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DISSERTATION

**REASSURANCE STRATEGY:
INCENTIVES FOR USE AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS**

by

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**REASSURANCE STRATEGY:
INCENTIVES FOR USE AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS**

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ABSTRACT

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From the case studies, this dissertation concludes that explanations based on any one theory (realism, liberalism, or constructivism), any one level of analysis (individual, state, or alliance), or any one party (sending or receiving state) alone cannot provide a satisfactory account for the outcome of reassurance strategy. An eclectic and broad approach incorporating two-party (the sending and receiving states) and three-level (leader, domestic politics and alliance politics) analysis, along with an understanding of the two states' circumstances and relations is necessary to increase the explanatory power. In sum, reassurance strategy must be viewed in the context of the individual, domestic, and international factors of both sending and receiving states. This dissertation shows that reassurance can succeed, but only when several conditions are met. Of these, leader's perceptions are the most important, but they alone cannot bring about change in the relations between two states unless other factors in the domestic and international environments are supportive.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Reassurance strategy is derived from a critique of deterrence strategy. It is the persuasion of one's opponent that a state has no malignant intentions to be an aggressor, demonstrated by limiting offensive capabilities, in order to reduce tensions and the possibility of war. The different assumption between reassurance and deterrence strategy is "the source of hostility."¹ Proponents of reassurance strategy argue that if the hostility of an adversary is driven by vulnerability, reassurance strategy is "more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence strategy."² In other circumstances, reassurance can also be used as a complement to deterrence.

The purpose of this dissertation is to recognize the situations when reassurance is an appropriate strategy and to assess which conditions are important for the success and failure of reassurance strategy. This dissertation develops some "contingent generalizations"³ about the conditions that lead to the success or failure of reassurance strategy. Also, it recommends policy options to make reassurance strategy successful.

B. MOTIVATION

The most heavily militarized frontier in the world is the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula, which was established in 1953. The Korean War is not officially over and the Korean peninsula remains unstable. Korean unification seems far more remote since the end of the Korean War. The dominant influence strategy of South

¹ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues*, 43, no. 4 (1987): 40.

² Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 59.

³ Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), xi. George and Bennett say, "Contingent generalizations were intended to help policy specialists first to diagnose and then to prescribe for new situations, much as medical doctors in clinical settings."

Korea and the United States on the Korean peninsula has been “deterrence” through superior military capability to prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea. On the other hand, North Korea has also tried to deter South Korea and the United States by using military threats and its nuclear weapons program.⁴ Is deterrence an appropriate strategy on the Korean peninsula to accomplish a peaceful outcome? Several scholars strongly believe that a deterrence strategy based on military power does not guarantee the avoidance of war nor tension reduction. Janice Gross Stein, for example, claims the irrelevance of military superiority to deterrence success:

One of the most robust findings is that the military superiority of a defender may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of deterrence success. This proposition is generally supported across cases and across different kinds of evidence. Consideration of the relative military balance is not the primary determinant of the outcome of deterrence.⁵

These possible limitations of deterrence provide the motivation to explore an alternative strategy to complement or possibly replace deterrence strategy.

C. IMPORTANCE

After the end of the Cold War, people hoped for a more peaceful world and expected a tremendous decrease in the frequency of war. However, war is still part of human life. Heracleitus’ remark, “*Polemos Pater Pantom* (War is the father of all things)”⁶ seems to be an immutable truth. Donald Kagan says that “Statistically, war has been more common than peace.”⁷ It seems that the arguments of classical realists and neorealists are true in human history. They basically argue that conflicts involving the use of force are inevitable. As one summary of his views puts it, Hans Morgenthau believed, “The reason why states behave as they do is firmly rooted in human biological impulses:

⁴ Derek D. Smith, *Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁵ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 29.

⁶ Will and Ariel Durant, *The Lessons of History* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 81.

⁷ Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 570.

this inevitably generates a capacity for self-interested, egoistic behavior, either by individuals or in interstate relations via collective egoism.”⁸ Then, do we need to accept the inevitability of war? What is the best strategy for avoiding war and reducing tensions?

Scholars who study security have devoted most of their attention to negative and hard instruments such as deterrence, coercive diplomacy, use of military power, and so on. They believe that the best answer for security is to build more arms and develop technology to win wars. However, there are not only negative and hard-line approaches but also positive and soft-line strategies for seeking security. Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan state,

The strategy of engagement, or the use of incentives alongside other foreign policy tools to persuade governments to change one or more aspects of their behavior, has received relatively little scrutiny. Instead, the attention of scholars, policymakers, and pundits has generally focused on those instruments of foreign policy—in particular military force or economic sanctions—that seek to attack, harm, or otherwise diminish the capabilities of the target country.⁹

Richard Ned Lebow also explains the difficulty in researching positive and soft approaches such as reassurance strategy:

No striking example of successful reassurance comes readily to mind. One of the reasons this is so may be simply that such an approach to conflict management has rarely been employed. Another reason may be methodological; it is extremely difficult to recognize the success as opposed to the failure of such a policy. Failure is manifest in crisis or war, events that readily impinge upon historical consciousness. Success, which results in greater tranquility than would otherwise be the case, can easily go unnoticed, for it may produce no observable change in the level of tension.¹⁰

⁸ John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, and Stuart Poore, eds. *Neorealism and Strategic Culture* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 30.

⁹ Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Introduction” in *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 1.

¹⁰ Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, eds., Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 192.

This dissertation explores “reassurance strategy” as a possible alternative strategy to deterrence to achieve the same goals of deterrence, which are to avoid war and reduce tensions. Compared to deterrence, less effort has been devoted to researching the conditions of success and failure of reassurance strategy. This dissertation focuses on discerning the most favorable conditions for the success of reassurance strategies.

D. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

1. Research Question

The main research questions are under what conditions is reassurance most likely to be an appropriate strategy, and what factors are associated with the success or failure of reassurance.

2. Variables and Hypotheses

a. *The Independent Variable (IV), the Condition Variables (CV), the Intervening Variables (IntV), and the Dependent Variable (DV)*

Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy can be drawn in a diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV)¹¹ (Figure 1.1).

In this dissertation, the independent variable (IV) is the implementation of reassurance strategy by the sending state. The dependent variable (DV) is the success or failure of reassurance strategy. These two variables frame the causal and caused phenomenon of the hypotheses. Also, there are two condition variables (CV), circumstances and relations between the two parties (CV 1) and the motivating factors of a receiving state (CV 2). These variables frame “antecedent conditions”¹² which have

¹¹ Stephen Van Evera, *Guidance to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7–48.

¹² “Phenomena whose presence activates or magnifies the causal action of the causal and/or explanatory phenomena,” quoted from Van Evera, 16.

impacts on intervening variables (IntV). Also, the intervening variables (IntV) frame “intervening phenomenon,”¹³ which “are caused by the IV and cause the DV.”¹⁴ This arrow-diagram explanation, with variables, is proposed to connect causal hypotheses and explain the outcome of the reassurance strategy.

IV	→	IntV	→	DV
The implementation of reassurance strategy (The sending state)	→	1. Sending state leader’s perceptions about the receiving state and its leader 2. Receiving state leader’s perceptions about the sending state and its leader. 3. Domestic politics of the receiving state 4. Domestic politics of the sending state 5. Alliance politics of the receiving state 6. Alliance politics of the sending state	→	Success or failure of reassurance strategy

X

CV 1	→	CV 2
Circumstances and relations between a sending state and a receiving state	→	Receiving state’s motivating factors
1. Balance of Power 2. Interdependence 3. Identity	→	1. Greed 2. Insecurity 3. Mixed

Figure 1.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)¹⁵

¹³ “Phenomena that form the explanation’s explanation. These are caused by the causal phenomenon and cause the outcome phenomenon,” quoted from Van Evera, 16.

¹⁴ Ibid., 11. “Q causes A, and A causes B”: A becomes an intervening variable.

¹⁵ Van Evera, *Guidance to Methods*, 7–48.

In addition, the arrow-diagram can be described in another figure that focuses more on the condition variables and the intervening variables (Figure 1.2). The two-party (the sending state and the receiving state) and three-level (leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics) framework, including condition variables, is useful to understand the impacts of the reassurance strategy and predict its outcome.




Figure 1.2. The Two-by-three Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the Receiving State, IV, and CV)

b. Hypotheses

The main focus of this dissertation is the conditions of success or failure of reassurance strategy. The main hypotheses are as follows:

H1: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the sending state leader's perceptions about the receiving state.

H2: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the receiving state leader's perceptions about the sending state.

H3: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic politics in the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic politics in the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance politics of the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance politics of the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.

If these hypotheses are correct, sending states should try to influence receiving state leader's perceptions and the domestic politics and the alliance politics of both the receiving state and their own when using reassurance strategy.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW I: BACKGROUND ON REASSURANCE STRATEGY

1. Origins of Reassurance Strategy

a. Critique of Deterrence Strategy

Scholars developed reassurance strategy due to criticisms of deterrence strategy and desire to find an alternative strategy. Deterrence strategy has been the main influence strategy in international relations, especially during the Cold War. However, there have been many critiques of deterrence strategy. For example, Alexander George

and Richard Smoke present cases of deterrence failure and argue that a deterrence strategy is not always effective and is dependent on prevailing conditions.¹⁶ Janice Gross Stein also argues that there are “limiting conditions that constrain the utility of deterrence.”¹⁷ She explains the possibility of a deterrence strategy being “provocative, ineffective, or irrelevant”:

....deterrence can fail at times regardless of how well it is executed. It can provoke rather than prevent a challenge from a frightened or vulnerable adversary, because it intensifies the pressure on a would-be challenger to act. It can also fail because a defender or a challenger misinterprets the other’s intentions and signals; under these conditions, it becomes ineffective. Finally, it can be irrelevant when initiators are insensitive to threats and their consequences. This is most likely to happen when their attention is focused on their own needs. In short, deterrence can at times be provocative, ineffective, or irrelevant.¹⁸

b. No Theory of Reassurance Strategy and Ambiguity Between Incentives of Reassurance Strategy and Conditions Needed for Success of Reassurance Strategy

According to Janice Gross Stein, strategies of reassurance have been less researched than have strategies of deterrence, and it is necessary to develop a theory of reassurance by studying incentives for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy to reduce tension and avoid war. As she writes:

Unlike deterrence, there is no “theory” of reassurance. There are, however, islands of theory in several of the behavioral sciences that address its functional purposes. Generally, strategies of reassurance have received less attention in the strategic literature than has deterrence, and there is less known about incentives for their use and the conditions of their success.¹⁹

¹⁶ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

¹⁷ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

Furthermore, there has been no clear distinction between incentives for reassurance strategy and conditions for success of reassurance strategy. It is necessary to distinguish these two for the development of reassurance theory. “Incentives for their use and the conditions of their success” are two separate things to investigate.

c. *Need to Research Strategic, Domestic Political, and Psychological Obstacles to the Success of Reassurance Strategy*

In addition, Stein explains that strategic, domestic political, and psychological factors can lead to the failure of deterrence strategy. She also says that reassurance strategy must overcome similar obstacles to succeed, arguing:

Preliminary historical and comparative research suggest that strategies of reassurance may at times be effective in reducing some of the obvious risks of deterrence. Restraint, the development of informal norms of competition, and irrevocable commitments can help to reassure a vulnerable adversary, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, and create alternatives to the use of force.

Longer-term strategies of reassurance designed to gradually reduce international tension and create limited security regimes can, in addition, help the parties to move away from the use of threat of force as their dominant mode of discourse. To succeed, however, all these strategies must overcome some of the same psychological, political, and strategic obstacles that confound deterrence.²⁰

However, she does not explain strategic, domestic political, or psychological obstacles to reassurance success in detail. This dissertation explores these obstacles that can bedevil deterrence to see how they affect the success or failure of reassurance strategy. The factors that cause complications for deterrence and reassurance can be analyzed in similar ways by investigating strategic factors, domestic political factors and psychological factors.

²⁰ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 58.

d. *Response to Critique of Reassurance Strategy*

It is necessary to consider critiques arguing that reassurance strategy has an overly rosy view. Evan Braden Montgomery argues that the central debate between offensive and defensive realism is how to overcome the uncertainty that drives the security dilemma and fear of vulnerability.²¹ Fear of vulnerability is the main argument against a reassurance strategy. Montgomery says, “Small gestures that do not affect a state’s capabilities are thus likely to be discounted, and gestures sufficient to convey information are likely to be dangerous if others are in fact greedy.”²² Both the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 and the Falklands war between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982 are useful examples to show how a reassurance strategy can be dangerous.²³ China’s strategy of a limited demonstration of threat was interpreted as fear of military defeat by the Indian leaders. Great Britain’s reassurance strategy toward Argentina strengthened the resolve of Argentinian leaders committed to military action.

In addition, Stein points out the need for further research. She says, “Evidence of the interactive impact of restraint and deterrence is fragmentary and episodic. Analysts have not yet examined the documentary record to identify the relevant universe of cases.”²⁴ It is necessary to research how to overcome this “reassurance dilemma”²⁵ between costly signaling and fear of vulnerability because the main critique of reassurance is related to them.

²¹ Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” *International Security* 31, no.2 (Fall 2006): 151–185.

²² *Ibid.*, 159.

²³ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 36–38.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

²⁵ I would like to label this situation as the “reassurance dilemma.”

2. Previous Research and Need to Explain the Causal Mechanism Between Reassurance Strategy and Its Outcome

a. Typology-type Approach

Most research about reassurance strategy has followed a typology-type approach and has recommended an appropriate policy depending on types of states. For example, Charles L. Glaser categorized states into four types of adversaries (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1. Glaser's Types of Adversaries²⁶

	Greedy	Not-Greedy
Always Secure	Deterrence Model	Ideal State
Potentially Insecure	Doubly Difficult	Spiral Model

Stephen R. Rock develops a similar typology of adversaries and suggests an appropriate strategy depending on each type (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2. Rock's Matching Appeasement Strategies to Target States²⁷

		Greed	
		Low	High
Insecurity	Low	Appeasement probably not necessary (no cases)	Reciprocity; Mixed Strategy (Nazi Germany)
	High	Unilateral Concessions; Pure Inducements (the United States)	No clear strategy: anything beyond limited appeasement problematic (the Soviet Union, Iraq, North Korea)

²⁶ Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," in *World Politics*, 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 503.

²⁷ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 166.

Rock subdivides states into six types of adversaries depending on basic motivation and degree of needs/demands (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3. Rock's Types of Adversaries²⁸

		Basic Motivation	
		Security	Greed
Needs/Demands	Low	Insecure	Revisionist
	Moderate	Frightened	Expansionist
	High	Paranoid	Hegemonic

Even though all these typology-type approaches assume the nature of the target state is important in deciding which strategy is appropriate, they do not explain enough about the causal mechanism between the implementation of reassurance strategy and the outcome of reassurance strategy. This dissertation assumes that state motivations can be transformed. The ultimate object in the dissertation is to explain the causal mechanism.

b. Rational Model Approach

(1) Utility Model Approach (The Cost/Benefit Calculation). Some scholars use a rational model approach. Both a deterrence strategy and a reassurance strategy are influence strategies aimed at persuading others by manipulating their cost/benefit calculation. Deterrence is “the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”²⁹ On the other hand, reassurance is the persuasion of one’s opponent that a course of action to accept the status quo or the preferred policy direction decreases costs. That is, a reassurance strategy persuades an adversary by the expectation of a positive outcome after accepting the defender’s preferred policies. Therefore, based on the expected

²⁸ Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, 158.

²⁹ George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 11.

cost/benefit calculation of an adversary in the utility model, the influence strategy can be summarized and a reassurance strategy can be differentiated from a deterrence strategy as follows (Table 1.4):

Table 1.4. Deterrence and Reassurance in the Utility Model³⁰

Objective of strategy (An expected course of an adversary's action)	Manipulation of cost/benefit calculation of an adversary	Categories of strategy
To prevent unwanted action	Increase cost	Deterrence through punishment
	Decrease benefit	Deterrence through denial
To encourage wanted action	Increase benefit	Positive incentive
	Decrease cost	Reassurance

This model needs further research to know the process of cost/benefit calculation and the conditions of success and failure of a reassurance strategy. In other words, it is necessary to know how the sending state makes an impact on the cost/benefit calculation and how the receiving state calculates cost and benefit.

(2) Bayesian Approach. According to Bayesian approach, the posterior probability of certain outcome is proportional to the product of the likelihood multiplied by the prior probability.³¹ Andrew Kydd uses a Bayesian approach to explain the conditions of success and failure of reassurance strategy. This approach explains the likelihood of escalation and de-escalation of tension. Specific factors to escalate and deescalate tensions need to be considered (Table 1.5):

³⁰ Professor Jeffrey W. Knopf's lectures and class discussions, NS 4669 Conflict and Cooperation in World Politics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, August 30, 2007.

³¹ The posterior probability depends on the prior probability through the following formula: $P(A | B) = P(B | A) P(A) / P(B)$.

Table 1.5. Kydd's Bayesian Approach³²

		Beliefs about the other state's motivation	
		Fearful: P(F)	Trusting: P(T) = 1- P(F)
Motivations	Aggressive P(A)	Prior: P(AF) Likelihood of Escalating: P(E AF)	Prior: P(AT) Likelihood of Escalating: P(E AT)
	Security Seeking: P(S) = 1 – P(A)	Prior: P(SF) Likelihood of Escalating: P(E SF)	Prior: P(ST) Likelihood of Escalating: P(E ST)
Bayesian Approach: $P(A E) = P(E A)*P(A) / [P(E A)*(A) + P(E \sim A)*(\sim A)]$ A: Aggressive and E: Escalate P(A E): Aggressive after observing arms buildup P(E A): the likelihood of escalation from an aggressive type P(E S): the likelihood of escalation for the security seeking type			

(3) The Trust Game/The Reassurance Game.³³ Game theoretic analysis methods are possible tools to analyze rational choice related to a reassurance strategy. One of the most widely influential analyses of the rational choice approach is the trust game provided by James Coleman.³⁴ As shown in Figure 1.3, it based on if-then analysis with the probability of loss (1-P) or gain (P) of trust.

³² Andrew Kydd, "Fear and Reassurance in International Relations," Ph.D. diss. (University of Chicago, 1996), 34–68.

³³ Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," in *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No.2 (Spring 2000), 330–341

³⁴ James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1990), 91–116.




Figure 1.3. Coleman's Trust Game³⁵

The other analysis is the reassurance game explained by Andrew Kydd.³⁶ Kydd modifies the trust game by adding second rounds to give the players the opportunity to decide whether to cooperate or defect after the first round.³⁷ He also explains when reassurance is possible and when it is not based on “equilibria in the reassurance game”³⁸ (see Appendix A).

Kydd applied his model to the end of the Cold War. According to Kydd, “This process can be seen at work at the end of the Cold War, in the signals made by Gorbachev, and in the way Western perceptions of the Soviet Union changed in response. By sending costly signals to the other side, trust can be built.”³⁹ However, his rational model approach is not adequate. By assuming rationality, it ignores the psychological and domestic political factors that can cause reassurance to fail. It is also necessary to trace the relationship between a reassurance strategy and its impact on the other side's leader's perception and domestic politics and those of its own. Kydd acknowledges that his effort is a beginning of study about reassurance strategy and research remains underdeveloped. He says, “The research game presented here is a first

³⁵ Coleman, *Foundations of Social Science*, 91–116.

³⁶ Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 334.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 333.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 336.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 352.

step in providing a rational choice foundation for this literature. Many issues remain to be explored, such as problems introduced by the existence of multiple actors and mass publics, asymmetries between the actors, and bounded rationality.”⁴⁰ Therefore, this dissertation considers that the rational model approach is not adequate to answer the research question. Instead, it directly explores the causal mechanisms involved by focusing on three intervening variables—leader’s beliefs and perceptions, and the domestic and alliance politics of the receiving state and the sending state—which are related to those problems.

c. The Need for Systematic Analysis of the Conditions

Previous researches, such as typology-oriented and rational model approaches, are inadequate to understand the causal mechanisms between reassurance strategy and its success or failure. Alexander George recommends a reassurance strategy as an alternative strategy of influence and then emphasizes the need for detailed analysis. He says, “There is a need for more systematic analysis of the conditions and modalities for choosing between deterrence and reassurance, or combining them in an optimal manner....A correct image of the opponent and good intelligence is needed to distinguish between need for deterrence or for reassurance, and for sensitivity to the possibility that elements of both are appropriate in some situations.”⁴¹ A more systematic approach is necessary to create a framework to analyze the conditions for success or failure of reassurance. There has been a lack of theoretical and empirical research to explain the causal relationships involved in the outcome of reassurance strategy.

Consequently, even though previous researches provide the policymakers with a basis for judging an appropriate strategy, they are not enough to apply to the real world because they do not provide a framework including causal mechanisms to judge whether a reassurance strategy is likely to be successful or unsuccessful in a particular situation. In-depth study of a variety of successful and unsuccessful cases is necessary to

⁴⁰ Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 353.

⁴¹ Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavior Models of Adversaries,” *Comparative Strategy* 22 (December 2003), 466.

help the policymakers make proper judgments. This research explores the situations and conditions that affect the success and failure of reassurance strategy.

F. LITERATURE REVIEW II: HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES

1. Independent Variable (IV): The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy (the Sending State)

A reassurance strategy is the persuasion of one's opponent that one's state has no malignant intentions to expand, demonstrated by changes in one's behavior or policy, in order to avoid war and reduce tensions. Derek D. Smith distinguishes a reassurance strategy from conciliation. He says, "Reassurance is a tactic where one seeks to convince an adversary of one's benign intentions, hoping to forestall aggressive action; conciliation involves offering rewards to an opponent in order to achieve the same result."⁴² Consequently, a reassurance strategy is an effort to compensate for the limitations of deterrence strategy through positive signals rather than negative threats of retaliation or punishment.

There is no one particular reassurance strategy. Reassurance strategy can be implemented through various methods. Stein identifies five reassurance strategies, which cover all possible methods of reassurance strategy: 1) reassurance through restraint; 2) reassurance through norms of competition; 3) reassurance through irrevocable commitment; 4) reassurance through limited security regimes; and 5) reassurance through reciprocal strategies like "Tit for Tat (TFT)"⁴³ or GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction).⁴⁴

⁴² Smith, *Deterring America*, 18.

⁴³ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

⁴⁴ Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 85–134.

2. Condition Variables (CV): Circumstances and Relations Between Sending and Receiving States and Receiving State's Motivating Factors

Condition Variables (CV) help explain the conditions for success or failure of reassurance strategy because they provide the framework to understand how intervening variables are influenced by condition variables and cause the outcome of reassurance strategy. There are two condition variables for reassurance strategy. First, circumstances and relations between sending and receiving states need to be considered. Three main international relations theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide different perspectives to analyze the circumstances. Second, motivating factors are influenced by the circumstances and relations between sending and receiving states. If receiving states have only greedy intentions, the implementation of a reassurance strategy will end in a failure. Receiving states should have insecure and need-oriented motivations or at least mixed intentions for success of the reassurance strategy.

a. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations Between a Sending State and a Receiving State

(1) Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach). According to structuralists, such as realists and neorealists, an increase of military power is the way to achieve security under anarchy. Some may argue that superior military capability brings recognition of the weakness of an adversary, which can lead to the success of reassurance strategy. Others may argue that military parity is an incentive for reassurance strategy. Stein says, “A recent study of United States-Soviet arms control notes that ‘arms control agreements have been concluded only when neither side has an appreciable advantage—that is, only when there already existed rough parity in the relevant forces on the two sides.’”⁴⁵ The Balance of Power between two adversarial countries needs to be considered to understand the conditions for success of reassurance strategy and conditions for success or failure of reassurance strategy.

⁴⁵ Janice Gross Stein, ed. *Getting to the Table* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 131 cited from Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haas, eds, *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight* (Cambridge MA: Ballinger 1987), 330.

(2) Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach). The democratic peace theory argues that democratic states foster *norms of peace* and provide institutional mechanisms to find compromise rather than conflict.⁴⁶ One of the hypotheses of Bruce Russett and John Oneal about economic interdependence and conflict is that “the probability two states will become embroiled in conflict is inversely related to the degree to which they are economically interdependent.”⁴⁷ For example, they argue that economic interdependence is an important factor for a peaceful Northeast Asia and could be a first step toward peace:

In contemporary East Asia, a region that is still far short of a generalized system of virtuous circles and where there are only a minority of stable democracies, the most effective entry point for the promotion of peace may again be through continuing growth in economic interdependence. North Korea, while holding tightly to its authoritarian political system, seems to be inching forward partially opening its closed economy. China, though hardly democratic, now has a ratio of foreign trade to GDP higher than Japan’s and has come far toward a more open economy and better integration into global economic institutions. All the Kantian elements of change remain severely restricted in China, but major improvements have occurred. The strength of internal forces with an interest in maintaining and extending political and economic reforms and constructive engagement in world affairs suggests this is likely to continue.⁴⁸

However, Russett and Oneal are also concerned that there are possibilities of halting or even reversing the peaceful trend because of several circumstances such as “an economic slump, internal political unrest, or a deterioration of relations with the West.”⁴⁹ Due to its prominence in liberal theory, economic interdependence will be examined as a condition variable of reassurance strategy.

Contrary to liberals, neorealists argue that interdependence and trade can promote conflict. Kenneth Waltz argues that interdependence is not necessary for peace and conflict is inevitable without regulation:

⁴⁶ Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 38–39.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

The fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones have been fought within arenas populated by highly similar people whose affairs had become quite closely knit together. It is hard to get a war going unless the potential participants are somehow closely linked. Interdependent states whose relations remain unregulated must experience conflict and will occasionally fall into violence. If regulation is hard to come by, as it is in the relations of states, then it would seem to follow that a lessening of interdependence is desirable.⁵⁰

Kenneth Waltz also argues that interdependence leads to instability and conflict. He says, “Many seem to believe that a growing closeness of interdependence improves the chances of peace. But close interdependence means closeness of contact and raises the prospect of occasional conflict.”⁵¹ The effects of interdependence on the use of reassurance thus need to be investigated.

(3) Identity (from the Social Constructivist Approach). Social constructivism considers state identity to be an important variable, and argues that identities can change in the direction of a larger shared identity or community.⁵² There are two useful articles to study the relationship between the change of identity and resolution of conflict. Janice Gross Stein argues that there are causal relationships among mediation, image change, and conflict resolution. She says, “In all these cases, conflict reduction required more than reciprocation of small concessions in a gradually building process. The core of the solution lies in the often difficult decision by senior leaders to acknowledge, respect, and accommodate different identities and share political power.”⁵³

On the other hand, R. William Ayres focuses on the correlation between image change and conflict resolution:

⁵⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Myth of National Interdependence,” in *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations’ Third Debate*, ed. Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 81.

⁵¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 138.

⁵² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 246–378.

⁵³ Janice Gross Stein, “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 204.

The results sought here are not whether mediation causes image change, which in turn causes resolution (although this argument is made by some scholars—see Stein, 1996), but whether in situations of attempted mediation, image change and resolution are correlated. If the former argument is true (as is argued on the grounds of social psychological theory), the latter must be; if the latter is false, the former’s usefulness is seriously called into question.⁵⁴

In addition, constructivists such as Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil argue that identity change was important at the end of the Cold War.⁵⁵ Kydd also says, “Much of the debate about Soviet motivations in the 1980s was over whether they were being conciliatory because they were simply recognizing a temporary weakness, or because they had experienced a genuine transformation of identity into a state that no longer sought to expand its influence and subvert others.”⁵⁶ This dissertation explores the outcome of reassurance strategy by investigating these kinds of changes in circumstances that can affect intervening variables and the outcome of reassurance strategy.

b. Condition Variable (CV) 2: Receiving State’s Motivating Factors

(1) The Concept of “Motivating Factors.”⁵⁷ Robert Jervis, Charles Glaser, and Janice Gross Stein explain the concept of motivating factors. Robert Jervis divides adversaries into two types, a “status quo state” and an “expansionist state.”⁵⁸ According to Jervis, the deterrence model provides appropriate prescriptions in the latter case, but the spiral model better predicts the results of threat-based strategies in

⁵⁴ William Ayres, “Mediating International Conflicts: Is Image Change Necessary?” *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no.4 (November 1997): 432.

⁵⁵ Koslowski Rey and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System” *International Organization* 48, no2 (1994): 215–247.

⁵⁶ Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 22.

⁵⁷ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59.

⁵⁸ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 100–102.

the former case.⁵⁹ He says, “A major determinant of the effect of threats is the intention of the other side. When faced with an aggressor, threats and force are necessary....On the other hand, when conflict erupts between two status quo powers, the spiral model will probably provide the correct explanation and policy prescription.”⁶⁰ Charles L. Glaser says, “I use the term *greedy* for a state willing to incur costs or risks for nonsecurity expansion; by contrast, a *not-greedy* state is unwilling to run risks for nonsecurity expansion.”⁶¹ Also, Stein divides adversaries’ motivating factors into “need-oriented” and “opportunity-oriented.” She claims that the determination of an adversary’s “motivating factors” is critical for understanding the implementation of either deterrence or reassurance strategies.

In sum, all three explanations are similar and the perception of an adversary’s motivating factors can be divided into two types (Table 1.6):

- 1) Aggressive / Greedy / Opportunity-oriented motivating factors; and
- 2) Status quo / Not-greedy / Need-oriented motivating factors.

Table 1.6. Perceptions of Motivating Factors and Security Policy

Scholars	Motivating Factors	
Robert Jervis	Aggressive	Status quo
Charles Glaser	Greedy	Not-greedy
Janice Gross Stein	Opportunity	Need

(2) The Relationship between Motivating Factors and the Outcome of Reassurance Strategy. Even though, unlike deterrence, reassurance has not received much attention from political scientists and policymakers, those who consider reassurance as an important influence strategy agree that adversarial motives are

⁵⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 58–113.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 101–102.

⁶¹ Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” in *World Politics*, 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 501.

significant for the outcome of reassurance strategy. For example, Janice Gross Stein distinguishes between three scenarios to determine the effectiveness of reassurance strategies. According to Stein:

It is also important to analyze the outcome of reassurance strategies both in and outside the context of deterrence. An adversary's mixture of need and opportunity, for example, may be important in determining the effectiveness of reassurance strategies. If an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs or strategic weakness, then reassurance may be more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence. If adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence. When an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity, reassurance is likely to misfire and encourage the challenge it is desired to prevent.⁶²

I accept Stein's hypothesis for my dissertation and consider the receiving state's motivating factor as one of the condition variables. Alexander George recommends Stein's article as "the best discussion of various reassurance strategies"⁶³ and agrees with the hypothesis. He says, "A hypothesis has been advanced that reassurance of some kind might be more appropriate than deterrence when the adversary's motivation for possibly taking a hostile action is defensive and stems from a sense of weakness, vulnerability, or mistaken concern that hostile actions are about to be directed towards it."⁶⁴

Jervis also says, "...neither theory is confirmed all the time. There are many cases in which arms have been increased, aggressors deterred, significant gains made, without setting off spirals. And there are also many instances in which the use of power and force has not only failed or even left the state worse off than it was originally (both of these outcomes can be explained by deterrence theory), but has led to mutual insecurity and misunderstandings that harmed both sides."⁶⁵ In sum, the receiving state's insecure motivating factor is a necessary condition for success of a reassurance strategy.

⁶² Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 59.

⁶³ George, "Need for Influence," 484, note 4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 466.

⁶⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 84.

(3) Uncertainty about “Motivating Factors.” As explained above, it is possible to distinguish motivating factors in theory. A country’s motives for expansion or security-seeking are important for defense decision-making. However, even though it is possible to differentiate motivating factors and they are important for success and failure of reassurance strategy, it is extremely difficult, almost impossible, to distinguish them in reality. It is clear that most states’ motivating factors do not exist with absolute certainty. Any mixture of two possible factors—need and opportunity—is plausible. Most states can be categorized to be a “greedy,” “not-greedy” or “mixed” state. Strategies have been fluctuating depending on how states assess the situation at a particular point. This changeability is common between adversarial countries.

For example, it is difficult to analyze and predict North Korea’s strategy because North Korea seems to have both opportunity-driven and need-driven motives, and the relative weight of the two are dependent on circumstances. North Korea has not given up its “greedy” motive for expansion. Also, a matter of regime survival and economic need makes North Korea change into a “not-greedy” state, especially after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, we can conclude that North Korea’s strategy is multiple, flexible, and not easily predictable. However, we need to estimate its motivations as best as possible, based on the circumstances because the success or failure of each strategy is dependent on the motives of the receiving states. Each case study will present the evidence for each of the three possible motivations in order to come to at least a rough judgment of the relative balance of greed and insecurity. Stein says, “The important question for strategy, however, is the relative weight of need and opportunity as motivating factors. It is significant because it speaks to the approximate mixture of deterrence with other strategies of conflict management.”⁶⁶

Therefore, this dissertation considers the circumstances and conditions (Condition Variable 1), which impact the motivating factors (Condition

⁶⁶ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance” 30. For more extensive discussion of the interactive effects of need and opportunity as motives to a challenge to deterrence, Stein recommends R.N. Lebow, “Deterrence: A political and psychological critique. In P. Stern, R. Axelrod, R. Jervis, and R. Radner, eds., *Perspectives on Deterrence* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Variable 2) of the receiving state. These two conditions variables frame antecedent conditions that influence the intervening variables, such as the sending state leader's perception, the receiving state leader's perception, the domestic politics of sending and receiving states, and the alliance politics of sending and receiving states. These variables and their relations are important to understand the prospects for the use of reassurance strategy.

3. Intervening Variables (INTV)

a. Sending State Leader's Perceptions about the Receiving State (from the Individual-level Approach)

Scholars had not given enough attention to the impact of the sending state leader's perception of the implementation of the reassurance strategy and its outcome. To study incentives for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy, it is necessary to investigate the sending state leader's perceptions about the receiving state and its leader. Usually, if two parties are in hostile adversary relations, there is only strong negative information about the receiving state. Therefore, it is not easy to catch any change of the target state in terms of the motivating factors. The sending state leader may have only limited information or misperceptions about the receiving state due to lack of sources or faulty assessment of intelligence. For example, Gorbachev believed that Reagan had only expansionist / greedy / opportunity motivating factors at the early stage of the Gorbachev period. The Soviet military and intelligence missed the signs of Reagan's status quo / not-greedy / opportunity-oriented motivating factors. Even so, Gorbachev implemented his reassurance strategy.

That is, some leaders implement reassurance strategy even though there is only negative information about the receiving leader and the receiving state. Therefore, there are two necessary questions to ask: (1) Did the sending state leader still have doubts about the receiving state and its leaders in terms of the motivating factors when implementing reassurance strategy? And (2) Did the sending state leader's perceptions change during the implementation of the reassurance strategy?

For example, Kim Dae Jung implemented his Sunshine policy toward North Korea, even though he was uncertain about Kim Jong Il because there was only negative information available. His perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea changed after their summit meeting. Also, Gorbachev's summit meetings with Reagan provided him opportunities to change his image of Reagan. If a sending state leader confirms that a receiving state leader has status quo / not-greedy / need-oriented motivating factors and willingness to show a positive response, the leader would continue the reassurance strategy and the possibility of the success of the reassurance strategy would increase. When the sending state leader recognizes the receiving state leader as a counterpart with whom to work, he/she is likely to negotiate with that leader to solve conflicting issues rather than to vilify and threaten. In sum, the sending state's leader's perceptions need to be investigated to explore the incentive for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy.

***b. Receiving State Leader's Perceptions about the Sending State
(from the Individual-level Approach)***

The receiving state leader's perceptions about the sending state are also an important variable from the individual-level approach. Even if the sending state implements reassurance strategy based on its own "not-greedy" motivations, it does not mean that the receiving state will interpret it that way. Aside from the "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors of the sending state, the receiving state leader's perceptions are equally crucial. If a receiving state's leader believes that a sending state has expansionist / greedy / opportunity-oriented motivating factors, reassurance strategy is more likely to fail. On the other hand, if the receiving state's leader considers the sending state's status-quo / not-greedy / need-oriented motivating factors, the prospects for success of a reassurance strategy become more positive. Indeed, a major goal of reassurance is to change the target state's image of the sender to one that does not have aggressive intentions.

Even though a leader's belief is difficult to know, it nevertheless plays an important role in success and failure of reassurance strategy. When Stein explains the

psychological factors in deterrence success, she emphasizes that it is important to know “the conditions that arouse deeply felt political needs and strategic fears and their relative impact on leaders’ calculations about a challenge to deterrence.”⁶⁷ Likewise, the heuristics and biases of leaders about sending state’s motivating factors can contribute in important ways to errors that can result in the failure of reassurance strategy. In sum, the issue is whether the receiving state perceives accurately that the sending state’s motivating factors as status quo / not-greedy / need-oriented or it misperceives and discounts or ignores the signal due to conditional factors such as strategic, domestic political and psychological obstacles. The relationship between perceptions of a receiving state’s leader about a sending state’s motivating factors and the implementation of national security policy are shown in the following (Table 1.7):

Table 1.7. Receiving State Leaders’ Perceptions and Prospects for Reassurance Strategy

Receiving state leaders’ perceptions about sending state’s motivating factors	→	Prospects for reassurance strategy
Consider the sending state as expansionist / greedy / opportunity-oriented	→	Less successful
Consider the sending state as status quo / not-greedy / need-oriented	→	More successful
Consider the sending state’s motivating factors as the mixture of greedy and not greedy intentions	→	Partially successful

A leader can be misinformed by the military or intelligence. The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 is an example to show that miscalculation from faulty assessment of military intelligence can promote rather than reduce tension. Stein says, “Prime Minister Nehru and Defense Minister Menon were persuaded that China would want to avoid the condemnation by the nonaligned bloc that would follow if it were to use force. Indian leaders also incorrectly saw themselves as militarily superior and interpreted the apparent Chinese reluctance to fire on the Indian pickets as evidence of

⁶⁷ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 24.

fear of military defeat.”⁶⁸ According to Stein, the cause of this misperception was “a series of self-serving and unrealistic intelligence reports from a highly politicized military bureaucracy.”⁶⁹ The impact of psychological and organizational biases on the adversary leader’s decision making is important in determining whether reassurance strategy will succeed or not.

c. Domestic Politics of the Sending State (from the Domestic-level Approach)

Domestic politics in the sending state is also an important intervening variable for success or failure of reassurance strategy. It can provide the incentive for use by the sending state or constrain the leader’s ability to implement reassurance strategy. Thus, this dissertation investigates the impact of domestic politics of the sending state on the success of reassurance strategy. There are several examples to show the importance of domestic politics of the sending state. Stein says, “Like deterrence, outside the laboratory reassurance through irrevocable commitment also requires a degree of freedom from domestic political and bureaucratic constraints.”⁷⁰ She explains that Sadat could make an irrevocable commitment by visiting Jerusalem because he had great autonomy in decision making after the 1973 October War.⁷¹ Larson considers Khrushchev’s victory against Malenkov in the Kremlin power struggle as the main reason for the Soviet shift on Austria:

The military objected to Malenkov’s efforts to reduce defense expenditures. Khrushchev agreed that Soviet defenses required further strengthening....Khrushchev’s advocacy of renewed emphasis on the priority of heavy industry enabled him to gain the support of Molotov, Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Lazar Kanovich, a majority of the Presidium. The army, fed by heavy-industry products, also allied with Khrushchev against Malenkov.⁷²

⁶⁸ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 38.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 44.

⁷¹ Ibid., 44–45.

⁷² Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” *International Organization*, 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987), 44–45.

Larson's comparison of the political situation under Khrushchev to that under Malenkov shows how domestic politics play a role in reassurance strategy:

By forging a broad coalition including old Stalinists and the military as well as the government and economic elite, Khrushchev was in a political position to make the concessions required for détente with the United States. In contrast, having united the hard-liners and armed forces against him through his consumer goods policy, Malenkov was unable to go beyond symbolic tension-reduction gestures that did not succeed in undermining Western suspicion.⁷³

Larson emphasizes the importance of analysis of domestic politics to understand Khrushchev's policy:

Thus, to explain the Austrian State Treaty and other of Khrushchev's major innovations in Soviet foreign policy, one must go to the decision-making level of analysis and examine the dynamics of the process by which Khrushchev formed a domestic coalition.⁷⁴

The Sunshine Policy in South Korea is another example to show the impact of domestic political constraints on the success of reassurance strategy. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung implemented the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. There was a summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in 2000. One of the agreements at the 2000 summit meeting was Kim Jong-Il's visit to Seoul: "President Kim Dae Jung cordially invited National Defense Commission chairman Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong Il decided to visit Seoul at an appropriate time."⁷⁵

Actually, the second summit meeting between South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il was held in Pyongyang instead of Seoul in October 2007. There are many reasons to explain why Kim Jong Il could not visit Seoul. One of them was the domestic politics of South Korea. Anti-communism, especially anti-North Korean conservatism has been the dominant ideology in South Korean politics since the

⁷³ Larson, "Crisis Prevention," 58.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, New ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 431.

Korean War. Progressives in South Korea appeared upon the scene of South Korean politics after the transition to democracy in 1987, but conservative ideology is still strong in South Korean politics because of the existence of North Korea. Therefore, one of the main characteristics of South Korean domestic politics is debate between conservatives and progressives.⁷⁶ Conservatives consider North Korea a menacing threat and they have criticized the Sunshine Policy. On the other hand, progressives see North Korea as a brother nation expected to live as one after unification. They have supported the Sunshine Policy.⁷⁷ Therefore, the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun toward to North Korea were implemented under the conservative-progressive split. Kim Jong Il might have considered this political situation in South Korea in a negative light and decided not to visit Seoul because of anticipated protests by the strong conservatives in South Korea.

Consequently, this dissertation considers the influence of domestic politics of the sending state as an important variable to lead to success or failure of reassurance strategy. Thus, it investigates the impact of domestic support on the perceptions of the receiving state and, eventually, the outcome of reassurance strategy.

d. Domestic Politics of the Receiving State (from the Domestic-level Approach)

This hypothesis is similar with one of propositions of Lebow and Stein in *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* They say, “Reassurance is more likely to succeed when an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs and/or strategic weakness.”⁷⁸ Stein points out that quantitative studies of deterrence have not systematically investigated the impact of domestic political factors on the outcome of deterrence.⁷⁹ Just like deterrence, analyses of reassurance strategy need to look at the

⁷⁶ Haesook Chae and Steven Kim, “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 31, no.4 (Autumn 2008): 77–95.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁷⁸ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990), 73.

⁷⁹ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 34.

relationship between domestic politics and the outcome of reassurance both systematically and empirically. Deborah Welch Larson and Janice Gross Stein explain the importance of domestic politics of the receiving state on success of reassurance strategy.

(1) Larson's Causal Discussion of GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction)⁸⁰ in the Austrian State Treaty. In *Alternative to War or Surrender*, Charles E. Osgood argues that the way to halt the spiral of continuous tension is "taking the initiative, not by creating threats and tensions but by reducing and controlling them."⁸¹ He used *Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction (GRIT)* as a technical term for this type of policy. The main idea is "unilateral initiative."⁸² The initiator of a GRIT strategy announces in advance that it will carry out a series of unilateral conciliatory actions and invite but does not expect the immediate reciprocation of the other side.⁸³

Larson discusses the process and causal mechanisms of signing the Austrian State Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. She argues that "GRIT better explains the Austrian State Treaty because departure from a strict tit-for-tat strategy of contingent concessions was required to elicit U.S. reciprocated cooperation in signing the treaty and agreeing to a summit meeting."⁸⁴ She points out several differences between GRIT and the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The main differences are no assumption of immediate reciprocation, public statement, diversification of issues, and moderately risky concessions:⁸⁵

On the other hand, GRIT differs from tit for tat in several ways. First, unlike the tit for tat, GRIT does not assume that the other side will

⁸⁰ Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962), 6.

⁸¹ Ibid., 85–86.

⁸² Ibid., 86.

⁸³ Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 56.

⁸⁴ Larson, "Crisis Prevention," 29.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 32–3.

immediately reciprocate....Persisting in conciliatory acts despite ridicule or dismissal from the recipient helps to convince the other side of one's good faith.⁸⁶

Second, GRIT requires the decision maker to state publicly that the series of moves is intended to reduce tension, whereas tit for tat communicates mainly through the pattern of rewards and punishments. By incorporating a public statement, GRIT diminishes uncertainty and puts additional pressure on the other side to reciprocate by making salient the norm of reciprocity: public opinion generally favors returning "good for good and evil for evil."⁸⁷

Third, GRIT spreads concessions over different issue-areas or geographic areas where tit for tat makes no provision for increasing the level of locus of cooperation....In addition, consistent conciliatory behavior over different modalities creates the impression of sincerity and fosters trust.

Fourth, GRIT concessions must be moderately risky to engender trust....If the concessions involve some cost, they are less likely to be dismissed as having ulterior motives and more likely to elicit reciprocal cooperation.⁸⁸

One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to investigate the causal mechanism of domestic politics of the receiving state for the success of reassurance strategy. The four differences between GRIT and TFT are directly related to causal mechanisms between reassurance strategy and its success.

(2) Stein's Discussion of "Reassurance through Irrevocable Commitment." In addition, a dramatic, unilateral action of the sending state can have an impact on domestic politics of the receiving state. For example, Egyptian President Sadat's speech to Israel's parliament influenced Israel's public. Stein analyzes success of the reassurance strategy of Sadat and introduces several factors of it. Most of the factors are related to the domestic politics of Israel. She says:

⁸⁶ Larson, "Crisis Prevention," 32, referring to Harold H. Kelley, "Attribution in Social Interaction," in Edward E. Jones et al., eds., *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning, 1971).

⁸⁷ Ibid., 33, referring to Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review* 25 (April 1960): 161–178.

⁸⁸ Ibid., referring to Osgood, "Winning the Real War with Communism," 316; Dean G. Pruitt, *Negotiation Behavior* (New York: Academic, 1981), 124–25; S.S. Komorita, "Concession-making and Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17 (1973), 745–62; Robert L. Swinth, "The Establishment of the Trust Relationship," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11 (1967), 335–344.

Why did reassurance succeed? Several factors were at play, some general and some specific to the historical context. First, the initiative was irreversible....Israel's leadership and public recognized the irreversibility of the action and, consequently, gave it great weight.

Second, the substantial cost to President Sadat of breaking the long-standing Arab taboo of not dealing directly Israel was also apparent to Israel's leaders....Israel's leaders reasoned that Egypt's president would not incur such heavy costs were he not sincere.

Third, Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem challenged the most important set of beliefs about Arab goals among Israel's leadership and public....Once these core beliefs were shaken, it became easier for Israelis, as cognitive psychologists predict, to revise associated assumptions and expectations.

Fourth, President Sadat spoke over the heads of Israel's leadership directly to Israel's public. With his flair for the dramatic, he created the psychological and political symbols that would mobilize Israel's citizens to press their more cautious and restrained leaders....The strategy of reassurance had multiple audiences and multiple constituencies.

Fifth, the president of Egypt adopted a strategy of reassurance only when he judged that the conflict between Egypt and Israel had "ripened for resolution."⁸⁹ In 1977, both leaders shared a common aversion to war. Sadat's initiative took place after a war that both sides lost.⁹⁰

As shown above, domestic politics of the receiving state play an important role in the success of a reassurance strategy. Changing the views of domestic audiences can be necessary to reassurance success, and domestic actors can even pressure a relevant leader to respond positively. In other cases, domestic constraints may prevent a receiving state's leader from reciprocating. This dissertation further investigates how reassurance strategy influences domestic politics of the receiving state and what the general causal mechanisms are.

⁸⁹ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) and Janice Gross Stein, "The Alchemy of Peacemaking: The Prerequisites and Co-requisites of Progress in the Arab-Israel Conflict," *International Journal* 38 (Autumn 1983): 531–555.

⁹⁰ Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 43–44.

e. Alliance Politics of the Sending State (from International-level Approach)

Scholars have not given enough attention to the impact of alliance politics of the sending state in the implementation and outcome of the reassurance strategy. The influence of alliance partners creates different contexts within the reassurance strategy. The sending state can be constrained from fully implementing reassurance strategy because the receiving state can also be threatened by the allies of the sending state. The relations among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States are a good example. Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea were constrained by the Bush administration's hard-line policy toward North Korea. Therefore, alliance politics of the sending state are added as one of the intervening variables between the implementation and the outcome of the reassurance strategy.

f. Alliance Politics of the Receiving State (from International-level Approach)

Just as there has been lack of study of the impacts of alliance politics of the sending state on the implementation and the outcome of reassurance strategy, the impacts of alliance politics of the receiving state have not been researched sufficiently by scholars. The influence of the allies of the receiving state plays a role when exploring the outcome of reassurance strategy. Therefore, the perceptions of the allies of the receiving state about the reassurance strategy of the sending state are important. Also, how much the allies of the receiving state can influence the receiving state for reciprocity also needs to be considered. For example, the United State has tried to solve the North Korean nuclear problem with the help of China, North Korea's ally, through the Six-Party Talks. China's perceptions of the United States' reassurance strategy and its level of influence on North Korea are crucial to evaluate how much the efforts of the United States can lead to success. Therefore, alliance politics of the receiving state should be included to explore the outcome of the reassurance strategy.

4. Dependent Variable (DV): Success or Failure of Reassurance Strategy

It is not easy to distinguish the success and failure of reassurance strategy in reality. The debate between Montgomery and Shiping Tang shows the difficulty. Criticizing Montgomery's claim that reassurance rarely works, Tang says, "...other examples of successful reassurance include the détente between Britain and France before World War I, the reconciliation between Germany and France after World War II, the emerging strategic partnership between post-Soviet Russia and China, the rapprochement between China and Vietnam, and the forging of a partnership between Argentina and Brazil."⁹¹ Montgomery responds that "...I believe Tang has confused my explicit and modest goal of examining military reassurance with the daunting task of explaining rivalry termination. Even a quick glance at his suggested examples of successful reassurance bears this out. For example, the pre-World War I détente between Britain and France and the post-World War II reconciliation of France and Germany were largely a reaction to the rise of Germany and the Soviet Union, respectively, not to military reassurance." This debate shows the necessity to decide on the scope of success or failure of reassurance strategy.

Compared to the success or failure of deterrence strategy, it is relatively easier to decide whether there is a success or failure of reassurance strategy. If there is no response to deterrence strategy, it is difficult to judge the outcome. However, in reassurance strategy, no response means a failure of reassurance strategy. Consequently, this dissertation codes success and failure of reassurance strategy for the purpose of analysis. Then, it selects cases to fit into those categories.

a. Success of Reassurance Strategy: Tension Reduction Through Positive Response from the Receiving State and No War

Because both avoidance of war and reduction of tensions are the main objectives of reassurance strategy, these are evaluated to decide the success of reassurance strategy. Tension reduction by getting any positive response from the

⁹¹ Shiping Tang and Evan Braden Montgomery, "Correspondence: Uncertainty and Reassurance in International Politics," *International Security* 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 196.

receiving state or concluding any treaty with the receiving state can be considered as a success of reassurance strategy. For example, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was not successful in the early period. After the second-term Reagan administration responded positively and sought some compromise, the possibility of total war between the United States and the Soviet Union became less plausible. This is a typical example of successful reassurance strategy.

Most scholars consider Gorbachev's reassurance strategy as a successful case because there was no war, and it reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had sent "costly signals" between 1985 and 1989. Costly signals are "signals designed to persuade the other side that one is trustworthy by virtue of the fact that they [the signals] are so costly that one would hesitate to send them if one were untrustworthy."⁹² Kydd argues that "the Soviet Union changed from an expansionist state to security seeker, but that this change was not transparent. Therefore, Gorbachev implemented a policy of costly signals to reassure the West."⁹³ Kydd points to three events as clear examples of costly signals showing the changes of Soviet intentions. The three examples are "the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the 1988 withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement of conventional force reductions, and the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe."⁹⁴ These three events made the United States change its perception of the Soviet's motivating factors.

The Reagan administration adopted "a much more accommodationist approach"⁹⁵ to the Soviet Union and showed positive responses. Negotiation is the typical example of the implementation of reassurance strategy and a precondition of its success. Reagan suggested that "the United States would seek to reduce the cost of

⁹² Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," 326.

⁹³ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*, 26.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 215.

⁹⁵ James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 139.

national security ‘in negotiations with the Soviet Union.’”⁹⁶ Reagan had five meetings with Gorbachev between 1985 and 1988, more than any other American president.⁹⁷

The second and third summits were the most important ones for success of reassurance strategy. The 1986 Reykjavik summit focused on nuclear arms talks and agreed “in principle to reduce all strategic nuclear weapons 50 percent over a five-year period and to limit intermediate-range nuclear forces to 100 warheads for each side.”⁹⁸ The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was signed at the third summit in 1987.⁹⁹ The Soviet Union removed Soviet SS-20s that could target Western Europe and the United States removed American Pershing and cruise missiles it had deployed in Western Europe. In addition, negotiations toward the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) began during the second Reagan administration and START I was signed in July 1991.¹⁰⁰ The significant change of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1985 and 1989 period is an example of the success of reassurance strategy.

b. *Failure of Reassurance Strategy: No Response or Rejection from the Receiving State, Tension Increase, or War*

If there is no response to deterrence strategy from the other side, it is difficult to decide whether the strategy is a success or failure. Contrary to deterrence strategy, reassurance fails when there are no responses from the receiving state and no relationship change between the two countries. However, it is necessary to decide the scope of time because a successful case in a short period can be interpreted as an unsuccessful case over a long period.

⁹⁶ McCormick, *American Foreign Policy*, 139.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 140–1 and Richard Crockatt, “The End of the Cold War,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 3rd ed., ed., John Baylis and Steven Smith (Oxford: Oxford Press University, 2005), 121.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 141, cited from “The Reykjavik Meeting,” *GIST* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, December 1986), 11.

⁹⁹ Crockatt, “The End of the Cold War,” 121.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

For example, according to Larson, the Austrian State Treaty is an example of successful reassurance strategy under Khrushchev.¹⁰¹ She says, “The period of détente following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in itself contributed to preventing crises....The tensions are now relaxed.”¹⁰² However, the arms control proposal of Khrushchev in 1955 after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was rejected by the United States. Montgomery says, “Despite substantial reductions in the size of the Soviet military, these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.”¹⁰³ Overall, Khrushchev’s reassurance strategy was a failure because the United States considered his concessions as propaganda. Also, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union did not change that much after his proposal. Montgomery says, “Khrushchev’s troop reductions therefore did not reassure the United States and did not function as costly signals.”¹⁰⁴ Even though the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was a successful case of reassurance strategy in the beginning of Khrushchev’s period, Khrushchev’s reassurance as a whole was a failure.

There are similar cases between South Korea and North Korea. The first agreement between the two Koreas after the Korean War was the “July 4 Joint Statement” in 1972. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung proposed a meeting with South Korea on August 6, 1971.¹⁰⁵ Kim Il Sung said, “We are ready to establish contact at any time with all political parties, including the [ruling] Democratic Republican Party, and all social organizations and individual personages in South Korea.”¹⁰⁶ After the proposal, there was the historic initial secret meeting between Kim Il Sung and Lee Hu Rak, director of the South Korean intelligence agency, before the announcement of the joint statement. The discussion between North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and the second most powerful figure in South Korea showed the agreement on independence:

¹⁰¹ Larson, “Crisis Prevention,” 56.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma,” 174.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 177.

¹⁰⁵ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 12.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Lee: President Park Chung Hee and I believe unification should be achieved by ourselves without interference of the four powers [the United States, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union].... We are never front men of the United States or Japan. We believe we should resolve our issues by ourselves....

Kim: Our position is to oppose reliance on external forces on the issue of unification. This is where I agree with Park Chung Hee....

Lee: I'd like to tell you that President Park is a person who detests foreign interference most.

Kim: That being so, we are already making progress to solve the issue. Let us exclude foreign forces. Let's not fight. Let's unite as a nation. Let's not take issue with communism or capitalism.¹⁰⁷

Three principles of the July 4 Joint Statement declared the goal of independent unification and peaceful relationship between the two Koreas:

First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another.

Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.¹⁰⁸

Contrary to the two Koreas' agreement, the North Korean visit to Seoul showed the difficulty of reconciliation and ended in the failure of reassurance. The South Korean government had purposely decided to televise the highly ideological Northerners' speeches live because they believed that the northerners would offend most of the conservative South Korean public.¹⁰⁹ The North Korean political advisor, Kibok Yun, attacked the United States and praised Kim Il Sung as "the Great Leader."¹¹⁰ After the

¹⁰⁷ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 23.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

live television speech by the highly ideological political advisor, the South Koreans were offended and scared because they were fearful of communism and trusted their strong friendship with the United States.¹¹¹ In sum, even though the “July 4 Joint Statement” was the first successful agreement between the two Koreas, it was an example of a failure of reassurance because the relationship did not progress and tension instead increased.

Consequently, the progress of the relationship between the two countries is an important factor in deciding whether it is a success or failure of reassurance strategy. Specifically, the conclusion of agreements or treaties, change of frequency of crises, and change in public statements are considered in the dissertation as signs of improvement in the relationship between the two countries.

G. RESEARCH METHODS

1. Case Methods: “Structured, Focused Comparison”

a. The Method and Logic of “Structured, Focused Comparison”

The main research method in this dissertation is “structured, focused comparison.” This method helps analyze reassurance strategy “in ways that would draw the explanations of each case of a particular phenomenon into a broader, more complex theory.”¹¹² Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explained this method in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*:

The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible.

¹¹¹ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 30.

¹¹² George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 67.

The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases.¹¹³

b. *Strengths of Case Methods and Purpose of the Dissertation*

The reason for using case study methods with structured, focused comparison is that strengths of case study methods coincide with the purpose of the dissertation. George and Bennett explain four strong advantages of case methods: “their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.”¹¹⁴ These advantages match with the purposes of my dissertation (Table 1.8).

Table 1.8. Strengths of Case Study Methods and Purposes of the Dissertation

Strengths of Case Study Methods	Purposes of the dissertation
Conceptual validity	Demonstrate conceptual validity of reassurance strategy
Deriving new hypotheses	Derive new hypotheses on success and failure of reassurance strategy
Exploring causal mechanisms	Explore causal mechanisms between reassurance strategy and the outcome of reassurance strategy
Modeling and assessing complex causal relations	Model and assess complex causal relations among variables

This dissertation tried to achieve conceptual validity of reassurance strategy and explore causal mechanisms between the reassurance strategy and the outcome of reassurance strategy. Also, there are new hypotheses related to success or

¹¹³ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 19.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 67.

failure of reassurance strategy. Finally, it proposes a framework to model and assess causal relations among variables. Therefore, the primary method in this dissertation is “structured, focused comparison”¹¹⁵ as outlined by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett.

b. Questions¹¹⁶

Based on “the diagram of the main argument and hypotheses” (Figure 1.1), similar questions are asked of each of the cases in order to explore similarities and differences among them. The process is used to develop “contingent generalizations” about conditions that affect the outcomes of reassurance strategy. This method requires the detailed examination of individual cases and helps identify variables and the causal mechanism and relationship between variables. Therefore, general questions can be asked depending on variables in this dissertation.

(1) Independent Variable (IV): The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy (the Sending State). Reassurance strategy is defined as actions taken with the aim of persuading the receiving state of evidence of the sender’s benign intentions to refrain from military action or an escalation in tensions. That is, one of critical questions is whether the sending state offers a reassurance strategy to ameliorate “the source of hostility”¹¹⁷ driven by the vulnerability and weakness of the receiving state. Assuming that the receiving state has a “not-greedy” motivating factor arising from vulnerability, the receiving state will not respond positively to serious threats to its sovereignty from the sending state. Which reassurance strategy was perceived as solving the security concern of the receiving state is an important question to ask. It is difficult for the sending state to give an absolute security guarantee to the receiving state at the

¹¹⁵ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 19.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 86, claim that “the proper focusing and structuring of the comparison requires a fine-tuned set of general questions.” Stephen R. Rock suggests seven general questions related to an appeasement policy example in *Appeasement in International Politics*. Some of my questions are similar with his general questions. Refer to, Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 17–20 (see Appendix B).

¹¹⁷ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” *Journal of Social Issues*, 43, no. 4 (1987): 40.

beginning of implementation of a reassurance strategy. Therefore, how the receiving state perceives the reassurance strategy of the sending state from the perspective of its own security is important. In sum, the concept of security guarantee or co-existence in reassurance strategy is important to satisfy the receiving state's concerns:

Question 1: Did the sending state's reassurance strategy communicate its willingness to offer a security guarantee to or accept co-existence with the receiving state?

Also, it is essential to ask a question about the incentive for the use of reassurance strategy which should explain the context and background of the implementation of the reassurance strategy:

Question 2: What was the incentive for the use of a reassurance strategy?

As explained earlier, there is no one particular reassurance strategy. Reassurance strategy can be implemented through Stein's five reassurance strategies, which cover all possible methods of reassurance strategy: 1) reassurance through restraint; 2) reassurance through norms of competition; 3) reassurance through irrevocable commitment; 4) reassurance through limited security regimes; and 5) reassurance through reciprocal strategies like 'tit for tat (TFT)' or GRIT (Gradual Reciprocation in Tension-reduction).¹¹⁸

Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did the sending state offer to the receiving state?

(b) Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations between a Sending State and a Receiving State. Before exploring the causal mechanism between reassurance strategy and its outcomes, it is necessary to understand the circumstances and relationships between a sending state and a receiving state in order to investigate how those affect both the leader's decision about how to respond to

¹¹⁸ Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 85–134.

reassurance strategy and the success or failure of reassurance strategy in the end. Therefore, the following questions should be asked:

Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between the sending state and receiving state over the time period a reassurance strategy was attempted?

- Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the “balance of power” between the two countries? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence the balance of power affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state?
- Question 4-b (from the Liberal Approach): What was the level of “interdependence” between the two countries? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state?
- Question 4-c (from the Constructivist Approach): To what extent was there a shared identity or norms between the two countries? Was the degree of shared understanding changing and if so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity/norms affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state?

(3) Condition Variable (CV) 2: Receiving State’s Motivating Factors. It is difficult to know the adversaries’ motivating factors. However, the determination of an adversary’s “motivating factors” is critical for understanding the implementation of reassurance strategy:

Question 5: What were the receiving state’s motivations? Is the state best seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was the sending state’s perception of the receiving’s motivations?

Also, an aversion to war is another factor to understand motivations. Thus:

Question 5: Did the two parties share an aversion to war?

(4) Intervening Variable (IntV) 1: Sending State Leader's Perceptions about the Receiving State and its Leader (from the Individual Level Approach). The sending state leader's beliefs and perceptions are changeable. When the sending state leader initiates the reassurance strategy, he or she may still have doubts about the receiving state and its leaders. Hence:

Question 7: How did the sending state's leader perceive the receiving state and its leader? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led the sending state leader to misperceive the receiving state's leader? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome the sending state leader's cognitive barriers to changing his/her image of the receiving state?

(5) Intervening Variable (IntV) 2: Receiving State Leader's Perception about the Sending State and its Leader (from the Individual Level). The receiving state leader's beliefs and perceptions is a critical intervening variable for the success of reassurance strategy. Hence:

Question 8: How did the receiving state's leader perceive the reassurance strategy offered by the sending state? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led the receiving state to discount the reassurance strategy? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome the receiver's cognitive barriers to changing its image of the sender?

(6) Intervening Variable (IntV) 3: Domestic Politics of the Sending State (from the Domestic Level Approach). The sending state can implement reassurance strategy without strong support from its own domestic politics. However, this situation will give suspicion to the receiving state and end in failure of the reassurance strategy. For example, Gorbachev had difficulty in persuading the Soviet military and party members to implement a reassurance strategy. There was even a military coup attempt. South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were criticized by the opposition party about their Sunshine Policy. Even though there has been some progress in the relationship between the two Koreas, tension has not been reduced significantly. Hence, the following questions should be asked:

Question 9: How did domestic politics of the sending state react to the reassurance strategy offer to the receiving state? Was there sufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

(7) Intervening Variable (IntV) 4: Domestic Politics of the Receiving State (from the Domestic Level Approach). Leaders in the receiving state play an important role in responding to reassurance strategy. However, leaders cannot decide the way to respond without considering domestic politics. Therefore, the domestic politics of the receiving state is another critical intervening variable for success of reassurance strategy. Questions related to domestic politics of the receiving state are:

Question 10: How did key domestic actors in the receiving state perceive the reassurance strategy offered by the sending state? Did the reassurance strategy generate domestic support in the receiving state for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try to prevent the receiving state from offering a positive response?

(8) Intervening Variable (IntV) 5: Alliance Politics of the Sending State (from the International Level Approach). The perceptions of the allies of the sending state and their level of influence need to be considered. Questions related to alliance politics of the sending state are:

Question 11: How did key allies of the sending state affect the reassurance strategy to the receiving state? Was there sufficient alliance support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

(9) Intervening Variable (IntV) 6: Alliance Politics of the Receiving State (from the International Level Approach). Alliance politics of the receiving states also plays a role in the outcome of the reassurance strategy. Hence the following questions should be asked:

Question 12: How did key allies of the receiving state perceive the reassurance strategy? Did the reassurance strategy generate alliance support for the receiving state's reciprocity? Did key allies try to prevent the receiving state from offering a positive response?

(10) Dependent Variable (DV): Success or Failure of Reassurance Strategy. As explained earlier, if there is a positive response to the reassurance strategy followed by tension reduction, it can be categorized as a success. On the contrary, if there is no response or rejection from the receiving state, it is a failure of reassurance strategy. Hence, the questions relating the success or failure of reassurance strategy are as follows:

Question 13: Was there any positive response to the reassurance strategy from the receiving state? Or, was there no response or rejection from the receiving state, followed by an increase in tensions?

Consequently, this dissertation has total of 13 questions to use a “structured, focused comparison” method outlined by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett as the primary method. Each question will be applied to case studies and answers will be compared.

2. Case Selection

This dissertation plans to find successful and unsuccessful cases of reassurance strategy and to identify “contingent generalizations.” Even though some scholars believe that it is difficult to research reassurance strategy, there are cases to show success and failure of reassurance strategy in adversarial relations. Three adversarial relations cases are selected in this dissertation to fulfill the requirements of a “structured, focused comparison”: 1) South Korea and North Korea: Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Kim Il Sung; 2) the United States and North Korea: George W. Bush, and Kim Jong Il; and 3) the United States and the Soviet Union: Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.

These three cases are selected because each case had a different outcome. Also, all variables can be compared across these cases. The first case study, South Korea’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy) seems to be a partly successful case. The relationship between the United States and North Korea during the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008 shows an unsuccessful case of reassurance strategy. Finally, the

relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Gorbachev and Reagan period seems to be a success. In sum, this dissertation tries to find the incentives for and conditions of success of reassurance strategy by comparing these three cases—partial success, failure, and success—by explaining why reassurance strategy led to different outcomes.

H. OUTLINE

This dissertation is divided into three main parts. As discussed so far, Chapter I introduces the motivation for the research and explains the research questions, hypotheses and research methods. Chapters II, III, and IV are case studies. Chapter II is a partial success of reassurance strategy of South Korea toward North Korea (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea). Chapter III is a failure case of reassurance strategy of the United States toward North Korea (Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea in 2007 and 2008). Chapter IV is a success case of reassurance strategy of the Soviet Union toward the United States (Gorbachev's reassurance strategy). The same hypotheses and research method of a "structured, focused comparison" will be applied to the case studies.

Finally, in Chapter V, research findings will be compared to explain the conditions and causal mechanisms of reassurance strategy outcomes and patterns of success and failure of reassurance strategy. This dissertation argues that reassurance strategy can succeed, but only when several conditions are met. Leader's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending and receiving state need to be supportive for the success of reassurance strategy. Also, it finds that each leader's beliefs and perceptions are the most important variables. Lastly, it recommends an appropriate policy based on the findings. The motivating factors of the target state should be investigated fully and objectively because the reassurance strategy will success only when the state has "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors. Also, an eclectic and broad approach including leader's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending and receiving states is necessary to analyze conditions for success or failure and predict the outcome.

II. CASE I: A PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL REASSURANCE STRATEGY CASE (KIM DAE JUNG’S “SUNSHINE POLICY” AND ROH MOO HYUN’S “PEACE AND PROSPERITY POLITY”)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. A Partial Successful Reassurance Strategy Case Between South Korea and North Korea

The prospects for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula remain highly unpredictable, and a solution to achieve Korean unification seems as far off as it did after the Korean War. Even though there have been many debates over policy in the Korean peninsula, no strategy to reduce tensions has seemed plausible. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang described the debate over North Korea perfectly in the beginning of their co-authored book, *Nuclear North Korea*.

Put two people in a room to discuss North Korea and three different opinions will emerge—all likely to be charged with emotion, if not outright vitriol. Why? Because the debate on the Democratic People’s Republic Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has emerged in the past decade as one of the most divisive foreign policy issues for the United States and its allies in Asia.¹¹⁹

Even though many different policy options have been considered by scholars and decision makers, the most dominant strategy of South Korea to prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea has been deterrence through hard power, mainly military power. However, two former South Korean presidents’ policies toward North Korea—Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy between 1998 and 2003 and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy between 2003 and 2008—were different from deterrence strategy. Their policies are good examples of reassurance strategy because Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun tried to persuade North Korea that there were no intentions to attack North Korea

¹¹⁹ Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1.

and that they wanted to reduce tensions and avoid war through engagement and coexistence rather than coercion and efforts to topple the North Korean regime.

The results of Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy are very controversial. There was some progress toward reconciliation and peace between the two Koreas. For example, there were the first two summit meetings in 2000 and 2007 between the two Koreas. During the summit meetings, leaders of the two Koreas agreed on the 2000 Joint Declaration and the October 4 declaration, respectively. Also, during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, trade and interchange of people between the two Koreas increased significantly. However, there were not only positive results but also continuous provocative actions by North Korea and political and military tensions between the two Koreas. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear threat was the primary threat to stability on the Korean peninsula, and it proved very difficult to solve.

Consequently, Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy achieved some objectives, yet there was no significant tension reduction on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, they can be considered as partially successful cases of reassurance strategy. This chapter investigates the conditions and outcomes of Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy in an effort to understand what factors are associated with the success or failure of a reassurance strategy.

2. Variables

Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy during the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998 – 2003) and the Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003 – 2008) can be drawn in a diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). The independent variable is the implementation of a reassurance strategy, such as the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy; and the dependent variable is the success or failure of those strategies.

There are six intervening variables that influence the dependent variable: (1) the South Korean leader's beliefs and perceptions about North Korea and its leader; (2) the North Korean leader's beliefs and perceptions about South Korea and its leader; (3) the domestic politics of South Korea; (4) the domestic politics of North Korea; (5) the alliance politics of South Korea; and (6) the alliance politics of North Korea. Also, two condition variables—the circumstances and relations between South Korea and North Korea and North Korea's motivating factors—are included in the hypotheses. In sum, the hypotheses and all variables can be drawn as in Figures 2.1 and 2.2:




Figure 2.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Van Evera, *Guidance to Methods*, 7–48.




Figure 2.2. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the Receiving State, and CV)

3. Hypotheses

The main focus of this dissertation is on the conditions that lead to success or failure of reassurance strategy. The hypotheses of this case study are as follows:

H1: South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to succeed if it altered the South Korean leader's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

H2: South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to succeed if it altered Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea.

H3: South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to succeed if it altered domestic politics in South Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to succeed if it altered domestic politics in North Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy) was more likely to succeed if it altered alliance politics of South Korea (the United States) towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity policy) was more likely to succeed if it altered alliance politics of North Korea (China and Russia) towards support for foreign policy change.

If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of South Korea's reassurance strategy (Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy) would have been influenced by the six intervening variables (leader's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of South Korea and North Korea). For the full success of South Korea's reassurance strategy, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations should have tried to influence Kim Jong Il's perceptions and the domestic politics and the alliance politics of both South Korea and North Korea.

4. Chronology

A chronological narrative of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations will clarify the main argument and hypothesis with various variables. The main events are combinations of success and failure of reassurance strategy which show

that Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy were partially successful cases of a reassurance strategy.

Table 2.1. The Kim Dae Jung Administration (1998–2003)

1998	February 25	Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as South Korea's 15th President and introduced his Sunshine Policy.
1999	June 7-15	Several North Korean ships provoked a nine-day naval confrontation in the Yellow Sea. On June 15, there was an exchange of gunfire between the two Korea's ships. One North Korean torpedo boat was sunk and another large patrol craft was seriously damaged by South Korean warships. ¹²¹
2000	June 13-15	Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang and had a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il presented the 2000 Joint Declaration.
	September 25-26	An inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting was held for the first time ever on Cheju island, South Korea.
	October 9-12	Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, North Korea's second-highest ranking military and civilian official visited the United States.
	October 13	Kim Dae Jung was selected for the 2000 Nobel peace prize.
	October 23-25	Madeleine Albright, the former U.S. Secretary of State visited Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang
2001	January 20	George W. Bush took office and U.S. policy toward North Korea was reconsidered.
2002	January 29	Bush called North Korea part of an "Axis of Evil" in the Union address.
	June 29	There was a naval skirmish near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. Six South Koreans and an underdetermined number of North Koreans were killed.
	October 3-4	When James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang, Kang Sok Ju, first vice-minister for foreign affairs acknowledged the nuclear program and requested security guarantee.

¹²¹ The Republic of Korea Navy, ROK Navy History, http://www.navy.mil.kr/english/sub_guide/sub_data.jsp?menu=3 (accessed on June 16, 2009).

Table 2.2. The Roh Moo Hyun Administration (2003–2008)

2003	February 25	Roh Moo Hyun inaugurated as South Korea’s 16th President and introduced his Peace and Prosperity Policy.
2004	May 26 and June 3-4	The first and second general level talks were held to prevent another skirmish and reduce tension in the West Sea
2006	July 4	North Korea test-fired six short- and medium-range missiles and one long-range missile. ¹²²
	October 9	North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
2007	October 2-4	The second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was held. Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il presented the October 4 Declaration.
	November 27-29	The second defense ministerial talks were held to support the implementation of the October 4 Declaration.

B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV): THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY (THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY POLICY)

1. Coexistence and Security Guarantee

Question 1: Did Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy communicate the South Korean leaders’ willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to North Korea?

¹²² According to Steven A. Hildreth, ballistic missiles are classified by range as follows: Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) = 150–799kms; Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) = 800–2,399kms; Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) = 2,400–5,499kms; and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles (ICRBMs) = 5,500kms and greater. Refer to “North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” *CRS Report for Congress*, February 24, 2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 1.

a. Acceptance of Coexistence

The first question regarding the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity policy is whether the policies communicated willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to North Korea. This question is essential to analyze the implementation of reassurance strategy and evaluate the success or failure of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy.

