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THESIS

**LEVERAGING RURAL AMERICA IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM IN AMERICA
THROUGH THE USE OF CONSERVATION DISTRICTS**

by

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March 2010

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**LEVERAGING RURAL AMERICA IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
IN AMERICA THROUGH THE USE OF CONSERVATION DISTRICTS**

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ABSTRACT

A vast, untapped resource is available to the federal government and the Department of Homeland Security in the war on terror. The citizens that comprise rural America have long been ignored by the efforts to wage the war on terror, and have been told, along with their urban counterparts, that the government would wage the war on terror, not citizens. Homeland Security's message of vigilance in the war on terrorism and of prevention, mitigation, and recovery after terror events and natural disasters is not taking root in rural America because the communication methods are not effective. Terrorists are increasingly targeting rural America and using rural America for operational support and training. The special demographics, skills and abilities of rural Americans warrant further consideration by the Department of Homeland Security as a front on the war on terror.

The findings and recommendations of this research advocate the creation of a domestic intelligence-gathering network, which utilizes the nation's 2,946 local conservation districts to interact with rural citizens. Conservation districts, as a unit of local government, occupy a unique place in their local communities due to their non-regulatory nature. As a result, they have a high degree of trust in their local communities. Conservation districts would forge a partnership with rural Americans and state fusion centers for information gathering purposes. Intelligence analysts would analyze that information at the state fusion center and use it to support the war on terror. In this way, the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. intelligence community could leverage rural America as a force multiplier.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

C/ACAMS	Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System
CIC	Canadian Intelligence Community
CIKR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMT	Emergency Medical Technician
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GIS	Geographic Information System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HIFLD	Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data
HSIN	Homeland Security Information Network
HSNTP	Homeland Security National Training Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HSSLIC	Homeland Security State and Local IC of Interest
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
iCAV	Integrated Common Analytical Viewer
IC	Intelligence Community
LE	Law Enforcement
MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
NASCA	National Association of State Conservation Agencies
NASS	National Agriculture Statistics Service
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
NOC	National Operations Center
NRCS	National Resources Conservation Services
NRDP	National Rural Development Partnership

OCIPEP	Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
PCII	Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
RDPC	Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium
RIN	Rural Information Network
RL	Rural Lens
RS	Rural Secretariat
RSS	Really Simple Syndication
SAR	Suspicious Activity Reporting
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SBU	Sensitive but Unclassified
TELINT	Telemetry Intelligence
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WSCC	Washington State Conservation Commission

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This thesis is dedicated to my two daughters, Jaidyn and Jozi. It is my sincere hope that this small contribution to homeland security will serve to make the world a little safer for you both.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A strategy that seeks lasting strength.

(Jenkins, 2006, p. 157)

An alternative strategy, more consistent with American tradition, would have been to reduce public fear through a different style of communication and governance and by more actively engaging citizens in their own preparedness and response. Such a strategy would attack the terror, not just the terrorists. This approach would have seen the administration working closely with the legislative and judicial branches to increase security without trespassing on liberty. It would aim at preserving national unity. In sum, it would be a strategy that seeks lasting strength.

(Jenkins, 2006, p. 157)

The federal government does not provide homeland security. Citizens do.

(Jenkins, 2006, p. 157)

If you are talking about who is responsible for homeland security, my feeling is we all are.

(S. Trefry, personal communication, September 8, 2009)

Rural America has long been ignored in the efforts to wage the war on terrorism. While “rural” can be defined in many ways, even a conservative definition puts the number of Americans who live in rural areas at 17 percent of the entire U.S. population—50 million people, (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 30), “living on 80 percent of the land” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 6). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has underserved rural America and told Americans as a whole that the government would wage the war on terrorism, not citizens. The special demographics of rural America warrant further consideration by DHS as a front in the war on terrorism. Conservation districts, as a unit of local government, occupy a unique place in their local communities due to their non-regulatory nature and can be leveraged

by DHS as a force multiplier. Homeland Security's message of prevention, mitigation, and recovery after terror events and natural disasters is not taking root in rural America because communication methods are not effective. Homeland security for all Americans would be strengthened by an effective communications and education campaign implemented through a partnership with the nation's 2,946 local conservation districts. "The best way to increase our ability as a nation to respond to disasters, natural or man-made, is to enlist all citizens through education and engagement, which also happens to be a very good way to reduce the persistent anxieties that afflict us. We have not done this" (Jenkins, 2006, p. 156).

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Rural America has been largely ignored by the federal government in its effort to wage the war on terrorism. The DHS has underserved rural America and told Americans as a whole that the government would fight the war on terrorism, not citizens. The special demographics of rural America warrant further consideration by DHS as a front in the war on terrorism. Further, DHS's message of prevention, mitigation, response and recovery after terror events and natural disasters is not reaching rural America because the modes of communication it uses are not effective in rural America.

Rural America is where terrorists can and do plan, prepare, and execute attacks, yet it is less than a full partner in the fight against terror. Rural America consists of up to 80 percent of the land mass of the United States, an area too large for law enforcement from which to gather intelligence information, without help (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). Yet, the trust relationship between rural Americans, the federal government, and law enforcement has deteriorated. As a result, rural Americans generally have an intense dislike and distrust of the federal government, and this hinders the government's ability to engage rural America in the war on terrorism.

Funding for rural initiatives is meager compared to their urban counterparts. For fiscal year 2007, DHS allocated a combined total of \$182 million in cooperative and interagency agreements to design and deliver first responder training programs to federal,

state, local and tribal jurisdictions (Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security National Training Program (HSNTP), 2007). On the other hand, also in fiscal year 2007, DHS allocated just \$11.6 million for the same training in rural communities by creating a Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium (RDPC) through Eastern Kentucky University (Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security National Training Program (HSNTP), 2007). Based on a population of 50 million, that adds up to roughly \$4.31 per rural resident. Further, the RDPC is designed for rural first responder training, so grant funds are not allocated to rural citizens themselves, only to rural first responders.

Rural communities also have unique emergency management needs that typically do not exist in metropolitan areas. These include the identification of property addresses for properties that encompass multiple acres and multiple structures, the storage of hazardous chemicals, fuels and pesticides in outbuildings, the presence of livestock and farm animals, and complex water, irrigation and feed storage systems.

The meager attempts DHS has made to communicate with rural Americans have been ineffective. Current disaster and terrorism-related educational programs designed to reach the rural population (*Citizen Corps*, *Neighborhood Watch*) are unsuccessful because they do not communicate effectively to rural Americans. Further, rural Americans have an aversion to the use of technology, specifically the Internet, as a communication device. State and federal agencies increasingly rely on the Internet as their primary means of public information dissemination, and as a result, communication with rural America is crumbling.

Americans traditionally are self-reliant, yet altruistic. “Self-reliance, reinforced by mutual assistance, is a fundamental American virtue” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). Rural survey respondents consistently value helping their neighbors, getting along, and working together to solve problems (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). However, Americans increasingly rely on the government to respond to the needs of victims of the disasters and terrorist events. Americans are losing their ability to be self-reliant and take care of themselves. This places an unnecessary strain on the government’s preparation, response and mitigation systems for disasters and terrorism

events. Rural Americans, though, understand that help may not be coming to them immediately after a disaster. They understand that local services may be too far away to respond or overwhelmed when they do respond (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 25). Rural America is accustomed to limited resources and government assistance, and reliance on themselves and their neighbors.

The U.S. government has not fully engaged rural America in the war on terror. As a result, citizens are not prepared, natural resources not protected, and DHS resources are being spent and used ineffectively. Efforts to engage rural America must take into account the unique characteristics of the vast rural areas and their populace. Successful partnership efforts with local conservation districts can result in the overall increase of American homeland safety and security.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is can rural America be leveraged to provide intelligence support to America in its fight against terrorism and in natural disaster prevention, response, recovery and mitigation? In seeking to answer this question, this thesis addresses a second set of questions.

- What role can landowners, farmers, rural people, and conservation districts play as collectors of intelligence information in the war on terror?
- What trust and privacy issues exist between rural Americans and the federal government, and can those issues be overcome so that rural Americans can become full partners in the war on terror with the federal government?
- Can conservation districts train rural Americans to prepare, respond, mitigate and recover from terrorism and natural disasters, and if so, how can it be done cost-effectively?
- Can conservation districts use their existing structure for communicating with local landowners to establish an effective means of collecting intelligence information related to terrorism and natural disasters, and if so, would this use of conservation districts be valuable to DHS?

- Would a program that allows rural landowners to disclose hazardous materials or dangerous conditions on their land voluntarily to conservation districts for use by emergency responders (firefighters, police, (Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), Red Cross) in times of terror events and natural disasters be useful and cost effective?
- If rural Americans do not use the Internet as their primary form of communication or their primary source of information, what do they use, why, and how can DHS access this and use it to communicate or disseminate information effectively about terrorism and natural disasters to rural Americans?
- Are rural Americans willing to help in the war on terrorism, and if so, what would motivate them to do so and are there any privacy rights, laws or other concerns that might hinder their involvement?
- What gaps exist in rural America that need to be filled before rural America can be involved in the war on terrorism?

C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This thesis serves to renew the relationship between rural America and the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). It fills a gap in the literature related to rural America's role in the war on terrorism and effective disaster planning, mitigation, response and recovery efforts. It seeks to sharpen the focus on where best to allocate scarce resources to prevent terror attacks and provide information to first responders. This thesis explores the relationship between rural Americans and the local government agencies they work most closely with on a daily basis.

This research serves as a starting point for further exploration of collaborative efforts between rural and urban populations. It adds a new operational capability to the IC and take advantage of relationships that already exist to fill gaps in information collection and gathering efforts in rural America. It seeks to link federal, state, and local information collection efforts in a practical and effective way to produce real results on the ground.

The consumers of this research are local governments, law enforcement agencies, rural Americans, and the IC.

Homeland security practitioners and leaders are to gain an understanding of how rural Americans can assist in the war on terrorism and in disaster planning, mitigation, response and recovery efforts.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on using rural America in the war on terrorism and effectively aid in the prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery from natural disasters is nearly non-existent. Studies that directly address this research question (i.e., “first tier” studies) cannot be found. The scant literature that does exist seems to have been created for some other purpose than analyzing whether rural America can be integrated into homeland security, and if so, how that can be done. In other words, the only literature that seems plentiful is “second tier” literature—relevant information that does not directly address the same topic.

The problem seems to be that academia or the government has made little to no effort to combine the two areas of study. Most of the literature appears to be based around studies of rural America in general, attempts to define it, categorize it, and study it for its demographics, socio-economics, and to understand its nature. Similarly, most literature on the war on terrorism does not relate back to rural America and is generally divorced from making all but the most cursory relational connections to rural America, instead focusing on urban population centers and the war on terrorism. This focus on urban centers is understandable since the 9/11 attackers chose New York and Washington, D.C. as their targets, arguably the two most important urban centers in America. As a result, the literature that connects rural America to the war on terrorism is sparse, highly generalized, and limited in scope.

However, there does seem to be ample literature on discrete aspects of the question of increasing the use of rural America in the war on terrorism. That literature centers mostly around rural law enforcement and first responders, although studies connecting terrorism and terrorist activities to rural America also appear to be on the rise.

These studies and reports are generally more credible sources than news articles or other media as they are devoid of bias, opinion and speculation and are subject to peer review and comment.

Generally, most of the literature involving rural America falls into five categories: (1) reports, studies, and statistical compilations of information about rural America gathered by federal, state, and local governments; (2) reports and studies of rural America commissioned by governmental agencies but authored by non-profit surrogate entities, universities, or colleges; (3) reports authored by or submitted to legislative bodies on the federal and state level dealing with the war on terrorism; (4) media articles and publications on rural America and the war on terrorism; and (5) plans, procedures, policy documents and pamphlets written by and for local governmental agencies that deal primarily with how those agencies interact, communicate, and serve rural America.

Some governmental reports, studies, and statistical complications from the government are over a hundred years old (Census Bureau information, mainly), while others are current, up-to-date reports used in a variety of on-going governmental entitlement programs. Most of the rural studies and reports authored by non-profit entities deal with targeted research questions or issues that governmental agencies need answered to administer some portion of their program. Reports submitted to legislative bodies dealing with the war on terrorism and rural America generally are critiques of the efforts to wage the war against terror, outlines of current threats to America, or delineate successes in the war on terrorism. Media articles and publications contain the most current and expansive analysis of topics related to rural America and the war on terrorism. Finally, governmental plans, procedures and policy documents are generally recent in nature (post 9/11) and provide direction in operations and planning for local governmental agencies charged with either assisting rural America or addressing the war on terrorism and disaster response, planning, mitigation or recovery efforts, or some aspect of both directives.

Perhaps at the outset the most important aspect of this research question is the definition of “rural.” While “rural” can be defined in many ways, even a conservative definition puts the number of Americans who live in rural areas at 17 percent of the entire U.S. population—50 million people (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 30). America is much less problematic to define and generally not considered an issue. However, not many sources define rural, and the sources that do so vary widely. Some sources never define this term, believing, maybe, that the term is clear. Therefore, for those that do not define this term, it is unknown exactly what they mean when they use it.

Establishing a definition of rural is akin to trying to hit a moving target. Dictionary definitions invariably include some aspect of living in the country or tie the definition to agriculture (Random House, 2009). The federal government uses many different definitions, often depending on the parameters of grant programs. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 has a definition of “local government,” which includes “rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity” (Homeland Security Act of 2002). For the general public, a Web site is even dedicated to determining if a user is “rural” for purposes of federal programs (Rural Assistance Center, 2008). It is not uncommon to receive both affirmative and negative responses when using the Web site, depending on which government program is being asked the question.

The three most widely used rural definitions are based on administrative boundaries (United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) rural development programs), land use concepts (Census Bureau), or economic concepts, including “commuting areas” (Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008). They are all subject to considerable variation for socioeconomic characteristics. Typically, “urban” is defined first and whatever is left constitutes “rural.”

Some researchers find it useful to define rural America further into three different categories, loosely based on economics: amenity-rich areas, declining resource-dependent areas, and chronically poor communities (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007). Such categorization of rural America is useful in targeting appropriate resources, grant monies, educational campaigns, and terrorism investigations. For

example, amenity-rich areas must ensure the successful integration of newcomers and long-term residents, while chronically poor communities focus on breaking the cycle of poverty (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007).

Beyond definitional issues, rural America has long been ignored by the efforts to wage the war on terrorism. The DHS and the federal government as a whole should draw on the unique characteristics of rural America to assist in the fight against terrorism. Differing geography, population fluctuations due to tourism, limited access to specialized equipment and resources (HAZMAT), international border boundaries, equipment and staffing shortages, and communications all pose unique challenges to rural America (Strugar-Fritsch, 2003). However, most of the literature documenting these unique rural characteristics has come about through an analysis of rural first responders' needs (Strugar-Fritsch, 2003). While many parallels exist between rural responders' needs and rural America in general, there are differences, not only in population and scale, but also in the focus and purpose of the studies and analysis of the needs of rural first responders.

On the other hand, at least one recent study shows there are factors unique to rural America that makes its citizens less prepared for disasters and terrorists events. Rural America is older, has less formal education, earns less and is increasingly populated by minorities; Hispanics in particular. As the study of preparedness by the Council for Excellence in Government shows, people "aged 65 or older are significantly less prepared than younger people," adults with little high school education "are less prepared than those with a high school diploma or more education, those making \$40,000 a year or lower are less likely to be prepared," and "Hispanics are less likely to be prepared than white or African-Americans" (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006).

Studies by non-profit organizations show that rural Americans generally have an intense dislike and distrust of the federal government. Further, they have an aversion to the use of technology, specifically the Internet, as a communication device. Perhaps the most comprehensive compilation of information related to rural America comes from the USDA's census of agriculture (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2008). The

USDA, through the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) conducts the census every five years, going back to the over 150 years to the 1840 census. The census was conducted by mail the entire time.

Rural or farm usage of computers and the Internet is significantly less than the average population. In 2003, 62 percent of households had personal computers and Internet access (Day, Janus, & Davis, 2005), compared to just 39 percent of farmers (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2002). Further, governmental Web sites related to disaster preparedness have been shown to generate low rates of usage among all Americans (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006).

Studies show that rural residents prefer communication through their established networks (Dollisso & Martin, 2001). In one study, over 60 percent of the participants reported that the Internet was the least used source for agricultural information, and that overall, participants preferred to use magazines, neighbors, radio, and local Extension Services for information (Dollisso & Martin, 2001).

Further studies show that privacy and the credibility of the government agency making contact with the rural population are key elements in successful communication between the government and rural America (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999). If a governmental agency lacks credibility within the rural community, or is seen as wanting private information without a valid reason, the communication shuts down (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999). A 2003 *Citizen Corps* survey asked what would be the best way for an organization to provide information about disaster preparedness. In the national survey, regular mail was the most common response (41 percent), followed by TV or radio (24 percent) and local newspaper (15 percent)—only 6 percent indicated that the Internet was the best way to provide information (Citizen Corps, 2005, p. 12).

State and federal agencies increasingly rely on the Internet as their primary means of public information dissemination, and as a result, communication with rural America is breaking down. Rural America is not receiving preparedness information and the homeland security message from DHS.

In congressional testimony, governmental agency reports, and presidential directives, the federal government acknowledges that domestic terrorism in rural areas and targeting rural areas is on the rise (Lewis, 2005). The agriculture, livestock, and food infrastructure in America is increasingly seen as a target for terrorists among governmental agencies (Daniels & Coates, 2001). Reports document malicious and terrorist attacks using food as a delivery system in the United States and abroad (Daniels & Coates, 2001).

