Korea, the Never-Again Club, and Indochina
Abstract
Much has been written about the American military's cautious approach to the use of force in the post-Vietnam era. Journalists and academics have noted that contrary to stereotypes of the military as eager to employ American troops abroad, the military of the 1970s and 1980s has been a conservative, at times even restraining, influence on American foreign policy. A number of senior military officers have argued that U.S. troops should not be committed to combat unless certain conditions hold. Clear objectives should be established, public support should be relatively assured, and commanders should be given the freedom and forces necessary to accomplish their mission before the public tires of American involvement. When it comes to the use of force the United States should either bite the bullet or duck, but not nibble. The current conservative approach to the use of force is not, however, an entirely new phenomenon. Such sentiments certainly appear to be more universally shared now than before America's frustrating involvement in Southeast Asia, but what Samuel Huntington termed the military's "pacifist attitude" has been characteristic of earlier episodes in American history as well. This examination of the spring 1954 deliberations over intervention to save the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in French Indochina shows that the impact of the Korean War was, to some degree at least, a precursor of the military's post-Vietnam thinking concerning the use of force. Especially in retrospect, the Korean War came to be regarded by the military as precisely the type of costly and indecisive conflict to be avoided in the future.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1987
- Accession Number
- ADA518550
Entities
People
- David H. Petraeus