(1) Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. The name of Kim Dae Jung's reassurance strategy is known as the Sunshine Policy. The name came from Aesop's famous fable, "The Wind and the Sun."

The Wind and the Sun were disputing which was the stronger. Suddenly they saw a traveller coming down the road, and the Sun said: "I see a way to decide our dispute. Whichever of us can cause that traveller to take off his cloak shall be regarded as the stronger. You begin." So the Sun retired behind a cloud, and the Wind began to blow as hard as it could upon the traveller. But the harder he blew the more closely did the traveller wrap his cloak round him, till at last the Wind had to give up in despair. Then the Sun came out and shone in all his glory upon the traveller, who soon found it too hot to walk with his cloak on. Kindness effects [sic] more than severity.¹²³

As in the fable, Kim Dae Jung wanted to persuade North Korea to give up its bellicosity and change its attitude toward South Korea and the outside world in order for South Korea to achieve reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.

Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated as South Korea's President on February 25, 1998.¹²⁴ In his inauguration speech, he declared three principles regarding North Korea. One of those principles was about the acceptance of coexistence:

¹²³ Aesop, "The Wind and the Sun," *Aesop's Fables*, http://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Aesop/Aesops_Fables/The_Wind_and_the_Sun_p1.html (accessed on February 17, 2009).

¹²⁴ Nicholas D. Kristof, "South Korea's New President Appeals to North to End Decades of Division," *New York Times*, February 25, 1998, A8, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/world/south-korea-s-new-president-appeals-to-north-to-end-decades-of-division.html?pagewanted=1> (accessed on February 17, 2009).

First, he said, in a clear warning not to mistake courtesy for weakness, “we will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind.” Second, he sought to reassure the North that the South’s policy is not threatening, saying “we do not have any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea.” Third, he added, “we will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.”¹²⁵

Also, he showed his intention of non-aggression and coexistence by emphasizing the implementation of the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement¹²⁶ (see Appendix C). The full name of the Basic Agreement is “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.”¹²⁷ It is composed of four chapters and twenty-five articles. The first two chapters are about mutual recognition and nonaggression. For example, Chapter 1, Article 1, states “South and the North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.”¹²⁸ Also, in Chapter 2, Article 9, it says, “South and North Korea shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.”¹²⁹ Kim Dae Jung said he wanted to carry the Basic Agreement into practice:

The path toward resolution of the South-North problem is already open. It lies in the enactment of the South-North Basic Agreement, adopted on December 13, 1991. The authorities in the South and the North have already reached complete agreement on three issues, namely reconciliation, exchanges and cooperation, and non-aggression between the South and the North.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Kristof, “South Korea’s New President.”

¹²⁶ USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center, “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea,” <http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/korea-agreement.htm> (accessed on February 26, 2009) and CSIS Working Group Report, “Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Working Group Report of the CSIS International Security Program,” 47, <http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/conventionalweapons/CSISConventionalArmsControl.pdf> (accessed on February 23, 2009).

¹²⁷ “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.”

¹²⁸ USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center, “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.”

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ *New York Times*, “Words of Kim Dae Jung: Call for Reconciliation,” February 25, 1998, A8, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/world/words-of-kim-dae-jung-call-for-reconciliation.html?pagewanted=1> (accessed on February 26, 2009).

The relations between the two Koreas became better than ever after adopting the Basic Agreement.¹³¹ However, the Agreement was never put into effect because there was neither enough confidence between the two Koreas nor consultation between the United States and South Korea. Furthermore, North Korea made an announcement of nullification of the Basic Agreement in January 2009. The Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in North Korea says, “All of the agreements concerning the issue of putting an end to the political and military confrontation between the North and South will be nullified. The Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South and the points on the military boundary line in the West Sea stipulated in its appendix will be nullified.”¹³²

The Basic Agreement was “by far the most important document adopted by the two sides since the North-South joint statement of July 4, 1972.”¹³³ It provided guidelines for a peace treaty, and ultimately for peaceful unification. Don Oberdorfer says, “The guidelines of the ‘special interim relationship,’ if implemented, would have meant a nearly complete cessation of the conflict on the peninsula and a reversal of decades of policy on both sides.”¹³⁴ He points out four important contents of the agreement:

Mutual recognition of each other’s systems, and an end to interference, vilification, and subversion of each other.

Mutual efforts “to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace,” with continued observance of the armistice until this was accomplished.

Nonuse of force against each other, and implementation of confidence-building measures and large-scale arms reductions.

¹³¹ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 262.

¹³² *Hankyoreh Sinmun*, “N. Korea Threatens to Invalidate Inter-Korean Accords,” January 31, 2009, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/336104.html (accessed on February 26, 2009).

¹³³ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 260.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 262.

Economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges, free correspondence between divided families, and the reopening of roads and railroads that had been severed at the North-South dividing line.¹³⁵

Therefore, the Basic Agreement was based on the concept of coexistence and Kim Dae Jung's proposal of an exchange of special envoys to carry out the Basic Agreement meant that he was willing to recognize North Korea and expressed his acceptance of coexistence. In addition, in his inauguration speech, Kim Dae Jung proposed a summit meeting. He said, "First of all, I propose an exchange of special envoys for carrying out the South-North Basic Agreement. I am ready to agree to a summit meeting, if North Korea wants [it]."¹³⁶

Two years later, Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang and had a summit meeting on June 13-15, 2000. Kim Dae Jung was selected for the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize on October 13, 2000. The Nobel Prize committee announced that "Through his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae Jung has attempted to overcome more than fifty years of war and hostility between North and South Korea. His visit to North Korea gave impetus to a process which has reduced tension between the two countries. There may now be hope that the cold war will also come to an end in Korea."¹³⁷ When Kim Dae Jung received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on December 10, 2000, he explained the intentions of his Sunshine Policy:

To replace the dangerous stand-off with peace and cooperation, I proclaimed my Sunshine Policy upon becoming President in February 1998, and have consistently promoted its message of reconciliation with the North: first, we will never accept unification through communization; second, nor would we attempt to achieve unification by absorbing the North; and third, South and North Korea should seek peaceful coexistence

¹³⁵ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 262.

¹³⁶ *New York Times*, "Words of Kim Dae Jung," A8.

¹³⁷ "Korean President Kim Dae Jung Receives the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize," UCLA Center for East Asian Studies, East Asian Studies News File, October 13, 2000, <http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/2000Peace.htm> (accessed on February 26, 2009).

and cooperation. Unification, I believe, can wait until such a time when both sides feel comfortable enough in becoming one again, no matter how long it takes.¹³⁸

Consequently, Kim Dae Jung communicated two messages: “that his administration’s goals would be peaceful coexistence, not unification; and that its policies would seek to reassure the North Korean regime of, not undermine confidence in, South Korea’s good intentions.”¹³⁹ The Sunshine policy is based on the concept of coexistence.

(2) Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. The succeeding Roh Moo Hyun administration continued to follow a policy similar to the Sunshine Policy and emphasized the concept of coexistence. Roh Moo Hyun renamed the reassurance policy as the Peace and Prosperity Policy and focused more on economic cooperation. One month after the 2003 presidential election, Chung Dong Young, an advisor to Roh Moo Hyun explained the grand vision of the Roh Moo Hyun administration. He said:

If North Korea responds to the outside world and abandons its nuclear program, South Korea will reward them beyond their expectations. We don’t know how long it will take to reunify the two Koreas so our priority is peaceful coexistence. Mr. Roh’s grand vision is to make North and South Korea into a single economic community.¹⁴⁰

Chung also added that “The Sunshine policy has been successful in reducing hostility between North and South Korea. However, it was less effective in changing the North Korean system. The new government will strive to induce North Korea to reform, open up and come out of isolation.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Kim Dae Jung, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2000. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2000/dae-jung-lecture.html (accessed on February 26, 2009).

¹³⁹ Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, *Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over Policies toward North Korea* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, 2002), 24.

¹⁴⁰ Andrew Ward, “Roh Tries to Tempt N. Korea with Incentives,” *Financial Times*, January 22, 2003, www.ft.com/northkorea.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

Roh Moo Hyun introduced his Peace and Prosperity Policy in his inauguration speech on February 25, 2003:

I have several principles that I plan to adhere to in pushing the “policy for peace and prosperity” on the Korean peninsula:

First, I will try to resolve all pending issues through dialogue.

Second, I will give priority to building mutual trust and upholding reciprocity.

Third, I will seek active international co-operation on the premise that South and North Korea are the two main actors in inter-Korean relations.

And fourth, I will enhance transparency, expand citizen participation, and secure bipartisan support.

I will implement my policy for peace and prosperity with the support of the general public.¹⁴²

His principles state that he recognized North Korea as a counterpart of dialogue and trust building based on the concept of coexistence.

b. Difficulty of Offering Security Guarantee

Even though Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun expressed their intentions of non-aggression, security guarantees could not be offered to North Korea. At that time, the United States played an important role in security matters on the Korean peninsula and North Korea considered that a security guarantee from the United States was necessary. The Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, along with the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on 27 July 1953.¹⁴³ South Korea was not a signatory. South Korean President Syngman Rhee

¹⁴² BBC, “Roh Moo Hyun’s Inauguration Speech,” February 25, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2797053.stm> (accessed on March 28, 2009).

¹⁴³ Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*. 1st ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 87.

wanted to keep the war going in order to unify the peninsula. Rhee found the prospect of a divided Korea unacceptable.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, South Korea did not sign the Armistice Agreement. Presently, the United States and South Korea want a peace treaty limited to North Korea and South Korea, but this is an untenable position because South Korea did not sign the Armistice in 1953.¹⁴⁵ A non-aggression agreement between South Korea and North Korea was not enough to provide a security guarantee to North Korea. This shows that alliance politics is one of intervening variables which influence the outcome of the reassurance strategy. The process of how the Basic Agreement became a dead document confirms the difficulty of offering a security guarantee by South Korea only.

Contrary to the optimistic Basic Agreement, there was an unexpected announcement that influenced its implementation. In October 1992, the defense ministers of the U.S. and South Korea made a statement about a renewal of the “Team Spirit” exercise, “which was deemed important for readiness as well as a potent pressure point against the North.”¹⁴⁶ It was an explosive announcement because “the 1992 exercise had been canceled in the period of mutual accommodation that led to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Yongbyon”¹⁴⁷, the main nuclear site in North Korea. It was very surprising that the interagency policy committee in Washington had neither been informed nor consulted before the decision was made at the defense ministers’ annual meeting.¹⁴⁸ Oberdorfer explained the situation with a quotation from the U.S. ambassador to Seoul, “To Korea experts in Washington and to Donald Gregg, U.S. ambassador to Seoul, it was an unpleasant bolt from the blue—he later called it ‘one of the biggest mistakes’ of Korea policy on his watch.”¹⁴⁹ North Korea described the announcement to resume the Team Spirit exercise as “a criminal act” and cancelled all

¹⁴⁴ Martin, *Under the Loving Care*, 87.

¹⁴⁵ Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002), 155.

¹⁴⁶ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 272–273.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 272.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 273.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

North-South contacts except for the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.¹⁵⁰ This incident shows how important the influence of the U.S. is in the progress of negotiation with North Korea.

After Kim Dae Jung became a president, the Clinton administration supported the Sunshine Policy and considered normalization with North Korea in late October 2000. However, there was not enough time to develop the relationship between the United States under the Clinton administration and North Korea. In January 2001, George W. Bush took office and the Sunshine Policy was not supported as much as it had been by the Clinton administration. From North Korea's perspective, the United States was its main threat. North Korea requested security assurance and a bilateral peace treaty with the United States as a precondition of no nuclear weapons development. North Korea felt threatened by the United States, especially since the end of the Cold War and the "Axis of Evil" statement in the president Bush's State of the Union address in 2002. North Korea considered regime survival as a primary goal of its nuclear strategy based on its perception that the United States maintained the hard-line policy toward North Korea.

North Korean leaders repeatedly stated that they are willing to restrict their nuclear program if the United States guarantees the country's security. When James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang in October 2002, Kang Sok Ju, first vice-minister for foreign affairs acknowledged the nuclear program and requested security assurances. Kang said, "If the U.S. recognized North Korea's system of government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere in his country's economic development, Pyongyang would seriously discuss U.S. concerns about the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) programme."¹⁵¹

Two weeks after North Korea's admission about having an HEU program in October 2002, North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that the United States' hostile policy was the cause of their nuclear program and requested a non-aggression treaty between North Korea and the United States:

¹⁵⁰ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 273.

¹⁵¹ Charles L. Pritchard, "A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line," *Financial Times*, October 10, 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/pritchard/20031010.htm> (accessed on February 25, 2009).

As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it cropped up as the U.S. has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hostile policy toward it in accordance with the strategy for world supremacy.... If the U.S. legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns.¹⁵²

Based on North Korea's request for the security guarantee, regime survival seems to be the primary motive for the nuclear program. Even though there had been this kind of difficulty to offer a security guarantee, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun continuously expressed the intention of non-aggression and tried to persuade the United States to support the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy.

In sum, the first answer to the question of whether Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy communicate South Korea's willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to North Korea is "yes." However, the concept of coexistence was related to the security guarantee issue and there was a limitation on South Korea's ability to offer a security guarantee to North Korea because the United States, as a main actor, did not want to provide a security guarantee.

2. The Incentive for Use of Reassurance Strategy

Question 2: What was the incentive for Kim Dae Jung's and Roh Moo Hyun's use of a reassurance strategy?

The biggest incentive for use of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy was the expected high cost of unification by the collapse and absorption of North Korea. South Korea learned from the lessons of German unification that the costs of Korean unification would be extremely high and South Korea would need to pay greatly for it. The costs of Korean unification are not clear because estimates vary widely

¹⁵² Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), "Conclusion of Non-aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called for," 25 October 2006, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm> (accessed on September 3, 2006).

depending on the conditions. However, it is clear that the costs of Korean unification would be very high under any conditions. Shin Gi Wook and Kristin Burke explain the inspiration of the Sunshine Policy:

A turning point in South Korea's policy toward the North occurred with Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy." South Korea in the 1990s was increasingly concerned about the prospect of heavy financial burdens if a hasty reunification occurred, having seen the "costly" unification process of Germany. The Sunshine Policy was inspired by this new thinking.¹⁵³

The expected high costs of Korean unification and the possibility of North Korea's collapse were considered when implementing the Sunshine Policy.

a. *Estimates of Capital Cost of Korean Unification*

In the 1990s, many scholars estimated the capital cost of Korean unification and the South Korean government considered their research. Selig S. Harrison said, "Estimates of the cost of reunification range from \$182.7 billion to \$2 trillion depending on assumptions concerning such factors as the timing of reunification, how reunification costs are defined, the level of development in the North and South at the time of integration, and development priorities in the North after reunification."¹⁵⁴ Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Liu estimated the cost of unification range from \$600 billion to \$3 trillion between 1990 and 2000.¹⁵⁵ Charles Wolf, Jr., and Kamil Akramov predicted the range of the costs of Korean unification from about \$50 billion to \$670 billion in 2003 U.S. dollars based on their simulation model of a targeted doubling of North Korea's GDP in four years.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Shin Gi Wook and Kristin C. Burke, "North Korea and Identity Politics in South Korea," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 15, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2008): 289.

¹⁵⁴ Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 97.

¹⁵⁵ Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Liu, "The Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Alternate Scenarios," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 8. (August 1998): 801–803.

¹⁵⁶ Charles Wolf, Jr. and Kamil Akramov, *North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Korean Unification* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), 39.

b. Other Possible Cost Elements

It is necessary to consider other possible cost elements for Korean unification. Most of the studies on the costs of Korean unification have focused on the capital costs because that assumption is necessary for simulation or prediction. However, there are definitely other possible costs for Korean unification such as social, cultural, educational, and psychological costs. Those elements will make the costs of Korean unification even higher. Wolf and Akramov observed, “Most of the studies focus primarily on the capital costs of reunification, as does our own analysis, and do not encompass humanitarian, social, and psychological costs as well as other possible cost elements.”¹⁵⁷ Noland pointed out that estimated costs of Korean unification should be doubled to include the cost of “social-economic adjustment.”¹⁵⁸

Choi Young Back argued that there would be huge additional costs during Korean unification saying:

The costs of developing the North would be staggering—a great burden if the South alone is to bankroll it. Broadly, costs are the following kinds: costs of restructuring and privatization uneconomic state enterprises, costs of building up infrastructure, costs of cleaning up environmental degradation, costs of assuming the North Korean external debts (largely to Russia, China, and Japan), and costs of providing welfare for the North Koreans during transition.¹⁵⁹

Consequently, not only the capital costs of Korean unification but also other elements would raise the total costs of Korean unification.

c. Possibility of Collapse

The economic gap between the two Koreas is dramatic. North Korea’s economy is a total failure. There is the possibility of the collapse of North Korea due to

¹⁵⁷ Wolf and Akramov, *North Korean Paradoxes*, 46.

¹⁵⁸ Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 308.

¹⁵⁹ Choi Young Back. “Costs and Benefits of Unification,” in *Perspective on Korean Unification and Economic Integration*, ed. Choi Young Back, Yesook Merrill, Yung Y. Yang and Chang Semoon (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: E. Elgar, 2001), 179.

the horrible economic conditions. One goal of economic engagement for South Korea is to prevent North Korea from collapsing suddenly. West Germany's absorption of East Germany after its collapse showed that it was a very expensive process. Some scholars have estimated the costs of Korean unification by comparing them with German unification. Most of them think Korean unification would be more costly. For example, according to William W. Lewis, Korean unification would be much harder than German unification because:

North Korea's GDP per capita is only 5 percent of that of the South, yet its population is about half. The corresponding ratios for East Germany were 50 percent of West Germany's GDP per capita and only 25 percent of the population. The difficulties of German unification look like a piece of cake next to the difficulties of Korean unification.¹⁶⁰

Therefore, South Korea prefers gradual unification rather than rapid absorption after a North Korean collapse. However, there is the possibility of collapse and it would be much more expensive without preparation. Harrison says, "The general expectation in the South is still that its overwhelming economic superiority makes eventual absorption inevitable."¹⁶¹ In order to cushion the economically difficult impact of reunification, especially in the case of the collapse of North Korea, the Sunshine Policy was considered by South Korea.

3. The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy

Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did South Korea offer to North Korea during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations?

South Korea implemented reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment and limited security regimes. As an irrevocable recognition of the North's sovereignty, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun visited Pyongyang and showed their intentions to

¹⁶⁰ William W. Lewis, *The Power of Productivity: Wealth, Poverty, and the Threat to Global Security* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 131.

¹⁶¹ Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 96.

reduce tension through dialogue. Also, South Korea proposed measures to reduce tensions through limited security regimes such as inter-Korean defense ministerial talks, general-level talks and working-level talks

a. Reassurance Through Irrevocable Commitment: Inter-Korean Summit Meetings and Joint Declarations

(1) Kim Dae Jung's Visit to Pyongyang and the First Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2000. Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang on June 13, 2000. It was the first visit by a South Korean president since the Korean War. This first inter-Korean summit meeting showed that President Kim had no intention of using military force for unification. His visit was an expression of the sincere desire of Kim Dae Jung for reconciliation and peaceful unification. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il presented the 2000 Joint Declaration on June 15, 2000 (see Appendix D).

Above all, Kim Dae Jung's visit to Pyongyang is an example of reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment. When leaders consider the status quo unacceptable, they can try a strategy of irrevocable commitment to "persuade their adversary to enter into serious negotiations to reduce the costs of the status quo."¹⁶² Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 is a typical example of a strategy of irrevocable commitment. Once he had publicly recognized Israel's existence with this highly symbolic step, the action could not be undone.

Similar to Sadat's irreversible initiative to visit Jerusalem, Kim Dae Jung's action was also irreversible. The first visit of a South Korean president to Pyongyang was a historic event and it was treated as a sincere effort to show his intentions to reduce tensions and have negotiations with North Korea. Also, both leaders shared a common aversion to war and there were some conditions for the initiation of negotiations such as "hurting stalemate" and "sense of a way out."¹⁶³ However, compared

¹⁶² Stein. "Deterrence and Reassurance," 42.

¹⁶³ I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000), 225–250.

to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Kim Dae Jung's visit to Pyongyang has some differences. The substantial political cost to President Kim Dae Jung's direct contact with North Korea was not apparent to North Korean leaders, while Israeli leaders and the republic clearly recognized the great political risk Sadat was taking.

Also, even though Kim Dae Jung's arrival in Pyongyang provided an opportunity to change views about South Korea among North Korea's leadership and public, their beliefs were not shaken that much. Furthermore, Kim Dae Jung did not have a chance to speak directly to North Korea's public which is tightly controlled by North Korean government. Consequently, even though Kim Dae Jung's visit to Pyongyang was an irrevocable commitment, it did not have the same impact as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

However, the inter-Korean summit meeting provided both leaders with the opportunities to recognize their misperceptions and stereotyping of their adversary's judgments and to reassure their adversary of their benign intentions.¹⁶⁴ When Kim Dae Jung accepted the Nobel peace prize, he described his experience during the 2000 summit meeting and explained the result of his efforts:

At first, North Korea resisted, suspecting that the sunshine policy was a deceitful plot to bring it down. But our genuine intent and consistency, together with the broad support for the sunshine policy from around the world, including its moral leaders such as Norway, convinced North Korea that it should respond in kind. Thus, the South-North summit could be held.

I had expected the talks with the North Korean leader to be extremely tough, and they were. However, starting from the shared desire to promote the safety, reconciliation and cooperation of our people, the Chairman and I were able to obtain some important agreements.

First, we agreed that unification must be achieved independently and peacefully, that unification should not be hurried along and for now the two sides should work together to expand peaceful exchanges and cooperation and build peaceful coexistence.

¹⁶⁴ Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 42.

Second, we succeeded in bridging the unification formulas of the two sides, which had remained widely divergent. By proposing a “loose form of federation” this time, North Korea has come closer to our call for a confederation of “one people, two systems, two independent governments” as the pre-unification stage. For the first time in the half-century division, the two sides have found a point of convergence on which the process toward unification can be drawn out.

Third, the two sides concurred that the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula should continue for stability on the peninsula and Northeast Asia.¹⁶⁵

The U.S. military presence has been the hottest topic among security issues on the Korean peninsula. The summit meeting gave an opportunity to discuss it. North Korea has requested the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula since the end of the Korean War. Kim Jong Il gave his frank perspective on the role of the U.S. forces in South Korea. Kim Dae Jung explains his discussion with Kim Jong Il about this issue:

During the past 50 years, North Korea had made the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula its primary point of contention. I said to Chairman Kim: “The Korean peninsula is surrounded by the four powers of the United States, Japan, China and Russia. Given the unique geopolitical location not to be found in any other time or place, the continued U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula is indispensable to our security and peace, not just for now but even after unification.

Look at Europe. NATO had been created and American troops stationed in Europe so as to deter the Soviet Union and the East European bloc. But, now, after the fall of the communist bloc, NATO and U.S. troops are still there in Europe, because they continue to be needed for peace and stability in Europe.” To this explanation of mine, Chairman Kim, to my surprise, had a very positive response. It was a bold switch from North Korea’s long-standing demand, and a very significant move for peace on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Kim Dae Jung, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2000.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

In sum, Kim Dae Jung's visit to Pyongyang and the 2000 Joint Declaration was an example of reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment.

(2) Roh Moo Hyun's Visit to Pyongyang and the Second Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2007. The second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was held on October 2–4, 2007.¹⁶⁷ Roh Moo Hyun travelled by car instead of airplane and stepped out of his vehicle to walk across the border. He said, "Our people have suffered from too many hardships, and development has been held up due to this wall. This line will be gradually erased and the wall will fall."¹⁶⁸ It was a very symbolic gesture, to step across a yellow strip to visit Pyongyang. Compared to the first summit meeting, the second summit meeting was an opportunity for more substantial and practical dialogues. Military and economic issues were the main agenda. Compared to the 2000 Joint Declaration, the October 4 Declaration¹⁶⁹ includes more specific agreements to implement military and economic items (see Appendix E).

For example, the October 4 Declaration includes an agreement to hold defense ministerial talks and designate a joint fishing area to avoid clashes in the West Sea.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, the two Koreas agreed on several infrastructure plans to help economic cooperation: a "special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea" encompassing Haeju, the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong, repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju

¹⁶⁷ *Korea Times*, "Delayed Summit," August 19, 2007, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/opi_view.asp?newsIdx=8588&categoryCode=202 (accessed on March 1, 2009).

¹⁶⁸ "Korean Leaders Meet in Pyongyang," *New York Times*, October, 3, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/asia/03korea.html> (accessed on March 1, 2009).

¹⁶⁹ The official name of October 4 Declaration is "Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity."

¹⁷⁰ The Ministry of Unification, Inter-Korean Dialogue, "Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity," http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFdialogue_agreements (accessed on March 3, 2009).

railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.¹⁷¹ All these specific agreements are commitments that the two Koreas need to carry into practice for success.

b. *Reassurance Through Limited Security Regimes: Inter-Korean Military Talks*

Limited security regimes are agreements of principles or procedures between adversaries to “reduce the likelihood of an unintended and unwanted war.”¹⁷² Many dialogues between the two Koreas started right after the 2000 Joint Declaration. During the Kim Dae Jung administration, between February 1998 and February 2003, there was one inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting and fifteen rounds of the inter-Korean military working level talks. Also, during the Roh Moo Hyun administration, between February 2003 and February 2008, there were other inter-Korean defense ministerial meetings, twenty-one rounds of the inter-Korean military working-level talks, and seven rounds of the inter-Korean general-level talks. All these inter-Korean military talks are examples of reassurance through limited security regimes (see Appendix F).

(1) Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks. Most significantly, an inter-Korean defense ministerial meeting was held for the first time ever between the two Koreas on Cheju Island, South Korea, on September 25–26, 2000, “to provide a military assurance for the implementation of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration adopted during the historic Inter-Korean Summit.”¹⁷³ After the talks, a delegation of five, headed by Minister of Defense Cho Seong Tae of South Korea and a delegation of five, headed by the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Kim Il Chol of North Korea, made joint press statements (see Appendix G).

¹⁷¹ The Ministry of Unification, Inter-Korean Dialogue, “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFdialogue_agreements (accessed on March 3, 2009).

¹⁷² Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 45.

¹⁷³ Inter-Korean Document, “Joint Press Statement of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks,” <http://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/> (accessed on February 20, 2009).

The main agreements were to support the implementation of the 2000 Joint Declaration militarily. For example, they agreed to “actively cooperate with each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians...allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and materials into their respective sections of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the construction of a railway and a road that connects the South and the North...[and] handle the problem of opening the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the areas around the railway and the road that connect the South and the North on the basis of the armistice treaty.”¹⁷⁴

Also, in the second defense ministerial talks, on November 27–29, 2007, the two Koreas agreed to support the implementation of the October 4 Declaration militarily. The two Koreas agreed to guarantee military security “for the inter-Korean freight train service between the South’s Munsan and the North’s Bongdong, the direct maritime route to the North’s port at Haeju, joint use of the Hangang estuary, and nonstop flight service for tourists between Seoul and the North’s mountain resort at Baedusan.”¹⁷⁵ These agreements during defense ministerial talks were more economic than military in nature. However, the behavior of the military was constrained by some of the steps agreed to as a result of the economic engagement. For example, opening the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) puts a tremendous burden on the military from a security perspective. Not only opening the railway or highway across the DMZ but also opening the maritime route and flight route can be onerous to the military.

It is more difficult to make limited security regimes than economic regimes because the defection of an adversary from a regime is more dangerous when the issue is related to security than the economy.¹⁷⁶ Europe is a successful example of how a

¹⁷⁴ Inter-Korean Document, “Joint Press Statement.”

¹⁷⁵ Moon Sung Mook, “S-N Defense Chiefs’ Talks Lay Groundwork for Less Tension, More Cooperation,” *Korea.net*, December 7, 2007, http://www.korea.net/News/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20071207004&part=111&SearchDay= (accessed on April 1, 2009).

¹⁷⁶ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 50.

more economic relationship led to formation of an international organization. European leaders, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Jean Monnet, and Robert Shuman believed that economic interdependence would lead to peace.¹⁷⁷ Two new institutions—the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)—were formulated for the purpose of peace and stability rather than economic development.¹⁷⁸ However, ECSC and OEEC are not security regimes but economic institutions. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun expected similar progress between the two Koreas. Inter-Korean defense ministerial talks were held based on the similar anticipation. Therefore, even though they also agreed to set up a joint military committee and discuss the Northern Limit Line (NLL) issue again within the committee to avoid accidental clashes,¹⁷⁹ the main agreements were related to economic issues.

Consequently, the first and second inter-Korean defense ministerial talks provided opportunities for the two Koreas to discuss how take steps for building mutual trust and guaranteeing military security. They focused on how to support the implementation of both the 2000 and 2007 Joint Declarations.

(2) General-Level Talks and Working-Level Talks: Tension Reduction Plan over the NLL and the MDL. The most sensitive military issue on the Korean peninsula is the western sea borderline, in other words, the NLL. According to the explanation of the Ministry of Defense, the Republic of Korea, the NLL is “a line the United Nations Command (UNC) commander established in August 1953 to restrict patrol activities of the ROK Air Force in conjunction with the purpose of reducing the possibility of an occurrence of and preventing accidental armed clashes between the South and the North. The NLL was established on the criteria of the prolonged line of the

¹⁷⁷ Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace*, 26.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

Military Demarcation Line (MDL)¹⁸⁰ toward the East Sea and an intermediate line between five islands in the northwest and North Korean area toward the West Sea.”¹⁸¹ The sea border was not clearly delineated at the end of the Korean War and North Korea refuses to recognize the NLL drawn by the U.S.-led UN command.¹⁸² The NLL has been the de facto maritime border in the West Sea. However, North Korea neither accepted its validity nor agreed with South Korea and the UNC and they often violated the NLL.¹⁸³

The number of violations has increased since the economic difficulty in the 1990s and there have been two skirmishes in the West Sea between South Korea and North Korea. First, on June 14, 1999, there was an exchange of gunfire in the West Sea and one North Korean patrol boat was sunk and another one was badly damaged by South Korean warships.¹⁸⁴ Second, on June 29, 2002, there was a naval skirmish near the NLL in the West Sea. There were scores of casualties on both sides; six South Koreans died and eighteen were injured.¹⁸⁵

To prevent another skirmish and reduce tension in the West Sea, there were the first and second general level talks in May and June 2004. A tension reduction plan over the MDL was also discussed because the NLL is an extension of the MDL. The two Koreas took a small first step to mitigate military tension around the NLL and the MDL by adopting the “Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities, the Elimination of

¹⁸⁰ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 129, <http://www.mnd.go.kr> (accessed on April 4, 2009). According to *2006 Defense White Paper*, “Military border line which divides the area under the control of the UNC commander and the area under control of North Korea’s commander. The MDL starts from the northern bank of the river Imjingang with MDL No. 0001 and continues to the East Sea district with MDL No. 1292.”

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Hannah Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950 – 2007,” *CRS Report for Congress*, April 20, 2007, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 19.

¹⁸⁴ *Korea Times*, “Two North Korean Navy Boats Sunk,” June 15, 1999, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on April 4, 2009).

¹⁸⁵ Jung, Sung Ki, “S. Korea Marks 4th Anniversary of Bloody Naval Clash,” *Korea Times*, June 28, 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on February 26, 2009).

Propaganda Apparatus in the Military Demarcation Line Areas.”¹⁸⁶ The two sides agreed on measures to prevent accidental skirmishes: “(1) use/communication of an international common network for commercial vessels; (2) establishment/use of visual signal (signal lights and flags) provisions; (3) intelligence sharing regarding illicit fishing boats of a third country; and (4) installation of a communication liaison office in the West Sea.”¹⁸⁷ With regard to the suspension of propaganda activities and the elimination of propaganda means, the Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, says “Owing to this agreement, the Inter-Korean propaganda war activities which used to be labeled as war without bullets were suspended and there [*sic*] means were eliminated, resulting in making an opportunity to support the ROK government reconciliation and cooperation policy.”¹⁸⁸

In March 2006, South Korea made proposals to prevent maritime clashes in the West Sea and establish a joint fishing area through the third round of the general level military talks.¹⁸⁹ South Korea also expressed its intension to discuss the NLL issue in the inter-Korean defense ministerial talks based on two principles: “(1) Respect/Observe the NLL as agreed in the Basic Agreement and (2) Comprehensive implementation as for agreed items of military area in the Basic Agreement.”¹⁹⁰

After the announcement of second summit meeting between the two Koreas in August 2007, there were arguments about whether the NLL should be discussed or not during the summit meeting. South Korea previously had a firm position that the NLL is not a negotiable issue, but there were some changes in the South Korean government. Unification Minister Lee Jae Joung said in a National Assembly session, “I don’t think that the NLL is basically a territorial concept, but a security concept to

¹⁸⁶ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 130.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ Ministry of National Defense, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 133.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 266.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

prevent military clashes.”¹⁹¹ Then, the NLL issue was also discussed during the military talks that followed the summit meeting. However, the NLL problem could not be solved and tensions always exist in the Western Sea.

Consequently, even though inter-Korean military talks have not achieved significant results, the number of inter-Korean military talks during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations increased significantly, and those talks provided opportunities for the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations to make proposals to and discuss with North Korea to reduce tensions and avoid unnecessary military clashes. The two Korean military sides tried to support the implementation of the 2000 and 2007 Joint Declarations made during the two summit meetings from the military perspective. In sum, the inter-Korean military talks played important roles in implementing the reassurance strategy through limited security regimes.

C. CONDITION VARIABLES (CV): CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA’S MOTIVATING FACTORS

1. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations Between South Korea and North Korea

Before exploring the causal mechanisms between Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategies and their outcomes, it is necessary to explore the circumstances and relationships between South Korea and North Korea. This research takes an eclectic approach by combining realism, liberalism, and constructivism in order to investigate how the circumstances and relationships affect the intervening variables (leader’s perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending state and the receiving state) between the implementation of reassurance strategy, such as the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy and their outcomes.

¹⁹¹ Jung Sung Ki, “Will Leaders Agree on Tension-Reduction Plan? *Korea Times*, August 13, 2007, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2007/08/180_8269.html (accessed on February 28, 2009).

Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between South Korea and North Korea over the time period when Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy were attempted?

a. Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach): Unfavorable to North Korea

Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the "balance of power" between the two Koreas? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence the balance of power affected the calculations of either South Korea or North Korea?

(1) Balance of Power between the Two Koreas: Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP). To explore the balance of power between the two Koreas, Kenneth N. Waltz's structural realism needs to be considered. Waltz tried to bring more conceptual clarity to the meaning of power and suggested capability rather than power. He says that capabilities can be ranked depending on the scores of several items: "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence."¹⁹² Also, he recognizes that states have different combinations of capabilities which are difficult to measure and compare, and that the wrong answers can be reached.¹⁹³

With regard to material capabilities, mainly two measures have been used: gross national product (GNP) and the index of the Correlates of War (COW) project. In this dissertation, GNP is used to compare the power of South Korea and North Korea because the COW cannot measure the differences in industrialization and technological advances. John R. Oneal compared GNP and COW of the United States and the Soviet Union after 1971 and concluded that GNP is more valid because "the COW index no longer accurately measures industrialization and technological

¹⁹² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 131.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

sophistication for the economically advanced countries.”¹⁹⁴ Technological gaps between South Korea and North Korea are difficult to measure to compare capabilities.

There are two ways to compare GNP¹⁹⁵: GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. dollars and per capita in U.S. dollars. Both show that the balance of power became favorable to South Korea. First, GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. dollars shows that the GNP of South Korea in 1998 was 33 times bigger than that of North Korea and the gap was getting bigger. By 2007, the GNP of South Korea was 65 times bigger. The average GNP ratio of South Korea versus North Korea between 1998 and 2007 was almost 52. Power cannot be measured accurately by these numbers, but it shows that the balance of power has been leaning toward South Korea. GNP at current prices in U.S. dollars can be summarized as in Figure 2.3:

¹⁹⁴ John R. Oneal, “Measuring the Material Base of the Contemporary East-West Balance of Power,” *International Interactions* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1989):177.

¹⁹⁵ Gross national product (GNP) is identical to gross national income (GNI). I use GNP instead of GNI. Refer to United Nations Statistics Division Web page at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/glossResults.asp?Id=8> (accessed on February 2, 2009) According to the definition of term, “Gross national income (GNI) is GDP less net taxes on production and imports, less compensation of employees and property income payable to the rest of the world plus the corresponding items receivable from the rest of the world (in other words, GDP less primary incomes payable to non-resident units plus primary incomes receivable from non-resident units). An alternative approach to measuring GNI at market prices is as the aggregate value of the balances of gross primary incomes for all sectors; (note that gross national income is identical to gross national product (GNP) as previously used in national accounts).”




Figure 2.3. GNP at Current Prices in U.S. Dollars¹⁹⁶

Second, per capita GNP in U.S. dollars show the same results. As shown in Table 2.3, South Korea's per capita GNP between 1998 and 2007 was much greater than that of North Korea. It was an average of 26 times bigger. Also, it became more favorable to South Korea, growing from 16 times bigger in 1998 to 32 times in 2007.

¹⁹⁶ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on February 2, 2009).

Table 2.3. Per Capita GNP in U.S. Dollars¹⁹⁷

Year	S. Korea (U.S. \$)	N. Korea (U.S. \$)	S. Korea / N. Korea
1998	7,364	455	16.18
1999	9,472	451	21.00
2000	10,890	461	23.62
2001	10,225	475	21.53
2002	11,581	467	24.80
2003	12,819	470	27.27
2004	14,304	472	30.31
2005	16,508	548	30.12
2006	18,481	577	32.03
2007	19,840	617	32.16
			Avg. 25.90

Even though GNP showed that the balance of power was unfavorable to North Korea between 1998 and 2007, North Korean military forces still posed a serious threat to South Korea. Comparison of GNP does not provide a complete picture of the security situation between the two Koreas. The existing military capability (or “power”) still matters. *The Military Balance*¹⁹⁸ and *The SIPRI Yearbook*¹⁹⁹ estimate elements of force structure such as the numbers and size of units, their equipment, military expenditures and so on. Also, *The Defense White Paper* of South Korea makes a comparative quantitative assessment of the two Koreas.²⁰⁰ Based on quantitative

¹⁹⁷ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on February 2, 2009).

¹⁹⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance [year of publication]* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), also refer to <http://www.iiss.org/>.

¹⁹⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), also refer to SIPRI Web site at <http://www.sipri.org/>.

²⁰⁰ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *The Defense White Paper*, <http://www.mnd.go.kr>, (accessed on February 2, 2009).

comparison of the force structures available from these sources, it is clear that North Korea has considerable military capability to threaten South Korea.

For example, compared to South Korea's approximately 680,000 troops, North Korea had about 1.1 million between 1998 and 2007.²⁰¹ In terms of numbers, North Korea's Army units such as corps, divisions, and brigades were two or three times as many as South Korea's. In 2006, whereas South Korea had 12 army corps including special warfare command and 50 divisions, North Korea had 19 corps and 75 divisions.²⁰² North Korea had also more military equipment in its Army, Navy, and Air Force in terms of quantitative assessments.

However, this quantitative comparison will overestimate the gap between South Korea and North Korea because qualitative factors would favor the South. As Stephen Biddle argues, material factors alone cannot explain military capability.²⁰³ There are more factors to consider other than force structure to understand military capability. Military capability has four major components: "force structure, modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability."²⁰⁴ From the qualitative comparisons considering modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability, it appears that North Korea's military capability became more unfavorable between 1998 and 2007.

First, North Korea could not modernize its weapon systems and equipment because of the decline of its economy between 1998 and 2007. As shown in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3, North Korea's GNP did not increase much. According to *The Military Balance*, *The SIPRI Year Book*, and *The Defense White Paper*, there was not significant modernization of any military equipment or weapon systems of North Korea except the development of strategic weapons. Second, the training of military personnel was constrained by a lack of economic resources. For example, North Korean pilots had

²⁰¹ IISS, *The Military Balance* (1998–2007).

²⁰² The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 261.

²⁰³ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

²⁰⁴ DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/> (accessed on July 8, 2009).

about 20 or less flying hours per year because of fuel shortages.²⁰⁵ South Korean pilots had more than 100 hours per year. Third, most of North Korea's military assets have exceeded their life span and they definitely have maintenance and support problems. North Korea still has T-34/T-54/T-55, MiG-15/17/19s, and so on. Some of them were used during the Korean War. However, South Korea has consistently upgraded its military equipment and purchased newer weapons. All these factors change the mere quantitative comparison of force structure. The combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments of military capability of the two Koreas suggests that the balance became unfavorable for North Korea between 1998 and 2007.

Therefore, the answer for the question of what the "balance of power" between the two Koreas was that South Korea was in a better position than North Korea in terms of balance of power. Also, it became more favorable to South Korea between 1998 and 2007.

(2) The Impact of Unfavorable Balance of Power to North Korea on Its Calculations. The unfavorable balance of power to North Korea affected the calculations of North Korea. The evidence is North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Even though there are many arguments about North Korea's capability, it is clear that North Korean leaders felt the necessity of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence and substitution for conventional forces to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power. The problem with maintaining conventional forces is cost. Nuclear deterrence was used as the only way to reduce costs. According to North Korea's news service, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), "The intention to build up a nuclear deterrent is not aimed to threaten and blackmail others but to reduce conventional weapons...to channel manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the betterment of people's living."²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ IISS, *The Military Balance* (1998–2007).

²⁰⁶ Barbara Demick, "N. Korea: Nuclear Weapons Cut Costs; Pyongyang says atomic arms program aims to reduce regime's reliance on conventional forces," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 June 2003, A3.

Because of the expense to expand the army, North Korea might have intended to substitute nuclear for conventional power. Victor Cha said, “they fear the growing disparity in the balance of forces on the peninsula in favor of the U.S. and South Korea.”²⁰⁷ North Korea appears to have opted to purchase a nuclear deterrence capability after the end of the Cold War and the loss of its Soviet ally.²⁰⁸ North Korea leaders would have thought nuclear weapons posed a firm deterrent measure with low cost in the 1990s. The threat posed by North Korea in the 1980s diminished after the end of the Cold War because North Korea’s military capabilities deteriorated as “a result of severe resource constraints.”²⁰⁹ A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) study on North Korean conventional warfighting capabilities concluded, “North Korea’s capability to successfully conduct complex, multiechelon, large-scale operations to reunify the Korean peninsula declined in the 1990s. This was, in large measure, the result of severe resource constraints, including widespread food and energy shortages.”²¹⁰

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korean leaders have not considered that its conventional warfighting capabilities are strong enough to deter the United States and South Korea. During the Gulf War in 1991, North Korea was stunned by the use of the superior conventional weapons of the United States. North Korea’s weaponry was very similar to that of Iraq at the time. Lacking military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China, North Korea could not modernize its conventional forces. Several scholars support the idea that North Korea uses its nuclear program to neutralize its deteriorated military capability. John Pike, a defense analyst at GlobalSecurity.org, argued that the North Korean army is not the main threat, “As long

²⁰⁷ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 84.

²⁰⁸ C. Kenneth Quinones, “Reconciling Nuclear Standoff and Economic Shortfalls: Pyongyang’s perspective,” in *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival*, ed. Kihl, Young Whan and Kim, Hong Nack (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 81.

²⁰⁹ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 78–79.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

as the war was conventional, I don't think North Korea would do much better than Iraq did."²¹¹ Harrison summarizes North Korea's change:

Pyongyang has responded with nuclear and missile programs designed both to deter any United States use of nuclear weapons in Korea and to neutralize the superiority of South Korean airpower over its aging Mig [sic] force. Unless the United States joins in a denuclearization of Korea and in arms-control agreements that reduce or remove the threat of a preemptive strike by United States aircraft, North Korea is unlikely to foreclose the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities.²¹²

North Korea has felt the unfavorable balance of power, especially the disparity in conventional forces and its economic constraints. Therefore, it has focused on its nuclear program since the 1990s. The adverse change in the balance of power has made North Korea more interested in receiving reassurance, but also more reluctant to give up its nuclear program. This made it harder for reassurance to succeed.

b. Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach): Low Interdependence

Question 4-b (From the Liberal Approach): What was the level of "interdependence" between the two Koreas? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either South Korea or North Korea?

Katherine Barbieri's, and Bruce Russett's and John Oneal's approaches have been frequently used to measure economic interdependence between two countries. Both approaches are considered. They show that there was very low interdependence between South Korea and North Korea. Therefore, it did not affect the calculations of either South Korea or North Korea.

²¹¹ John Pike, quoted in Mark Sappenfield, "For U.S. Military, Few Options to Defang; Any U.S. Action Risks Nuclear Reprisals against American Troops and Allies in the Region and a Renewed Korean Conflict," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0707/p04s01-usmi.htm> (accessed on 25 August 2007).

²¹² Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 200.

(1) Barbieri's Model.²¹³ There are four equations to calculate economic interdependence in Barbieri's model.

(1) Trade Share i	= Dyadic Trade ij / Total Trade i
(2) Salience ij	= $\sqrt{(\text{Trade share i} * \text{Trade share j})}$
(3) Trade symmetry ij	= 1 - Trade share i – Trade share j
(4) Interdependence ij	= Salience ij * Symmetry ij

As shown in Table 2.4, the trade share of North Korea in South Korea is very low. The average trade share of North Korea in South Korea between 1998 and 2007 is 0.17%. In Table 2.5, the trade share of South Korea in North Korea reached 35% of North Korea's total trade in 2007. In Table 2.6, the economic interdependence is extremely low, even though the values had increased between 1999 and 2007. The average economic interdependence between 1999 and 2007 is only 1.5%.

Table 2.4. Trade share of North Korea in South Korea²¹⁴

Year	Trade b/t SK & NK (millions of U.S. \$)	Total Trade of SK (millions of U.S. \$)	Trade Share of NK in SK	
1998	222	225,600	0.00098	
1999	334	263,400	0.00127	
2000	425	332,700	0.00128	
2001	403	291,500	0.00138	
2002	642	314,600	0.00204	
2003	724	372,600	0.00194	
2004	697	478,300	0.00146	
2005	1,055	545,600	0.00193	
2006	1,350	634,900	0.00213	
2007	1,797	728,300	0.00247	
			Avg.	0.00169

²¹³ Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no.1 (1996): 36–7.

²¹⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea, Statistics of Economy and Trade, <http://www.mofat.go.kr/economic/economicdata/statistics/index.jsp> (accessed on March 8, 2009).

Table 2.5. Trade share of South Korea in North Korea²¹⁵

Year	Trade b/t SK & NK (millions of U.S. \$)	Total Trade of NK (millions of U.S. \$)	Trade Share of SK in NK
1998	222		
1999	334	2,383	0.14016
2000	425	3,166	0.13424
2001	403	4,231	0.09525
2002	642	3,248	0.19766
2003	724	3,300	0.21939
2004	697	4,139	0.16840
2005	1,055	4,776	0.22090
2006	1,350	5,010	0.26946
2007	1,797	5,096	0.35263
			Avg. 0.19979

Table 2.6. Trade salience, symmetry, and economic interdependence between South Korea and North Korea

Year	Trade salience	Trade symmetry	Economic Interdependence
1998			
1999	0.01333	0.86111	0.01148
2000	0.01310	0.86704	0.01135
2001	0.01148	0.90613	0.01040
2002	0.02008	0.80438	0.01616
2003	0.02065	0.78255	0.01616
2004	0.01567	0.83306	0.01305
2005	0.02067	0.78104	0.01614
2006	0.02394	0.73267	0.01754
2007	0.02950	0.64984	0.01917
Avg.	0.01836	0.80190	0.01473

²¹⁵ Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis," *CRS Report for Congress*, August 26, 2008, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 25 and 43.

(2) Russett and Oneal's Method.²¹⁶ Russett and Oneal used the ratio of trade to gross domestic product (GDP) based on Purchase Power Parities (PPP).²¹⁷

- (1) Trade dependence ij = (Import ij + export ij)/GDPi = Trade ij/GDPi
- (2) Trade dependence ji = (Import ji + export ji)/GDPj = Trade ji/GDPj
- (3) Economic Interdependence ij = lower of (trade dependence ij & trade dependence ji)
- (4) Trade asymmetry ij = higher of (trade dependence ij & trade dependence ji)

South Korea's trade dependence on its linkages with North Korea is low. North Korea's trade dependence on its linkages with South Korea has been increasing rapidly, but it is still low and the average is about 6%. Therefore, the measurement of the economic interdependence between the two Koreas is very low. The average of economic interdependence between the two Koreas from 1998 to 2007 is 0.001118 (Table 2.6).

Table 2.7. Trade Dependence of South Korea and North Korea²¹⁸

Year	Trade SK, NK (millions of U.S. dollars)	SK GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	SK Trade dependence with NK (economic inter- dependence)	N. Korea GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	NK Trade dependence With SK (trade asymmetry)
1998	222	345,433	0.000643	10,273	0.021610
1999	334	445,401	0.000750	10,280	0.032490

²¹⁶ Bruce Russett and John Oneal, "Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." In *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 275.

²¹⁷ Russett and Oneal use GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP). PPP is used to convert national currency expenditures to a common currency unit to compare across countries. Thus, I used GDP based on US dollar and data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on March 11, 2009).

²¹⁸ GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP).

Year	Trade SK, NK (millions of U.S. dollars)	SK GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	SK Trade dependence with NK (economic inter- dependence)	N. Korea GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	NK Trade dependence With SK (trade asymmetry)
2000	425	511,659	0.000831	10,608	0.040064
2001	403	481,894	0.000836	11,022	0.036563
2002	642	546,935	0.001174	10,910	0.058845
2003	724	608,146	0.001191	11,051	0.065514
2004	697	680,492	0.001024	11,168	0.062410
2005	1,055	791,429	0.001333	13,031	0.080961
2006	1,350	888,023	0.001520	13,764	0.098082
2007	1,797	956,788	0.001878	14,753	0.121806
Avg.	765	625,620	0.001118	11,686	0.061835

(3) No Economic Interdependence between the Two Koreas.

The two Koreas were not economically interdependent between 1998 and 2007. Two Korean scholars, Ju Sung Whan and Han Chung Young used the two previous models to measure economic interdependence of the two Koreas between 1990 and 2003 and show similar results.²¹⁹ They conclude that “The results of measuring economic interdependence by Barbieri’s methods indicate that the trading relationships between South Korea and North Korea is neither extended nor balanced in dependence, these produced low economic interdependence between the two Koreas. These are the same as the results of measurement by Oneal and Russett’s method.”²²⁰

²¹⁹ Ju Sung Whan and Han Chung Young, “Measuring of Economic Interdependence between South Korea and North Korea,” *The Northeast Economic Association of Korea*, <http://www.neak.or.kr/> (accessed on February 15, 2008).

²²⁰ Ibid.

North Korea has been economically weaker and more dependent on other countries' aid, including South Korean aid, since the end of the Cold War. The two Koreas are not interconnected enough to expect economic interdependence to bolster the chances for the success of reassurance strategy. Therefore, there is no evidence to show a possible impact of economic interdependence on North Korea's calculations.

c. Identity (from the Constructivist Approach): Rise of New Identity

Question 4-c (From the Constructivist Approach): To what extent was there a shared identity between the two Koreas? Was the degree of shared understanding changing, and if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that identity affected the calculations of either South Korea or North Korea?

(1) New Identity in South Korea toward North Korea: From Enemy to Partner. A new identity related to North Korea was built before and after the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. The evidence of that new identity is the different response of South Korea to the North Korean threat. Several polls illustrate identity changes from enemy (anti-Communist/anti-North Korea) identity to partner (peaceful coexistence) identity in South Korea. They show very interesting results about how some South Koreans view North Korea, as well as how they view the relationship between South Korea and the United States. In June 1994, the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula escalated. Some South Koreans stockpiled food such as noodles and canned goods in preparation for emergency use. An opinion poll conducted by *Seoul Shinmun* on June 22, 1994, demonstrated that 65.7 percent of respondents favored the use of economic sanctions against North Korea.²²¹

However, in the 2002 nuclear crisis, South Koreans did not feel an immediate threat from North Korea. Son Key Young says, "In 2002, however, North Korea was far from the image of an enemy, with South Korea taking a 'neutral' stance between Pyongyang and Washington."²²² A Gallup Korea survey about images of North

²²¹ Son Key Young, *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms, and the Sunshine Policy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 160.

²²² *Ibid.*, 158.

Korea and the United States in 2002 shows that South Koreans had more positive images toward North Korea than toward the United States. (Table 2.8)

Table 2.8. Images of North Korea and the United States in 2002²²³

	North Korea	United States
Positive	47.4	37.2
Negative	37.0	53.7
Don't know	15.6	9.1

There is another example to show that the concept of the main enemy has changed in South Korea. The term “main enemy” was first used in the 1995 *Defense White Paper* after two events—the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 and the March 1994 threat to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” made by a North Korean negotiator during intra-Korean contacts in Panmunjeom.²²⁴ The Ministry of Defense said it would drop the term “main enemy” in reference to North Korea in a defense white paper for 2004.²²⁵ The white paper had been stalled since 2000 due to disputes over the “main enemy” designation. In inter-Korean meetings since the June 2000 summit meeting, North Korea persistently asked for the “main enemy” terminology to be dropped.²²⁶

Also, several other polls show that South Koreans think the nuclear problem should be solved by dialogue. This means that they consider North Korea as a partner in negotiation rather than an evil to fight against. An opinion poll by the Yonhap News Agency on October 23–24, 2002, shows that over 85 percent of people interviewed

²²³ Victor D. Cha, “Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations,” in *Korean Attitudes toward the United States: Changing Dynamics*, ed. David I. Steinberg (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 129, sources from Gallup Korea Survey (1,054 sample size), December 2002.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Yu Yong Won, “N. Korea No Longer ‘Main Enemy’ in Defense White Paper, *Chosun Ilbo*, January 28, 2005, <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501280038.html> (accessed on March 21, 2009).

²²⁶ Ibid.

avored dialogue.²²⁷ A similar survey conducted by the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification demonstrated that 91 percent of respondents favor diplomatic and peaceful solutions and over 60 percent support economic cooperation and the Mt. Geumgang tour project.²²⁸

Identity change in South Korea was expressed in the presidential election in December 2002. A progressive leader, Roh Moo Hyun, who called for a continuous engagement policy with North Korea and more independent relations with the United States, won the presidential election against a conservative leader, Lee Hoi Chang, who supported a more coercive approach toward North Korea and a strong U.S.-South Korean alliance. Positive images toward North Korea declined in 2004 and 2007 polls, such that more people now had a negative than a positive image. However, it is significant that 21.9 percent and 32.8 percent of South Koreans in 2004 and 2007, respectively, still had positive images toward North Korea because it illustrates the identity change of South Koreans after the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy (Table 2.9).

Table 2.9. Images of North Korea in 2004²²⁹ and 2007²³⁰

	2004	2007
Positive	21.9	32.8
Negative	47.6	62.1
Don't know	30.5	5.2

According to a telephone survey conducted in January 2004, respondents considered the United States more of a threat to South Korean security than North Korea. According to that telephone survey of 800 people conducted by Research &

²²⁷ Son, *South Korean Engagement Policies*, 159, source from Yonhap News (South Korea), November 12, 2002.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Gallup Korea, <http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb> (accessed on 10 March 2009), 2004 survey conducted from 23 November to 9 December, 2004 (1009 samples, 95% reliability).

²³⁰ Ibid., 2007 survey conducted on 23 June 2007 (1005 samples, 95% reliability).

Research, 39 percent of respondents said that the United States poses a threat to South Korea, compared with only 33 percent who said the same about North Korea, followed by 12 percent for China and 8 percent for Japan.²³¹ *Korea Times* had an interesting comparison with the results of a similar survey conducted in 1993.

The results of the poll are remarkable when compared with those of a similar survey conducted by Gallup Korea back in 1993. At that time, 44 percent picked North Korea as a top military threat, followed by 15 percent for Japan and 4 percent for China. Only 1 percent chose the U.S., with as many as 72 percent supporting the presence of American troops here to preserve peace and stability on the peninsula.²³²

This identity change from enemy identity to partner identity in South Korea is more obvious in the younger generations. Almost half (47.7 percent) of people aged 18 to 23 years old surveyed in February 2006 said that South Korea should side with North Korea, if Washington attacked nuclear facilities in the North without Seoul's consent. Here is the figure to show the remarkable result:




Figure 2.4. South Korea's youngsters' survey about U.S. strike and Seoul's aid for N.K.²³³

²³¹ *Korea Times*, "Opinion of the US Troubling: Security on Peninsula should not be compromised," January 12, 2004, http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=threat+survey++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/opinion/200401/kt2004011217163111300.htm&media=kt (accessed on February 20 2009).

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Park Song Wu, "48% Youth Would Support N. Korea in Case of U.S. Attack," *Korea Times*, 21 Feb 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200602/kt2006022117121711950.htm> (accessed on February 21, 2009).

This survey was conducted by *Korea Times* and its sister paper *Hankook Ilbo* from 16–19 February 2006. In the survey of 1000 young people aged 18 to 23, “nearly 48 percent of respondents said that if the United States attacked nuclear facilities in North Korea, Seoul should act on Pyongyang’s behalf and demand Washington stop the attack.”²³⁴ Furthermore, 40.7 percent of them said Seoul should keep a neutral stance in the event of such attacks, while 11.6 percent said South Korea needs to act in concert with the United States.²³⁵ Even though these opinions do not represent the whole of South Korea, the results show a transformation of the South Korean attitude toward North Korea. Those young people will be the main actors in future Korean politics and their identity and norms will influence the politics of South Korea. In the 2002 presidential election, the voter turnout of those aged between 20 and 24 stood at 57.9 percent.²³⁶

In sum, there was an identity change of South Koreans vis-à-vis the North. This identity change means that South Koreans shifted their images toward North Korea from an enemy that they cannot live together with to a bad partner that they should try to live together with.

(2) New Identity in North Korea toward South Korea: From Enemy (Revolutionary Object) to Rivalry (Competing Object). There is very limited information to show the identity change in North Korea. In the 1960-70s, North Korean leaders were confident of the communization of the Korean peninsula and felt it was only a matter of time. South Korea was a revolutionary object. The transcript of the confidential discussions between Kim Il Sung and Erick Honecker in December 1977 has recently been released from East German archives. Three strategic directions in the transcript show Kim Il Sung’s views on South Korea:

²³⁴ Park, “48% Youth Would Support.”

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

First, to successfully carry out the organization of socialism in the northern part of the country; second, to support the revolutionary struggle in South Korea; third, to develop solidarity and unity with the international revolutionary forces.²³⁷

However, the circumstances became more favorable to South Korea in the 1980s. They dramatically changed in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. There is some evidence showing that North Korea understands that it is almost impossible to enact a communist revolution in South Korea. Thus, it does not consider South Korea as a revolutionary object any more. Oberdorfer introduced the conversation between Selig Harrison and Hwang Jang Yop²³⁸ in Pyongyang in 1987. Hwang told Harrison that “a communist revolution in the South was ‘completely out of question’ and that ‘we must find a way for North and South to co-exist peacefully under different social and economic systems.’”²³⁹

Cha points out several indications showing North Korea’s changes in identity toward South Korea by acknowledging the difficulty of success of revolution in South Korea and a low possibility of North Korea’s invasion for hegemonic unification. For example, North Korea abolished the Unification Committee at the September 1998 session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (1st session, 10th term).²⁴⁰ According to Cha, this is “a low-key but very significant event”²⁴¹ to show North Korea’s change. According to Cha, “Russian observers note that among the core principles that have made up the *juche* (self-reliant) ideology, emphasis has shifted recently from universal ‘communization’ to ‘self-dependency’ as the ultimate revolutionary goal.”²⁴² Cha argues

²³⁷ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 97.

²³⁸ Hwang Jang Yop is a North Korea’s prominent official and the architect of *Juche* (self-reliance) philosophy. He defected to South Korea on February 12, 1997.

²³⁹ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 401.

²⁴⁰ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 20

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid., 21.

that these changes come from “an enormous and insurmountable gap between the two countries”²⁴³ and North Korea’s experiences of the “trials and tribulations in our construction of socialism.”²⁴⁴

As shown in Figure 2.5, analysis of North Korean news shows some identity changes, too. Jun Mi Young explains North Korea’s identity change toward South Korea after the 2000 summit meeting by analyzing *Rodong Sinmum*²⁴⁵ between 1999 and 2001.²⁴⁶




Figure 2.5. The number of articles that criticize South Korean presidents or government (1999–2001)²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 20.

²⁴⁴ Victor D. Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 1 (2002), 62, referring to *Chosun Ilbo*, March 20, 1997, reprint of Kim Jong Il’s fiftieth anniversary speech at Kim Il-sung University; and Nautilus Institute, “The DPRK Report,” no. 7 (May/June 1997), [ftp://ftp.nautilus.org/napsnet/RussiaDPRK/DPRK_Report_7.txt](http://ftp.nautilus.org/napsnet/RussiaDPRK/DPRK_Report_7.txt) (accessed on April 1, 2009).

²⁴⁵ A North Korean newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. It is available at KCNA Web page at <http://www.kcna.co.jp/today-rodong/rodong.htm>.

²⁴⁶ Jun Mi Young, “*Nambukjeongsanghoidam Ihu Bukhan Daenaminsikei Byunhwa* [North Korea’s Perception Change after North-South Summit Meeting],” January 11, 2005. <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/> (accessed on March 20, 2009).

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

According to Jun Mi Young, the number of articles that criticize the South Korean president and government decreased significantly between 1999 and 2001 (156 articles in 1999, 46 articles in 2000, and 1 article in 2001).²⁴⁸ Compared to the 1960s when North Korea was more aggressive, the change in the number is more obvious. In the 1960s, the number of articles that criticized South Korean presidents or government was higher: 189 articles in 1964, 223 articles in 1965, and 214 articles in 1966.²⁴⁹

These facts show that there was a start of shift from Hobbesian enemy identities to Lockean rivalry identities.²⁵⁰ According to Alexander Wendt, a Hobbesian enemy identity “constitutes by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.”²⁵¹ North Korea’s identity toward South Korea in the 1960s can be categorized as Hobbesian enemy identity. Without the change of identity, the number of articles that criticize the South Korean president and government should have been the same or increased. The significant decrease between 1999 and 2001 can be interpreted as a change in North Korea’s attitude toward South Korea and a partial shift of identity, even though it was hardly permanent.

Whereas the Hobbesian identity is “enemies” that want to eliminate each other, the Lockean identity is “rivals” that recognize each other and agree to coexist.²⁵² Wendt says, “Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their ‘life and liberty,’ as a *right*, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them.”²⁵³ However, unlike Kantian friend identity, Lockean identity is not free from violence and it can lead to dispute by force. The decreasing number of criticizing articles does not mean the elimination of the possibility of disputes.

²⁴⁸ Jun, “North Korea’s Perception Change,” 209.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 246–312.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 260.

²⁵² Ibid., 279.

²⁵³ Ibid.

Consequently, the new identity was created in North Korea toward South Koreans from Hobbesian enemy identity to Lockean rivalry identity. This means that North Korea considered South Korea as a competing object rather than a revolutionary object or existential threat. This shift improved the changes for successful reassurance.

2. Condition Variable (CV) 2: North Korea's Mixed and Uncertain Motivating Factors

Question 5: What were North Korea's motivations? Is North Korea best seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was South Korea's perception of North Korea's motivations?

Question 6: Did the two Koreas share an aversion to war?

The first step in evaluating whether or not reassurance strategy toward North Korea would be successful and effective is to analyze the "motivating factors" of North Korea, because if North Korea has only a "greedy" motivating factor, reassurance strategy would fail in the end. Also, strategy must still be made based on some assessment of motivating factors. This section attempts to identify the needs and opportunities of North Korea and determine whether or not North Korea is greedy and has the motive to expand. Also, it is necessary to explore whether North Korea shared an aversion to war with South Korea because an aversion to war implies "need-oriented" and "not-greedy" motivating factors.

a. North Korea's "Not-greedy" and "Need-oriented" Motivating Factors: Defensive Motive

Even though North Korea's attack on South Korea for unification under its control cannot be ruled out, the unfavorable change in the balance of power toward North Korea made a communist revolution in the South almost impossible. As explained in the previous section of this chapter, the balance of power is much more favorable to South Korea and it affected the calculations of North Korea. South Korea's GNP at current prices is about more than fifty times larger and GNP per capita is almost thirty times larger (Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3). The situation is totally different compared to 1950s and 1960s.

Victor Cha introduces several evidences showing that North Korea changed its goals from “universal ‘communization’ to ‘self-dependency’ as the ultimate revolutionary goal.”²⁵⁴ For example, North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yop admitted that “a communist revolution in the South is no longer a viable DPRK objective.”²⁵⁵ The national goal of North Korea thirty years ago was “enforcing a Socialist unification upon the South.”²⁵⁶ According to Cha, the change of this goal can be found in Kim Jong Il’s words to admit the need for change, “self-reliance should not be interpreted as meaning that we will not import what others have because we will import selectively.”²⁵⁷ Cha concludes that “Now, Pyongyang’s end game has changed from one of hegemonic unification to basic survival, avoiding collapse, and avoiding dominance by the South, precisely the type of fears behind a preventive lashing-out type action.”²⁵⁸

North Korea’s perspective about U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula shows North Korea’s need-oriented motivating factors. During the 2000 summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Il expressed his idea that the United States needed to stay on the Korean peninsula after unification. This is a significant change after the end of the Cold War. Bruce Cumings points out, “In the new century, the North does not want the United States out of Korea, in spite of regime propaganda, but wants us to stay involved, to deal with a new and threatening strategic environment since

²⁵⁴ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 21, referring to Nautilus Institute, “The DPRK Report” and Kim Jong Il’s address at 50th anniversary commemoration ceremony of Kim Il Sung University (December 1996), reprinted in *Wolgan Choson* [Choson Monthly] April 1997.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 20, referring to Oberdorfer’s recounting of conversations between Hwang and Selig Harrison in *Two Koreas*, 401.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 21, referring to Nicholas Eberstadt, “‘National Strategy’ in North and South Korea.” *NBR Analysis* 7.5 (1996), 1–12.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, referring to “Collection of Comrade Kim Jong Il’s Works,” 272 cited in *Vantage Point*, 24.4 (April 2002): 52.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

the collapse of the Soviet Union (which abruptly abandoned the North in 1991²⁵⁹) to help the country through its current difficult transition, and to keep the South from swallowing it.”²⁶⁰

Based on the change of the balance of power between the two Koreas, a communist revolution in South Korea does not seem to be the primary motive of North Korea. Regime survival seems to be one and it illustrates their “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors from weakness and insecurity. However, North Korea also shows “greedy” and “opportunity-motivated” motivating factors as well as “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors.

b. North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” Motivating Factors: Offensive Motive

The possibility of success of a North Korean attack against South Korea has waned because of South Korea’s growing economic, military, and diplomatic power and its better relationships with China and Russia. However, its offensive doctrine cannot be ruled out. The evidence to show North Korea’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motive is its forward-deployed military. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the Korean peninsula is one of the most heavily militarized frontiers in the world. North Korea deploys about 70 percent of its ground forces south of Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and 65 percent of its military units and up to 80 percent of its estimated firepower are within approximately 60 miles of the DMZ.²⁶¹ The North Korean artillery around the DMZ such as 240mm multiple rocket launcher system and 170mm self-propelled guns is the most serious threat to South Korea. This forward deployment means that North Korea can invade South Korea without redeployment.

²⁵⁹ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), x, referring to Edward Neilan, “Soviets Demand Look at Reactors in North Korea,” *Washington Times*, April 16, 1991, A1. “Soviet-DPRK trade was cut in half from 1988 and 1992, and shipments of oil dropped by three quarters in one year alone (from 440,000 tons in 1990 to 100,000 tons in 1991).”

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, *North Korea*, x.

Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford assess that “It is estimated that if North Korea decided to initiate hostilities, the Republic of Korea and the United States would have at most 24-36 hours warning under ideal conditions, or as little as 12 hours if the Korean People’s Army (KPA) already was at an alerted status.”²⁶² Phillip C. Saunders says that a strategy of unification is consistent with North Korea’s military doctrine and force deployments. “Most North Korean military units are located close to the Demilitarized Zone and are positioned and trained to undertake offensive operations.”²⁶³

In addition, even though the possibility of North Korea’s attack has decreased due to the shift of the balance of power, there is a possibility of a North Korean attack as a last push against South Korea. Cha also warns of the worst case of North Korea’s attacking South Korea:

At the worst-case end of the spectrum, through long-range artillery barrages, missile strikes, or chemical weapons attacks deliberately non-American in target and short of all-out war, the North could seek to hold Seoul hostage with the hope of renegotiating a new status quo. Again, the relevant point here is not the objective feasibility of “winning” with such an action, but the belief in North Korea that acting is better than doing nothing, and that doing nothing promises slow and certain death.²⁶⁴

Like Egyptian decision making in 1973 and Japanese decision making to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, there is the possibility of North Korean military action due to conditions of military inferiority and unfavorable changes in the balance of military

²⁶¹ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., *The Armed Forces of North Korea* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 3 and Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, *North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: The Strategy Studies Institute, 2007), 65. Also, available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=771> (accessed on March 15, 2009).

²⁶² Scobell and Sanford, *North Korea’s Military Threat*, 65.

²⁶³ Phillip C. Saunders, “Confronting Ambiguity: How to handle North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” *Arms Control Today*, March 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/saunders_mar03.asp (accessed on March 30, 2009).

²⁶⁴ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 24.

capabilities to avoid further loss.²⁶⁵ Such a scenario, however, would reflect North Korean survival motivations rather than greedy or expansionist goals.

c. *Mixed Motivations*

In the analysis, it is clear that the North Korean motivating factor does not exist with absolute certainty. Either of two possible factors—need and opportunity—is plausible. North Korea can be categorized to be either a “greedy” or “not-greedy” state. North Korea’s strategies have been fluctuating depending on how North Korea assesses the situation at a particular point. This changeability is a characteristic of North Korea’s motivational factors and is expected to continue.

A country’s motivating factors are important because there could be some contradictions and differences between alternative strategies for responding. If North Korea has a “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” doctrine, deterrence strategies may be the best option. On the other hand, if North Korea’s motivating factor focuses more on “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motive, there is high chance of success to implement reassurance strategy to reduce tension and the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula.²⁶⁶

Unfortunately, it is difficult to analyze and predict North Korea’s strategy because North Korea has both opportunity-oriented and need-oriented motives and the relative weight of two are dependent on circumstances. North Korea has not given up its “greedy” motive for expansion. Also, a matter of regime survival makes North Korea change into a “not-greedy” state. Therefore, we can conclude that North Korea’s strategy is mixed, flexible and not easily predictable. Even though it is difficult to know the intentions, North Korea’s mixed motivations means that reassurance strategy should be tried to reduce tensions with North Korea because there is a possibility of success.

²⁶⁵ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 16.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 59.

d. South Korea's Perception of North Korea's Motivating Factors

Just as there are evidences of both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motivating factors in North Korea, South Korea’s perceptions of North Korea’s motivating factors are divided into two groups. Division and disputes over North Korea’s motivating factors can be categorized into conservative and progressive factions in South Korea. Conservatives perceive North Korea as an enemy whereas progressives consider it a partner.²⁶⁷ Before the transition to democracy in 1987, there was no competition between conservatives and progressives in South Korea because the authoritarian government reinforced anti-communism and anti-North Korean concepts as the only primary legitimate ideology.²⁶⁸ Progressives ascended and the monopoly of conservatives ended in the 1990s. In sum, the biggest difference between conservatives and progressives in South Korea is their perception of North Korea.

However, both conservatives and progressives generally perceive North Korea as a substantial threat. They believe that North Korea did not give up “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. Chae Hae Sook and Steven Kim used “cluster analysis”²⁶⁹ to identify the general trend of conservatives and progressives in South Korea. The results of survey are shown in Figure 2.6:

²⁶⁷ Chae Hae Sook and Steven Kim, “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 77.

²⁶⁸ Chae and Kim, “Conservatives and Progressives,” 78.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 94, fn 1. According to Chae Hae Sook and Steven Kim, Cluster analysis is “a set of statistical techniques that group objects into homogeneous categories on the basis of their similarities. This statistical tool discovers meaningful structures within the data set that would otherwise remain hidden.” Chae and Kim referred to Maurice Lorr, *Cluster Analysis for Social Scientists* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1983), 1–6; Darren George and Paul Mallery, *SPSS for Windows Step by Step* (Boston: Pearson Education, 2006), 261–276; “Cluster Analysis,” Statsoft, <http://www.statsoft.com/testbook/stcluan.html> (accessed on April 1, 2009).




Figure 2.6. Perception of Conservatives and Progressives about the Sunshine Policy and the North Korean Threat²⁷⁰

Chae and Kim collected survey data from 1,001 South Korean adult citizens during March 8–28, 2007.²⁷¹ They considered two main issues relating to inter-Korean relations: engagement with North Korea (the Sunshine Policy) and the North Korean nuclear weapons threat (North Korean threat) and asked questions about them (see Appendix H). As shown in Figure 2.6, the analysis of this survey shows that South Koreans perceive that North Korea has “greedy” motivating factors. That is, both conservatives and progressives feel a threat from North Korea. On the other hand, progressives’ support for the Sunshine Policy suggests that some progressives think that North Korea also has “not-greedy” motivating factors from vulnerability and that the Sunshine Policy is necessary to reduce tension.

²⁷⁰ Chae and Kim, “Conservatives and Progressives,” 83 (see Appendix H). For Sunshine policy: 0=an ongoing military threat; 10=a partner in inter-Korean détente, and for North Korean threat: 0=a very serious threat; 10=not a threat.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 79.

(1) North Korea's "Not-greedy" and "Need-oriented" Motivating Factors: Progressives' Support for Sunshine Policy. Even though there are common perceptions about North Korea as a "greedy" state in South Korea, progressives recognize that North Korea feels vulnerable and alongside residual greedy motivations it also shows "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors. The survey about the Sunshine Policy shows that conservatives and progressives are situated on opposite sides of the reference line on questions regarding the Sunshine Policy.²⁷² (Figure 2.6). Progressives consider North Korea as a reliable partner (VIEWNK) and believe that North Korean can be influenced through the Sunshine Policy (SPCHANGE).²⁷³ These responses would have been impossible if progressives had perceptions that North Korea had only "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors. These perceptions are based on the idea that North Korea is not only a "greedy" state but also "not-greedy" state.