Further, case studies of domestic terrorist cells show that terrorists often use rural areas as bases or training grounds as it is easier to hide their activities in sparsely populated rural areas (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), while statistical investigations commissioned by governmental agencies show that terrorists are increasingly using local, rural communities as a base to conduct operations (Smith, 2008).

In local governmental publications and outreach materials, it can be shown that rural Americans understand that help may not be coming to them immediately after a disaster (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006). Pamphlets, manuals, and other outreach materials exist to educate rural Americans on how they could plan for, mitigate, respond to and recover from natural disasters and terrorist events (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006). However, there are few, if any, materials directed towards recruiting rural Americans to help in the fight against domestic terrorism.

The literature available related to the question of integrating rural America into the war on terrorism is sparse, fragmented, and uncoordinated. Various levels of government, governmental agencies, universities, and non-profit organizations have produced a wide amount of information that needs to be gathered together to provide an overall picture of the possibilities of matching rural America with DHS efforts in the war on terrorism. Most of the literature that exists consists of high quality studies and statistics without any link between rural America and the war on terrorism.

E. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH/FURTHER QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis focuses on a gap that exists in the U.S. IC with regard to domestic intelligence collection and coordination efforts in rural America. It uses conservation districts as an intermediary between the IC and rural America. Conservation districts are known and trusted by rural Americans. Districts, their supervisors, and staff could be leveraged to repair and enhance the relationship between the federal government and rural America. The research for this thesis focused on the local and state level, but more research could be done on a nation-wide basis to gauge the efficacy of this proposal.

Furthermore, other avenues for reaching rural America could be explored. The Cooperative Extension System Offices of the United States Department of Agriculture's National Institute of Food and Agriculture could be integrated into this effort. The Extension Service is the educational arm of the Department of Agriculture. One or more experts who provide useful, practical, and research-based information to agricultural producers, small business owners, youth, consumers, and others in rural areas and communities of all sizes staff their offices. The Extension Service is significantly different from conservation districts in a number of ways: they have no field staff, fewer local offices, have a regional focus across state lines rather than local focus, and their employees work directly for the federal government rather than a local government entity. However, the Extension Service has a wealth of information, knowledge, and understanding about the demographics and issues of rural America that could be accessed to enhance this proposal further. This line of research warrants further investigation.

F. METHODOLOGY

1. Research Design

This thesis question involves the use of conservation districts (local, non-regulatory state governmental entities) to assist in information gathering and collection in rural America related to the planning, mitigation, response and recover efforts concerning

natural disasters and terrorism. The scope of this research is limited to assessing these conditions in Washington State, and further research can entail a nation-wide investigation.

Two research methods were used to collect data. The first method employed the qualitative collection of data from seven subjects who represented managers, supervisors, landowners, farmers and senior management of conservation districts, state conservation associations, national conservation associations, and those who interacted with the aforementioned on a regular basis. The second method used was an on-line survey of supervisors, landowners and farmers associated with conservation districts.

The interviewees and survey respondents were chosen as they could provide information about the efficacy of this thesis and the ability of conservation districts to execute the proposed action (i.e., act as gatherers and collectors of information). They were asked about their involvement in the war on terrorism and natural disasters, their opinions about both of those topics, their degree of trust in the current intelligence gathering community, and the value of this area of research. Interviewees were chosen in an effort to provide qualitative data, while survey respondents were chosen in an attempt to gather a broader range of data.

2. Population

The population for this thesis consisted of managers, supervisors, landowners, farmers and senior management of conservation districts, state conservation associations, national conservation associations, and those who interacted with the aforementioned on a regular basis. Conservation district supervisors are elected to serve on the boards of conservation districts. Three of the five board supervisors must be owners of farms. Districts cover an entire state, both urban and rural areas. All interviewees and survey respondents were from Washington State. Interviewees were subject matter experts who consisted of four staff members of the Washington State Conservation Commission (WSCC), two conservation district supervisors who were also landowners, and one manager of a conservation district. Three of the four staff members for the WSCC also

hold elected or appointed positions on the Board of the National Association of State Conservation Agencies (NASCA). The on-line survey was sent to 95 conservation district supervisors in Washington State. Of those 95, 33 completed the survey (35 percent). All survey respondents who started the survey finished the survey.

Interviewees and survey respondents were recruited through a network of relationships established by the author as a staff member of the WSCC and the conservation districts existing in Washington State. Interviewees were contacted to participate in this research through e-mail, telephone, and personal contact. Survey respondents were contacted through e-mail for participation in the on-line survey. The interviews and the survey were conducted during the fall of 2009.

The WSCC and the conservation districts work closely together to further natural resource conservation in Washington State. Both entities work with landowners, farmers, and ranchers to achieve their conservation goals. Neither the WSCC nor the conservation districts are regulatory agencies, but seek rather to assist landowners, ranchers and farmers in complying with local, state, and federal laws and regulations.

3. Instruments Used in Data Collection

Two instruments were employed to collect data for this research. One instrument was an interview. The interview consisted of 20 questions (see Appendix A for a copy of the interview questions). The target audience was managers, supervisors, landowners, farmers and senior management of conservation districts, state conservation associations, national conservation associations, and those who interacted with the aforementioned on a regular basis. Interviewees came from across Washington State. The interview questions were designed to assess the involvement and trust that these persons have in their systems, duties, and responsibilities as they related to the war on terrorism, disaster response, and their interaction with the homeland security IC. The interview questions asked participants to rate their agreement in their agency's/jurisdiction's ability to perform operations and interactions with the IC. There were three main areas of inquiry: duties, information exchange, and trust. The inquiry into duties sought to determine what

activities a conservation district could be involved in or currently involved in related to homeland security. The inquiry into information exchange, collaboration and communication sought to investigate the current state of information exchange and collaboration between conservation districts, local law enforcement, and homeland security agencies, and to identify any obstacles that might exist to that exchange. The inquiry into trust sought to assess trust issues among the government (federal, state, local), rural private landowners, and conservation district staff and supervisors who were members of their own rural communities. Interview questions differed slightly in diction and tone for conservation district directors, supervisors, and managers versus farmers, ranchers and landowners.

The other instrument was a survey. The on-line survey was sent to respondents across Washington State. The survey consisted of ten questions (see Appendix B for a copy of the survey questions). The target audience was conservation district supervisors (who were also landowners in the area) and managers. The survey tool was designed to assess the involvement and trust that these persons have in their systems, duties, and responsibilities as they related to the war on terrorism, disaster response, and their interaction with their federal, state, and local IC. The survey asked participants to rate their agreement in their agency's/jurisdiction's ability to perform operations and interactions with the IC. The survey was sent electronically through an on-line service (SurveyMonkey.com).

4. Data Collection Procedures

The purpose, scope, and conditions of participation of the research were explained to all participants. The researcher explained to interviewees that they would be audio taped and the results of the interview transcribed so that interviewees may be quoted directly. All interviewees agreed to the conditions of participation. Interviewees were sent a copy of the transcription by e-mail for verification of accuracy. No transcript was returned by a participant for more editing. All interviews were conducted at the interviewee's place of business, at their convenience. Survey respondents were greater in number than interviewees in an attempt to gather a broader range of data. Survey

responses were kept anonymous and no identifying question was asked of the respondents. Interviewees were recruited through a currently established network of relationships established by the researcher as a staff member of the WSCC and the conservation districts that exist in Washington State. Interviewees were contacted through e-mail, telephone and personal contact for recruitment. All interviews were conducted in person by the researcher, except for one conducted telephonically. Prior to each interview, informed consent was given for the interview and the tape recording of the interview by all interviewees. Survey respondents were contacted by e-mail only through a public e-mail listing of conservation district supervisors and managers. E-mails were sent asking them to participate in the survey, and to log onto the survey Web page on SurveyMonkey.com.

5. Analysis of Data

Both the interviews and the survey were synthesized in the author's analysis of this thesis research. Interview responses and survey results are cited throughout this thesis to provide the data from which arguments are made. Generally, a number of different points can be deduced from summarizing the results of the interviews and survey.

- *The recognition of the unique non-regulatory nature of conservation districts.* Conservation districts, while a local division of state government, have no regulatory powers over their constituents. Districts serve and assist those farmers, ranchers and landowners within their boundaries with their natural resource conservation needs. This gives districts a unique place in their communities, between those who regulate (other government agencies) and the regulated (the public). The placement of conservation districts between these two parties allows for districts to serve as agents of information exchange for communication purposes, and allows districts to interact beyond information exchange with both parties to implement natural resource conservation practices. This creates a wealth of trust between the districts and the government agencies, and the districts and the public. The districts strive to serve the public by assisting the public with the regulatory agencies, and this in turn, creates trust.
- *The need to maintain privacy when it comes to private rural landowners, ranchers and farmers.* Conservation districts have built relationships between themselves and those they serve by maintaining their confidentiality and privacy interests to the extent allowed by law. If rural Americans and private landowners were called on to assist in information

gathering efforts, that privacy must be maintained for their voluntary participation in such a program.

- *The need to conduct more training and informational meetings on the nature of the terrorist and natural disaster threat to rural areas.* A high level of denial of the possibility of any terror threat in rural areas exists, yet there was recognition that more information is needed to have a better understanding of the nature and likelihood of the threat. Most rural communities are very integrated and vigilant to new developments in their area, but would need some further direction on what to report and to whom when it comes to homeland security. Further, recognition that rural private landowners are an important part of infrastructure protection exists given the large amount of land they control.
- *The need to support rural areas with more funding to effectuate more interaction, dialogue, training, and information exchange among rural Americans and government at all levels with regard to homeland security information.* Conservation districts are almost entirely dependent on grant funding to conduct their operations, and this hampers their ability to create and maintain programs over the long term. Further, districts in rural areas have even more limited funding than their urban counterparts, yet rural districts are called on to serve their communities in a broader range of areas than urban districts.
- *The recognition that conservation districts could provide information and training to their constituents in the course of the duties already provided.* Conservation district supervisors and staff are already out in the field contacting farmers, ranchers and landowners in remote areas that can participate in a formal program to exchange suspicious activity information. They already provide services during times of natural disaster, including preparation, mitigation, and recovery. Depending on the type of information exchange system created, districts can implement such an information gathering system with minor adjustments to their current functions and methodologies. While responding to disasters is nothing new for districts, taking a more active role in homeland security is. That new role might cause concern among the supervisors and staff of district and it is necessary to address those concerns. In addition, district staffing issues might be a concern given the type of program created.
- *A need exists to provide high quality training and information to rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about dangerous conditions or hazardous materials possibly on their property.* Ranchers and farmers typically employ the use of pesticides and herbicides during the course of their operations, and not all have the information to use, dispose, or secure those materials safely.

- *It is recognized that law enforcement in rural areas is limited in resources and that creates gaps and other areas that terrorists and criminals might exploit.* While some concern exists about becoming directly involved in the apprehension or confrontation of criminals and terrorists in rural areas, it is recognized that observable events can be reported more frequently, easily, and effectively if a trusted, local collector of that information exists.
- *The need to maintain traditional modes of communication between the government and the public in rural areas.* While increased use of electronic media is occurring (i.e., the Internet) to communicate, the total reliance by government agencies on Web sites to communicate with the public is not effective at generating trust between the government and the rural public. Farmers and ranchers continue to use traditional means of obtaining information (newspapers, radio, and television), in addition to using the Internet among the younger generation. Web sites are seen as useful for communicating mundane information about programs, but not for generating trust of the kind that needs to exist for valuable information exchange between the communicators.
- *A need exists to ensure proper protocols and systems are in place for the collection, use and dissemination of any information obtained from private, rural landowners, farmers and ranchers.* Having protocols in place for the collection, use and dissemination of information from rural Americans establishes confidence in the system created, and thereby, creates more trust among those using it.
- *A need exists to identify clearly what homeland security is, how it applies to rural areas, and who is responsible for it.* Providing that information to rural Americans can serve to bring clarity to the roles and responsibilities of homeland security practitioners in rural areas, and build confidence and understanding among the rural population.

II. DEFINING RURAL AMERICA

A. THREE MAIN DEFINITIONS

Establishing a definition of rural is akin to trying to hit a moving target. Dictionary definitions invariably include some aspect of living in the country or tie the definition to agriculture (Random House, 2009). The federal government uses many different definitions, often depending on the parameters of grant programs. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 has a definition of “local government,” which includes “rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity” (Homeland Security Act of 2002). For the general public, there is even a government Web site dedicated to determining if a user is “rural” for purposes of federal programs (Rural Assistance Center, 2008). It is not uncommon to receive affirmative and negative responses when using the Web site, depending on which government program is being asked the question.

The three most widely used rural definitions are based on administrative boundaries (United States Department of Agriculture rural development programs), land use concepts (U.S. Census Bureau), or economic concepts, including “commuting areas” (Office of Management and Budget); (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 29). All definitions are subject to considerable variation for socioeconomic characteristics. The typical method to define rural is to define “urban” first, and whatever is left constitutes “rural.” Historically, the nation has often viewed rural America as a “residual.” In population statistics, for instance, the rural population is what is left over once the cities are counted” (Drabenstott, 2002, p. 2). For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 depicts a graphical depiction of the size and scope of the Census Bureau’s definition of “rural” using nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties.

Nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties, 2003




Figure 1. Non-metropolitan and Metropolitan Counties meeting the Census Bureau Definition of “Rural.” (From: Economic Research Service, 2004).

B. EFFECTS OF THOSE DEFINITIONS ON POLICY

Some researchers find it useful to define rural America further into three different categories, loosely based on economics: amenity-rich areas, declining resource-dependent areas, and chronically poor communities (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007, p. 4). Such categorization of rural America is useful in targeting appropriate resources, grant monies, educational campaigns, and terrorism investigations. For example, amenity-rich areas must ensure the successful integration of newcomers and long-term residents, while chronically poor communities focus on breaking the cycle of poverty (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007, p. 4). Further refinement of a definition of rural America allows the targeted application of national policy initiatives to be implemented by the most effective means.

Regardless of refining the definition of rural, the choice of one's definition of the term brings with it the possibility of great variance in numbers. If, as some claim, "[t]he share of the U.S. population considered rural ranges from 17 to 49 percent depending on the definition used" (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 29), that variance has great implications for public policy. Implementing a public policy initiative involving 50 million people versus 150 million people involves assigning greater time, effort and resources to the task.

C. DEFINITION FOR PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS

For purposes of this thesis, the term "rural" is defined using the most conservative definition available—utilizing all three concepts and combining the two most well known definitions of rural—the USDA's administrative definition and the OMB's economic concept. This results in a calculation of 17 percent of the U.S. population (50 million people) as "rural" (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 30). Even using this very conservative definition, rural America is large and "new pressures from globalization, demographic shifts, migration, landscape transformation, and resource limits are reshaping rural life. Fifty million people live in small towns and rural communities—17 percent of the nation's population, living on 80 percent of the land" (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 6).

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III. A RURAL INFORMATION NETWORK

The harvest is plentiful, but the workers are few.

(The Bible: New International Version, 2006)

A. DEFINITION

The Rural Information Network (RIN) is a knowledge management and information sharing system, created either entirely new or by modifying existing systems. The RIN focuses the efforts of rural Americans on the collection of information for processing by trained intelligence analysts, who “harvest” the information channeled to them for use in fusion center products and dissemination to the U.S. Intelligence IC. In this way, rural America becomes a force multiplier for the DHS in the war on terrorism.

The RIN operates by having individual, private landowners or rural Americans voluntarily supply information to their local conservation district staff and supervisors who then input that information into a secure database for transmittal to a central point (a state fusion center) for analysis. Conservation district staff and supervisors possess training in the collection of information themselves, and in the operation of the RIN database. Information communication methods include face-to-face personal interactions, telephone calls, text messages, e-mails, and other forms of communication. Figure 2 illustrates the communication pathways of the RIN. The information is then processed and exploited by trained analysts at state fusion centers for production and distribution to DHS and state and local customers.




Figure 2. The Diagram of the RIN Connections.

The RIN collects information from all points in rural America and channels it to conservation district staff and supervisors. Staff and supervisors, rather than traditional intelligence analysts, are in the field on a daily basis. They do not spend a lot of time in the office. As such, they are in a unique position to know the community, their neighbors, the landscape and the infrastructure that exist in rural America.

A stakeholder group is established to set requirements and product deliverables. The RIN creates an on-going communications cycle between rural America and the IC, allowing for a continuous dialogue and true communication to occur. This serves to rebuild the trust relationship between the federal government, the IC, and rural America.

The RIN is designed to meet the new asymmetric terrorism threat to America, which requires that the IC create and use new domestic intelligence methods and sources. By leveraging rural America in domestic intelligence efforts in the war on terrorism through partnership with a division of local government (conservation districts), the IC can more readily meet this asymmetric terrorism threat. The war on terrorism requires the IC to employ new methods of collection and to alter its information-sharing paradigm. Rural America is an ever-increasing battleground in the war on terrorism, and the IC must

find new methods to engage rural Americans in this fight. If DHS can leverage rural America in the fight against terror, then it can have additional sets of eyes and ears up to at least 17 percent of the American population—50 million people (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008). The RIN can be newly created or modified from existing systems to meet the needs of rural America and DHS. It can connect with the IC through fusion centers and the DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) portal.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: *National Preparedness* (HSPD-8) and the *Interim National Preparedness Goal* set forth policy directives for preparing to meet the challenges of terrorist events and natural disasters (Homeland Security Directive 8: National Preparedness, 2003; Interim National Preparedness Goal, 2005). The capability-specific priority in HSPD-8 that the RIN most directly meets is 3.2.1: information sharing and collaboration to enable effective prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities; not just for terrorism, but also for natural disasters. Priority 3.2.1 acknowledges, “[e]ffective terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts depend on timely and accurate information” about terrorists and their operations, targets, and methods (Interim National Preparedness Goal, 2005, p. 12). By “collecting, blending, analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis,” homeland security is enhanced (Interim National Preparedness Goal, 2005, p. 13). This effort is to be undertaken horizontally within the federal government and vertically between the federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector. However, while HSPD-8 recognizes that citizen involvement is paramount in the war on terrorism, the limited avenues that DHS has created for citizen participation are largely ineffective (*Citizen Corps, Neighborhood Watch*) concerning information collection efforts.

B. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

This section analyzes the use of rural America in the war on terrorism through the seven phases of the intelligence cycle as it applies in the RIN. In the contexts of the RIN, this section examines those components of the intelligence cycle that are functional, those that need reworking, and how that reworking can be accomplished.

The seven elements of the intelligence cycle are (1) identifying requirements, (2) collection, (3) processing and exploitation, (4) analysis and production, (5) dissemination, (6) consumption, and (7) feedback (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55). Figure 3 displays the intelligence cycle. The RIN focuses the efforts of rural Americans on the collection of information for processing by trained intelligence analysts. As such, it is primarily involved with the collection slice of the intelligence pie.



Figure 3. The Intelligence Cycle. (From: Directorate of Intelligence).

1. Identifying Requirements

Identifying requirements is the process by which types of intelligence are collected and then those policy areas that need intelligence are determined and prioritized (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55). Prioritizing must be done because resources are limited. Policy areas are typically prioritized based on perceived level of threat or an importance versus likelihood analysis (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 58).

Generally, in the war on terrorism, the federal government has set intelligence requirements through a variety of strategy documents, presidential directives, and congressional actions that filter down to the state and local governments. Rural America

is acknowledged by the federal government as a target for terrorists, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considers eco-terrorism to be the number one domestic terrorism threat (Lewis, 2005), and eco-terrorists are targeting rural America. Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front attacks include targeting fur farmers, forestry services, federal land, meat packing plants, lumber facilities, and other rural locations (Lewis, 2005). Further, Homeland Security Presidential Directive #9 recognizes that “America’s agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks” (News Releases: The White House, 2004). The Food and Drug Administration has “long understood that our public food and water supplies are among the most likely avenues for terrorist threats” (Daniels & Coates, 2001, p. 3).

While the RIN would focus the efforts of rural Americans on collection of information for processing by trained intelligence analysts, it would also serve to re-focus the identification of intelligence requirements from urban to rural America. DHS directives and strategy documents generally acknowledge that some state and local governmental policy choices (i.e., the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources) also contribute to the identification of requirements. Rural America, through its local and state government representatives, has been given the opportunity to contribute to the setting of requirements related to rural areas. While rural American residents typically have an idea of the kinds of threats they are facing, they sometimes need additional information from the state and federal government to prioritize needs in their area properly. Sensitive infrastructure or a key resource might exist in their area that is secret or otherwise non-disclosed. Differing geography, population fluctuations due to tourism, limited access to specialized equipment and resources (i.e., HAZMAT), international border boundaries, equipment and staffing shortages, and communications all pose unique challenges to rural America (Strugar-Fritsch, 2003), and impose unusual information requirements on those responsible for intelligence in their communities.

Further, while information typically flows well horizontally between levels of government when setting requirements, gaps exist in the information flowing vertically

due to the inability of the national government to communicate effectively with local governments and rural America. In addition, rural Americans and local governments generally have a long-term view of requirements and the needs of their communities while state and federal governmental representatives have shorter time spans associated with their requirements.

2. Collection

Collection is the process of producing raw information (not intelligence) that can be used by intelligence analysts after it has undergone processing and exploitation. Many different collection disciplines or INTs exist: MASINT (Measurement and Signatures Intelligence), HUMINT (Human Intelligence), SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), COMINT (Communications Intelligence), TELINT (Telemetry Intelligence), and OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 107).

Collection is likely the area of the intelligence process in which rural America can make the greatest contribution, specifically in OSINT and HUMINT, and to a lesser extent, GEOINT and MASINT. The RIN would be most effective in these areas.

Rural Americans have a high degree of physical and social interconnectivity within the areas they live. As collectors of information, they can provide information about unusual activity and unfamiliar persons in their communities. Terrorists are increasingly using local, rural communities as a base to conduct operations. A National Institute of Justice (NIJ) study found that “committing an act of terrorism will usually involve local preparations” (Smith, 2008). Further, almost half (44 percent) of all terrorists examined lived within 30 miles of their targets (Smith, 2008). This has great implications for eco-terrorism, which has already been noted to affect rural America inordinately and to be on the rise. The NIJ study acknowledged that much of the terrorist conduct is not necessarily criminal in nature, but “early intelligence may give law enforcement the opportunity to stop the terrorists before an incident occurs” (Smith, 2008).

Rural America, by its very nature, is keenly aware of local issues, critical infrastructure and key resources necessary for the nation's security. Due to their connection to the land, rural Americans have a greater stake in issues that affect them locally than urban populations, which are highly mobile and transitory, while rural Americans are not mobile and have invested in their land and communities.

The RIN involves the use of conservation districts to collect and gather information, either directly through their own staff or in conjunction with rural Americans. Conservation districts are a local government structure familiar to and accessible by rural Americans easily utilized to communicate with and gather information from rural Americans. Their structure consists of a network of over 2,946 conservation districts and nearly 15,000 men and women who serve on their governing boards (National Association of Conservation Districts). Conservation districts are local units of government established under state laws to execute natural resource management programs at the local level (National Association of Conservation Districts). Districts work with millions of cooperating landowners and operators to help them manage and protect land and water resources on all private lands and many public lands in the United States (National Association of Conservation Districts). Districts "share a single mission: to coordinate assistance from all available sources—public and private, local, state and federal—in an effort to develop locally-driven solutions to natural resource concerns" (Sims, 2007). Conservation districts are already involved in a number of programs concerned with disaster preparedness and mitigation, have technical expertise to operate in rural areas, and are trusted and respected by rural Americans (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006).

Conservation districts could also help landowners who wish to participate voluntarily to collect information related to a variety of hazardous or dangerous materials or substances on their property (fuel, explosives, heavy equipment, animals, retaining ponds, weapons and ammunition, and structures (homes, barns/outbuildings)). District staff can collect operational information, such as reporting on congregations of vehicles or persons at the end of back roads or piles of shell casings or other materials left behind

by training operations in remote locations. Individual landowners and farmers could voluntarily provide tactical information, such as reporting the locations of propane tanks, ammonium nitrate, anhydrous ammonia tanks, fertilizer storage facilities, or water pumping infrastructure. Local incident commanders can then have immediate access to that information during natural disasters or terror events involving that land or area. Not only is such information useful for prevention purposes, but also for response during times of natural disaster or terrorist events.

The RIN can enhance intelligence capabilities by increasing the ability to manage the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector on a continual basis, especially in rural areas. A state fusion center can analyze any information collected and gathered at the local level by the conservation districts, share that information, as appropriate, with local law enforcement, businesses and rural community members, and disseminate that information through reports, situational awareness bulletins, and other products. Through the relationships developed by the RIN, the fusion center can define rural intelligence customers and assess their needs, develop a network capable of obtaining intelligence in an unclassified form to nontraditional customers, such as state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector, and integrate applicable non-law enforcement disciplines into intelligence analysis and information sharing processes. The RIN can encourage the removal of impediments to information sharing within the IC, and the establishment of a need-to-share versus a need-to-know culture for all data. This effort is voluntary on the part of rural individuals, landowners, farmers and ranchers. Local law enforcement, as partners with the fusion center, benefit by increased and enhanced reporting of suspicious activities and circumstances, vetted through trained conservation district staff, supervisors, and fusion center analysts.

The RIN can enhance counter-terrorism investigation and law enforcement capabilities by increasing their capability to deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, apprehend, and prosecute suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security by increasing the amount of actionable information and evidence collected. Law

enforcement benefits by the exponential increase in capable “eyes and ears” of members of the rural public in reporting and watching out for suspicious circumstances and behavior, in areas previously unavailable to law enforcement. The RIN fosters collaboration and cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement to investigate and resolve incidents and investigations by breaking down the stovepipes of jurisdictional boundaries between urban and rural areas and involving a greater number of rural citizens in the prevention and detection of terrorism. The RIN raises the awareness of rural citizens to terrorism, terrorist activities, plans, tactics and threats. It enhances the readiness and capabilities of state, regional, tribal, and local operational teams, law enforcement agencies, and key non-law enforcement homeland security disciplines in rural areas through the education and training for rural citizens. Rural citizens add to the resources that law enforcement can draw from to combat terrorism.

It is essential that American citizens be a part of the joint intelligence effort to combat terrorism. The failure to include them in a meaningful way in the war on terrorism does not achieve unity of effort. “U.S. intelligence must learn more about American institutions as partners while seeking to educate the American people about intelligence” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198). Further, the success of domestic U.S. intelligence efforts relies on “the forging of a deep partnership with the American nation” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198).

A typical American citizen likely needs some education and training in the art of information collection, but that does not mean that the IC or DHS should not undertake this effort. “The essence of intelligence success in the homeland is voluntary cooperation...” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 208). If Americans properly understand the new terrorism threat America faces and possess a few rudimentary tools to deal with it (i.e., knowledge in disaster preparation and information gathering), then they are more than willing to cooperate voluntarily in the war on terrorism. “Much of the U.S. public, now under increasing threat, supports U.S. intelligence” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 214).

This voluntariness is the key to addressing the privacy considerations as well. The more cooperation and trust built into the IC, not only internally among its own agencies,

but also externally among its clients, the more the American public allows it to do its job. “The sharpest weapon... [is] a citizen imbued with patriotism, independence, and free will” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 215) and one that has a clear understanding and appreciation of the nature of the threat America faces in the war on terrorism.

3. Processing and Exploitation

Processing and exploitation means the deconstruction of the information received and re-packaging of it into useful intelligence. The technical expertise that conservation district staff have related to crop rotation, water usage, and natural resources are helpful in processing and exploitation involving MASINT and GEOINT data. Conservation district staff and supervisors require training in the collection and documentation of this kind of information, but they are already familiar with the collection of this kind of information and technologies associated with it. Conservation district staff regularly interprets satellite imagery, GIS data, sensor data (water usage, temperature, soil moisture, etc.) in their daily duties.

4. Analysis and Production

Analysis and production is the domain of the trained intelligence analyst as it involves combining the raw data into a written document that summarizes its meaning and makes conclusions. The reports and tips generated or collected by district staff can be collated by trained intelligence analysts in each state.

5. Dissemination

Dissemination is the process of “moving the intelligence from the producers to the consumers” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 62). Having the information come into a single analyst in a state fusion center keeps costs to a minimum while maximizing the utility of the information gathered by those in the field. A precedent for this kind of staffing at fusion centers does exist, as some centers have non-law enforcement liaisons (Jackson, 2009, p. 68).

6. Consumption

Consumption refers to the actual use of the intelligence by the end-user; generally, the concern is with how the information is consumed and whether it is presented to the consumer in a useful way. Again, trained analysts can be used to ensure requirements are being met. Information can flow back from the fusion center to the conservation districts and local law enforcement with minimal security clearance requirements, ensuring the broadest possible dissemination of threat information.

7. Feedback

Feedback is, ideally, a continual cycle of communication between the IC and the policy community (those who set the requirements) with the policymakers giving direction to the IC on what is working and what needs to be improved. As noted above, the key to successful feedback is continuous, open and two-way communication between the producers and the consumers. Feedback in this situation can be difficult due to the large numbers of collectors, but products can be crafted for broad dissemination, similar to N.Y.P.D.'s S.H.I.E.L.D. Appendix C reflects the author's proposed product for intelligence dissemination under the RIN.

Some might argue that rural American's should just join *Citizen Corps* Councils (<http://www.citizencorps.gov/>) and actively engage in emergency services activities, rather than create a new structure involving conservation districts assisting them in information gathering. *Citizen Corps*, however, does not actively engage in information gathering efforts, but rather in emergency preparedness efforts. It urges its volunteers to be personally responsible for participating in "crime prevention and reporting," but limits training to "taking classes in emergency preparedness, response capabilities, first aid, CPR, fire suppression, and search and rescue procedures" (*Citizen Corps*). Further, some rural "people are really leery about the government" and prefer to "step up to the plate on their own terms and participate without having to gain someone else's trust in the government" (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). They can use a local government contact familiar to them (conservation districts), rather than have to

build a relationship with a new organization (Citizen Corps). DHS should not exclude a large segment of the population because they do not want to become formally involved with the federal government. Further, *Citizen Corps* purportedly serves 78 percent of the total U.S. population (Citizen Corps), but a close review of the information supplied by *Citizen Corps* shows that the councils closely mirror the major population centers of the states and are mostly councils “in name only” without any further local connection to their communities except for state-wide activations. Conservation district staff, on the other hand, are based in every county, parish, or local governmental entity across the nation, regardless of population center (urban and rural), and furthermore, their staff actively travel the countryside making daily contacts with private landowners, farmers, and others in their communities. They are much more closely connected to local rural communities than *Citizen Corps*.

Currently, the DHS encourages the reporting of “suspicious activity” using their Web site to leave a tip for the FBI (Report Incidents). Most rural Americans are not comfortable involving the federal government in something in their local area (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). However, if a local contact point exists with whom they are comfortable interacting they are much more likely to make that report or voluntarily allow access to their land to gather information or conduct surveillance (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Information communication methods can include face-to-face personal interactions, telephone calls, text messages, e-mails, and other forms of communication (meetings, workshops, etc.). The RIN can be designed to allow for multiple methods of reporting suspicious activity by rural citizens, similar to how urban citizens can make reports using a variety of formats familiar to them (i.e., texting, e-mail, postings on Internet social media sites, telephone, and personal contact. Conservation district staff and supervisors pass that information along to the fusion center for further analysis and production.

Any new organization designed to collect domestic intelligence must be acceptable by the public (Jackson, 2009, p. 9). Using conservation districts to gather raw data from rural Americans does not create any new significant structure. Educating rural

America about rudimentary information collection methods and providing specific, targeted training for conservation district staff members is all that is needed. Conservation districts have worked hard to generate and maintain a high level of “institution based trust” with their constituents—trust in the districts themselves (Jackson, 2009). By providing training to them and instituting an effective public relations campaign to allay any fears members of the public might have about that training, rural Americans and district staff members can become another set of eyes and ears in the war on terror. As one manager noted, “districts could be in a position, as neighbors out in the country, in more rural-populated districts, to be those eyes and ears or help promote eyes and ears” (M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009). The success of domestic U.S. intelligence efforts relies on “the forging of a deep partnership with the American nation” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198), and “the truth is, the collection and analysis of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies” (Loyka et al., 2005, p. 6).

C. PURPOSE OF THE RIN

The RIN is designed to address many different issues and shortcomings with the federal government’s current policy towards rural America. The RIN targets scarce resources to rural America so it can serve as a force multiplier in the war on terrorism. It creates a dedicated communications link between rural America and the Department of Homeland Security, thus allowing the Department’s message to get through to rural America. It serves to combat terrorists who are using rural America, a part of America particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack. It serves to bring relief to overwhelmed rural first responders, law enforcement, and firefighters, many of whom serve in multiple capacities at the same time. It serves to strengthen the U.S. border by reaching those rural border areas, and supplement current information collection and intelligence systems. Finally, the federal government can look toward Canada for effective models that integrate rural citizens into homeland security policies.

1. Resources Are Scarce and Rural America Could Be a Force Multiplier in the War Against Terrorism

If mobilized through targeted, effective education and training programs, rural Americans can be a great asset to DHS in preventing, mitigating, and recovering from disasters and terrorist events. “We need to increase preparedness by educating and mobilizing all Americans to participate in homeland security” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 153). Americans traditionally are self-reliant, yet altruistic. Rural survey respondents consistently value helping their neighbors, getting along, and working together to solve problems (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 17). DHS should put the powerful traditions of self-reliance and resiliency to work in the war against terrorism as “[s]elf-reliance, reinforced by mutual assistance, is a fundamental American virtue” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). “Strong traditions of self-reliance and individualism prevail in rural places, and they are coupled with very high levels of trust and civic engagement, particularly in the Heartland” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 4).

However, Americans increasingly rely on the government to respond to the needs of victims of disasters or terrorist events. “By making homeland security a purely Washington affair, the Government was signaling that it would take responsibility for both security and response. Instead of promoting self-reliance, the government encouraged dependency” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). Americans, in general, are losing their ability to be self-reliant and take care of themselves. This places an unnecessary strain on the government’s preparation, response and mitigation systems for these events. A more prepared public relieves this pressure, as citizens are better able to defend themselves when confronted by terrorists or help themselves or others in times of disasters. Rural Americans understand that help may not be coming to them immediately after a disaster. “For those of us living in rural communities, it is especially important that we be prepared because community services are often limited and local responders—like police, fire personnel, and medical facilities—may be many miles away, or quickly overwhelmed by the scope of a major disaster” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 25).

“Public education is the first step toward strengthening ourselves. We need more than Homeland Security Web sites and Government Printing Office pamphlets; we need to aggressively educate the public through all media, in the classrooms, at town halls, in civic meetings, through professional organizations, and in volunteer groups” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). However, the federal government’s main avenue of educating its citizens in disaster preparedness and terrorism events is through FEMA’s (Federal Emergency Management Agency) *Citizen Corps*. While such training in first aid, disaster response and mitigation, and terror psychology is necessary, it is far from adequate for the war on terrorism. *Citizen Corps*, while serving as the umbrella organization for a number of different citizen engagement initiatives (*USAonWatch/Neighborhood Watch*, *The Fire Corps*, etc.) does not fill the leadership role of coordinating citizens in rural America for information gathering purposes. While *Citizen Corps* acknowledges, “we all have a role in hometown security,” few actual security measures and initiatives exist in most of its programs (The National Office of Citizen Corps–FEMA Community Preparedness Division). Most of its programs revolve around preparation, mitigation, response and recovery efforts related to natural disasters and terrorism. *Citizen Corps* asserts that there are currently 2,403 Councils that serve 225,985,904 people or 79 percent of the total U.S. population” (The National Office of Citizen Corps–FEMA Community Preparedness Division). However, *Citizen Corps* has no definition of “serve.” No matrix exists for measuring how 79 percent of the U.S. population is served. There is little to no drive to engage the public, let alone the rural public, in domestic information gathering efforts.

