or agency of the government. Congress has even enacted legislation giving the Defense Department the authority to use its funds, rather than State Department funds, to train and equip allies globally, thereby reducing State Department policy oversight.⁷⁶ As a consequence of Congressional unwillingness to grant the civilian departments and agencies of the

Executive branch greater and more flexible authorities, “the Department of Defense has become a major driver for long-term economic, judicial, and societal aspects of U.S. foreign policy.”⁷⁷ According to Ahmed Rashid, “foreign policy became the prerogative of the Department of Defense, which was unaccountable to the U.S. Congress or the public, rather than the domain of the State Department.”⁷⁸ He quoted journalist Dana Priest in explaining the phenomenon – “The military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress.”⁷⁹

Options for Situational Leadership of Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction

Successful reconstruction and stabilization efforts address challenges posed by combating insurgents, training local security forces, shaping government institutions, reconstructing infrastructure, building a sustainable economic foundation and enhancing public services. These efforts demonstrate a substantial commitment to most aspects of nation building, but are very expensive in terms of lives and dollars. Assuming (1) that the Department of State must play a role in the planning, coordination and implementation of future USG R & S efforts, (2) that the President and Congress will be unable to come to an agreement that will result in the State Department being adequately resources to execute its foreign assistance responsibilities and (3) that Congress will continue to authorize the Department of Defense to transfer up to \$300 million to the Department of State to fund reconstruction and stabilization programs in accordance with Section 1201 of the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization act in lieu of appropriating conflict preventions funds to the Department of State, there are essentially three options available to the President when deciding what agency should lead reconstruction and stabilization activities and operations. There is a Diplomacy focused (DoS-led) alternative, an Environment focused (Permissive vs. Non-

Permissive) alternative, and a Task focused (Stabilization vs. Reconstruction) alternative.

A Diplomacy focused approach to R & S planning, coordination and implementation is a status quo option that retains the Department of State-led, interagency approach of NSPD-44. This approach emphasizes and relies on the diplomatic capacity of the USG to ensure an effective response to crisis requiring R & S operations. Unfortunately, the Department of State is grossly under-resourced for the task at hand. This situation has routinely resulted in military assumption of DoS responsibilities in order to achieve stated USG objectives. To ensure required capabilities are resident in the civilian sector of the USG, the Administration will have to work with Congress to significantly expand the resources (personnel and funds) available to the Department of State. Without a significant reprioritization of assets to enhance the capacity of the Department of State, this is not a feasible policy alternative.

An Environment focused approach to assigning responsibility for R & S planning, coordination and implementation recognizes the significant difficulty the Department of State encounters when attempting to prepare for and execute R & S operations in a non-permissive environment. Six years after the inception of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the U.S. runs 12 of the 25 PRT in Afghanistan. The teams are staffed by officials from the Departments of State, Agriculture and Treasury, in addition to military personnel. They are intended to support the development of a more secure environment in the provinces; to facilitate cooperation between the Afghan government, civilian organizations and the military; and to strengthen the Afghan government's influence through interaction with sub-national political, military and community leaders.

Unfortunately, the Department of State has struggled to recruit civilians who are willing to fill positions in non-permissive environments. Rebuilding security forces, establishing correctional facilities and judicial systems, rebuilding the private sector and developing institutions of government are essential stability tasks that should be undertaken by civilian authorities; however, in accordance with DODI 3000.05, the military will assume responsibility in the absence of required civilian capacity. The skill sets resident in the Department of Defense may not be optimal for all R & S tasks, but the military can provide its own security while operating in the most challenging, non-permissive environments.

If this alternative is selected, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) would become a Deputy Assistant National Security Advisor for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) staff would be incorporated into the National Security Council staff. It would support Department of State planning, coordination and implementation of R & S operations in permissive environments. The staff would support Department of Defense planning in the event R & S operations are to occur in a non-permissive environment.

A Task focused approach allocates responsibility for planning, coordination and implementation of stability operations to the Department of State and the Department of Defense by the function they are most likely to encounter and best able to execute. The common challenges associated with R & S operations are exacerbated by two major gaps that consistently plague the implementation of these operations: (1) the failure to quickly move to stabilize a country and begin reconstruction and (2) the failure to provide sufficient resources and personnel, guided by a strong mandate at the mission's

outset. Once the mission deploys, there is a limited window of opportunity to establish law and order, to promote effective, representative governance, to provide essential services, and to begin showing progress on economic and social reconstruction. However, most missions face critical personnel and resource shortages at the outset and fail to meet civilian staff and force requirements for at least six to nine months. The window of opportunity normally closes long before an operation is fully staffed and resourced.

One of the lessons from our experience in Iraq is that, while military personnel can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world, the same is not true of U.S. government civilians. While the Department of States has people with the skills needed for effective reconstruction and development endeavors, they must be drawn from existing jobs, causing gaps in other operations. There is no capacity for DoS to surge other than to reprioritize manpower requirements and neglect other work.

In contrast, the Department of Defense is generally able to get a military force to a threatened area quickly. That force may actually already be on site, operating in the aftermath of conflict. In post-conflict occupations, the senior military commander is effectively a military governor. His force has the personnel, equipment and specialized capabilities necessary to immediately take action to begin stabilizing the affected country. Formally assigning the Secretary of Defense responsibility for planning, coordinating and implementing the USG stabilization effort will promote more effective military planning across the phases of a conflict and facilitate the State Department's follow-on foreign assistance and reconstruction initiatives.

If this alternative is selected, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) would become a Deputy Assistant National Security Advisor for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) staff would be incorporated into the National Security Council staff. It would support Department of Defense planning, coordination and execution of operations designed to stabilize the situation on the ground. It would also support Department of State planning, coordination and execution of long-term reconstruction.

The options for situational leadership of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction presented above are all feasible; however, each one requires reorganization within the Executive branch or commitment by the Congress to facilitate effective stability operations. Of all the options available, retaining the Department of State-led, interagency approach of NSPD-44 would eliminate any impression internationally that American foreign policy is dominated by the Department of Defense or that it has been “militarized.”

Conclusion

There is an inescapable reality. The Department of Defense has capacity that does not exist anywhere else in the U.S. government. Whether DoD likes it or not, it is and will continue to be an essential enabler for American foreign policy responses to crisis across the spectrum of conflict. DoD must be prepared to support other government departments and agencies, but it should not be surprised when it is required to lead reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Until recently, military leaders have generally lacked enthusiasm for stability operations and possessed neither the formal training for nor experience in these areas. Today, the military has made great strides, but it has not fully embraced SSTR operations. Until the Department of

Defense internalizes its responsibilities as articulated by DODI 3000.05, stability operations will lack the civil-military cohesion, flexibility, and responsiveness necessary for success early in the effort (the first three years of the stability operation).

“The current imbalance between funding and authority [for post-conflict reconstruction] undermines efforts to build civilian capacity and creates inefficiencies.”⁸⁰ The general lack of civilian resources will demand that the military continues to play a larger and larger role in the non-military facets of reconstruction and stabilization operations. “If the problems on the civilian side of crisis management cannot be solved, we will begin to see a realignment of authorities between the Departments of Defense and State. Some would argue that this realignment has already begun.”⁸¹ Continued Congressional unwillingness to allocate resources to facilitate an effective foreign policy leadership role for the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development will eventually cement responsibility for reconstruction and stabilization operations in the Department of Defense.

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