Also, according to Chae and Kim, progressives and conservatives show different perspectives on the results of the Sunshine Policy:

Likewise, progressives and conservatives disagreed about whether the Sunshine Policy has led to a reduction of tension (SPTENSN) or can prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime (SPPREVENT) and whether it has bolstered the North Korean regime (SPBOLSTR). On these questions about the underlying assumptions and effectiveness of the Sunshine Policy, progressives and conservatives lined up on opposite sides of the fence.²⁷⁴

Chae and Kim conclude that "In sum, the survey data shows that the South Korean public is only moderately divided on the issue of inter-Korean reconciliation, while it is loosely united on the issue of national security." That is, contrary to expectations that conservatives are more concerned about the nuclear program and progressives downplay North Korea's threat, both conservatives and progressives essentially agree that North

²⁷² Chae and Kim, "Conservatives and Progressives," 82.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

Korea is a threat.²⁷⁵ Consequently, South Koreans generally see North Korea as a “greedy” state and yet some progressives recognize that North Korea has “not-greedy” motivating factors as well.

(2) North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” Motivating Factors: North Korean Threat. Generally speaking, South Koreans have low trust in North Korea and consider North Korea as a threat having “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. According to Figure 2.6, the analysis of responses to questions about a North Korean threat shows that both conservatives and progressives share a common ground on the North Korean threat.²⁷⁶ According to Chae and Kim, “On the North Korean threat, however, the two clusters essentially agreed....Both clusters mean lines run below the reference line, indicating that the North Korean threat distressed both groups.”²⁷⁷ Chae and Kim explain that progressives share the views of conservatives on North Korean threat issues:

Like the conservatives, they are keenly aware of the danger posed by the North Korean nuclear threat (THRTSK, TRNKNUKE, and TRNKSALE) and show a strong dislike of North Korea and its leadership (FEELNK and FEELKIM). Furthermore and contrary to the prevailing portrait, progressives do not strongly object to South Korea’s forceful measures to censure North Korea for the continued development of its nuclear program (PROJECTS, UNSNCTN, SUPPOTUS, PSI, and USNKPLCY).

In fact, progressives go so far as to join conservatives in their support of the developing of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons to counter the North Korean threat (DEVPNUKE).²⁷⁸

Regardless of South Korean attitudes on international relations, conservatives or progressives, South Koreans feel that North Korea is a substantial threat and it has a motivating factor to threaten or attack South Korea. This means that domestic support for reassurance may have been weak and Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were constrained by that.

²⁷⁵ Chae and Kim, “Conservatives and Progressives,” 82.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 77–95.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 82.

e. *Aversion to War by South Korea and North Korea*

(1) South Korea. South Korea had a strong aversion to war. Considering the geographic location, the size, formation, tactics and technology of the two Koreas' military forces, the cost of war on the Korean peninsula would be very high. Therefore, even though military action might be the most direct way to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons and topple the North Korean regime, it was difficult to take military action against North Korea.

Seoul, the capital of South Korea, has over 10 million inhabitants. Including the satellite towns and the major port city of Incheon, the population of the Seoul National Capital area is almost 25 million out of the about 48 million total South Korean population.²⁷⁹ This area is only 25 miles away from the DMZ and the North Korean artillery attacks and missile attacks would panic Seoul.²⁸⁰ South Koreans remembered the "sea of fire" statement by North Korean representative, Park Yong Su at the final South-North working level meeting at Panmunjom in March 1994. He threatened his South Korean counterpart, Song Young Dae, by saying, "Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be difficult for you to survive."²⁸¹

A chemical, biological, or nuclear attack against Seoul would be horrible. Bruce Bennett, a policy analyst at Rand, predicted the tremendous threat of North Korea:

One battery of North Korean 240-mm multiple rocket launchers fired into Seoul can deliver roughly a ton of chemical weapons, which, according to various accounts, could kill or injure thousands or tens of thousands. North Korea has many such batteries. In addition, North Korean special

²⁷⁸ Chae and Kim, "Conservatives and Progressives," 84.

²⁷⁹ Korea.net, Korea's Official Web site, Facts and Figures at <http://www.korea.net/> (accessed on April 2, 2009).

²⁸⁰ Edward F. Bruner, , "North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options," *CRS Report for Congress*, 29 July 2003, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 3.

²⁸¹ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 304.

forces teams might each spray several kilograms of anthrax in Seoul, leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people infected, many of whom would die unless properly treated.

A North Korean nuclear weapon fired into Seoul might cause damage similar to that of the nuclear weapon detonated on Hiroshima in World War II, which left some 70,000 dead and 75,000 injured.²⁸²

Roh Moo Hyun expressed his aversion to war and emphasized the importance of dialogue:

If you say it is foolish to have dialogue with him then we should exercise pressure on Kim Jong Il. But if he does not bend to pressure, then it means we should go ahead and attack. It all comes down to the fact that we can't have a military attack. It's our judgment that we cannot face or embrace war with North Korea. It is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in such a way that we do not have to face such a situation.²⁸³

South Koreans knew that even though South Korea could win the war, the damage could be tremendous and reconstruction would be very difficult. Therefore, South Koreans had strong aversion to war based on the calculations of cost of war on the Korean peninsula.

(2) North Korea. North Korea also had an aversion to war. North Koreans had horrific memories of the Korean War. Bruce Cumings explained how North Koreans felt about the Korean War and how much aversion there was to war at a conference in October 2008.²⁸⁴ He started his presentation with his personal impression during his first visit to North Korea in 1981. He said, "I was struck by the degree to which the war seemed to have ended only a few years earlier. There were posters all over

²⁸² Bruce Bennett, "N. Korea's Threat to S. Korea," Rand Corporation, 7 March 2003, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/030703UPI.html> (accessed on March 22, 2009).

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Video of Bruce Cumings's presentation, "War is a Stern Teacher." It is available at <http://kpolicy.org/documents/policy/081201paulliemreunification.html>. (accessed on March 14, 2009). "Reunification: Building Permanent Peace in Korea," a conference held at the University of California, Berkeley, October 10, 2008.

the county about the American bombing of North Korea. My guide wanted to tell me about his relatives who died in that bombing.”²⁸⁵ Then, he explained how North Koreans consider the Korean War. He said:

It is not an exaggeration to say that the DPRK as a nation is like a Korean or Vietnam or Iraq war veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder....Nobody knows how many Koreans died in the Korean War. Most scholars accept the figure of two million North Korean civilians.

The initial population in North Korea in the 1950s was 8 million. So we’re talking about a holocaust like the one that hit Poland or Russia during WWII. Maybe it was less but it was just a horror.²⁸⁶

Bruce Cumings described the air campaign as “everything but atomic bomb.”²⁸⁷

Jasper Becker also said, “It is understandable why the North has invested enormous efforts into protecting itself. Even more than the Chinese, Kim had bitter firsthand experience of what a sustained U.S. bombing attack could mean.”²⁸⁸ Then, he describes how the United States’ air campaign was conducted in detail:

In the first Korean War, three years of bombing attacks had left almost no modern buildings standing and no more targets to destroy. UN forces, largely American, had flown 720,980 sorties and had dropped 476,000 tons of ordnance. B-29s had flown 20,448 sorties (10,125 by day) and had dropped 168,368 tons of bombs.

The war’s largest air raid came on August 29, 1952, when Pyongyang was leveled by a 1,403-sortie assault. The bombing had destroyed the entire economy and infrastructure. Cumulatively, the bombs killed nearly 150,000 North Korean and Chinese troops and destroyed 975 aircraft, 800 bridges, 1,100 tanks, 800 locomotives, 9,000 railroad cars, 70,000 motor

²⁸⁵ Video of Bruce Cumings’s presentation, “War is a Stern Teacher.” It is available at <http://kpolicy.org/documents/policy/081201paulliemreunification.html>. (accessed on March 14, 2009). “Reunification: Building Permanent Peace in Korea,” a conference held at the University of California, Berkeley, October 10, 2008.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005, 151.

vehicles, and 80,000 buildings. Aircraft attacks shattered three of North Korea's 20 irrigation dams, and the floods wiped out roads, railroad tracks, and thousands of acres of rice fields.²⁸⁹

This experience has brought a tremendous aversion to war to North Koreans.

North Korea has felt the disparity and vulnerability in air power and conventional forces. Therefore, North Korea has not only a "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factor but also a "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" one from aversion to war based on the superior military capability of South Korea and the United States in the 1990s and the calculations of the cost of war on the Korean peninsula from the Korean War experience and the 1991 Iraq War. Consequently, the two Koreas shared an aversion to war because of the expected high costs of war.

The next section will explore the impacts of circumstances and relations between South Korea and North Korea (CV1) and North Korea's motivating factors (CV2) on leaders' perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of South Korea and North Korea (IntV).

D. INTERVENING VARIABLE (INTV): LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS OF SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA

1. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea

Question 7: How did Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun perceive Kim Jong Il and North Korea? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led Kim Dae Jung or Roh Moo Hyun to misperceive Kim Jong Il? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's cognitive barriers to change their image of Kim Jong Il and North Korea?

²⁸⁹ Becker, *Rogue Regime*, 151

Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea changed during the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. The summit meetings especially provided them opportunities to change their images of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

a. Kim Dae Jung's Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea

(1) Before the 2000 Summit Meeting. Even though there had been negative information about Kim Jong Il, Kim Dae Jung considered Kim Jong Il as a dialogue partner several months before the summit meeting. He described Kim Jong Il as "a pragmatist, a man of insight, a decisive leader with whom it is possible to negotiate."²⁹⁰ Selig Harrison argued that this kind of expression was one of the decisive factors of Kim Jong Il's acceptance of the summit meeting.²⁹¹ This suggests Kim Dae Jung did not have strong cognitive biases and was open to changing his image. However, Kim Dae Jung was uncertain about Kim Jong Il and North Korea, and there was only negative information about Kim Jong Il. Kim Dae Jung asked, "If all this information were true, how can I have meeting with this kind of person?"²⁹² He wanted to have more objective and accurate information about Kim Jong Il.

Therefore, Kim Dae Jung sent Lim Dong Won, a director general of the National Intelligence Service, as a special envoy to Pyongyang in May 2000. Kim Dae Jung gave Lim Dong Won three missions. Kim Dae Jung said, "By any means, you should visit Pyongyang as a presidential envoy. Meet Kim Jong Il and carry out three missions. First, find out what kind of person Kim Jong Il is. Second, thoroughly explain discussion items of the summit meeting in advance and find out North Korea's position.

²⁹⁰ Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 88. cited from Kim Dae Jung, interviewed by Tetsuya Chikushi, Tokyo Broadcasting system Television Network, 1354 GMT, February 2, 2000. Selig Harrison recommends several sources for an English Translation: "see FBIS JPP 20000210000029, February 10, 2000. See also Lee Chang Sup, "President Kim Describes Kim Jong Il as a Pragmatist," *Korea Herald*, February 12, 2000, 1, reporting an interview in *Der Spiegel*, the Germany weekly, in which Kim Dae Jung said that Kim Jong Il is "a pragmatist and appears to be in full control of North Korean affairs."

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Lim Dong Won, *Peacemaker* [in Korean], (Seoul: Joongangbooks, 2008), 48.

Third, reach an agreement on a joint declaration draft. Basically, your task is to have a preliminary meeting for the summit meeting.”²⁹³

Lim Dong Won found out that Kim Jong Il was very different from what he had heard and read about him before his meeting. He made a six-point report to Kim Dae Jung about Kim Jong Il to prepare for the first summit meeting:

1. He is a strong dictator, stronger than his father, whom Lim had met on two occasions in the early 1990s.
2. He is the only person who is open-minded and pragmatic in the North Korean system.
3. He is a good listener. He took notes on the meeting with Lim, like a student with a professor.
4. When he is persuaded by another’s point of view, he is decisive.
5. He is gentle and polite to older people around him, as he was to Hyundai founder Chung Ju Yung.
6. He has a sense of humor.²⁹⁴

Kim Dae Jung was relieved by Lim Dong Won’s report and became more optimistic about the meeting with Kim Jong Il.

(2) After the 2000 Summit Meeting. After the 2000 summit meeting, Kim Dae Jung expressed his personal feelings about Kim Jong Il and North Korea:

I found that Pyongyang, too, was our land, indeed. The Pyongyang people are the same as we, the same nation sharing the same blood....We lived as a unified nation for 1,300 years before we were divided 55 years ago against our will. It is impossible for us to continue to live separated physically and spiritually. I was able to reconfirm this fact first-hand during this visit. I have returned with the conviction that, sooner or later, we will become reconciled with each other, cooperate, and finally get reunified.²⁹⁵

²⁹³ Lim, *Peacemaker*, 48.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 73 and Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 429–430.

²⁹⁵ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 433.

In an interview with Anjaili Rao of CNN, Kim Dae Jung candidly described his impression of Kim Jong Il:

Anjaili Rao (AR): Kim Jong-il is such a secretive figure but you've met him. Give us an idea of your impressions of this man.

Kim Dae Jung (KDJ): That's a very interesting question! Kim Jong-il is very different from how the outside world perceives him to be. And I'm not the only one who thinks so. Secretary Albright, Prime Minister Koizumi and former Prime Minister Peterson of Sweden also had that same impression when they visited North Korea and met Kim Jong-il.

KDJ: Kim Jong-il is a very smart man who's very quick to make a decision. If he sees that another person's ideas are right, he can accept them on the spot. These are his merits.

KDJ: Of course, Kim Jong-il is also completely committed to a dictatorship, which fits our perception of him as an evil man.²⁹⁶

Also, Kim Dae Jung recognized the vulnerability of North Korea and understood the motivating factors of North Korea. Kim Dae Jung explained that the North Korean nuclear crisis could be solved with a security guarantee after the North Korean nuclear test in 2006:

Even after the nuclear test, Pyongyang has pledged that if its security is guaranteed through North Korea-U.S. direct bilateral talks and [the U.S.] lifts economic sanctions against it, it will positively accept the denuclearization of the peninsula.²⁹⁷

Kim Dae Jung's perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea changed because of the 2000 summit meeting. It was sufficient to overcome Kim Dae Jung's cognitive barriers to changing his image of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

²⁹⁶ CNN.com/Asia, "Kim Dae Jung Talkasia Transcript," November 20, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/11/20/talkasia.kim.script/index.html> (accessed on March 16, 2009).

²⁹⁷ "Keep Sun Shining on North: Kim Dae Jung," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, October 20, 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/165967.html (accessed on March 15, 2009).

b. Roh Moo Hyun's Perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea

(1) Faith in a Conciliatory Approach. Roh Moo Hyun had faith in a conciliatory approach and followed Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. Roh Moo Hyun believed that North Korea developed its nuclear program because it felt insecure and vulnerable. Han Sung Joo, a South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. said:

In contrast, President Roh Moo Hyun's view was that North Korea had developed its nuclear program because of a keen sense of insecurity in the face of the overwhelming military might of the United States and the prosperous South Korea. "If the source of the sense of insecurity is removed, North Korea will rid itself of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons program." This was what Roh insisted on both in private and in public.²⁹⁸

In an interview with *The New York Times* after his presidential election, Roh Moo Hyun expressed his perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea and explained his approach toward North Korea. Roh Moo Hyun believed that Kim Jong Il sincerely wanted to have a dialogue rather than a confrontation. Roh Moo Hyun said:

If you treat someone with mistrust he will come back to you with more mistrust and skepticism. I think the fundamental thing is Mr. Kim Jong Il's situation. He has to keep his people fed and he has to assure the stability of his own system, and he has to come out to the world. There are various occasions on which he has made this clear.²⁹⁹

Therefore, the unfavorable balance of power toward North Korea and rise of a new identity influenced his perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. Roh Moo Hyun believed that North Korea had "not-greedy" intentions and was capable of accepting negotiation. Because he did not start with a strongly negative image of North Korea, there was not a significant cognitive barrier that had to be overcome to convince Roh Moo Hyun to continue with reassurance.

²⁹⁸ Korea Economic Institute (KEI), *Ambassadors' Memoir: U.S.-Korea Relations Through the Eyes of the Ambassadors* (Washington, D.C.: KEI, 2009), 198.

²⁹⁹ Howard W. French, "South Korea's President-Elect Rejects Use of Force against North Korea," *New York Times*, January 17, 2003, A12.

(2) The 2007 Summit Meeting. The second inter-Korea summit meeting, this time involves Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il, provided another opportunity for Roh Moo Hyun to consider Kim Jong Il as a negotiation partner for discussing many difficult issues. The summit did nothing to make Roh Moo Hyun's image of his counterpart more negative and seems even to have shifted it in a more favorable direction. Roh Moo Hyun had an interview with CNN's Sohn Jie Ae on December 10, 2007, after the summit meeting and expressed his impression of Kim Jong Il:

Sohn Jie Ae (SJA): What was your first impression of Kim Jong Il when you first met him?

Roh Moo Hyun (RMH): People that have met Chairman Kim get a lot of questions about him. I think this is because there is the perception that he is probably a strange man. But I think that that perception itself is not correct. In a word, he speaks with candor, and in a direct manner without hesitation. But that is not to say that what he says is offensive or he makes everyone around him uncomfortable.

He is someone who knows how to maintain a pleasant atmosphere and is considerate of others in conversation. Honestly, he is not someone that is aggressive or makes people uncomfortable. He is considerate, listens, and at times is humorous. And while he is talking with you, he makes you feel safe and makes you like him.³⁰⁰

Roh Moo Hyun expressed his beliefs that North Korea would give up its nuclear program if the circumstances changed and North Korea felt secure:

SJA: What were your discussions about the North's nuclear issue? Did you feel or did Kim Jong Il ever tell you that he was willing to give up his nuclear weapons system, or do you believe that he will?

RMH: Yes, I do. I have believed for a long time that North Korea was willing to give up nuclear weapons, and there is no change in my belief. That is, I believe that North Korea thinks it is more beneficial not to have nuclear weapons than to have them, and that if the circumstances were

³⁰⁰ "Interview with South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun," *CNN.com/Asia*, December 10, 2007, <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/12/08/talkasia.roh/index.html#cnnSTCText> (accessed on March 15, 2009).

right, they would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons. I have no doubt about such assertions from North Korea. I think there are sufficient grounds to think so.³⁰¹

During the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy, both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun changed their perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. They were able to perceive Kim Jong Il as a reasonable leader to negotiate with rather than an unreasonable leader as was perceived before the summit meetings. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun believed that the motivating factor of North Korea's nuclear program was its security and that a security guarantee would be a solution to resolving the nuclear crisis.

c. *Condition Variables and the Perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun*

Why did Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun change their perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea? First, the change in the balance of power was a factor that led to their change in perception. As explained in the previous section, the balance of power became unfavorable to North Korea, especially from the economic perspective. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun understood that Kim Jong Il needed to cooperate with them for survival. Oberdorfer introduced Kim Dae Jung's beliefs about the opening of North Korea:

Kim Dae Jung, in a dinner for Korea experts and friends in New York three months later, said he believed the most important reason of the opening was North Korea's desperate economic travail, which made assistance from the outside essential to its survival. "Without improved relations with South Korea, others won't help them."³⁰²

Second, along with the unfavorable shift of the balance of power in North Korea, North Korea's economic dependence on South Korea increased. Even though the two Koreas were not economically interdependent, North Korea became dependent on

³⁰¹ "Interview with South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun," *CNN.com/Asia*, December 10, 2007, <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/12/08/talkasia.roh/index.html#cnnSTCText> (accessed on March 15, 2009).

³⁰² Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 433.

South Korea economically. For example, trade dependence increased from 2 percent in 1998 to 12 percent in 2007 (Table 2.5). Also, North Korea agreed on the Mt. Geumgang project and Gaesung Industrial Complex project. These changes made Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's perception of North Korea from that of a hostile enemy to a partner with which to work by starting economic projects.

Third, two summit meetings and the agreement of the 2000 Joint Declaration and October 4 Joint Declaration established new identities among Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Kim Jong Il. It brought an identity shift away from hostile enemy relations. They recognized each other as counterparts to work together and to negotiate with to solve many issues rather than vilify and threaten each other.

2. Kim Jong Il's Perceptions of Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea

Question 8: How did Kim Jong Il perceive the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy offered by South Korea? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led Kim Jong Il to discount those reassurance strategies? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome Kim Jong Il's cognitive barriers to changing his image of South Korea?

The beliefs and perceptions of Kim Jong Il are an important factor because he fully controlled North Korea. According to Michael J. Mazarr, "There is a strong evidence that Kim is a fully engaged leader, that he is closely involved in the details of governing."³⁰³ He introduced one anecdote:

In one widely reported incident, during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000, the U.S. delegation gave Kim a list of more than a dozen questions about the technical specifications of North Korea's missile programs. The Americans expected Kim to hand them to an aide; instead he answered many of the questions from memory. Defectors who have worked near him describe a

³⁰³ Michael J. Mazarr, "Kim Jong Il: Strategy and Psychology," Korea Economic Institute (KEI)'s Academic Paper Series on Korea, vol. 1, February 21, 2008, 7, <http://www.keia.org/Publications/OnKorea/2008/08mazarr.pdf> (accessed on March 15, 2009).

night owl who reads hundreds of reports from officials of his regime and who routinely calls people in the middle of the night with questions or guidance.³⁰⁴

a. *Kim Jong Il's Perception of Kim Dae Jung: The 2000 Summit Meeting*

There are limited sources from which to learn about Kim Jong Il's perceptions of Kim Dae Jung. However, there were several interviews with Kim Jong Il from which his perception of Kim Dae Jung can be interpreted. Moon Myong Ja,³⁰⁵ a Korean-American journalist, conducted an exclusive interview with Kim Jong Il after the summit meeting. Kim Jong Il expressed his impression of Kim Dae Jung and his willingness to carry out the Joint Declaration:

Moon Myong Ja (MMJ): On June 13, you showed exceptionally good hospitality to President Kim Dae Jung by meeting him at the airport. It was unprecedented in terms of protocol. Please tell me what made you do that?

Kim Jong Il (KJI): I spontaneously made that decision. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kim Dae Jung's image had been not so good among our people. His image is derived from the negative information about his words and deeds. For instance, he has advocated continued U.S. military presence in South Korea even after the unification has been realized; he detained a number of South Korean unification activists; and he failed to take due steps to send our unconverted long-term prisoners back to us. In contrast, however, President Kim made a brave decision to come visit Pyongyang. Therefore, necessity to change such a mood of the Pyongyang citizens drove me to greet him at the airport.

³⁰⁴ Michael J. Mazarr, "Kim Jong Il: Strategy and Psychology," Korea Economic Institute (KEI)'s Academic Paper Series on Korea, vol. 1, February 21, 2008, 7, <http://www.keia.org/Publications/OnKorea/2008/08mazarr.pdf> (accessed on March 15, 2009).

³⁰⁵ Moon Myong Ja (Julie Moon) had an exclusive interview with Kim Jong Il in 2000 after the summit meeting. She was best known for her exclusive interview with the late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in 1992 and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1980 respectively. Moon was a chief editorial writer of the Washington-based U.S. Asian News Agency. She gained asylum in 1973. For her biography, refer to Kang Shin Woo, "Korean-American Journalist Moon Dies at 78," *Korea Times*, July 27, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/03/178_28265.html and Jo Il Jun, "Yushinjeonkwon hyanghan yaebong youksae saegida [the brunt of an attack toward Yushin power, engrave in history] http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/300775.html (accessed on March 16, 2009).

MMJ: What was your impression about President Kim?

KJI: The 5-point joint declaration agreed at the current summit talks is so significant that it may be named a great charter for national unification. You cannot do everything at one go. It may take some time, however, we must put it into practice without fail. I do believe that President Kim has a firm will and good faith to put the agreement into action with unwavering attention. ... I also will do my utmost for its realization.³⁰⁶

Also, a delegation of the South Korean news media heads met Kim Jong Il and had a twenty-minute interview with him at Pyongyang on August 12, 2000. In the interview, Kim Jong Il praised Kim Dae Jung and considered the 2000 summit meeting and the Joint Declaration as very significant steps for unification. Also, he expressed his regret over criticism by South Korea:

Kim Jong Il: Both North and South made unification impossible. Both governments of the past era share the blame. Both Koreas used unification to preserve their political systems. But thanks to President Kim Dae Jung's determination, there was the June 15th summit and the situation has changed fundamentally. I see that some Southern press organs and opposition leaders criticize the 6.15 summit.³⁰⁷

These interviews show that Kim Jong Il perceived Kim Dae Jung as a reasonable leader and a negotiation partner to discuss issues related to security on the Korean peninsula.

b. *Kim Jong Il's Perception of Roh Moo Hyun: The 2007 Summit Meeting*

Even though so little is known for certain about how Kim Jong Il perceived Roh Moo Hyun, Kim Jong Il's behavior and Roh Moo Hyun's impressions during the 2007 summit meeting provide hints of his perception of Roh Moo Hyun. The acceptance of the second summit meeting meant that Kim Jong Il considered Roh Moo

³⁰⁶ Moon Myong Ja, "Sikryang Bonaejun Hankuksaram Indojuuie Gipi Gamsa [Deep thanks to humanitarianism of South Korean who sent food]," *Wolgan Mal* [Monthly Words], vol 170 (August 2008): 56–61.

³⁰⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, "Kim Jong Il's Dialogue with South Korean Media Heads," August 13, 2000, <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200008/200008130358.html> (accessed on March 16, 2009).

Hyun a partner he could talk with. Zhu Feng said, “By agreeing to the summit, Kim could be seen as rewarding Roh’s policy of ‘peace and prosperity.’”³⁰⁸

On the last day of Roh Moo Hyun’s Pyongyang visit, Kim Jong Il asked Roh Moo Hyun to extend his visit by one day. When Roh Moo Hyun said that he would have to consult his staff, Kim Jong Il responded, “Can’t a president decide? Presidents should be able to decide.”³⁰⁹ This episode shows that Kim Jong Il wanted to continue to negotiate with Roh Moo Hyun, which suggests he did not perceive the South Korean leader as hostile or inflexible.

c. Kim Jong Il’s Perceptions of South Korea

One of the agreements at the 2000 South Korea and North Korea summit meeting was Kim Jong-Il’s visit to Seoul.³¹⁰ South Korean media heads asked a question about his visit to Seoul twice during the interview in August 2000 after the summit meeting:

South Korean media (SKM): When are you planning to visit the South?

Kim Jong Il (KJI): I’ll be visiting in an appropriate time and I wish it would be sooner.

SKM: If you are invited to the Sydney Olympics along with President Kim Dae-jung, would you accept the invitation?

KJI: I would prefer to visit Seoul first, as I would play a role of actor in Sydney. I’ll have to go to Seoul first, as I owe a lot to President Kim....

SKM: Will you visit Seoul within this year? (Asking for the second time)

KJI: You media organization heads are trying to go home with only the top news, eh? This autumn, I am going to Russia. Putin eagerly hoped I would.... I owe President Kim Dae Jung one so I have to go to Seoul. The National Defense Commission and the Japanese Foreign Ministry are currently conducting discussions but I haven’t received any report yet. If

³⁰⁸ Antoaneta Bezlova, “Far East: Koreas in Win-Win Deal,” Inter Press Service (ISP) News Agency, October 5, 2007, <http://www.ipsnews.org/news.asp?idnews=39537> (accessed on March 16, 2009).

³⁰⁹ Norimitsu Onishi, “Pledging Peace, Koreans Agree on Economic Projects,” *New York Times*, October 4, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/asia/04korea.html> (accessed on April 1, 2009).

³¹⁰ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 431.

the optic cable to the South starts operation, I will be able to notify things that are to be told to the South within a split second.³¹¹

Unfortunately, his return visit to Seoul did not occur. Actually, the second summit meeting between South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il was held in Pyongyang instead of Seoul in October 2007. The failure of Kim Jong Il to come to Seoul did not help the reassurance strategy of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Even though Kim Jong Il expressed his wish to visit Seoul several times, his intention and the meaning of “in an appropriate time” were very vague. There was always doubt about the effectiveness of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy without Kim Jong Il’s reciprocal behavior, especially a visit to Seoul.

Many reasons explain why Kim Jong Il could not visit Seoul. One of them was Kim Jong Il’s concerns about the domestic politics of South Korea. Anti-communism, especially anti-North Korean conservatism, had been the dominant ideology in South Korean politics since the Korean War. Also, in the interview with South Korean media heads in August 2000, Kim Jong Il said “The Southern government seems to be not as influential as I had thought.”³¹² Kim Jong Il considered the conservative-progressive split of domestic politics in South Korea and was concerned about the criticism of the strong conservatives in South Korea.

3. Domestic Politics of South Korea

Question 9: How did key domestic actors in South Korea perceive the reassurance strategy (the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy) offer to North Korea? Did the reassurance strategy generate domestic support in South Korea? Was there sufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

³¹¹ *Chosun Ilbo*, “Kim Jong Il’s Dialogue.”

³¹² *Ibid.*

a. *How Were the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy Toward North Korea Perceived?*

Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy received relatively high public support during the first and second year of his administration. However, results of later surveys asking whether people approved of Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy toward North Korea or not showed that public support continuously declined (Table 2.10).

Table 2.10. Public Opinion on Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy

	Approve	Disapprove	no response
Jun 17, 1998 ³¹³	76.9	7.1	16.1
Feb 22, 1999 ³¹⁴	70.2 ³¹⁵	25.2	4.6
Feb 24, 2000 ³¹⁶	49	25.8	25.2
Jun 8, 2001 ³¹⁷	33.9	43.9	22.1

As shown in Table 2.10, there were significant differences between 1998 and 2001. In 2001, the approval rate was only 33.9 percent, which was 10 percent less than the disapproval rate. The reason for this decline was twofold. First, public opinion declined due to the lack of reciprocity from and provocative actions of North Korea. The number of provocative actions of North Korea did not decrease during the Kim Dae Jung administration. South Koreans remembered the 1999 and 2002 skirmishes in the West

³¹³ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on June 17, 1998 (1625 sample, + - 2.4% sample error, and 95% reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=19980607009 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³¹⁴ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 22, 1999 (1017 sample, + - 3.1% sample error, 95% reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=19990204007 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³¹⁵ It is combination of 30.2% (those who wanted to strengthen the Sunshine policy) and 40.0% (those who wanted to maintain the current level of the Sunshine policy).

³¹⁶ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 24, 2000 (1062 samples, + - 3.0 sample error, 95% reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20000207006 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³¹⁷ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on June 8, 2001 (1045 samples, + - 3.0 sample error, 95% reliability), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20010601005 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

Sea and argued that South Korea should retaliate more and build a greater deterrence capability. Average South Koreans criticize the lack of reciprocity from North Korea. Paik Jin Hyun, a politics professor at Seoul National University, said, “We have seen enough symbolism, handshakes and wine toasts. Now we are looking for concrete evidence of change, and I don’t think we’ve seen it.”³¹⁸

Second, Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy was not implemented with wide national consensus. Lee Hong Koo, a former South Korean ambassador to the United States between 1998 and 2000, claimed that Kim Dae Jung was “too eager to reach some agreement with North Korea and also personally to leave a legacy in that regard.”³¹⁹ He also said that the 2000 summit with Kim Jong Il was too soon and secret without national consensus:

He was soon negotiating a summit with Kim Jong Il, which ultimately was held in Pyongyang in June 2000. But he and his closest advisors kept these negotiations completely private and secret and out of the regular channels of government decision making; they excluded the foreign and unification policy bureaucracy and also the elected political leaders in the National Assembly. I myself as the ambassador to the United States was kept in the dark, and I was becoming increasingly uncomfortable about my government’s handling of North Korea policy.³²⁰

Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy was less popular than Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy. In 2003, the first year of Roh Moo Hyun’s administration, 33.9 percent of the voters approved his policy toward North Korea. This was related to the scandal of “bribes for summit.”³²¹ In February 2003, Kim Dae Jung admitted that his government was involved in a \$200 million payment to North Korea before the 2000 summit meeting and this damaged the credibility of the Sunshine Policy.³²² Also, North Korea’s nuclear activities since 2002 made the situation unfavorable to the

³¹⁸ *Newsweek*, “A Battle for Peace; Skepticism at Home and Abroad Threatens South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy,” April 23, 2001, 34.

³¹⁹ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 138.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 138.

³²¹ *Financial Times*, “Kim Apology Fuels ‘Bribes for Summit,’” February 15, 2003, www.ft.com/northkorea (accessed on April 1, 2009).

³²² *Ibid.*

implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Therefore, as shown in Table 2.11, domestic support for the Peace and Prosperity Policy consistently declined and, in 2007, it was at 17.8 percent. Also, the disapprove percentage remained higher than the approve number after August 2003. It was difficult for Roh Moo Hyun to implement his Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea with low domestic support.

Table 2.11. Public Opinion on Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy

	Approve	Disapprove	Neutral	No response
May 31, 2003 ³²³	33.9	33.5	16.1	10.4
Aug 23, 2003 ³²⁴	29.7	41.8	17.2	11.4
Feb 21, 2004 ³²⁵	24.1	33.7	21.9	20.2
Feb 19, 2007 ³²⁶	23.8	51.6	16	8.5
Jun 23, 2007 ³²⁷	17.8	54.7	18.7	8.9

b. The Sharp Polarization of Korean Society, Inadequate Domestic Support and Constraints from Conservatives

(1) Hairline Victories in the 1997 and 2002 Presidential Elections and the Popularity Decline of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. Despite the consecutive victories by progressive candidates in both the 1997 and the 2002

³²³ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on May 31, 2003 (1038 samples, + - 3.0 sample error, 95% confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20030501005 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³²⁴ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on August 23, 2003 (1097 samples, + - 3.0 % sample error, 95% confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20030801008 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³²⁵ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 21, 2004 (1036 samples, + - 3.0 % sample error, 95% confidence) http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20040202016 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³²⁶ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on February 19, 2007 (1006 samples, + - 3.1 % sample error, 95% confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20070202010 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³²⁷ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on June 23, 2007 (1005 samples, + - 3.1 % sample error, 95% confidence), http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb_04Content.asp?SN=20070601015 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

presidential elections, they were hairline victories and it was difficult to implement a reassurance strategy towards North Korea by ignoring conservatives. Kim Dae Jung won the 1997 presidential election for two main reasons—the conservative candidates’ split and support from another conservative leader Kim Jong Pil and his party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD).³²⁸ Lee In Jae, the governor of Gyeonggi province and a member of the ruling Party, the Grand National Party (GNP), left the party and ran for president on his own and Kim Jong Pil, a leader of the ULD made a pre-election pact with Kim Dae Jung and supported his bid for the presidency. Kim Dae Jung won the 1997 presidential election with 40.3 percent support while the conservative party GNP’s leader, Lee Hoi Chang got 38.7 percent of the vote. The third was another conservative candidate, Lee In Jae who received 19.2 percent support.³²⁹

The 2002 presidential election was even more competitive. Roh Moo Hyun was elected with 48.9 percent of the vote and it was only a 2.3 percent difference from the conservative leader, Lee Hoi Chang, who finished in second place.³³⁰ Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had difficulty in starting the implementation of a reassurance strategy toward North Korea with limited public support and strong opposition from conservatives who strongly criticized any reassurance strategy toward North Korea.

Furthermore, Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity continuously declined during their presidencies. After the 2000 summit meeting, Kim Dae Jung’s popularity was about 30 percent from 2001 to the end of his term in 2003. Figure 3 illustrates Kim Dae Jung’s popularity surveys conducted by Gallup Korea between 1998 and 2003 (Figure 2.7).

³²⁸ *Economist.com*, Country Briefings, South Korea, Political Forces, May 8, 2007, <http://www.economist.com/countries/SouthKorea/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Forces> (accessed on April 4, 2009).

³²⁹ William E. Berry, Jr. *Global Security Watch—Korea: A Reference Handbook* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 37.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.




Figure 2.7. Kim Dae Jung's Popularity (1998–2003)³³¹

According to the popularity surveys conducted by Gallup Korea, Roh Moo Hyun's overall popularity was lower than 30 percent except during the first six months of his presidency. Figure 2.8 includes all the results of popularity surveys conducted by Gallup Korea between 2003 and 2007. The popularity decreased significantly in 2003 from 59.6 percent in April to 22 percent in December. In January 2007, Roh Moo Hyun's popularity was only 13.4 percent. There was some increase due to the 2007 summit meeting. However, his popularity fell back to only 22.9 percent in December 2007. After September 2003, Roh Moo Hyun's popularity was generally less than 30 percent. Under this circumstance, Roh Moo Hyun could not actively implement his Peace and Prosperity Policy toward North Korea.

³³¹ Gallup Korea, Surveys conducted between June 1998 and February 2003, <http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/> (accessed on March 29, 2009).




Figure 2.8. Roh Moo Hyun's Popularity (2003–2007)³³²

After the 2007 summit meeting, there was debate over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) issue in South Korea. Roh Moo Hyun expressed his idea about the NLL to reporters during the discussion of the inter-Korean summit. He said the NLL is “a line in the water between the two Koreas for military reasons.”³³³ According to Roh Moo Hyun, “There are people in this country who think the NLL issue is directly related to territory. That’s an idea that is sure to mislead the public....Why call a line drawn within the same territory a territorial border and have concerns for territorial sovereignty?”³³⁴ There was a survey questioning whether South Koreans agreed with Roh Moo Hyun’s statement about the NLL. The survey showed 59 percent of South Koreans did not agree with Roh Moo Hyun’s statement (Table 2.12):

³³² Gallup Korea, Surveys conducted between April 2003 and December 2007, <http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/> (accessed on March 29, 2009).

³³³ Lee Min, “Roh Concludes Yellow Sea Line is not a Border,” *JoongAng Daily*, October 12, 2007, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2881438> (accessed on April 7, 2009).

³³⁴ Ibid.

Table 2.12. Response to Roh Moo Hyun’s statement about NLL³³⁵

Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No response
8.9%	23.3%	26.2%	32.8%	8.9%
Positive: 32.1 %		Negative: 59%		

(2) No Majority in the Legislature during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun Administrations. Kim Dae Jung’s party did not have a majority in the legislature during his administration (Table 2.13).

Table 2.13. Distribution of National Assembly Seats by Political Party³³⁶

	NCNP (1996) / MDP (2000)	NKP(1996) / GNP(2000)	ULD	Other Parties
April 1996	79	139	50	16
April 2000	115	133	17	8

The majority party was Grand National Party (GNP) which represented conservatives. The GNP was a strong opposition group against the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae Jung had difficulty getting any legislation passed by the National Assembly. Furthermore, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP)’s popularity decreased. Also, the MDP lost in by-elections in three constituencies in October 2001.³³⁷ Finally, Kim Dae Jung relinquished

³³⁵ Gallup Korea, Survey conducted on October 16, 2007 (864 samples, + - 3.3 % sample error, 95% confidence), http://panel.gallup.co.kr/svcdb/condition_content.asp?objSN=20071001008 (accessed on April 3, 2009).

³³⁶ Levin and Han, *Sunshine in Korea*, 98, referring to Kim Doh Jong and Kim Hyung Joon, “Analysis of the 16th National Assembly Election,” *Korea Focus* 8, no. 3 (May-June 2000): 2.

³³⁷ *Asiaweek*, “Three Sixty: The Week: The Rejection-‘Sunshine’ President Kim Dae Jung Has Come under a Dark Cloud,” November 9, 2001, 1.

his party's leadership in November 2001 to take responsibility for the defeats and this created a lame-duck situation for the rest of his term.³³⁸

Furthermore, Roh Moo Hyun was impeached by the opposition parties in March 2004 by a vote of 193 to 2 in the National Assembly.³³⁹ The GNP and MDP members of the legislature claimed that Roh Moo Hyun violated election laws by supporting the Uri party.³⁴⁰ Roh Moo Hyun did not join the Uri Party, but said that he would do everything he could legally to support the Uri Party in the April 15 elections.³⁴¹ However, the violation of election law was just a plausible excuse for impeachment. The fundamental reason for impeachment was the tension between Roh Moo Hyun and the opposition party. According to *BBC*, "The impeachment is the culmination of a row between Mr. Roh and the opposition-controlled National Assembly. Analysts say the charges against Mr. Roh were relatively minor, and the stand-off has more to do with jockeying for the 15 April general elections."³⁴²

After the impeachment, tens of thousands of South Koreans joined candlelight vigils to oppose the decision of the assembly members.³⁴³ Three main broadcasting services conducted surveys about people's opinions on the impeachment. Almost 70 percent of South Koreans disapproved of the Roh Moo Hyun's impeachment by the GNP and MDP members.³⁴⁴ This public anger was reflected in the results of the April 2004 legislative election. The Uri Party³⁴⁵ became a majority party in the April

³³⁸ Choi Hae Won, "Korean President Gives Up Ruling-Party Leadership—Penance for Election Loss, Move Clouds Prospects for Economic Program," *Wall Street Journal*, November 9, 2001, A13.

³³⁹ *BBC*, "South Korean President Impeached," 12 March 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3504026.stm> (accessed on April 10, 2009).

³⁴⁰ Ser Myo Ja, "Parties Present Bill to Impeach the President," *JoongAng Daily*, March 9, 2004, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2106792> (accessed on April 10, 2009).

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² *BBC*, "South Korean President Impeached."

³⁴³ Samuel Len, "President's Impeachment Stirs Angry Protests in South Korea," *New York Times*, March 13, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/13/world/president-s-impeachment-stirs-angry-protests-in-south-korea.html> (accessed on April 11, 2009).

³⁴⁴ Yonhap News (South Korea), "Gukmin 70% 'Tanhaek Jalmotdoaitda' [People 70% Disapprove Impeachment]," March 12, 2004, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/> (accessed on April 10, 2009).

³⁴⁵ The Party name was originally Our Open Party and Changed to Uri Party. "Uri" means Our in Korea.

2004 legislative elections.³⁴⁶ In May 2004, the Constitutional Court declared that Roh Moo Hyun's violation of the election law was not serious enough for him to be impeached.³⁴⁷

However, the Uri Party's popularity decreased considerably and it lost in the next by-election and regional elections. Finally, the Uri Party could not maintain its majority status after mass defections in early 2007. On February 7, 2007, twenty-three lawmakers left the Uri Party and the GNP became the majority party with 127 seats.³⁴⁸ In June 2007, the Uri Party had only seventy-three lawmakers after more defections. It was less than half of the result of 2004 legislative elections.³⁴⁹ One principle of the Uri Party was continuation of the Sunshine Policy. However, the Uri Party could not implement the Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun could not get support from the Uri Party for the implementation of the Peace and Prosperity Policy.

(3) The Fierce Opposition from Conservative Media and NGOs. The domestic politics of South Korea have been deeply divided into conservatives and progressives, and supporting and opposing groups about the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Generally, progressives are described as supporters of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy while conservatives have been opponents. The government party and the opposition party have debated fiercely on the implementation of those policies. Not only the government and parties, but also the media, civil groups, and nongovernmental organizations are deeply divided into supporting and opposing groups about the government policy toward North Korea. Norman D. Levin and Han Yong Sup said, "The major South Korean actors...are sharply divided between supporters and opponents of the sunshine policy. They are

³⁴⁶ Ser Myo Ja, "Open Party Eyeing Majority," *JoongAng Daily*, April 15, 2004, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2122677> (accessed on April 11, 2009).

³⁴⁷ Min Seong Jae and Jo Kang Su, "President Resumes Power," *JoongAng Daily*, May 14, 2004, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2414437> (accessed on April 10, 2009).

³⁴⁸ Ser Myo Ja, "Mass Defection Turns Uri Party into a Minority," *JoongAng Daily*, February 7, 2007, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2872187> (accessed on April 11, 2009).

³⁴⁹ Lee Min, "Shrinking Uri Refuses to Disband," *JoongAng Daily*, June 16, 2007, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2876861> (accessed on April 11, 2009).

equally divided on the effectiveness of the policy in producing changes in North Korea.”³⁵⁰ They created a figure³⁵¹ that shows the division of South Korea between supporters and opponents (Figure 2.9). This division of South Korea continued during Roh Moo Hyun’s presidency.




Figure 2.9. Notional Positions of Major Actors on Sunshine Policy

The media was divided into two groups. The three major TV broadcasting services such as MBC (Moonhwa Broadcasting Company), KBS (Korea Broadcasting System), and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System) have generally supported the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. The most influential progressive newspaper is *Hankyoreh Sinmun*, which regards “the Sunshine policy as a means for reducing the possibility of war and fostering inter-Korean reconciliation.”³⁵² In

³⁵⁰ Levin and Han, *Sunshine in Korea*, 87.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 88.

³⁵² Ibid., 75.

the 2000s, many progressive internet news sites such as *Ohmynews*,³⁵³ *Pressian*,³⁵⁴ and *Redian*³⁵⁵ were established and expressed more progressive perspectives. Even though these progressive media all generally supported the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy, there was strong opposition from the conservative media.

The three biggest newspapers, *Chosun Ilbo*, *JoongAng Ilbo*, and *Donga Ilbo* have played a strong role and are influential in conservative circles. *Cho-Joong-Dong* is an abbreviation of these three newspapers and symbolizes a strong conservative group in Korea. They strongly criticized the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy and have supported a more hard-line policy toward North Korea based on strong deterrent capabilities and the rule of reciprocity. *Chosun Ilbo* is anti-Communist and anti-North Korea and criticized the Sunshine Policy “for having weakened South Korea’s security, while predicating South Korean policy on the ‘naïve’ assumption that North Korea can be enticed to change.”³⁵⁶ *Donga Ilbo* has expressed “strong doubts about the sincerity of Kim Jong Il’s reputed statement that he accepts the U.S. military presence in South Korea, while it has warned against revising South Korea’s National Security Law until there is evidence of a corresponding change in Pyongyang’s attitude.”³⁵⁷ *JoongAng Ilbo* has also criticized unilateral aid and insisted that “reciprocity should be applied to all interactions between the two Koreas.”³⁵⁸ The Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations were constrained from fully implementing the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy by these fierce opposition newspapers.

³⁵³ *OhmyNews*, www.ohmynews.com. It was established in 2000.

³⁵⁴ *Pressian*, www.pressian.org. It was established in 2004. Pressian is a combination of Press and Internet Alternative News Media.

³⁵⁵ *Redian*, www.redian.org. It was established in 2006. Redian is a combination of Red and -ian. That means passion, temptation, and progressive.

³⁵⁶ Levin and Han, *Sunshine in Korea*, 73.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Levin and Han argue that *JoongAng Ilbo* has been “the most moderate and balanced in its criticisms of the Sunshine Policy.” However, it is more opposition side against the Sunshine policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy.

On the other hand, after decades of dictatorial rule, civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations became important actors in South Korea in the 1990s and the 2000s. Levin and Han give brief overviews of the major civic groups and NGOs during Kim Dae Jung's administration by dividing them into the progressive and conservative sides of the spectrum.³⁵⁹ On the progressive side of the spectrum, the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC), Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Anti-U.S. and Anti-U.S. Military Base NGOs and labor groups such as the Federal of Korean Trade Union (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) were established in the 1990s and have played important roles in progressive circles.³⁶⁰

In response to the rise of progressive groups in the 1990s, conservative groups were created in the mid-1990s.³⁶¹ They have emphasized "liberal democracy and an open market economy"³⁶² and have supported a more hard-line policy toward North Korea. The National Congress of Freedom and Democracy (NCFD), Korean Freedom League (KFL), and Korean Veterans Association (KVA) are typical conservative groups in South Korea. For example, the NCFD has opposed the Sunshine Policy and insisted on a formal apology "for North Korea's past terrorist activities and a pledge to end its weapons of mass destruction program, missile activity, and other threatening behavior."³⁶³

Consequently, South Korea is deeply divided into supporters and opponents of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy in parties, media, civil groups and nongovernmental organizations (Table 2.14). The fierce debates between these two groups constrained the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations from implementing their more progressive approach to North Korea.

³⁵⁹ Levin and Han, *Sunshine in Korea*, 75–83.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 77–81.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 81–82.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, 82.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

Table 2.14. Positions of Major Actors on the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy

Notional Position	Support	Oppose
Political Orientation	Progressives	Conservatives
The Parties	MDP, Uri Party	GNP
The Media	MBC / KBS / SBS, <i>Hankyoreh Sinmun</i> , <i>Ohmynews</i> , <i>Pressian</i> , <i>Redian</i>	<i>Chosun Ilbo</i> , <i>JoongAng Ilbo</i> , <i>Donga Ilbo</i>
Civil Groups and Nongovernmental Groups	KCRC, CCEJ, PSPD, Anti-U.S. and Anti-U.S. Military Base NGOs, Labor Groups such as FKTU and KCTU.	NCFD, KFL, KVA

The debate between conservatives and progressives shows the difference in identity. Conservatives consider North Korea an adversary threatening South Korea. Progressives, on the other hand, see North Korea as a brother nation with which they should live together to the end. During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, the progressive perspective increased compared to previous administrations and led to an identity shift in the domestic politics of South Korea. However, it was not sufficient to make reassurance credible.

South Korea needed more support from its domestic politics to implement reassurance strategies. For the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace Prosperity Policy, a series of conciliatory initiatives were required to be taken independently of North Korea's response. The policies could not be maintained without support from South Koreans, especially from the military and conservatives. From the point of the view of the military, the strategic situation could be dangerous. During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, public opinion about the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy showed that there was not full support for implementation and there was much criticism and a request for immediate reciprocity by

the North. Therefore, a domestic consensus in beginning a series of conciliatory actions is a prerequisite for implementation of reassurance strategies.

4. Domestic Politics of North Korea

Question 10: How did key domestic actors in North Korea perceive Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy? Did South Korea's reassurance strategy generate domestic support in North Korea for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try to prevent North Korea from offering a positive response?

a. *Sungun (Military-First) Politics in North Korea*

Kim Jong Il transformed North Korea “from a party-state system to a military-first political system” beginning with the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994.³⁶⁴ Ilpyong J. Kim said, “During the Kim Il Sung period (1948-1994), the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) played the central role in North Korean politics. However, the role of KWP has been gradually diminished while the role of the North Korean military in politics has rapidly increased under Kim Jong Il’s leadership.”³⁶⁵ One explanation for the power shift from the KWP to the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is “Kim’s suspicions of senior KWP cadres of his father’s generation, who are less responsive to his command than younger KPA officers. He knows from history that Kim Il Sung took one decade of KWP factional struggles to reach the summit.”³⁶⁶

Kim Jong Il was elected to the first vice chair of the National Defense Commission (NDC) in May 1990 and was reelected as the NDC chairman in September 1998.³⁶⁷ In 1998, North Korea amended its constitution making Kim Il Sung the “eternal president” and Kim Jong Il became the supreme leader as the chairman of the NDC, “a

³⁶⁴ Ilpyong J. Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics,” in *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival*, ed. Kihl Yong Whan and Kim Hong Nack (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), 59.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ken E. Gause, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics to A Point* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2006), <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> (accessed on March 15, 2009), 49, fn. 4.

³⁶⁷ Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics,” 60–1.

position that has functioned as the center of political power in North Korea ever since—the most powerful position in the government of the DPRK.”³⁶⁸ Ilpyong J. Kim also said, “In the communist political system the general secretary of the communist party is traditionally most powerful, as is the case in China as well as in the former Soviet Union. It was also the case in North Korea prior to the constitutional amendment of 1998.”³⁶⁹

The power shift from KWP to KPA was clearly shown in formal North Korean leadership ranking.³⁷⁰ Military leaders rose to higher positions after the death of Kim Il Sung and they made up the largest share of entourage members.³⁷¹ Furthermore, the military had become superior to any other institution in North Korea, especially since the amendment of the constitution in 1998. Ilpyong J. Kim concluded, “In fact the military is so powerful that is above the state. The military has now become the supreme commander of the state, the party, and society, turning North Korea into a military garrison state.”³⁷²

For example, after the constitutional change, Cho Myong Rok, the first vice chairman of the NDC, was promoted to second to Kim Jong Il from the seventh in ranking during the rule of Kim Il Sung.³⁷³ He was a fighter pilot in the Korean War and a friend of Kim Il Sung.³⁷⁴ In October 2000, Kim Jong Il sent Cho Myong Rok rather than a foreign ministry official to the United States. Cho Myong Rok carried a letter from Kim Jong Il and met President Bill Clinton on October 10, 2000.³⁷⁵ He was the first North Korean official to visit the United States and meet the U.S. president, fifty years after the

³⁶⁸ Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics,” 61.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., For the text of the 1998 North Korean Constitution, see Ilpyong J. Kim, *Historical Dictionary of North Korea* (Lanham, Maryland : Scarecrow Press, 2003), 147–173 and *Gonghwakook Heonbeob* [the Republic Constitution] at <http://www.kcna.co.jp/honbeob/honbeob.htm> (accessed on April 10, 2009).

³⁷⁰ Gause, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends*, 8.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 9

³⁷² Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics,” 61.

³⁷³ Ibid., 62.

³⁷⁴ Ellen Nakashima, “Clinton Meets Senior Officer of North Korea,” *Washington Post*, October 11, 2000.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

Korean War began.³⁷⁶ Cho changed to his military uniform to meet President Clinton. American officials said, “it is intended to denote that for the first time the powerful North Korean military, rather than the country’s far weaker diplomatic corps, had taken center stage in the negotiations with the United States.”³⁷⁷ Wendy R. Sherman, a special advisor to [Clinton] on Korean affairs, said that Cho’s visit, “conveys a very important message to us and the citizens of North Korea...that this effort to improve relations is one shared not only by the civilian side, the Foreign Ministry, but by the military as well.”³⁷⁸

b. *Military Turf: Interest in Interfering with the Positive Response to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy*

There were two naval skirmishes, one in June 1999 and another in June 2002. Even though it is not clear whether these activities were planned and executed by Kim Jong Il, political elites, high-ranking military elites, or the local military leaders, they were implemented by the military against South Korea. Because Kim Jong Il is actively involved in the fine points of government policy, there is a high possibility that the two naval skirmishes resulted from instructions given by the North Korean leader. These kinds of activities were definitely not a positive response to the Sunshine Policy. It would have been impossible for North and South Korea to trust each other after these bloody conflicts. North Korea did not get any benefit from these skirmishes but became a more isolated state.

In May 2006, North Korea cancelled test runs for train services between North Korea and South Korea.³⁷⁹ The reason for the cancellation was not clear, but it is believed that the military influenced North Korea’s decision to cancel the test train

³⁷⁶ *New York Times*, “After 50 years, a North Korean at the White House,” October 11, 2000, A3.

³⁷⁷ David E. Sanger, “North Korean at White House, Continuing a Warming Trend,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2000.

³⁷⁸ Nakashima. “Clinton Meets Senior Officer.”

³⁷⁹ Anna Fifield, “North Korea Politics: Pyongyang Cancels Test Train Run over Border,” *EIU ViewsWire*, May 25, 2006.

run.³⁸⁰ According to North Korean media, the North sent the following notice to South Korea: “It is our view that it is impossible to conduct the trial operation of a north-south train on May 25 as scheduled, given that the military authorities of both sides have failed to take any measure for a military guarantee, the south side is creating a very unstable situation unfavorable for holding such a national event as the trial train operation as evidenced by the pro-U.S. ultra-right conservative forces’ frantic acts of burning the flag of the dignified DPRK, recklessly attacking the June 15 forces almost every day and pushing the situation in Korea to an extreme phase of confrontation and war as your side is aware of these developments.”³⁸¹ From these kinds of cases, it can be assumed that the military played an important role in the decision-making of how to respond to the Sunshine Policy offered by South Korea.

Even though Kim Jong Il was clearly in charge of running the government, he needed the support of military to maintain his power. The military also had a strong interest in protecting their turf won from the KWP after the death of Kim Il Sung and during the succession to Kim Jong Il. Ken E. Gause said, “The military elite (or at least the harder-line elements with the high command), fearing a loss of status and the control it won from the KWP in the late 1990s, allegedly has moved to block the country’s early ventures into capitalism.”³⁸² Gause explained one interesting theory to describe the military’s status:

According to one theory, Kim decided to declare the existence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons to counter the military security arguments. The military had been arguing: “Why does North Korea have to take a conciliatory stance by suggesting the possibility of abandoning nuclear weapons when the United States keeps its hostile policy toward North Korea unchanged? The regime is still beset with instability because of that, which makes it all the more necessary for the military to take action.” Therefore, North Korea needed to declare its possession of nuclear weapons in terms of saying that it could handle its own security without

³⁸⁰ Jung Jae Yong, “(Sokbo) Buk, Cheoldosiheomunhaeng Chuiso Tongbo [(flash news) North Korea, Notifies Train Test Run Cancellation]” *Hangyoreh Shinmun*, May 24, 2006, <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/126131.html> (accessed on April 1, 2009).

³⁸¹ KCNA, “North Side Notifies South Side of Its Stand on Trial Train Operation,” May 25, 2006.

³⁸² Gause, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends*, 45.

having to make a compromise to the United States to pacify the military before instituting a shift away from the military-first policy.³⁸³

It is clear that the military played a central role in North Korea and it would act to protect its “turf.” It prevented North Korea from responding more positively toward South Korea’s reassurance strategy.

5. Alliance Politics of South Korea

Question 11: How did key allies of South Korea affect the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy offered to North Korea? Was there sufficient alliance support to make reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its Sunshine Policy?

a. *The Kim Dae Jung Administration and the Clinton Administration*

In August 1998, United States intelligence agencies announced that they detected a secret underground facility at Kumchang-ri in North Korea that they believed to be the centerpiece of an effort to revive North Korea’s frozen nuclear weapons program. The media reported this as a serious problem.³⁸⁴ The issue resulted in very controversial debates over whether the United States should maintain the 1994 Agreed Framework. The U.S. Congress considered a cut-off of fuel-oil shipments to North Korea.

However, it turned out that the United States intelligence agencies made mistakes and that the underground site was not for the nuclear weapons program. In late August 1998, the United States and South Korea told North Korea that the underground facilities did not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, this news did not appear as prominently in the main media.³⁸⁵ Later, in May 1999, a group of U.S. inspectors visited the suspected underground facilities and reportedly concluded it was “an

³⁸³ Gause, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends*, 60, fn. 110.

³⁸⁴ David E. Sanger, “North Korea Site an a-Bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say,” *New York Times*, August 17, 1998, A1, A4; *New York Times*, “North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” August 19, 1998, A34; *Washington Post*, “Politics of Blackmail,” August 24, 1998, A18; J F O McAllister, “Is North Korea the Latest to Proliferate?” *Time*, August 10, 1998, 24; *Wall Street Journal*, “North Korea’s Nukes,” August 21, 1998, 1.

³⁸⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, “Pyongyang’s Provocation,” September 1, 1998, A18.

extensive, empty tunnel complex.”³⁸⁶ The suspected underground facilities threatened the collapse of the five-year-old 1994 Agreed Framework. The issue hurt efforts to improve inter-Korean relations after the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung and implementation of the Sunshine Policy in February 1998.

However, after the 2000 inter-Korean summit, the relationship between the United States and North Korea was improving. President Bill Clinton supported Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and wished to promote peace on the Korean peninsula by coordinating with Kim’s administration. Yang Sung Chul, a former South Korean ambassador to the United States between 2000 and 2003, described the September 2000 summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Clinton as a very smooth meeting.³⁸⁷ He said that “The two presidents were in full agreement over President Kim’s North Korean policy, and the atmosphere of their meeting could not have been better.”³⁸⁸ Later, Clinton expressed the importance of cooperation with South Korea in dealing with the North Korean issue. He said, “Let me emphasize that I believe this process of engagement with North Korea, in co-ordination with South Korea and Japan, holds great promise and that the United States should continue to build on the progress we have made.”³⁸⁹

In late 2000, there was the possibility of a summit meeting between Clinton and Kim Jong Il. North Korean Marshall Cho Myong Rok visited Washington to discuss the summit on October 9-12. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met Kim Jong Il during a return visit to Pyongyang on October 23-25. Both visits were “preparatory visits” before the summit.³⁹⁰ Clinton pledged to visit North Korea, but the summit did not materialize. Reflecting the impending change to a new administration,

³⁸⁶ Philip Shenon, “Suspected North Korean Atom Site is Empty, U.S. Finds,” *New York Times*, May 28, 1999.

³⁸⁷ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 146.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ BBC, “Clinton will not Visit North Korea,” December 28, 2000, <http://212.58.226.17:8080/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1091440.stm> (accessed on March 19, 2009).

³⁹⁰ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 146.

Clinton announced, “There is not enough time while I am president to prepare the way for an agreement with North Korea that advances our national interest and provides the basis for a trip by me to Pyongyang.”³⁹¹

Stephen Bosworth, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea between 1997 and 2000, advised Clinton not to go to Pyongyang for the summit meeting with Kim Jong Il, “because chances of any breakthrough were slim.”³⁹² Bosworth said:

When asked by Washington in mid-December for my views, I cautioned that a presidential visit to North Korea should be the culmination of a successful diplomatic process....If a summit were going to be held, there should be a reasonable likelihood that it would lead to a real breakthrough....As a practical matter, there was not enough time to lay the negotiating groundwork, and the administration reluctantly accepted that there could be no U.S.-DPRK (North Korean) Summit.³⁹³

Madeleine Albright described the difficult situations in the lame-duck year of the Clinton administration:

...day by day, week by week, the White House delayed making a final decision because of the scheduling chaos created by crisis-driven negotiations on the Middle East. As the holidays neared, the President felt he had to choose between a trip to North Korea ...and a crash effort to reach closure with the Israelis and Palestinians. In the final effort to sidestep this choice, we invited Chairman Kim to come to Washington. North Korea replied that they could not accept the invitation.³⁹⁴

Clinton’s visit to North Korea, with “the full support of the Kim Dae Jung government, was aborted in the end.”³⁹⁵ Clinton recently said he regretted that he did not visit North Korea.³⁹⁶ The consequences of a summit meeting between Clinton and Kim

³⁹¹ “Clinton will not Visit North Korea.”

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 126.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 148.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Yonhap News (South Korea), “Bosworth Advised then President Clinton not to visit Pyongyang,” March 20, 2009.

Jong Il were not assured. However, as Clinton said, it would have been a possible chance to solve the nuclear and missile problems on the Korean peninsula.

b. The Kim Dae Jung Administration and the Bush Administration

The first meeting between Kim Dae Jung and George W. Bush in March 2001 was held when the Bush administration was reviewing the relationship of the United States with North Korea. The United States had not expressed its policy toward North Korea clearly. However, the Bush administration's approach to North Korea was totally different from the Clinton administration's. There was an "Anything But Clinton (ABC)" tone toward foreign policy in the White House. Therefore, the way that the Bush administration perceived Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy changed from Clinton's.

Two former U.S. ambassadors to South Korea during the Kim Dae Jung administration testified about the changes from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration. Bosworth said, "As I told President Kim and my Korean friends, I anticipated that after a period of taking stock the Bush administration would eventually pick up with North Korea pretty much where Clinton had left off and that the United States would continue to support Kim Dae Jung's efforts to engage with Pyongyang....I was obviously very mistaken. The inauguration of George W. Bush, and then the events of 11 September 2001, brought a very different U.S. approach to the world and to North Korea."³⁹⁷ Thomas Hubbard, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea between 2001 and 2004 said:

The frosty atmosphere that surrounded President Kim Dae Jung's meeting with President Bush in March 2001, when it became clear that the new administration would not carry on with President Clinton's engagement policy vis-à-vis the North, graphically displayed these differences to both publics and brought home to all of us how hard it is maintain a healthy bilateral relationship without a clear sense of common purpose with regard to North Korea. Differences over how to deal with the North cast a shadow over U.S.-ROK relations that persisted throughout my tenure in Seoul and beyond.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁷ KEI, *Ambassadors' Memoir*, 126.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 180.

Yang Sung Chul, a former South Korean ambassador to the United States between 2000 and 2003, watched Kim Dae Jung's two meetings with Clinton in New York in 2000 and with Bush in Washington in 2001 and described the differences. He said, "At a minimum, the atmosphere of the two summits...were completely different because President Kim was meeting two political personalities whose backgrounds, upbringings, experiences, expertise, policy visions, and personal values contrasted substantially and even fundamentally."³⁹⁹

The Bush administration's policy review was announced in June 2001. The Bush administration added to the agenda for negotiations issues such as the North Korean missile program, missile exports, North Korean conventional forces, and its human rights record.⁴⁰⁰ This "raised the bar substantially for any successful negotiations with North Korea."⁴⁰¹ Then, there was the September 11 attack that raised terrorism as the most significant threat to the United States and U.S. policy toward North Korea become less enthusiastic about negotiations with North Korea. In 2002, the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea became clearer. The Bush administration completed the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NPR "outlined plans to develop conventional and nuclear weapons that would be able to attack underground bunkers and specifically mentioned the DPRK as one of the seven countries against whom these weapons might be targeted."⁴⁰² The NSS called explicit attention to U.S. willingness to act preemptively if it deemed it necessary.

President Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union address, described North Korea as part of an "Axis of Evil." After the Axis of Evil statement, Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy could not be implemented more proactively because tensions increased between the United States and North Korea. Kim Dae Jung believed that the Bush

³⁹⁹ KEI, *Ambassadors' Memoir*, 150.

⁴⁰⁰ Berry, *Korea: A Reference Handbook*, 39.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, fn. 50, referring to *GlobalSecurity.org*, "Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm> (accessed on March 19, 2009).

administration put obstacles in the way of success of the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae Jung expressed this in an interview with CNN in 2006:

Within the North and South Korean relationship, the Sunshine Policy has been successful. But with North Korea and the United States, the relationship was better during the Clinton administration as there was greater cooperation.

Since the start of the Bush administration, relations between the two countries have worsened. And in the process, that's caused complications to the Sunshine Policy.⁴⁰³

c. The Roh Moo Hyun Administration and the Bush Administration

Differences over North Korea between South Korea and the United States continued to exist during the Roh Moo Hyun administration. There were several occasions showing the different perspectives and approaches toward North Korea between Roh Moo Hyun and Bush. In November 2004, Roh Moo Hyun visited Los Angeles on his way to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Chile.⁴⁰⁴ He expressed his idea view of North Korea during his speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. He said that “North Korea’s nuclear weapons pursuit cannot be viewed as an instrument to attack...or to assist terrorist groups....North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons if it can discover the hope that its security will be assured.”⁴⁰⁵

According to Han Sung Joo, the former South Korean ambassador to the U.S. between 2003 and 2005, this statement “was sure to cause raised eyebrows and disappointment if not outright anger in Washington.”⁴⁰⁶ Before the Roh Moo Hyun and Bush meeting in Chile, Han Sung Joo returned to Washington and explained to the White

⁴⁰³ CNN.com/Asia, “Kim Dae Jung Talkasia Transcript.”

⁴⁰⁴ K. Connie Kang, “Los Angeles; Roh Cautions U.S. on North Korea,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 13, 2004, B3.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 199.

House staff that “President Roh had profound and genuine concerns about the possibility of military conflict breaking out on the Korean peninsula, and his wish was that the North Korea nuclear issue would be resolved in a peaceful and mutually beneficial way.”⁴⁰⁷

Han Sung Joo described what happened in the summit meeting:

...we agreed that it would be best for relations between our two countries and our ability to deal with North Korea if President Roh’s Los Angeles remarks did not become an issue at the forthcoming Santiago summit. As it happened, President Bush, who surely must have been briefed about it, did not even mention the remark at the meeting, much less question its meaning or purpose.

But, to everyone’s surprise, President Roh did. He did so to explain that his remark was intended to rebuke not the policy of the Bush administration, but the views expressed by some “ultra hard-line commentators” in Washington D.C. To his credit, and to the relief of others present, President Bush chose not to prolong that part of the summit discussion.⁴⁰⁸

Also, Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to Korea between 2005 and 2008, described the Roh Moo Hyun and Bush summit meeting in Gyeongju in November 2005 as the “worst-ever ROK-U.S. Summit.” The two sides diverged especially over recent U.S. financial sanctions intended to pressure North Korea to stop arms trafficking:

Roh and his team, keen to build on the September 2005 joint statement—with its comprehensive vision of a new peace structure for the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia—couldn’t comprehend why the United States would put all of this at risk through its crackdown on North Korean illicit activities. This disagreement was the backdrop for the worst-ever ROK-U.S. summit, held in Gyeongju in November 2005, when Presidents Roh and Bush argued for more than an hour over the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁷ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 199.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

After the 2007 inter-Korean summit meeting, Roh Moo Hyun asked President Bush to meet Kim Jong Il right away. However, Bush said that the meeting would be possible only “after North Korea dismantled its nuclear program and gave up its nuclear weapons.”⁴¹⁰

All these episodes show that there were different perspectives toward North Korea between South Korea and the United States during the Bush administration. Thomas Hubbard emphasized the importance of alliance politics. He said that “I certainly learned that I could not deal effectively with South Korea without giving a great deal of thought and attention to the problem of North Korea, which still lies at the center of our alliance. It was equally apparent to me that U.S. policymakers could not expect to deal effectively with the North Korean problem without taking seriously into account the needs and concerns of our ally in the South.”⁴¹¹

The concerns of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations were not taken into account seriously enough during the Bush administration. The Bush administration perceived the offers of the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy to North Korea as naïve and insufficient. Therefore, the Bush administration did not offer support to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy towards North Korea. As a result, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations were constrained from fully implementing the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy.

6. Alliance Politics of North Korea

Question 12: How did key allies of North Korea perceive Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy? Did the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy generate alliance support for North Korea’s reciprocity? Did North Korea’s key allies try to prevent North Korea from offering a positive response?

⁴¹⁰ *Wall Street Journal*, “Politics and Economics: In Brief,” November 14, 2007. A6.

⁴¹¹ KEI, *Ambassadors’ Memoir*, 180.

a. *Perceptions of China and Russia about the Sunshine Policy Offered by South Korea*

(1) South Korea's Normalization with China and Russia. China and Russia's relations have a sensitive nature with the two Koreas, which has remained a dilemma for Beijing and Moscow since they established official diplomatic relations and increased economic cooperation with South Korea in the early 1990s. South Korea rushed to normalize ties with China and the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union established full diplomatic relations with South Korea on January 1, 1991, after Gorbachev's meeting with the former South Korean President Roh Tae Woo.⁴¹² Even though it was suggested that a special envoy to do a "distasteful job" be sent, Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, felt obligated to go himself to Pyongyang because he knew that it would be very difficult to convince North Korea to accept normalization with South Korea.⁴¹³ Shevardnadze argued that "North Korea would benefit from Moscow's diplomatic relations with Seoul because Soviet officials would be able to talk directly with the South on North-South issues, the problem of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons, and any other topics of importance to Pyongyang."⁴¹⁴

The North Korean foreign minister, Kim Young Nam replied that "it would reinforce the division of the country and severely aggravate relations between Moscow and Pyongyang."⁴¹⁵ North Korean leaders might have realized that there was a change in the balance of power in the post-cold war era. They might have started considering a self-reliant nuclear weapons program at that time, too.

China followed the Soviet Union's lead in moving toward a normal relationship with South Korea.⁴¹⁶ The trade between China and South Korea grew tremendously after China opened to market economics and became seven times larger

⁴¹² Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 214.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Edward A. Olsen, *Korea: The Divided Nation* (Westpoint, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 142.

than its trade with North Korea.⁴¹⁷ China pushed North Korea to accept the concept of the two Koreas being admitted to the United Nations. South and North Korea joined the UN General Assembly in 1991. North Korea announced, “It had no choice but to apply for UN membership—even though dual membership would be an obstacle to unification—because, otherwise, the South would join the United Nations alone.”⁴¹⁸ North Korea’s new relationships with the Soviet Union and China might have made North Korea think about its security differently.

After the normalization of their relations with South Korea in the early 1990s, China and Russia wanted to maintain a good relationship with South Korea as well as the status quo on the Korean peninsula. China and Russia have strategic and economic national interests in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula without unexpected change in short term. In this context, China and Russia have supported the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy because they pursue the coexistence of the two Koreas and gradual change without the collapse of North Korea and absorption of North Korea into South Korea.

(2) Limited Support for the Sunshine Policy. Generally Speaking, North Korea’s two main allies, China and Russia, supported the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy because they wanted to maintain a good relationship with South Korea and North Korea both. However, they were not able to persuade North Korea to respond positively. The two countries mostly seek to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula. China and Russia not only improved their relationship with South Korea but also maintained diplomatic and strategic relationships with North Korea. Therefore, they neither actively cooperated with South Korea to help implement the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy, nor strongly influenced North Korea to respond positively.

⁴¹⁷ Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 231.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 232.

Several scholars agree that China prefers stability without big change over a short time period. Quansheng Zhao says, “Regarding the issues of Korean unification and peace process, it is believed that the prevailing consensus with the Beijing leadership is to maintain the status quo.”⁴¹⁹ Fei-Ling Wang also argues, “Unsure of the consequences of a Korean reunification, China has joined the other three major powers and adopted the preservation of the status quo as the guiding principle of its Korea policy.”⁴²⁰ Chalmers Johnson argues that China “prefers a structurally divided Korea that is unable to play its full role as a buffer between China, Russia, and Japan, thereby giving China a determining influence on the peninsula.”⁴²¹ Also, the Chinese foreign ministry expresses its favor for dialogue between two Koreas. For example, after the two Koreas announced the 2007 summit meeting in Pyongyang, the Chinese foreign ministry said on its official website that, “China consistently supports efforts by the North and South to improve bilateral relations and realize reconciliation and cooperation through dialogue. We welcome the positive results of the summit and believe it will be conducive to the peaceful progress of the Korean peninsula and the stability of the region.”⁴²²

Russia shows a similar passive attitude toward Korean issues. Joo Seung Ho explains, “Russia favors a gradual process to Korean unification, and its position may be summarized as follows: the two Koreas should pursue a long-term peaceful coexistence before they achieve unification; South Korea or the U.S. should not attempt to change North Korea’s behavior or seek North Korea’s collapse; Korean unification should be achieved through peaceful means; and the two Koreas should negotiate for peaceful unification on an equal footing.”⁴²³

⁴¹⁹ Quansheng Zhao, “China and the Korean Peace Process,” *The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers*, ed. Kwak Tae Hwan and Joo Seung Ho (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 101.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 101, quoted from Fei-Ling Wang, “Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China’s Views and Policy on Korean Unification,” *Pacific Affairs* 72, no. 2 (Summer 1999), 168.