The America government has tried to engage its public in prior information gathering efforts, most notably with *Citizen Corps*’ Operation TIPS in 2002. Concerns raised by Operation TIPS were many, ranging from lack of openness to lack of oversight (Cavoukian, 2003). Operation TIPS was doomed from the start as ill-marketed, and ultimately, unsupported by senior leaders in the administration. America still needs an effective means to engage its citizens, particularly in rural areas where resources and other means of information gathering are limited.

In the war on terror, America needs to combat a terrorist network (Al-Qaeda) with a similar network that understands how the terrorist network operates. America needs to engage its rural citizens directly as a force multiplier in the war on terrorism with a targeted, local relationship building effort. A system constructed with local people and assisted by conservation district staff can destroy the main reason that Operation TIPS failed—the central processing of the information collected. Rather than funneling information into one central depository, the information gathered from rural Americans can go through conservation districts, be used at that level and then go to state fusion centers for assessment. Only the most relevant and important information, as determined by requirements set in conjunction with the stakeholders, can go further; even then it is disseminated back to the collectors in the form of intelligence bulletins and products.

FEMA claims that “[b]y participating in Citizen Corps programs, you can make your home, your neighborhood and your community a safer place to live” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004, p. 3). While that is undoubtedly true, a little bit of training is not adequate against the global Islamist and domestic terrorism threat America faces today. America needs to combat radical Islamic ideology with its own core American ideology of freedom, self-reliance, due process, individual rights, greater good and the pursuit of happiness.

FEMA assures the public that by passing the *Citizen Corps* training program, “credit can be provided to those who successfully complete the entire guide and score at least 75 percent on a final examination.... Those who pass the examination can expect to receive a certificate of completion....” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004, p. 4). This certification process may work well enough with first responders who need proof of training for employment purposes, but for the general public, it creates a mindset that all that is necessary is to pass the course to be prepared. It implies finality in preparation and knowledge about disasters and terror events. This undermines the training itself it is always necessary to seek new knowledge and information about how to be prepared and how to fight terrorism. It creates an instant gratification mindset that is ineffective in combating the long-term ideological fight at the heart of the war on

terrorism. Rural Americans understand the long-term and delayed gratification to reap what is sown at the right time. Rural Americans have a better understanding of the timeframe of Islamic terrorists than their urban counterparts do. This understanding makes rural Americans better able to see the indicators and warnings posed by Islamic terrorists, and thus, can make them an effective counter-force to radicalization, recruitment, and operations of terrorists in rural America.

In rural America, geographic size matters. It covers a much larger geographical area than urban areas. Even a conservative definition of rural America indicates that “17 percent of the nation’s population... [are] living on 80 percent of the land” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 6). “In 2004, about 75 percent of the 4 million miles of public roads in the United States were in rural areas (those with fewer than 5,000 residents)” (National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, 2007). Not only is it large, private landowners own most of the land in rural America. “The land surface of the United States covers 2.3 billion acres. Private owners held 61 percent in 2002, the federal Government 28 percent, state and local governments 9 percent, and Indian reservations 3 percent. Virtually all cropland is privately owned, as is three-fifths of grassland pasture and range, and over half of forestland” (Amos Eno & Dyche, 2006, p. 1). The RIN creates the circumstances to allow DHS to obtain the cooperation necessary to access the 61 percent of lands in private ownership.

Furthermore, rural America has unique needs that must be met by rural residents themselves. The differing geography, population fluctuations due to tourism, limited access to specialized equipment and resources (such as HAZMAT), international border boundaries, equipment shortages, staffing shortages, and communications all pose unique challenges to rural America (Strugar-Fritsch, 2003). Rural communities also have unique emergency management needs that typically do not exist in metropolitan areas. These include identification of property addresses for properties that encompass multiple acres; more than one structure on the property; storage of chemicals, fuels and pesticides in outbuildings; the presence of livestock and farm animals; and complex water and irrigation systems. Due to these unique needs, rural Americans understand that help may

not be coming to them immediately after a disaster. “For those of us living in rural communities, it is especially important that we be prepared because community services are often limited and local responders—like police, fire personnel, and medical facilities—may be many miles away, or quickly overwhelmed by the scope of a major disaster” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 25). However, “[b]y definition, the fastest growing parts of rural America become part of the nation’s cities—a situation like a minor league team always losing its best players to the major leagues” (Drabenstott, 2002, p. 2). This means that the best and brightest in rural America are at risk of moving into cities and metropolitan areas. This creates additional strain on rural areas.

DHS is providing funding, ostensibly to rural America, but not necessarily to rural residents, and not at the same levels as their urban counterparts. For fiscal year 2007, DHS allocated a combined total of \$182 million in cooperative and interagency agreements to design and deliver training programs to federal, state, local and tribal jurisdictions (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). “Training will be designed for and delivered to appropriate state and local personnel in emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, public safety, the private sector, nonprofits, faith-based, and community organizations” (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). However, also in fiscal year 2007, DHS allocated just \$11.6 million for the same training in rural communities by creating a Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium (RDPC) through Eastern Kentucky University (Department of Homeland Security, 2007), which amounts to roughly \$4.31 per rural resident (50 million rural residents). The RDPC is designed for rural first responder training. Grant funds are not allocated to rural citizens themselves, but only to first responders. While this is a good first step, more needs to be done. Gary Wingrove, Chair of the RDPC Advisory Board, indicates, “[o]ftentimes the training needs of rural America have taken a backseat to their urban counterparts” (Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium, 2007).

Even if funds are allocated to rural America, those funds must actually arrive to do any good. President Obama, during the 2008 election, claimed that since 2001, the USDA has distributed more than \$70 billion to rural areas through its Rural Development

program. Yet, “less than half of those funds have gone to truly rural areas. Instead, the USDA has awarded the bulk of these benefits to metropolitan regions, recreational and retirement communities, and businesses that hardly qualify as contributing to the quality of life in rural America” (Obama/Biden, 2008). “Federal funding should be aimed at improving local capacity” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 159).

American attention to its rural citizens comes primarily through the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development office, and the National Rural Development Partnership (NRDP). However, NRDP acknowledges the vision of coordinating American rural policy is “still unfulfilled” and even identifies Canada as a country that has “established structures to ensure that rural needs are considered when government policies and programs are developed” (National Rural Development Partnership, 2006). Funding continues to be a problem as Congress never fully funded the NRDP and the state councils that the NRDP uses to coordinate on a local level have fallen from a high of 40 to just 35 state councils (National Rural Development Partnership, 2006, p. 8).

2. The Department of Homeland Security’s Message Is Not Getting to Rural America

Current disaster and terrorism-related educational programs designed to reach the rural population (*Citizen Corps, Neighborhood Watch*) are unsuccessful because they do not communicate effectively to this population. Rural Americans, generally, have an intense dislike and distrust of the federal government (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Further, they have an aversion to the use of technology, specifically the Internet, as a communication device. Rather, an “awful lot of information sharing takes place at the local coffee shop” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 2009). State and federal agencies increasingly rely on the Internet as their primary means of public information dissemination, and as a result, communication with rural America is deteriorating. Further, for those who embrace new technology in rural America, they do not yet have adequate Internet coverage. “Although our metropolitan areas are

covered well with DSL, cable and fiber optics, rural areas are limited to Satellite Internet in most cases” (Thomason, 2009). As of September 2008, “[o]nly 38 percent of rural Americans have access to a high-speed Internet connection” (Depew, 2008).

Web sites are not effective at building communication relationships between the federal government and rural citizens. Rural residents prefer communication through their established networks. In one study, over 60 percent of the participants reported that the Internet was the least used source for agricultural information, and that overall participants preferred to use magazines, neighbors, radio, and local Extension Services for information (Dollisso & Martin, 2001). Similarly, small and rural law enforcement agencies shun the Internet. “[L]ess than one-third of the [rural law enforcement] agencies reported that they maintain an official home page on the Internet” (Collins, 2004, p. 5). The Council for Excellence in Government conducted a survey in 2006 and asked Americans if they had heard of two national Web sites (Ready.gov and ReadyKids.gov). “Just sixteen percent of adults say they have heard about Ready.gov at the national level and 5 percent say they have heard of ReadyKids.gov” (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006, p. 8). Perhaps the most comprehensive gathering and request for information comes from the USDA’s census of agriculture (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2009). The USDA, through the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS), conducts the census every five years, going back over 150 years to the 1840 census. The census was conducted by mail the entire time. In 2007, NASS mailed the form to all farm and ranch operators, but for the first time, allowed for the survey of agriculture to be done by farmers on-line (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2007).

Rural or farm usage of computers and the Internet continue to be significantly less than the average population. In 2003, 62 percent of households had personal computers and Internet access (Day, Janus, & Davis, 2005, p. 1), compared to just 39 percent of farmers (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2002). Further, younger people continue to use the Internet more than older people do. The problem is that rural farmers are aging. “The average age of all U.S. principal farm operators in the 2002 Census was 55.3 years

of age. This average has been more than 50 years of age since at least the 1974 Census of Agriculture and has increased in each census since 1978—usually by one year or more from one census to the next” (Allen & Harris, 2005, p. 1).

Privacy and the credibility of the government agency making contact with the rural population are also key elements in successful communication. If a governmental agency lacks credibility within the rural community, or is seen as wanting private information without a valid reason, the communication shuts down (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 4). Similarly, in a survey conducted by the NASS to gauge farmers likelihood to respond to a government agencies request for information, the NASS found that “our data clearly shows a correlation between an individual’s likelihood of responding and their attitudes toward the specific government agency conducting the survey” (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 19). In other words, effective communication depends on which agency is doing the communicating. An agency with highly regulatory duties does not receive a warm welcome from rural communities. The solution that NASS found to address this problem was education. NASS created a training program specifically directed at farmers to educate them on the mission and benefit of interaction with NASS and its work (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 21). Outreach efforts in the NASS training program consisted of “letters, brochures, and additional personal contacts to develop rapport between interviewers and farm operators, and media advertisements” (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 21). Internet Web sites were not on this list. Homeland security needs the same targeted approach to reach the rural American population.

The 2003 *Citizen Corps* survey asked what would be the best way for an organization to provide information about disaster preparedness. In the national survey, regular mail was the most common response (41 percent), followed by television or radio (24 percent) and local newspaper (15 percent)—only 6 percent indicated that the Internet was the best way to provide information (Citizen Corps, 2005, p. 12).

The problem of effective communication with rural communities needs creative solutions. As one state director of a health department noted that when a needs assessment was sent out to rural communities, it “wasn’t friendly to rural areas—it was a huge book of forms for people to fill out, and rural areas don’t really have staff that can do things like that” (Mueller, 2006, p. 13). DHS needs to establish an effective means of communication with rural America.

3. Terrorists Are Using Rural America

Part of the allure of rural America is, “like a complex sacred text or an abstract painting, rural America is open to interpretation. As a result, people as diverse as Jefferson, Thoreau, counter-culture commune builders, and the Aryan Nation have found inspiration there” (Danbom, 1997, pp. 17–18).

Rural America is not ignored by terrorists. The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) lists Al-Qaeda and other “single-issue” groups as an increasing threat to the American homeland over the next few years (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). The NIE indicates that the IC will be challenged in how it “detects and disrupts plots,” and stresses that defensive efforts “will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). The RIN is designed to help provide that greater understanding of activities at the local level.

Further, the FBI considers eco-terrorism to be the number one domestic terrorism threat (Lewis, 2005, p. 18), and eco-terrorists are targeting rural America. Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front attacks include targeting fur farmers, forestry services, federal land, meat packing plants, lumber facilities, and other rural locations (Lewis, 2005, p. 11). Eco-terrorists use a variety of tactics unheard of in urban areas, including animal releases, sabotaging construction equipment, tree spiking, pouring sand or sugar in gas tanks, and cutting hydraulic lines (Carson, 2005, p. 43). Further, terrorists often use rural areas as bases or training grounds as it is easier to hide their

activities in the sparsely populated rural areas. Examples include the Toronto 18, Portland Six, and the Northern Virginia Paintball cell (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). As DHS Secretary Napolitano has stated, “one of the things we need to do is communicate that unfortunately the terrorist threat is not just focused on New York City or Washington, D.C., or a few other urban areas. Indeed if you look at the last couple of weeks, arrests have been made in places like Minneapolis and North Carolina” (Napolitano, 2009).

In a study authored by Brent Smith, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) found that “committing an act of terrorism will usually involve local preparations” (Smith, 2008, p. 5). Further, “almost half (44 percent) of all terrorists examined lived within 30 miles of their targets” (Smith, 2008, p. 3). Smith illustrates this principle in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Distance from Terrorist Residence to Target (All Groups). (From: Smith, 2008, p. 3).

An even greater percentage (51 percent) of environmental terrorists lives within 30 miles of their targets (Smith, 2008, p. 4). Figure 5 illustrates this principle. This has great implications for eco-terrorism, which has already been noted to affect rural America inordinately and to be on the rise. The NIJ study acknowledged that much of the terrorist conduct is not necessarily criminal in nature, but “early intelligence may give law enforcement the opportunity to stop the terrorists before an incident occurs” (Smith, 2008, p. 5).




Figure 5. Distance from Environmental Terrorist Residence to Target. (From: Smith, 2008, p. 4)

4. Rural America Is Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack

According to the 2007 NIE, terrorists, and in particular Al-Qaeda, are “likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. population” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). The main infrastructure target that exists in rural America is agriculture and food supply-related systems. President Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) #9 recognizes that “America’s agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, 2004). The agriculture, livestock, and food infrastructure in America is increasingly seen as a target for terrorists. The Food and Drug Administration has “long understood that our public food and water supplies are among the most likely avenues for terrorist threats” (Daniels & Coates, 2001, p. 3). Malicious and terrorist attacks using food as a delivery system have already occurred in the United States and abroad (Daniels & Coates, 2001, p. 3). However, actual terrorist attacks are not necessary, just the threat of an attack is enough to cause panic and disrupt markets (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2001, p. 5). The agriculture/food/fiber production and processing industries are particularly vulnerable targets of bioterrorism (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2001, p. 6). Yet, while an alert farmer is the first line of defense against the spread of agricultural disease, that farmer “may hesitate to call animal health officials for fear his entire herd will be quarantined...” (Casagrande, 2001, p. 10).

5. Rural Law Enforcement Is Overwhelmed

Local police forces are tasked with being the first line of defense against rural terrorist operations. “As with many other services, however, rural areas are severely constrained by the lack of law enforcement resources. In 1999, for example, 52.4 percent of all local law enforcement agencies employed less than 10 sworn personnel while 5.7 percent employed just one sworn officer” (Foster & Cordner, 2005, p. 13).

Local police “are in the best position to monitor potential homegrown terrorists... [because] they know their territory” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 166). However, “[r]ural police are first responders to a wider variety of concerns than are urban police and consequently have additional channels for gathering information” (Weisheit & Wells, 2001, p. 10). Similarly, in some cases in remote communities, a conservation district’s responsibility “may move over into some activities that we would think of as more governmental that a county or a city or even a sheriff’s department may get engaged in” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 2009). However, “out in the country, law enforcement takes a long time to get there” and the response may be limited (W. F. Hendrix, personal communication, October 5, 2009).

Another area of increasing concern is gangs in rural areas. “Specifically, gangs were more likely to be reported in nonmetropolitan [rural] areas experiencing economic growth” (Weisheit & Wells, 2001, p. 4). Gangs, their affiliates, criminal networks and gang indoctrination methods are on the rise in rural areas. In one study, most rural jurisdictions reported that the majority of gang members are local youth. “However, in many jurisdictions the impact of imported gang members was substantially greater than their numbers alone would suggest, because they became an important conduit for the movement of ideas and symbols into these areas” (Weisheit & Wells, 2001, p. 8). This suggests that radicalization, as urban radicals and terrorists expanding into rural areas may influence a similar process to gang induction and membership rather than local rural people becoming gang members and radicalizing on a local level.

The changing nature of rural America also brings with it other challenges for rural law enforcement. For instance, there is an influx of new immigrants into the rural population (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007, p. 4). These new immigrants are primarily Hispanics, but other groups are represented (e.g., Hmong). Integrating these new immigrants into rural America is essential to combating possible radicalization. If the new immigrants are alienated by their attempts to integrate into rural America, they are at higher risk for disaffection and radicalization by Islamic terrorist supporters and other terror groups.

Not only does rural law enforcement suffer from a lack of resources, small departments and multiple mission demands, a “rural paradigm” exists that prevents rural departments from acknowledging possible terrorist activities in their area (The Council on State Governments, 2005, p. 23). The Council on State Governments found that “state officials face many unique challenges in working with local agencies in rural areas. The two most prevalent issues raised by state officials stem from this “rural paradigm.” Those issues include a lack of immediate concern by local law enforcement (“it can’t happen here”) and a lack of personnel and resources to participate in state-level efforts” (The Council on State Governments, 2005, p. 23).

