Intelligence in Vietnam and Iraq: Lessons Unlearned
Abstract
Most aspects of U.S. strategic and operational difficulties in the present Iraq War can be traced in some measure to problems in understanding and using strategic and operational intelligence. The primary rationale for the war posited by the George W. Bush administration predicated on the possession by Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction established an intelligence controversy immediately. Subsequent U.S. strategic and operational difficulties during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the ensuing Iraqi counterinsurgency were, in part, due to manipulation and misuse of strategic intelligence and to inadequate intelligence support for the type of unconventional war being fought. This paper examines the last major unconventional war fought by the United States, Vietnam, and how use or misuse of strategic and operational intelligence affected the rationale and conduct of that conflict. Examined through the lens of three specific aspects of intelligence assessment of the operational area (rationale for war, nature of war and measuring war progress) it becomes clear that many of the same errors that complicated U.S. efforts in Vietnam were replicated during the Iraq operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA518420
Entities
People
- Roy F. Unger Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College