⁴²¹ Chalmers Johnson, “Korea and Our Asia Policy,” *The National Interest* 41 (Fall 1995): 67.

⁴²² “Far East: Koreans in Win-Win Deal,” *Global Information Network*, October 5, 2007.

⁴²³ Joo Seung Ho, “Russia and the Korean Peace Process,” *The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers*, ed. Kwak Tae Hwan and Joo Seung Ho (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 154.

b. China and Russia's Loss of Leverage over North Korea

Considering the balance of power in Northeast Asia, some neorealists would argue that “the end of the Cold War left North Korea with no choice but to internally counteract the sharp deterioration of the external balance of power.”⁴²⁴ North Korea has become more isolated and relies more on its own defense. China and Russia have lost their leverage to influence North Korea's policy. One Chinese official says, “The North Koreans don't listen to us...they don't listen to anyone.”⁴²⁵ It summarizes North Korea's attitude to China and Russia.

The change of North Korea's relationship with China and Russia has recently been shown. For example, after North Korea's missile test on July 4, 2006, Chinese leaders were frustrated. The United States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, “I think the Chinese are as baffled as we are by North Korea's actions. China has done so much for that country and that country just seems intent on taking all of China's generosity and giving nothing back.”⁴²⁶ Yan Xuetong, a professor of international relations at Beijing's Tsinghua University, stated “I think that China is very unhappy with North Korea, which put it in a very awkward position. China now feels it is trapped in a game it can't win.”⁴²⁷

Sandip Kumar Mishra, a professor at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, India, argues “After the North Korean missile tests, it has become more obvious that Pyongyang is not ready to listen to anybody in its resolution to

⁴²⁴ C.S. Eliot Kang, “North Korea's *Engagement Motives*,” in *The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers*, ed. ed. Kwak, Tae-Hwan and Joo, Seung-Ho (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003) 65, quoted in David Kang's “North Korea: Deterrence Through Danger,” in *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 234–263.

⁴²⁵ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 22, Cha's personal interview, high-level Chinese foreign ministry official with Asia portfolio, Washington, D.C., October 1997.

⁴²⁶ Simon, Elegant, “The Worst of Friends,” in *Time*, Asia ed., July 24, 2006. <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501060724-1215009,00.html> (accessed on April 6, 2009).

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

get direct talks with the United States at any cost.”⁴²⁸ Also, North Korea’s refusal to participate in the Six-Party Talks in November 2005 between the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, throws doubt on whether China can play a key role in persuading North Korea.⁴²⁹ Paik Hak-soon, a scholar at the Sejong Institute, a North Korean think-tank based in Seoul, said, “Chinese policy is striking a very fine balance between North Korea and the United States. If China does help, the North Korean leadership is determined to go in its own way.”⁴³⁰

North Korea claimed that it conducted a nuclear test on October 9, 2006.⁴³¹ The situations before and after the nuclear test clearly show the limitations of China’s and Russia’s leverage with North Korea. North Korea provided information about the 2006 nuclear test only thirty minutes before the event. China was very concerned about the short notice. Even though there were many speculations and doubts about the nuclear test, the United National Security Council condemned North Korea’s action.⁴³² China and Russia both denounced it. China said it “firmly opposes” North Korea’s conduct and Russian President Putin said “Russia absolutely condemns North Korea’s nuclear test.”⁴³³

Consequently, the end of the Cold War has changed the balance of power against North Korea. Such factors as the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic development of China, and South Korea’s normalization with China and the Soviet

⁴²⁸ Sandip Kumar Mishra, “Does China Still have Leverage?” *Korean Times*, August 14, 2006, http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/opinion/200608/kt2006081418530754060.htm&media=kt (accessed on April 6, 2009).

⁴²⁹ Mishra, “Does China Still have Leverage?”

⁴³⁰ Paik, Hak-soon quoted in Carpenter, Christopher, “China Walks a Fine Line with North,” *Korean Times*, August 4, 2006, http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200608/kt2006080418104111990.htm&media=kt (accessed on April 6, 2009).

⁴³¹ KCNA, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” October 9, 2006, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>. (accessed on April 6, 2009).

⁴³² Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options,” *CRS Report for Congress*, December 12, 2006, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

⁴³³ David Stout and John O’Neil, “North Korea’s Claim is Met with Doubt and Anger,” *New York Times*, October 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09cnd-nuke.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1 (accessed on March 29, 2009).

Union in 1991 help explain why North Korea seems to have decided to develop a self-reliant nuclear deterrence without help from its two Cold War patrons—China and Russia. Therefore, China and Russia have lost their leverage over North Korea, especially in security issues.

E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY

Question 13: Was there any positive response to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy from North Korea? Or, was there no response or a rejection from North Korea, followed by an increase in tensions?

1. Positive Response to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy from North Korea

a. Two Summit Meetings and the Agreements

The most significant responses to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy from North Korea were two summit meetings and the agreements reached. The 2000 summit meeting was the first inter-Korean summit, ever, since the division of the country in 1945. The 2000 Joint Declaration covers the most important controversial issues such as the political system of a unified Korea, humanitarian issues, mutual trust building, and implementation of the agreements. It shows the overarching direction that the two Koreas should take for reconciliation and peace on the Korean peninsula (see Appendix D).

For the six months following the summit meeting, there was significant tension reduction between the two Koreas. There were defense ministerial talks, working-level talks and tensions across the DMZ were reduced. Even though Kim Jong Il did not visit Seoul after the first summit meeting, the acceptance of the second summit meeting in Pyongyang can be considered as a positive response to the Peace and Prosperity Policy. The October 4 Declaration is more practical and substantial than the 2000 Joint Declaration and shows the intentions of both sides to implement the agreements and provide concrete shape to the plan (see Appendix E).

b. Gaesung Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tour

There were two symbolic results to illustrate the change on the Korean peninsula after the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. North Korea's agreements to opening Gaesung and Mt. Geumgang were positive responses to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Even though the level of interdependence between the two Koreas was low, interconnectedness⁴³⁴ between the two Koreas tremendously increased between 1998 and 2007. As evidence of the increase of this interconnectedness, there have been significant increases in trade and tourism between South Korea and North Korea since 1998. Trade and the interchange of people are two good examples to show the increasing interconnectedness and positive development between the two Koreas.

(1) Trade. First, trade between South Korea and North Korea was \$222 million in 1998. In 2007, trade between South Korea and North Korea was \$1,787 billion (Figure 2.10):




Figure 2.10. Trade between South Korea and North Korea⁴³⁵

⁴³⁴ Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 8–9, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain the difference between interdependence and interconnectedness. They say, “Where there are reciprocal costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness.”

⁴³⁵ The Ministry of Unification, the Republic of Korea, “Statistics,” <http://www.unikorea.go.kr> (accessed on March 6, 2009).

The Gaesung Industrial Complex is a driving force of trade between the two Koreas. It is located one hour's distance from Seoul. The Gaesung Industrial Complex Development Project, which combined South Korean capital and North Korean labor, was designed to help businesses establish their competitiveness and test the possibility of inter-Korean economic cooperation.⁴³⁶ Figure 2.10 illustrates the increase in trade between South Korea and North Korea. This is a tremendous improvement of the relationship between South Korea and North Korea. It was impossible to imagine that South Koreans would work in the North Korean territory before the Kim Dae Jung administration.

(2) Interchange of People. In 2007, 159,214 people traveled between South Korea and North Korea. In 2005, the number was 88,341 and this number was almost as big as the total of 85,400 people who traveled during the sixty years since the end of the Korean War (Figure 2.11):




Figure 2.11. Interchange of people between South Korea and North Korea⁴³⁷ (excluding tourists to Geumgang Mt, total 1,730,000 until 2007)

⁴³⁶ The Ministry of Unification, the Republic of Korea, "Statistics," <http://www.unikorea.go.kr> (accessed on March 6, 2009).

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

This major change was because of the tours to Mt. Geumgang and the Gaesung Industrial Complex. From November 1998, when the tours to Mt. Geumgang first began, until 2007, a total of 1,730,000 people participated in these tours. This number is not included in the total of interchange of people (Figure 2.11). For the Mt. Geumgang tour, North Korea opened the Jangjeon port where a North Korean strategic Navy base is located.

2. Continuous Military Tension between the Two Koreas

a. Continuous North Korean Provocative Actions

Even though there has been some economic cooperation and tension reduction between the two Koreas, there is continuous political and military tension between the two Koreas. The North Korean nuclear threat has never dissipated. Also, there have been ceaseless North Korean “provocative actions.”⁴³⁸ During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations between 1998 and 2007, the provocative actions did not significantly decrease.⁴³⁹ Hannah Fischer summarized them, showing that North Korea made provocative actions almost every month.⁴⁴⁰ Some of the most significant actions are as follows⁴⁴¹:

1. June 22, 1998: A North Korean midget submarine was seized after it was spotted entangled in South Korean fishing nets off the South Korean town of Sokcho, south of the DMZ. When brought to shore three days later, the nine crew aboard were found dead from an apparent group suicide.
2. August 31, 1998: North Korea test-fired a new 3-stage Taepodong-1 missile in an arc over Japan, causing angry reactions from Japan

⁴³⁸ Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions,” 1. Fischer includes the following actions into “provocation actions”: “armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.”

⁴³⁹ Ibid., 15–33.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. According to Fisher, there were total 86 provocative cases between April 1998 and March 2007.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

and the United States as a provocation that stoked tensions in Northeast Asia. Several days later, however, North Korea claimed that it used a multistage rocket to successfully launch a satellite into orbit for peaceful exploration of space, not a ballistic missile as alleged by U.S. and other sources.

3. December 18, 1998: In a firefight, the South Korean navy sank a North Korean semi-submersible high-speed boat some 150 kilometers southwest of Pusan. The body of a North Korean frogman was recovered near the site. The vessel was first spotted two kilometers off the port city of You[sic].⁴⁴²
4. June 1999: Several North Korean ships provoked a nine-day naval confrontation off South Korea's western coast in disputed waters on the Yellow Sea—over the disputed sea border known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL).⁴⁴³ On June 15, 1999, when the confrontation ended in an exchange of fire, both sides blamed each other for starting the firefight. One North Korean torpedo boat caught fire and sank with its entire crew on board, while five others were heavily damaged. Two of the more modern South Korean vessels sustained minor damage. It was the most serious naval clash since the end of the Korean War—and the second such incident since December 1998. Since the June encounter, North Korea asserted that more bloodshed would be “inevitable” unless the South Korean intrusion into “our territorial waters is checked.” It also called on the U.S. side to renounce the NLL and to “withdraw all its ships from the disputed waters.”⁴⁴⁴
5. June 29, 2002: A gun battle erupted between South and North Korean naval ships on the Yellow Sea. North Korean patrol boats allegedly crossed the Northern Limit Line and opened fire on a

⁴⁴² Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions,” 15–33, referring to *Yomiuri Shimbun* in Japanese [Tokyo], December 19, 1998. The name of the port city is not You but Yeosu.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 19. The NLL was drawn by the United Nations Command (UNC) after the Korean War. Even though it has been de facto maritime border, North Korea never accepted its validity and often violated the NLL. Since the economic difficulty in the 1990s, the number of violations increased. For more information, refer to Terence Roehrig, “Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or International Law?” *Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies* 194, no. 3 (2008).

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., 18–19, referring to “Five-Point Proposals Set Forth by KA Side,” KCNA in English, July 2, 1999.

South Korean patrol boat. Four South Koreans and an underdetermined number of North Koreans were killed.⁴⁴⁵

6. July 4, 2006: Defying broad international pressure, North Korea test-fires six missiles into the East Sea, including a long-range Taepodong-2 with the theoretical capacity to reach the continental U.S.
7. October 9, 2006: North Korea announced that it had carried out an underground nuclear test. It called the test a “historic event” and said that “it will contribute the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area around it.”⁴⁴⁶

Some conservatives argued that North Korea’s missile test in July 2006 and nuclear test in October 2006 show the total failure of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. One of conservative newspapers, *Donga Ilbo*, said in an editorial:

The nuclear testing by North Korea proves that the pro-NK Sunshine Policy of the government that busied itself covering up for North Korea has failed completely. It is now revealed to the light of the day how the policy chosen out of ignorance about what the North really is and of the fascination of being one nation was unrealistic.

The 6.15 Joint Declaration that promised a peaceful coexistence of South and North Korea and the Six-Party Talks aimed at encouraging North Korea to give up on nuclear weapons all ended up in vapor.⁴⁴⁷

b. Limited Reassurance Through Restraint

There has been very limited reassurance through restraint between the two Koreas. In 1989, a proposal for a sixty-two mile “Offensive Weapon-Free Zone” and

⁴⁴⁵ Six South Koreans were killed and nineteen South Koreans were wounded. South Korea expect over thirty casualties of North Koreans. Refer to the Republic of Korea Navy, ROK Navy History, http://www.navy.mil.kr/english/sub_guide/sub_data.jsp?menu=3 (accessed on June 16, 2009).

⁴⁴⁶ Fischer, “North Korean Provocative Actions,” 33, referring to KCNA report, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” Pyongyang, October 9, 2006, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>.

⁴⁴⁷ “State of Emergency,” *Donga Ilbo*, October 10, 2006, <http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=080000&biid=2006101048748> (accessed on June 20, 2009).

“Limited Deployment Zone” was made by Lim Dong Won, who later became Kim Dae Jung’s national security advisor.⁴⁴⁸ Lim proposed that “Tanks, mechanized infantry, armored troop carriers, and self-propelled artillery would be barred completely from this zone, and the number of infantry divisions would be subject to agreed limits.”⁴⁴⁹ Lim said “Given the difficulty of verifying troop numbers, it seems important that cuts in major items of equipment proceed in parallel with less verifiable troop reductions.”⁴⁵⁰ However, this kind of proposal was neither reciprocated nor did it reduce the tension between the two Koreas.

The two Koreas took only a very small first step to mitigate military tension around the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 2004. There was agreement with regard to the suspension of propaganda activities and the elimination of propaganda means.⁴⁵¹ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, says “Owing to this agreement, the Inter-Korean propaganda war activities which used to be labeled as war without bullets were suspended and there [sic] means were eliminated, resulting in making opportunity to support the ROK government reconciliation and cooperation policy.”⁴⁵² However, these kinds of restraints were very limited in reducing tensions between the two Koreas.

When adversaries are entangled in an escalating series of threats and military deployments, restraint can be important in reducing the likelihood of miscalculation.⁴⁵³ Forward deployed forces are serious threats on the Korean peninsula and there have been attempts to restrain them. As explained earlier, the DMZ is the most heavily militarized area in the world with military forces of the two Koreas. Moon Chung In points out that there are two implications of a forward deployment pattern. He says,

⁴⁴⁸ Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 145.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., quoted in Lim Dong Won, “Conditions for Arms Control between South and North Korea,” *Chosun Ilbo*, October 10, 1989, esp. 4–5.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid., quoted in Lim Dong Won, “Next Steps in Arms Control,” in *Restarting the Peace Process in the Korean Peninsula*, ed. Kongdan Oh and Craig. S. Coleman, report on a conference sponsored by *Korea Times*, Los Angeles, June 8, 1994. 135–6, published by *Korea Times*, Los Angeles, September 1994.

⁴⁵¹ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 133.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 35.

“One is a high potential for the outbreak of limited or all-out war by default, if not by design....The other implication is the potential for conflict escalation to the regional theater.”⁴⁵⁴ To prevent the outbreak of conflict in the DMZ, it is important for the two Koreas to pull back and reduce the armed forces around the DMZ.

There were some positive responses to the Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy from North Korea and they can be interpreted as success of the reassurance strategy. However, there was no significant tension reduction on the Korean peninsula. Kim Dae Jung believed his Sunshine Policy was a partial success:

I cannot say the Sunshine Policy achieved perfect success, but it's true it obtained excellent results. Above all, the tension between North and South Korea has been eased. Before the Sunshine Policy, the situation was that people in the South panicked when the United States lost the Vietnam War. And they panicked when a North Korean border guard fired a gun. People even got ready to flee the country!

But after the Sunshine policy, there's a much better understanding among the people. For example, this time, when North Korea fired its missiles, or when there was news that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons, the South Korean people didn't really panic. Now, the South Korean people have much more knowledge about their counterparts in North Korea. And the South Korean people now have a lot more confidence in dealing with the North.⁴⁵⁵

Consequently, South Korea's reassurance strategy between 1998 and 2007 can be categorized as a case of partial success. It led to some positive responses from North Korea such as two summit meetings and the agreements and Gaesung Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tour. However, there were continuous North Korean provocative actions and limited progress in military restraint, which show that reassurance was only partially successful.

⁴⁵⁴ Moon Chung In, *Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul, Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1996), 48.

⁴⁵⁵ *CNN.com/Asia*, “Kim Dae Jung Talkasia Transcript.”

F. OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION

1. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes

The outcomes of the hypotheses applied to the two Koreas during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations are as shown in Figure 2.12:

IV	→	IntV	→	DV
Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy (Reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment and limited security regimes)	→	1. Some change in Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea 2. Some change in Kim Jong Il's perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea 3. Limited support in domestic politics of South Korea (Conservative and Progressive split) 4. Little support in domestic politics of North Korea (Military first policy) 5. Little support from alliance politics (U.S.) of South Korea 6. Little support from alliance politics (China and Russia) of North Korea	→	Partial success of reassurance strategy (2000 Joint Declaration, October 4 Declaration)

X

CV 1	→	CV 2
Circumstances and relations between a sending state and a receiving state	→	North Korea's motivating factors
- Unfavorable balance of power to North Korea - Low interdependence - Rise of new identity - Aversion to war		Mixed (Greedy and insecure)

Figure 2.12. The Outcome of the Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)

There was some change in Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea through summit meetings and the other inter-Korean talks (IntV 1). Also, there were some changes in Kim Jong Il's perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea (IntV 2). However, there was limited support in domestic politics of South Korea and North Korea was considered a substantial threat to South Korea (IntV 3). Moreover, there was little support in domestic politics of North Korea due to the strong power of the military (IntV 4). The United States did not fully support Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy (IntV 5). As shown in the North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, China and Russia lost their leverage over North Korea in security issues (IntV 6). That is, allies of both South Korea and North Korea either did not or could not fully support Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy.

Therefore, partial changes in the intervening variables—the changes of leaders' perceptions and limited support in domestic politics of South Korea with little support from domestic politics in North Korea and alliance politics of the two Koreas—resulted in a partial success of reassurance strategy (DV).

2. Result of Hypotheses

The conditions of partial success of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategies can be explained by the result of the hypotheses.

Result of hypotheses:

H1: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was *more* likely to succeed when it altered their beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea changed.

H2: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was *more* likely to succeed when it altered Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea.

H3: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in South Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in North Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter alliance (the United States) politics of South Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter alliance (China and Russia) politics of North Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

Consequently, the changes of the leaders' perceptions provided positive conditions for success of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy. However, they are not enough for the success of the reassurance strategy. Domestic and alliance politics did not offer positive conditions and they were less likely to succeed with little support from them. The outcomes of South Korea's reassurance strategy were influenced by two positive variables (leaders' perceptions of South Korea and North Korea) and four negative variables (domestic and alliance politics of South Korea and North Korea).

3. Conclusion

a. The Possibility of the Success of the Reassurance Strategy Toward North Korea

It is worth asking the counterfactual—would a more fully implemented reassurance strategy have worked, or is North Korea too tough a case? Is deterrence strategy the only option to avoid war on the Korean peninsula? Or did reassurance strategy give North Korea benefits? Decisions to lean on reassurance or deterrence must be a function of whether or not North Korea has changed. If it is quite clear that North Korea does not give up its greedy motivations, South Korea and the United States need to prepare for more deterrence strategies. But, if there is some evidence that North Korea shows “not-greedy” and “need-driven” motivations, South Korea and the United States should consider reassurance strategies.

As Janice Gross Stein suggests, leaders can modify their strategies and reassurance strategy to reduce tensions may be useful under changed circumstances.⁴⁵⁶ As we discussed in the previous sections, the political, economical, and psychological context has been changing on the Korean peninsula, especially since the end of the Cold War, and North Korea's motivating factors have shifted from "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" to partly "need-oriented." This does not mean that deterrence strategies should be ruled out because the context has not totally changed. However, as Janice Gross Stein argues, deterrence may not only fail, but provoke violent actions under certain kinds of strategic conditions.⁴⁵⁷

Therefore, reassurance strategies may be useful in changing the context of the relationship, inducing more cooperation, and ultimately avoiding war between the two Koreas. Therefore, the best policy options to reduce the tension on the Korean peninsula should be reassurance strategies combined with deterrence strategies. However, the implementation of a reassurance strategy combined with deterrence does not guarantee success. Favorable domestic and alliance politics are necessary conditions for success.

b. The Importance of Domestic and Alliance Constraints

In the case study, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy was limited by domestic and alliance constraints. The implementation of reassurance strategy toward North Korea, a state long identified as an enemy, was difficult for the South Korean public and the United States government to swallow. A cognitive-level perspective is often used to explain the success of reassurance strategy. This chapter shows that domestic and alliance political factors can also play roles in promoting a favorable environment for the success of reassurance strategy.

Consequently, a reassurance strategy cannot succeed solely by altering the cognitions of the target state's leaders when domestic and alliance political factors are not

⁴⁵⁶ Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 56.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid, 17.

favorable. The other leader's perceptions may include recognition of domestic and alliance constraints on the sending side's government. A combination of change in the other leader's perceptions and favorable domestic and alliance politics is necessary for the success of a reassurance strategy.

III. CASE II: AN UNSUCCESSFUL REASSURANCE STRATEGY CASE (BUSH’S REASSURANCE STRATEGY IN 2007 AND 2008)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. An Unsuccessful Reassurance Strategy Case Between the United States and North Korea

The relations between the United States and North Korea remain very hostile and no strategy to solve this confrontation has seemed plausible. On July 27, 1953, the Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, along with the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was established by that agreement.⁴⁵⁸ The war between the United States and North Korea is not officially over. The Armistice Agreement technically still prevents any aggressive action between the United States—along with South Korea—and North Korea, because no peace treaty has ever been signed. When the Agreement was signed, it was only intended as a temporary measure. However, it has been almost 60 years since the end of the Korean War.

The dominant strategy of the United States since 1953 has been deterrence through hard power. It has been successful in preventing North Korea from attacking South Korea. However, tension still exists and reached a peak when North Korea carried out a nuclear test on October 6, 2006. After that test, the Bush administration changed its approach to North Korea. Alongside deterrence, a reassurance strategy through reciprocity (“Tit-for-Tat”) was implemented by the United States in 2007 and 2008. The Bush administration tried to persuade North Korea that the United States would normalize relations and offer a security guarantee if North Korea would dismantle its nuclear program. However, the results of Bush’s reassurance strategy were not successful.

⁴⁵⁸ For full context of armistice agreement, refer to http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKor_VTK_1953_07_27_korean_armistice_agreement.pdf (accessed on July 27, 2009).

Even though there was some progress toward the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program, tension between the United States and North Korea remained high and North Korea did not give up its nuclear program. Furthermore, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009.⁴⁵⁹

Consequently, Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 did not achieve any tension reduction with North Korea. Therefore, it can be considered as a case of failure of reassurance strategy. This chapter investigates the conditions and outcomes of Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea in an effort to understand what factors are associated with the failure of reassurance strategy. It finds that leaders' enemy identities and the influence of domestic and alliance politics of both the United States and North Korea were the most important factors.

2. Variables

Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors associated with the failure of Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 can be drawn in a diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). The independent variable is the implementation of Bush's reassurance strategy, and the dependent variable is its success or failure.

There are six intervening variables that influence the dependent variable: (1) Bush's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea; (2) Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions about Bush and the United States; (3) the domestic politics of the United States; (4) the domestic politics of North Korea; (5) the alliance politics of the United States; and (6) the alliance politics of North Korea. Also, two condition variables—the circumstances and relations between the United States and North Korea and North Korea's motivating factors—are included in the hypotheses. In sum, the hypotheses and variables can be drawn as in Figures 3.1 and 3.2:

⁴⁵⁹ Mary Beth Nikitin, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues," *CRS Report for Congress*, May 26, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 10.

IV	→	IntV	→	DV
The implementation of reassurance strategy (Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008)	→	1. Bush's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea 2. Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions about Bush and the United States 3. Domestic politics of the United States 4. Domestic politics of North Korea 5. Alliance politics of the United States 6. Alliance politics of North Korea	→	Success or failure of reassurance strategy

X

CV 1	→	CV 2
Circumstances and relations between the United States and North Korea		North Korea's motivating factors
1. Balance of Power 2. Interdependence 3. Identity	→	1. Greed 2. Insecurity 3. Mixed

Figure 3.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁶⁰ Van Evera, *Guidance to Methods*, 7–48.




Figure 3.2. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the Receiving State and CV)

3. Hypotheses

The main focus of this dissertation is on the conditions for success or failure of reassurance strategy. The hypotheses of this case study are as follows:

H1: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to succeed if it altered Bush's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

H2: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to succeed if it altered Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions about Bush and the United States.

H3: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to succeed if it altered domestic politics in the United States towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to succeed if it altered domestic politics in North Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to succeed if it altered alliance politics of the United States (South Korea and Japan) towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was more likely to succeed if it altered alliance politics of North Korea (China and Russia) towards support for foreign policy change.

If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea in 2007 and 2008 would have been influenced by the six intervening variables (leader's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics each of the United States and North Korea). For the full success of its reassurance strategy, the Bush administration should have tried to influence Kim Jong Il's perceptions and the domestic politics and the alliance politics of both the United States and North Korea.

4. Chronology

A chronological narrative of the Bush administration will help to elucidate the main argument. Between 2001 and 2006, the Bush administration implemented a coercive strategy, which changed after North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006. The Berlin meeting in January 2007 between Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, and Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, was a turning point of Bush's policy from a deterrence and preemptive attack strategy to a reassurance strategy (in this case alongside deterrence, as the U.S. administration continued efforts to deter North Korea). The Bush administration implemented its reassurance strategy mainly through the Six-Party Talks. However, Bush's reassurance strategy resulted in failure, and tensions between the United States and North Korea increased. As a result, the Obama administration faced North Korean challenges after it took office in 2009 and there was a second North Korean nuclear test in May 2009.

Table 3.1. The First Bush Administration and the First Half of the Second Bush Administration (2001–2006): Deterrence and Preemptive Attack Strategy

2001	January 20	George W. Bush took office and U.S. policy toward North Korea was reconsidered.
2002	January 29	Bush called North Korea part of the “Axis of Evil” in his State of the Union address.
	October 3-4	James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, visited Pyongyang and met Kang Sok Ju, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea. Kelly told Kang that the United State had evidence of a uranium enrichment program.
2003	January 10	North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). ⁴⁶¹
	August 27-29	The first round of the Six-Party Talks was held.
2004	February 25-28	The second round of the Six-Party Talks was held.
	June 23-26	The third round of the Six-Party Talks was held.
2005	February 10	North Korea declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense.
	July 26-August 7	The first phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was held.

⁴⁶¹ BBC, “N. Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Pact,” January 10, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2644593.stm> (accessed on July 30, 2009).

	September 13-19	The second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. The six party members agreed on a “Joint statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)” (see Appendix I). ⁴⁶²
	September 15	The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao as a questionable primary money laundering concern under the Patriot Act because of its corrupt financial activities with North Korea.
	November 9-11	The first phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held.
2006	July 4	North Korea test-fired six short- and medium-range missiles and one long-range missile. A long-range missile, Taepo-Dong 2, that was believed to have theoretical capability to reach the continental United States, ⁴⁶³ failed after 40 seconds. ⁴⁶⁴
	October 9	North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.
	October 14	The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718. ⁴⁶⁵
	December 18-22	The second phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held.

⁴⁶² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009). Also, refer to U.S. Department of State, “Six-party Talks, Beijing China,” <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm> and <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁴⁶³ According to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Taepo Dong was to deliver 1,000 to 1,500 kg warhead to a 4,000 to 8,000 km range. Refer to Bermudez, “North Korea’s Long-Range Missiles,” *Jane’s Ballistic Missile Proliferation* (2000), 5.

⁴⁶⁴ Donald G. Gross, “U.S.-Korea Relations: North Korea Rolls the Dice and Conducts Missile Tests,” Brad Glosserman and Sun Namkung, eds., *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 8, no. 3 (October 2006):43–54, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0603q.pdf> (accessed on April 5, 2009).

⁴⁶⁵ For the full text of UNSC Resolution 1718, refer to <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement>.

Table 3.2. The Second Half of the Second Bush Administration (2007–2008): Reassurance Strategy

2007	January 16-18	Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, and Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, met in Berlin, Germany.
	February 8-13	The third phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. Six party members agreed on steps for phased implementation of the September 19, 2005 Agreement (February 13, 2007 Agreement) (see Appendix J). ⁴⁶⁶
	March 19-22	The first phase of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was held. On March 19, The United States unfroze North Korean funds to reciprocate the positive response from North Korea.
	May	The Bush administration announced that it agreed to release \$25 million of North Korea's frozen assets held at Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao.
	July 18-20	The first phase of the sixth round resumed. A joint statement was issued (see Appendix K). ⁴⁶⁷
	September 27-30	The second phase of the sixth round was held. "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (October 3, 2007 Agreement)" was issued on October 3 (see Appendix L). ⁴⁶⁸
	October 2-4	The second inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was held. Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il presented the October 4 Declaration (see Appendix D).

⁴⁶⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁴⁶⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Press Communiqué of the Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 20, 2007," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t343875.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁴⁶⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm> (accessed on July 21, 2009). Also, refer to U.S. Department of State, "Six Parties October 3, 2007 Agreement on 'Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,'" October 3, 2007, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93223.htm> and U.S. Department of State, "Six-party Talks--Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement," October 3, 2007, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93217.htm> (accessed on July 21, 2009).

2008	June 26	North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program to China. President Bush announced that the Trading with the Enemy Act would no longer apply to North Korea and notified Congress of his intent to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List after the required 45-day waiting period.
	June 28	North Korea destroyed the cooling tower at the 5MW reactor in Yongbyon.
	July 10-12	The Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing. Six party members reached consensus on the full and balanced implementation of the September 19, 2005 Agreement. ⁴⁶⁹
	July 11	A South Korean tourist at the Mt. Geumgang resort was shot to death by a North Korean guard.
	October 2-3	Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang for further talks on the verification agreement.
	October 11	The United States announced an agreement with North Korea on the verification measures and removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
	October 13	North Korea lifted its ban on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and announced the continuous disablement process of Yongbyon nuclear facilities.
	December 8-11	The Six-Party Talks were held to draft an agreement on verification protocol. However, North Korea objected to some of the verification measures and refused to make a written agreement. The talks concluded with no written agreement.

⁴⁶⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Press Communiqué of the Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 12, 2008" <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t474096.htm> (accessed on July 21, 2009).

Table 3.3. The Obama Administration (2009–)

2009	April 5	North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-2 missile that failed. North Korea claimed that it was a satellite launch which used peaceful rocket technology.
	April 12	The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a nonbinding President's statement on North Korea's missile launch, condemning the action as a violation of a resolution 1718 banning all missile activities.
	April 14-15	North Korea declared that it would not participate in the Six-Party Talks any more. It asked U.S. and international inspectors to leave the country and verification and monitoring activities ended.
	May 25	North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and launched two short-range missiles.
	June 12	UNSCR 1874 condemning the second North Korean nuclear test was adopted by the United Nations Security Council. It called on UN members to inspect cargo vessels suspected of carrying military material in or out of North Korea. ⁴⁷⁰
	July 4	North Korea fired seven missiles.
	September 4	North Korea claimed that it had entered a final phase in uranium enrichment.

⁴⁷⁰ Mary Beth Nikitin, Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Dick K. Nanto, and Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 23, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1–2. Also, for the full text, refer to United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest TERMS Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions, Resolution 1874 (2009) Strengthens Arms Embargo, Calls for Inspection for Cargo, Vessels if States Have 'Reasonable Grounds' to Believe Contain Prohibited Items," June 12, 2009, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm> (accessed on July 22, 2009).

B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV): THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY

1. Coexistence and Security Guarantee

Question 1: Did Bush's reassurance strategy communicate the United States willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to North Korea?

a. CVID vs. Security Guarantee

When the Bush administration implemented its reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008, a key issue was always whether the United States accepted coexistence with and offered a security guarantee to North Korea. In the Six-Party Talks, North Korea kept asking for a security guarantee from the United States and the United States did not want to offer a security guarantee to North Korea until North Korea showed clear evidence of CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement) of its nuclear program. The key problem was that North Korea was unwilling to dismantle its nuclear program completely until the United States offered a security guarantee to North Korea and normalized relations. The United States was not willing to accept coexistence with North Korea, nor would it offer a security guarantee to North Korea if North Korea did not give up its nuclear program.

North Korean leaders repeatedly stated that they were willing to restrict their nuclear program if the United States guaranteed the country's security. When James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, visited Pyongyang in October 2002, Kang Sok-ju, First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Korea, requested a security guarantee. Kang said, "If the U.S. recognized North Korea's system of government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere in his country's economic development, Pyongyang would seriously discuss U.S. concerns about the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program."⁴⁷¹ Also, Charles L.

⁴⁷¹ Pritchard, "A Guarantee to Bring Kim."

Pritchard recalled an interesting discussion between Kim Jong Il and Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State in October 2000:

He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With the appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to convince his military that the U.S. was no longer a threat and then be in a similar position to refocus his country's resources.⁴⁷²

The U.S. response to North Korea's request for a security guarantee was that North Korea should dismantle its nuclear program completely before the United States would consider this matter. President Bush said, in a side meeting with his Chinese counterpart during the APEC summit in October 2003, that he had a willingness to provide a written security guarantee to North Korea if North Korea showed verifiable evidence of giving up its nuclear-arms ambitions.⁴⁷³

b. Agreements and Security Guarantee

The second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was held on September 13-19, 2005. The six-party members agreed on a "Joint statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)" which included the full dismantlement of nuclear weapons in North Korea and no aggressive intentions by the United States. According to the September 15, 2005 Agreement, the main commitments of North Korea and the United States were as follows:

The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² Pritchard, "A Guarantee to Bring Kim."

⁴⁷³ *Wall Street Journal*, "Bush Offered Security Assurances, But No Treaty, To North Korea," October 20, 2003, A1.

⁴⁷⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

In addition, by the strong request of North Korea, the sovereignty issue was included in the September 19, 2005 Agreement:

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.⁴⁷⁵

After the 2006 nuclear test, the United States showed its willingness to normalize relations with North Korea after dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program in both the February 13, 2007 Agreement and October 3, 2007 Agreement which are the agreements to implement the September 19, 2005 Agreement. The February 13, 2007 Agreement set up plans for the normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations after North Korea shut down and sealed the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. It said, "The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations."⁴⁷⁶ The October 3, 2007 Agreement also included a similar sentence with regard to the normalization issue, namely that, "The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their bilateral relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship."⁴⁷⁷

In December 2007, Bush sent a personal letter to Kim Jong Il. Even though it was interpreted by some scholars as evidence of a policy change by the Bush administration, the U.S. goal of a complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program had not changed. According to an excerpt obtained by the Associated Press, Bush wrote, "I want to emphasize that the declaration must be complete and accurate if we are to continue our progress."⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks."

⁴⁷⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁴⁷⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Press Communiqué of the Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t343875.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁴⁷⁸ "Bush letter to Kim Jong Il Shows Policy Change," *USA Today*, December 6, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-06-bush-letter_N.htm (accessed on July 25, 2009).

Consequently, Bush's reassurance strategy communicated his willingness to accept coexistence with and offer a security guarantee to North Korea. However, the Bush administration made it clear that the agreement would be possible only if North Korea dismantled its nuclear program completely, irreversibly, and verifiably.

2. The Incentive for Use of Reassurance Strategy

Question 2: What was the incentive for Bush's use of a reassurance strategy?

North Korea's nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and the difficult situation in Iraq in 2006, were incentives for Bush's use of a reassurance strategy. Even though North Korea's nuclear test was a serious threat to the United States, "immediate deterrence"⁴⁷⁹ was less necessary because there was no clear evidence of North Korea's consideration of an attack against South Korea or the United States. Therefore, the Bush administration implemented a reassurance strategy in the context of "general deterrence."⁴⁸⁰

a. North Korean Nuclear Test on October 9, 2006

On September 19, 2005, the Six-Party Talks' members agreed on a "Joint statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)" after the second phase of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks on September 13-19, 2005 (see Appendix I). However, there had been a different U.S. approach to North Korea during the talks. The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as a primary money laundering concern under the Patriot Act because it

⁴⁷⁹ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 40. Freedman used the definition described by Patrick Morgan. According to Patrick Morgan, immediate deterrence is described as "a relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it." Morgan also said, "Immediate deterrence involves an active and urgent effort by A to deter in the course of a crisis when the efficiency of any threats will soon be revealed by B's actual behavior."

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid. Compared to immediate deterrence, the possibility of direct engagement is low and deterrence depends on the assessment of strategic environment. According to Patrick Morgan, a general deterrence situation is "when opponents who maintain armed forces regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack."

facilitated North Korea's criminal activities including counterfeiting of U.S. currency.⁴⁸¹ U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice linked this U.S. enforcement effort to the Six-Party Talks and the BDA issue became an obstacle to their success.⁴⁸² The U.S. accusation that the BDA was money laundering for North Korea became North Korea's main reason to boycott the Six-Party Talks, and it refused to discuss the denuclearization issue until the United States settled the BDA issue.⁴⁸³ Even though the six party members agreed on the September 19, 2005 Agreement, they could not implement it because North Korea did not treat denuclearization and the BDA issue separately and kept asking the United States to lift the sanctions and treat the BDA issue individually.⁴⁸⁴ For about one year after the September 19, 2005 Agreement, the Six-Party Talks were deadlocked. Finally, North Korea conducted a nuclear test on October 6, 2006.⁴⁸⁵

The October 9, 2006 nuclear test made clear that Bush's policy toward North Korea neither solved the nuclear problem nor reduced tension with North Korea. On October 14, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 to condemn North Korea's nuclear test.⁴⁸⁶ The Six-Party Talks resumed in December 2006. However, those responses to the nuclear test did not resolve the North Korean nuclear program issue and tensions rose. The Bush administration became willing to negotiate with North Korea. According to Mike Chinoy, President Bush and Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, altered their approaches to North Korea:

⁴⁸¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Room, "Treasury Designated Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act," September 15, 2005, <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2720.htm> (accessed on July 28, 2009) and *Globalsecurity.org*, "U.S. Cites Banco Delta Asia for Money Laundering, Other Crimes," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2005/09/sec-050915-usia02.htm> (accessed on July 18, 2009).

⁴⁸² Glenn R. Simpson and Gordon Fairclough, "U.S. Focuses on a Macau Bank in Probe into North Korea Ties," *Wall Street Journal*, September 17, 2005, A4.

⁴⁸³ Dick K. Nanto, "North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency," *CRS Report for Congress*, June 12, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2.

⁴⁸⁴ BBC, "N Korea Offers Nuclear Talks Deal," April 13, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4905308.stm> (accessed on August 3, 2009).

⁴⁸⁵ Chanlett-Avery and Squassoni, "North Korea's Nuclear Test."

⁴⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)," <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm> (accessed on August 5, 2009).

But the nuclear test changed everything. Although hard-liners had expected a test to be the event which showed that engagement did not work and that increased pressure was the only option, Rice—and Bush—grudgingly reached the opposite conclusion. As David Straub, the former head of the State Department’s Korea Desk, observed, “It became the moment where she and Bush had to confront the fact that everything they had been doing in terms of North Korea did not work.”⁴⁸⁷

After the 2006 nuclear test, even some leading Republicans such as Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Pennsylvania’s Arlen Specter, asked the Bush administration to have bilateral talks with North Korea. Specter said, “Let’s talk to them....This issue is serious enough with North Korea, with their having nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them, that I think we ought to use every alternative, including direct bilateral talks.”⁴⁸⁸ Former Secretary of State James Baker also said, “In my view, it is not appeasement to talk to your enemy.”⁴⁸⁹

b. Difficulty in the Iraq War in 2006

In 2006, at the same time that relations of the United States with North Korea were deteriorating, the situation in Iraq was getting worse. The Bush administration was focused on developing stability in Iraq and did not want to have an additional military confrontation with North Korea. The violence in Iraq was getting more severe and became a more serious problem for the United States. After the parliamentary elections on December 15, 2005, Iraq’s new parliament and leaders could not form a government of national unity and the political situation was still very unstable in 2006. The year 2006 started with “one of the bloodiest days since the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003” with 140 deaths including 5 U.S. troops on January 6, 2006.⁴⁹⁰ In February, the Bush administration asked Congress for an additional \$70 billion for Iraq

⁴⁸⁷ Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 306.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 299–300, referring to Transcript, *Fox News Sunday*, October, 22, 2006.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., 300, referring to ABC News, *This Week with George Stephanopoulos*, October 18, 2006.

⁴⁹⁰ Nelson Hernandez and Saad Sarhan, “Insurgents Kill 140 as Iraq Clashes Escalate,” *Washington Post*, January 6, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/05/AR2006010500351.html> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

and Afghanistan.⁴⁹¹ On February 22, 2006, insurgents bombed Iraq's Golden Mosque in Samarra, the most revered shrine in Iraq. That action fueled sectarian tensions between Shiites and Sunnis and more than 1,000 people were killed over several days.⁴⁹²

On June 15, 2006, the Pentagon stated that the number of U.S. troops killed in Iraq reached 2,500.⁴⁹³ North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October, which was also the second-deadliest month of 2006 with 106 deaths of U.S. troops in Iraq.⁴⁹⁴ December became the deadliest month of 2006 in Iraq with 112 deaths of U.S. troops.⁴⁹⁵ The American death toll in the Iraq War reached 3,000 in December 2006.⁴⁹⁶ More than 34,000 Iraqis were killed from violence in 2006.⁴⁹⁷ The worsening situation in Iraq made the United States more anxious to explore a reassurance strategy toward North Korea because more tensions and the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula would be serious burdens to the Bush administration. American public opinion and Congress did not want to have another conflict on the Korean peninsula given the difficult conditions in Iraq.

3. The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy

Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did the United States offer to North Korea during the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008?

⁴⁹¹ Ann Scott Tyson and Linton Weeks, "Bush to Seek Extra \$90 Billion for Wars, Gulf Coast," *Washington Post*, February 3, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/05/AR2006010500351.html> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

⁴⁹² Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebt, "Toll in Iraq's Deadly Surge: 1,300," *Washington Post*, February 28, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/27/AR2006022701128.html> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

⁴⁹³ BBC, "US Death Toll in Iraq Hits 2,500," June 15, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5084068.stm> (accessed on August 11, 2009).

⁴⁹⁴ *icasualties.org*, "Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year and Month," <http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁶ Reuters, "US Military Deaths in Iraq Reach 3,000," *AlertNet*, December 31, 2006, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N31273678.htm> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

⁴⁹⁷ United Nations (UN) News Center, "Over 34,000 Civilians Killed in Iraq in 2006, says UN Report on Rights Violations," <http://huwu.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21241&Cr=iraq&Cr1=> (accessed on August 10, 2009).

According to Janice Stein, two reassurance strategies—reassurance through a limited security regime or reassurance through reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat or GRIT)—are “more appropriate in the context of general deterrence.”⁴⁹⁸ The United States tried to solve the problem of the North Korean nuclear program both through the Six-Party Talks, an example of a limited security regime, and through the principle of “action for action,” which is similar to the concept of reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat).

a. Reassurance Through Limited Security Regimes

As explained in the previous case study, limited security regimes are agreed-upon principles and procedures among adversaries “in an effort to reduce the likelihood of an unintended and unwanted war.”⁴⁹⁹ The Six-Party Talks can be referred to as a limited security regime because they aimed to solve the North Korean nuclear weapons problem, in other words, to reduce tensions with North Korea. Even though all six members have different approaches, they all shared the principle of the peaceful resolution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. The creation of limited security regimes is most likely in the context of general deterrence when leaders share a common aversion to war and to its consequences.⁵⁰⁰

The Six-Party Talks were created because the six participating states—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia—shared an aversion to war or instability and their consequences on the Korean peninsula. Also, limited security regimes “make intentions less opaque and estimation less difficult, and they reduce the likelihood of miscalculation.”⁵⁰¹ The North Korean nuclear problem is a difficult problem to solve because North Korea is the most isolated country in the world. Thus, participants expected that the Six-Party Talks could provide valuable information to other members and reduce the likelihood of defection.

⁴⁹⁸ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 32.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid. Also refer to Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 299–324 and Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict,” *International Journal* 40, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985): 599–627.

For the United States, the Six-Party Talks became the main effort to solve the North Korean nuclear problem after the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002 and North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. Between 2003 and 2007, there were a total of six rounds of the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks achieved little progress until the second phase of the fourth round in September 2005. Six-party members agreed on "Joint statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005 Agreement)" (see Appendix I).

b. Reassurance Through Reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat)

The United States used a reassurance strategy through reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) after the 2006 nuclear test. Robert Axelrod argues that a Tit-for-Tat strategy is the most likely to promote cooperation in a state of anarchy among egoists.⁵⁰² Axelrod defines Tit-for-Tat as "the policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous move."⁵⁰³ That is, it begins with a cooperative move from the sending state; the next move depends on what the receiving state did on the previous move. The reassurance strategy of the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008 always began with a cooperative move by proposing incentives and requesting North Korea's cooperative response in parallel.

(1) The Transition Point of Bush's Policy toward North Korea: U.S.-North Korea Bilateral Talks in Berlin in January 2007. The first move of the United States was the private bilateral meeting of Christopher Hill with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan, the North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Berlin, Germany on January 16–18, 2007. This meeting was initiated by Christopher Hill. The Six-Party Talks on December 18–22, 2006, had stalled. That night the talks ended, Christopher Hill sent his aide Sung Kim, director of the State Department Office of Korean Affairs, to the North Korean embassy with the message proposing a bilateral talk with Kim Gye Gwan. North Korea responded positively on December 27. Then,

⁵⁰¹ Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 46.

⁵⁰² Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, 13.

Christopher Hill got approval from Secretary Rice and President Bush to engage North Korea directly.⁵⁰⁴ Don Oberdorfer noted, “This action bypassed the Washington bureaucracy, some of whose officials have thrown up roadblocks in the past to meetings and agreements with the North.”⁵⁰⁵

On January 17, Christopher Hill said, “The United States has made it very clear that we have no intention of attacking North Korea. We look forward to having a good relationship with a de-nuclearized North Korea.”⁵⁰⁶ The Bush administration had not wanted to have bilateral talks with North Korea and this January meeting was a significant change, even though the United States considered the meeting as “preparations for the Six-Party Talks.”⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, North Korea viewed the meeting as a bilateral negotiation and announced that “The talks took place...in a positive and sincere atmosphere and a certain agreement was reached there.”⁵⁰⁸

Christopher Hill evaluated the Berlin meeting as “useful” and expressed optimism about future prospects. After Hill’s meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Keiichiro Sasae, on January 19, 2007, Hill said, “I would say those meetings in Berlin were indeed useful. They were very concrete. We discussed some of the specific issues we would need to negotiate in the Six-Party Talks. We hope that this time we can make some real progress.”⁵⁰⁹ The Six-Party Talks in December 2006, two months after the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, ended with no agreement on North Korean disarmament and no date for further talks. However, the third phase of the Six-Party Talks was held after the Berlin meeting between Christopher Hill and Kim Kye

⁵⁰⁴ Don Oberdorfer, “How the White House Learned to Live With Kim Jong Il,” *Newsweek*, March 14, 2007, <http://www.nautilus.org/pipermail/cankor/2007-March/000106.html> (accessed on July 30, 2009).

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ *Spiegel Online*, “Top US Negotiator in Berlin for Nuclear Talks with North Korea,” January 17, 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,460382,00.html> (accessed on July 30, 2009).

⁵⁰⁷ *BBC*, “‘Progress’ in N Korea-US Talks,” January 19, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6277551.stm> (accessed on July 30, 2009).

⁵⁰⁸ KCNA, “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Results of DPRK-U.S. Talks,” January 20, 2007, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm> (accessed on August 1, 2009).

⁵⁰⁹ “Hill to Work on Date for N. Korea Talks,” *Chinadaily*, January 22, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-01/22/content_788619.htm (accessed on August 1, 2009).

Gwan on February 8–13, 2007. This was the beginning of the transition in the Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea from a deterrence and preemptive attack strategy to a reassurance strategy.

(2) Agreements Based on the Principle of “Action for Action”: The September 2005, February 2007, and October 2007 Agreements. Most agreements between the United States and North Korea in regard to North Korea’s nuclear program were made through the Six-Party Talks. Those agreements were based on the concept of Tit-for-Tat or action for action. In the September 19, 2005 Agreement, “The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action’.”⁵¹⁰ The main required actions for North Korea were to abandon all nuclear weapons and the existing nuclear program and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

On the other hand, the actions for the United States in parallel with North Korea’s actions were to have no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and no intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons. Also, the United States and North Korea agreed to “respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.”⁵¹¹

The principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action” was also emphasized in the February 13, 2007 Agreement, the first phase implementation of the September 19, 2005 Agreement. In the February 13, 2007 Agreement, “The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘action for action’.”⁵¹² Even though the goal of the Bush

⁵¹⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

administration was the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program, it accepted the two phase approach of freezing North Korean nuclear facilities in the first phase, and dismantling all nuclear facilities in the second phase.

From the U.S. perspective, this approach of accepting the phased dismantlement in the Six-Party Talks was the first initiative of the United States. North Korea agreed to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In return, the six party members including the United States agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initial phase with the initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil within 60 days.⁵¹³ Also, the United States promised to normalize relations with North Korea if other steps in the agreement were completed.

Dick K. Nanto says, "The February 2007 Agreement represented a clear change in strategy by the United States and other parties to the talks."⁵¹⁴ The former South Korea ambassador to the United States, Han Sung Soo, described the change of the United States approach toward North Korea in 2007 as "an about-face."⁵¹⁵ He says:

It would and did decide to negotiate with North Korea on a bilateral basis. It decided to reward North Korea for its 'good behavior,' that is, for freezing, declaring, and dismantling its nuclear weapons, material and facilities. But, even without complete dismantlement of the program and a full declaration of all nuclear development and transfer activities, the Bush administration became willing to provide rewards in the form of lifting North Korea from the list of countries that support terrorism; removing restrictions on North Korea trade under the Trading with the Enemy Act; and providing energy, food, and security assurances.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁵¹⁴ Dick K. Nanto, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," *CRS Report for Congress*, June 4, 2009, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 15.

⁵¹⁵ KEI, *Ambassadors' Memoir*, 198.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

The February 13, 2007 Agreement was a product of the reassurance strategy through reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) implemented by the Bush administration and a turning point for American strategy toward North Korea. After North Korea's first positive response to the agreement of February 13, the Bush administration responded again cooperatively by announcing that it had agreed to release \$25 million of North Korea's frozen assets held at BDA in Macao since March 14, 2006.⁵¹⁷ On June 25, North Korea announced that the BDA issue was resolved and that it would carry out the agreement reached on February 13.

The head of delegation meeting of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing from July 18–20, 2007, and emphasized the principle of Tit-for-Tat or action for action in a press communiqué on July 20, 2007 (see Appendix K).⁵¹⁸ It said, "All other parties undertook to fulfill their respective obligations as listed in the September 19 Joint Statement and February 13 Agreement in line with the principle of 'action for action'."⁵¹⁹

The second phase of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was held on September 27–30, 2007. The six-party members agreed on the October 3, 2007 Agreement, which dealt with the second phase implementation of the September 19, 2005 and February 13, 2007 Agreements (see Appendix L).⁵²⁰ The principle of Tit-for-Tat or action for action was also emphasized in the October 3, 2007 Agreement. The main required actions for North Korea to fulfill were to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement, to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 Agreement by December 31, 2007, and to not transfer

⁵¹⁷ Nanto, "North Korea," 15, fn 29.

⁵¹⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Press Communiqué of the Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t343875.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm> (accessed on July 21, 2009).

nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. In response to North Korea's actions, the United States agreed to its commitments based on the action for action principle. The United States removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and terminated application of the Trading with the Enemy Act. According to the October 3, 2007 Agreement:

Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-U.S. Relations.⁵²¹

(3) The Implementation of the Agreements in 2008. The implementation of the 2007 agreements in the Six-Party Talks started in early November 2007. The actions of the United States and North Korea were based on the concept of Tit-for-Tat. In November 2007, the Six-Party Talks members agreed on 11 steps to disable the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Eight out of the 11 steps had been completed by early 2008 (Table 3.4):

⁵²¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement." <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm> (accessed on July 21, 2009).

Table 3.4. Disablement Steps at Yongbyon, North Korea⁵²²

Step	Facility	Status as of May 2009
Discharge of 8,000 spent fuel rods to the spent fuel pool	5-megawatt reactor	6,400 completed as of April 2009
Removal of control rod drive mechanisms	5-megawatt reactor	To be done after spent fuel removal is completed
Removal of reactor cooling loop and wooden cooling tower interior structure	5-megawatt reactor	Tower demolished June 26, 2008
Disablement of fresh fuel rods	Fuel fabrication facility	Not agreed to by North Korea: consultations held January 2009 with South Korea on possibility of purchase
Removal and storage of 3 uranium ore concentrate dissolver tanks	Fuel fabrication facility	Completed
Removal and storage of 7 uranium conversion furnaces, including storage of refractory bricks and mortar sand	Fuel fabrication facility	Completed
Removal and storage of both metal casing furnaces and vacuum system, and removal and storage of 8 machining lathes	Fuel fabrication facility	Completed
Cut cable and remove drive mechanism associated with the receiving hot cell door	Reprocessing facility	Completed
Cut two of four stream lines into reprocessing facility	Reprocessing facility	Completed
Removal of drive mechanisms for the fuel cladding shearing and slitting machines	Reprocessing facility	Completed
Removal of crane and door actuators that permit spent fuel rods to enter the reprocessing facility	Reprocessing facility	Completed

⁵²² Nikitin, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons," 13, referring to "North Korean Disablement Actions,," *Arms Control Today*, October 2008; "Disablement Actions," National Committee on North Korea website; Siegfried Hecker, "Denuclearizing North Korea," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 2008.

North Korea delayed the disablement process in the autumn of 2008 by linking it to U.S. removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and verification measures. Disagreements over verification procedures led to a halt of the verification process.⁵²³ In September 2008, North Korea rejected the initial U.S. verification proposals and threatened to begin processing plutonium again.⁵²⁴ After two months of deadlock, Christopher Hill visited Pyongyang to have further talks on the verification agreement on October 2-3, 2008. On October 11, 2008, the United States announced an agreement with North Korea on measures to verify the North Korean nuclear weapons program and remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.

United States officials announced that “North Korea had agreed to allow experts to collect samples and conduct forensic tests at all of its declared nuclear facilities and at undeclared sites upon mutual consent.”⁵²⁵ Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Paula DeSutter told reporters on October 11, “All of the elements that we sought...are included in the various documents and agreements that they’ve obtained with the North Koreans.”⁵²⁶ Disablement work could start again in October 2008 after the United States removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.⁵²⁷

However, on November 12, 2008, North Korea said that “it would not allow outside inspectors to collect samples at its main nuclear complex to verify its account of past activities.”⁵²⁸ The North Korean Foreign Ministry said that it never

⁵²³ Glenn Kessler, “Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal,” *Washington Post*, September 26, 2008, A20, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/25/AR2008092504380.html?sid=ST2008092600020&s_pos= (accessed on August 18, 2009).

⁵²⁴ Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” 18.

⁵²⁵ *Los Angeles Times*, “World; N. Korea says no to sampling at nuclear sites,” November 13, 2008, A6.

⁵²⁶ Peter Crail, “U.S. NK Agree on Draft Verification Plan,” *Arms Control Today* 38, no. 9 (November 2008): 27–29.

⁵²⁷ Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” 14.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

agreed to such sampling and it contradicted statements by U.S. officials.⁵²⁹ North Korea suspended disablement in December 2008. The Six-Party Talks in December 2008, the last of the Bush administration, ended without a full verification protocol. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, “There was a lot of agreement among a majority of the delegations there, but ultimately [North Korea] was not ready.”⁵³⁰ Consequently, the incomplete dismantlement of the nuclear program and rejection of sampling measures led to the failure of Bush’s reassurance strategy in the end.

In response to the disagreement on the sampling issue and the stalemate in the Six-Party Talks in late 2008, the United States announced the halt of its heavy fuel oil shipment on December 12, 2008. Consequently, the United States stopped fulfilling its commitments in parallel with North Korea’s non-fulfillment based on the principle of Tit-for-Tat or action for action.

C. CONDITION VARIABLES (CV): CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA’S MOTIVATING FACTORS

1. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations Between the United States and North Korea

To explore the causal factors between the Bush administration’s reassurance strategy and its outcomes, the first step is to understand the circumstances and relationships between the United States and North Korea. The values of these condition variables affect North Korea’s motivating factors and intervening variables such as leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics and alliance politics.

Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between the United States and North Korea over the time period when Bush’s reassurance strategy was attempted?

⁵²⁹ Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” 14.

⁵³⁰ Barbara Demick, “The World: No Breakthrough in Talks on N. Korea’s Nuclear Program; U.S. says Pyongyang Refused to Budge on Inspection Protocol. The Matter Will Fall to Next Administration,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 12, 2008, A4.

a. Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach)

Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the “balance of power” between the United States and North Korea? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence the balance of power affected the calculations of either the United States or North Korea?

(1) Balance of Power between the United States and North Korea: Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP). As GNP is used to compare the power of South Korea and North Korea in the previous case study, the same method is applied to the United States and North Korea. Both GNP at current prices in million U.S. dollars and per capita in U.S. dollars show that the balance of power was extremely unfavorable to North Korea. First, the GNP of the United States in 2006 was 961 times bigger than that of North Korea and 943 and 1071 times bigger in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The average ratio of the GNP of the United States to that of North Korea between 2001 and 2008 was 983. The overall balance of power was strongly in favor of the United States. GNP at current prices in U.S. dollars is summarized in Figure 3.3:




Figure 3.3. GNP at Current Prices in U.S. Dollars⁵³¹

⁵³¹ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on August 16, 2009).

Second, per capita GNP in U.S. dollars show the same results. Per capita GNP of the United States was significantly greater than that of North Korea, as summarized in Table 3.5:

Table 3.5. Per Capita GNP in U.S. Dollars⁵³²

Year	U.S. (US \$)	N. Korea (U.S. \$)	U.S./N. Korea
2001	35,469	475	74.67
2002	35,997	467	77.08
2003	37,150	470	79.04
2004	39,374	472	83.42
2005	41,486	548	75.70
2006	43,617	577	75.59
2007	45,422	617	73.62
2008	45,836	555	82.59
			Avg. 77.71

(2) The Impact of Unfavorable Balance of Power to North Korea on its Calculations. North Korea recognizes the unfavorable balance of power. Therefore, North Korea has tried to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power and gain “asymmetrical” advantage over the United States through its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.⁵³³ Even though GNP showed that the balance of power was unfavorable to North Korea between 2001 and 2008, North Korean military forces still posed a serious threat to the United States, especially, because of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

⁵³² Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on August 16, 2009).

⁵³³ Bill Gertz, “North Korea Pumps Money into Military,” *Washington Times*, August 3, 2004, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/aug/03/20040803-122618-7502r/> (accessed on August 17, 2009).

General Leon J. LaPorte, U.S. Forces Korea commander between 2003 and 2006, said that “They are making, primarily, their investments in the asymmetrical areas. They realize that they can never invest enough money in their navy and air force to compete [with U.S. and South Korean forces]. So they are investing in asymmetrical capabilities.”⁵³⁴ General LaPorte emphasized in particular his concern over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and a second one on May 25, 2009. Even though there is uncertainty about important details of the North Korean nuclear tests, those tests showed that North Korea had significantly improved its skills for the engineering requirements of plutonium production and explosive device design. Several sources estimate that North Korea separated plutonium in a range from 30 to 50 kg, which is enough plutonium for approximately five to eight weapons, assuming 6 kg per weapon.⁵³⁵ North Korea might have used approximately 5–6 kg of plutonium for each test and it is likely to have 20–40 kg of plutonium remaining, enough for approximately three to six nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s ballistic missile program, including Taepo Dong 1 and 2 missiles, is a potential threat to the United States. In the absence of reliable data on the capabilities of North Korea’s missiles, some American analysts have estimated the North Korean threat as potentially quite severe. For example, Steven A. Hildreth says that “For the Taepo Dong 1 to achieve greater range its payload would have to be decreased. Some analysts speculated that a reduced-payload configuration could deliver a 200 kg warhead into the U.S. center and a 100 kg warhead to Washington D.C., albeit with poor

⁵³⁴ Gertz, “North Korea Pumps Money into Military.”

⁵³⁵ Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” 5. Nikitin referred to three sources: (1) Siegfried Hecker estimates 40-50 kg of separated plutonium and 6 kg for the test, Siegfried Hecker, January 21, 2004, testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC); (2) David Albright and Paul Brannan’s study says 33-55 kg of separated plutonium and roughly 5 kg for the test, David Albright and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock February 2007,” Institute for Science and International Security, February 20, 2007; and (3) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill cites 50 kg in his comments, Christopher Hill, “Interview on PBS NewsHour,” October 3, 2007, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/93274.htm>.

accuracy.”⁵³⁶ According to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessments, the Taepo Dong 2 has the potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the United States.⁵³⁷ The Taepo Dong 2 is believed to be a two-stage missile and have “a range potential of as much as 3,750 km with a 700 to 1,000 kg payload and, if a third stage were added, some believe that range could be extended to 4,000 to 4,300 km with a full payload.”⁵³⁸ Some analysts believe that “the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a 700 to 1,000 kg payload as far as 6,700 km.”⁵³⁹

Therefore, even though the balance of power between the United States and North Korea was in favor of the United States, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and its ballistic missile program are a serious threat from the U.S. point of view. The nuclear test affected the calculation of the United States, especially hard-liners, in term of the balance of power. The United States considered the nuclear test as a negative shift of balance of power. This consideration also influenced the domestic politics of the United States. However, North Korea did not see it that way because North Korea recognized that the United State is a major nuclear state with thousands of weapons and it still had a less favorable balance of power. Thus, even though the North Korean nuclear test affected the U.S. perspective of the balance of power, it did not change the balance of power between the United States and North Korea.

The answer for the question of what was the “balance of power” between the United States and North Korea is that North Korea had a considerably less favorable situation, even though there were asymmetric threats posed by the North

⁵³⁶ Steven A. Hildreth, “North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” *CRS Report for Congress*, February 24, 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), 2, referring to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. 2,” Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, 30.

⁵³⁷ Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080205_testimony.pdf. (accessed on August 18, 2009).

⁵³⁸ Hildreth, “North Korean Ballistic Missile,” 2, referring to “Taepo Don 2,” *The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, 2002, 3.

⁵³⁹ Ibid., referring to “North Korean Missile Could Bring U.S. into range: Experts,” *Agency France-Presse*, June 20, 2006 and Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. 2,” 30.

Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This situation continued in 2007 and 2008. However, it is necessary to consider U.S. perceptions of the 2006 North Korean nuclear test because it was considered as a negative shift of the balance of power and influenced the domestic politics of the United States. This impact is discussed below.

b. Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach): No Interdependence

Question 4-b (From the Liberal Approach): What was the level of “interdependence” between the United States and North Korea? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either the United States or North Korea?

Like the previous case study between the two Koreas, Katherine Barbieri’s, and Bruce Russett’s and John Oneal’s approaches are used to measure economic interdependence between the United States and North Korea. The results show that there was almost no interdependence at all. Therefore, it did not affect the calculations of either the United States or North Korea.

(1) Barbieri’s Model.⁵⁴⁰ The application of Barbieri’s model to the United States and North Korea between 2001 and 2008 shows that there was absolutely no interdependence between the two countries. As shown in Table 3.6, the trade share of North Korea for the United States was almost zero:

⁵⁴⁰ Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 36–7.

Table 3.6. Trade share of North Korea in the United States⁵⁴¹

Year	Trade b/t U.S. & NK ⁵⁴² (millions of U.S. dollars)	Total Trade of U.S. ⁵⁴³ (millions of U.S. dollars)	Trade Share of NK in U.S.	
2001	0.5	2,375,296	0.00000	
2002	25.2	2,376,541	0.00001	
2003	8.0	2,535,415	0.00000	
2004	25.3	2,928,453	0.00001	
2005	5.8	3,278,187	0.00000	
2006	n/a	3,663,729	n/a	
2007	1.7	3,987,758	0.00000	
2008	52.2	4,349,128	0.00001	
			Avg	0.00001

As shown in Table 3.7, the trade share of the United States for North Korea was also very low and the average between 2001 and 2008 was only 0.3%. By Barbieri's method, these data lead to a calculation of economic interdependence that is effectively zero, as shown in Table 3.8:

⁵⁴¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea, Statistics of Economy and Trade, <http://www.mofat.go.kr/economic/economicdata/statistics/index.jsp> (accessed on March 8, 2009).

⁵⁴² U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, "Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with North Korea," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5790.html> (accessed on August 18, 2009), 2006 data is not available.

⁵⁴³ U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, "U.S. Trade in Goods and Services-Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf> (accessed on August 18, 2009).

Table 3.7. Trade share of the United States in North Korea⁵⁴⁴

Year	Trade b/t U.S. & NK (millions of U.S. dollars)	Total Trade of NK (millions of U.S. dollars)	Trade Share of U.S. in NK	
2001	0.5	4,231	0.00012	
2002	25.2	3,248	0.00776	
2003	8.0	3,300	0.00242	
2004	25.3	4,139	0.00611	
2005	5.8	4,776	0.00121	
2006	n/a	5,010	n/a	
2007	1.7	5,096	0.00033	
2008	52.2	n/a	n/a	
			Avg	0.00299

Table 3.8. Trade salience, symmetry, and economic interdependence between the United States and North Korea

Year	Trade salience	Trade symmetry	Economic Interdependence
2001	0.00000	0.99988	0.00000
2002	0.00029	0.99225	0.00028
2003	0.00009	0.99758	0.00009
2004	0.00023	0.99390	0.00023
2005	0.00005	0.99879	0.00005
2006	0.00000	1.00000	0.00000
2007	0.00001	0.99967	0.00001
2008	n/a	n/a	n/a
Average	0.00013	0.99701	0.00013

⁵⁴⁴ Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis," *CRS Report for Congress*, August 26, 2008, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 25 and 43, and for additional information, refer to Mika Marumoto, "Project Report: DPRK Economic Statistics Project (March 2009)," US Korea Institute at SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies), The Johns Hopkins University, http://uskoreainstitute.org/pdf/specialreports/DPRKstat/DPRK_Stats_FullRPT.pdf (accessed on August 18, 2009).

(2) Russett and Oneal's Method.⁵⁴⁵ As shown in Table 3.9, U.S. trade dependence on its linkages with North Korea has been almost zero. It shows that North Korea's trade dependence on its linkages with the United States was also extremely low. Therefore, the Russett and Oneal method as displayed in Table 3.8 shows that the measurement of the economic interdependence between the two Koreas was almost zero.

Table 3.9. Trade Dependence of U.S. and North Korea⁵⁴⁶

Year	Trade b/t U.S., NK (millions of U.S. dollars)	U.S. GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	U.S. Trade dependence with NK (economic interdependence)	N. Korea GDP (million US dollars)	NK Trade dependence with U.S. (trade asymmetry)
2001	0.5	10,075,900	0.000000	23,697	0.000021
2002	25.2	10,417,600	0.000002	1,636,500	0.000015
2003	8.0	10,908,000	0.000001	1,657,650	0.000005
2004	25.3	11,630,900	0.000002	1,675,200	0.000015
2005	5.8	12,376,100	0.000000	1,801,509	0.000003
2006	n/a	13,132,900	0.000000	1,945,196	0.000000
2007	1.7	13,776,472	0.000000	2,051,729	0.000001
2008	52.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Avg.	17	11,759,696	0.000001	1,541,640	0.000009

⁵⁴⁵ Russett and Oneal, "Classical Liberals Were Right," 275.

⁵⁴⁶ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on August 20, 2009). GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP).

(3) No Economic Interdependence between the United States and North Korea. The United States and North Korea were not economically interdependent at all between 2001 and 2008. Most of trade between the United States and North Korea was U.S. assistance to North Korea.⁵⁴⁷ For example, in 2006, there was no U.S. assistance to North Korea. After the progress in the Six-Party Talks in the fall of 2007, the United States provided heavy fuel oil in return for North Korea's freezing and disabling nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.⁵⁴⁸ In May 2008, the United States Agency for International Development announced a food assistance plan to North Korea by providing 500,000 metric tons (MT) and a U.S. ship delivered 37,000 tons of wheat to North Korea on June 30, 2008.⁵⁴⁹

The United States could not trade with North Korea under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act. On June 26, 2008, the Bush administration announced that the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act would no longer apply to North Korea and notified Congress of its intent to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List after the required 45-day notification period to Congress.⁵⁵⁰ On October 11, 2008, the Bush administration removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.⁵⁵¹ The level of economic interdependence between the United States and North Korea had been zero. There was very little change as a result of U.S. assistance to North Korea in 2007 and 2008 even with the progress of the Six-Party Talks. Consequently, economic interdependence is not a factor in the relationship between the United States and North Korea.

⁵⁴⁷ Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin, "U.S. Assistance to North Korea," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 31, 2008, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3, referring to *Washington Post*, "U.S. Wheat Begins New Aid to North Korea," July 1, 2008.

⁵⁵⁰ Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea: Terrorism List Removal," *CRS Report for Congress*, April 15, 2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 9.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

c. ***Identity (from the Constructivist Approach): The Persistence of Enemy Identity and Hobbesian Culture***

Question 4-c (From the Constructivist Approach): To what extent was there a shared identity between the United States and North Korea? Was the degree of shared understanding changing and if so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity affected the calculations of either the United States or North Korea?

As mentioned in the previous case study, there was some identity shift from Hobbesian enemy to Lockean rival between South Korea and North Korea between 1998 and 2007. However, between the United States and North Korea, the Hobbesian identity has not changed at all. The United States considers North Korea as an enemy in terms of nuclear proliferation and terrorist threats. On the other hand, North Korea considers the United States as an imperialist threat to its security. These enemy identities and Hobbesian culture have persisted and affected the calculations of both the United States and North Korea.

(1) The United States: “Axis of Evil” and Enemy Identity of North Korea. To the United States, North Korea is a potential threat and enemy with its missiles and nuclear weapons. Most leaders in the United States have an enemy identity of North Korea. During the Bush administration, the concept of an evil actor with an enemy identity was intensified. A large majority of public opinion showed that the American public considered North Korea as one of the country’s greatest enemies. For example, the Gallup polls about American attitudes toward North Korea between 2000 and 2007 show that Americans had a generally negative impression of North Korea.⁵⁵² One question was what their overall opinion of North Korea was—very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?⁵⁵³ Table 3.10 shows that about 76 percent (mostly unfavorable 37.6% and very unfavorable 37.9%) of the participants have unfavorable opinions of North Korea.

⁵⁵² Jibum Kim, Carl Gershenson, Jaeki Jeong, and Tom W. Smith, “The Polls-Trends: How Americans Think about North Korea: 2000–2007,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 804–821.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, 806.

Table 3.10. Overall American Opinion of North Korea⁵⁵⁴

Date	Very favorable	Mostly favorable	Mostly unfavorable	Very unfavorable	No opinion	N
Nov 13-15, 2000	3	23	41	22	11	1,028
Feb 1-4, 2001	3	28	37	22	10	1,003
Feb 4-6, 2002	3	20	38	27	12	1,011
Feb 3-6, 2003	1	11	38	42	8	1,001
Mar 14-15, 2003	2	6	33	53	6	1,007
Feb 9-12, 2004	2	10	42	41	5	1,002
Feb 7-10, 2005	1	12	38	42	7	1,008
Feb 6-9, 2006	2	8	38	43	8	1,002
Feb 1-4, 2007	2	10	33	49	6	1,007
Average	2.1	14.2	37.6	37.9	8.1	1,007.7

The next question was whether respondents considered North Korea: an ally of the United States; friendly, but not an ally; unfriendly; or an enemy of the United States.⁵⁵⁵ Table 3.11 shows that an average 41.8% of participants considered North Korea as an enemy of the United States and an average 35.8% answered that North Korea is unfriendly. That is, almost 80% of participants had an enemy image of North Korea.

⁵⁵⁴ Kim et al., "The Polls-Trends: How Americans Think about North Korea," 806.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

Table 3.11. American Enemy Identity toward North Korea⁵⁵⁶

Date	Ally	Friendly, not an ally	Unfriendly	Enemy	No opinion	N
May 18-21, 2000	6	26	35	24	9	1,011
Mar 14-15, 2003	2	5	43	46	4	1,007
Apr 22-23, 2003	2	11	36	45	6	1,001
Sep 19-21, 2003	5	7	39	44	5	1,003
Jul 6-9, 2006	2	10	34	47	7	1,007
May 4-6, 2007	4	17	28	45	6	1,028
Average	3.5	12.7	35.8	41.8	6.2	1009.5

Also, according to the Gallup poll conducted on February 1–4, 2007, 18% of Americans identified North Korea as the United States’ greatest enemy.⁵⁵⁷ President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech in 2002 influenced American public opinion about the perception of North Korea. Relatively few Americans (2%) thought of North Korea as the United States’ top enemy in 2001. This figure jumped to 22% in 2005 and it has continued to remain high (15% in 2006 and 18% in 2007) (Figure 3.4). Lydia Saad says, “President George W. Bush may be struggling to rally Americans around his Iraq War policies, but he has evidently been more successful at influencing public opinion about the United States’ enemies in the world, more generally.”⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁶ Kim et al., “The Polls-Trends: How Americans Think about North Korea,” 806

⁵⁵⁷ Lydia Saad, “‘Axis of Evil’ Countries Dominate U.S. Perceptions of Greatest Enemy,” February 22, 2007, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/26653/axis-evil-countries-dominate-us-perceptions-greatest-enemy.aspx#1> (accessed on August 22, 2009).

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.