6. Rural Time Perspective

In their book, *The Time Paradox*, Philip Zimbardo and John Boyd discuss the war on terrorism as “a war on time perspectives” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). They delineate two types of future time perspectives: mundane and transcendental. The mundane future goals are those that can be achieved in a person’s or society’s lifetime. On the other hand, “[t]he transcendental future time perspective extends from the death of the physical body to eternity” (Zimbardo, 2008, pp. 172-173). Zimbardo and Boyd posit that Germany and Japan were defeated in World War II “not by destroying people but by destroying people’s plans for the future” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). By destroying both countries’ plans for world domination (mundane future goals), both lost their “motivation to fight and agreed to surrender” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183).

In the war on terrorism, however, America’s primary adversary, Al-Qaeda, has hopes that “lie squarely in the transcendental-future” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). Destroying the mundane future goals of Al-Qaeda “ensures that transcendental-future goals alone are obtainable” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). If the mundane future goals are destroyed, all that remains for Al-Qaeda is the transcendental future. So, “[w]hile the West looks to new strategies that can turn the tide of war next week, next month, or next year, this adversary plans for the distant future” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 184). Apparently recognizing this, John McCain famously said during the 2008 presidential campaign that American troops might remain in Iraq one hundred years in direct opposition to Al-Qaeda

training, recruiting and motivational efforts (Corley, 2008). “The West worries about troop level next year. Al-Qaeda worries about the next century” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 184). Zimbardo and Boyd conclude this argument by asserting, “the war on terrorism is a battle between the United States government’s vision of the mundane future and the vision of the transcendental future held by those who are its enemies. Short-term victory is unlikely when the adversary is planning for eternity” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 184).

Al-Qaeda has repeatedly shown a much greater time perspective during the war on terrorism than the American government. The quintessential example of this is the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by Ramzi Yousef, nephew of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and the span of eight years between the September 11, 2001 attacks. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared war on America. Later that same year, the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are bombed, and in 2000, the U.S.S. Cole is bombed. In contrast, during the first Gulf War in 1990–1991, it took the U.S. just over six months to conduct that entire campaign. The main invasion of the 2003 Iraq war by U.S. forces took just over three months, notwithstanding ongoing efforts to rebuild the nation and pacify the insurgency.

Rural America has a much longer time perspective than urban America, and in that regard, is similar in nature to Islamic fundamentalists. In a study conducted of 8,000 rural Americans in the fall of 2007, over 70 percent of the respondents indicated that they had lived in rural America for more than 10 years (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). The study also found that “almost two-thirds of respondents in chronically poor [rural] counties said they have lived in the area for their entire lives” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 15). Moreover, 55 percent of respondents indicated that at least one parent grew up in that same area (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). Rural America’s largely agrarian, family oriented lifestyle lends itself to being the antithesis of modern, urban America.

While “rural America tends to look backward instead of forward—at what it has lost instead of what it might gain” (Drabenstott, 2002, p. 2), this perspective can help the federal government in the war on terrorism. Rural Americans have a similar time

perspective as Islamic terrorists, and therefore, a better understanding of the mindset of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists than their urban counterparts. The unique understanding of time perspective that rural America has makes rural Americans better able to recognize the indicators and warnings posed by Islamic terrorists, and thus, can make them an effective counter-force to radicalization, recruitment efforts, and terrorist operations in rural America.

In his book, *From the Terrorist's Point of View*, Fathali Moghaddam asserts that a tension exists between globalization and local group identification among individuals (Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, 2006, p. 30). Western cultures have had many more years to adapt to globalization changes than Eastern cultures and many Islamic nations (Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, 2006, p. 30). This tension causes identity conflict and strife for individuals who cannot adapt quick enough, and leads to the path of terrorism (Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, 2006, p. 30). This conflict is nowhere more evident in America than in rural America. Rural America is increasingly under pressure from global economic forces seeking to dominate local, rural identities. "Globalization is changing the rural economy; agriculture and low-skilled manufacturing are no longer key drivers" (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 3). As such, rural Americans have a unique understanding of the problems and forces at work that push individuals toward those first few steps in the "staircase to terrorism" (Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, 2006). Rural Americans, much more than urban Americans, have an understanding of the same forces that push Islamic youth towards terrorism.

"Too often, our understanding of terrorism is shaped by one frantic media event after another, all focused on short-term goals" (Moghaddam, *How Globalization Spurs Terrorism*, 2008, p. preface X). The federal government should shift its focus in the war on terror from the short-term time perspective to a long-term time perspective. It should investigate the use of rural America in the war on terrorism to combat radicalization, recruitment efforts, and terrorist operations among American youth. To "better

understand why terrorist behave the way that they do” (Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View, 2006, p. 2), America should make use of all of its citizens as a resource in the war on terrorism, not just those in major urban centers.

7. Current Information Collection and Intelligence Systems

The primary means DHS uses to gather intelligence from the American public is through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). DHS touts HSIN as a “comprehensive, nationally secure and trusted Web-based platform able to facilitate Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and international partners” (Homeland Security Information Network, 2009). HSIN allows various levels of government and private industry to collaborate in major urban areas. It provides “real-time, interactive connectivity between states and major urban areas and the National Operations Center (NOC),” and has five major mission areas (Intelligence and Analysis, Law Enforcement, Emergency Management, Critical Sectors, and Multi-Mission Agencies) (Homeland Security Information Network, 2009). HSIN has an impressive list of capabilities, including: 24/7 availability; document libraries; instant-messaging tools; Web conferencing; incident reporting; situational awareness and analysis; geographical visualization; announcements; discussion boards; task lists; calendars; Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds; and online training materials (Homeland Security Information Network, 2009). HSIN also has a nomination process by which membership and access to the system is granted. DHS has further refined HSIN with creation of the Homeland Security State and Local IC of Interest (HSSLIC). The HSSLIC is a “structured, charter-governed community of intelligence analysts at the federal, state and local level” which uses a restricted access virtual work area that is “protected by two-factor authentication and facilitates collaboration” (Homeland Security Information Network, 2009).

HSIN was “[b]uilt to enable collaboration through the use of Web-based technology, HSIN facilitates collaboration among the various states, territories, the National Capital Region, and major urban areas” (Homeland Security Information Network, 2009). Its stated purpose is to focus only on metro/urban areas. As a platform to

interact with rural America, HSIN is too complicated and tries to be too many things for too many customers. HSIN's nomination process may add some additional security to the system, but it also serves as a barrier for the collection of information from sources who might not want to become members. Those sources would have to be vetted and their information investigated under a system that does not have a membership requirement, but at least their information can be included in the collection process.

The iCAV application is also part of the HSIN. iCAV stands for Integrated Common Analytical Viewer. It is a "secure, Web-based, geospatial visualization tool that integrates commercial and government-owned data and imagery from multiple sources." iCAV allows users to view and analyze infrastructure data using a geographic information system. Access is granted through a username and password protocol. The iCAV system uses a special dataset ("HSIP Gold") that contains information from the 18 critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) sectors. The HSIP Gold dataset may be requested through the Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data (HIFLD) Working Group.




Figure 6. iCAV Screen Shot. (From: Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

iCAV uses a special dataset from which its maps are derived. That dataset has a national focus and is limited to 18 sector-specific CIKR's. The Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Data (HIFLD) Working Group manages that dataset. While the HIFLD asserts it was created to foster the development of infrastructure information across "multiple levels of government," the HIFLD membership consists entirely of federal agencies (Welcome to the The Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HIFLD) Working Group). Further, HIFLD meetings "focus primarily on different national-level and defense critical infrastructure sectors..." and are not inclusive in state or local participation as "parallel sessions and communications at SECRET or higher [information classification] levels are conducted as necessary" (Welcome to the The Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HIFLD) Working Group).

In 2005, it was noted that "[i]ntelligence support to the homeland security community below the federal level is largely non-existent due to classification issues" (Jardines, 2005, p. 12). In 2008, security clearances still posed problems for the FBI, DHS, and state and local law enforcement (Eack, 2008). In 2010, reducing the amount of classified intelligence is a work in progress, and there is currently at least one bill before Congress (H.R. 553) addressing this issue (GovTrack, 2009). The RIN can eliminate this problem by collecting voluntary, open-source information. The RIN can focus more on local issues and information and encompass the collection of information not only on CIKR, but also on terrorists themselves. It also does not discourage local participant as it can be designed specifically for the use of local government and private entities.

iCAV is also integrated with C/ACAMS. C/ACAMS is the Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System. It is directed at state and local first responders and allows them to map their own data, as well as to develop their own response and recovery plans based off the CIKR data they collect or is provided to them. Access to C/ACAMS is through a password-protected protocol after initial training by first responders in the use of the system. Data used by C/ACAMS is exempt from public disclosure by the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program.




Figure 7. C/ACAMS Screen Shot. (From: Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

C/ACAMS is the most promising program to perhaps modify or integrate with the RIN. It has information privacy protocols to protect the disclosure of information provided to it for use in making CIKR protection plans. Protecting privacy is a high priority for rural Americans. While C/ACAMS allows for rural first responders to create their own plans, it does not allow private landowners or others access to do so without some sort of documented CIKR homeland security responsibilities. Another obstacle is the higher level of training required to use C/ACAMS due to the self-service nature of plan creation.

DHS also publishes a “Department of Homeland Security Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report” (DHS Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report, 2009). The Report is a daily summary of “open-source published information concerning significant critical infrastructure issues. Each Daily Report is divided by the critical infrastructure sectors and key assets defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan” (DHS Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report, 2009). However, the DHS Daily Report has little to no intelligence analysis published in the report, no connection to the articles analyzed in the report to current possible terrorist threats, nor analysis of the information itself for trends, indicators or warning intelligence. Further, the Daily Report is organized by infrastructure type/sector, rather than on any geographic or regional boundary. While this might be useful for sector-specific threats, it hinders the analysis of cross-sector, regional,

or geographic threats or intelligence that might exist. Other knowledge management systems outside of DHS exist (see the U.S. Coast Guard's Citizen Action Network (CAN)), but further research is necessary.

The current selection of DHS information collection and intelligence systems is inadequate to meet the needs of the asymmetric domestic terrorism threat in rural America. A database system that allows information to be pushed in from various sources (individuals, landowners) to a central point for analysis and that could pull information from those sources can be both flexible and unobtrusive. By focusing on just two different but complementary areas of knowledge management, the RIN can be easy to manage and use.

8. Lessons Learned from Canada

Canada has created a unique model for interaction with its rural population, and America should adopt this model. America should adopt the Canadian model of focused attention and interaction with its rural citizens for use in domestic information gathering efforts in the war on terrorism.

Brian Jenkins' statement, "[t]he federal government does not provide homeland security. Citizens do" (Jenkins, 2006, p. 157), applies equally well to the Canadian government as to the American government. The Canadian government understands that statement, but the American government does not. America, through its DHS and the IC, has largely ignored its citizens, especially in rural America, in the fight against domestic terrorism. The war on terrorism requires the IC to employ new methods of information collection and to alter its information sharing and collecting paradigm. Rural America is an ever-increasing battleground in the war on terrorism, and the IC must find new methods to engage rural Americans in this fight.

Both America and Canada have large rural areas. The vast majority of land in Canada is considered rural. Similar to America, any land not classified “urban” in Canada is typically defined as “rural.” (Mendoza & Johnson, 2009). In Canada, 32 percent of the 33 million in total population live in non-urban areas, or about 10.5 million people (Statistics Canada, 2009).

Similar to America, rural areas in Canada are used and targeted by terrorists. “Eco-terrorist strikes against the Canadian oil industry were the country’s most notable terrorist incidents in 2008” (Gartenstein-Ross, Goodman, & Grossman, 2009, p. 16). Through 2008 and mid-2009, six terrorist bombings of EnCana facilities occurred near the small, rural community of Tomslake, on the border of British Columbia and Alberta near Dawson Creek, B.C., about 560 kilometers northwest of Edmonton (Stolte, 2009). A map created anonymously on the Internet (Figure 8) shows the locations of the last bombing near the Tomslake community (Energetic, 2009).




Figure 8. Anonymous map of EnCana Bombings. (From: Energetic, 2009).

On January 8, 2010, Royal Canadian Mounted Police were able to arrest the suspected bomber, an Eco-terrorist convicted in attacking EnCana predecessor Alberta Energy Company facilities (EnCana’s predecessor) in the 1990’s (Jones, 2010). The rapid growth of Canada’s natural resource extraction industry is seen as a potential flashpoint

for violent acts in response (Flanagan, 2009). Groups operating in rural Canada that might choose violence in response to increased resource extraction include “individual saboteurs, eco-terrorists, mainstream environmentalists, First Nations, and the Métis people” (Flanagan, 2009, p. 1). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has also identified the desire to move to, and operate in, rural areas as a characteristic of Canadian “Doomsday Religious Movements,” providing further evidence that more than one type of terrorist organization finds rural Canada attractive (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1999). Further, Bill Hubble, Deputy Director General of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada said in 2006, “we don't know what we don't know” with regard to the extent of organized crime in rural Canada (Ghoreishi & Drukier, 2006).

“Many Canadians may be surprised to learn that, with the exception of the United States, there are more terrorist groups active in Canada today than in any other country in the world” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2008). Considering the length of the U.S.–Canadian border, “approximately 3,987 miles,” (Beaver, 2006), this is a sobering fact. The NIE lists “Islamic terrorist groups and cells” as America’s most persistent threat, but does not quantify the number of terrorist groups operating in the United States (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). The United States Department of State only keeps a list of designated “foreign terrorist organizations,” and puts that number at forty-five (U.S. Department of State, 2010). The Canadian Intelligence Community (CIC) clearly understands that the Canadian homeland is threatened by domestic and international terrorism. Before September 11, “Canada had a relatively modest security and intelligence community, with no stand-alone foreign intelligence service” (Purdy, 2007, p. 106). “Security and terrorism were not top issues in Canada prior to 9/11” (Purdy, 2007, p. 108). While Canada has not suffered terrorist attacks to the same degree as America with regard to September 11, the CIC recognizes that “the absence of violence here at home does not mean the absence of terrorist activity” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2008). Indeed, the second core national security interest for Canada is “ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies” (The Privy Council Office, 2005, p. 1).

The IC in both Canada and the United States is very similar in its organization—a number of different state agencies exist that have control over different aspects of the intelligence process. Those agencies conduct operations and gather information to report to their agency heads who, in turn, report to ministers and directors at higher levels in the IC. What is dissimilar is the posture that the Canadians have versus the Americans with regard to those outside the IC—the ordinary citizens—particularly those far from the urban centers of political, economic and social power in Canada. The Canadians have actively engaged those more rural members of its society in the intelligence process through its Rural Secretariat and the Rural Lens concept, described in detail below.

Similar to America, the Canadian IC “mandates and activities were not well understood among the general population” (Purdy, 2007, p. 108). It was only after September 11 that the Canadian IC realized the connection between terrorism and economic performance, causing it to draw “new, nontraditional players (business leaders, economic think-tanks, provincial governments, and others) into the national dialog on terrorism and security” (Purdy, 2007, pp. 108-109). While “concern about terrorism has slipped” (Purdy, 2007, p. 110) in recent Canadian polls, “a deeply embedded security ethic is now a fundamental feature of contemporary Canadian and U.S. outlooks” (Graves, 2005, p. 12).

Today, the Canadian Security Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 9) includes a role for average citizens to play in the collection of information in partnership with the Canadian IC. “Information from members of the public” is the first type of information collection listed by the CSIS in its outline of the Canadian intelligence cycle (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2004). The Canadian IC clearly values the input of the ordinary citizen in its information gathering efforts. However, Canadian citizens are still encouraged, similar to their American counterparts, to report by telephone, e-mail, or using a Web portal.




Figure 9. The Canadian Security Intelligence Cycle. (From: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2004).

In 1998, Canada created the Rural Secretariat (RS) in response to concerns that the government was not responding to rural issues and challenges (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). Unlike Rural Development, America's counterpart in the Department of Agriculture, the Canadian RS goes beyond coordinating just agriculture-related initiatives. It works in partnership, not only with other federal agencies, but also with private groups and non-governmental organizations to assist with any need a rural Canadian community might have, including knowledge building, policy development and strategies, and information sharing (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). Canada, rather than having just one agency primarily responsible for reaching out to the rural Canadians, combines a whole host of agencies together to form a Rural Development Network (RDN). The RDN "is made up of over 200 members representing 28 federal departments and agencies" (Rural Development Network, 2008).

More importantly, Canada has created a framework from which it tasks its governmental agencies and partners to look at rural Canada—The Rural Lens (RL). The RL is “a way of viewing issues through the eyes of rural Canadians and raising awareness of these issues across all federal departments” (The Rural Secretariat, 2009). By looking through this RL, the Canadian government seeks to ensure that “rural issues and concerns are considered in the design and the delivery of federal policies and programs” (The Rural Secretariat, 2009).

Moreover, to effectuate the insight gained by using the RL, Canada has created Rural Teams in each province and territory to build partnerships and create networks and alliances on a local level (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). These Rural Teams are comprised of “representatives from different levels of government and key stakeholders” in rural areas (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). Not only does the Canadian government recognize the importance of local-level relationships in building solid partnerships between all levels of government, it has acted upon that vision with the creation of the Rural Teams. The Rural Teams work to create a relationship between the Canadian government and its rural citizens by establishing regular, familiar and trusted interaction and communications channels. Rural Teams help to eliminate the “us” versus “them” dynamic that often exists between local citizens and federal government.

Also, as part of its RS, Canada has targeted “information outreach” that includes not only electronic media, but also print media as well (Partridge & Olfert, 2008, p. 15). This is important because Canada’s population is aging, (Statistics Canada, 2009) and studies show that younger Canadians use electronic media more than older Canadians do (Statistics Canada, 2009). Yet, Canada’s main communicate effort with its citizens, both urban and rural, increasingly is the Internet. This is parallel to what is happening in America. The Internet has substantial advantages to getting the message out to citizens, but rural citizens in both America and Canada do not use it for accessing government materials in nearly the same numbers that use the Internet for other purposes (Statistics Canada, 2009). Communication at the personal level is still what is preferred.

