Defining Afghanistan Policy and Risk -- America's Achilles Heel
Abstract
War is a failure of diplomacy to bring about a resolution to disagreements between actors. Since the attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States has based the policies and objectives of the nation on a conventional Army strategy. Since 2003, the policies and objectives of the nation have relied on military counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Unfortunately, as only a single instrument of national power, the military cannot effectively address the current impact of globalization on insurgency's tactics of provocation, intimidation, protraction, and exhaustion beyond the defined area of operation in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda. In the face of a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the change of pace continues to accelerate, the current strategy cannot succeed without a long-term detrimental impact on the force. This paper will explore the use of COIN strategy to address the effects of globalization as they apply to Afghanistan. In addition, it will offer some foreign policy recommendations that the United States can enact to balance its commitment to the War on Terrorism and the effects of protracted combat on the United States Army.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 22, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA518423
Entities
People
- Reginald L. Sikes Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College