Figure 3.4. Trends in Perception of “Axis of Evil” Countries as “Greatest Enemy”⁵⁵⁹

American enmity toward North Korea was solidified by material facts such as the missile tests and nuclear weapons program. Also, there were many examples of North Korea’s past aggressive behaviors such as Pueblo Incident in 1968⁵⁶⁰ and Axe Murder Incident in 1976.⁵⁶¹ In his study of identity, Jae-Jung Suh says, “It is undeniable that there were material realities that lent themselves to such threat assessments.”⁵⁶² According to Suh, the material factors are one element of identity constitution. American identity of North Korea became further consolidated by the representational and institutional facts:

U.S. identity has also been constituted through material acts, representational practices, and institutional politics. The experience of fighting the Korean War and protecting the South throughout the Cold War did much to propel the United States into its role as a defender of the free world.

⁵⁵⁹ Saad, “‘Axis of Evil’ Countries Dominate.”

⁵⁶⁰ Refer to USS Pueblo (AGER-2) Veteran’s Association homepage, <http://www.usspueblo.org/>.

⁵⁶¹ Refer to Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, “The DMZ War Operation Paul Bunyan: The ‘Axe Murder Incident’ 18 August 1976 at Panmunjom,” <http://www.vfwpost7591.org/opn-PB.html>.

⁵⁶² Jae-Jung Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Affairs* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 165.

As South Korea's identity was defined as opposite of the North's, the United States was identified in terms of its role in containing the danger of communism, of which North Korea constituted an important part during and especially after the Cold War. Finally, the U.S. government institutionalized measures to politically and economically punish North Korea for its transgressions and, in so doing, effectively secure the North's identity as the Other and the United States' as its opposite.⁵⁶³

Even though there are several scholars in the United States, such as Bruce Cumings, Selig Harrison, Leon Segal and David Kang, who interpret North Korea's identity from different perspectives, such as security dilemma, economic need, vulnerability, and need-oriented motivations, the dominant identity of North Korea in the United States has been that of the enemy under Hobbesian culture. Bruce Cumings points out, "A mimetic American commentary unites diverse opinion on one point: this place is a rogue-terrorist-communist-Stalinist-totalitarian-Oriental nightmare, America's most loathed and feared 'Other.'"⁵⁶⁴

(2) North Korea: "Empire of Devil" and Imperialist Enemy Identity of the United States. As a response to Bush's Axis of Evil speech in the 2002 State of the Union Address, North Korea called the United States the "Empire of Devil." According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA):

Though it has the largest number of weapons of mass destruction in the world, the U.S. is sharply increasing military expenditure. This clearly proves that the U.S. "empire of devil," is posing a grave threat to the world peace and stability.⁵⁶⁵

This image of the United States is dominant in the North Korean media. The North Korean government believes the United States' intentions are aggressive and considers all military exercises of the United States with South Korea as a preparation for an invasion and war with North Korea. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) always describes the United States as an imperialist and U.S. forces as

⁵⁶³ Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity*, 125.

⁵⁶⁴ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), viii.

⁵⁶⁵ KCNA, "KCNA on U.S. National Defense Budget," February 8, 2002.

“imperialist aggression forces.” North Korea condemns the United States almost every day in their news. This has been the constant perspective of North Korea. Here are typical examples collected from the KCNA news between 2007 and 2008 when the Bush administration attempted to implement its reassurance strategy:

January 8, 2007: The above-said exercise staged by the U.S. imperialists with the mobilization of those strategic bombers from the outset of the year clearly indicates that they are set to ignite an adventurous nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.⁵⁶⁶

October 16, 2007: The warlike elements of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces are nowadays busying themselves deploying warplanes in and around South Korea to be ready to go into action against the DPRK, according to a military source.⁵⁶⁷

Reviewing 2008 KCNA news, there was not much change in the rhetoric about the United States, which showed the North Korean identity of the United States as an imperialist enemy. Here are some examples:

January 5, 2008: The U.S. has become all the more frantic in its moves to modernize nuclear weapons in the new century as it considers the nuclear weapons as an all-powerful means and pins great hope on their use in realizing its Asia and world strategies for aggression. It is the intention of the U.S. nuclear war mongers to modernize the nuclear weapons so that they can be used as conventional weapons in wars.⁵⁶⁸

April 18, 2008: The U.S. bellicose forces raised a hue and cry over "missile threat" from the DPRK, making nonsensical speculations. This is nothing but sophism prompted by a sinister aim to justify their moves to establish the missile defense system (MD) and invent a pretext for launching a military invasion of it.⁵⁶⁹

October 2, 2008: The U.S. is talking about "peace and stability" on the peninsula, but it is, in actuality, pursuing confrontation and war against the

⁵⁶⁶ KCNA, “U.S. Imperialist Aggression Forces Commit Air Strike Exercise,” January 8, 2007.

⁵⁶⁷ KCNA, “U.S. Forces Deploy Warplanes to Be Ready to Go into Action,” October 16, 2007.

⁵⁶⁸ KCNA, “U.S. Measure for ‘Nuclear Reduction’ Termed Hypocritical,” January 5, 2008.

⁵⁶⁹ KCNA, “U.S. Reckless Missile Hysteria under Fire,” April 18, 2008.

DPRK. All its military actions in Korea are not aimed at preserving "peace" but at serving the purpose of rounding off the preparations to carry out its policy for invading the DPRK.⁵⁷⁰

This kind of language always exists in North Korean media and shows the dominant North Korean identity and attitudes toward the United States. In sum, it is easy to see the persistency of enemy identity and Hobbesian culture between the United States and North Korea. The United States sees North Korea as a member of an "Axis of Evil" that has weapons of mass destruction and North Korea views the United States as an "Empire of Devil" that constantly looks for a chance to topple the regime. There is a shared enemy identity between the United States and North Korea and the degree of shared understanding has not changed. This kind of a shared enemy identity affected the motivating factors of North Korea as well as all intervening variables of this dissertation, such as leaders' perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the United States and North Korea.

Consequently, the balance of power remained very favorable to the United States but was complicated by the North's demonstration of nuclear weapon potential; there was no economic interdependence; and enemy identities remained unchanged. These condition variables (CV1) affected North Korea's motivating factors (CV 2) and other variables such as leaders' perceptions and domestic and alliance politics of North Korea and the United States (IntV).

2. Condition Variable (CV) 2: North Korea's Mixed and Uncertain Motivating Factors

Question 5: What were North Korea's motivations? Was North Korea best seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was the United States' perception of North Korea's motivations?

Question 6: Did North Korea share an aversion to war with the United States?

⁵⁷⁰ KCNA, "DPRK-Targeted Joint Military Exercises Slammed," October 2, 2008.

Even though there is not much empirical evidence about North Korea's motivating factors, assessment must be made of the kinds of intentions North Korea has because it is a fundamental factor in the success or failure of a reassurance strategy. Those who advocate a reassurance strategy need to explain their assessments about North Korea's motivating factors.

a. North Korea's "Not-greedy" and "Need-oriented" Motivating Factors: Defensive Motive

The balance of power has shifted against North Korea after the end of the Cold War. The possibility of a total war initiated by North Korea has been lower since the end of the Cold War. In other words, North Korea has a "not-greedy" and "defense-oriented" motive. North Korea's main concern after the end of the Cold War became regime survival. North Korea has requested security guarantees and a bilateral peace treaty with the United States as a precondition for giving up its nuclear weapons development. North Korea has been threatened by the United States, especially since the end of the Cold War, and the "Axis of Evil" statement after 9/11. North Korea would consider regime survival as a primary reason for seeking a deterrent as long as the United States maintains the hard-line policy toward North Korea.

David Kang argues that North Korea is not a threat. He also states that the changing balance of power against North Korea has increased North Korea's security fears.⁵⁷¹ He points out the main dilemma of North Korea's nuclear program issue:

In a nutshell, the problem is this: the United States refuses to give security guarantees to North Korea until it proves it has dismantled its weapon program. The North refuses to disarm until it has security guarantees from the United States. Hence, stalemate.⁵⁷²

Two weeks after North Korea's admission about having an HEU program in October 2002, North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that the United

⁵⁷¹ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 41–69.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, 43.

States' hostile policy was the cause of their nuclear program and requested a non-aggression treaty between North Korea and the United States:

As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it cropped up as the U.S. has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hostile policy toward it in accordance with the strategy for world supremacy.... If the U.S. legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns.⁵⁷³

North Korea's request for a security guarantee and diplomatic recognition as a condition for the disablement of its nuclear program continued. The discussions and agreements of the Six-Party Talks showed this. In September 2005, North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for economic aid as well as security guarantees and diplomatic recognition in the September 19, 2005 Agreement. In the February 13, 2007 Agreement, North Korea requested normalization of U.S.–North Korean relations which meant recognition of its right to exist.

Based on North Korea's continuous request for security guarantees and normalization of the two countries' relationship and the unfavorable shift of the balance of power, regime survival seems to be the primary motive of the nuclear program and other military actions and it illustrates North Korea's "not-greedy" motivating factors as arising from fear and insecurity. However, that may not be a totally correct view of North Korea's motivating factors. North Korea also shows "greedy" and "opportunity-motivated" motivating factors, given its aggressive actions beyond its borders such as the proliferation of WMDs.

b. North Korea's "Greedy" and "Opportunity-Oriented" Motivating Factors: Offensive Motive

If North Korea had only "not-greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors, North Korea could implement the previous deals with the United

⁵⁷³ KCNA, "Conclusion of Non-aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called for," October 25, 2006.

States and make more progress in negotiations. According to Victor D. Cha, even though the United States had deals twice offering food, energy, and normalized relations with North Korea in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 2005 Agreement in return for denuclearization, North Korea continuously made provocative actions after reaching agreements.⁵⁷⁴ A series of North Korean provocative actions in 2009 “can no longer be rationalized as an attempt to engage the United States.”⁵⁷⁵ One evidence to show North Korea’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors is its wishes to be recognized as a nuclear state.⁵⁷⁶ Another point of evidence is its cooperation with other countries in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

(1) Demand for Recognition as a Nuclear State. The possibility of success of Korea’s reunification under the North’s control has waned because the circumstances have been changed by South Korea’s growing economic power and better relationships with China and Russia. However, there is no clear evidence showing that North Korea has changed its objective to reunify Korea under its control. This means that North Korea has not given up its “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, even though it is difficult to implement in reality. Therefore, under the changed circumstances, North Korea demanded recognition as a nuclear state. The continuous provocative actions of North Korea could be efforts to buy time and fulfill this changed “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factor.

North Korea has provoked skirmishes to create tension and take advantage of the consequences. This is “coercive bargaining” strategy. According to Cha, coercive strategy “derives from the preemptive/preventive logic.”⁵⁷⁷ He says that “This strategy does not advocate all-out war. Rather it utilizes deliberate, limited acts of violence to create small crises and then negotiate down from the heightened state of

⁵⁷⁴ Victor D. Cha, “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (October 2009), 123.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁵⁷⁷ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 24.

tension to a bargaining outcome more to the North's advantage than the status quo."⁵⁷⁸ If coercive bargaining is North Korea's intention, then there is a high chance of violence resulting and a low chance of success of negotiation. Cha argues that North Korea wants a U.S.-India type deal. He said, "I believe that North Korea wants a deal ultimately, but not one that requires full denuclearization on their part....in the course of sometimes heated talks, the North Koreans would assert to Hill, the lead U.S. negotiator, that the United States should simply accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, much as they have done for India and Pakistan."⁵⁷⁹

(2) Proliferation of WMD. The most fundamental U.S. concern of the confrontation with North Korea is the proliferation of WMD and technologies to other governments or to terrorist groups. North Korea's cooperation with Iran and Syria might be motivated by a balancing strategy⁵⁸⁰ to find allies and get help; nevertheless, North Korea's nuclear program and its proliferation is "a threat to the United States—probably much more from possible leakage to terrorists than from direct attack—and a serious setback to global nonproliferation, the problem is even more a northeast-Asian regional issue."⁵⁸¹ If North Korea was motivated only by "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors, it would not try to increase the most serious threat to the United States and take advantage of the difficult conditions of the United States in Iraq.

There was a correlation between the Middle East and North Korea's strategic calculation. The destabilizing situation and U.S. difficulties in the Middle East could provide North Korea with a strategic gain. To the United States, North Korean WMD proliferation to the Middle East could be interpreted as a very offensive threat to the U.S. security and interests. According to Larry A. Niksch, "If one accepts that North Korean leaders genuinely worry about U.S. military or other coercive actions

⁵⁷⁸ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 24.

⁵⁷⁹ Cha, "What Do They Really Want," 123.

⁵⁸⁰ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43.

⁵⁸¹ James A. Kelly, "Two for Now," *The National Interest* 98 (November/December 2008), 28.

against them, it then stands to reason that they judge that destabilizing the Middle East and complicating U.S. policies and commitments in that region provide an important strategic gain for North Korea.”⁵⁸² Niksch claims that “Pyongyang’s fear of a U.S. unilateral attack obviously receded [in the second half of 2003 and 2004], and Pyongyang saw a new opportunity for diplomatic advantage.”⁵⁸³ When the United States had difficulty in Iraq in late 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test and became more assertive.

The cooperation between North Korea and Iran in development of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons is a most serious concern of the United States. While North Korea and Iran established diplomatic ties in 1973, missile collaboration reportedly only began in 1985 under the Islamic revolutionary government, and they expanded their relationship in the 1990s.⁵⁸⁴ As Christina Y. Lin notes, “North Korea’s No-dong, Taepo-dong 1, and Taepo-dong 2 missiles were the basis for development of Iran’s Shahab 3, Shahab 4, and Shahab 5/6⁵⁸⁵, respectively.”⁵⁸⁶

After North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the cooperation on nuclear issues increased and the military relationship between North Korea and Iran has become more intense since November 2006.⁵⁸⁷ According to *The Daily Telegraph*, in November 2006, North Korea invited a team of Iranian nuclear scientists to share the results of an underground test to help Iran conduct a similar one in

⁵⁸² Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival*, ed. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 111.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Christina Y. Lin, “The King from the East: DPRK-Syria-Iran Nuclear Nexus and Strategic Implications for Israel and the ROK,” Korean Economic Institute (KEI), Academic Papers Series on Korea 3, no. 7 (October 2008), 2, <http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2008/APS-Lin.pdf> (accessed on September 7, 2009), referring to Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea Profile—Missile,” September 2008, www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid., fn 8, “The Shahab 5/6 are thought to be in development and have not been tested.”

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. See Jennifer Kline, “Special Report: Challenges of Iranian Missile Proliferation – Part I, Partner with North Korea,” *WMD Insights* 9 (October 2006): 2–8, http://www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/FP_OctIssue.pdf (accessed on September 9, 2009).

⁵⁸⁷ Con Coughlin, “N. Korea Helping Iran with Nuclear Testing,” *Daily Telegraph*, January 24, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1540429/N-Korea-helping-Iran-with-nuclear-testing.html> (accessed on September 9, 2009).

the future.⁵⁸⁸ The relationship between North Korea and Iran became closer and they expanded their mutual exchanges to other fields.

For example, on January 19, 2007, North Korea and Iran signed “a 2007–2009 plan for cultural and scientific exchange.”⁵⁸⁹ The nuclear programs of both countries have become serious problems for the United States, and their increased cooperation has intensified threats to the United States. North Korea’s uranium enrichment program has been a special concern, especially since the 2002 nuclear crisis. North Korea claimed that it had completed experiments to enrich uranium in September 2009 and assistance from Iran for the uranium enrichment was possible.⁵⁹⁰ *The Economist* summarizes the scenario many fear:

North Korea and Iran are already known to co-operate intensively in developing nuclear-capable missiles. So what is to stop them helping each other with their nuclear programs? North Korea has plutonium and warhead-building skills. A master tunneller, it could also help any country wanting to hide its nuclear efforts from satellites. Iran, meanwhile, has the uranium-enrichment skills that North Korea previously lacked. Small wonder Iran thinks it can enrich on happily.⁵⁹¹

Also, the relationship between North Korea and Syria has raised suspicions. In May 2007, North Korea and Syria signed an agreement on friendship and scientific cooperation between Kim Il Sung University and University of Damascus in Syria.⁵⁹² North Korea reportedly helped the Syrian nuclear program. Even though there was no clear evidence of North Korean assistance to the Syrian nuclear program after the Israeli airstrike on September 6, 2007,⁵⁹³ and there was little official commentary from

⁵⁸⁸ Con Coughlin, “N. Korea Helping Iran with Nuclear Testing.”

⁵⁸⁹ KCNA, “DPRK-Iranian Cultural and Scientific Exchange Plan Signed,” January 20, 2007.

⁵⁹⁰ *Economist*, “Iran, North Korea and the Bomb,” September 12, 2009, 67.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹² KCNA, “Agreement Signed between DPRK and Syrian Universities,” May 16, 2007.

⁵⁹³ Daryl G. Kimball, “North Korea and the Incident in the Syrian Desert,” *Arms Control Today* 38, no. 4 (May 2008), 3.

the United States on Syria and North Korea's nuclear connection,⁵⁹⁴ North Korea's role in the Syrian nuclear program was suspected. In April 2008, the United States released intelligence information saying that the Syrian nuclear reactor was built with assistance from North Korea and the Bush administration cut off delivery of heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea.⁵⁹⁵

In sum, even though it is not clear if North Korea could attack the continental United States, North Korea's aggressive actions of proliferation of WMD to other countries create serious threats to the United States and they constitute North Korea's "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors.

c. *Mixed Motivations*

As explained in the previous case study, North Korea's motivating factors cannot be determined with certainty. It is true that between 2007 and 2008, when the Bush administration implemented the reassurance strategy toward North Korea, Pyongyang seemed to have mixed motivations and its strategies differed depending on how North Korea interpreted the situation. An unfavorable balance of power in the 1990s and early 2000s increased North Korea's security fears and North Korea continued to request a security guarantee from the United States. These fears and requests for a security guarantee continued in 2007 and 2008 as shown in the February 13 Agreement and October 3 Agreement. This showed North Korea's "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors.

However, North Korea has also shown its "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors toward the United States by showing its efforts to be a nuclear state and cooperating with other countries, such as Iran and Syria, in the development of WMD. When the United States had difficulty in Iraq in 2006 and 2007,

⁵⁹⁴ Peter Crail, "NK-Syria Nuclear Connection Questionable," *Arms Control Today* 37, no. 8 (October 2007): 35–6.

⁵⁹⁵ Crail, "NK-Syria Nuclear Connection Questionable."

North Korea conducted its nuclear test and then increased its cooperation on the nuclear and missile program with Iran. These actions were motivated by gain, rather than need.

According to Cha, alongside the demand for recognition as a nuclear state, North Korea wanted to receive “regime security assurance” from the United States. Cha said, “Thus, what Pyongyang wants is not just a negative security assurance from the United States against nuclear attack, but a positive security assurance that it will not allow the House of Kim Jong Il—that is, Kim Jong Il and his son, Kim Jong Un, who is set to succeed him—to collapse as Pyongyang partially denuclearizes and goes through a modest reform process to absorb the economic assistance and opening to the outside world that would come with a grand deal.”⁵⁹⁶ North Korea wants to be a nuclear state and receive “regime security assurance” from the United States. This shows that North Korea has not only “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors, but also “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, even under the vulnerable conditions. Consequently, North Korea has both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motives toward the United States.

d. The United States’ Perception of North Korea’s Motivating Factors

Just as North Korea showed evidence of both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motivating factors, the United States’ perception of North Korea’s motivating factors has two aspects. Depending on the perceptions of North Korea’s intentions, interested parties have been sharply divided between hard-liners and soft-liners. Also, the different perceptions make the acceptance of co-existence with North Korea and a clear security guarantee the main issues in dealing with North Korea that divide the hard-line approach and soft-line approach. North Korea’s nuclear program is interpreted from two different perspectives in terms of motivating factors. For example, after the 2002 crisis resulting from discovery of a secret uranium enrichment program, hard-liners asserted that North

⁵⁹⁶ Cha, “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” 126.

Korea had “the fundamentally unchanged and ‘evil’ intentions.”⁵⁹⁷ Soft-liners argued that North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment program “derives from basic insecurity and fears of U.S. preemption.”⁵⁹⁸

(1) North Korea’s “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” Motivating Factors: Soft-liners’ (the Regionalists) Focus on North Korea’s Insecurity. Soft-liners in the United States who support negotiation with North Korea “focus on the full scope of the DPRK’s security concerns and [would] provide North Korea with clear security assurances in return for its willingness to verifiably dismantle its program.”⁵⁹⁹ They are mainly regional experts and Korean scholars. This “regional security” approach is related to reassurance strategy because these experts assume that North Korea’s behavior is based on its insecurity and vulnerability. They believe that “[North Korea] could be persuaded to alter its behavior if its insecurities were addressed.”⁶⁰⁰ Also, they explain that the reasons for all failures of U.S. policy toward North Korea to require it to dismantle its nuclear program are due to U.S. failure to provide a security guarantee and normalize the relationship.

David Kang argued that a security guarantee was essential to solve North Korean nuclear problem. He said:

The way to resolve the crisis is by addressing the security concerns of North Korea. If the United States genuinely has no intention of attacking North Korea or pressuring it for regime change, the administration should conclude a nonaggression pact. It is not that surprising that North Korea does not believe the Bush administration’s occasional assurances about having no intention of using force when the administration refuses to formalize those assurances.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁷ Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 2 (Summer 2004), 230.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁵⁹⁹ Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2009, 25, referring to Daniel Poneman and Brent Scowcroft, “Korea Can’t Wait,” *Washington Post*, February 16, 2003, B7.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ Cha and Kang, “The Debate over North Korea,” 245.

Selig Harrison is another leading supporter of this perspective. Harrison argues that North Korea will not denuclearize without solving its insecurity concerns. He says, “But the harsh reality in dealing with North Korea is that the egocentric nuclear policies pursued by the United States will simply not work.”⁶⁰²

Some U.S. officials also considered North Korea’s “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was one of primary officials who implemented Bush’s reassurance strategy as the head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks. Hill believed that reassurance through the Six-Party Talks was the best way to solve the North Korean nuclear problem and argued there was high possibility of success. In August 2005, one month before the September 19 Agreement, he had an interview with *PBS*. He recognized North Korea’s vulnerability. He said, “This is a country that really needs some help, really needs some help in terms of its economy. And I can assure you making weapons is not part of that.”⁶⁰³ He also emphasized the important of the Six-Party Talks. He said:

President Bush has made very clear on many occasions that we considered the Six-Party Talks the best way to solve this. I mean, this is not a bilateral issue with the U.S. Every country there needs to be involved. So we think it’s the best, and as long as we’re making progress, I would say we made some progress in Beijing, we’ll stick with it.⁶⁰⁴

Victor Cha also pointed out that North Korea’s primary concern is regime survival. He was director for Asian Affairs in the White House’s National Security Council and deputy head of delegation to the Six-Party Talks during the second Bush administration. In his testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2009, he said:

⁶⁰² Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 266.

⁶⁰³ PBS, “Newsmaker: Christopher Hill,” Online NewsHour, August 9, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/july-dec05/hill_8-09.html (accessed on September 20, 2009).

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

The North wants a special type of “regime security assurance” from the United States. This stems from the fundamental reform dilemma that the DPRK faces, which I wrote about in *Foreign Affairs* in 2002: It needs to open up to survive, but the process of opening up leads to the regime’s demise. Thus, what Pyongyang wants is an assurance from the United States that it will not allow the regime to collapse during a reform process.⁶⁰⁵

In sum, the regionalists and some officials who support a soft-line or engagement approach perceive North Korea as a weak and vulnerable state whose primary goal is regime survival by achieving a security guarantee from the United States.

(2) North Korea’s “Greedy” and “Opportunity-Oriented” Motivating Factors: Hard-liners’ (the Globalists) Focus on North Korean Threat. On the other hand, for hard-liners in the Bush administration who supported containment and/or regime change, a possible North Korean attack on the continental United States and South Korea continued to be a primary U.S. concern. Furthermore, North Korea’s continuous development of nuclear weapons and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technology from North Korea to other states or non-state actors could be serious threats to the United States. For hard-liners, in order to stop North Korean nuclear program and prevent proliferation, containment and/or regime change was the best solution because North Korea had “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. These hard-liners were conservative groups and government officials who supported a “global security” approach.⁶⁰⁶

They had concerns about proliferation and North Korea is “just one of many ‘rogue regimes’ that were unlikely to change, and thus U.S. objectives could best be met by preventing proliferation and promoting regime change.”⁶⁰⁷ They also feared the possibility of transfer of North Korean weapons and technology to terrorist

⁶⁰⁵ Victor D. Cha, “North Korea: What Do They Want?” Testimony in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, June 11, 2009, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 429, available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ChaTestimony090611p.pdf> (accessed on October 20, 2009). Also, see Cha, “North Korea: What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum.”

⁶⁰⁶ Ford, Hosford, and Zubrow, 24.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

groups such as Al-Qaeda.⁶⁰⁸ Hard-liners did not support any negotiation with North Korea. John Bolton was one of the strong hard-liners. When Bolton, as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, participated in the Six-Party Talks in July 2003, he said, “Hundreds of thousands of people [are] locked in [North Korean] prison camps, with millions more mired in abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. For many in North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare.”⁶⁰⁹ In 2008, Bolton also described the removal of North Korea from the terrorism list as “surrender” and “bending the knee to North Korea.”⁶¹⁰ According to Bolton’s writing after he left office:

Delisting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a terrorist sponsor represents a classic case of prizing the negotiation process over substance, where the benefits of “diplomatic progress” can be trumpeted in the media while the specifics of the actual agreement, and their manifest inadequacies, fade into the shadows.⁶¹¹

Consequently, the United States recognized that the balance of power had shifted unfavorably to North Korea since the end of Cold War and regime survival has been North Korea’s primary goal. At the same time, the United States felt a considerable threat from North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs.

e. Aversion to War by the United States and North Korea

(1) The United States. The most cogent fear of the United States was that a nuclear ballistic missile could strike the continental United States. However, there is not only a nuclear threat from North Korea to the United States. The cost of war on the Korean peninsula would be extremely high. During the crisis over

⁶⁰⁸ U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, “North Korea: Time to Change the Dynamics,” March 4, 2003, <http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/2003/fr030403.pdf> (accessed on September 10, 2009).

⁶⁰⁹ “Bush Backs Bolton’s Tough Talk,” *Washington Times*, August 4, 2003 <http://washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/04/20030804-111212-6491r/> (accessed on September 12, 2009).

⁶¹⁰ John R. Bolton, “Bush’s North Korea Surrender Will Have Lasting Consequences,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 13, 2008, A19.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*

North Korea's nuclear program in the spring of 1994, General Luck estimated the possible result of a war on the Korean peninsula:

...on the basis of the experience in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, that due to the colossal lethality of modern weapons in the urban environments of Korea, as many as 1 million people would be killed in the resumption of full-scale war on the peninsula, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans, that the out-of-pocket costs to the U.S. would exceed \$100 billion, and that the destruction of property and interruption of business activity would cost more than \$1,000 billion (one trillion) dollars to the countries involved and their immediate neighbors.⁶¹²

David C. Kang introduced estimated calculations of a war on the Korean peninsula, which “would cost the United States more than \$60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties.”⁶¹³ Any war on the Korean peninsula would be a disaster for the two Koreas and a serious burden to the United States. South Koreans are seriously concerned about the cost of a war, too.

In 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned North Korea by saying that “We are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts. We’re capable of winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the case of the other, and let there be no doubt about it.”⁶¹⁴ However, another war against North Korea would not appear as easy to most Americans as Rumsfeld suggested given the difficult conditions in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. United States casualties on the Korean peninsula would most likely not be accepted by U.S. public opinion.

Also, the United States would need to consider China if there were a major war on the Korean peninsula. Any conflict involving the United States against North Korea would likely raise tensions between the United States and China. China would not fight directly against the United States as in the Korean War, but it would likely support North Korea and tension could escalate. Therefore, even though the United

⁶¹² Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas*, 324.

⁶¹³ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*, 55.

⁶¹⁴ *Fox News.com*, “Rumsfeld Warns N. Korea: U.S. Can Fight Two Wars,” December 24, 2002, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,73825,00.html> (accessed on August 30, 2009).

States could win a war against North Korea, it has an aversion to war because the damage would be high and reconstruction would take a great deal of time and investments.

(2) North Korea. As explained in Chapter II, North Korea had an aversion to war against the United States. They recognized that the consequences of any serious military action or use of a nuclear weapon would be annihilation of North Korea. According to Selig S. Harrison, North Koreans had the trauma of the Korean War, which created a “permanent siege mentality.”⁶¹⁵ Carter Eckert, director of the Korea Institute at Harvard, explained that “virtually the whole population worked and lived in artificial underground caves for three years to escape the relentless attack of American planes, any one of which, from the North Korean perspective, might have been carrying an atomic bomb.”⁶¹⁶ This kind of horrific memory of the Korean War became more vivid after the 1991 Iraq War.

The United States showed superior air force power against Iraq in 1991. North Korea felt the serious vulnerability, especially in air power. In the 1990s, North Korean military leaders often expressed their concerns about U.S. air power. When North Korean Lt. Gen, Kwon Jung Yong, deputy army chief of staff for strategy, disarmament, and foreign affairs met Gen. Edward C. Meyer, former U.S. Army chief of staff met in May 1992, he pointed to a map and explained the reasons for its forward deployed forces. He said that “You can leapfrog over us, deep into our territory. That is why we must keep our forces far forward, to deter you, to make it too costly for you to do that. You talk to of equitable redeployments but they wouldn’t equitable unless we are no longer threatened by your air force as well as your ground forces.”⁶¹⁷ Selig Harrison had a chance to talk with First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju in a one-on-one dinner on September 29, 1995. When Harrison called attention to arms control and pullbacks of troops from DMZ, Kang mentioned the North Korean military’s concerns about the superior U.S. air power. According to Harrison, “he held up a knife, drew it across his

⁶¹⁵ Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 8.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid. Quoted from Carter Eckert, “Korean Reunification in Historical Perspective” (paper prepared for a conference on Korean unification sponsored by *Seoul Shinmun*, February 3, 1996), 7.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 151.

throat, and said, ‘My military friends will do this to me if I even mention such a thing. Unless, of course, you are prepared to withdraw your forces, especially your air forces.’”⁶¹⁸ In sum, the Korean War experience and the demonstration of the superior U.S. air power in 1991 Iraq War brought an aversion to war to the North Koreans.

D. INTERVENING VARIABLES (INTV): LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA

1. Bush’s Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea

Question 7: How did Bush perceive Kim Jong Il and North Korea? Was there evidence that common psychological biases led Bush to misperceive Kim Jong Il? Or, was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome Bush’s cognitive barriers to change his image of Kim Jong Il and North Korea?

a. Dualism: Good vs. Evil

Bush’s unfavorable perception of Kim Jong Il was well-known from his 2002 statements like “Kim Jong Il is a pygmy” and “I loathe Kim Jong Il.” The *Washington Post*’s Bob Woodward, in his book *Bush at War*, describes his interview at the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas in August 2002, when he asked Bush about North Korea, “The President sat forward in his chair. I thought he might jump up he became so emotional about the North Korean leader. ‘I loathe Kim, Jong Il’ Bush shouted, waving his finger in his air. ‘I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people.’”⁶¹⁹

Based on this perception, Bush and his administration believed that containment and/or regime change was the preferred way to solve the North Korean problem. This perspective was based on dualism or a Manichean (black and white) view

⁶¹⁸ Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, 151.

⁶¹⁹ Bill Powell, “Nuclear Blackmail North Korea is no Iraq. There’s no military option. So how do you get a defiant Kim Jong Il to give up his nukes?” http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/01/20/335652/index.htm (accessed on 20 August 2007) quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2002), 340.

of the world. The Bush administration believed that “Good” should win over “Evil” and “Good” cannot accept “Evil.” This position became stronger after September 11. Bush’s dualistic understanding and perception of the world and North Korea were expressed many times. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush described North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”:

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens....States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.

They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic....I will not wait on events, while dangers gather, I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.⁶²⁰

Then, Bush strongly believed that “Evil” exists and “Good” should overcome it. He said, “We’ve come to know truths that we will never question: Evil is real, and it must be opposed.”⁶²¹ North Korea’s evil identity had been established during the Cold War and persisted after its end.⁶²² North Korea’s bad reputation and notorious actions justified Bush’s perception of North Korea as evil and North Korea’s provocative actions in 2007 and 2008 strengthened its evil image. Consequently, based on Bush’s belief that the world was divided into good and evil camps, the president had an image of North Korea as evil.

⁶²⁰ The White House, Official Website of President George W. Bush, “The President’s State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, <http://whitehouse.georgewbush.org/news/2002/012902-SOTU.asp> (accessed on March 29, 2009) and *CNN.com*, “Bush State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/> (accessed on September 6, 2009).

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Suh, *Power, Interest, and Identity*, 153.

b. *Some Changes in Bush's Statements, but Few Changes in Bush's Perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea in 2007 and 2008*

President Bush's statement in November 2006 was a first sign of some changes in his perceptions of North Korea. After his meeting with Roh Moo Hyun during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, Bush said he would be willing to meet with Kim Jong Il if he gave up his nuclear weapons program.⁶²³ According to Chinoy, "It was an offhand comment—not a serious policy position—but the implication was that Bush, who had never disguised his loathing for Kim and his hope that the 'evil' regime would disappear, was open to ending decades of hostility, and perhaps even to a face-to-face meeting."⁶²⁴ Bush told reporters, "We want the North Korean leaders to hear that if it gives up its weapons—nuclear weapons ambitions—that we would be willing to enter into security arrangements with the North Koreans, as well as move forward new economic incentives for the North Korean people."⁶²⁵ This sign of changes in Bush's statements was more obvious in 2007.

When the Bush administration implemented the reassurance strategy in 2007, there were also some changes in Bush's statements about North Korea. Bush was satisfied with the February 13, 2007 Agreement. Bush praised the agreement by saying that "These talks represented the best opportunity to use diplomacy to address North Korea's nuclear program."⁶²⁶ Chinoy explained the change in Bush's approach to North Korea in 2007:

For the President, the deal represented yet another major turnaround. Since taking office, Bush had insisted there would be no bilateral negotiations with a regime he loathed, and that North Korea would never be

⁶²³ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 310.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., referring to White House, Web site of President George W. Bush, "Transcript: President Bush Meets with President Roh of the Republic of Korea," November 18, 2006. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061118-4.html> (accessed on September 13, 2009).

⁶²⁶ White House, Web site of President George W. Bush, "Transcript: Statement by President Bush on Six-Party Talks," February 13, 2007, and Lou Dobb's Tonight, *CNN*, February 13, 2007, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/070213/ldt.01.html> (accessed on September 13, 2009).

“rewarded” for bad behavior; the administration’s previous stance at the six-party talks had reflected this hard-line view....

Now, underscoring the failure of its preference for coercion, threats, sanctions, and talk of pre-emptive strikes, Bush had signed on to a deal whose outline had been established in Hill’s unprecedented bilateral [talks] with Kim Gye Gwan in Berlin.⁶²⁷

Also, there were some changes in Bush’s statements about Kim Jong Il. Bush called Kim Jong Il “Mr. Chairman” several times. Surprisingly, in December 2007, Bush sent a letter to Kim Jong Il staring with “Mr. Chairman” and signed it “Sincerely.”⁶²⁸ In *Meltdown*, Chinoy tells the inside story how Bush decided to send a letter to Kim Jong Il.⁶²⁹ It was Christopher Hill’s idea to take a letter from Bush to Kim Jong Il because Hill felt it was necessary to engage Kim Jong Il directly for the success of negotiation.⁶³⁰ One former senior State Department official emphasized the necessity to engage with Kim Jong Il: “This is a guy who is obviously in charge and prepared to do some unconventional things. If you want a deal with North Korea on matters of deep sensitivity and vital interests, we will have to engage with him.”⁶³¹

According to a Senior State Department official, the letter said, “I want to emphasize that the declaration must be complete and accurate if we are to continue our progress.”⁶³² Some argued that the letter showed a significant change in Bush’s policy toward North Korea. According to Derek Mitchell, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The letter is evidence that U.S. policy toward North Korea has changed ‘at least 150 degrees’ from early in the Bush administration.”⁶³³ He

⁶²⁷ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 326.

⁶²⁸ Zain Verjee, “Bush Sends Letter to Kim,” <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/12/06/korea.letter/index.html#cnnSTCText> (accessed on July 28, 2009).

⁶²⁹ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 355–357.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, 355.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*

⁶³² *Msnbc.com*, “Bush Sends Personal Letter to N. Korean Leader,” December 6, 2007. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22126678/> (accessed on September 11, 2009).

⁶³³ *Ibid.*

said, “Kim Jong Il is someone who Bush famously loathed. He’s quoted as saying he loathes Kim Jong Il and called him a pygmy, and the attitude was that you don’t talk to evil, you end it.”⁶³⁴

However, these changes in Bush’s statements did not mean that Bush had changed his overall perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. The Bush letter was sent for a domestic political purpose. In early December, the December 31 deadline of the October 3, 2007 Agreement was likely to slip and Bush needed to show both conservatives and liberals that the Bush administration “will not roll back its requirements or accept less than a full declaration of the North’s nuclear program.”⁶³⁵ Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said, “I think a presidential letter is a fairly restrained version of direct communication and appropriate to the stage of the negotiation. I think it’s better to be written than for the president to jump on a plane to Pyongyang.”⁶³⁶

Therefore, even though there were some changes in Bush’s statements along with the implementation of reassurance strategy in 2007, there was no evidence of significant change in Bush’s personal perception of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

Even though Bush’s policy toward North Korea certainly changed, there were some examples to show that Bush’s perception of Kim Jong Il did not change. In February 2008, Bush said that he had no intention to form personal relations with Kim Jong Il. At a press conference at the White House, Bush said:

Here’s what I learned. I learned that it’s important to establish personal relations with leaders even though you may not agree with them—certain leaders.

Now, I’m not going to have a personal relationship with Kim Jong Il, and our relationships are such that that’s impossible. But U.S.-Russian relations are important.

⁶³⁴ *Msnbc.com*, “Bush Sends Personal Letter to N. Korean Leader,” December 6, 2007. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22126678/> (accessed on September 11, 2009).

⁶³⁵ “Bush Sends Personal Letter.”

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

It's important for stability. It's important for our relations in Europe.⁶³⁷

Also, when South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak visited Camp David in April 2008, Bush's firm and short answer to the question about the possibility of a meeting with Kim Jong Il showed very clearly that he did not have any intention to meet Kim Jong Il:

Question:....And what will you do, President Bush—do you have any intention to meet with both President Lee and Chairman Kim in order to resolve this issue?

President Bush: No. As to the latter point, no I don't.⁶³⁸

Even though the United States had committed itself to negotiations for the eventual normalizations of relations through the 2007 agreements, Bush was not ready to meet Kim Jong Il. This shows that there were only very limited changes in Bush's perceptions of Kim Jong Il. In sum, Bush perceived Kim Jong Il as evil until the end. Bush's implementation of reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 and North Korea's response were not sufficient to overcome his cognitive barriers to changing the image of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. There was little prospect for the success of Bush's reassurance strategy without a more fundamental change of Bush's perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea. Even though Bush changed his policy toward North Korea, Bush himself remained skeptical and failed to change his perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

2. Kim Jong Il's Perception of Bush and the United States

Question 8: How did Kim Jong Il perceive Bush's reassurance strategy? Was there evidence that common psychological biases led Kim Jong Il to discount those reassurance strategies? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome Kim Jong Il's cognitive barriers to changing his image of the United States?

⁶³⁷ *Fox News.com*, "Transcript: President Bush's White House Press Conference," February 28, 2008, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,333553,00.html> (accessed on September 12, 2009).

⁶³⁸ *Reuters*, "Remarks by President Bush and President Lee Myung Bak of the Republic of Korea in...", April 19, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS73885+19-Apr-2008+PRN20080419> (accessed on September 5, 2009).

Just as Bush perceived Kim Jong Il as evil, Kim Jong Il hated Bush intensely. South Korean monitors of the North's propaganda machinery observed that George W. Bush "has been bombarded by the most North Korean invective and labeled with by far the greatest number of insulting epithets."⁶³⁹ Here are examples used by North Korea to describe Bush: "human trash," "political idiot," "the world's worst violator of human rights," and so on.⁶⁴⁰ However, not many speeches or statements by Kim Jong Il are available.

Therefore, this author used North Korea's state-run media, such as the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), as a primary tool to understand the thinking of Kim Jong Il and other leadership toward Bush and the United States. Mostly, the North Korean position came in the form of remarks and articles attributed by the KCNA to Kim Jong Il. The KCNA also covers the statements of spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in North Korea, *Rodong Sinmun*, the main North Korean newspaper, and interviews with North Korean government officials and so on. In *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, Chinoy says:

With its bombast and overheated rhetoric, North Korea's state-run media is often dismissed as meaningless propaganda and all too often not taken seriously by journalists and others following the situation. During my research, however, I spent many hours poring over Pyongyang's official pronouncements. It became increasingly clear that stripped of the verbiage, they were also a valuable tool to understanding the thinking of the North Korean regime.⁶⁴¹

Also, based on testimonies of those who met Kim Jong Il, such as Madeleine Albright and Konstantin Pulikovsky,⁶⁴² there is good reason to believe Kim Jong Il

⁶³⁹ Lee Sung Yoon, "Why Kim Jong Il Hates George W Bush," *Asia Times*, February 17, 2005, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GB17Dg02.html> (accessed on September 6, 2009).

⁶⁴⁰ Lee, "Why Kim Jong Il Hates."

⁶⁴¹ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 368.

⁶⁴² A Russian emissary who rode trains with Kim Jong Il during a 2001 rail trip from Pyongyang to Moscow.

“micromanages every detail of government business.”⁶⁴³ Kim Jong Il definitely controls the state-run media. Therefore, an official news agency of North Korea can be interpreted as reflecting what Kim Jong Il thought about Bush and the United States.

To know whether there were changes in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Bush and the United States, the articles are divided into three periods:

- (1) 2005-2006: between the September 19, 2005 Agreement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement;
- (2) 2007: between the February 13, 2007 Agreement and the October 3, 2007 Agreement; and
- (3) 2008: the implementation of the 2007 agreements.

The news on the Six-Party Talks was rare and brief in the KCNA, yet there were many complaints against the United States in each period. The continuous complaints show that there were few changes in Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of Bush and the United States and that Kim Jong Il mistrusted the United States.

a. 2005–2006: Complaints About the BDA Issue Between the September 19, 2005 Agreement and the Nuclear Test in 2006

The tone of Kim Jong Il and other North Korean leaders’ positions toward the September 19, 2005 Agreement and their perceptions of the United States were reflected in the statements of the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in North Korea released by the KCNA the following day. Even though the six parties agreed “to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action,’”⁶⁴⁴ North Korea wanted the United States to take action first. Also, North Korea was not sure about the intention of the United States. According to the statement of the North Korean Foreign Ministry:

⁶⁴³ National Intelligence Service, South Korea, “Testimonies of North Korean Defectors: Hwang Jang-yop Speaks,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS), www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis-docs/hwang2.htm.

⁶⁴⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” and U.S. Department of State, “Six-party Talks, Beijing China,” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2009).

The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs, a physical guarantee for confidence-building. This is our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeply rooted rock. We have so far shaped our policies towards the U.S. hardliners and will do so in the future, too.

One should wait and see how the U.S. will move in actuality at the phase of "action for action" in the future but should it again insist on "the DPRK's dismantlement of nuclear weapons before the provision of LWRs," there will be no change in the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. and its consequences will be very serious and complicated. If the U.S. opts for reneging on its promise, we will go ahead without an inch of deflection along the road indicated by the Songun line, our faith and signpost.⁶⁴⁵

During the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on September 22, 2007, North Korean delegates continued to emphasize the U.S. commitments by saying that "The DPRK will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if its relations with the U.S. are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and it is not exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat any longer. What is most essential is, therefore, for the U.S. to provide light water reactors to the DPRK as early as possible as evidence proving the former's substantial recognition of the latter's nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose."⁶⁴⁶ One month after the September 19, 2005 Agreement, North Korea started complaining about the actions of the United States. The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in North Korea said "The United States, however, has been careless in its words and deeds quite contrary to the spirit of the statement in a little over one month since the publication of the statement. This makes us doubt the U.S. will to implement the statement."⁶⁴⁷

After the U.S. Department of Treasury's designation of BDA as North Korea's money-laundering bank and its declaration of sanctions against North Korea, the rhetoric of North Korean news articles became more belligerent:

⁶⁴⁵ KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks," September 21, 2005.

⁶⁴⁶ KCNA, "DPRK's Stand on Solution to Nuclear Issue Reiterated," September 28, 2005.

⁶⁴⁷ KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK FM. Refers to Issue of Participation in 5th Six-Party Talks," October 25, 2005.

It is not hard to guess that the U.S. Department of Treasury's decision on sanctions against the trade companies of the DPRK is not a simple issue related to economic relations but a link in the whole chain of the carefully prearranged provocative and hostile moves of the U.S. to stifle the DPRK.

The U.S. armed invasion of other countries has always been accompanied by its persistent racket for sanctions against them. The U.S. freezing of the properties of the DPRK companies did not come by chance....Dialogue and sanctions can never go together.⁶⁴⁸

The chief of the North Korean mission at the United Nations sent a letter to the UN secretary general and the president of the UN General Assembly on October 28, 2005, to criticize the United States again. It said:

The U.S., however, is only insisting on the CVID defying the principle of simultaneous action agreed upon by the six parties, and busy staging a smear campaign against the DPRK, pulling it up over the "human rights issue" and "illegal deals" and other baseless issues. This behavior diametrically runs counter to the spirit of the joint statement, a joint product of the six parties, and makes the DPRK to doubt whether the U.S. is willing to implement the joint statement or not.⁶⁴⁹

On November 8, 2005, North Korea made its complaint over Bush's statement about North Korea and expressed its mistrust of the U.S. commitments to the Six-Party Talks:

According to foreign press reports, on Nov. 6 Bush, revealing again his inveterate rejection of the DPRK during his tour of Brazil, malignantly slandered our supreme headquarters with such unspeakable vituperation as "tyrant" and the like....

These remarks...deprive us of any trust in the negotiators of the U.S. side to the six-party talks who claim to be have been mandated by him. We will never pardon whoever dares speak ill of our supreme headquarters in any case.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁸ KCNA, "Dialogue and Sanctions Can Never Go Together: Rodong Sinmun," October 25, 2005.

⁶⁴⁹ KCNA, "U.S. Urged to Honor Its Commitments," November 4, 2005.

⁶⁵⁰ KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK FM. Refutes U.S. Chief Executive's Anti-DPRK Vituperation," November 9, 2005.

North Korea's belligerent expressions and signs of its mistrust of the United States continued in the news, and the tensions between North Korea and the United States were escalating. North Korea argued that the September 19, 2005 Agreement had not been implemented because the United States imposed sanctions against North Korea. Almost every day, news from the KCNA criticized the actions of the United States. Here is one news example showing North Korea's perception of Bush and the United States:

December 20, 2005: The Bush administration painted the DPRK as a "lawless state" and a "criminal state," not content with labeling it a "rogue state." This smear campaign is aimed at creating an environment for implementing its hard-line policy towards the DPRK according to its premeditated "scenario." Once the U.S. said that the DPRK is a sovereign state and it respects the sovereignty of the DPRK. However, the reality proves that this was nothing but a ruse to deceive the international community and buy time for stifling the DPRK militarily.⁶⁵¹

Based on this kind of news reports after the September 19, 2005 Agreement, it is clear that North Korea perceived the United States as an enemy, not a trustworthy negotiation partner, and it had doubts of the sincerity of the United States in implementing the September 19, 2005 Agreement. This was a reflection of Kim Jong Il's perception of Bush and the United States, and led to a rapid downturn in relations between North Korea and the United States. After all the rhetoric, the escalation resulted in the missile test in July 2006 and the first North Korean nuclear test that October. North Korea claimed that the nuclear test was "entirely attributable to the U.S. nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure."⁶⁵² Tension was at its peak at this time.

b. 2007: Complaints About U.S. Policy and Military Actions Between the February 13 Agreement and the October 3 Agreement

After confrontations between North Korea and the United States in 2006, the year 2007 showed some positive results in the Six-Party Talks, such as the February

⁶⁵¹ KCNA, "KCNA Blasts U.S. Moves to Scuttle Six-Party Talks," December 20, 2005.

⁶⁵² KCNA, "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Moves Concerning Its Nuclear Test," October 12, 2006.

13 and the October 3 agreements. However, there was no positive news from the KCNA related to the 2007 agreements. News about the 2007 agreements was usually very insipid and short without any affirmative statements.

On the other hand, news about the United States included strong complaints and expressed doubts. According to most KCNA news related to the relationship with the United States in 2007, North Korea kept criticizing the U.S. policy. Here are some examples of North Korea's claims. According to a *Rodong Sinmun* article of February 8, 2007, North Korea claimed that "The U.S. is the chief violator of the NPT," and criticized the U.S. position toward Japan and Israel.⁶⁵³ The article goes on:

While shutting eyes to and supporting the development and possession of nuclear weapons by pro-U.S. forces and its allies from the standard of unilateralism and prejudice, it styles itself a "nuclear judge," kicking up a row of pressure on those countries incurring its displeasure by pulling them up over their "nuclear issues." This is really the height of sarcasm.⁶⁵⁴

When the Six-Party Talks were held in February 2007, North Korea continued to criticize the United States; "The Bush administration, advertising 'the building of a powerful U.S.', is pursuing the policy of strength, a leftover of the Cold War era, in its hare-brained military adventures to put the world under its control by force of arms."⁶⁵⁵

Also, North Korea often made strong complaints about the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and stated that "Dialogue and saber-rattling cannot go together."⁶⁵⁶ Here are a couple of examples:

March 20, 2007: "RSOI" and "Foal Eagle" joint military exercises projected by the U.S. to stage in south Korea are a preliminary war, a

⁶⁵³ KCNA, "U.S. Double Standards Blasted," February 8, 2007.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁵ KCNA, "U.S. Policy of Strength under Fire," February 13, 2007, referring to *Rodong Sinmun*, February 12, 2007.

⁶⁵⁶ KCNA, "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Assails Projected S. Korea-U.S. Joint Military Maneuvers," March 23, 2007.

nuclear test war, designed to make a surprise preemptive attack on the DPRK, and they are the criminal behavior going against the aspiration and demand of the people for peace.⁶⁵⁷

July 5, 2007: The U.S. reckless military actions make the DPRK skeptical about whether the U.S. is truly willing to seek a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue and improve the DPRK-U.S. relations. The U.S. administration clarified more than once that it would not invade the DPRK by force of arms, while talking about the resumption of the six-way talks. If this is true, the U.S. should stop the military actions threatening the DPRK.⁶⁵⁸

In sum, even though there was some progress in the Six-Party Talks in 2007, there was no change in Kim Jong Il's perceptions of Bush and the United States based on this analysis of North Korea's state-run media. North Korea still condemned the U.S. policy and military actions.

c. 2008: Continuous Complaints About U.S. Policy and Military Actions

North Korea continued to make complaints about U.S. policy and military actions in 2008. According to KCNA news:

March 4, 2008: The U.S. kicked off the nuclear war maneuvers against its dialogue partner though it has talked about a "peaceful solution of the nuclear issue" and the "establishment of a peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula." This is a clear indication that the U.S. is invariably sticking to its hostile policy to stifle the DPRK by force. Such nuclear threat and blackmail do not work on the DPRK but will only put a brake on the process of the denuclearization of the peninsula.⁶⁵⁹

Also, there was a strong condemnation of Bush's statement in March 2008. According to KCNA news:

At a recent press conference Bush carelessly termed the DPRK and other countries "rogue states" and asserted that the U.S. missile shield to be built

⁶⁵⁷ KCNA, "U.S. Nuclear Hysteria Going against Dialogue and Peace Assailed," March 19, 2007.

⁶⁵⁸ KCNA, "Rodong Sinmun Slams U.S. Arms Build-Up behind Scene of Dialogue," July 5, 2007, referring to *Rodong Sinmun*, July 4, 2007.

⁶⁵⁹ KCNA, "Spokesman of Foreign Ministry Lambastes Joint Military Exercises," March 4, 2008.

in Europe is not targeted against countries in the region but it is aimed to contain the “missile threat” from such countries as North Korea....Bush's labeling the DPRK as “rogue state” revealed his chronic hostile attitude towards the DPRK.

However, when the United State and North Korea started negotiations for implementing the 2007 agreements in April 2008, some positive news appeared. After the April 22–24 negotiations between North Korean officials and the delegation of U.S. nuclear experts in Pyongyang, the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “The negotiations proceeded in a sincere and constructive manner and progress was made there.”⁶⁶⁰ Also, when the Bush administration declared that the United States will take North Korea off the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and exempt it from the Trading with the Enemy Act, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “The DPRK appreciates and hails this as a positive measure.”⁶⁶¹

However, overall news in 2008 still showed a belligerent attitude and doubt toward the United States. While it appreciated the removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, North Korea expressed its doubts about the United States’ policy and requested the total withdrawal of hostile policies toward it. The statement of the spokesman went on, “The measure taken by the U.S. to lift the major sanctions which it has applied against the DPRK, listing it as an enemy state for more than half a century, should lead to totally withdrawing its hostile policy toward the DPRK in all fields in the future. Only then can the denuclearization process make smooth progress along its orbit.”⁶⁶²

Overall, statements in the state-run news agency showed North Korea did not trust the United States and placed an emphasis on the U.S. need to keep its commitments. Consequently, there was no change in North Korea’s perception of Bush and the United States in 2007 and 2008. Kim Jong Il did not fully trust Bush’s

⁶⁶⁰ KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Pyongyang Visit by U.S. Nuclear Experts Delegation,” April 25, 2008.

⁶⁶¹ KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman on U.S. Lifting of Major Economic Sanctions against DPRK,” June 28, 2008.

⁶⁶² Ibid.

reassurance strategy due to the legacy of the animosity and its interpretation of U.S policy and military actions toward North Korea. Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was not sufficient to overcome Kim Jong Il's perceptions or change his image of Bush and the United States.

3. Domestic Politics of the United States

Question 9: How did domestic politics of the United States perceive Bush's reassurance strategy offer to North Korea? Was there sufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

The domestic politics of the United States were divided into hard-liners and soft-liners who had totally different perceptions of Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea. These different perceptions were expressed in the U.S. Congress and by the U.S government and reflected both a partisan divide between the Republicans and Democrats and a government divided between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Internal division in the Bush administration was one of the biggest obstacles to the success of the administration's reassurance strategy.

The shift of Bush's approach toward North Korea from hard-line to soft-line in 2007 was made possible through the rise of soft-liners and departure from the government of influential hawks. However, there was a lack of interagency consensus between hard-line agencies and soft-line agencies. Also, hard-liners strongly expressed their opposition to any soft-line approach toward North Korea through articles and papers. Those hard-liners who left office were still influential. As a result, domestic support was not sufficient to make the reassurance strategy credible. The Bush administration was constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy due to a lack of full support from domestic politics.

a. *The Rise of Soft-liners and the Fall of Hard-liners in 2007 After Democratic Congressional Victories in November 2006*

The role of Congress was important for implementing the reassurance strategy because Congress had a right to refuse to approve any proposal for U.S. aid to

North Korea. Because of the voters' disappointment in the Bush administration's handling of the war in Iraq, the November 2006 congressional elections resulted in a change in the legislative branch that gave control of Congress to the Democrats. The election led to the rise of soft-liners and the fall of hard-liners within the administration.

After the Democrats' victory in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Department of State played a more active role in the implementation of policy toward North Korea. According to Chinoy:

For Rice and Hill, the election and the changed balance of power within the administration provided a new opportunity to wrest control of North Korea policy from those who had for so long sought to block real negotiations, and to win support for a new approach from a weakened President Bush.⁶⁶³

The influence of many hard-liners such as Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, UN Ambassador John Bolton, and Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Robert Joseph weakened and some left the administration.⁶⁶⁴ Donald Rumsfeld resigned within days, although many believed he was fired. John Bolton chose to resign because there was low possibility of his confirmation by the Senate. Another hard-liner, Robert Joseph, was planning to resign early in the following year. Therefore, as Chinoy says, "The right-wing hard-liners who had dominated the Bush administration for so long were in retreat."⁶⁶⁵

As a result, the February 13, 2007 Agreement was made under this different situation in Washington. The influence of hard-liners had been reduced significantly. According to the explanation of Chinoy:

Now, in a situation reflecting the changed balance of power in Washington, Rice was able to bypass the bureaucracy altogether. Hill dealt with the secretary of state, who dealt directly with the president. The hard-liners were again cut out of the action until after a decision was made.

⁶⁶³ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 309.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

When they found out, they were furious, but with no support from Rice or Bush, they could do little to derail the process.⁶⁶⁶

Following the rise of soft-liners, there was a retreat from the U.S. assertion in 2002 that North Korea was developing a highly enriched uranium program and success in reaching the February 13 Agreement in the Six-Party Talks. The six-party members were able to reach the February 13 Agreement because of the changed circumstances in the United States.⁶⁶⁷ Hill indicated a significant change from the administration's earlier claims. On February 22, 2007, he said:

We have information...that North Korea made certain purchases of equipment highly consistent with HEU...it's a complex program, it does require more equipment than we know they have purchased, and a variety of techniques we don't know they have worked out. But we need to know why they purchased aluminum tubes from Germany and elsewhere—tubes we know fit the Pakistani-designed centrifuges we know they purchased. If the tubes do not go to an HEU program, fine, we can discuss that later on [in the six-party talks process].⁶⁶⁸

While still expressing suspicions, Hill's comments expressed greater uncertainty and were less accusatory than previous administration rhetoric.

b. Constraint from the Opposition of Hard-liners

One of problems in the implementation of reassurance toward North Korea in 2007 and 2008 was the opposition of hard-liners and lack of interagency consensus. The declaration of the September 19, 2005 Agreement and the declaration of BDA as North Korea's money-laundering bank happened in the same week. The implementation of the September 19, 2005 Agreement stalled almost immediately. There was not much cooperation between the Departments of State and Treasury. Chinoy ended

⁶⁶⁶ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 325.

⁶⁶⁷ Andrew Grotto, "Pragmatism Trumps Ideology on North Korea," *Washington Post*, February 23, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/22/AR2007022201736.html> (accessed on August 29, 2009).

⁶⁶⁸ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 330. Quoted from Transcript, "Update on the Six-Party Talks with Christopher Hill," The Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, February 22, 2007, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0222south%20korea/20070222hill.pdf> (accessed on August 29, 2009).

his book *Meltdown: the Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* by saying that, “As the Bush administration entered its final months, the internal battle for control of North Korea policy, which began within days of the president taking office in 2001, showed no sign of ending.”⁶⁶⁹

Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 met with strong conservative criticism. The conservatives had a view that past agreements with North Korea had failed and North Korea had been rewarded for its bad behavior without ensuring the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests appeared to prove the conservatives’ view that the path of negotiation was futile and North Korea would only respond to pressure. The hard-line group was led by neoconservatives like Vice President Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, non-proliferation specialists such as John Bolton and Robert Joseph in the State Department, conservative congressmen, conservative media and think tanks, the Department of Defense, and so on. According to Chinoy, “Privately, [Hill] complained to friends that negotiating with the North Koreans was often less fraught than dealing with hard-liners in Vice President Cheney’s office and elsewhere in the administration.”⁶⁷⁰

(1) The Opposition from Neoconservatives. The rise of the North Korea and Syria nuclear cooperation issue was one example to show that Bush administration’s hard-liners, so-called neoconservatives, were the main domestic hurdle to implementing the reassurance strategy. A series of classified intelligence briefings about North Korea’s nuclear connection with Syria were provided to members of Congress in late April 2008.⁶⁷¹ The timing of the information release was suspicious to the soft-liners. The information, such as a photograph of a senior official from North Korean with the director of Syria’s nuclear agency, had already been acquired from the

⁶⁶⁹ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 336. Quoted from Transcript, “Update on the Six-Party Talks with Christopher Hill,” The Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, February 22, 2007, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0222south%20korea/20070222hill.pdf> (accessed on August 29, 2009).

⁶⁷⁰ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 363.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

Israeli intelligence community almost a year before Israel's airstrike on September 6, 2007.⁶⁷² Furthermore, the officials who gave the briefing acknowledged that the information did not make it possible to determine with confidence whether the Syrian site was actually going to be used for nuclear weapons development. However, the suspicion about North Korea's connection with a Syrian nuclear program seriously damaged any soft-line approaches toward North Korea in 2008.

The former U.N. ambassador, John Bolton, was one of the strongest opponents to Bush's reassurance strategy to North Korea and he continued to try to influence Bush's reassurance strategy. He criticized the February 13, 2007 Agreement in the Six-Party Talks as a "charade" and brought the division of the Bush administration to light.⁶⁷³ Bolton said in a highly publicized book published in 2007:

Analytically, so similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework that Clinton administration alumni praised it, this deal let North Korea escape from the corner where we had put them by Resolution 1718's sanctions and our Treasury Department's aggressive efforts to impose tough economic pressure on the DPRK for its illicit money-laundering. The February 13 agreement is what Powell would have loved to try in 2001 before Bush pulled him back from 'leaning too far forward' on his skis.⁶⁷⁴

In addition, Bolton made remarks aiming at Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "The people who want to make this deal with North Korea are in denial about what North Korea is up to."⁶⁷⁵ Even though Bolton's objections to the agreement with North Korea were dismissed by Bush, Dick Cheney praised them at a conference of conservatives.⁶⁷⁶ The primary purpose of all these efforts of hard-liners

⁶⁷² Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 363.

⁶⁷³ Thomas L. Friedman, "A Foreign Policy Built on Do-Overs; [Op-Ed]," *New York Times*, February 23, 2007, A21.

⁶⁷⁴ John Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2007), 311.

⁶⁷⁵ Guy Dinmore, "World News: Four Years of Turmoil in Iraq Put Pragmatists in Driving Seat Decisions on North Korea, Iran and Syria Reveal Stark Internal Divisions in the White House on Foreign Policy, says Guy Dinmore," *Financial Times*, March 7, 2007, 8.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

was to generate “political pressure on President Bush to pull back from the accord Hill had been seeking to negotiate.”⁶⁷⁷ To some degree, they achieved their purpose.

Bolton’s statements against Bush’s reassurance strategy and hardliners’ sharp criticism continued in 2008. Bolton declared that the 2007 agreements were “to accept on faith, literally, North Korean assertions that it has not engaged in significant uranium enrichment, and that it has not proliferated nuclear technology or materials to countries like Syria and Iran.”⁶⁷⁸ When the United States removed North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list in October 2008, Bolton criticized the action, “By taking them off the terrorism list, you remove one of the legitimizers of the other sanctions. For North Korea, that was important, because it makes them look like more of a normal nation.”⁶⁷⁹ Bush administration officials needed to cite a long list of punitive restrictions to North Korea in order to fend off this kind of criticism after their removal of North Korea from the list. Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the Department of State, said, “North Korea remains subject to numerous sanctions resulting from its 2006 nuclear test, its proliferation activities, its human rights violations and its status as a Communist state.”⁶⁸⁰ In sum, the implementation of the reassurance strategy was constrained by the opposition from neoconservatives in 2007 and 2008.

(2) The Opposition from Conservative Congressmen. Even though Congress could not lead U.S. policy toward North Korea, help from Congress was absolutely necessary for the executive branch to implement any policy because Congress could impede or support it. The North Korean Human Rights Act (PL 108-333) was passed in October 2004.⁶⁸¹ Under the Act, the office of the special envoy for human rights in North Korea was created and was to report to the Congress. The Act drew

⁶⁷⁷ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 364.

⁶⁷⁸ John R. Bolton, “Bush’s North Korea Capitulation,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 2008.

⁶⁷⁹ Choe Sang Hun and Helene Cooper, “North Korea to Resume Disabling Nuclear Plant,” *New York Times*, October 12, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/asia/13nkorea.html> (accessed on August 30, 2009).

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸¹ U.S. House of Representatives, “The North Korean Human Rights Act (U.S. Public Law 108–333; 22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.),” <http://hirc.house.gov/archives/nkhra.htm> (accessed on September 22, 2009).

attention to the poor human rights conditions in North Korea and reports required by the North Korean Human Rights Act strengthened the voice of conservative hard-liners. According to the report of Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. special envoy for human rights in North Korea, North Korea is “one of the worst abusers of human rights in the world today.”⁶⁸²

The human rights conditions in North Korea in 2007 and 2008 were horrific. According to 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “The government’s human rights record remained poor, and the regime continued to commit numerous serious abuses.”⁶⁸³ Based on the poor human rights conditions in North Korea, many conservative hard-liners would not support the Bush administration’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008. Then, the North Korean Human Rights Act became an obstacle to the implementation of Bush’s reassurance strategy. North Korea kept arguing that the Act was evidence of a hostile U.S. policy and interference into its sovereignty. For example, here is a summary of one *Rodong Sinmun* article condemning the human rights approach:

The imperialists consider the “human rights” offensive as important leverage in carrying out their strategy for world supremacy...in essence, intended to force other countries and nations to introduce the “model of human rights” of Western style in a bid to Westernize and Americanize the world. The danger of the offensive lies in that it is used as a lever for openly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and infringing upon their state sovereignty and a prelude to the war of aggression against other countries.⁶⁸⁴

The implementation of the 2007 agreements through the Six-Party Talks was hampered by the opposition from conservative U.S. congressmen who favored a more hawkish approach to North Korea. For example, some conservatives in Congress

⁶⁸² U.S. Department of State, “Final Report of Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea,” January 17, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/g/senk/115268.htm> (accessed on September 25, 2009).

⁶⁸³ Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100524.htm> (accessed on September 24, 2009).

⁶⁸⁴ KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun Calls for Frustrating Imperialists ‘Human Rights’ Offensive,” August 18, 2007.

were not happy with the February 13, 2007 Agreement with North Korea.⁶⁸⁵ Conservative Republican Senator Sam Brownback from Kansas placed a hold on the nomination of Hill's deputy, Kathleen Stephens, to become the next U.S. ambassador to South Korea, to express his protest of Hill's negotiation with North Korea.⁶⁸⁶

Another typical example of the opposition against any soft-line approach to North Korea was Republican Senator John McCain, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 2008 Republican presidential candidate. After the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, he highly criticized Clinton's 1994 Agreed Framework as a failure. He said, "The Koreans received millions and millions in energy assistance. They've diverted millions of dollars of food assistance to their military."⁶⁸⁷ He added that "The worst thing we could do is to accede to North Korea's demand for bilateral talks....When has rewarding North Korea's bad behavior ever gotten us anything more than worse behavior?"⁶⁸⁸ Most Republican congressmen shared similar perceptions and attitudes towards to North Korea which continued in 2007 and 2008.

The North Korean Human Rights Act is an example of how Congress complicated the Bush administration's reassurance strategy toward North Korea. Congressional members, especially conservative hard-liners, were unwilling to change the Act to support Bush's shifted policy toward North Korea.

c. Bush's Low Popularity in 2007 and 2008

With low popularity ratings in 2007 and 2008, the Bush administration had difficulty in implementing a reassurance strategy toward North Korea. Bush's popularity continuously declined during his presidency and his popularity rating was about 30 percent in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 3.5). It was 50-60 points lower than the

⁶⁸⁵ "Bush Sends Personal Letter."

⁶⁸⁶ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 364.

⁶⁸⁷ *Msnbc.com*, "McCain Criticizes Bill Clinton on North Korea," October 10, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15210254/> (accessed on September 22, 2009).

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

approval rating at the beginning of his presidency in 2001 and 2002. When Bush left office in January 2009, his final approval rating was 22 percent, the lowest rating ever.⁶⁸⁹ Difficult situations in Iraq and the economy were the main reasons for the low popularity. The CNN polling director, Keating Holland, said, “Lame-duck presidents presiding over unpopular wars or struggling economies have gotten low approval ratings in the past. By contrast, lame ducks like Ronald Reagan, Dwight Eisenhower, and Bill Clinton had robust approval ratings in their final years in office, but each one was presiding over good economic times and a country at peace.”⁶⁹⁰ The Bush administration needed more support from the public to continuously implement reassurance strategies and overcome strong conservative objections. Bush’s low popularity ratings showed that there was not full support in domestic politics for the implementation of his reassurance strategy.




Figure 3.5. George W. Bush Quarterly Job Approval Averages

In sum, Bush’s reassurance strategy to North Korea might have been implemented under the rise of soft-liners. However, there was strong opposition from the hard-liners who perceived Bush’s reassurance strategy as appeasement or a reward for North Korea’s bad behavior. Also, Bush’s popularity declined significantly in 2007 and 2008. The wide division between soft-liners and hard-liners and low popularity led to

⁶⁸⁹ “Bush’s Final Approval Rating: 22 Percent,” *CBS News*, January 16, 2009. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/16/opinion/polls/main4728399.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody> (accessed on September 22, 2009).

⁶⁹⁰ Paul Steinhauser, “Poll: Bush’s Popularity Hits New Low,” <http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/19/bush.poll/> (accessed on September 24, 2009).

insufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible. As a result, the Bush administration was constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy.

4. Domestic Politics of North Korea

Question 10: How did key domestic actors in North Korea perceive Bush's reassurance strategy? Did Bush's reassurance generate domestic support in North Korea for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try to prevent North Korea from offering a positive response?

Another serious obstacle to the success of Bush's reassurance strategy remained the uncertain domestic politics of North Korea. The most important reasons for the uncertainty stemmed from the succession issue and the deteriorating economy. Kim Jong Il had strengthened the power of the military to hold control of North Korea after the death of his father Kim Il Sung. In 2007 and 2008, there seemed to be a greater need to get support from the military to consolidate his power under increasingly unstable conditions. The unstable situation in North Korea without significant progress in the relationship with the United States in 2008 strengthened the power of the military. Therefore, the military became the key institution for political stability, and its skeptical view about the development in the relationship with the United States prevented North Korea from offering a positive response to Bush's reassurance strategy in 2008.

a. *The Military as the Key Domestic Actor Under "Sungun (Military-first)" Politics and Its Interference with Positive Responses to Bush's Strategy*

As explained in the previous case study between the two Koreas, Kim Jong Il strengthened the power of the military under the *Sungun* (military-first) politics after the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. The declaration of the revised 1998 North Korean constitution is evidence of that change. As Gause describes the change:

Under the banner of 'military-first politics,' the adulation that was once reserved for the party has shifted to the military, and its presence can be felt in every aspect of political and social life. The profound nature of this shift is made clear in the 1998 amendments to the constitution, which Kim

used to place his stamp on the regime, where the state presidency was for all intents abolished and all real power shifted to the National Defense Commission (NDC).⁶⁹¹

According to Article 100 of the 1998 North Korean Constitution, the NDC is “the highest military leading organ of the State power and an organ for general control over national defense.”⁶⁹² In reality, the NDC is the highest institution in North Korea. Therefore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s official title has been chairman of the NDC since September 1998.

There are several examples to show that the North Korean military plays an important role. Kim Jong Il has promoted military leaders to higher positions and visited various places, including factories, with military officers. In April 2007, Kim Yong Chun, the former chief of the general staff, was promoted to vice chairman of the NDC. Also, Kim Kyok Sik, a former general, was promoted to chief of the general staff of the North Korean People’s Army. According to the analysis by the South Korean government, the shuffle is part of Kim Jong Il’s efforts to strengthen *Sungun* (Military-First) policies.⁶⁹³

A September 2008 analysis of senior North Korean officials who accompanied Kim Jong Il on his inspections of various facilities between January and August 2008, found General Hyon Chol Hae, the 74-year-old deputy director of the general political department of the North Korean People’s Army accompanied Kim Jong Il most frequently, on 32 occasions.⁶⁹⁴ Other military leaders such as Ri Myong Su, the director of the administrative department of the NDC, Kim Jong Gak, the first vice-

⁶⁹¹ Gause, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends*, 2.

⁶⁹² *Chosun Minjujuui Inmin Gonghwakuk Sahojuui Heonbeob* [DPRK Socialist Constitution], <http://www.kcna.co.jp/honbeb/honbeb.htm> (accessed on September 27, 2009).

⁶⁹³ *Chosun Ilbo*, “North Korea Shuffles Military Heads,” April 23, 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/04/23/2007042361020.html (accessed on September 28, 2009).

⁶⁹⁴ *Chosun Ilbo*, “N. Korea’s Leading Apparatchiks Revealed,” September 18, 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/04/23/2007042361020.html (accessed on September 28, 2009).

director of the general political department of the North Korean People's Army, and Kim Kyok Sik, the chief of the general staff of the North Korean People's Army, ranked high in the analysis.⁶⁹⁵

When the tensions between the two Koreas were high in November 2008, North Korean Lt. Gen. Kim Yong Chol, a top policy maker at the NDC visited the Gaesung Industrial Complex to try to pressure South Korea over cross-border propaganda leaflets by threatening closure of the Complex.⁶⁹⁶ Kim Yong Chol threatened South Korea by asking questions like "How long would it take for the South Korean firms to pull out?" and saying that "There is no need to talk about this anymore when we already have our rules set out."⁶⁹⁷ This visit showed that the military is deeply involved in economic activities as a decision maker in North Korea.

The important role of the military in North Korea in 2007 and 2008 was confirmed in the 12th Supreme People's Assembly in April 2009. On April 9, 2009, Kim Jong Il was reelected as chairman of the NDC. The following day, North Korean newspapers released photos of all 12 members of the NDC.⁶⁹⁸ Up to that point, North Korea had released only the photos of the chairman and vice chairman. This was the first time to show all its members. According to *GlobalSecurity.org*, "The photographs are noteworthy because hitherto [sic] the Central Intelligence Agency had only noted six members of the NDC, not 12. The National Defense Commission was bolstered by the addition of one more vice chairman and four additional members, each of whom

⁶⁹⁵ *Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea's Leading Apparatchiks Revealed," September 18, 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/04/23/2007042361020.html (accessed on September 28, 2009).

⁶⁹⁶ *Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea Steps Up Threats Over Kaesung Complex," November 10, 2008. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/11/10/2008111061017.html (accessed on September 28, 2009).

⁶⁹⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, "N. Korea Steps Up."