Contrary to Canada's targeted communications campaign, critics point to the "fractured" nature of American rural policy, and a "lack of clear focus" with programs and objectives being too spread out to be effective (Partridge & Olfert, 2008, p. 16). "Clearly, Congress needs to better target U.S. RD programs if it wants to achieve success for the broader rural population" (Partridge & Olfert, 2008, p. 17).

Another important area for effective governmental coordination with the private sector is in infrastructure protection. By actively partnering with locals on private lands, the IC can gain access to a good portion of the critical infrastructure held in private hands today. It is commonly understood that 85 percent of American infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. In an extraordinary coincidence, 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in Canada is owned or operated by the private sector in Canada (Information Sharing and Protection Under the Emergency Management Act, 2007). What is needed is a way to communicate and mobilize those who own 85 percent of critical infrastructure effectively in rural America and rural Canada.

To meet that need in Canada, the Canadians have created an Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). To fulfill its mission to protect critical infrastructure, the OCIPEP seeks to share information with the security, intelligence, and private sector that owns the critical infrastructure. "Close cooperation and information sharing" are essential to this relationship (The Privy Council Office, 2001, p. 10). The OCIPEP actively engages the private sector in its efforts—not only those in urban centers, but also in rural areas.

D. OPERATION OF THE RURAL INFORMATION NETWORK

Who is watching a landowner's property? Well, it's the landowner themselves.

(M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009)

The RIN operates by making individuals, private landowners and rural Americans aware of the terrorist threat in their area, communicating what they see and hear to a local point of contact (conservation districts) for transmittal to state fusion centers for analysis

and product dissemination. Participation in the RIN is voluntary, and a marketing campaign raises the awareness of the RIN and its relationship with Districts. Direct one-on-one conservation district staff and supervisor contact could accomplish this with local rural residents. In addition, other traditional sources of communication media can also be used (i.e., newsletters, meetings, workshops, etc.). It is important to have private landowners, farmers and ranchers involved because they are “in the field.” They know their lands and communities best, and they can collect information with little or no training. In addition, these rural landowners frequently have close contacts already established with their local conservation district staff and supervisors. The RIN can also have protections similar to those already established in the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program to alleviate any fear of disclosure of critical infrastructure or key resource information. This type of structure protects information from public disclosure. Policies and procedures can be created to handle any information supplied by those individuals, landowners, farmers and ranchers to protect information deemed critical or sensitive while still preserving an information-sharing environment.

Once private landowners and rural residents agree to participate in the RIN, and after they are trained, they next concentrate on supplying and gathering information to the conservation districts. The fusion center and stakeholders involved in the intelligence gathering process set requirements. Information that gathered can include information on possible terrorist activities and past/current operations and indicators. Rather than just having a one way flow of information up from landowners in the field to the fusion center, rural landowners can be given the option to disclose to conservation districts information on hazardous materials, dangerous conditions, critical infrastructure or key resources that might be on their land. This information stays at the local level (at the conservation district), to be used by local first responders in times of disasters or emergencies. Landowners benefit by having quicker response times and local first responders benefit by having better situational awareness upon arriving on scene.

This kind of reciprocal communication model serves to establish a trust relationship between the rural landowners and the fusion center. Instead of a traditional bottoms-up communications model, this model allows a true communications exchange to occur. Figure 10 illustrates this communications information flow model.




Figure 10. Diagram of Information Flow within the RIN.

Landowners would report suspicious circumstances and other information to their local conservation district staff and supervisors through any means with which they are comfortable, be that face-to-face communication, telephone calls, e-mail, or other means of communication. Conservation district staff are also “in the field” on a regular basis. They know their communities, the landscape and the critical infrastructure and key resources that populate it. They can be trained information collection and RIN database management. They are already trained in some elements of information gathering and collection, typically, as it relates to natural resource conservation. This includes the interpretation of satellite imagery, GIS data (collection / interpretation), and sensor data (collection/interpretation). A formalized training program in information gathering techniques can augment this knowledge.

Once the information is collected, conservation district staff inputs that information into a secure database at the conservation district. This database can be complex or simple, as well as being with other systems, such as the state fusion center and HSIN. It can have limited access or be more open. After collection in the database,

the information is transmitted to the state fusion center for analysis, and processed and used by trained fusion center analysts. The analysts then can produce reports (similar to N.Y.P.D.'s S.H.I.E.L.D.) for distribution to DHS and to state and local customers (with appropriate tear lines). Appendix C contains an example of such a report. The critical infrastructure and key resource information remains at the conservation district for use by local incident commanders when responding to disasters and emergencies. Essentially, therefore, two types of information are collected: operational and tactical. Examples of operational information include congregations of vehicles or persons at the end of back roads, piles of shell casings or other materials, and the heavy or new use of roads or trails. Examples of tactical information might include locations of propane tanks, ammonium nitrate, anhydrous ammonia tanks, fertilizer storage facilities, water pumping infrastructure, explosives, heavy equipment, livestock, ingress/egress routes, shelter (homes, barns/outbuildings), and communications infrastructure.

After collection, the information is transmitted to state fusion centers for analysis. Once that information is processed, it can be disseminated through products of the fusion center. The fusion center can employ dissemination to allow information to be disseminated in a way not necessitating the time-consuming effort to obtain security clearances for the staff and supervisors of the conservation districts. Thus, the need to obtain costly and time-consuming security clearances before practitioners in the field can use the intelligence is eliminated (i.e., local law enforcement, private sector infrastructure security officers, and others).

Figure 11 graphically illustrates the RIN and its connections. The RIN allows for multiple inputs into the information stream to be made by landowners, ranchers, producers, and conservation district staff and supervisors. Information in the RIN flows vertically and horizontally, meaning that information about suspicious activities and other types of incidents flows into the system from landowners, ranchers, producers, and conservation district staff and supervisors. To effectuate a useful communications model, the communication are not just be vertical; from those on the fringes of the network (the landowners, ranchers and conservation district staff) to the fusion center. Rather, it also

flows down from the fusion center to those out in the field by way of reports, bulletins, and other products that the fusion center creates. In this way, an exchange of information rather than a one-way flow of information exists. This creates the necessary dynamic for effective communication to occur and establishes the relationship that allows for the flow of information and the development of trust.




Figure 11. Diagram of the RIN Connections.

The RIN allows the exchange of information between rural public/landowners and the government on a voluntary basis, using a trusted, known division of the local government. The federal government will not create this for rural America (as is HSIN, C/ACAMS, iCAV, etc.), but will be created in partnership with, and largely by, rural America, which creates “buy-in” by the locals and increase the development of trust in the system. The RIN does not create any new significant structure, yet it educates rural America about rudimentary information collection methods, empowers conservation district staff members through specific, targeted training, and allows conservation districts to continue to generate and maintain a high level of “institution based trust” with their constituents—rural America.

E. CONSERVATION DISTRICTS

1. Definition and Purpose

Conservation districts were born out of the dust bowl environmental disaster of the 1930s. The U.S. government recognized at that time that “soil conservation was central to the longevity of any civilization” and in particular, American civilization (Montgomery, 2007, p. 6), so it fostered the development of conservation districts at the local level. They have evolved over time, but most retain their original purpose to conservation soil and water. Districts serve as nodes in a nationwide system of local government agencies responsible for assisting local landowners in natural resource conservation. This structure is the network of over 2,946 conservation districts and approximately 15,000 men and women who serve on their governing boards (National Association of Conservation Districts). Districts are local units of government established under state laws to execute natural resource management programs at the local level (National Association of Conservation Districts). Districts are familiar to and readily accessible by rural Americans, which can easily be utilized to communicate with and gather information from rural Americans. Districts work with millions of cooperating landowners and operators to help them manage and protect land and water resources on all private lands and many public lands in the United States (National Association of Conservation Districts). Districts “share a single mission: to coordinate assistance from all available sources—public and private, local, state and federal—in an effort to develop locally-driven solutions to natural resource concerns” (Sims, 2007). Conservation districts are already involved in a number of programs concerning disaster preparedness and mitigation, have technical expertise to operate in rural areas, and are trusted and respected by members of rural America (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006).

2. Operations

Conservation districts work “directly with more than 2.3 million cooperating land managers nationwide. Their efforts touch more than 1.5 billion acres of private forest, range and crop land” (Sims, 2007, p. 1). They “work with landowners across the

country—urban, rural, row crop farmers, ranchers, forestland owners and specialty crop producers on the plains, in the hills and on both coasts - so we know that no one program, practice, or policy will work for everyone” (Sims, 2007). Districts work in conjunction with other local, state and federal governmental agencies to “support voluntary, incentive-based programs that present a range of options, providing both financial and technical assistance to guide landowners in the adoption of conservation practices, improving soil, air and water quality and providing habitat and enhanced land management” (Sims, 2007, p. 1).

Conservation districts are already involved in a number of programs concerning disaster preparedness and mitigation. They have the technical experience to be able to locate properties in flood plains and at risk for flooding, properties prone to wildfire damage due to improper foliage, and land subject to landslide and mudslides. Their technical expertise extends to understanding the needs of livestock ranchers, dairy operators, and crop growers. Districts have technical expertise that applies in many all-hazards scenarios related to planning, mitigating, and responding to disasters and terror events. Staff members are familiar with a variety of high tech equipment including Global Positioning System (GPS) units, remote sensing, satellite imagery interpretation, and Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping.

Districts also have a working knowledge of the local regions they serve—not only of the people there, but the land itself. This is synonymous with local law enforcement in large metropolitan areas knowing their particular block or “beat.” They know all the operators and can identify those persons and events that are out of place. While local law enforcement in rural areas also has this ability, typically it is not staffed to the level necessary to provide comprehensive coverage for the local area. Conservation districts, while also not having large staffs, have an extensive network of supervisors, employees, volunteers, and other contacts throughout the countryside that they can access. Their network is not formalized, but rather based on personal relationships and contacts, and is built on trust and confidence, rather than regulations and governmental directives. It is effective because it works, not because it is mandated.

Conservation districts have experience working with multiple local, state, federal and tribal agencies. They are experienced at handling government grants, cost share requirements, and the documentation necessary for grant purposes. Districts frequently take the lead in bringing together diverse governmental entities, community organizations, and individuals into formal agreements for mutual aid and support in times of disaster or for other purposes. They create their own resources and information guides tailored to their own community's needs. The Phoenix Guide (see Figure 12) is an example of a disaster and emergency manual that the Jefferson Conservation District in Colorado created for local use.

Districts have technical expertise applicable to many all-hazards scenarios related to planning, mitigating, and responding to disasters and terror events. They have knowledge of local customs, norms, and political mechanizations. They are not regulatory, so there is no judgment, just aid and direction. Districts espouse the best of what America is—local people helping one another. Further, “local groups, such as conservation districts, who are close to the disaster and aware of local needs, have great credibility with funding organizations and with donors. Local groups, with established community partnerships, will often be asked by funding organizations to sponsor recovery efforts” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 59).




Figure 12. The Phoenix Guide. (From: Jefferson Conservation District, 2006).

Districts have the technical expertise to prepare for unique disaster management issues. John Cline indicated in his paper that a terrorist attack on the nation's food supply, specifically livestock, would necessitate the burial and disposal of thousands of animal carcasses. His suggestion is to have "state and locally generated maps and pre-approved burial sites would aid in the speed of the disposal process" (Cline, 2005, p. 39). This knowledge of suitable burial sites is easily within the technical expertise of conservation districts. Further, Cline stresses that the "single most gaping hole in U.S. biosecurity is not within large complexes of the livestock industry. Rather, biosecurity vulnerabilities loom largest on the properties of the weekend farmer and the single-animal producer" (Cline, 2005, p. 41). Cline asserts that small farm operators might view biosecurity measures as too much work with which to comply (Cline, 2005, p. 41). However, this attitude is precisely what conservation districts work against on a daily basis when they work with landowners to comply with other federal USDA and National Resources Conservation Services (NRCS) programs. Conservation districts are able to effectuate compliance because they are assisting landowners in understanding the need for the regulation and the benefit of compliance.

Conservation districts, in partnership with the National Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), can draw upon a huge number of volunteers through the Earth Team volunteer program. "The Earth Team, the volunteer arm of the USDA NRCS, recruits volunteers in more than 2,946 locations across the country. Anyone 14 years of age or older can join the Earth Team. Volunteers can work outdoors or in a local office. Individuals or groups can donate time as a volunteer" (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 67). "The NRCS and conservation districts have benefited from the service of more than 300,000 volunteers who have contributed more than 10 million hours of service, valued at more than \$167.2 million" (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 67). The NRCS provides the training and insurance coverage, as well as travel and equipment costs for the volunteers (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 67). The conservation district and NRCS conducts a needs assessment to determine if volunteers are needed. The use of volunteers brings its own liability complications, but these issues

can be addressed with volunteer agreements and reliance on the federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 for nonprofit organizations and state legislation related to volunteers and insurance.

Conservation districts are also keenly aware of the local politics and issues that play important roles in bridging the gap between effective communication and a message that is not communicated. They are the non-regulatory repository of political knowledge and will in their areas. If they cannot do a particular task, they know to whom to go in the community to get it done. Districts are frequently called upon to be an intermediary between the government, public, and local landowners and producers. They provide public hearings on rural land issues, and conduct mediations of disputes in rural areas, as well as a neutral forum for vetting of issues raised by the communities in which they are located (Sims, 2007, p. 6).

“Conservation districts, government agencies, and community organizations all play critical roles in disaster recovery. However, ultimately, community recovery falls to the people living in the community where the disaster hit” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 33). While “[e]ach state may take a different approach... there is a consistent theme [among conservation districts] of working with landowners, providing technical assistance, financial assistance and expertise to help them make changes to their operations, or alter practices that... [are] critical to... [their] success” (Sims, 2007, p. 6).

3. Conservation Districts and Trust

Simply put, trust means confidence. The opposite of trust–distrust–is suspicion. When you trust people, you have confidence in them–in their integrity and in their abilities. When you distrust people, you are suspicious of them–of their integrity, their agenda, their capabilities, or their track record. It’s that simple.

(Covey, 2006, p. 5).

In early 2001, Washington State was in the grips of a devastating drought. By mid-summer, the drought was the second worst on record, second only to the 1977 drought. Eastern Washington, being the drier side of the state, was hit particularly hard.

Not only was the state's agriculture industry threatened, salmon stocks were hard hit, and hydro-energy production and drinking water supplies were in jeopardy. The Columbia River, the second largest river in the continental United States, flows through the heart of Eastern Washington. However, due to the then-current management practices and western water law obligations, the Columbia River was of little help in this crisis.

In response, the Washington State Legislature, and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) began efforts to create legislation to address water shortages in Eastern Washington. Over five years later, a compromise was reached to allow Ecology, under existing water law, to search for new sources of water in Eastern Washington to alleviate drought in the future (Washington State Legislature, 2006).

One of Ecology's first actions was to determine if any conservation projects could be done to save water. Ecology had just four months to return an answer back to the Legislature, and Ecology turned to conservation districts for the answer. Twenty-nine conservation districts along the Columbia River in Eastern Washington qualified for water conservation projects under the new program. The districts, working with the local farmers, ranchers and landowners, were very aware of the overwhelming effects of the 2001 drought and eager to assist in this effort. In just over one-month's time, the districts identified 5,293 potential on-farm water conservation projects (Washington State Department of Ecology, 2007).

Districts were able to identify so many potential projects because of their relationship with the landowners, ranchers and farmers in their local areas. "Conservation Districts are all about relationships" (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). They knew where the opportunities were because of their prior contacts, meetings, and interactions with those landowners. "If natural resources need managing and there is a nexus with private landowners, the one agency that has the relationships on the ground with private landowners is the conservation districts" (S. Trefry, personal communication, September 8, 2009). The districts, because of the relationships created based on their interaction with the landowners in the past, had something that gave them the ability to identify these projects quickly: trust.

The districts had worked with these landowners in the past on other natural resource conservation projects and had gained their trust. “In order to gain trust, you have to be able to have a coffee shop talk with people. And those kinds of talks with landowners are a little bit more prevalent since 9/11” (M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009). The landowners knew that they could trust district staff to help them with their projects on their land without subjecting them to regulatory oversight or penalties. “The staff ends up being pretty good friends with the people they are dealing with over time” (W. F. Hendrix, personal communication, October 5, 2009). The districts knew that if they could provide non-regulatory assistance to landowners, they could generate trust. “The districts are always real careful about being seen as being too close to any enforcement agency because they want to maintain the good technical assistance relationship. They are very protective of their non-regulatory role” (S. Trefry, personal communication, September 8, 2009).

The landowners knew that Ecology was a state regulatory agency with the power to impose fines and other legal penalties for not following their directives. Ecology knew this as well. Some call this “regulatory mitigation” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). It is the Districts’ ability to keep its constituents from being regulated against in a negative manner (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). “Oftentimes the regulatory entity will provide the large stick and the carrot but they don’t know how to do the carrot part, so they contract with the conservation district to provide the carrot to stay away from the stick” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Districts insert themselves “as the middle man so that the regulatory guy doesn’t have to do his job” (M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Ecology could not go directly to the landowners with their offer of financing in exchange for water conservation due to the lack of trust and confidence that landowners had that Ecology would not use their regulatory power against them. However, those same landowners knew that if their local conservation district were assisting them, they would be able to work with them free from regulatory oversight. The success that came with identifying so many water conservation projects came because of trust. This trust comes from “the knowledge that they are not a government agency and

that they are actually there to help; and to keep them out of trouble, to keep them farming, to keep them actively engaged in private property management instead of putting restrictions on them” (W. F. Hendrix, personal communication, October 5, 2009).