⁶⁹⁸ *Globalsecurity.org*, "National Defense Commission," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/ndc.htm> (accessed on September 20, 2009).

previously had dealings with military affairs.”⁶⁹⁹ The release of the photos of all members of the NDC can be interpreted as the strengthening of the NDC and expansion of military power.⁷⁰⁰

Keith Luse, a staff member for East Asia in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Sigfried Hecker of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, visited North Korea in February 2008. They provided a report about the status of the disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facility at Yongbyon to the members of Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate. According to Luse, disablement is difficult because of the North Korean military. He concluded his report by emphasizing that point:

There are other issues and questions regarding dismantlement and eventual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons inventory. Is the North Korean military resisting Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) efforts to substantively engage with the United States and the other five countries? Chairman Kim’s best efforts to orchestrate a balance among competing interests within the North, may be a “stretch too far” for North Korean military hardliners. Declaring and discarding the jewel of their arsenal will be difficult for those viewing it as the ultimate deterrent.⁷⁰¹

Power in North Korea had shifted to the military since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. The North Korean military interfered when the Bush administration implemented a reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008. The North Korean military acted as the key player in the decision making process for North Korea.

⁶⁹⁹ *Globalsecurity.org*, “National Defense Commission,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/ndc.htm> (accessed on September 20, 2009).

⁷⁰⁰ “Book, Kookbangwi Jeonwon Eolgool Gonggae [North Korea Released Faces of All Members of the National Defense Commission],” <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/350149.html> (accessed on September 21, 2009).

⁷⁰¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “North Korea and Its Nuclear Program: A Reality Check.” Hearing. 110th Congress, 2nd session, October 2008. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 5, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:45088.pdf (accessed on September 12, 2009).

b. Kim Jong Il's Need for the Military's Support: Political and Economic Reasons

Kim Jong Il needed to get more support from the military in 2007 and 2008 because of political and economic reasons. Politically, North Korea was in an uncertain position, especially in 2007 and 2008 after Kim Jong Il's health problems became an issue. The succession issue automatically caught the attention of the world. Economically, North Korea continued to struggle and there seemed no hope of progress in the short term. Despite economic difficulty, North Korea did not decrease its military expenditure. Kim Jong Il needed to persuade the military to divert the budget for economic reforms. But, hardliners in the military did not support it and they blamed the economic difficulty on the threat from the United States.

(1) Political Reasons: Kim Jong Il's Health Problem and the Succession Issue. Even though not much was known about Kim Jong Il's health or his possible successor, it is obvious that Kim Jong Il had a serious health problem in 2007 and 2008 and it raised questions about the uncertain succession after he dies. According to Chinese officials, Kim Jong Il visited the "People's Liberation Army Hospital 301," for tests about diabetes. Chinese doctors consulted Japanese experts and very specialized Western medications were shipped.⁷⁰² Reports about Kim Jong Il's failing health followed afterwards. In September 2008, Kim Jong Il did not attend the military parade for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of North Korea's founding, and then "rumors swirled that Kim Jong Il was gravely ill."⁷⁰³ A French doctor who treated Kim Jong Il, François-Xavier Roux, confirmed that Kim Jong Il had a stroke.⁷⁰⁴ Donald Gregg, a former ambassador to South Korea said, "[Kim's ill health] has put a blanket over creative thinking in North Korea."⁷⁰⁵

⁷⁰² Yossef Bodansky, "Succession Crisis in North Korea and Kim Jong Il's Need to Expand Tensions with the US," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 35, no. 3 (2007): 4.

⁷⁰³ *Economist* "Asia: Kim Jong Ill or Kim Jong Well?; North Korea," September 13, 2008.

⁷⁰⁴ Georges Malbrunot, "Ces médecins français au chevet de Kim Jong-il" [The French Doctors at the Head of Kim Jong Il], *Le Figaro*, November 12, 2008, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/12/11/01003-20081211ARTFIG00047-ces-medecins-francais-au-chevet-de-kim-jong-il-.php> (accessed on September 10, 2009).

⁷⁰⁵ Demick, "No Breakthrough in Talks," A4.

It is imperative for Kim Jong Il to preserve the support and preeminence of the military in order to consolidate power for his successor. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland observed in early 2008:

Succession is the weak point in any authoritarian regime and it is not at all evident that a dynastic heir is being groomed; none of the three sons who have been mooted as possible candidates appears today to be a credible successor. The Korean Workers Party has atrophied; unlike in China, one party does not have the coherence or command to manage the succession on its own. The military appears to be the key institution, indicated most clearly by the fact that Kim Jong Il continues to lead North Korea from his position as chairman of the National Defense Commission and continues to emphasize “military-first” politics.⁷⁰⁶

Yosef Bodansky also said, “According to PRC and Russian senior officials, Kim Jong Il recently began to consolidate a ‘collective leadership’ comprised of the upper-most military and security leaders. They are expected to consolidate the reign of Kim’s successor and preserve the support and preeminence of the North Korean defense and security sectors.”⁷⁰⁷ Consequently, Kim Jong Il needed to get support from the military to consolidate his power for his successor. To stabilize the political situation in North Korea is more important to him than offering any positive response to the United States which can result in opposition from the military.

(2) Economic Reason: Need for Economic Reform. Another reason Kim Jong Il sought military support other than the continuation of his power and succession to his son was to ensure economic reform. Gause says, “If any meaningful reforms are to take hold in North Korea, the defense budget will have to bear some of the cutbacks.”⁷⁰⁸ Under deteriorating economic conditions, the defense budget has been a serious burden to North Korea. Economic conditions in North Korea did not improve in

⁷⁰⁶ Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea in 2007: Shuffling in from the Cold,” *Asian Survey* 48, no. 1 (January/February 2008): 114.

⁷⁰⁷ Bodansky, “Succession Crisis,” 5.

⁷⁰⁸ Gause, *North Korean Civil-Military Trends*, 44.

2007 and 2008. In March 2007, the World Food Program estimated that “North Korea was one million metric tons short of grain and faced calamity unless additional aid was forthcoming.”⁷⁰⁹

To make matters worse, international aid had fallen since North Korea’s nuclear test and grain prices were skyrocketing in 2007. In March 2008, the United Nations estimated that North Korea had a 1.6 million metric tons grain shortfall.⁷¹⁰ As Haggard and Noland described, “Although other estimates—including ours—come to less alarming conditions, there can be little doubt that the balance between the demand and supply of grain in 2008 was at its most precarious point since the 1990s famine.”⁷¹¹ They also said, “Hunger-related deaths—possibly reaching the low tens of thousands—occurred in 2008.”⁷¹²

There is no definitive data about North Korea’s defense budget because North Korea does not announce its actual budget. Various sources calculate differently how North Korea spends for its military. However, it is clear that North Korea has spent a significant portion of its national budget for defense even under the economically difficult conditions. According to KCNA news, North Korea announced at the 6th meeting of the 11th session for the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009 that it had spent 15.8 percent of its total national budget for national defense in 2008, and it planned to spend the same 15.8 percent of the total state budgetary expenditure of 2009 for defense, though it did not announce the actual amount.⁷¹³

⁷⁰⁹ Haggard and Noland, “North Korea in 2007,” 110.

⁷¹⁰ Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea in 2008: Twilight of the God?” *Asian Survey*, 49, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 99–100.

⁷¹¹ Ibid. Also, refer to Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Famine in North Korea Redux?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper, no. 08–9, October 2008.

⁷¹² Ibid., 101.

⁷¹³ KCNA, “Report on Implementation of State Budget for 2008 and State Budget for 2009,” April 9, 2009.

According to South Korean analysis, “North Korea’s actual military expenditures exceed 30 percent of its gross national income (GNI).”⁷¹⁴ The Ministry of National Defense of South Korea argues that, in addition to the state budget, another source of income is through independent military accounts, such as “the defense industry, the exports of arms, and business set up within the military to bring in foreign currency,” which should be taken into consideration.⁷¹⁵ In sum, even though the actual military expenditure is vague, the available data gives a clue to how important military power is in North Korea.

However, continuous high spending for defense does not help Kim Jong Il’s economic reform plan. Reading the statements of news from North Korea and noting the increased number of Kim Jong Il’s visits to economic facilities, it appears that Kim Jong Il in 2007 and 2008 tried economic reform. For the success of his economic reform and regime survival, the military’s assistance is very important. Hardliners in the military feared that more economic engagement with the outside world would mean risky choices in terms of regime survival. They believed that North Korean economic difficulty is caused by the offensive strategy of the United States. Kim Jong Il cannot ignore those opinions and secure his leadership. Kim Jong Il needs the military not only to secure his power but also to implement economic reform. Support for the nuclear program might be the only way for Kim Jong Il to get the military’s agreement to cuts in other areas.

In sum, facing this unstable political and economic situation in North Korea, Kim Jong Il focused on the consolidation of his power. Therefore, Kim Jong Il was constrained in offering a full positive response to Bush’s reassurance strategy.

5. Alliance Politics of the United States

Question 11: How did key allies of the United States affect Bush’s reassurance strategy to North Korea? Was there sufficient alliance support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

⁷¹⁴ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *2008 Defense White Paper*, 30. <http://www.mnd.go.kr/> (accessed on September 20, 2009).

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 30–31.

a. South Korea

South Korea's different approaches toward North Korea by the Roh Moo Hyun administration in 2007 and the Lee Myung Bak administration in 2008 impacted the outcome of Bush's reassurance strategy. A comparison of 2007 and 2008 shows the importance of alliance politics in the implementation and outcome of reassurance strategy.

(1) The Bush Administration and the Roh Moo Hyun Administration in 2007. Roh Moo Hyun pursued a reassurance strategy toward North Korea following Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy after he took office in 2003. The Bush administration shifted its policy toward reassurance approaches in 2007. Therefore, in 2007, the Bush and Roh Moo Hyun administrations pursued similar approaches to North Korea. As a result, there were several signs of gradual rapprochement between the United States and North Korea such as the February 13 Agreement and October 3 Agreement. Also, Roh Moo Hyun had a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il in October 2007.

Between 2003 and 2006, the United States and South Korea had totally different perspectives on strategy toward North Korea. North Korea's overall response to the United States was negative during that time. For example, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and tensions were continuously escalating on the Korean peninsula except in September 2005 when the Six-Party Talks came to an agreement. Finally, North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006. After the nuclear test, Roh Moo Hyun met the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and resisted an aggressive response to North Korea. Roh Moo Hyun told Rice, "You Americans keep on saying you want this resolved diplomatically, but you are always putting up more hurdles."⁷¹⁶ Roh Moo Hyun complained about U.S. unwillingness to resolve the BDA investigation and to talk directly with North Korea.⁷¹⁷

This difference in perspective between the United States and South Korea changed in 2007. The first example to show how South Korea helped the United

⁷¹⁶ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 301.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid.

States in the implementation of Bush's reassurance strategy was the February 13, 2007 Agreement. In the Six-Party Talks in February 2007, South Korea wanted to advance the talks and was willing to help reach the agreement. After the Berlin meeting in January 2007, Christopher Hill met Kim Gye Gwan with confidence that "a deal with North Korea was within reach."⁷¹⁸ However, Kim Gye Gwan demanded a huge amount of heavy fuel oil and electricity—two million tons of oil and two million kilowatts of electricity.⁷¹⁹ Hill said after several meetings with Kim Gye Gwan, "If we don't reach a six-party agreement today, there is no Berlin. What was agreed at Berlin is off."⁷²⁰ The Six-Party Talks were close to collapse. South Korea did not want to see this happen. South Korean diplomat Chun Yung Woo met privately with Kim Gye Gwan to persuade him to agree to more for more return. Mike Chinoy reported the story behind the February 13 Agreement:

But the key to breaking the deadlock came from the initiative by South Korea's negotiator Chun Yung Woo, a tough and canny diplomat who had spent time at the IAEA. Meeting privately with Kim Gye Gwan, Chun told the North Korean that if he wanted more fuel oil, Pyongyang would have to agree to do more. The two men mapped out a deal under which North Korea would get 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for freezing Yongbyon.

But if Kim agreed to disable the reactor and declare all its programs, the North would receive 450,000 tons more in 50,000 ton tranches, plus the equivalent of 500,000 tons of oil in electricity and other assistance, to be delivered as they implemented their side of the bargain.⁷²¹

In the end, what Chun Yung Woo initiated worked out and the February 13 Agreement was reached. South Korea then immediately signaled its willingness to accelerate economic and diplomatic engagement with North Korea and strongly supported the Bush administration's reassurance strategy in 2007. Under the warmer conditions after the February 13 Agreement, the Roh Moo Hyun administration tried to have a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il and, finally, there was a summit meeting

⁷¹⁸ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 322.

⁷¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, 323.

in October 2007. It would have been difficult to have the summit meeting after the 2006 nuclear test without the progress made in the Six-Party Talks. Bruce Cumings argued that the 2007 summit meeting between the two Koreas was possible due to the change of relationship between Bush and Kim Jong Il. He says, “The real basis for the summit lies in the entirely unexpected warming of relations between President George W. Bush and Kim Jong Il, manifest in the 13 February agreement on denuclearization, the origins of which remain murky.”⁷²²

The summit meeting was originally to be held on August 2007, but was delayed by a flood in North Korea. The improved relationship between the two Koreas helped the Six-Party Talks to move forward. The summit meeting plan helped the Six-Party Talks members to reach the October 3 Agreement. Several days before the summit meeting, the Six-Party Talks reached the second phase of implementing the September 19, 2005 Agreement. During the summit meeting, Kim Jong Il showed strong confidence in Kim Gye Gwan and allowed him to brief Roh Moo Hyun on the North’s view of the six-party process.⁷²³

(2) The Bush Administration and the Lee Myung Bak Administration in 2008. Lee Myung Bak was inaugurated in February 2008 and declared a “denuclearization, opening, and 3000 dollars” policy. If North Korea were to denuclearize and open, South Korea would provide assistance in order to raise the per capita income of North Korea to \$3,000 within 10 years. This approach was totally different from that of the previous administrations. Compared to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations’ reassurance strategy to North Korea, the biggest difference in the “denuclearization, opening, and 3000 dollars” policy was more reciprocity, but not a step-by-step approach. Lee Myung Bak proposed that if North Korea first gave up its nuclear weapons, South Korea would provide more assistance and

⁷²¹ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 324.

⁷²² Bruce Cumings, “Kim Jong Il Confronts Bush—and Wins. A New Page in North-South Korean Relations,” <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Bruce-Cumings/2539> (accessed on September 7, 2009).

⁷²³ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 345.

investment.⁷²⁴ The Lee Myung Bak administration did not support the 2000 Joint Declaration and October 4, 2007 Declaration of the previous administrations.

Also, Lee Myung Bak put the ROK-U.S. alliance rather than inter-Korean relations as his top priority. Lee Sang Hyun said, “In contrast to his predecessor, President Lee identifies the restoration of a robust ROK-U.S. alliance as his top priority and argues that inter-Korean relations can only develop if the alliance remains strong.”⁷²⁵ In addition, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) won the majority of seats in elections in April 2008 and supported Lee Myung Bak’s approaches to North Korea.

This approach, however, has proved more difficult than expected. After the inauguration of Lee Myung Bak, there was an escalation of tension between the two Koreas in 2008. The key to Lee Myung Bak’s policy was the resolution of the nuclear crisis in advance. North Korea responded with vitriol. This policy has been stymied by strong criticism from North Korea. According to KCNA news:

The anti-north confrontational nature of Lee and the ruling conservative forces was brought to light when they advocated the so-called “no-nukes, opening and bringing the per capita income to 3000 dollars” as their “policy towards the north.” The above-said piffle is nothing but a very absurd and ridiculous jargon as they cried out for the North’s “complete nuclear abandonment” and “opening” as preconditions for the improvement of the north-south relations.

This is little short of an anti-reunification declaration as it is aimed at sacrificing the interests of the Korean nation to serve outside forces, pursuing confrontation and war and driving the north-south relations to a collapse.⁷²⁶

Lee Myung Bak made a speech to the new National Assembly on July 11, 2008 and confirmed that “the two summit declarations—and the extensive

⁷²⁴ Lee Sang Hyun, “ROK-U.S. Strategic Alliance and Inter-Korean Peace Initiative: Can They be Comparable?” *Korean and World Affairs* 32, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 132.

⁷²⁵ Ibid., 133.

⁷²⁶ KCNA, “Lee Myung Bak Regime’s Sycophancy towards U.S. and Anti-DPRK Confrontation Hysteria Blasted,” April 1, 2008.

goodies promised in the October 2007 statement in particular—were subject to Pyongyang’s compliance with all existing North-South agreements.” Furthermore, a South Korean tourist was shot and killed in the early morning the same day by one or more of the North’s soldiers.⁷²⁷ Lee Myung Bak heard about the incident several hours before the speech. Even though he did not mention the incident in the speech, the relationship between the two Koreas became extremely hostile and the Mt. Geumgang tour was suspended. The response to Lee Myung Bak’s speech from North Korea was bellicose and North Korean news media started calling Lee Myung Bak a traitor. According to *Rodong Sinmun*, “Traitor Lee’s ‘policy speech’ fully revealed his stance against reunification and for confrontation.”⁷²⁸

Furthermore, North Korea blamed South Korea for the Mt. Geumgang tourist incident and claimed that “The South side should be held responsible for the incident, make clear apology to the north side and take measures against recurrence of the similar incident.”⁷²⁹ As a result, there have been fundamental changes in the relations between the two Koreas since the inauguration of South Korean president Lee Myung Bak.

One month after the shooting incident, President Bush visited South Korea and had a summit meeting with Lee Myung Bak in August 2008. They agreed to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks and further expand the cooperation between the United States and South Korea.⁷³⁰ Lee Myung Bak emphasized the complete denuclearization of North Korea:

And as to what kind of behavior North Korea will take, what’s most important is - number one is that we must have a denuclearization of North Korea. So I will be patient; I will be consistent; and I will do my best. And I have faith and I am confident that we will be able to move on

⁷²⁷ Mark Magnier, “South Korean Killed by Solider in North,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 12, 2008.

⁷²⁸ KCNA, “Lee Myung Bak’s ‘Policy Speech’ under Fire,” July 14, 2008.

⁷²⁹ KCNA, “South Side to Blame for Incident at Mr. Kumgang Resort,” July 14, 2008.

⁷³⁰ “The President’s News Conference with President Lee Myung Bak of South Korea in Seoul,” *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 44, no. 31, August 11, 2008, 1095.

to the verification process and move on to the next phase of that. And we will try to do our best to make it complete, and I believe that North Korea must faithfully cooperate in the verification process.

So, regardless of what North Korea has in mind, I believe it's important for the rest of the members of the six-party talks to continue pursuing our objective. And at times we might have to wait; at times we might be difficult, but we will be consistent.⁷³¹

President Bush also agreed with the Lee Myung Bak's statements and emphasized the importance of the Six-Party Talks:

I know this: That the six-party talks are the best way to convince them to give up their weapons. I know there's a framework in place that will make it easier for those of us who care about this issue to work together to send a common message to the North Korea leader: You have a choice to make. You can verifiably do what you say you're going to do, or you'll continue to be the most sanctioned regime in the world.

We have put out a step-by-step process to-as a way forward for the North Korean leader. This isn't a U.S. proposal; this is a five-party proposal.⁷³²

The goal of two presidents was the same; the complete denuclearization of North Korea. However, reading their speeches carefully, there are slight differences in their approach to achieving the same goal. Even though Bush considered more step-by-step approaches based on the Tit-for-Tat concept, Lee Myung Bak wanted to solve the North Korean nuclear problem at once. He requested the complete denuclearization of North Korea as a precondition for providing any reward to North Korea.

As a result, contrary to the two presidents' common goal and high expectations for North Korea's response, North Korea ignored South Korea and wanted to talk directly with the United States rather than join the Six-Party Talks in 2008. Unfortunately, there have been no Six-Party Talks since September 2007. Even though

⁷³¹ "The President's News Conference with President Lee Myung Bak of South Korea in Seoul," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 44, no. 31, August 11, 2008, 1095.

⁷³² *Ibid.*

the United States wanted to implement its reassurance strategy based on the Tit-for-Tat and action-for-action principle through the Six-Party Talks framework, North Korea wanted to talk directly with the United States in 2008 due to the deteriorated relationship with South Korea.

In sum, the deteriorated relations between the two Koreas could not help the United States pursue its reassurance strategy by implementing all agreements made in 2007 with North Korea through the Six-Party Talks framework. Furthermore, the deteriorated relation could not generate North Korea's positive reciprocity.

(3) The Importance of Alliance Politics in the Implementation of the Reassurance Strategy toward North Korea between 1998 and 2008. To understand the importance of alliance politics in the implementation of the reassurance strategy toward North Korea, it is useful to compare the main strategy of the United States and South Korea toward North Korea between 1998 and 2008 and North Korea's responses. Strategy toward North Korea between South Korea and the United States between 1998 and 2008 is summarized in Table 3.12. The previous case study of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations' reassurance strategy and the U.S. policy toward North Korea during that time is included in the comparison.

In terms of the reassurance strategy perspective, the years 2000 and 2007 witnessed the implementation of reassurance strategy by both South Korea and the United States. This led to some positive responses from North Korea in both years. There were 2000 and 2007 summit meetings between the two Koreas. As the products of the summit meetings, the 2000 Joint Declaration and the October 4, 2007 Declaration were presented respectively. Also, in 2000, a summit meeting between Clinton and Kim Jong Il was considered.

Between 2001 and 2006, the relationship between the United States and North Korea was hostile. Finally, there was a nuclear test in 2006. The situation changed in 2007. Both the February 13 and October 3 agreements through the Six-Party Talks were made in 2007 and relations both between the United States and

North Korea and between South Korea and North Korea improved. However, the improved relationships changed in 2008. The relations between South Korea and North Korea became more hostile. This situation did not allow the implementation of the 2007 agreements and led to the collapse of the Six-Party Talks and North Korea's ongoing nuclear program in 2008.

Table 3.12. Strategy Toward North Korea between South Korea and the United States

Year	South Korean President	Strategy toward North Korea	U.S. President
1998	Kim Dae Jung (Progressive/ Reassurance)	Reassurance (SK) vs. Deterrence and Reassurance (U.S.)	Clinton (Deterrence, Reassurance)
1999			
2000		Reassurance (SK, U.S.)	Clinton (Reassurance)
2001		Reassurance (SK) vs. Deterrence, Preemptive (U.S.)	Bush (Deterrence, Preemptive)
2002			
2003	Roh Moo Hyun (Progressive/ Reassurance)		
2004			
2005			
2006			
2007	Reassurance (SK, U.S.)	Bush (Reassurance)	
2008	Lee Myung Bak (Conservative/ Deterrence)		Deterrence (SK) vs. Reassurance (U.S.)

Consequently, when the United States and South Korea pursued the reassurance strategy together, there were some positive responses from North Korea. These examples show the impact of alliance politics and its importance between the United States and South Korea in the implementation of reassurance toward North Korea.

b. Japan's Opposite Position

Japan did not support Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea at all. The response to the February 13, 2007 Agreement proved Japan's unsupportive position. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to join other participants of the Six-Party Talks in providing aid to North Korea.⁷³³ The abduction issue remained the most important issue in Japan and Abe could not offer any conciliatory gesture to North Korea given domestic political pressure. Mike Chinoy quotes Chris Nelson's explanation of Japan's situation, "Even if you assumed that Kim Jong Il can look sincere on this tragedy, how can Prime Minister Abe or his successors, be satisfied with whatever Pyongyang comes up with? And even if the government of Japan is satisfied, how can it convince the public and the media?"⁷³⁴

The response of Japan to Bush's action to take North Korea off the State Sponsors of Terrorism List showed how Japan perceived Bush's reassurance strategy. Japan was really upset when Bush took North Korea off the terrorism list. Family members of the abductees condemned the U.S. decision. Teruaki Masumoto, a brother of one of the eight Japanese who were kidnapped said, "I think it is an act of betrayal."⁷³⁵ Sakie Yokota whose daughter was kidnapped 31 years ago said, "Why did the United States remove North Korea from the list when it is clear to anyone's eyes that the North Korea is a terrorism-assisting country?"⁷³⁶ Politicians and government officials in Japan could not neglect their opinions.

⁷³³ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 328.

⁷³⁴ Ibid., 329, quoted from *The Nelson Report*, February 21, 2007.

⁷³⁵ Blaine Harden, "U.S. Move on N. Korea Assailed in Japan; Nuclear Plant's Dismantling to Resume, Pyongyang Says," *Washington Post*, October 13, 2008, A18.

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

Also, Japanese officials warned that the U.S. removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List would damage the relationship between Japan and the United States. For example, Kyoto Nakayama, special advisor to Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda on the kidnapping, said in an interview with AFP, “If the U.S. moves while completely ignoring the abduction issue, you can expect that relations between Japan and the United States will not improve.”⁷³⁷

In October 2008, Japanese leaders showed their strong opposition to the U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Prime Minister Taro Aso claimed that the North Korean kidnapping issue was still important leverage in the Six-Party Talks.⁷³⁸ Shoichi Nakagawa, a Japanese finance minister, said “he doubted that Japanese officials had been fully consulted beforehand,” even though the U.S. State Department announced that President Bush and Secretary of State Rice had spoken with their Japanese counterparts.⁷³⁹ Japan continued to request that the Japanese kidnapping issue should be solved before Japan provided any assistance to North Korea. Japan has not provided its share of the energy assistance under the October 3, 2007 Agreement, which amounts to 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.⁷⁴⁰

North Korea’s attitude to Japan had been very bellicose and in 2008, it became more hostile. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that North Korea would not consider Japan as a member of the Six-Party Talks. The spokesman said:

It is the assertion of Japan that it will not fulfill any commitment related to its economic compensation under the agreement reached at the six-party talks unless there is progress in the solution of the “abduction issue” between the DPRK and Japan.

⁷³⁷ *JoongAng Daily*, “Ignore Abductees at Your Peril, Japan Warns the United States,” October 26, 2007, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2881968> (accessed on September 1, 2009).

⁷³⁸ Choe and Cooper, “North Korea to Resume Disabling.”

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ Peter Crail, “Six-Party Talks Stall over Sampling,” *Arms Control Today* 39, n. 1 (January/February 2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/sixpartytalksstall (assessed on August 27, 2009).

It is the ulterior intention of Japan to bar the denuclearization of the peninsula from coming true and put spurs to its moves to turn itself into a military power under the pretext of the nuclear issue. Such country has neither justification nor qualification to participate in the talks. On the contrary, it only lays a hurdle in the way of achieving the common goal.⁷⁴¹

Japan's request to deal with its kidnapping issue in the Six-Party Talks was met with a hostile response by North Korea. Also, Japan's opposition to Bush's reassurance, such as the removal of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, could not help generate North Korea's reciprocity. Rather, it provoked North Korea's bellicose actions. Consequently, Japan gave priority to the kidnapping issue over Bush's reassurance strategy which reduced the chances for reassurance to succeed.

6. Alliance Politics of North Korea

Question 12: How did key allies of North Korea perceive Bush's reassurance strategy? Did Bush's reassurance strategy generate alliance support for North Korea's reciprocity? Did North Korea's key allies try to prevent North Korea from offering a positive response?

After the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, the Bush administration implemented a reassurance strategy to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through the Six-Party Talks with the assistance from China and Russia because the Bush administration judged that it lacked sufficient leverage unilaterally to compel North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. China and Russia, as key allies of North Korea, had consistently insisted on the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea, and had not supported pressure or sanctions intended to cause regime change because they believed that it could lead to increase of tensions or war on the Korean peninsula. As a result, generally speaking, they supported Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 because they believed that dialogue and engagement were better ways than containment and isolation for the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea.

⁷⁴¹ KCNA, "DPRK will not Regard Japan as Party to Six-Party Talks," December 8, 2008.

Therefore, China and Russia did not prevent North Korea from offering a positive response. At the same time, China and Russia had some national interests and limitations so that they could not strongly push North Korea to dismantle nuclear weapons completely. As shown by the 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear tests, China and Russia did not have strong leverage to control North Korea's behavior in 2007 and 2008, and North Korea acted assertively in its security issues. North Korea considered its nuclear program under its *Juche* (Self-reliance) ideology as the top security issue.

a. *China's Ambivalence: Tensions Between Support for Bush's Reassurance Strategy and Consideration of North Korea as an Ally*

(1) China's Support for Bush's Reassurance Strategy in 2007 and 2008. Basically, China and the United States had very different views of the North Korean nuclear issue. Daniel Pinkston, a Northeast Asia expert at the International Crisis Group observed, "Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics."⁷⁴² China, as the host nation of the Six-Party Talks, supported Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 because the Bush administration tried to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue. China had wanted to be involved in the North Korean nuclear issue from the beginning of the Six-Party Talks in 2003 as the "chief mediator" and "honest broker."⁷⁴³ David Kang explained China's intentions:

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that "Dialogue is vital to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and China is willing to work with all parties toward an early, peaceful solution to the issue." Without Chinese support, sanctions or other hard-line policies are unlikely

⁷⁴² Jayshree Bajoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 21, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html (accessed on October 1, 2009).

⁷⁴³ Anne Wu, "What China Whispers to North Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 35.

to become effective. One key question is the extent of Chinese influence on North Korea.⁷⁴⁴

There were several main reasons, such as border stability, the avoidance of war, and an improving relationship with the United States, for China to want to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and engagement rather than through a containment and isolation policy. First, the top priority for China was to maintain stability along the Chinese-North Korean border. China did not want to see any regime collapse in North Korea or war on the Korean Peninsula because those situations would cause hundreds of thousands of refugees to flow across the border into China. This was already a problem for China.

Second, another priority for China was to keep North Korea as a non-nuclear state. If North Korea had a nuclear weapon, there would be the possibility that Japan as well as South Korea, even Taiwan, would want to develop their own nuclear programs. These situations also would be serious threats to China's security. Third, from the Chinese perspective, the Six-Party Talks gave China an opportunity to improve its relationship with the United States. Ralph Cossa claimed that "the North Korean nuclear crisis was 'a gift from Kim Jong Il' to advance U.S.-Chinese cooperation."⁷⁴⁵

Therefore, the February 13 Agreement and October 4 Agreement in 2007 were achieved with strong support from China. Christopher Hill said in his interview with ABC on February 13, 2007, "This whole six-party process has done more to bring the U.S. and China together than any other process I'm aware of."⁷⁴⁶ In sum, China supported Bush's shift to reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008, after the restart of the Six-Party Talks.

⁷⁴⁴ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 124.

⁷⁴⁵ Bonnie S. Glaser and Wang Liang, "North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?" *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 167, quoting from Ralph Cossa, "China's Actions on North Korea Providing a Pivotal Test for U.S.-Chinese Relations," *International Herald Tribune*, October 12, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/13/america/NA_GEN_US_China_Relations_Test.php.

⁷⁴⁶ Glaser and Liang, "North Korea," 165.

(2) China's Consideration of North Korea as an Ally. Even though China supported Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008, China was the most important ally of North Korea. China has played an important role on the Korean peninsula as North Korea's ally because of historic, political, and economic reasons. China fought in the Korean War for North Korea. Even though it is difficult to measure China's influence on North Korea, and it is limited on the nuclear issue, it is clear that China is willing to be a main actor. Also, if China helps North Korea economically and militarily, North Korea will remain in its present status.

Even though China has been ambiguous about its commitment to North Korea in case of military conflict, there is still the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.⁷⁴⁷ Harrison explains the treaty between North Korea and China:

While China has shifted to a more symmetrical posture in its dealing with the two Koreas, its new posture remains conspicuously asymmetrical in one critical aspect. Article 2 of the Sino-North Korean "Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty" declares that the two signatory nations guarantee to adopt immediately all necessary measures to oppose any country or coalition of countries that might attack either nation.⁷⁴⁸

Even though the security situation after the end of Cold War has changed, and the meaning of treaty can be interpreted differently, this statement in the treaty obviously shows the relationship between North Korea and China. Any military action against North Korea cannot be taken without considering the mutual treaty between North Korea and China.

Also, China did not want to push for strong economic sanctions against North Korea. China expressed its displeasure and supported U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, which passed on October 14, 2006, five days after North

⁷⁴⁷ For the full text of the treaty, refer to http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm.

⁷⁴⁸ Jonathan D. Pollack and Lee Chung Min, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 54.

Korea's first nuclear test.⁷⁴⁹ China was angry and called the test a "flagrant and brazen" violation of international opinion and it supported a punitive response.⁷⁵⁰ Liu Jianchao, a spokesman for China's Foreign Affairs Ministry said on October 19 that "U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 was balanced and all parties should implement it strictly within the established guidelines."⁷⁵¹ At the same time, Liu emphasized the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea through dialogue in the Six-Party Talks. Liu said that the important information he sent to North Korea was that "its nuclear test was wrong and that the international community opposes it. The DPRK should return to six-party talks as soon as possible."⁷⁵² Also, he added, "Sanctions are not our aim. Our aim is to accelerate the reopening of six-party talks and resolve the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue."⁷⁵³

However, China did not rigorously implement the resolution, and many experts had doubts of China's economic sanctions against North Korea. Jayshree Barjoria said, "China has too much at stake in North Korea to halt or withdraw its support entirely."⁷⁵⁴ Mark Manyin said, "Trade [between North Korea and China] in heavy weapons systems such as missiles generally are not recorded, complicating any assessment of 1718's arms embargo."⁷⁵⁵ Actually, trade between North Korea and China in general increased by 13 percent in 2007 and 41 percent in 2008. Also, Chinese exports

⁷⁴⁹ For the full text of UNSCR 1718, refer to <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁷⁵⁰ David Stout and John O'Neil, "North Korea's Claim is Met with Doubt and Anger," *New York Times*, October 9, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/09cnd-nuke.html?pagewanted=1> (accessed on March 29, 2009), and Brian Knowlton and John O'Neil, "China Supports 'Punitive Actions' - Asia-Pacific-International Herald Tribune," *New York Times*, October 10, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/world/asia/10iht-nuke.3103387.html> (accessed on September 19, 2009).

⁷⁵¹ *People's Daily Online*, "China will not Break UNSC Resolution 1718," October 20, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200610/20/eng20061020_313822.html (accessed on September 29, 2009).

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Barjoria, "The China-North Korea Relationship."

⁷⁵⁵ Nikitin, et al., "North Korea's Second Nuclear Test," 16, fn 60.

to North Korea rose by 13 percent and 46 percent respectively in those years (Table 3.13).⁷⁵⁶

Table 3.13. China's Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 2006–2008⁷⁵⁷

(millions of U.S. dollars)				
Year	China's Imports	China's Exports	Total Trade	China's Balance
2006	467.718	1,231.886	1,699.604	764.168
2007	581.521	1,392.453	1,973.974	810.932
2008	754.045	2,033.233	2,787.278	1,279.188

This evidence shows that China considered North Korea as an important ally and viewed dialogue rather than pressure or sanctions as the best way to solve the North Korea nuclear problem. However, China had limited leverage over North Korea, especially on the nuclear issue.

(3) China's Limited Leverage over North Korea. Even though China has been the key ally of North Korea since the Korean War, its influence has been reduced, especially on the North Korean nuclear issue. A high-level Chinese foreign ministry official said in Victor Cha's interview in 1997 that "The North Koreans don't listen to us...they don't listen to anyone."⁷⁵⁸ As a result, even though China consistently protested North Korea's nuclear test, it could not prevent the 2006 North Korean nuclear test. There was no prior consultation about the test. North Korea notified China less than an hour before the test. North Korea had been claiming that its nuclear program was for its self-defense and based on its *Juche* ideology. The KCNA announced, "The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100 percent. It marks a

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., 16, referring to Global Trade Atlas using Chinese data.

⁷⁵⁷ Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," *CRS report for Congress*, June 4, 2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 54. Sources: Chinese (PRC excluding Hong Kong) data as supplied by World Trade Atlas.

⁷⁵⁸ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 22. Cha's interview, high-level Chinese foreign ministry official with Asia portfolio, Washington, D.C., October 1997.

historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA and people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defense capability.”⁷⁵⁹

Actually, in terms of their security interests and ideologies, China and North Korea have moved apart, especially since the end of the Cold War. Li Kaisheng explains the difference:

In the eyes of many North Koreans, China is marching firmly down the capitalist road, while many Chinese think that North Korea’s “military first” policy and dynastic succession are not within the realm of socialism. Under these circumstances, the so-called socialist alliance now exists nowhere but in people’s imaginations. Fundamentally, these changes reflect the fact that the interests of the two countries have shifted dramatically.⁷⁶⁰

Kaisheng adds that “The most fundamental interest of North Korea is the survival of its dynastic regime; therefore, it does not desire reforms or openness. Furthermore, it sometimes seeks to unify its people by creating international tensions, including producing nuclear weapons ‘to maintain its security.’”⁷⁶¹ Andrei Lankov, associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul also says, “North Korea’s leaders are in no hurry to introduce any reforms.”⁷⁶² These analyses seemed true regarding the relationship between China and North Korea, especially in 2007 and 2008. In sum, even though China was an important ally of North Korea, China did not have strong leverage over North Korea for it to give up nuclear weapons and give positive responses to the United States.

Furthermore, not only has China lost leverage to influence North Korea, but also China’s concern about a nuclear North Korea was an issue. China seemed

⁷⁵⁹ KCNA, “DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test,” October 10, 2006.

⁷⁶⁰ Li Kaisheng, “China Should Rethink Relations with North Korea,” *UPI Asia.com*, September 11, 2009, http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/09/11/china_should_rethink_relations_with_north_korea/2792/ (accessed on October 2, 2009).

⁷⁶¹ Ibid.

⁷⁶² Andrei Lankov, “Stay alive; Why North Korea Will not Change,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 9.

to have a serious concern about U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state. Even after the six-party members agreed the February 13 agreement, Gary Samore argued that “China’s biggest concern seems to be that the February agreement signals an American surrender to North Korean nuclear weapons.”⁷⁶³ Samore also stated:

Having complained for years that the Bush administration was demanding too much, the Chinese now say they fear Washington is secretly prepared to accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state. Pointing to the example of India, one senior Chinese official complained that the U.S. nonproliferation policy is weak and inconsistent: “Washington strongly opposes proliferation before a nuclear test, but once a test has been conducted, the U.S. accepts the country as a nuclear power.”⁷⁶⁴

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) perfectly described the relationship between China and North Korea as a “dilemma”:

China continues to face a tough choice between applying greater pressure, which could trigger North Korea's collapse, or doing too little to deter the regime from developing atomic weapons--an outcome that would raise the even-more-frightening spectre of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.⁷⁶⁵

Consequently, China supported a more reassurance-oriented strategy toward North Korea and welcomed the Bush administration’s shift in 2007 and 2008. China and the United States had the common goal of the denuclearization of North Korea. However, China as an important ally of North Korea had its own national interests and could not completely support the position of the United States. Furthermore, China was not able to fully use its leverage over North Korea, especially on the nuclear issue.

⁷⁶³ Gary Samore, “China Uneasy about U.S.-North Strides,” *JoongAng Daily*, August 6, 2007, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2878883> (accessed on September 9, 2009).

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ViewWire*, “China/North Korea Politics: Dilemma,” June 30, 2009.

b. *Russia's Ambivalence: Tensions Between Support for Bush's Reassurance Strategy and Russia's Limited Leverage over North Korea*

(1) Russia's Limited Support for Bush's Reassurance in 2007 and 2008. Russia, like China, showed similar attitudes to Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 because Russia wanted to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea through dialogue rather than containment and isolation.⁷⁶⁶ There are several reasons, similar to China's, why Russia demonstrated positive views of Bush's reassurance strategy. First, Russia feared that North Korea's sudden collapse or war on the Korean peninsula would endanger the security of Russia. Russia was concerned about the possible refugee flow across the border caused by the unstable situations along the Russian-North Korean border. Second, Russia showed much concern about North Korea's nuclear program. If North Korea became a nuclear state, Russia would more likely face nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia because Japan and South Korea might want to develop nuclear programs. Such a situation would bring instability and extra burdens to Russia.⁷⁶⁷ Third, the Six-Party Talks gave Russia an opportunity to maintain its power in Northeast Asia by becoming involved in the North Korean nuclear issue with other great powers.

There are some examples to show that Russia wanted to solve the nuclear problem through the Six-Party Talks and supported the shift of the Bush administration in 2007. Russia played an important role in solving the BDA problem. North Korea asked the United States to unfreeze and transfer \$25 million held in the BDA, but it was difficult to find a solution in the United States since "for four months a bureaucratic and political knot had held up this transfer."⁷⁶⁸ Ultimately, the Far Eastern

⁷⁶⁶ Georgy Toloraya, "The Six Party Talks: A Russian Perspective," *Asian Perspective* 32, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 45–69, <http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v32n4-d.pdf> (accessed on October 6, 2009).

⁷⁶⁷ Ha Yong-Chool and Shin Beom Shik, *Russian Nonproliferation Policy and The Korean Peninsula* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2006), 12. Also, available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB747.pdf> (accessed on October 6, 2009).

⁷⁶⁸ Joseph Ferguson, "U.S.-Russia Relations: Death of the 1990s," in *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relation* 10, no. 1, ed. Brad Glosserman and Carl Balker, (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, April 2008), 60, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0702q.pdf> (accessed on October 6, 2009).

Commercial Bank (Dalkombank) in Vladivostok received money from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that had been sent from the Banco Delta Asia.⁷⁶⁹ Then,

Dalkombank eventually transferred the money to North Korea. On June 23, 2007, the Russian Finance Ministry announced the completion of the transfer of funds from the BDA to North Korea through Dalkombank.⁷⁷⁰

Russia was the only member of the Six-Party Talks, besides the United States, that supplied heavy fuel oil to North Korea under the February 13 Agreement and continued to ask other members to carry out their obligations when the talks almost stalled in late 2008.⁷⁷¹ When South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myoung Hwan visited Moscow in September 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated, “We generally share the approaches and opinion that there should be measures to prevent breaks [in the six-party process]. We should leave behind the current phase and get back to implementation by all the countries of the agreements reached based on the principle of action for action.”⁷⁷²

Also, in April 2008, Christopher Hill admitted that U.S.-Russian cooperation on the North Korean nuclear problem was very important. He mentioned Russia’s significant role “in working out the outline of the future Northeast Asian security mechanism based on, among other things, Russian experience with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and in being instrumental in the practical aspects of future denuclearization.”⁷⁷³

⁷⁶⁹ Ferguson, “U.S.-Russia Relations,” 60.

⁷⁷⁰ Ferguson, “U.S.-Russia Relations,” 63.

⁷⁷¹ Toloraya, “The Six Party Talks,” 57.

⁷⁷² Ibid., 59, referring to “Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference Following Talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Yu Myung-hwan, Moscow, September 10, 2008,” www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/AA10D0AC3DED12CDC32574C1002D4BB1.

⁷⁷³ Ibid., 56, fn, 32, referring to Christopher Hill’s public address at Seattle University, April 17, 2008.

However, Bush's reassurance strategy did not generate Russia's full support for North Korea's reciprocity because of the deteriorated relations between Russia and the United States and Russia's dilemma between supporting Six-Party Talks and bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States in 2007 and 2008. First, the relationship between Russia and the United States had deteriorated in 2007 and 2008. Even though the United States and Russia found some common ground on North Korean nuclear issues in the Six-Party Talks, there were always sources of tensions between them. A Congressional Research Service report noted, "Relations between the United States and Russia appeared to reach a nadir in 2007-2008 with Putin's increasingly harsh criticism of the United States, sharp disagreements over Kosovo's independence, the proposed U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, and Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008."⁷⁷⁴ The Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 was "the most serious source of tensions between Russia and the United States since the end of the Cold War."⁷⁷⁵ The deteriorated relationship between Russia and the United States did not help the progress of Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea and North Korea's positive response. In sum, under the deteriorated circumstances between Russia and the United States in 2007 and 2008, Russia could not strongly ask North Korea to respond positively to Bush's reassurance strategy.

Second, even though Russia supported the Six-Party Talks, Russia understood the importance of the bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea. Russia believed that the important motivating factor of North Korea's nuclear program was regime survival and that the United States' security guarantee was essential. Therefore, Russia supported the "collective security assurance" plan to provide North Korea with a security guarantee as well as bilateral talks between the United States and

⁷⁷⁴ Jim Nichol, William H. Cooper, Carl Ek, Steven Woehrel, Amy F. Woolf, Steven A. Hildreth, and Vincent Morelli, "Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests," *CRS Report*, July 27, 2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 1.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Summary.

North Korea.⁷⁷⁶ However, the bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea reduced the role of Russia in the Six-Party Talks.

Russia basically welcomed Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea in 2007 because Russia wanted to solve the North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and a collective security mechanism. However, there was limited support because the relationship between Russia and the United States had tensions in 2007 and 2008 caused by different views on other areas such as U.S. missile defense, NATO expansion, and Russia's invasion of Georgia.

(2) Russia's Limited Leverage over North Korea. Russia has significantly lost its leverage over North Korea since the end of the Cold War and such trends continued in 2007 and 2008 because of economic and political reasons. Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery point out, "Russian reforms and the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the priority of the DPRK in the strategy of Russian foreign policy."⁷⁷⁷ Russia's refusal to host the Six-Party Talks showed that even though Russia has an important interest on the Korean peninsula, Russia did not consider it as a top priority issue and that Russia did not need to play an active role. When Kim Jong Il asked President Putin to host the meeting, Putin refused "because of continuing Chinese efforts to mediate between the United States and North Korea."⁷⁷⁸

China has become a more important actor than Russia since the Cold War. Russia has a fundamentally different political system since 1991 and has had economic problems since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Russia has been unwilling to provide generous economic benefits to North Korea. In 1991, the Soviet Union also

⁷⁷⁶ Ha and Shin, *Russian Nonproliferation Policy*, 19–20.

⁷⁷⁷ Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis," *CRS Report for Congress*, August 14, 2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 57.

⁷⁷⁸ Ha and Shin, *Russian Nonproliferation Policy*, 23, referring to Tadashi Ito, "PRC Source Cited on Putin Rejecting Kim Chong-Il's Request to Host Talks in Russia," *Sankei Shimbun*, September 9, 2003.

established diplomatic relations with South Korea over protests from North Korea.⁷⁷⁹ Recent statistics show that North Korea is not an important partner for Russia. According to Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “In 2008, North Korea ranked 107th among Russia’s sources of imports (below Jamaica and Ghana) and 92nd in terms of markets for Russian exports (below the Virgin Islands and Gibraltar). The increasing volume of Russian mineral fuel exports to the DPRK has moved Russia past Japan, Germany, and Thailand to become North Korea’s third largest trading partner.”⁷⁸⁰

The comparison between Russia’s merchandise trade with North Korea between 2006 and 2008 (Table 3.14) and China’s trade during the same period (Table 3.13) shows that the role of China had increased significantly. While trade between North Korea and China in general increased by 13 percent in 2007 and 41 percent in 2008, trade between North Korea and Russia decreased by 24 percent in 2007 and 31 percent in 2008 (Table 3.14):

Table 3.14. Russia’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 2006–2008⁷⁸¹

(millions of U.S. dollars)				
Year	Russia’s Imports	Russia’s Exports	Total Trade	Russia’s Balance
2006	20.076	190.563	210.639	170.487
2007	33.539	126.068	159.607	92.529
2008	13.519	97.005	110.524	83.486

Russia’s role in the North Korean nuclear issue was also restrained by political reasons. Even though Russia supported continuous Six-Party Talks to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, Russia’s role in the Six-Party Talks has been limited

⁷⁷⁹ For the Soviet/Russian Policy on the Korean policy in the 1980s and 1990s, refer to James Clay Moltz, “Russia and the Two Koreas: The Dilemmas of ‘Dual Engagement,’” *The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 6, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 380–395.

⁷⁸⁰ Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, “North Korea,” 58.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid. Sources: Russian data as supplied by World Trade Atlas.

by bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea, especially in 2008. Joseph Ferguson explained Russia's dissatisfaction with the progress of the Six-Party Talks in the early 2008. He said, "It is not only the obstreperous behavior of Pyongyang that is said to have been wearing on Russian negotiators, but more so the fact that the recent series of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea have essentially sidelined the other players, especially Russia and Japan."⁷⁸² Ferguson also analyzed the role of Russia in East Asia during the second quarter of 2008 and concluded that Russia lost both leverage over North Korea and its role in the Six-Party Talks. According to Ferguson:

No matter what happens in Korea, it is clear by now that Russia is playing little to no political role, which I suppose is better than playing a spoiler's role, as many accuse them of doing in Iran. The Kremlin's inability to gain a larger role has surely vexed them, but the process of the Six-Party Talks now seems almost bilateral (also to Japan and South Korea's chagrin).⁷⁸³

When the Six-Party Talks almost collapsed in late 2008, Russia's efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks by persuading all members to have meetings and implement the 2007 agreements failed. In sum, Russia lost its leverage over North Korea and it could not persuade North Korea's reciprocity. However, there is also not much evidence showing that Russia prevented North Korea from offering a positive response.

Consequently, both China and Russia perceived Bush's reassurance strategy implemented through the Six-Party Talks in 2007, as a correct decision to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, and supported it. However, they were unwilling to pressure North Korea to the full extent possible, especially China, due to fear of the negative implications. In sum, Bush's reassurance could not generate China's and Russia's full support for North Korea's reciprocity because they had limited

⁷⁸² Joseph Ferguson, "U.S.-Russia Relations: Weathering the Storm," in *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relation* 10, no. 1, ed. Brad Glosserman and Carl Balkar, (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, April 2008), 51, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0801qus_russia.pdf (accessed on October 6, 2009).

⁷⁸³ Ferguson, "U.S.-Russia Relations," 58.

leverage over North Korea. Therefore, the U.S. efforts to solve the North Korean problem through the Six-Party Talks could not lead to success.

E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY

Question 13: Was there any positive response to Bush's reassurance strategy from North Korea? Or, was there no response or rejection from North Korea, followed by an increase in tensions?

There were some positive responses from North Korea in 2007 and 2008 to Bush's reassurance strategy. The two agreements in the Six-Party Talks on February 13 (the first phase action) and October 3, 2007 (the second phase action) to implement the September 19, 2005 Agreement and the following actions such as the completion of eight disablement steps at Yongbyon out of 11 total steps are good examples. However, the Six Party Talks on December 8–12, 2008 ended in a stalemate. The 2007 agreements ended with just a statement of good intentions without substantial actions or denuclearization of North Korea. Furthermore, tension has increased since late 2008 and North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, Memorial Day in the United States. It appears that Bush's reassurance strategy for dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons program in 2007 and 2008 was a total failure.

1. Rejection from North Korea on Verification Protocol

The breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in December 2008 came from North Korea's objection to some of the verification measures and its refusal to make a written agreement. After Christopher Hill's visit to North Korea in October 2008, U.S. officials asserted that North Korea had made a verbal agreement on two key issues: "potential access to facilities not included in Pyongyang's nuclear declaration and permission for inspectors to take environmental samples from facilities to determine how much plutonium had been produced."⁷⁸⁴ The United States removed North Korea from the

⁷⁸⁴ Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Doesn't Agree to Written Nuclear Pact; Earlier Assurances Contradicted, U.S. says," *Washington Post*, December 12, 2008, A22.

State Sponsors of Terrorism List based on the agreement. However, in December 2008, North Korea rejected the verbal agreement and balked at agreeing to any written plan. After the talks on December 8–12, 2008, Christopher Hill said that the talks failed “because North Korea was not ready to reach a verification protocol with all the standards that are required.”⁷⁸⁵ He also said, “The North Koreans don’t want to put into writing what they are willing to put into words.”⁷⁸⁶

The primary issue of disagreement was sampling, which “allows inspectors to analyze materials, equipment, or the environment around facilities to gather information about substances of relevance to a nuclear program.”⁷⁸⁷ Even though U.S. officials seemed to believe that sampling as a verification measure had been agreed to, North Korea asserted that “it is only required at this point to carry out the limited verification steps agreed in writing with United States in October 2008, which did not include sampling provisions.”⁷⁸⁸

Also, North Korea claimed that the verification measures were not included in the 2007 agreements. Peter Crail said, “North Korea asserted that it was not obligated to address verification at all at the point in the negotiations because six-party agreements in October 2007 outlining the sequence for the current phase of North Korea’s denuclearization did not require concluding a verification protocol.”⁷⁸⁹ North Korea insisted that sampling was a “third phase” step which could be reached after the other five members completed their commitments in the 2007 agreements such as shipments of one million tons of heavy fuel oil.⁷⁹⁰

In response to North Korea’s refusal to accept the verification protocol, the United States halted energy assistance to North Korea. Sean McCormack, a Department

⁷⁸⁵ Kessler, “N. Korea Doesn’t Agree.”

⁷⁸⁶ Steven Lee Myers, “In Setback for Bush, Korea Nuclear Talks Collapse,” *New York Times*, December 12, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/world/asia/12korea.html> (accessed on October 3, 2009).

⁷⁸⁷ Crail, “Six-Party Talks Stall.”

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid.

of State spokesperson, said, “there is an understanding among the parties...that fuel oil shipments will not go forward absent progress.”⁷⁹¹ North Korea responded to the halt of energy assistance with a threat to slow the speed of disablement. There has been no progress since the stalemate in December 2008. Rather, the situation has gotten worse and North Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests in 2009.

2. North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests in 2009

Tension escalated since the stalemate of the Six-Party Talks in late 2008 and continued after the end of Bush’s presidency. Barack Obama has not proposed any radically new approach to North Korea since Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008. Obama recognized Bush’s shift in 2007. Obama said in September 2008, “When we re-engaged—because, again, the Bush administration reversed course on this—then we have at least made some progress, although right now, because of the problems in North Korea, we are seeing it on shaky ground.”⁷⁹²

During the early period of the Obama administration, there were North Korea’s April 5, 2009 launch of a Taepo Dong-2 and May 25, 2009 nuclear test. Even though these activities were conducted during the Obama administration, they demonstrated that the Bush administration’s efforts in 2007 and 2008 to prevent North Korea from continuing its nuclear program had resulted in failure. Some scholars argue that the United States should temporarily accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Charles Armstrong said:

The goal of these talks must go beyond the elimination of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. We may already be past the point of North Korea giving up its nuclear deterrent, and for the time being will have to live with a nuclear North Korea. But ultimately, viewing North Korea purely through the lens of nuclear non-proliferation is a mistake, North Korea’s belligerence, including its nuclear weapons program, is the result of its ongoing conflict with the U.S., not a cause. Therefore the goal of dealing

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Myers, “In Setback for Bush, Korea Nuclear Talks Collapse.”

with Pyongyang should be to eliminate of the root cause of the current crisis: the state of war.⁷⁹³

According to the KCNA, North Korea claimed that the second nuclear test was successful and the purpose of test was for self-defense and protection of sovereignty and socialism:

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way as requested by its scientists and technicians.⁷⁹⁴

On June 12, 2009, the United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea's second nuclear test and unanimously passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which puts in place a series of sanctions on several types of activities and calls on UN members to inspect cargo vessels suspected of carrying military material in or out of North Korea.⁷⁹⁵ In September 2009, besides conducting the nuclear test, North Korea claimed that it was "in the 'concluding stage' of tests to enrich uranium."⁷⁹⁶

Consequently, Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 eventually did not succeed in achieving its denuclearization objectives. Rather, there was a significant increase of tension in early 2009. Therefore, Bush's reassurance strategy can be categorized as a case of failure of reassurance strategy without tension reduction or the completion of dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.

⁷⁹³ Charles K. Armstrong, "Responding to Kim's Latest Provocation," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 172, no.5 (June 2009): 32.

⁷⁹⁴ KCNA, "KCNA Report on One More Successful Underground Nuclear Test," May 25, 2009.


⁷⁹⁵ Nikitin et al., "North Korea's Second Nuclear Test."

⁷⁹⁶ David E. Sanger, "N. Korea Reports Advances in Enriching Uranium," *New York Times*, September 3, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/asia/04korea.html> (accessed on September 9, 2009).

F. OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION

1. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes

In this case study, there were no changes in leaders' perceptions of both the United States and North Korea. Also, there was no support from domestic politics and either no support or only limited support from alliance politics of both the United States and North Korea. In sum, all six intervening variables were not favorable to the success of reassurance strategy. Therefore, the outcomes of the hypotheses applied to the case of the United States and North Korea during the Bush administration in 2007 and 2008 can be summarized as follows (Figure 3.6):



Circumstances and relations between a sending state and a receiving state		North Korea's motivating factors
- Unfavorable balance of power to North Korea - Low interdependence - Constant enemy identity - Aversion to war	→	Mixed (Greedy and insecure)

Figure 3.6. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)

2. Results of Hypotheses

The conditions of failure of Bush's reassurance strategy can be explained by the result of the hypotheses.

Result of hypotheses:

H1: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter Bush's beliefs and perceptions about Kim Jong Il and North Korea.

H2: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions about Bush and the United States.

H3: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in the United States towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter domestic politics in North Korea towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter alliance politics of the United States (South Korea and Japan) towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 was *less* likely to succeed when it could not alter alliance politics of North Korea (China and Russia) towards support for foreign policy change, though in this case more because the allies lacked leverage than because of any opposition to a positive response.

Consequently, all intervening variables provided negative conditions for success of Bush's reassurance strategy. Because leaders' perceptions, domestic and alliance politics of the United States and North Korea did not offer any positive conditions for success, Bush's reassurance strategy was less likely to succeed. Also, it is worth considering the primary reasons for these negative conditions. The persistence of enemy

identity and Hobbesian culture between North Korea and the United States are the main factors to influence leaders' perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of North Korea and the United States.

3. Conclusion

a. Importance of Knowing the Circumstances Between the Sending and Receiving States and the Motivating Factors of the Receiving State

The main difference between hard-liner and soft-liner approaches toward North Korea is an assumption about the intentions and nature of North Korea. However, North Korea's intentions are not clear because it has both "greedy" and "not-greedy" motivating factors. Yet, it is important to understand the "not-greedy" motivating factors for the implementation of reassurance strategy. Not only capability, but also motivation, is a very important factor for knowing your enemy and yourself.

The circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states from various perspectives—realist, liberal, and constructivist—should be considered to understand the motivating factors because they affect the formation of the motivating factors. In this case study, it is seen that one perspective is not likely to adequately explain the relationship between the circumstances and relations and the motivating

factors. Even though there is no economic interdependence between the United States and North Korea, the balance of power and identity are important factors in North Korea's motivating factors. Also, the circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states influence leaders' perceptions and domestic and alliance politics. Both the unfavorable balance of power toward North Korea and mutual enemy identities of the United States and North Korea are related. Therefore, it is important to understand the context of the relationship in order to comprehend the motivating factors and possibility of success of the reassurance strategy.

The United States has been focusing more on North Korea's "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors than on its "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" ones. The consideration of North Korea's "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors is necessary for knowing the enemy and improving policymaking. Domestic and alliance politics of the United States have been more likely to support the view that North Korea has only "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors. In sum, Bush's reassurance strategy failed because of the lack of consideration of the "not-greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors of North Korea by his administration, and by important actors in domestic and alliance politics.

b. Importance of Leaders' Perceptions, Domestic Politics, and Alliance Politics of the Sending and Receiving States

Prospects for a reassurance strategy must be viewed in the context of individual, domestic, and international factors of both sending and receiving states. The case study of the Bush administration's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008 toward North Korea shows that the cognition of leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the United States and North Korea did not alter; therefore, Bush's reassurance strategy ended in failure. The mutually preoccupied enemy images of the United States and North Korea affected the cognition of leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics, which are difficult to alter in a short time period. In the case study, the implementation of the reassurance strategy was constrained by domestic and alliance politics. The implementation of the reassurance strategy was met by a rise in opposition from domestic

politics and alliance politics. Therefore, to implement a reassurance strategy successfully, it is important to know how to make the opponents of the reassurance strategy from domestic politics and allies accept its necessity.

Also, domestic and alliance politics of the receiving state are important factors for the success of a reassurance strategy. The domestic conditions of North Korea in 2008 made it less likely to respond positively to Bush's reassurance strategy. China and Russia, as allies of North Korea, could not fully support Bush's reassurance strategy because of their limited leverage over North Korea. With almost everything working against it, it is not surprising that reassurance failed in this case.

IV. CASE III: A SUCCESSFUL REASSURANCE STRATEGY CASE (GORBACHEV'S REASSURANCE STRATEGY)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. A Successful Reassurance Case Between the Soviet Union and the United States

The end of the Cold War has been a very attractive subject for study because not only was it not expected but ambiguity still exists as to its causes. There have been vigorous debates about the American role in ending the Cold War. Some scholars, politicians, and defense decision makers believe that the strong deterrence strategy of the United States, especially the Reagan administration's hard line policy, led to the end of the Cold War. Former Vice President Dan Quayle claimed, "We were right to increase our defense budget."⁷⁹⁷ The columnist Tom Wicker also noted that Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and military buildup "seemed to impress the Soviets as a challenge that they might not be able to meet."⁷⁹⁸

Others argue that Gorbachev's unilateral initiation of reassurance strategies to search for an accommodation with the United States ended the Cold War.⁷⁹⁹ Furthermore, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein argue that Reagan's hard-line foreign policy was counterproductive. They say, "The Carter-Reagan military buildup did not defeat the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it prolonged the Cold War."⁸⁰⁰ While scholars have argued about the role of the Reagan administration's policy in the end of the Cold War, this outcome is almost impossible to explain in any simple way because it involved so many intertwined causal factors.

⁷⁹⁷ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Reagan and the Russians," *Atlantic*, February 1994, www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/reagrus.htm (accessed on April 5, 2009).

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 3rd ed., ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 216–7.

⁸⁰⁰ Lebow and Stein, "Reagan and the Russians."

Although the causes of the end of the Cold War remained debated, two historical developments that can be clearly recognized are the implementation of a reassurance strategy by Gorbachev and positive responses from the Reagan administration. U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s can be divided into two distinct periods. There was a strategy change from the 1981-1985 period of deterrence-dominant strategy to the 1985-1989 period of negotiation-dominant strategy, a change that resulted from Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. Gorbachev's reassurance strategy is a good example of successful reassurance strategy because it induced the shift in national security policy from the first Reagan administration to the second. Gorbachev tried to persuade the United States that the Soviet Union had no intentions to attack the United States. He wanted to reduce tensions and avoid war through that reassurance strategy. Finally, tensions and the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States were reduced significantly by the end of the Reagan presidency.

This chapter explores the incentives for use and the conditions of success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy including the causes of change in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union from a deterrence strategy to acceptance of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. It argues that changes in Gorbachev's and Reagan's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States were all associated with the changes in U.S. strategic policy and the success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy.

2. Variables

Based on the main research question, the relationship among possible factors associated with the success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy can be drawn in a diagram as independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV), intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). The independent variable is the implementation of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy and dependent variable is its success or failure.

There are six intervening variables that affect the dependent variable: (1) Gorbachev's beliefs and perceptions about Reagan and the United States; (2) Reagan's beliefs and perceptions about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union; (3) the domestic politics of the Soviet Union; (4) the domestic politics of the United States; (5) the alliance politics of

the Soviet Union; and (6) the alliance politics of the United States. Also, two condition variables—the circumstances and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and the United States’ motivating factors—are included in the hypotheses. The hypotheses and all variables can be drawn as in Figures 4.1 and 4.2:




Figure 4.1 Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)⁸⁰¹

⁸⁰¹ Van Evera, *Guidance to Methods*, 7–48.




Figure 4.2 Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (the Sending State, the Receiving State and CV)

3. Hypotheses

The main focus of this dissertation is on the conditions that lead to success or failure of reassurance strategy. The hypotheses of this case study are as follows:

H1: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it altered Gorbachev's beliefs and perceptions about Reagan and the United States.

H2: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it altered Reagan's beliefs and perceptions about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.

H3: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it altered domestic politics in the Soviet Union towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it altered domestic politics in the United States towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it altered alliance politics of the Soviet Union towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed if it altered alliance politics of the Soviet Union towards support for foreign policy change.

If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy would have been influenced by the six intervening variables (leader's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States).

4. Chronology

A chronological narrative of the Gorbachev period will help to elucidate the main argument and hypotheses with their various variables. The main events show that there was a shift in national security policy from the first Reagan administration to the second. Therefore, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was a successful case of reassurance strategy.

Table 4.1 The First Reagan Administration (1981–1985) before Gorbachev: Intensification of the Cold War and Military Build Up

1981	January 20	Reagan was sworn in as the 40th president of the United States after the landslide victory over Jimmy Carter.
	March 30	Reagan was shot in the chest in front of a Washington hotel in an assassination attempt by John Hinckley, Jr.

1982	June 8	In a speech to the British House of Commons, Reagan said, “the march of freedom and democracy...will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash of heap of history.”
	November 8-10	Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev died. Yuri Andropov succeeded.
1983	March 8	Reagan denounced the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” in the speech to the National Associate of Evangelicals.
	March 23	Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
	September 1	Soviet military shot down South Korean commercial flight KAL 007, killing 269 passengers, including 61 Americans.
	October 25	U.S. troops invaded Grenada to oust Marxists who had overthrown the government.
	November 2-11	NATO forces conducted Able Archer 83, a military exercise testing chain-of-command procedures for nuclear weapons; the CIA reports that Soviet officials feared it was the start of a surprise nuclear attack.
	November 20	ABC television aired <i>The Day After</i> , dramatizing the impact of nuclear war on a single town in Kansas.
	November 23	American Pershing II missiles are deployed in West Germany.
1984	January 16-17	Reagan called for a return to arms talks with the Soviet Union. Reagan met at White House with Suzanne Massie and sent her to Moscow as intermediary.
	February 9-13	Andropov died and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko.
	November 6	Reagan won reelection with 59 percent popular vote (525 electoral votes).

Table 4.2 Gorbachev and the Second Reagan Administration (1985–1989):
Gorbachev’s Reassurance Strategy and Reagan’s Acceptance

1985	March 10-11	Chernenko died. Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader.
	April	Gorbachev announced a temporary moratorium on INF missile deployment.
	August	Gorbachev imposed a unilateral nuclear test moratorium to the end of the year.
	November 19-21	Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time in Geneva.
1986	January 15	Gorbachev unveiled a proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free world by 2000.
	January	Gorbachev extended the nuclear-testing moratorium to the end of March
	February 25 - March 6	The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was held in Moscow and announced the fundamental principles (see Appendix M).
	March	Gorbachev extended the nuclear-testing moratorium to August.
	April 26	Soviet nuclear disaster occurred at Chernobyl.
	August 13	Reagan called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down.
	August 18	Gorbachev extended the nuclear-testing moratorium to the end of the year.
	August 30	Soviets detained American reporter Nicholas Daniloff in response to American arrest of a Soviet diplomat on spying charges.
	September 28-30	U.S. and Soviet officials announced a deal for Daniloff’s release. Shortly afterward, the White House announced that Reagan and Gorbachev would meet again soon in Reykjavik.
1987	October 11-12	At Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev discuss dramatic cutbacks in missiles and nuclear weapons, but no agreement was reached.
	February 28	Gorbachev announced Soviet Union was willing to try to conclude a treaty limiting intermediate-range missiles in Europe, without insisting that it be part of a larger agreement.

	May 27-28	In East Berlin, Gorbachev persuaded Eastern European leaders to approve new military doctrine in which Warsaw Pact is considered a strictly defensive alliance.
	May 28	West German teenager Matthias Rust flew Cessna plane through Soviet air defenses to Moscow; Gorbachev responded by shaking up Soviet military command.
	June 12	Reagan, in West Berlin, delivered a speech calling on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.”
	September 7	With Soviet acquiescence, Erick Honecker made his first visit to West Germany.
	December 8-10	Reagan and Gorbachev held a summit in Washington, concluded INF Treaty.
1988	May 27	U.S. Senate ratified INF Treaty.
	May 29-June 1	Reagan visited Moscow, said his description of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” was from “another time and another era.”
	November 8	Bush won the presidency.
	December 7	At United Nations, Gorbachev announced troop reductions and held brief meeting at New York’s Governor’s Island with Reagan and Bush.

Table 4.3 Gorbachev and the Bush Administration (1990–1991): Gorbachev’s Reassurance Strategy and Bush’s Acceptance

1990	February 4	Massive pro-democracy demonstrations were held in Moscow and elsewhere.
	June 1-3	Gorbachev and Bush had a summit meeting in Washington.
1991	July 31	The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed.
	August 19-21	Hard-liners in the Soviet leadership launched the August coup and Gorbachev was placed under house arrest in the Crimea.
	December 25	Gorbachev resigned as a president of the Soviet Union, which officially ceased to exist.

B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV): THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY (GORBACHEV'S REASSURANCE STRATEGY)

1. Coexistence or Security Guarantee

Question 1: Did Gorbachev's reassurance strategy communicate its willingness to accept coexistence with or offer a security guarantee to the United States?

a. *Gorbachev's Willingness for Coexistence*

Gorbachev tried to communicate the Soviet Union's willingness to accept coexistence at every opportunity. Gorbachev wanted to reform the Soviet Union. For the success of his reforms, he communicated that his policies toward the United States were based on the concept of peaceful coexistence and that he would seek to reassure the United States of his benign intentions. Gorbachev emphasized the importance of coexistence and tried to communicate his willingness to accept coexistence consistently. When Gorbachev met Vice President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State George Schultz, and Ambassador Arthur Hartman in the Kremlin on March 13, 1985, he expressed his willingness to accept coexistence with the United States. Gorbachev said:

The USSR has no expansionist ambitions....The USSR has never intended to fight the United States and does not have any intentions now. There have never been such madmen in the Soviet leadership, and there are none now. The Soviets respect your right to run your own country the way you see fit....As to the question of which is the better system, this is something for history to judge.⁸⁰²

In the same month of 1985, Gorbachev sent his first letter to Reagan and reemphasized his acceptance of coexistence with the United States:

Our countries are different by their social systems, by the ideologies dominant in them. But we believe that this should not be a reason for animosity. Each social system has a right to life, and it should prove its advantage not by force, not by military means, but on the path of peaceful

⁸⁰² Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 338.

competition with the other system. And all people have the right to go the way they have chose themselves, without anybody imposing his will on them from outside.⁸⁰³

Reagan responded warmly and sent Congressman Thomas P. (“Tip”) O’Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Moscow. Gorbachev then expressed his acceptance of peaceful coexistence to O’Neill. Gorbachev said, “A fatal conflict of interest between our countries is not inevitable. There is a way out, namely, peaceful coexistence, the recognition that each nation has the right to live as it wishes. There is no other alternative.”⁸⁰⁴ In 1986, Gorbachev reiterated, peaceful coexistence must “become the supreme and universal principle of interstate relations.”⁸⁰⁵ Gorbachev also emphasized that he had no intention to attack any allies of the United States. He said, “Never, under any circumstances, will our country begin military operations against Western Europe unless we and our allies are attacked by NATO! I repeat, never!”⁸⁰⁶

When Reagan visited Moscow between May 29 and June 1, 1988, Gorbachev proposed to the United States a joint proscription of military force based on the concept of coexistence. His proposal stated:

...the two leaders believe that no problem in dispute can be resolved, nor should it be resolved, by military means. They regard *peaceful coexistence* as a universal principle of international relations. Equality of all states, noninterference in internal affairs, and freedom of sociopolitical choice must be recognized as the inalienable and mandatory standards of international relations. (Emphasis added)⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰³ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 377.

⁸⁰⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev, *On My Country and the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 181; Reagan to Gorbachev, April 4, 1985, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State, USSR, box 39, RRPL, quoted in Leffler, 378.

⁸⁰⁵ Political Report of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, February 25, 1986, FBIS, March 28, 1986, O 33, O 29, quoted in Leffler, 389.

⁸⁰⁶ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 203.

⁸⁰⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, May 29, 1988, box 3, End of Cold War Collection, NSA, quoted in Leffler, 418–9 and *Washington Post*, “Gorbachev’s ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ Draft; Final Text,” June 2, 1988, A24.

In December 1988, in his United Nations address, Gorbachev emphasized again “peaceful coexistence” and each country’s “freedom of choice” of social system.”⁸⁰⁸

b. *The Meaning of Gorbachev’s Coexistence*

Gorbachev’s concept of coexistence reflected the recognition of the economic problems that had developed under socialism in the Soviet Union. He believed that peaceful coexistence was necessary to implement his reforms. Peaceful coexistence had been used by previous Soviet leaders and the meaning changed depending on the leader and the situation. Some scholars analyzed the concept of Gorbachev’s meaning of coexistence by comparing it with Khrushchev’s or Brezhnev’s.

According to William H. Luers, Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence had the notion that “while the United States and the Soviet Union should not go to war or interfere in one another’s internal affairs, the rest of the world was free game; the ‘class struggle’ and ‘ideological struggle’ would intensify to hasten the inevitable triumph of socialism. And war, although not ‘inevitable,’ still was a means of bringing about the end of capitalism.”⁸⁰⁹ George Kennan analyzed Khrushchev’s address and concluded that “So long as the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continue to hold that truth is what is useful to the interests of the Party that people should believe, regardless of how preposterous or absurd this may be in the light of objective evidence...even those people in other parts of the world who might most earnestly wish for coexistence as Mr. Khrushchev has defined it will have to put restraints on their hopes and expectations.”⁸¹⁰ Later, the concept of peaceful coexistence was used to justify the Brezhnev Doctrine that required “‘socialist’ states to stay ‘socialist.’”⁸¹¹ According to Jack F. Matlock, Jr., “‘Peaceful coexistence was supposed to apply only to ‘states with different social

⁸⁰⁸ Address by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 43rd U.N. General Assembly Session, December 7, 1988, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/1988-1107.Gorbachev.pdf> (accessed on October 28, 2009).

⁸⁰⁹ William H. Luers, “Gorbachev Cleans up a Cliché Khrushchev’s ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ Was a Ruse,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 27, 1988, 8.

⁸¹⁰ George F. Kennan, “Peaceful Coexistence,” *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 2 (January 1960): 190.

⁸¹¹ Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 307.

systems.’ This allowed ‘socialist states’ to follow a different principle in relations with each other, such as invading a neighbor to ‘preserve socialism.’”⁸¹²

In contrast, Gorbachev’s “peaceful coexistence” had a different meaning because it was not a form of class struggle or ideological struggle followed by revolution or war. It was to be understood as a factor of different circumstances. Gorbachev considered capitalism as a rival to compete against not an enemy to eliminate. Luers says, “The certitude and ideological arrogance of Khrushchev is muted. Gorbachev is a true believer but he does not daily preach the triumph of communism. In fact, much of his book and his daily message to the Soviet people is that socialism is a mess and needs fixing.”⁸¹³ Gorbachev thought that peaceful coexistence with the United States was necessary to focus on his reform and make Soviet socialism stronger.

Consequently, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was implemented with the continuous expression of Gorbachev’s willingness to accept coexistence with the United States to implement his reforms and win in the competition against capitalism.

2. Incentives for Use of Gorbachev’s Reassurance Strategy

Question 2: What was the incentive for Gorbachev’s use of a reassurance strategy?

Gorbachev faced external and internal difficulties when he took office. When he decided to accept the position of General Secretary in March 1985, he said, “We can’t go on living like this.”⁸¹⁴ To overcome those difficulties, he needed to start a reassurance strategy through arms control rather than a deterrence strategy through arms buildup. Externally, the primary concern was the nuclear threat. The increased tension with the United States during the first Reagan administration raised the possibility of war, especially nuclear war. These circumstances brought Gorbachev to embrace “new

⁸¹² Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 298.

⁸¹³ Luers, “Gorbachev Cleans up.”

⁸¹⁴ David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy* (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 187. Also, see Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991*, updated ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 111.

thinking (*novoye mishleniye*)” in foreign policy. The Chernobyl accident confirmed his beliefs about the dangers of nuclear war. Also, the difficult situation in Afghanistan motivated him to consider a reassurance strategy. The Soviet Union could not continue that war and needed to consider a new solution.

Internally, a difficult economic situation was another incentive. Also, the Soviet Union had social problems such as corruption. Gorbachev introduced *perestroika* (restructuring) for the economic and social development of the Soviet Union. For the success of *perestroika*, Gorbachev needed to reduce the burden of defense and improve the relationship with the United States. Gorbachev acknowledged those problems, which he described as “an avalanche of problems.”⁸¹⁵ He wrote in his memoirs:

On taking office as General Secretary in 1985 I was immediately faced with an avalanche of problems. It was vital to change our relationship with the West, particularly the United States, and to bring the costly and dangerous arms race to an end. We needed to withdraw from the damaging and costly war in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union faced tremendous internal problems. The process of reform required new leadership and courage. Long term problems needed to be addressed as soon as possible.⁸¹⁶

a. *External Problems: The Nuclear Threat and Difficulty in Afghanistan*

Gorbachev reevaluated the nuclear threat and concluded that nuclear war could not be won and the arms race would increase tension rather than bring stability. Gorbachev argued that his peace proposals were motivated by his understating that world peace could only be achieved by mutual understanding and reciprocity, especially cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the 27th Party Congress from February 25 to March 6, 1986, Gorbachev pointed out his view on security issues such as the nuclear threat. Gorbachev gave a report at the Party Congress which contained the following statements:

⁸¹⁵ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Bantam Book, 1997), 219.

⁸¹⁶ Ibid.

The policy of all-out struggle and military confrontation does not have a future....The arms race, like nuclear war itself, cannot be won....We must follow a path of co-operation to create a comprehensive system of international security....Therefore, security is a political problem, and it can be solved only by political means.⁸¹⁷

The Chernobyl nuclear accident on April 26, 1986, was a significant event that allowed Gorbachev to really experience a nuclear radiation disaster. Gorbachev's beliefs about the necessity of arms control, especially the reduction of nuclear weapons, became more consolidated. Gorbachev said, in a televised address, that "what an abyss will open if nuclear war befalls mankind. For inherent in the nuclear arsenals stockpiled are thousands upon thousands of disasters far more horrible than the Chernobyl one."⁸¹⁸ On May 5, Gorbachev also told the Politburo that "In one moment, we felt what a nuclear war is."⁸¹⁹ Also, on May 28, in a secret speech at the Foreign Ministry, Gorbachev solicited all possible efforts of the diplomats to "stop the nuclear arms race."⁸²⁰ David E. Hoffman pointed out, "Gorbachev, who in January called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, suddenly was faced with a real-time, catastrophic example of what the world might be like after a nuclear explosion, and it was even more frightening than he could have guessed."⁸²¹

The difficult situation in Afghanistan was another incentive for his reassurance strategy. On November 13, 1986, Gorbachev told the Politburo:

We must not waste time! We have been fighting for six years! Some say, if we continue the same way, it may be going on for another 20 or 30 years. And this is what's going to happen. People have raised the question: are we going to stay there forever? Or should we end this war? If we don't it will be a complete disgrace. Our strategic goal is to wrap up the war in one, maximum two years, and pull out the troops.⁸²²

⁸¹⁷ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 237–8.

⁸¹⁸ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 252.

⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁸²² *Ibid.*, 274.

Before Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985, the number of Soviet troops killed in action in Afghanistan was more than 9,000 and about 230,000 troops were wounded or ill.⁸²³ During the first two years after Gorbachev took office, the situation in Afghanistan had not improved. From May 1985 to December 1986, 2,745 soldiers died and more than 100,000 troops were wounded.⁸²⁴ In the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev described the war in Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.”⁸²⁵

Gorbachev needed a new approach to change this situation. His beliefs about the nuclear threat and the difficulties in Afghanistan inspired him to adopt and implement “new thinking (*novoye mishleniye*).” Fundamentally, this concept recognized the importance of peaceful coexistence and pursued a more cooperative approach, such as arms control, rather than a competitive one of the arms race to reduce the nuclear threat. Peter Zwick summarized Gorbachev’s “new thinking”:

1. Peaceful coexistence must continue in a “civilized” and “polite” manner.
2. The USSR can no longer seek to preserve its security solely through military power. Political means must also be employed.
3. There is nothing to be gained from a military conflict with the United States.
4. Traditional nuclear deterrence theories must be replaced by nuclear disarmament.
5. There is little chance for socialist transformation in the West; if it does occur it will probably be peaceful.
6. A comprehensive system of international security based on mutual security achieved by political agreement must replace the current system of security based on military competition.⁸²⁶

⁸²³ Oleg Kulakov, “Lessons Learned from the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Implications for Russian Defense Reform,” in *Research Paper*, no. 26 (March 2006): 4–5, Rome, Italy: Academic Research Branch, NATO Defense College.

⁸²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁵ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 242.

⁸²⁶ Peter Zwick, “Soviet Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control under Gorbachev: New Thinking, New Policy,” in *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War*, 2nd ed., eds., Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 91.

Gorbachev reemphasized the motives behind his reassurance strategy through “new thinking” in his book, *Perestroika*. Gorbachev said, “Soviet leaders are vigorously seeking to translate this new thinking into action, primarily in the field of disarmament. This is what prompted the foreign policy initiatives we have honestly offered the world.”⁸²⁷ Gorbachev continued to express his aversion to nuclear war and the necessity of arms control in his speeches. In his address to the International Forum in 1987, Gorbachev said, “We made ourselves face the fact that the stockpiling and sophistication of nuclear armaments means that the human race has lost its immortality. It can be regained only by destroying nuclear weapons.”⁸²⁸ Gorbachev also explained that the reason for his reassurance strategy was to avoid the dangerous situation in the world with the possibility of war, especially nuclear war. Gorbachev said, “...the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion that the situation in the world was too dangerous to allow us to miss even the slightest chance for improvement and for more durable peace. We decided to try by persuasion, setting an example and demonstrating common sense, so as to reverse the dangerous course of events.”⁸²⁹

Also, in his speech at a dinner in honor of Margaret Thatcher, he said, “deterrence is a policy of blackmail and threats...[which] means subordination of politics to the interests of militarism.”⁸³⁰ In sum, external problems such as the nuclear threat and the difficulties in Afghanistan provided Gorbachev with incentives to consider a reassurance strategy because international stability and peace were necessary for Gorbachev to achieve his primary goal of making the Soviet Union better through reform.

⁸²⁷ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 12.

⁸²⁸ Zwick, “Soviet Nuclear Strategy,” 91, referring to Mikhail Gorbachev’s Address to Participants in the International Forum, “For a Nuclear Free World, for Survival of Humanity,” *Information Bulletin* (April 1987): 7.

⁸²⁹ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 225.

⁸³⁰ Ibid., referring to speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Dinner in Honor of Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain, *Information Bulletin* (June 1987): 3.

b. Internal Problems: Economic Stagnation and Political Problems

In addition to external problems, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was motivated by internal problems. Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet Union had serious economic and political problems and that tensions with the United States would not help solve them. Gorbachev thought that Soviet Communism was in danger because the Soviet economy was in such a bad condition. For the success of economic recovery, he thought it was necessary to shift resources from defense to the civilian economy. A continuous arms race would have been a burden to economic recovery. Matlock pointed out that "Gorbachev was eager for progress in controlling arms since it was plain that the Soviet economy was suffering from the overwhelming burden of military spending."⁸³¹ Gorbachev expressed his idea in the meeting with President Reagan at Reykjavik, Iceland. "Our goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race. If we do not accomplish it,...[w]e will be pulled into an arms race that is beyond our capabilities, and we will lose it, because we are at the limits of our capabilities."⁸³²

Gorbachev wanted to make agreements on arms control that would enable him to reduce defense spending and use the monies for economic development. Gorbachev said, "If we don't back down on some specific, maybe even important issues, if we won't budge from the positions we've held for a long time, we will lose in the end....We will be drawn into an arms race that we cannot manage. We will lose, because right now we are at the end of our tether."⁸³³

Gorbachev believed that Soviet politics should focus on internal problems rather than external problems. He recognized that socialism was in danger because Soviet internal politics were in bad shape. Continuous involvement abroad was a burden to revitalizing socialism. As Leffler explains, "Gorbachev's concern was revitalizing socialism at home, not spreading it abroad."⁸³⁴ Leffler also points out, "...to make reform

⁸³¹ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 115.

⁸³² Leffler, *For the Soul*, 376.

⁸³³ Anatoly S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 84.

⁸³⁴ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 413.

work at home, he needed to reassure the United States that the Kremlin was not seeking to take advantage of local strife and regional disputes to expand Soviet influence.”⁸³⁵

The Chernobyl nuclear accident showed not only the danger of nuclear weapons but also the internal problems within the Soviet system. Nobody knew what to do after the accident. The information was not reported to leadership. Some basic steps, such as issuing protection gear to emergency personnel, making announcements to the people and arranging evacuation of the population were not executed. Gorbachev’s emphasis on reform grew significantly after the Chernobyl accident. In a secret speech at the Foreign Ministry on May 28, Gorbachev urged the diplomats to push the effort to “stop the nuclear arms race.”⁸³⁶ And, at the Politburo meeting on July 3, 1986, Gorbachev said:

Chernobyl happened and nobody was ready—neither civil defense, nor medical departments, not even the minimum necessary number of radiation counters. The fire brigades don’t know what to do! The next day, people were having weddings not far away from the place. Children were playing outside. The warning system is no good! There was a cloud after the explosion. Did anyone monitor its movement?⁸³⁷

Consequently, Gorbachev recognized and wanted to solve external and internal problems. For that, a reassurance strategy toward the United States was necessary. Gorbachev believed that the success of reassurance could achieve security and create an opportunity to solve the Soviet economic and political problems. Gorbachev revealed his incentives in his memoirs. He said, “Fate had decided that, when I became head of state, it was already obvious that there was something wrong in this country....The reason was apparent even then—our society was stifled in the grip of a bureaucratic command system. Doomed to serve ideology and bear the heavy burden of the arms race, it was strained to the utmost.”⁸³⁸

⁸³⁵ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 409.

⁸³⁶ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 252, referring to Mikhail Gorbachev, *Gody Trudnykh Reshenii* [Years of Difficult Decisions] (Moscow: Alfa-print, 1993), 46–55.

⁸³⁷ Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 66. Also see *V Politburo*, 61–66.

⁸³⁸ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, xxxiv.

3. Implementation of Reassurance Strategy

Question 3: What kind of reassurance strategy did the Soviet Union offer to the United States during the Gorbachev era?

Gorbachev implemented his reassurance strategy through all five reassurance methods identified by Stein—restraint, norms of competition, irrevocable commitment, limited security regimes and reciprocal strategy like GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction). However, GRIT, restraint, and irrevocable commitment at summit meetings were the most significant and the other two strategies are included within those three.

a. Reassurance Through Reciprocity: GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction)

The main idea of Charles Osgood's GRIT is that a sending state implements continuous conciliatory actions to a receiving state, even without immediate reciprocation, as a way to eventually convince the other side that it is possible to reduce tensions and avoid war. Despite rejections from the United States in the early stages of Gorbachev's tenure, Gorbachev continued his reassurance strategy. The typical examples of Gorbachev's GRIT strategy were unilateral nuclear weapons moratoriums and their continuous extension.

Gorbachev's continuous announcements of nuclear-related moratoriums between 1985 and 1987 are good examples of reassurance through restraint. They are also examples of reassurance through GRIT because the series of actions were publicly announced in advance and carried out, regardless of the United States' reciprocation or lack of it. Even though the Reagan administration kept ignoring Gorbachev's actions and rejecting his demands, Gorbachev extended his nuclear testing moratorium in January, March, and August 1986, and January 1987.⁸³⁹ Gorbachev's unilateral nuclear moratoriums and their extensions are summarized in Table 4.4.

⁸³⁹ Richard A. Bitzinger, "Gorbachev and GRIT, 1985-89: Did Arms Control Succeed because of Unilateral Actions or in Spite of Them?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 15, no. 1 (April 1994):68-79.

Table 4.4 The Unilateral Nuclear Moratorium and Its Continuous Extension.⁸⁴⁰

Year	Month	Major Unilateral Actions
1985	April	Gorbachev announced a temporary moratorium on INF missile deployment.
	August	Gorbachev imposed a unilateral nuclear test moratorium to the end of the year.
1986	January	Gorbachev extended a test moratorium to the end of March.
	March	Gorbachev extended the test moratorium to August.
	August	Gorbachev extended the test moratorium to the end of the year.
1987	January	Gorbachev extended the test moratorium until the next U.S. nuclear test (which was held in late February)

The first case was Gorbachev's announcement of a moratorium on deployments of further SS-20 missiles until November 1985. Gorbachev made an announcement in April 1985 and invited reciprocation from the United States by saying that that he would continue a moratorium "if the United States would stop placing Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe."⁸⁴¹ By making an announcement before acting, Gorbachev gave the United States time to evaluate his intention. The United States rejected the offer because the Reagan administration wanted to "modernize its nuclear armoury to strengthen its bargaining position in arms control talks or future crises,"⁸⁴² and they believed that "Gorbachev wanted to freeze a ten-to-one Soviet advantage in this class of weaponry."⁸⁴³

⁸⁴⁰ Bitzinger, "Gorbachev and GRIT, 1985-89," 78 and Appendix.

⁸⁴¹ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 116.

⁸⁴² Alan R. Collins, "GRIT, Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 204.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

The more significant case was a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, announced in April 1985. After that, Gorbachev extended the testing moratorium four times. However, the Reagan administration did not reciprocate Gorbachev's actions because American officials believed that the Soviet Union did not need to test for a while after recent tests, and there was difficulty in detecting low-yield underground tests.⁸⁴⁴ Also, American officials remembered that Khrushchev broke an earlier test moratorium, even though President John Kennedy had halted testing.⁸⁴⁵ Therefore, the United States continued its test program. The Soviets abandoned their moratorium after a U.S. nuclear test in February 1987.

However, Gorbachev's persistence with a unilateral nuclear moratorium was not a total failure. It was a significant turning point in the Soviet-U.S. relations. According to Matthew Evangelista, the first signal was the unilateral test moratorium and on-site monitoring. Evangelista points out, "Yet this initiative marked the beginning of a turning point. The Soviet unilateral test moratorium continued for 19 months without U.S. reciprocation, making the point (especially to Soviet domestic critics) that it was not necessary for the USSR to keep pace with the United States in every dimension of their security competition."⁸⁴⁶

Gorbachev's unilateral nuclear moratorium did begin to change both the Reagan administration's and American public's perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. It also began to influence alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman said, "Gorbachev's initiative did succeed in promoting a peaceful image of the Soviet Union among the American public and among U.S. allies, as well as among a few Reagan administration officials."⁸⁴⁷ In sum, Gorbachev's first implementation of reassurance strategy was the nuclear

⁸⁴⁴ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 116.

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁶ Matthew Evangelista, "Turning Points in Arms Control," in *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations*, eds., Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 84.

⁸⁴⁷ Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, *Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 121.

moratorium. Even though it did not result in an immediate positive response from the United States, it provided a reason for a new evaluation of Gorbachev and Soviet policy in the United States.

b. Reassurance Through Restraint

Gorbachev also implemented his reassurance strategy through restraint. The examples of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy through restraint were the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift to a defensive military doctrine.

(1) The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Gorbachev started a review of Soviet policy in Afghanistan in April 1985. Then, he announced a partial withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 1986. In April 1988, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the UN-mediated Geneva accords, which called for the complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989.⁸⁴⁸

As explained earlier, the difficulties in Afghanistan were an incentive for Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. It was very costly to stay. At the same time, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan showed the United States that there was no Soviet intention to be expansionist. Gorbachev expressed his intention by saying: "Afghanistan could not be considered a socialist country. There were too many non-socialist characteristics: a multi-party system, tribalism, capitalists, and clerical elements."⁸⁴⁹ As Andrew Kydd argues, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan "served both to reduce Soviet threat to the West and to demonstrate a lack of territorial ambitions."⁸⁵⁰ The second summit meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986 further influenced Gorbachev's calculations. Sarah E. Mendelson observes, "Moreover, according to several sources, after the summit at Reykjavik, Gorbachev and his advisors

⁸⁴⁸ Richard K. Herrmann, "Regional Conflicts as Turning Points," in *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations*, ed. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Led Lebow (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 62.

⁸⁴⁹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 376.

⁸⁵⁰ Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 230.

came to the conclusion that the United States would not entertain seriously to the idea of new political thinking until a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was complete.”⁸⁵¹ In sum, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan showed that the Soviet Union did not have intentions to expand its influence.

(2) The Shift to a Defensive Military Doctrine. Gorbachev’s change in Soviet military doctrine from offensive to defensive was another example of his reassurance strategy. Gorbachev’s announcements of a defense-oriented military doctrine are summarized in Table 4.5. The change of the military doctrine was significant because it “was the foundation of all the assumptions, goals and preparations of the sprawling Soviet defense machine, from frontline troops to the General Staff, from research institutes to arms factories.”⁸⁵²

Table 4.5 Announcement of Defensive Military Doctrine⁸⁵³

Year	Month	Major Unilateral Soviet Actions
1986	February	The Soviet Union announced ‘reasonable sufficiency’ principle.
1987	May	The Soviet Union promulgated a ‘defensive defense’ doctrine. The Soviet Union revealed the defensive Warsaw Pact military doctrine. ⁸⁵⁴
1988	December	Gorbachev announced conventional arms/troop reductions in a UN speech.
1989	January	The Soviets announced cuts in defense budget.
	January	At CSCE, Shevardnadze promised to provide the West with data on Soviet forces.

⁸⁵¹ Sarah E. Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” *World Politics* 45, no. 3 (April 1993): 356. Mendelson’s interviews: Sergey Akhromeev (former chief of the Soviet armed forces, 1984-88, and former senior military advisor to Gorbachev, who joined the summit) on January 3, 1991 and Vadim Zagladin (former director, Information Department, Central Committee) on December 12, 1990.

⁸⁵² Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 271.

⁸⁵³ Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT,” 78 and Appendix.

⁸⁵⁴ Voitech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 563–64.

Several steps made clear the shift in doctrinal emphasis. First, in February 1986, Gorbachev announced that Soviet military forces would be based on the principle of “reasonable sufficiency,”⁸⁵⁵ which meant that “Soviet conventional forces should be structured so as to defeat an invasion but not to carry out large-scale offensive action.”⁸⁵⁶ Gorbachev wrote in *Perestroika*, “We believe that armaments should be reduced to the level of reasonable sufficiency, that is, a level necessary for strictly defensive purpose.”⁸⁵⁷ Marshal Akhromeyev, the chief of the General Staff, gave a lecture on the new doctrine at the Academy of the General Staff in Moscow. Akhromeyev announced, “We are prepared to dismantle the mechanism of military confrontation with the United States and NATO in Europe.”⁸⁵⁸ It was a shock to the officers. Akhromeyev later said, “While I was speaking, there was absolute silence in the hall. The faces reflected incomprehension, bewilderment and alarm.”⁸⁵⁹

Even though Gorbachev knew of the complaints from the military, he approved the new military doctrine in December 1986. Gorbachev said, “We should not become like the generals, who are trying to scare us. They are already hissing among themselves: what kind of leadership do we have? ‘They are destroying the defense of our country.’ They say that Ogarkov⁸⁶⁰ is very upset. To him it is just give, give more. Cannons should be longer!”⁸⁶¹ In a meeting with leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries on May 27, 1987, Gorbachev unveiled the defensive doctrine, and a written statement was released the following day. At the meeting, Gorbachev revealed his idea for the Warsaw Pact’s military doctrine. According to a written statement after the Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin released on May 28, 1987, the main sentence was that “The military

⁸⁵⁵ Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT,” 73.

⁸⁵⁶ Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 291.

⁸⁵⁷ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 204.

⁸⁵⁸ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 271.

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁰ Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was removed as chief of the General Staff in September 1984. He still remained in the defense ministry and continued to claim the need to provide advanced technology to the military.

⁸⁶¹ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 275.

doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is strictly defensive, and starts from the point of view that, under current conditions, the use of military force to solve any controversial issue is unacceptable.”⁸⁶² In sum, the changed military doctrine showed the defensive intentions of the Soviet Union.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan was followed by more Soviet troop reductions in other countries. Gorbachev made an announcement of significant cuts in Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and Mongolia in a UN speech on December 8, 1988. Gorbachev said:

Today, I can report to you that the Soviet Union has taken a decision to reduce its armed forces. Within the next two years their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 men....By agreement with our Warsaw Treaty allies, we have decided to withdraw by 1991 six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to disband them....Soviet forces stationed in those countries will be reduced by 50,000 men and their armaments, by 5,000 tanks....By agreement with the government of the Mongolian People's Republic a major portion of Soviet troops temporarily stationed there will return home.⁸⁶³

Also, Gorbachev made an announcement of force cuts in the Nordic region in November 1989. In sum, the Soviet force reductions in Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and the Nordic region showed that the Soviet Union did not have intentions to expand its influence to other countries in line with its non-offensive defense posture.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift to a defensive military doctrine can also be interpreted as part of larger GRIT strategy. Even though it is not clear that Gorbachev was cognizant of the GRIT strategy, he followed the

⁸⁶² Mastny and Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle?* 563–64. Also, refer to Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), “Public Statement on the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact,” <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=19204&navinfo=15697> (accessed on November 30, 2009).

⁸⁶³ Associated Press, “The Gorbachev Visit; Excerpts from Speech to U.N. on Major Soviet Military Cuts,” *New York Times*, December 8, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/08/world/the-gorbachev-visit-excerpts-from-speech-to-un-on-major-soviet-military-cuts.html?pagewanted=1> (accessed on November 11, 2009).

main elements of GRIT.⁸⁶⁴ For example, when he took actions, the series of actions were publicly announced in advance. Along with the announcement of actions, Gorbachev included an explicit invitation for the United States to reciprocate. The announced series of actions were carried out regardless of the reciprocity of the United States. Gorbachev showed his intention to reduce the Soviet capability for retaliation. The act of reciprocation by the adversary was rewarded with an incremental increase in cooperation, such as Gorbachev's UN speech in 1988 after the ratification of INF treaty by the United States. Finally, even though nuclear weapons were Gorbachev's main concerns, his initiatives were diversified in the spheres of action and geographical location.

c. *Reassurance Through Irrevocable Commitment: Summit Meetings*

Gorbachev also implemented his reassurance strategy through summit meetings. They are examples of reassurance strategy through irrevocable commitment because Gorbachev tried to reassure the United States of his benign intentions by making proposals at summit meetings. Once offered, such proposals could not easily be taken back. Summit meetings created an opportunity for the leaders and public of the Soviet Union and the United States to understand each other.

There were five summits between Gorbachev and Reagan: first in Geneva in November 1985, second in Reykjavik in October 1986, third in Washington in December 1987, fourth in Moscow in May 1988, and a fifth in New York in December 1988. The first summit in Geneva provided opportunities for Gorbachev and Reagan to get to know each other. The first invitation for a summit meeting had been made by Reagan. Reagan wanted to invite Gorbachev to the United States to "convince him that America was a country of peaceful intent, and furthermore a flourishing democracy worthy of emulation."⁸⁶⁵ Gorbachev wanted to have a summit meeting because "While

⁸⁶⁴ For the main elements of GRIT, refer to Deborah Welch Larson's summary of Charles Osgood's GRIT. Refer to Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization*, 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 32.

⁸⁶⁵ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 125.

Gorbachev knew that the meeting in Geneva would not produce an arms control agreement, he was looking for reassurance that Reagan was a man he could do business with.”⁸⁶⁶

However, the second summit was initiated by Gorbachev, who made a proposal. After Gorbachev extended the nuclear testing moratorium on August 18, 1986, Gorbachev decided to invite Reagan to Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland.⁸⁶⁷ Gorbachev’s advisors such as Chernyaev, a national security advisor, and Akhromeyev, the chief of the General Staff, were more cautious and offered some guidelines for what Gorbachev should do. However, Gorbachev rejected those guidelines and insisted on more dramatic proposals. Gorbachev responded that “Our main goal now is to prevent the arms race from entering a new stage. If we don’t do that, the danger to us will increase.”⁸⁶⁸

The second summit in Reykjavik was significant because Gorbachev showed his commitment to induce a positive response from the Reagan administration and understand the different positions between the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev’s top agenda item for the Reykjavik meeting was “liquidation of nuclear weapons,” which was mentioned repeatedly by Gorbachev.⁸⁶⁹ As Gorbachev planned, he made dramatic proposals to Reagan. Gorbachev proposed a “50 percent reduction in what he called ‘strategic offensive arms,’” “deep cuts in the giant land-based missiles,” and the elimination of “all medium-range missiles in Europe, including the Pioneers and the Pershing IIs.”⁸⁷⁰ When U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and other U.S. officials got together at the first break, U.S. arms negotiator Paul Nitze said, “This is the best Soviet proposal we have received in 25 years.”⁸⁷¹ However, Gorbachev and Reagan could not sign any agreement because of their different perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

⁸⁶⁶ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 155.

⁸⁶⁷ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 258–259.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 260.

⁸⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 261.

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 262.

Gorbachev's strategy was to release the discussions to the world in the case of failure to convince the Reagan administration.⁸⁷² Gorbachev said, "If Reagan does not meet us halfway, we will tell the whole world about this. That's the plan. If we fail, then we can say—Look, here's what we are prepared to do!"⁸⁷³ Also, the Politburo demanded that "if the Americans rejected the agreements, a compromise in the name of peace, we would denounce the U.S. administration and its dangerous policies as a threat to everyone around the world."⁸⁷⁴ However, Gorbachev did not follow the plan at the press conference. Gorbachev said:

My intuition was telling me I should cool off and think it all over thoroughly. I had not yet made up my mind when I suddenly found myself in the enormous press conference room. About a thousand journalists were waiting for us. When I came into the room, the merciless, often cynical and cheeky journalists were waiting for us. I sensed anxiety in the air. I suddenly felt emotional, even shaken. These people standing in front of me seemed to represent mankind waiting for its fate to be decided.⁸⁷⁵

Gorbachev made rather more optimistic comments to the journalists, "We have already reached accord on much. We have come a long way."⁸⁷⁶ In sum, Gorbachev's proposal at Reykjavik was an example of his reassurance strategy through irreversible commitment. He had committed the Soviet Union to willingness to make deep cuts in the nuclear weapons that most concerned the Reagan administration.

⁸⁷² Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 262.

⁸⁷³ *Ibid.*, 260.

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 268.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, referring to Gorbachev Press Conference, October 14, 1986, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/8389/A1/1.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

C. CONDITION VARIABLES (CV): CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED STATES' MOTIVATING FACTORS

1. Condition Variable (CV) 1: Circumstances and Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States

Circumstances and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States comprise the first step to explore the causal mechanism between Gorbachev's reassurance strategy and its outcomes, because it affected motivating factors of the United States, (CV 2) as well as intervening variables (IntV), such as leaders' perceptions, and domestic and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. The general question about circumstances and relations between the two parties is as follows:

Question 4: What were the circumstances and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States over the time period when Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was attempted?

a. *Balance of Power (from the Realist Approach): Unfavorable to the Soviet Union*

Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach): What was the "balance of power" between the Soviet Union and the United States? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence the balance of power affected the calculations of either the Soviet Union or the United States?

(1) Balance of Power between the Soviet Union and the United States. There were vigorous debates in the 1980s about the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States, especially about the military balance. Reagan and other conservatives perceived the military balance had begun to favor the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. In the first State of the Union address on February 19, 1981, Reagan requested an increase in defense spending to respond to what he described as an unfavorable military balance:

I believe that my duty as President requires that I recommend increases in defense spending over the coming years. I know that you're all aware -- but I think it bears saying again -- that since 1970 the Soviet Union has

invested \$300 billion more in its military forces than we have. As a result of its massive military buildup, the Soviets have made a significant numerical advantage in strategic nuclear delivery systems, tactical aircraft, submarines, artillery, and anti-aircraft defense. To allow this imbalance to continue is a threat to our national security.⁸⁷⁷

Reagan shared this perception with other conservative officials in his administration. Since 1981, the Pentagon had published *Soviet Military Power*. It assessed, until 1986, that the military balance was unfavorable to the United States. According to *Soviet Military Power* in 1981:

To support the continuing growth and modernization of the armed forces, the Soviet Union over the past quarter century has increased military expenditures in real terms, devoting an average of 12-to-14 percent of its Gross National Product each year to the Soviet military. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military investment exceeded comparable U.S. spending by 70 percent in 1979. The defense sector is the first priority of Soviet industrial production.⁸⁷⁸

Congress initially supported Reagan's requests for increased defense.⁸⁷⁹ John Collins of the Congressional Research Service was requested by eight legislators, five Democrats and three Republicans, to compare the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1985, he concluded, in *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985*, that "the United States still lags behind the Soviet Union after having spent \$1 trillion since President Reagan took office in 1981."⁸⁸⁰ The American public also believed that the Soviet Union was militarily superior to the United States in the early 1980s, but also felt the vast increase in U.S. defense spending had

⁸⁷⁷ C-SPAN.org, "President Ronald Reagan's Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery, February 18, 1981," http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=1981 (accessed on December 1, 2009).

⁸⁷⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 9.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid., 188.

⁸⁸⁰ *New York Times*, "Soviet Found Ahead in Arms," July 28, 1985, A9, referring to John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985).

restored U.S. military strength against the Soviet Union by the mid-1980s.⁸⁸¹ In sum, the dominant perspective in the United States during the first Reagan administration was that Soviet military spending had surpassed that of the United States.

Also, conservatives in the United States estimated that the Soviet Union had gained superiority in the ability to deliver nuclear warheads. Many outside experts disputed this perspective. They believed the nuclear balance remained essentially one of parity, because even after any plausible first strike neither side could escape devastation in a nuclear war. Critics of the administration also argued that United States had a qualitative edge in conventional military capability. Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera described claims of Soviet military superiority as a myth built on “the ‘Games the Pentagon Plays’—false measures that support Pentagon arguments for preferred policies.”⁸⁸² They pointed out three games to mislead the public:

In the “Numbers Game,” Areas of Western numerical or qualitative superiority was ignored....The only question that really matters—“Can the United States carry out its strategy?”—is not asked....

In the “Trend Game,” alarming trends are presented without baseline figures or explanations. Thus, we often hear that the U.S. Navy has fallen from 1000 ships to less than 500; it is not explained that the Navy shrank because many ships built for World War II were finally scrapped in the 1960s and 1970s and because the Navy shifted from smaller to larger ships, so it now builds fewer ships of larger tonnage....

In the “Go It Alone Game,” Soviets and American forces are compared head to head, as if the United States had no allies and the Soviet Union no other enemies.⁸⁸³

⁸⁸¹ David M. Walsh, *The Military Balance in the Cold War: U.S. Perceptions and Policy, 1976-85* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 192.

⁸⁸² Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, “Regan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment,” in *Eagle Resurgent?: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown & Company, 1983), 100, referring to Les Aspin, “Games the Pentagons Plays,” *Foreign Policy* 11 (Summer 1973): 80–92.

⁸⁸³ Ibid.

In addition, while the United States could count on its European allies, many experts believed that Moscow could not expect the forces of Warsaw Pact countries to remain loyal. Stephen Walt argued that as the power that appeared more threatening, the Soviet Union had provoked more balancing behavior against it.⁸⁸⁴ Therefore, from Walt's perspective, the United States already enjoyed considerable advantages in the early 1980s. Walt showed the distribution of capabilities in 1982 between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies by comparing population, gross national product (GNP), size of armed forces, and defense expenditure (Table 4.6). Walt believed the bottom row most accurately reflected likely alignments, and it showed the United States and its allies ahead on every traditional measure of military power.

Table 4.6 Ratios of Capabilities between the American and Soviet Alliance Networks⁸⁸⁵

Coalitions	Population	GNP	Size of Armed Forces	Defense \$
(U.S.+ Allies) / (U.S.S.R + Allies)	2.25	3.26	0.99	1.17
(U.S.+ Allies + PRC) / (U.S.S.R + Allies + India)	1.81	3.30	1.32	1.30
(U.S.+ Allies + PRC) / (U.S.S.R + Allies)	4.08	3.52	1.49	1.32

By the mid-1980s, as the Reagan defense buildup had bolstered U.S. capabilities and critics had pointed out reasons to discount earlier claims of a Soviet advantage, there was not as much rhetoric claiming the military balance favored the Soviets.

Hence, by the time Gorbachev initiated reassurance, U.S. leaders did not seem to fear that the United States would be responding from a position of weakness. Even the Pentagon's annual report, *Soviet Military Power*, announced that the military balance was no longer unfavorable to the United States after 1987. The *Soviet*

⁸⁸⁴ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43.

⁸⁸⁵ Walt, "Alliance Formation," 34.

Military Power published in 1987 stated, “Increased U.S. defense spending has *narrowed* these differentials, but in critical areas such as R&D, the Soviet costs continue to exceed those of the U.S. [emphasis added].”⁸⁸⁶ In the 1988 *Soviet Military Power*, the Pentagon announced that “In 1987, as a result of the continued growth of the U.S. outlays, primarily for procurement, the annual difference in the cost of the military programs was *virtually eliminated* [emphasis added].”⁸⁸⁷

(2) Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP). Soviet thinking also evolved, but in the direction of perceiving the Soviet Union as the party facing an unfavorable balance. Even though the hard-liners and old thinkers in the Soviet Union believed that military power was a primary factor in security and foreign policy, the new thinkers recognized that the balance of power had become unfavorable to the Soviet Union because of the decline of Soviet economic power. Wohlforth pointed out that “The lodestar of the new thinking was de-emphasis of the importance of military power.”⁸⁸⁸ Gorbachev, as the leader of the new thinkers, strongly believed that military power was not the main key to Soviet security and foreign policy. Therefore, a broader perspective on power that includes the economic foundations of power and the perceptions of power in the Soviet Union and the United States is needed to understand the balance of power that affected the calculations of the Soviet Union and the United States as a whole.

Military power is only one element of power; economic power became more important in understanding change in the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. William Wohlforth concluded, “Only in the comparisons of military forces could the Soviets claim parity with the United States or between socialism and capitalism. If overall economic capabilities were truly to be taken as the main determinant of a state’s global position, then Moscow would have to accept a

⁸⁸⁶ Molly Moore, “U.S., Soviets Equal in Military Spending; Pentagon’s Purchase of Weapons Cited,” *Washington Post*, April 30, 1988, A18.

⁸⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 269.

world political status on a par with Japan.”⁸⁸⁹ As in the previous case studies, both estimates of GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. dollars and estimates of per capita income in U.S. dollars show the balance of power between the two states. In this case, the balance of power was unfavorable to the Soviet Union.

First, data on GNP at current prices in millions of U.S. dollars show that the GNP of the United States in 1981 was 3.43 times bigger than that of the Soviet Union and the gap was not decreasing. In 1990, the GNP of the United States was still 3.74 times bigger. The average ratio of the United States versus the Soviet Union in GNP between 1981 and 1990 was 3.76. Power cannot be measured precisely by this number, but it does suggest that the balance of power was favorable to the United States. GNP at current prices in U.S. dollars is summarized in Figure 4.3:




Figure 4.3 GNP at Current Prices in U.S. Dollars⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁸⁹ William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 272.

⁸⁹⁰ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on November 2, 2009)

Second, estimates of per capita GNP in U.S. dollars show the same results. The United States' per capita GNP was much greater than that of the Soviet Union between 1981 and 1990, as summarized in Table 4.7:

Table 4.7 Per Capita GNP in U.S. Dollars⁸⁹¹

Year	U.S. (U.S. \$)	USSR (U.S. \$)	U.S./USSR
1981	13,323	3,388	3.93
1982	13,860	3,556	3.90
1983	14,702	3,646	4.03
1984	16,314	3,415	4.78
1985	17,269	3,297	5.24
1986	17,909	4,023	4.45
1987	18,933	4,582	4.13
1988	20,367	5,056	4.03
1989	21,421	5,223	4.10
			Avg. 4.29

(2) The Impact of Unfavorable Balance of Power to the Soviet Union on the Calculations of the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet Union could neither maintain the expensive military competition against the United States, nor change the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States by significant economic development in a short time. Matthew Evangelista suggests that Gorbachev's calculations of the balance of power led to the reassurance strategy toward the United States. Evangelista argues:

⁸⁹¹ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on November 2, 2009).

Gorbachev could afford neither to match SDI nor to maintain the expensive nuclear arsenal necessary to defeat it. His only alternative was to agree to nuclear reductions and hope that the United States would never use its Star Wars shield in combination with its offensive nuclear sword.⁸⁹²

On the other hand, even though the balance of power was unfavorable to the Soviet Union, Soviet nuclear weapons represented a serious threat to the United States. When Reagan visited the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 1979, he was shocked to discover that “the United States lacked any defense against even one incoming Soviet missile.”⁸⁹³ In his autobiography, *An American Life*, Reagan tells how the Strategic Directive Initiative (SDI) was born:

Early in my first term, I called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our military leaders—and said to them: Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it; isn’t it possible in this age of technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they emerged from their silos? They looked at each other, then asked if they could huddle for a few moments. Very shortly, they came out of their huddle and said, “Yes, it’s an idea worth exploring.” My answer was, “Let’s do it.”⁸⁹⁴

Reagan’s calculations had not changed that much and were consistent with his longstanding ideas. Even though Reagan recognized the disadvantageous economic situation of the Soviet Union, the Soviet nuclear threat was a primary security concern.

Therefore, even though the first Reagan administration perceived the military balance had begun to favor the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, the answer for the question of what was the “balance of power” between the Soviet Union and the United States is that the Soviet Union was in a less favorable position in terms of balance of power. Furthermore, the balance of power was becoming more unfavorable to the Soviet Union with the vast increase of U.S. defense spending. This situation affected Gorbachev’s calculations and Gorbachev implemented the reassurance strategy toward

⁸⁹² Evangelista, “Turning Points in Arms Control,” 99.

⁸⁹³ Ibid., 164.

⁸⁹⁴ Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 547.

the United States. However, Soviet nuclear weapons were still serious threats to the United States, meaning nuclear arms control would be an important factor in the outcome of reassurance.

b. Interdependence (from the Liberal Approach): No Interdependence

Question 4-b (From the Liberal Approach): What was the level of “interdependence” between the Soviet Union and the United States? Was it changing and, if so, in what direction? Is there evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either the Soviet Union or the United States?

As in the two previous case studies, Katherine Barbieri’s and Bruce Russett and John Oneal’s approaches are used to measure economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States. The two models show that there was no economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1981 and 1989.

(1) Barbieri’s Model.⁸⁹⁵ As shown in Table 4.8, the trade share of the Soviet Union in the United States was very low. The average trade share of the Soviet Union for the United States between 1981 and 1990 was 0.5%. As shown in Table 4.9, the trade share of the United States for the Soviet Union was also low. The average trade share of the United States and the Soviet Union was 3.4%. During the Gorbachev period, between 1985 and 1990, the average trade share of the United States for the Soviet Union was about the same, 3.2%. As shown in Table 4.10, economic interdependence was extremely low between 1981 and 1990. The average economic interdependence between 1981 and 1990 was only 1.3%. Economic interdependence in 1986 and 1987 was especially low. It was about 0.8%.

⁸⁹⁵ Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 36–7.

Table 4.8 Trade share of the Soviet Union for the United States⁸⁹⁶

(millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	Trade b/t U.S. & USSR	Total Trade of U.S.	Trade Share of USSR for U.S.	
1981	3,051.56	507,395	0.006014	
1982	3,098.96	467,386	0.006630	
1983	2,577.69	470,607	0.005477	
1984	4,212.60	559,311	0.007532	
1985	3,107.78	575,027	0.005405	
1986	1,977.96	604,587	0.003272	
1987	2,097.37	677,123	0.003097	
1988	3,683.92	779,252	0.004728	
1989	5,483.10	857,230	0.006396	
			Avg.	0.005395

Table 4.9 Trade share of the United States for the Soviet Union⁸⁹⁷

(millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	Trade b/t U.S. & USSR	Total Trade of USSR	Trade Share of U.S. for USSR
1981	3,051.56	85,977.7	0.035492
1982	3,098.96	81,250.8	0.038141
1983	2,577.69	79,465.3	0.032438
1984	4,212.60	86,393.7	0.048760

⁸⁹⁶ Barbieri, Katherine, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins. Correlates of War (COW) Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 2.0, <http://correlatesofwar.org>, (accessed on May 8, 2009).

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

Year	Trade b/t U.S. & USSR	Total Trade of USSR	Trade Share of U.S. for USSR	
1985	3,107.78	98,236.5	0.031636	
1986	1,977.96	94,988.7	0.020823	
1987	2,097.37	100,612.8	0.020846	
1988	3,683.92	111,094.2	0.033160	
1989	5,483.10	117,618.8	0.046618	
			Avg.	0.034213

Table 4.10 Trade salience, symmetry, and economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and United States

Year	Trade salience	Trade symmetry	Economic Interdependence
1981	0.01461	0.97052	0.01418
1982	0.01590	0.96849	0.01540
1983	0.01333	0.97304	0.01297
1984	0.01916	0.95877	0.01837
1985	0.01308	0.97377	0.01273
1986	0.00825	0.98245	0.00811
1987	0.00804	0.98225	0.00789
1988	0.01252	0.97157	0.01216
1989	0.01727	0.95978	0.01657
Average	0.01357	0.97118	0.01316

(2) Russett and Oneal's Method.⁸⁹⁸ As shown in Table 4.11, trade dependence of the Soviet Union and the United States was very low. As a result, economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States was low and the average between 1981 and 1990 was less than 0.1 %. In short, interdependence was not a factor in this case.

Table 4.11 Trade Dependence of the Soviet Union and the United States⁸⁹⁹

Year	Trade b/t USSR, U.S. (millions of U.S. dollars)	USSR GDP (million US dollars)	USSR Trade dependence with U.S. (trade asymmetry)	U.S. GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	U.S. Trade dependence with USSR (economic inter-dependence)
1981	3,051.56	906,864	0.003365	3,105,400	0.000983
1982	3,098.96	959,948	0.003228	3,229,500	0.000960
1983	2,577.69	993,048	0.002596	3,508,800	0.000735
1984	4,212.6	938,264	0.004490	3,902,600	0.001079
1985	3,107.78	914,118	0.003400	4,187,500	0.000742
1986	1,977.96	1,126,234	0.001756	4,427,700	0.000447
1987	2,097.37	1,295,133	0.001619	4,702,100	0.000446
1988	3,683.92	1,442,175	0.002554	5,063,900	0.000727
1989	5,483.1	1,501,939	0.003651	5,441,700	0.001008
Avg.	3,255	1,119,747	0.002962	4,174,356	0.000792

⁸⁹⁸ Russett and Oneal, "Classical Liberals Were Right," 275.

⁸⁹⁹ Data collected from National Accounts Statistics database of main national accounts aggregates at the Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama> (accessed on October 20, 2009). GDP based on purchasing power parities (PPP).

c. ***Identity (from the Constructivist Approach): Rise of a New Identity***

Question 4-c (From the Constructivist Approach): To what extent was there a shared identity between the Soviet Union and the United States? Was the degree of shared understanding changing and if so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity affected the calculations of either the Soviet Union or the United States?

There was an identity shift from enemy (Hobbesian culture) to rivalry (Lockean culture) between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s. This means they recognized each other as sovereign states and agreed to coexist. Hobbesian culture is based on “the kill or be killed logic.” However, in a Lockean culture, “the live and let live logic” is dominant.⁹⁰⁰ Also, regarding the nuclear issue, the Soviet Union and the United States began to have a shared collective identity because both recognized the danger of nuclear war. To avoid nuclear war, the Soviet Union and the United States needed to change from an “other” or “enemy” identity to a “collective” identity. A shared Lockean culture and new collective identity between the Soviet Union and the United States affected the calculations of security interests and state behaviors of the Soviet Union and the United States.

(1) Rise of New Identity in the Soviet Union toward the United States: From Hobbesian Culture (Enemy) to Lockean Culture (Rival). The biggest difference between the new thinkers and the old thinkers was their consideration of identity toward the United States. Gorbachev and other new thinkers considered the United States a rival and even a partner that the Soviet Union needed to cooperate with to solve the nuclear threat. On the other hand, the old thinkers in the military and the KGB saw the United States as an enemy threatening the Soviet Union. The new thinkers gained power under Gorbachev’s leadership and this led an identity shift in the domestic politics of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁰⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 279.

The main character of Lockean culture is the recognition of the coexistence of states. As explained in section II in this chapter, Gorbachev emphasized the importance of sovereignty. In 1987, Gorbachev published *Perestroika* to explain his willingness to accept coexistence with the United States. Gorbachev wrote:

We openly say that we reject the hegemony-seeking aspirations and global claims of the United States. We do not like certain aspects of American politics and way of life. But we respect the right of the people of the United States, as well as that of any other people, to live according to their own rules and laws, customs and tastes.⁹⁰¹

Gorbachev emphasized that an image change was necessary for better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States:

We certainly do not need an “enemy image” of America, neither for domestic nor for foreign-policy interests. An imaginary or real enemy is needed only if one is bent on maintaining tension, on confrontation with far-reaching and, I might add, unpredictable consequences. Ours is a different orientation.⁹⁰²

Gorbachev believed that the Soviet Union would not give up socialism, but he disavowed any intention to impose the system on others. According to Gorbachev:

Speaking so, I would like to be clearly understood that though we, the Soviet people, are for socialism..., we are not imposing our views on anyone. Let everybody make his own choice: history will put everything in its place.⁹⁰³

In addition, the shift from Hobbesian culture to Lockean culture meant a rise of a new collective identity in the Soviet Union toward the United States. According to Wendt:

⁹⁰¹ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 12.

⁹⁰² Ibid., 216–217.

⁹⁰³ Ibid., 37.

In Lockean culture states identify with each other's survival, so that "death threats" to one are seen as threats to all, but this does not extend to identification with each other's security more generally because in many respects it is still a self-help culture.⁹⁰⁴

The Soviet Union identified and recognized the "death threats" from a nuclear war to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States. The advent of Gorbachev's "New Thinking" is a typical example to show the rise of a new collective identity in the Soviet Union. It became the foundation of Soviet foreign policy based on the recognition of security threats not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the world as a whole, including the United States. According to Robert G. Herman, Gorbachev's "new thinking" had three main ideas:

First, the existence of the "security dilemma," wherein measures taken by one side to enhance its security are invariably perceived by a would-be rival as undermining its own, means that security must be mutual or common and cannot be pursued unilaterally.

Second, resort to force or threats of force is neither an efficacious nor a legitimate way to resolve interstate conflicts. To ameliorate the security dilemma and the pressures propelling states to eschew diplomatic solutions, *strategies of reassurance* must replace or at least supplement those based on deterrence threats. [emphasis added]

And last, class values should be subordinated to "universal human values." Adoption of this idea amounted to a repudiation of Marxism-Leninism's Manichaeic worldview of irreconcilable interests between capitalism and socialism and thus paved the way for a new international order based on shared values.⁹⁰⁵

The first idea, the recognition of the security dilemma between the Soviet Union and the United States, was one of the main reasons for the rise of a new collective identity. The Soviet Union realized that "aggressive Soviet foreign policies

⁹⁰⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 337.

⁹⁰⁵ Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity in World Politics*, ed., Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 271–272, fn.1.

contributed to Western hostility.”⁹⁰⁶ The second idea, the necessity of diplomatic solutions, meant that the Soviet Union’s policy toward the United States moved away from the force-oriented strategy under its Hobbesian culture. The third idea, “universal human values,” meant that the Soviet Union recognized the conflict with the United States not only as the threat to “Self,” but also to “Other,” the United States and to the rest of the world. It implied that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was important in order to protect universal human values. In sum, acceptance of coexistence and a more collective identity due to the danger of nuclear war rose in the Soviet Union under the Gorbachev leadership.

(2) Rise of a New Identity in the United States toward the Soviet Union: From Hobbesian Culture (Enemy) to Lockean Culture (Rival). Just as the Soviets changed the identity of the United States from simply that of enemy (Hobbesian culture), a new identity rose in the United States. In the Soviet Union, even though the elite-level identity change was obvious, it was difficult to track the identity changes at the mass-level. However, in the United States, both the elite- and mass-level identity changes were palpable. Reagan invited Gorbachev to the United States several times before the first summit meeting in Geneva. The invitation showed Reagan’s intention to reduce the tensions between two countries through negotiation and cooperation. Jack Matlock reported, “As his diary entries show, President Reagan was nearly convinced that he should accept Gorbachev’s invitation to meet in Moscow. If Secretary Shultz had agreed, he almost certainly would have done so.”⁹⁰⁷ Reagan exchanged letters with Gorbachev numerous times, and they had a total of five summit meetings. All these actions were based on the recognition of the Soviet Union as a sovereign state rather than an enemy to destroy.

Also, the changes in the mass-level were reflected in numerous surveys. Alan Richman said that those survey measures show that “Americans” attitudes toward the USSR have changed from deep pessimism and hostility in the early 1980s, in

⁹⁰⁶ Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” 76.

⁹⁰⁷ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 125.

the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to one of cautious optimism entering the 1990s.”⁹⁰⁸ The change of American public identity toward the Soviet Union, from enemy to rival, was obvious in the polls. Roper has asked questions⁹⁰⁹ about public identity toward the Soviet Union on a five-point scale ranging from “close ally” to “enemy.” As shown in Table 4.12, there was significant change from enemy identity to rival identity.

Table 4.12 American Identity toward the Soviet Union⁹¹⁰

	Close Ally	Friend	Neutral	Unfriendly	Enemy	Don't Know
Jun 1982	1%	3%	10%	40%	40%	6%
Jun 1983	1	2	8	43	41	5
May-Jun 1984	1	2	4	40	49	4
Dec 1985	1	2	9	42	40	6
May 1987	--	4	13	44	32	7
May 1988	1	6	16	40	30	8
Jul 1989	1	15	27	34	14	9
Jul 1990	2	20	31	23	10	13

⁹⁰⁸ Alvin Richman, “Changing American Attitude toward the Soviet Union,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 135.

⁹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 143. The questions are like this: “...tell me if you believe the country [the Soviet Union] has acted as a close ally of the U.S., has acted as a friend but not close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the U.S., has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S., but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the U.S.?”

⁹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

In 1984, about 49 percent of respondents had considered the Soviet Union an “enemy” of the United States. Also, 40 percent termed it “unfriendly.”⁹¹¹ A total of 89 percent had a negative identity toward the Soviet Union. However, there were significant changes in 1989 and 1990. Those who rated the Soviet Union as “enemy” were only 14 percent and 10 percent in 1989 and 1990, respectively.

In addition, according to an ABC News poll taken two weeks before the 1990 summit, 73 percent of Americans had a favorable image of Gorbachev. It was more favorable than Reagan’s. It showed the significant change of the views of the American public toward the Soviet Union.⁹¹² Despite these American identity changes, most Americans still thought that the possibility of disputes or war with the Soviet Union existed. As Wendt said, in Lockean culture, “relative military power is still important because rivals know that others might use force to settle disputes, but its meaning is different than it is for enemies because the institution of sovereignty changes the ‘balance of threat.’”⁹¹³ Even though most Americans perceived that the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy or a serious threat, the Soviet Union was still widely seen as “a formidable rival for influence in various parts of the Third World.”⁹¹⁴ Consequently, there was identity change in the United States from Hobbesian culture to Lockean culture in the late 1980s.

2. Condition Variable (CV) 2: The United States’ Mixed and Uncertain Motivating Factors

Question 5: What were the United States’ motivations? Is the United States best seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was the Soviet Union’s perception of the United States’ motivations?

Question 6: Did the Soviet Union and the United States share an aversion to war?

⁹¹¹ Richman, “Changing American Attitude,” 137.

⁹¹² Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 411.

⁹¹³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 282.

⁹¹⁴ Richman, “Changing American Attitude,” 135.

a. The United States' "Greedy" and "Opportunity-Oriented" Motivating Factors: Offensive Motives

U.S. defense policy in the Reagan years appeared to some to convey offensive motivations. The Reagan administration raised military expenditures by 51 percent for the 1980-1985 years.⁹¹⁵ They planned to spend \$1.6 trillion on defense between 1981 and 1986 to strengthen military forces.⁹¹⁶ In the first defense guidance, the Reagan administration indicated it wanted to prepare to fight a nuclear war as a "protracted" war, not an all-out totally destructive war.⁹¹⁷ Richard Halloran explained:

The new nuclear strategy calls on American forces to be able to "render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet-allied) military and political power structure." But it goes on to require the assured destruction of "nuclear and conventional military forces and industry critical to military power." Those forces must be able to maintain, "through a protracted conflict period and afterward, the capability to inflict very high levels of damage" on Soviet industry.⁹¹⁸

Several new nuclear weapons, such as MX intercontinental missiles, Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, B-1 bombers and cruise missiles were developed during this period.⁹¹⁹ In the end, the defense budget increased from \$171 billion to \$229 billion, roughly 34 percent in real 1982 dollars.⁹²⁰ This was "the largest increase in American defense spending since the beginning of the Cold War."⁹²¹

The United States carried out extensive war exercises which the Soviets interpreted as evidence of "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors. During a massive three-carrier battle group exercise code-named FLEETEX 83-1, a group of at least six navy planes from the U.S.S. *Enterprise* and U.S.S. *Midway* flew over

⁹¹⁵ Richman, "Changing American Attitude," 235.

⁹¹⁶ Daniel S. Papp, Loch K. Johnson, and John E. Endicott, *American Foreign Policy: History, Politics, and Policy* (New York: Pearson, 2005), 176.

⁹¹⁷ Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Draws up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War," *New York Times*, May 30, 1980, A1.

⁹¹⁸ Ibid.

⁹¹⁹ Papp et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 176.

⁹²⁰ Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 154.

⁹²¹ Ibid.

Zelyony Island in the Kuril archipelago, which is Soviet territory. The Soviets protested the flyover of Zelyony Island to the American Embassy in Moscow.⁹²² Also, the KGB analyzed all communications⁹²³ during the exercise and claimed that the “Reagan administration was continuing preparations for nuclear war.”⁹²⁴ The NATO exercise, Able Archer, on November 2–11, 1983, was implemented to train “procedures for a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict.”⁹²⁵

According to the Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical Tables, there were continuous budget increases during the two Reagan administrations (Table 4.13).

Table 4.13 Defense Budget, 1976–1989⁹²⁶

Year	Defense Budget (million dollars)	Percentage of GDP
1980	133,995	4.9
1981	157,513	5.2
1982	185,309	5.7
1983	209,903	6.1
1984	227,413	5.9
1985	252,748	6.1
1986	273,375	6.2
1987	281,999	6.1
1988	290,361	5.8
1989	303,559	5.6

⁹²² Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 65.

⁹²³ Jerry Whitworth, the senior chief radioman, who had been spying for the Soviet Union since 1976, delivered paper copies of the messages and tape recordings of his observations to the KGB through a ring led by John Walker, a navy veteran.

⁹²⁴ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 67–68, referring to Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency, from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 472.

⁹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁹²⁶ White House Office of Management and Budget, “The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical Tables,” 51–52, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/hirs_of_st.pdf (accessed on November 11, 2009).

Consequently, the development of offensive weapons and military exercises, and the consistent increase of the defense budget during the first and second Reagan administrations implied that the United States had not given up its “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors.

b. The United States’ “Not-greedy” and “Need-oriented” Motivating Factors: Defensive Motive

Even though there was some evidence of “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, such as the development of weapons and the defense budget increase, the Reagan administration did not have only offensive motives. They felt threats mostly from the Soviet conventional military power and nuclear weapons.

(1) Conventional Military Forces. The United States and NATO allies worried about the Soviet conventional military power. The U. S. fear of a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe had been a primary rationale for the development of U.S. military power in Europe since the post-war period.⁹²⁷ The United States was reluctant to show any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy due to the fear of Soviet conventional military forces. According to Matthew Evangelista, “the U.S. and NATO have been reluctant to pursue Soviet initiatives that could reduce the threat of ballistic missiles, emphasizing the threat rather than prospects of alleviating it.”⁹²⁸ Evangelista also observed, “...throughout the fifteen years of MBFR⁹²⁹ negotiations in Vienna the United States insisted that the Soviet Union was superior in most important indices of conventional military power (even though anyone could see that the Soviet forces suffered one fundamental weakness: their main task was military occupation of an involuntary alliance of potentially hostile neighbors).”⁹³⁰

⁹²⁷ Matthew Evangelista, “Exploiting the Soviet ‘Threat’ to Europe,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 43, no. 1 (January/February 1987): 14–18.

⁹²⁸ Ibid. 16,

⁹²⁹ Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks. For more information, refer to CFE Chronology: Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/chron.htm>.

⁹³⁰ Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, 304.

The insecurity of the United States and NATO allies due to Soviet conventional forces was from the lack of transparency and data on those Soviet forces. Evangelista pointed out, “One of the main stumbling blocks in the negotiations themselves was the question of the degree of numerical disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces; the Soviets would not present sufficient data to convince the West that its estimates were too high.”⁹³¹

(2) The Strategic Directive Initiative (SDI). Even though SDI was seen as offensive and the most threatening program to the Soviet leadership, it was a good example to show the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the United States because the Soviet military threat, especially a nuclear threat, was a serious threat to the United States. Reagan claimed that SDI was “a purely defensive strategy.”⁹³² Reagan’s idea about SDI was initiated by the probable consequences of nuclear war against the Soviet Union. On December 22, 1982, Reagan asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “What if we began to move away from our total reliance on offense to deter a nuclear attack and moved toward a relatively greater reliance on defense?”⁹³³ Reagan wrote in his diary on February 11, 1983, about the motivation of SDI:

So far the only policy worldwide on nuclear weapons is to have a deterrent. What if we tell the world we want to protect our people, not avenge them; that we’re going to embark on a program of research to come up with a defensive weapon that could make nuclear weapons obsolete?⁹³⁴

Two weeks after Reagan described the Soviet Union as an evil empire, he made an extraordinary proposal, SDI, to protect the United States from any attack by the Soviet Union. SDI was the most significant example of Reagan’s military buildup. Some \$26 billion was spent on research.⁹³⁵

⁹³¹ Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, 304.

⁹³² Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 122.

⁹³³ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 50.

⁹³⁴ Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 130.

⁹³⁵ Wilentz, *Age of Reagan*, 280.

The SDI concept rejected the theory of nuclear deterrence and asserted the need as well as the technical feasibility to defend the American homeland.⁹³⁶ Reagan's plan was based on the idea that "it was better to 'protect than avenge.'" ⁹³⁷ However, the SDI plan was supported by those who believed that "it could serve deterrence."⁹³⁸ The Soviet Union was disturbed by SDI, and later, Gorbachev would agree to no arms reductions without changes in SDI.

Reagan repeated his "not-greedy" intentions and emphasized the importance of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Reagan recalled:

I wanted to let them know that we realized the nuclear standoff was futile and dangerous and that we had no designs on their territories....Somewhere in the Kremlin, I thought, there had to be people who realized that the pair of us standing there like two cowboys with guns pointed at each other's heads posed a lethal risk to the survival of the Communist world as well as the free world. Someone in the Kremlin had to realize that in arming themselves to the teeth, they are aggravating the desperate economic problems in the Soviet Union, which were the greatest evidence of the failure of Communism.⁹³⁹

In 1982 and 1983, before Gorbachev became the Soviet leader, Reagan expressed his intentions to talk with Soviet leaders. Reagan said, "We do not insist that the Soviet Union abandon its standing as a superpower or its legitimate national interests."⁹⁴⁰ Reagan's letter to Yuri Andropov also showed his intentions:

You and I share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of stability in the world. I believe we can fulfill that responsibility but to do so will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore been able to establish. We have much to talk about....Historically, our

⁹³⁶ Papp et al., *American Foreign Policy*, 176, referring to John Pike, *The Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1985).

⁹³⁷ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 19.

⁹³⁸ Ibid.

⁹³⁹ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 347, referring to Reagan, *An American Life*, 268.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid., 355.

predecessors have made better progress when communicating has been private and candid. If you wish to engage in such communication you will find me ready. I await your reply.⁹⁴¹

On February 11, 1984, right after the death of Andropov on February 9, Reagan wrote a letter to express his hope to elicit cooperation. Reagan said, “We do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people.”⁹⁴² In a subsequent letter in April, Reagan expressed his intentions again, “I want you to know that neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the Soviet people....Our constant and urgent purpose must be...a lasting reduction of tensions between us. I pledge to you my profound commitment to that end.”⁹⁴³

In March 1985, Vice President George H. W. Bush met the new Soviet leader, Gorbachev, and expressed the benign intentions of the United States. Bush stressed that “neither the American government nor the American people has hostile intentions toward you.”⁹⁴⁴ Those who worked in Reagan’s administration testify that Reagan did not have “greedy” intentions toward the Soviet Union. Casper Weinberger, the most hawkish person in the Reagan administration, said in 2002, “What he [Reagan] needed, what he needed and we were in full agreement on, was to restore our military deterrent capability—to get a capability that would make it quite clear to the Soviets that they couldn’t win a war against us.”⁹⁴⁵ Richard Pipes also said that Reagan had emphasized “the importance of compromise with the Soviet leadership” when he drafted and showed him NSDD-75.⁹⁴⁶ Frank Carlucci, who served as Reagan’s national security advisor and defense secretary, said, “I don’t think he ever thought of it in terms of

⁹⁴¹ Regan, *An American Life*, 576–82; Reagan to Andropov, July 11 1983, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council (NSC), Head of State, USSR, box 38–9, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL), quoted in Leffler, *For the Soul*, 355.

⁹⁴² Reagan to Chernenko, February 11, 1984, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State, USSR, boxes 38–9, RRPL, quoted in Leffler, *For the Soul*, 360.

⁹⁴³ Reagan to Chernenko, April 16, 1984, quoted in Leffler, 361.

⁹⁴⁴ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 365.

⁹⁴⁵ James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009), 249. James Mann’s interview with Casper Weinberger at the Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, November 19, 2002.

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

bankrupting the Soviet Union or forcing it to collapse. He just saw it as a lousy system, and if we could negotiate them into some common sense, they'd change their system."⁹⁴⁷ When James Mann asked West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl whether Reagan had intended to topple or bankrupt the Soviet regime, Kohl replied that "No. I don't think so. But he did think that the Soviet Union was simply living above its means."⁹⁴⁸

Consequently, Reagan had "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors from the danger of nuclear war against the Soviet Union. He wanted to "talk, reduce tensions, promote change in the Soviet Union, discourage Soviet adventurism, and, most of all, avoid nuclear war."⁹⁴⁹

c. *Mixed Motivations*

The United States wanted to win the competition against the Soviet Union. It sought the victory of capitalism over communism. The increase of the military budget and development of offensive weapons were part of efforts to expand capitalism and win over communism. This shows the "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors of the United States. However, this did not mean conquering the Soviet territory or forcibly changing the Soviet regime. On the other hand, the military buildup in the United States did not guarantee protection from the Soviet military threat, especially from nuclear weapons. Also, Soviet conventional forces threatening Western Europe were a serious threat to the United States and provided the United States with "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors.

Therefore, the United States seemed to have mixed motivating factors toward the Soviet Union. Even though there was not a complete change, there was some change in motivating factors of the United States from more "greedy" ones in the first Reagan administration into more "not-greedy" ones in the second Reagan administration. This change helped improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

⁹⁴⁷ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 251. Mann's interview with Frank Carlucci, January 19, 2005.

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid. Mann's interview with Helmut Kohl, September 27, 2007.

⁹⁴⁹ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 359.

d. *The Soviet Union's Perceptions of the United States' Motivating Factors*

(1) The United States' "Greedy" and "Opportunity-Oriented" Motivating Factors: The Hard-liners' Focus on Threat. The development of offensive weapons, a series of military exercises, the increase of military budgets, and the pursuit of SDI by the Reagan administration were serious threats to the Soviet Union and interpreted as evidence of "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors. These perceptions were common among Soviet hard-liners such as the Soviet military, KGB, and communist party leaders.

For example, the Soviet Union was panicked about the deployment in Europe of the Pershing II, which could fly at nearly Mach 8 with high-precision guidance systems and reach Moscow in six minutes.⁹⁵⁰ Hoffman said, "The Pershing IIs were so worrisome that builders of the Moscow antiballistic missile system were urged to alter it to detect and intercept them."⁹⁵¹ Oleg Gordievsky, who was the KGB's second-ranking official in the London office and secretly worked for Britain, said in an interview with Hoffman that the Soviet leaders "knew they would be the first to die, and don't want to die."⁹⁵² Also, the KGB may have misinterpreted the planned exercise, Able Archer '83, as "a real alert."⁹⁵³

Conservatives in the Soviet Union considered the shipments of the Stinger missiles to mujahideen in Afghanistan as an aggressive and hostile action by the United States. According to Mendelson's interviews with Georgii Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada (hereafter ISKAN) and Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of ISKAN, "American foreign policy in general, and specially toward Afghanistan, made

⁹⁵⁰ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 60–61.

⁹⁵¹ Ibid., 61, referring to Alexander Savelyev and Nikolay Detinov, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 57 and Oleg Golubev et al., *Rossiskaya Sistema Protivoraketnoi Oborony* [Russian System of Anti-Missile Defense] (Moscow: Tekhnokonsalt, 1994), 67.

⁹⁵² Ibid., 62, Hoffman's Interview with Gordievsky on August 29, 2005.

⁹⁵³ Ibid., 94, referring to Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 589.

it more difficult—not easier, he contended—for Soviet foreign policy to change in an accommodationist direction.”⁹⁵⁴ Arbatov claimed that “the arms buildup under Reagan did much to fan the flames of the conservatives in the Soviet Union.”⁹⁵⁵

Another example was Soviet perceptions of SDI. When Reagan made a speech about missile defense in March 1983, Andropov asserted that Reagan was “inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it.”⁹⁵⁶ Dmitry Mikheyev argued that SDI threatened the survival of the Soviet Union. According to Mikheyev:

The Soviet leadership is facing a painful dilemma. If SDI proceeds, the Party might lose the new technological race—and the ability to carry on its political struggle under the umbrella of the nuclear threat. The alternative is to restructure radically the Soviet socioeconomic system, by unleashing market forces and giving up the Party’s monopoly on the economy and information. Both scenarios involve grave political risks, fraught with the potential of ultimate political defeat.⁹⁵⁷

The pursuit of SDI by Reagan was seen by Gorbachev as evidence of Reagan’s “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. Even though Reagan claimed that SDI was a defensive program, Gorbachev believed that SDI was “a cover for an offensive, maybe even first strike, strategy.”⁹⁵⁸ These different perspectives on SDI were obstacles to reaching agreements in the first two summit meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, respectively. The dialogue between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Geneva summit shows the difference:

⁹⁵⁴ Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars,” 334, fn. 27. Mendelson’s interview with Georgii Arbatov on January 4, 1991, and with Andrey Kokoshin on November 11, 1991.

⁹⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁶ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 60.

⁹⁵⁷ Dmitry Mikheyev, *The Soviet Perspective in the Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense, 1987), 3.

⁹⁵⁸ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 122.

Gorbachev: If the goal was to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another sphere?

Reagan: These are not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these are weapons that destroy nuclear missiles.

Gorbachev: Let's ban research, development, testing and deployment of space weapons, then cut off offensive arms by 50 percent.

Reagan: Why do you keep speaking about space weapons? We certainly have no intention of putting something into space that would threaten people on Earth.⁹⁵⁹

Gorbachev believed that the United States would not depend exclusively on SDI because it could not provide perfect protection for the United States. Also, nuclear arms reductions combined with SDI would increase the vulnerability of the Soviet Union because SDI would be more effective if there were fewer numbers of warheads.⁹⁶⁰ Peter Zwick said, "In effect, the United States would have a 'first strike' capability, which means that the U.S. could launch a nuclear attack against the USSR and defend against any retaliation. That, in a nutshell, is why Gorbachev opposes SDI."⁹⁶¹

Gorbachev also expressed his concerns about SDI in *Perestroika*. He wrote:

We are against SDI, because we are for complete elimination of nuclear weapons and because SDI makes the world ever more unstable, because the consequences would be unpredictable. Instead of promoting security, SDI destroys the remnants of what might still serve security.⁹⁶²

The Soviet Union, especially conservative hard-liners, believed that the United States posed a serious threat to its security, and did have "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors.

⁹⁵⁹ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 231–232.

⁹⁶⁰ Zwick, "Soviet Nuclear Strategy," 99–100.

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁹⁶² Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 234.

(2) The United States' "Not-greedy" and "Need-oriented" Motivating Factors: The Reformers' Focus on Insecurity. From the perspective of Gorbachev's "new thinking" about foreign policy, the Cold War was no longer a struggle between capitalism and communism. The Soviet Union and the United States could become common victims of nuclear war. Gorbachev recognized the insecurity of the United States. Therefore, Gorbachev emphasized that the United States could not achieve any security without the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wrote in *Perestroika*, "For all the contrary nature of our relationship it is obvious that we can do nothing in terms of securing peace without the U.S., and without us the U.S. also will accomplish nothing."⁹⁶³

Later, in 1987, Gorbachev's attitude to SDI also changed. He announced the unlinking of SDI from the negotiations on INF in Europe. Therefore, the INF treaty could be signed after that. According to Alan R. Collins, there were three reasons for this change:

First, Reagan seemed to see the project as a purely defensive system; he even offered to sell it to the Soviet Union when it became available. Second, the 1983 version appeared technologically impossible, and a point defense that could cheaply be overwhelmed appeared the most likely outcome of the SDI. Finally, SDI seemed to be Reagan's 'pet' project, and another president would not be so attached to it."⁹⁶⁴

Gorbachev's acceptance of SDI as a defensive system meant that he recognized that SDI was initiated by Reagan's insecurity about nuclear war, which demonstrated the "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors of the United States.

Also, Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet conventional force was a serious threat to the United States and West Europe. Gorbachev announced major reductions in East Europe in a 1988 UN speech to show his sincerity and reduce the main threat to the United States and West Europe. Under Gorbachev, these kinds of

⁹⁶³ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 216.

⁹⁶⁴ Collins, "GRIT, Gorbachev," 208.

perceptions were shared with progressive soft-liners and reformers who acknowledged that the United States had an aversion to nuclear war. Without their help, Gorbachev could not have implemented his policy.

e. Aversion to War by the Soviet Union and the United States

The Soviet Union and the United States, especially the two leaders, Gorbachev and Reagan, shared an aversion to war, especially nuclear war. For example, the joint statement after the Geneva summit in 1985 said, "...a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority."⁹⁶⁵ Gorbachev and Reagan repeatedly voiced their aversion to war after the first summit in Geneva.

(1) The Soviet Union. Gorbachev and the Soviet people remembered the horrific experience of World War II. Gorbachev remembered from his childhood experience that war meant horror and trauma. In his memoirs, Gorbachev shared his horrific experience of when he was twelve years old in the spring of 1943:

...we children roamed through the countryside in search of trophies and came to a remote stretch of forest between Provolnoye and the neighboring village, Belaya Glina. There we stumbled upon the remains of Red Army soldiers, who had fought their last battle there in summer 1942.

It was an unspeakable horror: decaying corpses, partly devoured by animals, skulls in rusted helmets, bleached bones, rifles protruding from the sleeves of the rotting jackets. There was a light machine-gun, some hand grenades, heaps of empty cartridges. There they lay, in the thick mud of the trenches and craters, unburied, staring at us out of black, gaping eye-sockets. We came home in a state of shock⁹⁶⁶

⁹⁶⁵ "Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva, November 21, 1985," <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/112185a.htm> (accessed on November 19, 2009) and Mann, 43.

⁹⁶⁶ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 42–43.

Gorbachev's images of war were widespread in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev said, "I was fourteen when the war ended. Our generation is the generation of wartime children. It has burned us, leaving its mark both on our characters and on our view of the world."⁹⁶⁷

When Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, he remembered the desperation of war and believed that nuclear war should not occur. He said, "Never before has such a terrible danger hung over the heads of humanity in our times....The only rational way out of the current situation is for the opposing forces to agree to immediately stop the arms race—above all, the nuclear arms race."⁹⁶⁸ In his first letter to Reagan, Gorbachev expressed his view that the Soviet Union and the United States shared an aversion to nuclear war. He said that they were "not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides."⁹⁶⁹ Gorbachev also said in 1986, "In the atomic-cosmic era, world war is an absolute evil."⁹⁷⁰

Gorbachev and the Soviet people got a reminder of what nuclear war would be like from the explosion at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl on April 26, 1986. Gorbachev said, "It is another sound of the tocsin, another grim warning that the nuclear era necessitates a new political thinking and a new policy."⁹⁷¹ Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, pointed out the enormous impact of Chernobyl on the entire country's view of nuclear danger. Akhromeyev said, "After Chernobyl, the nuclear threat stopped being an abstract notion for our people. It became tangible and concrete. The people began to see all the problems linked with nuclear weapons much differently."⁹⁷²

⁹⁶⁷ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 43.

⁹⁶⁸ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 375, referring to Gorbachev, *On My Country*, 180.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 377.

⁹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 375.

⁹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 391.

⁹⁷² Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 252, referring to Sergei Akhromeyev and Georgi M. Kornienko, *Glazami Marshala i Diplomata* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1992), 98–99.