Conservation Districts provide that vital link between governmental agencies and private citizens in rural areas. They do this through “one-on-one interface with other agency staff, meetings in offices, meetings out on the ground, trying to marry up the concerns on the ground with the perspective of the regulatory agency or funding agency” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Typically, the end product of these efforts is a “more informed landowner, a protected natural resource, and a happy funding agency” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009).

Further, because of the credibility that districts have built with the citizens they serve, the dissemination of homeland security related issues and information can be enhanced. “Private landowners, I think, would have a higher belief [in homeland security information and issues] from those Conservation District folks because they are people that they work with all the time in understanding this is a real concern verses someone else that they are not familiar with trying to tell them it’s a real concern” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 2009). The familiarity and relationships that the districts have built over the years serves to lend credibility to their message.

Additionally, in rural areas, districts are intimately connected to their communities. “In very rural areas, we may have some of the landowners involved with the District [that] may also be the volunteer firefighter or part-time deputy or whatever else in the county or city” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 2009). In some cases in remote communities, a district’s responsibility “may move over into some activities that we would think of as more governmental that a county or a city or even a sheriff’s department may get engaged in” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 2009). This may be because in those areas, “most people’s relationship with the Sheriff’s Department isn’t a positive one” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009), but it also can be the result of familiarity. Each community is different, and districts acknowledge that. Districts “are very protective of their non-regulatory role,”

and therefore do not like to move into the regulatory realm (S. Trefry, personal communication, September 8, 2009). Once a district moves “past the non-regulatory realm, with whether it is serving landowners through conservation or assisting in homeland security, when we go to regulation we will no longer be effective” (M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009). The “trust factor is a sacred one and hard to gain back if you ever lose it” (R. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 10, 2009).

Of course, no matter the amount of effort, some citizens are not going to be able to be reached due to a lack of trust. “People are really leery about government, even about the conservation Districts in places. There are people out there who don’t even trust them... there will be a percentage of the population out there that might not be reachable” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). In the March/April 2009 issue of the Journal of Emergency Management, Bjorn Kruke examines the issue of trust and humanitarian aid in Darfur. In his study, he identifies the cycle that distrust creates between lack of trust and reduced information exchange (Figure 13) (Kruke, 2009, p. 34).




Figure 13. Diagram of “Cycle of Distrust.” (From: Kruke, 2009, p. 34).

Distrust breeds reduced information exchange. This then creates more distrust, which leads to less information exchange. Kruke summarized his findings into three areas: (1) mutual dependency motivates the parties to seek trust relations; (2) trust influences cooperation in the sense that the parties deal more with people whom they

trust and less with people they distrust; and (3) socialization increase mutual understanding and thereby the scope for trust building (Kruke, 2009, p. 23).

The problem for rural America and the federal government is that neither views themselves as dependent on the other and thus there is no motivation to seek trust relationships. “Nearly half of state legislators feel that state (35 percent) and local (11 percent) governments are primarily responsible for providing solutions to rural problems, while one-quarter believe the federal government is most responsible” (W. K. Kellogg Foundation). Federal legislators in Congress view the notions of individualism and self-reliance in rural communities, as a “challenge” to overcome when working toward governmental solutions to problems (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2002).

It is the unique governance structure of conservation districts that set themselves apart from this divide. “Many Districts across our state and across the nation are a trusted place because of the nature of the board of supervisors. Many supervisors or directors of the conservation district are producers themselves” (R. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 10, 2009).

Rural Americans trust districts because they are comprised of rural Americans. Another issue that damages the trust relationship between rural America and the federal government is intent. Covey contends that it is “either the real intent or the assumed or ascribed intent” of the parties that influences the trust relationship (Covey, 2006, p. 77). In response to a survey question asking conservation district supervisors and rural landowners whom they would report suspected terrorists to, 58 percent of respondents chose to report that information to local or county law enforcement, with just 15 percent choosing the FBI or DHS. However, when asked who is most responsible for fighting terrorism in their local area, 61 percent first chose either the FBI or DHS, with just 39 percent choosing local or county law enforcement. The trusted preference was to report locally even when responsibility was perceived nationally.

In investigating intent, Covey asks, “What is their motive or agenda? Do they really care about what’s best for everyone involved” (Covey, 2006, p. 77)? These questions illustrate a perceived agenda on the part of federal government that does not

lend itself to a trust relationship with rural America. By creating a new relationship with rural America through networking and partnering with conservation districts, the federal government can repair the trust relationship and create more trust in the fight against domestic terrorism. The federal government must be careful though, to make sure it does not fall into the trap of extending “counterfeit” trust (Covey, 2006, p. 227). There are two types of counterfeit trust—false trust and fake trust. False trust is “giving people the responsibility, but not the authority or resources, to get a task done” (Covey, 2006, p. 227). Fake trust is “acting like you trust someone when you really don’t. In other words, you entrust someone with a job, but at the end of the day, you “snoopervise,” hover over or “big brother” the person” (Covey, 2006, p. 227).

The federal government must be careful to avoid both of these counterfeit versions of trust in repairing its relationship with rural America. Engaging rural America in the war on terror will take investment and resources by the federal government in rural America, and the ability of DHS to take a hands-off approach to oversight. That is not to say no oversight. “Extend trust conditionally to those who are earning it and abundantly to those who have already done so” (Covey, 2006, p. 296). The benefits of such a program, though, are great. “By extending trust, you empower people. You leverage your leadership. You create a high-trust culture that brings out the best in people, creates high-level synergy, and maximizes the ability of any organization” (Covey, 2006, p. 228).

Kruke found that the effect of the cycle of distrust is that “coordination between the authorities and the international organizations... [was] difficult, mainly due to the mutual distrust and lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities” and that “lack of socialization between the different actors may lead to distrust just because actors have inadequate information about their counterparts” (Kruke, 2009, p. 35). Districts understand that trust is key to their interaction with their local landowners, and that to generate and keep that trust, relationships must be built. “Most landowners don’t like to be told what to do, especially if they don’t realize that what they are doing is wrong or if that is the way Grandpa did it. To change that attitude, you have to gain trust and work with the individual before you even tell them what is wrong” (M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009).

Districts interact with private landowners based on their “relationships, which are based on people, which are all different” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Some landowners might not want to be part of a formal program run by a governmental enforcement agency, or even a non-regulatory agency. However, if the opportunity exists to share information or resources, some might “step up to the plate on their own terms and participate without having to gain someone else’s trust in the government” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Further, if just one or two innovators exist who might be willing to participate or provide terrorist-related indicator and warning information, this may be all that is necessary to generate interest from others. Districts “know the land managers in their area that are willing accept new ideas, new concepts, new this and that, and are motivated to make change based on new information” (R. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 10, 2009). Still, some may “think their sheriff is a blooming idiot” and will be unwilling to cooperate with federal, state, and local law enforcement at all (R. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 10, 2009).

The public must accept any rural America-federal government partnership, especially a new organization designed to collect domestic intelligence (Jackson, 2009, p. 9). Using conservation districts as the bond that holds this relationship together does not create any new significant governmental structure. Districts have shown that they can respond quickly and effectively to governmental requests for assistance during times of drought and other disasters by tapping into their network of local, on-the-ground relationships with rural landowners, farmers, and ranchers. Educating rural America about rudimentary information collection methods and providing specific, targeted training for conservation district staff members is all that is needed. Conservation districts have worked hard to generate and maintain a high level of “institution based trust” with their constituents—trust in the districts themselves (Jackson, 2009). By providing training to them and instituting an effective public relations campaign to allay any fears members of the public might have about that training, rural Americans and district staff members can become another set of eyes and ears in the war on terrorism. The success of domestic U.S. intelligence efforts relies on “the forging of a deep partnership with the American nation” (Crompton, 2005, p. 198), and “the truth is, the collection and analysis of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies” (Loyka et al., 2005, p. 6).

IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

A. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

The *Power Versus Interest Grid* (see Figure 14) for leveraging rural America in domestic counter-terrorism efforts illustrates the dynamic interaction between the amount of power a given stakeholder group has versus the amount of interest that group can have in the RIN.




Figure 14. Power Versus Interest Grid Diagram. (After: Bryson, 2004, p. 338).

Many different groups of stakeholders exist that need to be coordinated to implement the RIN. As a network, a “central control” point for the RIN does not exist. Rather, a need to share information environment is created and each state fusion center, through a stakeholder group of local, state, and federal IC participants, oversees the information sharing protocols and links in the network. The power that any given group has in the *Power Versus Interest Grid* indicates how much influence they have in relation to the implementation and operation of any new intelligence gathering effort. The interest of a group is defined as the amount of importance or significance the group gives to such an effort to create a RIN. To engage such a disparate group of stakeholders and rural Americans in domestic counter terrorism activities, DHS should use community-policing principles. Rural law enforcement (LE) and the IC do not have the resources, culture, or technical understanding to engage this neglected but important segment of the American population without community-policing principles. Community policing allows LE and the IC to partner effectively with and gain the assistance of rural America to help fight the war on terrorism.

DHS should also promote the use of community policing by rural law enforcement agencies to engage rural America in counter terrorism activities in rural America. Community policing has historically operated in a manner that works well in rural America. The close connection to the community, one-on-one personal contact and long-term relationships that the LE practitioner of community policing enjoys in rural America fit well into how rural America operates and generates support for the creation of the RIN.

Each of the four dimensions of community policing has substantial advantages for engaging citizens in the war on terrorism to combat the new domestic terrorist threat when used in rural America (Cordner, 2001). In Dunham and Alpert’s book, *Critical Issues in Policing*, Gary Cordner writes about community policing (Cordner, 2001). He lists the four dimensions of community policing as the philosophical, strategic, tactical,

and organizational (Cordner, 2001). Each of these dimensions has elements that can work well if used in an overall strategy by the RIN stakeholders to engage rural America in the war on terror.

1. Philosophical

Cordner contends that the philosophical dimension of community policing is perhaps the most important (Cordner, 2001). It consists of citizen input, broad functionality, and personalized service. Citizen input to the LE and community policing process is critical to its success. Rural survey respondents consistently value helping their neighbors, getting along, and working together to solve problems (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). Rural Americans clearly have the mindset conducive to assisting LE. By having a broad functionality to LE, rather than just focusing on crime fighting, community-policing matches well with what LE finds in rural areas. Due to limited resources, but representing the only resource available, rural LE must do much more for rural communities than urban LE. Rural LE should partner with rural citizens to ease this burden. By providing personal service, rural LE gains the credibility necessary to build trust and relationships essential for rural citizens to aid and assist rural LE and the IC.

2. Strategic

Cordner says that three community-policing strategies are used to translate community-policing philosophy into action: re-oriented operations, geographic focus, and prevention emphasis (Cordner, 2001). Face-to-face communication is a key social mechanism by which rural citizens interact. It is also the key to re-oriented operations. Officers must interact with the community as the community does to develop trust. Once this trust is developed, LE sees rural citizens willing and able to provide support to LE operations. LE notices a reduction in resource expenditures, an increase in time savings in information collection and investigation, and has a better ability to focus resources while still maintaining that trust relationship. The emphasis community policing places on geographic assignments works well in rural communities if it is permanent (Cordner,

2001). Especially in rural America where citizens know each other well and have close ties, the placement of LE officers on a permanent basis within the community generates “trust, confidence and cooperation on both sides of the police-citizen interaction” (Cordner, 2001). As a result, rural LE, using community-policing principles, can access a network of rural citizens for information gathering purposes. If rural LE can create such a relationship, they are then able to do community policing without the police, as the citizens do LE’s job for them. Community policing also “emphasizes a more proactive and preventative orientation” (Cordner, 2001). LE and the IC can benefit from an orientation toward prevention in many areas in rural America. Security, food production and safety, pollution control, and other areas can be enhanced by having a rural LE focus on community policing principles. Perhaps most importantly, the entire culture of LE continues to change from one of just a narrow focus on crime fighting to one of identifying and preventing the unique problems and conditions of domestic counter-terrorism efforts. Community policing principles serve to reinforce the notion that all Americans can contribute to the war on terrorism, not just LE.

3. Tactical

Cordner sites positive interaction, partnerships, and problem solving as the three most important tactical elements of community policing (Cordner, 2001). Local positive interactions between rural LE and citizens create a dynamic in society that leads to greater partnerships. Rural Americans do not have the resources available to them that urban citizens do, so building effective partnerships is much more important. Due to its connection to the land, rural America has a greater stake in issues that affect them locally than urban populations. Urban populations are highly mobile and transitory, while rural Americans are not mobile and have invested in their land and communities. Effective partnerships lead to effective problem solving, and community policing emphasizes problem solving. It is in the interest of rural citizens to resolve their problems and interact with one another because they are not as transitory as the urban population. The tactical community policing principles can be an effective tool that rural LE and the IC can use to interact with this population.

4. Organizational

An effectively implemented community-policing program in rural America must be decentralized and have LE officers who are empowered to make their own decisions based on the LE organization's values. Rural LE must wear many hats to protect their communities. LE organizations that implement these organizational aspects of community policing see that same organizational structure in the communities they serve. The communities also recognize this in the LE organization, which fosters trust, communication and understanding. To be effective, LE must operate very similar to the culture and community with which it is associated.

The RIN strengthens information sharing and collaboration. The RIN creates a rural information network of landowners, farmers, and ranchers on private lands throughout America. After receiving training, they can report suspicious behavior and circumstances they observe to their local, trusted government representative from their conservation district. Districts pass that information on to the fusion center for further analysis and dissemination. A database is created for use by local landowners, farmers and ranchers to exchange resource needs and supplies before, during and after terrorist events and disasters. Rural populations can actively engage with the IC, law enforcement, and DHS in the fight against terrorism.

The RIN helps combat the new asymmetrical domestic terrorism threat. Rural areas have become a base of operations for terrorists. Further, agriculture and food supplies are targets of terrorists. The FBI has identified Eco-terrorism as the number one domestic terrorism threat, and eco-terrorists conduct their operations closer to rural areas than other types of terrorists. By leveraging rural America in domestic intelligence efforts through a partnership with conservation districts, LE and IC gains the assistance of a vast, untapped reservoir of information collection and more readily meets the new asymmetric terrorism threat.

The RIN also creates a more resilient rural population. Homeland security, disaster preparation, mitigation, response and recovery efforts for all citizens of rural America can be strengthened by actively engaging rural Americans in information

collection through a partnership with the 2,946 different local conservation districts. Conservation districts occupy a unique place in their local communities due to their non-regulatory nature and can be leveraged by DHS as a force multiplier for information gathering and disaster preparation, mitigation, response and recovery purposes.

B. OBSTACLES

Promoting community-policing principles on a national level in rural America involve encroaching on current governmental spheres of influence. DHS has sought to use its *Citizens Corps* program to engage its citizens in the war on terrorism and domestic preparedness efforts. *Citizen Corps*, while serving as the umbrella organization for a number of different citizen engagement initiatives, does not fill the leadership role of coordinating citizens in rural America for information gathering purposes to combat terrorism. While *Citizen Corps* acknowledges, “we all have a role in hometown security,” there are little actual security measures and initiatives in most of its programs (The National Office of Citizen Corps - FEMA Community Preparedness Division). Most of its programs revolve around preparation, mitigation, response and recovery efforts related to natural disasters and terrorism. Little to no drive exists to engage the public, let alone the rural public, in LE support activities.

Also, traditional LE culture frowns on community policing. A great emphasis of community policing is prevention, and “within both informal and formal police cultures, crime solving and criminal apprehension are usually more valued than crime prevention” (Cordner, 2001). DHS must lead and foster this enhanced use of community policing principles in rural America, or else it runs the risk of not receiving the support from the traditional LE and IC. If the LE and IC do not buy into community-policing principles, the lack of buy-in undermines any effort to engage rural America in community policing and the war on terrorism.

Furthermore, some might view an effort to use community policing to engage rural America in the war on terrorism as another Operation TIPS. Operation TIPS was a 2002 initial effort by DHS to engage its public in information gathering efforts. Privacy

concerns raised by opponents of Operation TIPS were many, ranging from a lack of openness to a lack of oversight (Cavoukian, 2003). The use of community-policing principles serves to diffuse the privacy arguments of privacy right advocates and others because a centralized system to target does not exist. Further, community-policing principles are less of a governmental program or directive and more of a philosophy of interaction between LE and citizens. America needs to engage its rural citizens directly as a force multiplier in the war on terrorism with a targeted, local relationship-building effort. Rather than funneling information into one central depository, the efforts of rural Americans can serve to augment, not replace, those of LE and the IC. Rural Americans are not a group that LE and the IC collects information on, but rather is a source of information, interaction, support and prevention.

A challenge for the RIN is to maintain the on-going cooperation with stakeholders in all aspects of the program. Stakeholders are intimately involved in setting requirements and continued support of the RIN. To overcome this, the RIN can create a stakeholder group that strives to include, acknowledge, and motivate stakeholders to participate and maintain that participation through the duration of the RIN.

Another challenge is to maintain the on-going participation of the fusion center. Active monitoring and maintenance of the relationship between the fusion center and the conservation districts and other stakeholders ensures that requirements are identified, intelligence product meets the needs of customers, and identified deliverables are met.

Continued funding of the RIN is also a challenge. Continued funding is needed to maintain the readiness of rural citizens to assist in information gathering and the changing nature of the domestic terrorist threat. The current twenty-four month DHS grant funding scheme does not lend itself to the continued operation of the RIN. A stable source of funding needs to be found, so that the knowledge of information collection procedures is not lost.

If such a system as the RIN were created, a clear marketing campaign to rural America needs to be undertaken so they are aware of the nature and extent of the database, its purposes, uses, and protections. The disclosure of private information to a

local governmental agency is an area of great concern for rural Americans. While most rural Americans have a good relationship with their local government agency, the same cannot be said of state or federal government. The use of the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program, if properly marketed to rural Americans, should alleviate fears that they have concerning disclosure of critical infrastructure and key resource information. Information submitted that meets the requirements of the PCII are protected from public disclosure, and cannot be used by any governmental entity for regulatory purposes. Similar procedures need to be created to address information supplied by landowners and others under the RIN to protect them from any possible ramifications of disclosure.

V. CONCLUSION

The reason to establish an information-collection system in rural America is to leverage rural America as a force multiplier in the war on terror. The citizens that comprise rural America have long been ignored by the efforts to wage the war on terror, and have been told, along with their urban counterparts, that the government wages the war on terror, not citizens. Homeland Security's message of vigilance in the war on terrorism and of prevention, mitigation, and recovery after terror events or natural disasters is not taking root in rural America because the communication methods are not effective. Terrorists are increasingly targeting rural America and using rural America for operational support and training (Smith, 2008). The special demographics, skills and abilities of rural America warrant further consideration by DHS as a front on the war on terror.

The findings and recommendations of this research advocate the creation of a domestic intelligence-gathering network, which utilizes the nation's 2,946 local conservation districts to interact with rural citizens. Conservation districts, as a unit of local government, occupy unique places in their communities due to their non-regulatory nature. As a result, they have a high degree of trust among those they serve. Conservation districts forge a partnership with rural Americans and state fusion centers for information gathering purposes. Intelligence experts at state fusion centers analyze this information and use it to support the war on terror.

In their book, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, W. Han Kim and Renee Mauborgne argue that organizations should move beyond incremental competitive strategies called "red oceans" to "blue oceans" where they build new value based on creating new demand (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). They do this by establishing a "strategy canvas," which illustrates the value innovation being created. Figure 15 shows a strategy canvas based on the principles of *Blue Ocean Strategy* as it applies to the RIN. The strategy canvas for the RIN graphically illustrates the RIN's value innovation. By increasing the avenues of local communications and the exchange of information using an intermediary between rural

Americans and the federal government, more trust is created, the relationship between the federal government and rural America is strengthened, the U.S. IC gains an ally in areas of America that currently are being overlooked, and a light can shine into the dark of domestic terrorism in rural areas.




Figure 15. RIN Strategy Canvas Diagram. (After: Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).

What is needed is not a good strategic plan in a red ocean; homeland security needs to get out of that ocean entirely. The traditional disciplines that perform the duties of homeland security—law enforcement (FBI, state police, etc.), the military, the IC, border security, and others still need to keep incrementally improving their operations by using traditional red ocean strategies. However, homeland security, or perhaps DHS,

needs to operate in a “blue ocean” to meet the demand that exists. That demand comes from citizens who are bitter about having to wait in line at airport security checkpoints, who do not want to have to present a passport when they cross into Canada, and who do not understand why Islamic jihadists want to kill Americans. Homeland security must meet these demands with a new strategy. The Department of Defense was able to operate with a blue ocean strategy during the Cold War and motivate Americans by using education and behavior designed to combat the threat that existed at that time. DHS must create that same sort of strategy in the war on terrorism or risk losing the support of a generation of Americans. Like *Blue Ocean Strategy* says, the “demand is out there, largely untapped” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 211). What is needed is a shift in focus from “competing to a focus on value innovation” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 211).

What value innovation is the DHS bringing to the war on terrorism? Each governmental agency can do its part as before, but what is needed is a completely new way of looking at the problem of defeating asymmetrical terrorism. Perhaps a return to true federalism principles and understanding that “the best knowledge is often at the fringe of an organization” (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 204) is the recombination that creates a value innovation to move DHS into that blue ocean. The RIN allows information from the fringe to reach the critical nodes of the network.

What sets the RIN apart from other intelligence and information gathering efforts is the value innovation creates for DHS: trust. Reestablishing trust with such a large group of Americans sets DHS apart from other agencies. Conservation districts have the trust of other local, state and federal governmental organizations, as well as the landowners and farmers in rural America.

Not only should DHS use a blue ocean strategy of value innovation to implement the RIN, it should also use principles of “megacommunities.” The megacommunity concept was developed by Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly in their book, *Megacommunities* (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008). The heart of the megacommunity strategy is harvesting the energy created by the “dynamic tension” created between three branches of society: the government, the

private sector (businesses) and non-governmental organizations (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 55). These three branches “come to megacommunities when they recognize that the problems facing them are more complex than they can solve alone” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 54). Megacommunities develop when the interests of the three branches “intersect over time” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 54). However, these three sectors must have an exchange or dialogue for them to meet any new complex societal problem effectively (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 62).

The need to harness the dynamic tension between the government, businesses and non-governmental organizations is present in rural America. Conservation districts can and should be used to harness this tension. Conservation districts can assist the three sectors in the exchange of information needed to bring the full resources of rural America to bear on the war on terrorism. Conservation districts are familiar with working with the “dynamic tension” created by businesses, the public, and the government. They already work with millions of cooperating landowners and operators to help them manage and protect land and water resources on all private lands and many public lands in the United States (National Association of Conservation Districts).

The mission of conservation districts is “to coordinate assistance from all available sources—public and private, local, state and federal—in an effort to develop locally-driven solutions to natural resource concerns” (Sims, 2007). To execute this mission, conservation districts frequently create megacommunities to accomplish their natural resource conservation objectives. If DHS were to engage conservation districts to create megacommunities in rural areas to fight terrorism, then those citizens could become a force-multiplier in the war on terrorism. Conservation districts routinely work with a variety of public, non-profit and private sector partners to “reach the goals they cannot achieve alone” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 28), which is one of the chief benefits of megacommunities. Further, conservation districts are already

part of numerous programs that deal with disaster preparedness and mitigation. Additionally, they have technical expertise to operate in rural areas, and are trusted and respected by members of rural America (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006).

Currently, DHS encourages the reporting of “suspicious activity” through the use of their Web site to leave a tip for the FBI (Report Incidents), and the federal government is moving to a national suspicious activity environment with the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, 2010). However, rural Americans are not comfortable involving the federal government with issues in their local area. Megacommunity members can be “kept apart by their own constituents, by the aspects of their goals that are at cross-purposes, and by their perceptions of each other” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 70). The unease that rural Americans have with the federal government is an example of this concept. However, if they had a local contact point with whom they are comfortable interacting, they would be much more likely to make that report or voluntarily allow access to their land to gather information or conduct surveillance.

Conservation districts have experience working with multiple local, state, federal and tribal agencies. They are experienced at handling government grants, cost share requirements, and the documentation necessary for grant purposes. Districts frequently take the lead in bringing together diverse governmental entities, community organizations, and individuals into formal agreements for mutual aid and support in times of disaster or for other purposes. They create their own resources and information guides tailored to their own communities needs.

A small investment by DHS into a training program for district supervisors and staff can allow DHS to partner with the districts in providing a local connection to landowners and other rural Americans. District staff can leverage their position in their communities to receive information on possible terrorist activities in rural America and serve as a repository of information for landowners to disclose to first responders voluntarily in the event of natural disasters. Rural landowners can disclose hazardous conditions or materials on their land to conservation districts so that first responders have

that information when they arrive on scene. Further, they can also provide a list of resources (buildings, materials, fuels, etc.) to be made available to first responders and others who might need them in times of disaster or terror events.

Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly in *Megacommunities* describe a December 2001 simulation in Washington D.C. involving the three sectors of a megacommunity to explore bioterrorism. Their summary of the outcome includes two key points: a “widespread recognition of the need for a new kind of partnership in the pursuit of homeland security,” and that “[p]reparedness would require new levels of communication and cooperation across public-private, local-national, and military-civilian boundaries” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008). Conservation districts can bring all of these principles to the war on terror for DHS.

Any new organization designed to collect domestic terrorism information must be acceptable by the public (Jackson, 2009, p. 9). By utilizing a *Megacommunity* strategy to interact with its rural citizens, DHS and America can gain a force multiplier for use in its efforts in the war on terrorism. The success of DHS’s efforts relies on “the forging of a deep partnership with the American nation” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198), and “the truth is, the collection and analysis of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies” (Loyka et al., 2005, p. 6).

Conservation districts have worked hard to generate and maintain a high level of “institution based trust” with their constituents—trust in the districts themselves (Jackson, 2009). This trust was not created by a top-down hierarchical structure, but rather by a bottom-up, dispersed network of local, rural people providing services where needed.

By providing training to rural Americans and instituting an effective public relations campaign to allay any fears members of the public might have about that training, rural Americans and conservation district staff members become another set of eyes and ears in the war on terror. At a time of ever-increasing demands on the federal government and the DHS, districts and rural Americas can provide increased situational awareness at minimal cost and resource allocation.

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview Questions for Conservation District Directors, Supervisors, and Managers

DUTIES

1. How can conservation districts help in homeland security? (Can conservation districts be used as a resource to respond to natural disasters and terrorist events?)
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts to help in homeland security?
3. Describe how your conservation district is currently involved in local homeland security efforts?
4. Describe your perception of your conservation district's level of knowledge about the occurrence of terrorism and natural disasters in your area.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE/COLLABORATION/COMMUNICATION

1. Describe how conservation districts interact with rural landowners, farmers, and ranchers.
2. How can conservation districts reach rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about homeland security?
3. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts in communicating with rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about homeland security?
4. Describe how conservation districts collaborate with other local, state and federal governmental entities in your area.
5. Describe any information your conservation district receives from local, state, or federal law enforcement about homeland security issues in your area.
6. Describe any information your conservation district receives from local, state, or federal emergency services agencies about homeland security issues in your area.

TRUST

1. How willing would your conservation district be to share homeland security information with governmental agencies above and below your level of government?
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts to share homeland security information with governmental agencies above and below your level of government?
3. How willing would your conservation district be to share homeland security information with private landowners, farmers, and ranchers?
4. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts to share homeland security information with landowners, farmers, and ranchers?
5. Who in your area should be most responsible for homeland security?
6. How would you describe your conservation districts' relationship or interaction with that entity that is most responsible for homeland security in your area?
7. Where or to whom should your conservation district report information to about suspicious activities or persons in your local area?
8. Could your conservation district be a place where local landowners, farmers and ranchers report suspicious activities or persons?
9. Is there anything about conservation districts that would make landowners, farmers or ranchers more likely to report suspicious activities or persons to the conservation district rather to some other governmental entity?
10. Describe how you would feel those most responsible for homeland security should interact with local landowners, farmers, and ranchers?

Interview Questions for Farmers, Ranchers, and Landowners

DUTIES

1. How can landowners, farmers, and ranchers help in homeland security?
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for landowners, farmers, and ranchers to help in homeland security?

3. Describe how you are currently involved in local homeland security efforts?
4. Describe your level of knowledge about the occurrence of terrorism and natural disasters in your area.

INFORMATION EXCHANGE/COLLABORATION/COMMUNICATION

1. Describe how rural landowners, farmers, and ranchers interact with conservation districts.
2. How can conservation districts reach rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about homeland security?
3. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts in communicating with rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about homeland security?
4. Describe how you collaborate with local, state and federal governmental entities in your area.
5. Describe any information you receive from local, state, or federal law enforcement about homeland security issues in your area.
6. Describe any information you receive from local, state, or federal emergency services agencies about homeland security issues in your area.

TRUST

1. How willing would you be to share homeland security information with governmental agencies?
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for you to share homeland security information with governmental agencies?
3. How willing would you be to share homeland security information with your local conservation district?
4. What are some of the obstacles that you see for you to share homeland security information with your local conservation district?
5. Who in your area should be most responsible for homeland security?
6. How would you describe your relationship or interaction with that entity that is most responsible for homeland security in your area?

7. Where or to whom should you report information to about suspicious activities or persons in your local area?
8. Could your conservation district be a place where local landowners, farmers and ranchers report suspicious activities or persons?
9. Is there anything about conservation districts that would make landowners, farmers or ranchers more likely to report suspicious activities or persons to the conservation district rather to some other governmental entity?
10. Describe how you would feel those most responsible for homeland security should interact with local landowners, farmers, and ranchers?

APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONS

1. How involved is your conservation district in local emergency services efforts?

Response Percent	Response Count	
57.6	19	Not involved
39.4	13	Somewhat involved
3.0	1	Heavily involved

2. To your knowledge, has your conservation district ever provided staff, equipment or technical support to the public or another state agency in responding to a natural disaster or terrorist event? If so, please indicate the type of support below.

Response Percent	Response Count	
100.0	2	Staff support
0.0	0	Equipment
100.0	10	Technical support

3. Do you feel that it would be helpful to have a non-law enforcement and non-regulatory local contact to report suspicious behavior or circumstances to?

Response Percent	Response Count	
51.5	17	Yes
48.5	16	No

4. Do you believe you have enough information to decide if there is a terrorism problem in your local area?

Response Percent	Response Count	
15.6	5	Yes
84.4	27	No

5. Do you feel you know enough about possible terrorist activities in your area to report it if you see it?

Response Percent	Response Count	
32.3	10	Yes
67.7	21	No

6. If you felt that there were potential terrorists in your local area, would you report them?

Please pick your top three choices.

First	Second	Third	Response Count	
31.6(6)	36.8(7)	31.6(6)	19	The local police department
50(2)	25(1)	25(1)	4	The local emergency services department
50(1)	50(1)	0(0)	2	A local governmental agency (fire department, NRCS)
46.4(13)	28.6(8)	25(7)	28	The county sheriff's office
0(0)	50(1)	50(1)	2	The state emergency services department
27.8(5)	27.8(5)	44.4(8)	18	The Washington State Patrol
22.2(2)	33.3(3)	44.4(4)	9	The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
30(3)	50(5)	20(2)	10	The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0	The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
0(0)	0(0)	100(1)	1	Other (affected local agency or entity, if any)

7. Who do you feel is most responsible for fighting terrorism in your area? Please rank each choice from those most responsible to those least responsible.

Most Responsible						Least Responsible			Response Count	
24(6)	20(5)	8(2)	20(5)	16(4)	4(1)	0(0)	4(1)	4(1)	25	Local police
4(1)	17(4)	4(1)	8(2)	13(3)	17(4)	13(3)	17(4)	8(2)	24	Local EMD
0(0)	0(0)	11(2)	5(1)	0(0)	5(1)	21(4)	21(4)	37(7)	19	Local govt. agency
27(7)	19(5)	27(7)	19(5)	8(2)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	26	County sheriff
0(0)	5(1)	5(1)	10(2)	19(4)	24(5)	24(5)	0(0)	14(3)	21	State EMD
5(1)	14(3)	46(10)	27(6)	0(0)	0(0)	5(1)	0(0)	5(1)	22	WSP
31(8)	27(7)	15(4)	12(3)	4(1)	4(1)	4(1)	4(1)	0(0)	26	FBI
46(12)	19(5)	4(1)	4(1)	19(5)	4(1)	4(1)	0(0)	0(0)	26	DHS
0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	13(3)	21(5)	8(2)	25(6)	33(8)	24	FEMA
0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	100(2)	2	Other

8. Do you feel that terrorism prevention is a high priority for your local area?

Response Percent	Response Count	
0.0	0	Yes
40.6	13	No
37.5	12	It is important, but there are other things that are more important
12.5	4	It is not important and there are other much higher priorities in my area
9.4	3	There is no terrorism in my local area

9. Do you feel that natural disaster mitigation efforts are a high priority for your local area?

Response Percent	Response Count	
51.5	17	Yes
27.3	9	No
21.2	7	It is important, but there are other things that are more important
0.0	0	It is not important and there are other much higher priorities in my area

10. How does your district get disaster or terrorism information? Please choose all that apply.

Response Percent	Response Count	
12.9	4	The local police department
41.9	13	The local emergency services department
29.0	9	A local governmental agency
32.3	10	The county sheriff's office
16.1	5	The state emergency services department
12.9	4	The Washington State Patrol (WSP)
3.2	1	The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
9.7	3	The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
9.7	3	The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
51.6	16	Radio reports
48.4	15	Television
54.8	17	Internet
0.0	0	Other

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APPENDIX C. SAMPLE RIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BULLETIN

UNCLASSIFIED // OPEN SOURCE			
_____ STATE FUSION CENTER			
FUSION CENTER CONTACT INFORMATION		(DATE)	
BULLETIN			
(PICTURES AND TITLE HERE)			
REPORT ORIGINATED FROM:			
Locality:	State:	Region:	Nationwide
REPORT DIRECTED AT:			
Locality:	State:	Region:	Nationwide
PRIMARY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE / KEY RESOURCE AFFECTED (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)			
☐	Agriculture and Food	☐	Energy
☐	Banking and Finance	☐	Government Facilities
☐	Chemical	☐	Healthcare and Public Health
☐	Commercial Facilities	☐	Information Technology
☐	Communications	☐	National Monuments and Icons
☐	Critical Manufacturing	☐	Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
☐	Dams	☐	Postal and Shipping
☐	Defense Industrial	☐	Transportation Systems
☐	Emergency Services	☐	Water
SECONDARY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE / KEY RESOURCE AFFECTED (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)			
☐	Agriculture and Food	☐	Energy
☐	Banking and Finance	☐	Government Facilities
☐	Chemical	☐	Healthcare and Public Health
☐	Commercial Facilities	☐	Information Technology
☐	Communications	☐	National Monuments and Icons
☐	Critical Manufacturing	☐	Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
☐	Dams	☐	Postal and Shipping
☐	Defense Industrial	☐	Transportation Systems
☐	Emergency Services	☐	Water
Synopsis of Circumstances that led to the issuance of this Bulletin:			
Analysis of Synopsis for Situational Awareness:			
(FUSION CENTER CONTACT INFORMATION)			

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