(2) The United States. The aversion to war, especially nuclear war, against the Soviet Union was palpable in the United States. First, Reagan had a strong aversion to nuclear war and had doubts about the utility of nuclear weapons. Many administration officials believed that Reagan had wanted reductions in nuclear weapons since his first term. Jeffrey W. Knopf said, “Most former administration officials I interviewed contend that Reagan wanted sharp reductions in nuclear weapons from day one.”⁹⁷³ Knopf also pointed out, “Reagan himself claims that, soon after he took office, as he learned the number of fatalities that a nuclear war would cause, ‘My dream, then, became a world free of nuclear weapons.’”⁹⁷⁴ There were many significant statements by Reagan showing his anti-nuclear views from the beginning of his first term. For example, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., also said, “During his first press conference as president, on January 29, 1981, Reagan stated that he was in favor of negotiating to achieve ‘an actual reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons’ on a basis that would be verifiable.”⁹⁷⁵

Two weeks after Reagan described the Soviet Union as an evil empire, he made an extraordinary proposal, the Strategic Directive Initiative (SDI), to protect the United States against any attack by the Soviet Union. Reagan explained that he conceived of the SDI “to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose...is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.”⁹⁷⁶ After Reagan watched a preview of the ABC movie, *The Day After* in October 1983, he said, “It

⁹⁷³ Jeffrey W. Knopf, *Domestic society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US arms control policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 228.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid., quoted in Reagan, *An American Life*, 550.

⁹⁷⁵ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 3–4.

⁹⁷⁶ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 354, referring to Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005), 81–121 and John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security During the Cold War*, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 356–59.

is powerfully done and left me greatly depressed.”⁹⁷⁷ Reagan thought that those who claimed a nuclear war “winnable” were crazy.⁹⁷⁸

In the State of the Union Address in January 1984, after his reelection, Reagan declared again his aversion to nuclear war. He said, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”⁹⁷⁹ Richard Crockatt pointed out that “Reagan signaled a historic turn toward a more conciliatory posture toward the Soviet Union in a speech of January 1984, well before Gorbachev came to power, promoted by a growing horror at the possibility of nuclear war.”⁹⁸⁰

Second, the aversion to nuclear war in the American public was apparent. The American peace movements were typical examples to show that. The nuclear freeze movements originated with a proposal in 1980 by a young disarmament researcher, Randall Forsberg, and their consequences were a big surprise. Forsberg was not motivated by an actual war, but “by the increased threat of war associated with the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the SALT II arms control agreement that had already been negotiated with the Soviet Union, and by Carter’s Presidential Directive 59 that made plans for a first strike nuclear war.”⁹⁸¹ The main reason for massive support of the nuclear freeze was the sharing of this threat from nuclear war. The danger of nuclear war led to the formation of collective identity in the United States.

⁹⁷⁷ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 359, referring to Reagan, *An American Life*, 585–86 and Beth A. Ficher, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid., 363, referring to “Address on the State of the Union,” January 25, 1984, Public Papers of the Presidents (PPP): Ronald Reagan, 1984, 87–94.

⁹⁸⁰ Crockatt, “The End of the Cold War,” 123.

⁹⁸¹ David Adams, *The American Peace Movements* (New Haven, CT: Advocate Press, 1985), 15, available at <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter6-15.html> (accessed February 17, 2009).

D. INTERVENING VARIABLE (INTV): LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

1. Gorbachev's Perceptions of Reagan and the United States

Question 7: How did Gorbachev perceive Reagan and the United States? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led Gorbachev to misperceive Reagan? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome Gorbachev's cognitive barriers to change his image of Reagan and the United States?

a. *Gorbachev's Perception Change of Reagan and the United States*

According to Matlock, Gorbachev's perceptions of Reagan and the United States were more distorted than those of Reagan toward Gorbachev before the Geneva summit meeting. Matlock describes the Soviet leader's initial image of his counterpart as follows:

He suspected that Reagan was interested only in stringing him along with sweet talk and no substance, using the meeting as cover for an American drive to secure military supremacy. He was still being advised that any real agreement with Reagan would be impossible, and that the only prudent course for the Soviet Union was to continue its confrontational policies until U.S. allies woke up to the dangers and pressed Reagan or his successor to act more rationally.⁹⁸²

Gorbachev had strong hostility to SDI. When he met with leaders of the Warsaw Pact on October 22, 1985, he said, "They are planning to win over socialism through war or military blackmail....Its military nature is obvious....Its purpose is to secure permanent technological superiority of the West, not only over the socialist community, but over [the U.S.] allies as well."⁹⁸³

However, Gorbachev changed his perception of Reagan through the summit meetings. Gorbachev met Reagan for the first time in Geneva on November 19, 1985. Gorbachev was eager to reach an agreement on arms reductions and wanted

⁹⁸² Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 154.

⁹⁸³ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 380.

Reagan to give up SDI. Gorbachev considered SDI an offensive measure to threaten Soviet security.⁹⁸⁴ Even though Gorbachev and Reagan could not reach any agreement, they became acquainted with each other and each formed a positive impression. Gorbachev came away believing that there was a possibility to improve relations with the United States through negotiations with Reagan.⁹⁸⁵

Gorbachev remembered how he felt a connection with Reagan at their first meeting in Geneva. Gorbachev said, “Somehow, we extended a hand to each other, and started talking. He speaks English, I speak Russian he understands nothing, and I understand nothing. But it seems there is a kind of dialogue being connected, a dialogue of the eyes.”⁹⁸⁶ However, Gorbachev still expressed his suspicion about the United States in the Politburo meeting in September 1986. Melvin P. Leffler summarized Gorbachev’s worries based on Chernyaev’s comments:

He felt he was being tested, squeezed. The Americans “were using our sincere desire to disarm [as a tool against us].”⁹⁸⁷ When the Politburo met again on 4 September, Gorbachev poured forth his spleen. The Americans, he said, wanted to exhaust the Soviet Union, to keep the Kremlin trapped in regional imbroglios, like the one in Afghanistan. They yearned for superiority and sought to intimidate. Their aim, he suspected, was to undermine perestroika. They did “not want to let us increase the dynamism of our system.” They must not be permitted to gain superiority.⁹⁸⁸

One month later, there was the second summit meeting. Even though the Reykjavik summit meeting on October 11–12, 1986, did not reach any agreement, Gorbachev considered the Reykjavik meeting as a turning point. According to Gorbachev:

⁹⁸⁴ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 383.

⁹⁸⁵ Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 52–53.

⁹⁸⁶ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 475.

⁹⁸⁷ Comment by Chernyaev, in Nina Tannenwald, ed., “Understanding the End of the Cold War, 1980–1987: An Oral History Conference, May 7–10, 1998” (Brown University, Watson Institute for International Affairs, Provisional Transcript, 1999, available at National Security Archive (NSA), George Washington University, Washington, D.C.), 155, quoted in Leffler, *For the Soul*, 391.

⁹⁸⁸ Resolution of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU, September 4, 1986, REEAS, Chernyaev Collection, NSA (also published in *Istochnik* 2 [1995]); Chernyaev’s Notes from the Politburo Session, September 22, 1986, REEAD 2956, NSA, quoted in Leffler, *For the Soul*, 391.

And still Reykjavik marked a turning point in world history. It tangibly demonstrated that the world situation could be improved....At Reykjavik we became convinced that our course was correct and that a new and constructive way of political thinking was essential.⁹⁸⁹

Gorbachev believed that the United States was not aggressive toward the Soviet Union. He wrote in *Perestroika*:

I will never accept the claim—whatever anyone might tell me—that the American people are aggressive toward the Soviet Union. I cannot believe that. There are, perhaps, some individuals who are pleased that there is tension, confrontation or intense rivalry between our countries. Perhaps some people do gain something from it. But such a state of things does not meet the larger interests of our peoples.⁹⁹⁰

Gorbachev visited Washington on December 8–10, 1987 and signed the INF treaty with Reagan. Gorbachev believed that Reagan had changed his attitude toward the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs, “It seemed to me that during my visit Reagan re-appraised many things and succeeded in overcoming some of his own stereotypes and misconceptions.”⁹⁹¹

Finally, during Reagan’s visit to Moscow on May 29-June 1, 1988, Gorbachev perceived Reagan as a partner to “do business with” rather an enemy against which to “fight a battle.” Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs:

“Mr. Gorbachev deserves most of the credit as the leader of this country,” President Reagan replied....For me, Ronald Reagan’s acknowledgement was one of the genuine achievements of his Moscow visit. It meant that he had finally convinced himself that he had been right to believe, back in Reykjavik, that you could “do business” with the changing Soviet Union—the hopeful business of preventing a nuclear war.⁹⁹²

⁹⁸⁹ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 240.

⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁹⁹¹ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 577.

⁹⁹² *Ibid.*, 590.

In sum, Gorbachev changed his perceptions of Reagan and the United States from an enemy to a partner, almost a friend, through their personal contacts. This was possible because Gorbachev had an open-minded character.

b. Gorbachev's Open-minded Leadership Style

Gorbachev's reform and changes in the relationship with the United States and Europe were possible because Gorbachev had an open-minded leadership style. When Archie Brown asked Zdeněk Mlynář⁹⁹³ whether Gorbachev had an open mind, Mlynář replied, "Yes, he's open-minded, intelligent, and anti-Stalinist."⁹⁹⁴ This perspective was correct. Victor Kremenjuk, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Science (ISKAN), pointed out that Gorbachev was more interested in policy debate than previous leaders:

He likes to set up competing explanations and hear them out. Gorbachev likes different proposals while Brezhnev and even Andropov wanted to hear only their style, their points of views reiterated. They wanted fully consistent proposals. Gorbachev likes to be able to compare. When people realize this, then there was a switch. People wrote much more open and critical assessments of matters.⁹⁹⁵

Valerii Sidorov, former aide to Alexander Yakovlev and Evgenii Primakov, also said, "...every meeting with the intelligentsia. It is always a two-sided conversation. And Gorbachev tends to listen more."⁹⁹⁶

In addition, Gorbachev had more open-minded views on the West than any other Soviet leaders. Gorbachev visited Western countries such as Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the 1980s and those visits gave him much broader perspectives. Robert D. English believes, Gorbachev's visits to European

⁹⁹³ Gorbachev's closest Russian friend. They studied together in the Law department of Moscow University from 1950 and 1955.

⁹⁹⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversation with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism*, trans. George Shriver with a Forward by Archie Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xiv.

⁹⁹⁵ Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars," 353, fn. 96. Mendelson's interview with Victor Kremenjuk on November 1, 1990.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid., Mendelson's interview with Valerii Sidorov, on November 15, 1990.

countries “had an enormous impact on his intellectual evolution.”⁹⁹⁷ Gorbachev was shocked by the openness, better functioning of society and higher standards of living in Europe than in the Soviet Union. Quoting Gorbachev, English reports, “Having met people ranging from German students and French farmers to Italian workers, the ‘openness and relaxed, free, and critical discussion’ he encountered ‘shook my faith in the superiority of socialist democracy.’”⁹⁹⁸

As a result of his exposure to the West and openness to debate, Gorbachev did not have psychological biases or cognitive barriers to changing his image of Reagan and the United States. In the end, he did change his image of Reagan and the United States.

2. Reagan’s Perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union

Question 8: How did Reagan perceive Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led Reagan to discount those reassurance strategies? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome Reagan’s cognitive barriers to changing his image of the Soviet Union?

Reagan missed the signs of Gorbachev’s difference from previous Soviet leaders at the early stage of the Gorbachev period. As David Hoffman pointed out, that was from Reagan’s “deep anti-communism and his long-held ideas about the Soviet system” and “lack of good intelligence.”⁹⁹⁹ However, Reagan changed his perception of Soviet leaders as Gorbachev implemented a reassurance strategy. Gorbachev was a different leader from other previous Soviet leaders. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, said Reagan for years believed that Soviet leaders “weren’t reliable people, that they were aggressive and expansionist and dangerous. Those were his views,

⁹⁹⁷ Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals & the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 182.

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁹ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 189.

and he maintained those views, I think—until the Gorbachev era.”¹⁰⁰⁰ According to Kirkpatrick, Reagan changed his thinking because of Gorbachev.¹⁰⁰¹

Reagan’s attitude toward the Soviet Union actually started changing in 1984 before Gorbachev came into power, and this initial shift in attitude was eventually confirmed by Gorbachev’s policies. Therefore, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy was sufficient to overcome any remaining cognitive barriers to changing Reagan’s image of the Soviet Union. When Reagan met the president of Yugoslavia, Mika Spiljak, at the White House on February 1, 1984, he discussed the intentions of the Soviet Union. Reagan expressed his change in perceptions toward to the Soviet Union in his diary. He wrote:

He believed that coupled with their expansionist philosophy they are also insecure & genuinely frightened of us. He also believes that if we opened them up a bit their leading citizens would get braver about proposing change in their system. I’m going to pursue this.¹⁰⁰²

This paragraph is significant because it shows that Reagan considered the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the Soviet Union and pursuit of a new approach as a result.

a. Reagan’s Perception Change of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union

The 1985 selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union contributed to changes in Reagan’s perception about Soviet leaders and the U.S. perception of the Soviet Union.

(1) Reagan’s Doubts Early in the Gorbachev Era. In 1985, Reagan believed that all Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, were alike because the Soviet monolithic communist system could not change.¹⁰⁰³ Reagan said that “I can’t claim that I believed from the start that Mikhail Gorbachev was going to be a different

¹⁰⁰⁰ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 249–50. Mann’s interview with Jeane Kirkpatrick.

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰² Reagan, *Reagan Diaries*, 217.

¹⁰⁰³ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 190.

sort of Soviet leader. Instead, as this note in my diary five weeks after he became general secretary of the Communist Party indicates, I was wary.”¹⁰⁰⁴ Reagan met U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Harman and wrote in his diary on April 19, 1985: “He [Hartman] confirms what I believe that Gorbachev will be tough as any of their leaders. If he wasn’t a confirmed ideologue he never would have been chosen by the Polit beaureu [sic] [Politiburo].”¹⁰⁰⁵

Shortly before the first summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985, Reagan dictated his thoughts to his secretary. The comments show Reagan still thought about Gorbachev in traditional terms. As Matlock summarized it, the president commented:

He is (as are all Soviet General Secretaries) dependent on the Soviet Communist hierarchy and will be out to prove to them his strength and dedication to Soviet traditional goals.” So far so good, I thought as I read. Subsequently, the president acknowledged that Gorbachev did not “want to undertake any new adventures” but would “be stubborn and tough about holding what he was.” He believed that Gorbachev’s major goal would be “weaning our European friends away from us” by “making us look like a threat to peace.”¹⁰⁰⁶

Reagan wrote also about his thoughts on arms control with the Soviet Union. According to Matlock, “As for arms reduction, he believed that Gorbachev wished to ‘reduce the burden of defense spending that is stagnating the Soviet economy,’ and that it ‘could contribute to his opposition to SDI’ since ‘he doesn’t want to face the cost of competing with us.’”¹⁰⁰⁷ Reagan also had suspicions of the Soviet military. Reagan wrote, “...the Soviets are planning a war. They would like to win without it and their chances of doing that depend on being so prepared we could be faced with a surrender or die ultimatum.”¹⁰⁰⁸

¹⁰⁰⁴ Regan, *An American Life*, 614.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Regan, *Reagan Diaries*, 317.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 151.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid.

In the early years of the Gorbachev era, Reagan believed that the Soviet Union had not changed much and Gorbachev was not different from any other former Soviet leaders. However, Reagan's skeptical perceptions of Gorbachev changed as they increased their interchanges.

(2) Reagan's Changes of Perception Regarding Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. Through summit meetings, Reagan came to consider Gorbachev as a pragmatic leader with whom he could make agreements. James Mann concluded that one explanation for "Reagan's determination to do business with Gorbachev" was his firsthand contact with Gorbachev.¹⁰⁰⁹ After the first meeting in Geneva in November 1985, Reagan shared his first impression with his old friend, George Murphy. Reagan said, "At the same time, he is practical and knows his economy is a basket case. I think our job is to show him he and they will be better off if we make some practical agreements, without attempting to convert him to our way of thinking."¹⁰¹⁰

Also, the summit in Reykjavik gave Reagan an opportunity to understand how desperately Gorbachev wanted to limit Soviet military spending and reduce tensions with the United States. Before the summit in Reykjavik, the Reagan administration had not prepared for a substantive discussion on arms control and was not sure what Gorbachev wanted to do. Hoffman introduced some examples of how little the Reagan administration prepared for the Reykjavik meeting. Hoffman said:

A Soviet specialist at the State Department wrote a two-page memo that opened: "we go into Reykjavik next week with very little knowledge of how Gorbachev intends to use the meeting." [National Security Advisor] Poindexter wrote "talking points" that he gave to Reagan, including "anticipate no substantive agreements per se," and "meeting is in no sense a substitute or a surrogate for a summit."¹⁰¹¹

¹⁰⁰⁹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 57.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid., 44. Reagan's letter to George Murphy, December 19, 1985, in Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

¹⁰¹¹ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 260.

Reagan was became convinced of Gorbachev's sincerity and began to change his perception of the Soviet Union during his second term. He became the "leading dove of his administration."¹⁰¹²

Reagan received a question from a reporter during his European trip in June 1987 on how he perceived Gorbachev. The reporter said, "Do you trust him?" Reagan answered that "Well, he's a personable gentleman, but I cited to him a Russian proverb..., *Doveryai no proveryai*. It means trust but verify."¹⁰¹³ Reagan's answer, *Doveryai no proveryai*, reflected Reagan's perception of Gorbachev in 1987. First, Reagan thought that Gorbachev was perhaps not like previous Soviet leaders. Reagan was persuaded that "Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader from his predecessors, one with whom you could do business."¹⁰¹⁴ Second, Reagan wanted to confirm Gorbachev's sincerity to continue talks and reduce tensions between the two countries. Reagan acknowledged the possibility that Gorbachev was a trustful leader, but also raised skepticism about how Gorbachev would show his sincere intentions to ease the tensions with the United States.

Reagan's perceptions changed more after the signing of the INF treaty on December 8, 1987. Reagan acknowledged that, "our people should have been better friends long ago."¹⁰¹⁵ During Reagan's fourth summit with Gorbachev in May 1988, ABC correspondent Sam Donaldson asked, "Do you still think you're in an evil empire, Mr. President?" Reagan's answer was "no" without any hesitation.¹⁰¹⁶ Reagan said, "I was talking about another time and another era."¹⁰¹⁷ This answer was significant to show that Reagan's perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union totally changed.

¹⁰¹² Richard Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 370.

¹⁰¹³ Lou Cannon, "Aides Repair Gaffe by Reagan on Dollar," *Washington Post*, June 12, 1987, A 19; Transcript of the President's News Conference, June 11, 1987.

¹⁰¹⁴ Archie Brown, "Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War," in *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations*, eds., Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 51.

¹⁰¹⁵ Collins, "GRIT, Gorbachev," 208, cited from *Guardian*, December 9, 1987.

¹⁰¹⁶ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 304.

¹⁰¹⁷ Ibid.

According to Hoffman, “The moment marked the end of Reagan’s cold war.”¹⁰¹⁸ Reagan thought that Gorbachev was a leader different from previous Soviet leaders and there had been a “profound change” in the Soviet government.¹⁰¹⁹

On December 7, 1988, Reagan and George H. W. Bush met Gorbachev after Gorbachev’s historic speech at the United Nations. Reagan wrote in his diary, “I think the meeting was a tremendous success. A better attitude than at any of our previous meetings. He sounded as if he saw us as partners making a better world.”¹⁰²⁰

b. Cognitive Barriers Did Not Prevent Reagan from Changing His Views

The interchanges like the summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev are not enough to explain Reagan’s perceptual change regarding Gorbachev. For example, James Mann compared Nixon’s perception with Reagan’s after their meetings with Gorbachev. Nixon met Gorbachev in July 1986. Nixon described him as a leader with a “steel fist.” Nixon said, “Brezhnev used a meat axe in his negotiations, Gorbachev uses a stiletto. But beyond the velvet glove he always wears, there is a steel fist...In essence, he is the most affable of all the Soviet leaders I have met, but at the same time without question the most formidable because his goals are the same as theirs and he will be more effective in attempting to achieve them.”¹⁰²¹ However, contrary to Nixon who had cognitive barriers, Reagan had a more open mind and felt that Gorbachev was different from other Soviet leaders through their summit meetings.

Even before Reagan meet Gorbachev, he wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons and acknowledged that it was impossible without the Soviet Union. For example, when Vice President George Bush participated in Chernenko’s funeral, he

¹⁰¹⁸ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 312.

¹⁰¹⁹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 305.

¹⁰²⁰ Reagan, *Reagan Diaries*, 676.

¹⁰²¹ Memorandum on conversation with General Secretary Gorbachev at the Kremlin, July 18, 1986, Ronald Reagan postpresidential correspondence, Richard Nixon Library, quoted in Mann, 37.

delivered Reagan's letter to Gorbachev to invite Gorbachev to the United States.¹⁰²² Reagan said, "I would like to invite you to visit me in Washington at your earliest convenient opportunity....I want you to know that I look forward to a meeting that could yield results of benefit to both our countries and to the international community as a whole."¹⁰²³ Mann explained that Reagan had a desire to talk to the Soviet leadership before Gorbachev became a general secretary. Mann says, "Reagan personally emphasized during the National Security Council's final discussion of NSDD-75¹⁰²⁴ that he wanted nothing in the document that would stand in the way of 'compromise and quiet diplomacy' with Soviet leaders."¹⁰²⁵ Through his first term, Reagan learned that the Soviet Union felt a strong threat from the United States. Reagan said, "Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians. Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did."¹⁰²⁶

In addition, one of most important figures who influenced Reagan's perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union was Suzanne Massie,¹⁰²⁷ who taught Reagan the saying *Doveryai no Proveryai* (Trust but Verify). Reagan's meetings with Suzanne Massie show that Reagan had an open mind to learn about the Soviet Union. Reagan wanted to do business with the Soviet leadership and eventually changed his antipathy toward the Soviet Union. The tragic Chernobyl accident also affected Reagan's

¹⁰²² Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 108.

¹⁰²³ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 226.

¹⁰²⁴ NSDD stands for National Security Decision Directive. According to NSDD 75, "U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements." It is available at, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm> (accessed on November 12, 2009).

¹⁰²⁵ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 31, referring to Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Believer* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 198.

¹⁰²⁶ Leffler, *For the Soul*, 358.

¹⁰²⁷ Suzanne Massie is the author of a book called *The Living Mirror: Five Young Poets from Leningrad*. She met Reagan twenty two times between 1984 and 1988. For her biography, refer to Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 68–72 and her homepage at <http://www.suzannemassie.com/>.

perception of the Soviet Union. Massie gave Reagan her impressions from her visit after the Chernobyl accident. Shultz, who attended the meeting between Massie and Reagan recalled:

There were shortages of everything, and people now realized they had to turn to free enterprise. Chernobyl was of great symbolic importance, she felt: it showed that Soviet science and technology were flawed, that the leadership was lying and out of touch, that the party could not conceal its failures any longer. Chernobyl means ‘wormwood,’ a reference to bitterness and sorrow from the Book of Revelation. There are many biblical allusions in Russia now.¹⁰²⁸

Consequently, the personal interaction between Gorbachev and Reagan played an important role in the relations of the two countries. Matlock observed:

We can only be astonished that, over the historically brief period from 1985 to 1988, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev managed to find a common language, to build, step by frequently faltering step, a foundation of respect and trust, and on that basis to forge a common purpose that allowed them to transform the political landscape of the entire world. This happened because Gorbachev was different from the Soviet leaders he succeeded, and Reagan was different from the false image many of his critics—and some of his supporters—fashioned of him.¹⁰²⁹

The respect and trust between leaders of the sending and receiving states is a necessary condition for the success of reassurance strategy.

3. Domestic Politics of the Soviet Union

Question 9: How did key domestic actors in the Soviet Union perceive Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy offer to the United States? Did the reassurance strategy generate domestic support in the Soviet Union? Was there sufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

The key domestic actors in the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1989 can be divided into hard-liners and soft-liners. Generally speaking, soft-liners were the new

¹⁰²⁸ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 253, quoted from George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 724.

¹⁰²⁹ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 110–111.

thinkers such as Gorbachev's close advisors Yevgeny Velikhov, Alexander Yakovlev, and Georgii Arbatov who were supporters for Gorbachev's reassurance strategy, while the old thinkers, mainly from the military-industrial complex, opposed it. Some scholars described the debate between hard-liners and the soft-liners as "a conflict between 'diplomacists' who believe that progress can only be achieved through accommodation, and 'unilateralists' who believe that only Soviet military power can guarantee Soviet strategic gains."¹⁰³⁰

Over time, the old thinkers and unilateralists declined in influence and Gorbachev consolidated his power. Then, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy without strong opposition from the old thinkers. Eventually, the old thinkers pushed back, leading to the coup attempt that facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. By then, however, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy had already succeeded in convincing the United States that the Cold War was over.

a. Key Domestic Actors: Opponents

(1) Resistance to Gorbachev's Reassurance Strategy. Gorbachev's power rested on the three conservative institutions of the Soviet military, the Communist Party, and the KGB. Gorbachev needed to maintain ties to them. When Gorbachev became general secretary, those institutions had supported his reforms and changes because they hoped that economic reforms could help strengthen Soviet power by upgrading intelligence and the military. However, Gorbachev had realized that the reform of the military was necessary for reform in the Soviet Union. Matlock described this problem and pointed out, "Gorbachev's dilemma was that he could not avoid impinging on the military's prerogatives if he was to revitalize the economy, nor could he avoid a change in Soviet military doctrine if he was to relieve international tension so as to permit more attention to domestic reform."¹⁰³¹

¹⁰³⁰ Zwick, "Soviet Nuclear Strategy," 94, referring to Dan L. Strobe and Rebecca V. Strobe, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," *International Security* (Fall 1983): 91–116.

¹⁰³¹ Jack Matlock, Jr., *Autopsy on an Empire: the American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), 139.

As Gorbachev implemented his security policy, the military and some members of the Communist Party came to have anxiety and disagreement over his reassurance strategy, especially about unilateral military reductions. That is, they became opponents of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy toward the United States. Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States between 1962 and 1986, said, "Our military command, as well as some members of the political leadership, were decidedly unhappy about Gorbachev's zeal in making deep concessions in order to achieve agreements with Washington."¹⁰³² When Gorbachev changed the Warsaw Pact military doctrine from an offensive to a defensive one, after the Berlin meeting in 1987, Soviet military leaders expressed their opposite opinions to the military chiefs of staff of other European nations at a session in Moscow. Soviet Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov said, "the only way to definitively crush an aggressor is by executing decisive attacks...we cannot under any circumstances agree to unilateral reductions."¹⁰³³ Mann pointed out that "Those words seemed aimed at Gorbachev."¹⁰³⁴

As historian Robert England indicated, it was extraordinarily hard to make changes "in an ossified, militarized Party-state system," especially given the latent power of the hard-liners.¹⁰³⁵ Despite resistance from opponents, such as the military and party members, Gorbachev kept on with his reassurance strategy.

(2) Decline of the Opposition against Gorbachev and Positive Response from the United States. The decline of the opponents of Gorbachev started at the leadership level in the early stage of Gorbachev's rule. Graeme Gill pointed out the significance. Gill said, "Within Gorbachev's first two years new members accounted for five of eleven full Politburo members, six of eight candidate Politburo members, and nine of twelve central committee secretaries—an unprecedented turnover for a new Soviet

¹⁰³² Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 631, quoted in Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 174–175.

¹⁰³³ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 175, referring to Mastny and Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle*, 559–60.

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁵ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 183, referring to English, *Russia and the Idea*, 172–173.

regime.”¹⁰³⁶ Also, hard-liner Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the chief of the general staff, was removed in September 1984.¹⁰³⁷ Gorbachev’s leading opponent within the Party was Yegor Ligachev. He was forced to move from his position in charge of party ideology to that in charge of agriculture.¹⁰³⁸ Another opponent, former foreign minister Andrei Gromyko was also forced to retire.¹⁰³⁹

Gorbachev believed that he could not achieve his aims unless he won over these opponents who did not want to follow his reforms. There were several occasions that Gorbachev could use to exploit to win over opponents. After the Chernobyl incident in April 1986, Gorbachev emphasized the changes in personnel. Anatoly Adamishin, a deputy foreign minister recalled, “Chernobyl showed to Gorbachev that there was a level of officials who cheated him, who didn’t tell him the truth, so he decided to change the upper middle levels [of government].”¹⁰⁴⁰

A nineteen-year-old West German bank trainee, Mathias Rust, flew from Finland to Moscow and landed near Red Square in 1987 without being tracked or stopped by Soviet air defenses.¹⁰⁴¹ Rust’s illegal flight and the poor response from Soviet defense forces had a great impact on the Soviet military. Gorbachev was in Berlin for the Warsaw Pact meeting and told leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, “This is even worse than Chernobyl.”¹⁰⁴² When the first Deputy Minister of Defense, Pyotr Lushev, briefed Gorbachev, Gorbachev was furious at military leaders. When Lushev said that the duty officers “were unprepared to operate in non-standard circumstances,” Gorbachev responded, “And then how are we going to operate in combat conditions, when non-

¹⁰³⁶ Goldstein and Freeman, *Three-Way Street*, 209, fn. 90, referring to Graeme Gill, “Power, Authority and Gorbachev’s Policy Agenda,” in *The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok Initiative*, eds., Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997): 20.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid., referring to Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1985), 1018.

¹⁰³⁸ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 314.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid., 171.

¹⁰⁴¹ Ibid., 175–6.

¹⁰⁴² Ibid., 175.

standard situations occur?”¹⁰⁴³ Gorbachev replaced about 150 generals and colonels, including the head of the Air Defense Forces, considering them responsible for the event. Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov resigned.¹⁰⁴⁴ In this way, Gorbachev strengthened his own power, which was necessary for implementing his reassurance strategy.

Consequently, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy with reduced opposition. Gorbachev said, “But fine, at least everyone here, and in the West, will know where power lies. It is in the hands of the political leadership, the Politburo. This will put an end to gossip about the military’s opposition to Gorbachev, that he’s afraid of them, and they are close to ousting him.”¹⁰⁴⁵ Matthew Evangelista concluded:

Through his control of the domestic agenda and relying upon the authority of his position as top communist leader in an extremely hierarchical system, Mikhail Gorbachev was able to implement, without substantial domestic opposition, the ideas that brought the Cold War to an end.¹⁰⁴⁶

b. Key Domestic Actors: Supporters and Change from Above

Even though there was strong resistance from the militarized party-state system to Gorbachev’s ideas, there was widespread support from Gorbachev’s inner circle of advisors and the broader professional class they represented. Gorbachev designated reformers as his close advisors, which increased the ability of people in the professional class to influence the Soviet policy toward the United States. Some reform-minded actors gained control of greater political resources and access under the lead of Gorbachev and his advisors. In sum, Gorbachev’s leadership and the connection between his inner circle advisor group and a growing professional class created a domestic base of support for reassurance strategy toward the United States.

¹⁰⁴³ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 290.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 175–176.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 291, referring to Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 119.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Evangelista, “Turning Points in Arms Control,” 103.

(1) Gorbachev's Inner Circle Advisor Group. There were several important figures in Gorbachev's inner circle advisor group who were fatigued by the country's stagnation and hoped to see reform in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev replaced his foreign minister Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze. Gromyko, who had held the post for twenty-eight years, was a typical old thinker and saw the world from the Hobbesian perspective. Gorbachev wanted to change the confrontational perspective and selected Shevardnadze. Gorbachev's selection of Shevardnadze, his personal friend, was a surprise to everybody including Shevardnadze, who said it was "the greatest surprise of my life."¹⁰⁴⁷ Gorbachev wanted to assign a foreign minister with a fresh mind and "bring foreign policy under his direct control."¹⁰⁴⁸ Also, Gorbachev believed in reform of the military-industrial complex and appointed Lev Zaikov, a Leningrad party official, to oversee it. Gorbachev said that "There are many obstacles in this area of work. We need to fix things here."¹⁰⁴⁹

Gorbachev needed a military advisor who could understand his reassurance strategy and help implement it without opposition from the military. Sergei Akhromeyev, the chief of the General Staff, was another important figure in Gorbachev's inner circle of advisors who fulfilled Gorbachev's need. According to Hoffman, "Akhromeyev was above reproach by the military elite for his long service to the country, and he gave Gorbachev the cover and legitimacy he needed to attempt a radical farewell to arms."¹⁰⁵⁰ As a military advisor, he had worked a lot with Gorbachev on the implementation of the reassurance strategy through arms control negotiations, withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, change of military doctrine, and so on. Akhromeyev was the only top military officer who was not forced to leave after Rust's flight crossed the border.¹⁰⁵¹

¹⁰⁴⁷ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 128.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 213, referring to Minutes of the Politburo, June 29, 1985. Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 18, the national security archive (TNSA), <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/index.html>.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 270.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 291.

(2) Professional Class: Epistemic Communities (Specialist Networks) and the Intelligentsia. The rise of New Thinking and its influence on Soviet foreign policy was not a product of Gorbachev alone. Soviet reform-minded professionals in epistemic communities and the intelligentsia class played important roles. The term, epistemic community, refers to like-minded technical experts within a particular field. In the Soviet Union, the relevant epistemic communities comprised reform-minded experts on international relations and arms control. They have been called “specialist networks”¹⁰⁵² by Robert G. Herman and “epistemic communities” by other scholars such as Peter M. Haas,¹⁰⁵³ Matthew Evangelista,¹⁰⁵⁴ Emanuel Adler,¹⁰⁵⁵ and Sarah Mendelson.¹⁰⁵⁶ The most prominent figures in the epistemic communities were: Alexander Yakovlev, head of a prestigious think tank, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; Yevgeny Velikhov, deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy; and Georgii Arbatov, director of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada.¹⁰⁵⁷

In studies of the influence of expert knowledge on policy, many scholars have found that leadership style in the Soviet Union played a critical role. As Mendelson pointed out, “Specialists could change the terms of political discourse, but they needed sponsorship, institutionalization, and regular channels for communicating with the leadership, such as expert commissions or scientific councils.”¹⁰⁵⁸ In short, it

¹⁰⁵² Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” 284. Herman says, “I have deliberately eschewed the term *epistemic communities* because the networks of reform-minded specialists examined here do not fit the decidedly technical knowledge-based criteria employed by the concept’s most prominent theoreticians.

¹⁰⁵³ Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization* 46, no. 1, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination* (Winter 1992): 1–35.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Matthew Evangelista, “The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union,” *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 1–38.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creating of a Reflective Research Program,” *International Organization* 46, no. 1, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination* (Winter 1992): 367.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars,” 328.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 210.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars,” 338.

depends on “whether there is a good match between the leadership’s interests and the specialists’ advice.”¹⁰⁵⁹ Mendelson argues that implementation and influence of ideas depend on three factors: “(1) the type of access an epistemic community has to the political leadership; (2) the degree to which an idea proposed by the community is salient to the leadership; and (3) the ability of the leadership to control political resources in order to place controversial ideas on the policy agenda and to empower the community.”¹⁰⁶⁰ Mendelson used the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan as an example to show how the epistemic community was supported by Gorbachev and supported him.

Robert G. Herman emphasized the role of “specialist networks” to explain how New Thinking ideas were constructed in the Soviet Union and how it became the basis of state policy in the 1980s. According to Herman, “New Thinking was a collaborative effort, the result of intellectual give-and-take within these expert groups....Specialist networks quite literally provide the bridge between the emergence of new ideas and identities and their prospective adoption by the political leadership.”¹⁰⁶¹ After Herman interviewed dozens of Soviet specialists¹⁰⁶² and researched previously classified memoranda (*zapiski*), he concluded that Soviet policy in the late 1980s was the product of both specialist networks and the Gorbachev leadership. He argued that “the momentous turn in Soviet international policy was the product of cognitive evolution and policy entrepreneurship by networks of Western-oriented in-system reformers coincident with the coming to power of a leadership committed to change and receptive to new ideas for solving the country’s formidable problems.”¹⁰⁶³

¹⁰⁵⁹ Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 92–93.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars,” 359–360.

¹⁰⁶¹ Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” 285.

¹⁰⁶² Those from institutes under the Soviet Academy of Science as well as with senior state and party *apparatchiks*, many from the Central Committee’s International Department (CCID) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

¹⁰⁶³ Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” 273.

The support from the professional class was not limited to the epistemic communities. In addition to the epistemic communities on international relations and arms control, there was broad support from urban, middle-class professionals. The professional class who had “professional and economic interests in changing the system” promoted the implementation of reforms and supported Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy.¹⁰⁶⁴ Jack Snyder pointed out that one of factors “promoting the emergence of the reforms is the strengthening of the constituency that naturally favors it, the cultural and technical intelligentsia.”¹⁰⁶⁵ Snyder stated, “the intelligentsia has been steadily growing in size and independence as natural result of the gradual modernization of the economy and social structure.”¹⁰⁶⁶

Gorbachev wanted to reform the Soviet Union and appointed reformists as his close advisors. Also, Gorbachev and his advisors communicated with the epistemic communities and the intelligentsia and used their knowledge to help guide reform, including the reassurance strategy. Snyder observed, “Gorbachev is trying to empower new constituencies, working through new institutions and transforming old ones.”¹⁰⁶⁷ The convergence of interests between Gorbachev and the professional experts from epistemic communities and the intelligentsia group provided supportive domestic politics for Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States. Therefore, changes from above were possible in the Soviet Union.

4. Domestic Politics of the United States

Question 10: How did key domestic actors in the United States perceive Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy? Did Gorbachev’s reassurance generate domestic support in the United States for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try to prevent the United States from offering a positive response?

¹⁰⁶⁴ Jack Snyder, “The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?” *International Security* 12, no. 3 (Winter, 1987–1988): 112.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ibid., 114.

There were two groups in the United States—opponents and supporters of Reagan’s reciprocity to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. They had two competing perspectives on the Soviet Union: the opponents emphasized the aggressive character of the Soviet Union that hoped to expand its influence, and the supporters of Reagan’s reciprocity stressed the danger of nuclear weapons and the arms race. The disagreement between Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz, is a good example of controversy between opponents and supporters.

In the end, opponents like Weinberger could not prevent the Reagan administration from offering positive responses to the Soviet Union. There was the rise of supporters with backing from ordinary citizens shown in the nuclear freeze movement. Also, Reagan was popular and could persuade conservatives to accept his response to the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the Reagan administration could show positive responses to the Soviet Union without strong opposition in domestic politics. The freeze movement started in the early 1980s and created political circumstances favorable to arms control. In contrast to the Soviet Union where reassurance strategy started from top, in the United States, the rise of soft liners and supporters for arms control emerged from the bottom in domestic politics.

a. *Resistance to Reagan’s Positive Response from Opponents*

There were strong opponents among the conservative hard-liners who were against any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. Mann pointed out that there were three constituencies: (1) leading American intelligence and defense officials; (2) the political right; and (3) realists who were very critical of Reagan and opposed any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy.¹⁰⁶⁸ Mann said that there were “three separate but overlapping constituencies, each of which had played a powerful role in influencing American policy during the Cold War.”¹⁰⁶⁹

¹⁰⁶⁸ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, xvi–xvii.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, xvi.

(1) Intelligence and Military. The Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union depended on intelligence and the military because Reagan and his aides obtained information about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union from them. According to Hoffman, "The Central Intelligence Agency devoted about 45 percent of its analytical manpower to the Soviet Union."¹⁰⁷⁰ The CIA's first assessment of Gorbachev, titled "Gorbachev, the New Broom," described Gorbachev as "the most aggressive and activist Soviet leader since Khrushchev."¹⁰⁷¹ William Casey, the director of the CIA, attached a very skeptical cover note to the assessment. He wrote that Gorbachev and those around him "are not reformers and liberalizers either in Soviet domestic or foreign policy."¹⁰⁷² Hoffman said, "He could not have been more wrong."¹⁰⁷³ The CIA briefing paper for the first summit meeting in Geneva in 1985 said Gorbachev had "little expectation of any major substantive breakthrough on arms control or regional issues."¹⁰⁷⁴

Defense Secretary Weinberger was another typical figure among conservative opponents. According to Matlock, even though Reagan thought meetings of American and Soviet military officers would be a good idea, they could not be implemented for several years "because of rivalries in Washington."¹⁰⁷⁵ Matlock said, "Secretary Weinberger did not like the idea and refused to approve any high-level military contacts unless and until he personally met the Soviet minister of defense....Weinberger himself did not want to be seen talking to Soviet military leaders."¹⁰⁷⁶

¹⁰⁷⁰ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 191, referring to Gates, address to Boston Committee on Foreign Relations, November 28, 1984.

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid., referring to "Gorbachev, the New Broom," Office of Soviet Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1985 released to author under FOIA, partially redacted.

¹⁰⁷² Ibid., referring to Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 331–332.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Ibid., 225.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 128.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid.

There are other examples of military leaders objecting to some of the measures discussed by Reagan and Gorbachev. After Reykjavik, Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told Reagan, “he and the other chiefs were upset by the idea of doing away with ballistic missiles.”¹⁰⁷⁷ Nelson Ledsky, a staff aide at Reagan’s National Security Council said, “Reykjavik scared everyone. It was seen as a scary proof that Ronald Reagan might do something terribly reckless.”¹⁰⁷⁸ A booklet, *Soviet Military Power*, published by the Pentagon, claimed that “the Soviets also have two ground-based lasers that are capable of attacking satellites in various orbits. These systems suggest that the Soviets are willing to use space for military purposes that are more ominous than those for which it has been used thus far.”¹⁰⁷⁹ Hoffman criticizes the propaganda piece:

This was a gross exaggeration; neither LE-1 nor the Terra-3 lasers could attack anything....The Soviets had not given up hope, but the glossy Pentagon booklet took old failures and hyped them into new threats.¹⁰⁸⁰

These kinds of information influenced Reagan’s view of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union in 1985 and 1986.

When Gorbachev made a proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free world in January 1986, the general response from the administration was skeptical. According to Shultz, Richard N. Perle, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, told the White House Senior Arms Control Group:

The president’s dream of a world without nuclear weapons—which Gorbachev had picked up—was a disaster, a total delusion. Perle said the president would direct his arms controllers to come up with a program to

¹⁰⁷⁷ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 48.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid. Mann’s interview with Nelson Ledsky, March 3, 2005.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Chapter III – Strategic Defense and Space Programs,” in *Soviet Military Power 1985*, http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_85_ch3.htm (accessed on November 13, 2009).

¹⁰⁸⁰ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 223.

achieve that result. The Joint Chiefs' representative agreed with Perle. They feared the institutionalization and acceptance of the idea as policy."¹⁰⁸¹

Gates, deputy CIA director, said that Gorbachev's proposal to get rid of all nuclear weapons in the world was "tactically a clever stroke" but "did not change any basic Soviet position."¹⁰⁸²

Reagan's July 25, 1986, letter to Gorbachev proposing eventual elimination of ballistic missiles, followed by discussion of the complete elimination of all strategic offensive weapons at the summit meeting in Reykjavik, became a big issue to the military. The military leaders were angry because there had been no consultation with them. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., spoke for the other service chiefs on this issue. He said, "The unanimous answer was that from a national security perspective it was completely unacceptable. The chiefs were quite disturbed."¹⁰⁸³ After serious thought for several days, Crowe spoke up at the White House National Security Planning Group meeting October 27, 1986. He said, "Mr. President, we are concluded that the proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles in 10 years time would pose high risks to the security of the nation."¹⁰⁸⁴

Even two weeks before the third summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Washington, Gates still failed to grasp the intention of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. Gates said, "We will see no lessening of their weapons production. And, further, Soviet research on new, exotic weapons such as lasers and their own version of SDI continues apace."¹⁰⁸⁵ In sum, military leaders and defense officials believed that Gorbachev was not different from previous leaders and expressed their concern about the limiting of missiles and nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union.

¹⁰⁸¹ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 240.

¹⁰⁸² Gates, *From the Shadows*, 377.

¹⁰⁸³ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 271.

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 273.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 294.

(2) The Political Right. The political right, which had supported Reagan from the beginning of his political career, became critical of Reagan. There are many examples showing the resistance of those on the political right. The Daniloff case is one. George Will strongly criticized the administration. He wrote, “The administration believes that Gorbachev wants to end the arms race so he can raise his people’s standard of living....The administration partakes of national vanity of believing that if Soviet leaders just see our supermarkets and swimming pools, they will see the folly of trying to win an arms race with a nation this rich.”¹⁰⁸⁶ Will wrote in April 1987, “Reagan seems to accept the core of the catechism of the antinuclear left, the notion that the threat to peace is technological, not political—the notion that the threat is the existence of nuclear weapons, not the nature of the Soviet regime.”¹⁰⁸⁷ One of the most outspoken conservative columnists, Charles Krauthammer said, “Mr. Gorbachev, your iron teeth are showing.”¹⁰⁸⁸ Also, when Reagan assigned Howard Baker as the White House chief of staff, William Safire, *New York Times* columnist said, “The Russians...now understand the way to handle Mr. Reagan: Never murder a man who is committing suicide.”¹⁰⁸⁹ According to James Mann, “By the spring of 1987, Reagan found that he would have to work harder to overcome the mistrust of the conservatives—and indeed, they remained deeply critical of Reagan for the remainder of his time in the White House.”¹⁰⁹⁰

(3) Realists. The third group who criticized Reagan’s meetings with Gorbachev was the group of officials who had run American foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford administrations. For example, Nixon and Kissinger opposed Reagan’s diplomacy with Gorbachev. They said, “Because we are deeply concerned

¹⁰⁸⁶ George F. Will, “Reagan Botched the Daniloff Affair,” *Washington Post*, September 18, 1986, A25; George F. Will, “Reeling Toward Reykjavik,” *Washington Post*, October 3, 1986, A23.

¹⁰⁸⁷ George F. Will, “The Opiate of Arms Control,” *Newsweek*, April 27, 1986, 86, quoted in Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 51.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Charles Krauthammer, “Gorbachev’s Iron Smile,” *Washington Post*, April 24, 1987, A27, quoted in Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 51.

¹⁰⁸⁹ William Safire, “Secrets of the Summit,” *New York Times*, December 6, 1987, Section 4, 31.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 51.

about this danger, we, who have attended several Summits and engaged in many negotiations with Soviet leaders, are speaking out jointly for the first time since both of us left office.”¹⁰⁹¹ After Kissinger talked about the agreement with Shultz in 1987, he said, it “undoes forty years of NATO.”¹⁰⁹² Kissinger also said, “Many Europeans are convinced a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States.”¹⁰⁹³

Reagan faced opposition from three groups—the military and the intelligence community, the political right, and realists—who influenced American policy toward the Soviet Union and strongly opposed Reagan’s positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy. As Hoffman pointed out, “Reagan’s circle was riven by disagreement, and there was no consensus that this [Gorbachev] was a man they could do business with.”¹⁰⁹⁴

b. *Rise of Supporters for Arms Control and Changes in Reagan’s Policy toward the Soviet Union*

Despite the lack of information about Gorbachev and the conservative hard-liners’ opposition to Reagan’s positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, Reagan changed both his perceptions of Gorbachev and his policy toward the Soviet Union. Reagan not only listened to soft-liners but also tried to persuade hard-liners to provide support. Also, there was public support for arms control in the United States. The freeze movement had an impact on the Reagan administration’s change in policy toward the Soviet Union.

(1) **Reagan’s Persuasion.** Reagan helped generate domestic support for reciprocity and persuaded hard-liners. For example, in the spring of 1985, the unratified SALT II treaty became an issue because the United States needed to retire one

¹⁰⁹¹ Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, “A Real Peace,” *National Review*, May 22, 1987, 32–34.

¹⁰⁹² Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 254, referring to Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 988; Henry A. Kissinger, “A New Era for NATO,” *Newsweek*, October 12, 1987, 57.

¹⁰⁹³ *Ibid.*, 255.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 189.

of its submarines to launch a new one in order to not exceed the limit specified by the SALT II treaty.¹⁰⁹⁵ Despite objections from civilian officials in the Department of Defense, Reagan decided to decommission the old submarine while also trying to mollify the objectors.¹⁰⁹⁶ According to Matlock, “However, he tried to appease the hardliners in the Defense Department by describing Soviet treaty violations in his public statement and promising ‘appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet non-compliance.’”¹⁰⁹⁷

Reagan’s often used phrase, “Trust, but verify,” was intended to get support from domestic politicians, especially from hard-liners, in the United States. According to Matlock:

Reagan’s favorite phrase, “Trust, but verify,” was directed not only at Gorbachev—to explain why we needed reliable verification of agreements—but also at those in his own administration who, like Weinberger, persisted in opposing realistic negotiation with the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev had understood this better, he would not have been so annoyed at Reagan’s repeated use of it.¹⁰⁹⁸

The Berlin Wall speech in June 1987 had a similar intention. Reagan spoke the famous sentence, “Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”¹⁰⁹⁹ This sentence demonstrated Reagan’s discredit of the Communist system. At the same time, Reagan could persuade the American public and especially hard-liners of his working with Gorbachev. According to Mann, “The Berlin Wall speech was, in a real sense, the political prerequisite for the president’s subsequent efforts to work with Gorbachev in easing the tensions of the Cold War.”¹¹⁰⁰

There are many examples showing how Reagan approached conservative hard-liners with his personal communication skills despite their

¹⁰⁹⁵ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 121.

¹⁰⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 120–121.

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 122.

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 202.

¹¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 120.

condemnation of Reagan's response to Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. When there was strong opposition to the INF treaty from the conservatives, Reagan did not ignore their opinions, but cajoled them. According to Frank Carlucci, U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1987 to 1989, "He had a marvelous facility with the right wing. Periodically, he would invite them into the White House, into the Roosevelt Room, and he would come in and shake everybody's hand, and tell a joke or two, and leave the dirty work to the rest of us."¹¹⁰¹ When the Nixon administration veterans complained about Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union, Reagan tried to avoid bitter confrontation. Reagan had a secret meeting with Nixon to get support for his overtures to Gorbachev on April 27, 1987.¹¹⁰² Reagan assigned Henry Kissinger as chairman of a bipartisan commission on Central America and suggested he participate in the inauguration of South Korea's new president, Roh Tae Woo in 1988 to represent the administration.¹¹⁰³ According to Mann, "The result of these efforts was to defuse the opposition. Some of the conservatives continued to criticize Reagan's treaty, but without the passion or venom they were able to summon on other issues."¹¹⁰⁴

Reagan had the capability to communicate with those who had different opinions. Matlock also said, "He disliked direct confrontation with cabinet members, particularly old friends like Weinberger. He also understood that he would need the acquiescence, if not the active support, of the hard-liners in his administration if he was to implement a positive agenda with the Soviet Union."¹¹⁰⁵ In sum, Reagan's communication skill played a significant role when Reagan developed relations with the Soviet Union because it helped him cajole hard-liners to accept his policy.

(2) The Rise of Supporters. Reagan knew that there were different perspectives about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union in his administration—

¹¹⁰¹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 288.

¹¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 233.

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 288.

¹¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Weinberger, Casey, Ed Meese on the conservative hard-line side and Shultz and McFarlane on the progressive soft-line side. He needed to resolve the dispute and choose one side. Reagan wrote in his autobiography:

George Shultz and Cap Weinberger were having one of their disputes over policy. Cap was not as interested as George in opening negotiations with the Russians and some of his advisors at the Pentagon strongly opposed some of my ideas on arms control that George supported, including my hope for eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world.

Cap had allies among some of my more conservative political supporters, who let me know they thought Schultz had gone soft on the Russians and they wanted me to fire him—an idea, I told them, that was utter nonsense.

Meanwhile, Bud McFarlane, who also sometimes differed with Cap and angered him by claiming the Pentagon could modernize its forces effectively at substantially lower cost than Cap was asking for, sided with George. Bill Casey and Ed Meese line up in Cap's camp in favoring an even harder line toward the Russians....¹¹⁰⁶

Reagan also wrote in his diary of which side he was going to support. According to Reagan, “‘Actually George is carrying out my policy. I’m going to meet with Cap and Bill and lay it out to them. Won’t be fun but has to be done.’ I didn’t disagree with Weinberger that the Russians were an evil force in the world and untrustworthy, but I didn’t think that meant we shouldn’t talk to them.”¹¹⁰⁷

In the fall of 1987, there was a decline of conservative hard-liners in the Reagan administration. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the most powerful hardliner who wanted to expand defense spending and develop new weapons systems, resigned in October 1987.¹¹⁰⁸ Although Weinberger explained that he wanted to resign because his wife was in poor health, his position in the administration and Congress had been limited under the improved relationship between the United States and the Soviet

¹¹⁰⁵ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 115.

¹¹⁰⁶ Reagan, *An American Life*, 605–606.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 606.

¹¹⁰⁸ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 255.

Union. Mann said, "...members of Congress had grown increasingly skeptical of his incessant pleas for more money and weaponry."¹¹⁰⁹ Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle who strongly opposed arms control agreements with Soviet Union also resigned several months after the resignation of Weinberger.¹¹¹⁰ Frank Carlucci became defense secretary and Colin Powell became the deputy national security advisor. Also, William Casey died of a brain tumor and William Webster replaced him as the new CIA director. Mann pointed out that these changes in the senior ranks of the Reagan administration were a power shift to Shultz's camp. Mann said, "Now, for the first time, Shultz was the unchallenged leader of Reagan's foreign policy team. Where previously the Reagan administration had bogged down in fractious disputes over how to deal with the Soviet Union, the new team of Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, and Webster worked together in relative harmony."¹¹¹¹ Reagan's assignment of the moderate Howard Baker as his White House chief of staff was also a sign of the decline of conservative hard-liners.¹¹¹²

(3) Public Support: The Rise of the Freeze Movement in the Early 1980s and Reagan's Popularity. In the early 1980s, there was already an extensive citizens' campaign on nuclear arms issues (the freeze movement) that affected the Reagan administration. During the first Reagan administration, the freeze movement generated electoral incentives and a shift in elite and congressional coalitions for a change in Reagan's foreign policy, mainly military and nuclear policy.¹¹¹³

A portion of the American public continued to request the pursuit of an arms control policy with the Soviet Union. As a result, the freeze movements which started in the first Reagan administration, had an impact on the second Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union. Even though Reagan wanted arms reductions and recognized the rise of the freeze movement in America during his first term, there was no acceptance of the freeze proposal. However, the administration

¹¹⁰⁹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 255.

¹¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 256.

¹¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹¹³ Knopf, *Domestic Society and International Cooperation*, 199–246.

learned that the public would applaud any move to negotiate arms control, setting the stage for policy change in the second term. As explained earlier, those who supported negotiations with the Soviet Union rose in the bureaucracy, although not because of the freeze movement. Also, Reagan could be more flexible on his policy toward the Soviet Union after re-election. As Goldstein and Freeman pointed out, “Reagan for his part had a virtually free hand in foreign policy after his re-election victory.”¹¹¹⁴

The American public clearly supported Reagan’s positive response to Gorbachev. An ABC poll taken the day Gorbachev left for home after the Washington summit in December 1987 showed that 76 percent of Americans considered Gorbachev’s visit as a positive step to better a relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and supported Reagan’s policy.¹¹¹⁵ Gorbachev also recognized the importance of public opinion in the United States to induce the positive response from the Reagan administration. According to Matlock, “his moves had to concentrate more on influencing public opinion in the West than on addressing the real concerns of his negotiating partners.”¹¹¹⁶

Reagan’s job approval ratings in the second term between 1985 and 1989 were higher than that of the first term between 1981 and 1984. Reagan’s initial job approval rating was as high as 60 percent in early 1981 and 68 percent after the attempted assassination on March 30, 1981. However, Reagan’s job approval rating had dropped to 49 percent by the end of 1981 and continued to fall. During 1982, it stayed in the 40 percent range and he finally received a 35 percent job approval rating, the worst of his administration, in 1983. Ratings improved in late 1983 and Reagan’s job approval rating moved back above 50 percent in 1984 (Figure 4.4).

¹¹¹⁴ Goldstein and Freeman, *Three-Way Street*, 209, fn. 90.

¹¹¹⁵ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 275, referred to ABC news transcripts, December 10 and 11, 1987.

¹¹¹⁶ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 115.

After Reagan was reelected “in the largest electoral vote landslide in U.S. history”¹¹¹⁷ in November 1984, polls showed Reagan’s job approval rating soared. In 1985, it stayed in the 60 percent range. It marked a 68 percent job approval rating in May 1986, which tied for the highest job rating of the Reagan administration in May 1981. Because of the Iran-Contra affair, Reagan’s job approval rating plummeted to 47 percent in December 1986 and stayed low throughout 1987. In 1988, it moved back above 50 percent and reached 57 percent in mid-November and 63 percent in December 1988.¹¹¹⁸ As shown in Figure 4.4, the second Reagan administration enjoyed a higher job approval rating. When Reagan had his own troubles from the Iran-Contra affair and low popularity from the late 1986 to 1987 before the Washington summit, Reagan could not give any positive signs to Gorbachev. However, except for this period, the higher job approval rating during the second term helped Reagan “do business with Gorbachev” overall.




Figure 4.4 Reagan’s Job Approval: Yearly Average, 1981–1989¹¹¹⁹

¹¹¹⁷ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 163.

¹¹¹⁸ Jeffrey M. Jones, Frank Newport, and Lydia Saad, “Ronald Reagan from the People’s Perspective: A Gallup Poll Review,” *Gallup*, June 7, 2004, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/11887/Ronald-Reagan-From-Peoples-Perspective-Gallup-Poll-Review.aspx> (accessed on May 25, 2009).

¹¹¹⁹ Jones et al., “Ronald Reagan from the People’s Perspective.”

Consequently, Reagan could overcome the resistance of the opponents to a positive response toward Gorbachev's reassurance strategy, such as Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Snowcroft, by his personality and relatively high popularity. James Mann had an interview with Anatoly Adamishin, the Soviet deputy foreign minister. Adamishin said, "Other leaders, like [Vice President George H.W.] Bush, had to cater to political forces. But Ronald Reagan could overcome the resistance of the hawks."¹¹²⁰ This observation was correct. Without Reagan's efforts to persuade conservative hard-liners and a strong base of public support, it would have been difficult to respond to Gorbachev's reassurance strategy.

5. Alliance Politics of the Soviet Union

Question 11: How did key allies of the Soviet Union affect Gorbachev's reassurance strategy to the United States? Was there sufficient alliance support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?

Alliance politics of the Soviet Union need to be understood from two levels—leaders and ordinary people. Leaders of Warsaw Pact countries did not fully support Gorbachev's reassurance strategy toward the United States. On the other hand, ordinary people supported it and had strong zeal for reforms in the late 1980s. Leaders accepted Gorbachev's reassurance strategy, at least in words. Furthermore, they could not constrain Gorbachev from implementing his reassurance strategy because ordinary people in Warsaw Pact countries did not follow their leaders. Rather, ordinary people in Warsaw Pact countries supported Gorbachev more than their own leaders. This bottom up support helped Gorbachev implement his reassurance strategy toward the United States.

a. *Gorbachev and Leaders of Warsaw Pact Countries*

(1) The End of the Brezhnev Doctrine and Defensive Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine. Gorbachev told Warsaw Pact leaders of two distinctive changes

¹¹²⁰ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 345. Mann's interview with Anatoly Adamishin, April 10, 2008.

in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. The first was the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine's "assertion of the Soviet Union's right to intervene with force in Eastern Europe,"¹¹²¹ and the second the change in the Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine from offensive to defensive. These changes were based on Gorbachev's new thinking: "The greatest enemy of the Soviet interests in Europe was the Soviet imperial system itself."¹¹²²

First, Gorbachev decided to meet the leaders of the Warsaw Pact¹¹²³ countries right after he became the general secretary in 1985 to present the different Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact countries, which was the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev thought that "relationships with these countries were badly in need of revitalizing."¹¹²⁴ The leaders of Warsaw Pact countries who attended the meeting were Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, Erich Honecker of the German Democratic Republic, Janos Kadar of Hungary, Gustav Husak of Czechoslovakia, and Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland.

In the meeting, Gorbachev emphasized the sovereignty and independence as well as the responsibility of each country. He said, "In essence, however, our statement at this meeting signified a shift to new relations, a rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine, which had never been officially proclaimed but which had in fact defined the USSR's approach towards its allies."¹¹²⁵ This policy was maintained and Gorbachev kept his word later when there were social and political changes in Eastern Europe that finally led to the end of the Cold War

The second significant change of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy to the leaders of Warsaw Pact countries was the new Warsaw Pact military doctrine,

¹¹²¹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 345. Mann's interview with Anatoly Adamishin, April 10, 2008.

¹¹²² Christopher Jones, "Protection from One's Friends: the Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact," in *Soviet Strategy and New Military Thinking*, ed. Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121.

¹¹²³ In the Soviet Union, the official name is the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which was the military alliance organized under Soviet leadership as a counterpart to NATO.

¹¹²⁴ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 600.

¹¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

which changed it from offensive to defensive. Gorbachev met with leaders of Warsaw Pact countries in Berlin on May 27, 1987.¹¹²⁶ A written statement followed: “They [Warsaw Pact countries] do not regard any individual government or group of people as their enemy.”¹¹²⁷ This new doctrine was interpreted as a disadvantage to leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. James Mann said, “For Eastern European leaders such as Honecker, this new doctrine meant that they were less able than in the past to justify repressive policies at home. How could they justify a hard line on the basis of an external threat if there was no longer an enemy?”¹¹²⁸

In sum, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy related to the Soviet allies was expressed by the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the change of the Warsaw Pact treaty to a defensive one. These changes created tensions between Gorbachev and the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. However, those leaders could not strongly oppose the changes.

(2) Tensions between Gorbachev and the Leaders of the Warsaw Pact Countries. There were tensions under the surface between Gorbachev and leaders of Warsaw Pact countries because “Their own power had long been based on maintaining the same control over dissent and political opposition as the Soviet Union had established.”¹¹²⁹ The leaders of Warsaw Pact countries worried that Gorbachev’s reform would lead to changes in leadership and rule in their countries. However, they could not reject Gorbachev’s new approach directly. In 1985, even though the leaders of all these Warsaw Pact countries had absolute power within their own territories, they were influenced by the Soviet Union. As Matlock observed, “Soviet ‘allies’ were not a problem for Gorbachev in 1985. The countries of the Warsaw Pact were controlled at that time by Communist Parties that, with the occasional exception of the Romanian, were

¹¹²⁶ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 170.

¹¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹¹²⁸ Ibid., 173.

¹¹²⁹ Ibid., 172.

conditioned to do Moscow's bidding."¹¹³⁰ Therefore, they could not show strong opposition to Gorbachev's reassurance strategy.

However, there were many signs of tensions between Gorbachev and the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries. There was a bitter joke circulating in Prague in 1987, saying that it was now Czechoslovakia's turn to send "fraternal assistance" to the Soviet Union, a reference to the 1968 Soviet invasion.¹¹³¹ Gustav Husak, the 74-year-old Czechoslovakian president had "anxiety and confusion" about Gorbachev's reassurance strategy because the words used in the 1968 "Prague spring" such as "reform, liberalization, and democratization" had now appeared in the Soviet Union.¹¹³²

Erick Honecker, the East German leader, was a good example of the tensions between Gorbachev and leaders in Eastern Europe. Honecker made clear that he had no intention to support Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy in 1987. Honecker and his aides controlled the East German press to block coverage of political change in the Soviet Union. Frank Herold, who served from 1984 to 1988 as a correspondent for the East German Communist Party organ *Neues Deutschland*, said, "I only covered science, sports and fine arts, no politics at all."¹¹³³ All the other leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries had fears of the impact of Gorbachev's ideas and took similar positions to Honecker's.¹¹³⁴

However, even though there were tensions between Gorbachev and the leaders in the Warsaw Pact countries, they did not have enough leverage to constrain Gorbachev from implementing his reassurance strategy because the Warsaw Pact countries had serious economic and political problems and the ordinary people did not support their leaders. The ordinary Eastern Europeans supported Gorbachev rather than their own leaders.

¹¹³⁰ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 118.

¹¹³¹ Michael T. Kaufman, "Glasnost Upsetting to Soviet Allies," *New York Times*, April 5, 1987, A4.

¹¹³² Kaufman, "Glasnost Upsetting."

¹¹³³ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 173. Mann's interview with Frank Herold, November 4, 2005.

¹¹³⁴ Kaufman, "Glasnost Upsetting."

b. Support from the Warsaw Pact Countries

(1) Problems of East Europe. Even though most leaders in Eastern Europe worried about the impact of Gorbachev's reforms on their own power, they had already lost their legitimacy because of economic problems and poor political leadership in the 1980s. Solidarity, the first non-Communist-controlled trade union in Poland, started in the early 1980s. It had a significant impact on other parts of Eastern Europe. It provided not just an example of trade union protests by workers, but a well-organized mass movement of most ordinary people demanding their rights and liberalization.¹¹³⁵ The Polish military and police arrested the union leaders and imposed martial law in December 1981. However, the repression failed, and in the end, Solidarity's ideas won and led to political change "by winning the sympathies of almost ten million members, about one-third of the population."¹¹³⁶ Significantly, the Soviet Union had not intervened to repress the Solidarity movement, which was "a living refutation of the party's claim of representation."¹¹³⁷

The other Warsaw Pact countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, had similar economic and political problems and followed a similar track. Steven W. Hook and John Spanier said, "The lesson [in Poland] was not lost on other parts of Eastern Europe, where the struggle by Solidarity served as an inspiration and a precursor of greater challenges to come."¹¹³⁸

(2) The Ordinary People's Support for Gorbachev. After Gorbachev came into power in 1985, the Brezhnev Doctrine ended and non-intervention of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe was officially announced. The ordinary Eastern Europeans demanded their rights more vigorously and supported Gorbachev rather than

¹¹³⁵ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 17th ed. (Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 2007), 186.

¹¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹¹³⁸ Ibid.

their leaders. The sign, “Gorbachev is with us,” on a shop window in Prague in late 1989 showed the sweeping change and support of ordinary people for Gorbachev in Eastern Europe.¹¹³⁹

The East German case is a good example of the ordinary people’s support for Gorbachev. Even though Honecker and other leaders in East Germany tried to block the political changes begun in the Soviet Union, they could not isolate ordinary East Germans. James Mann interviewed Bettina Urbanski, who in 1987 was serving as the editor in charge of socialist countries for the East Berlin newspaper *Berliner Zeitung*. Urbanski said “Gorbachev had a very strong echo within the East German population. The more we moved towards reform, the more restrictive the [East German] government became, both internally and externally in insisting on the wall.”¹¹⁴⁰

In June 1987, young East Germans gathered near the Berlin Wall to catch the sounds of three nights of open-air rock summer concerts outside the Reichstag building, about 200 yards from the Berlin Wall. Violence escalated and there were skirmishes between protesters and police. Surprisingly, some of the young East Germans shouted, “Gorbachev! Gorbachev!”¹¹⁴¹ When Gorbachev joined a gala celebration in October 1989, the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the East German state, ordinary people ignored Honecker and shouted “Gorbachev! *Perestroika!* Help us!”¹¹⁴² The repressed demands for reform and liberalization among the ordinary people in Eastern Europe were more dynamically expressed when Gorbachev came into power and declared the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. For that reason, most ordinary people in Eastern Europe supported Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy, especially the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Dramatic changes in East Europe at the end of the Cold War were

¹¹³⁹ Klas Bergman, “Dramatic Reforms Hit East Europe,” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 1990, 3.

¹¹⁴⁰ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 173. Mann’s interview with Bettina Urbanski, November 14, 2005.

¹¹⁴¹ Ibid., 190, referring to “East German Rock-Music Fans Throw Stones at Police,” *AP*, June 7, 1987; Ingomar Schwelz, “Police Battle with East Berlin Rock Fans Near Berlin Wall,” Associated Press, June 8, 1987; Robert J. McCartney, “East German Rock Fans, Police Clash,” *Washington Post*, June 9, 1987, A1.

¹¹⁴² Ibid., 331, referring to Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 522–525.

possible because ordinary people had strong demands for liberalization and hopes for change. The support from those ordinary people who wanted reform helped Gorbachev carry out his reassurance strategy toward Europe and the United States.

6. Alliance Politics of the United States

Question 12: How did key allies of the United States perceive Gorbachev's reassurance strategy? Did Gorbachev's reassurance strategy generate alliance support for U.S. reciprocity? Did key allies try to prevent the United States from offering a positive response?

The relationship of the Soviet Union with key allies of the United States in Europe, especially leading NATO members such as Britain, West Germany, and France, showed positive improvement during the Gorbachev era. In most NATO countries, there were anti-nuclear movements and public pressures to stop the arms race, with the focus on halting the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Europe. These pressures influenced governments in Europe. Also, Gorbachev believed that "key European countries could be used to 'moderate' American policy."¹¹⁴³ Gorbachev met leaders of those countries and explained his reassurance strategy and received general support for U.S. reciprocity. Therefore, there were no key allies that tried to prevent the United States from offering a positive response. European governments had some reservations about the INF Treaty, but aside from this issue they generally encouraged the United States to respond positively to Gorbachev.

a. *The Nuclear Protest Movement and the Missile Debate Among NATO Members*

As the United States and its allies moved toward deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces to counter the Soviet SS-20s in the early 1980s, there were strong anti-nuclear protests in many West European countries. Lawrence S. Wittner said, "In nearly every West European country, antinuclear groups mushroomed into mass

¹¹⁴³ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 119.

movements, and were supported by social-democratic political parties.”¹¹⁴⁴ Allied leaders were influenced by the nuclear protest in their own countries. Although they did not support the movement, they could not ignore it. As James Mann observed, “The British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the French prime minister, Francois Mitterrand, all voiced concern about the implications of removing American missiles from Europe.”¹¹⁴⁵

However, they could not maintain these positions because of domestic pressure. Leaders in NATO countries expressed their concerns about public pressure to the Reagan administration. Weinberger recalled that “as more and more of the demonstrations were held...more and more defense ministers urged that more be done.”¹¹⁴⁶ The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Kenneth Adelman, said, “West European governments were nervous about their public, scared to death.”¹¹⁴⁷ According to Wittner, “The West German government warned George Shultz that there must be ‘a real negotiation’ over the missiles, ‘not just a show.’”¹¹⁴⁸ Also, European countries were not supportive of Reagan’s SDI dream.¹¹⁴⁹ Thatcher and Mitterrand thought that SDI brought more domestic pressures.

As a result, the protest movements and public pressures on governments of NATO allies influenced the Reagan administration. As Matlock put it, “Reagan could not take his allies for granted. Although governments in the key European NATO countries had resisted public pressure to stop the deployment of INF missiles and had swallowed some doubts about Reagan’s willingness to negotiate, all were under domestic pressure to show more ‘flexibility’ in dealing with the Soviet Union.”¹¹⁵⁰ As a result, Reagan

¹¹⁴⁴ Lawrence S. Wittner, “Reagan and Nuclear Disarmament: How the Nuclear Freeze Movement Forced Reagan to Make Progress on Arms Control,” *Boston Review*, April/May 2000, <http://bostonreview.net/BR25.2/wittner.html> (accessed on December 2, 2009).

¹¹⁴⁵ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 48.

¹¹⁴⁶ Wittner. “Reagan and Nuclear Disarmament.”

¹¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁸ Ibid., referring to Shultz, 137, 149–150.

¹¹⁴⁹ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 120.

¹¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 118.

proposed a “‘zero-zero option’ whereby the United States would not deploy any of its Pershings or cruise missiles if the Soviets dismantled all of their intermediate-range missiles, which had a maximum range of 1,500 miles.”¹¹⁵¹ U.S. defense officials initially embraced the proposal because they expected the Soviets to reject it. Later, Gorbachev accepted the proposal and it led to the signing of the INF treaty in 1987.

In sum, governments in the key European NATO countries were under domestic pressure from the anti-nuclear movement. The United States was also influenced by that movement and the Soviet Union tried to exploit the situation to stop the deployment of INFs to Europe. Therefore, the nuclear freeze movement and its European counterparts in the early 1980s generated positive circumstances for Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy and U.S. reciprocity in the late 1980s. At least, the NATO allies could not encourage the United States to promote the arms race against the Soviet Union.

b. Gorbachev’s Meetings with Leaders of Key Allies of the United States

Gorbachev believed that the roles of allies of the United States were important for the success of his reassurance strategy and tried to generate support from key allies of the United States. For example, when Gorbachev met Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, he asked them to push Reagan to accept his approaches, and they actually pressed Reagan to negotiate with Gorbachev on nuclear issues.

(1) Britain. Britain, a key ally of the United States, perceived Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy as a sincere approach that was different from that of previous Soviet leaders. Margaret Thatcher recognized that Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader after she met him on December 16, 1984, before Gorbachev took office. Thatcher said, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together...we should both do everything we can to see that war never starts again, and therefore we go into the

¹¹⁵¹ Hook and Spanier, *American Foreign Policy*, 187.

disarmament talks determined to make them succeed.”¹¹⁵² Gorbachev wanted to get support from Thatcher to influence Reagan’s reciprocity. Jim Kuhn, Reagan’s personal assistant, recalled that Prime Minister Thatcher had a big impact on Reagan when she visited Camp David in December 1984 several weeks after Reagan’s reelection.¹¹⁵³ Thatcher asserted her view that “We can do business together” to Reagan.¹¹⁵⁴ She said Gorbachev was more open than his predecessors, yet that he rejected the SDI.¹¹⁵⁵ Gorbachev asked Thatcher to relay his ideas about the SDI, “Tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons.”¹¹⁵⁶

Thatcher met Gorbachev for the second time during her visit to Moscow between March 23 and April 1, 1987. Gorbachev pointed out the danger of nuclear war and Thatcher responded with her strong belief in nuclear deterrence for peace. However, the meeting gave Thatcher an opportunity to realize the change in the Soviet Union. Thatcher said, “the ground was shifting underneath the communist system.”¹¹⁵⁷ Gorbachev believed that Thatcher could convey his thoughts to Washington. Thus, whenever Gorbachev had a chance to talk with Thatcher, he asked her to inform Washington about his sincerity. Thatcher’s views were taken into account by the Reagan administration.

(2) West Germany. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pressed Reagan to meet Gorbachev because the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented West Germany from developing closer economic ties with Eastern Europe. Horst Teltschick, Kohl’s foreign policy advisor said, “Our main interest was to get the second Reagan administration back to a summit with the Soviets, because

¹¹⁵² Margaret Thatcher Foundation, “TV Interview for BBC (Gorbachev: ‘We can do business together’),” December 17, 1984, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=105592> (accessed on November 9, 2009).

¹¹⁵³ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 225.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁵ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 173.

¹¹⁵⁶ Ibid., quoted from Memorandum of Conversation, December 22, 1984.

¹¹⁵⁷ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 481–482.

we had learned that [West] Germany's room for maneuver was dramatically restricted by this stalemate between the two superpowers. We felt that when they started the summits, we would get a new chance to develop our relations with the Central Europeans.”¹¹⁵⁸

However, Kohl was hesitant to fully support the outline of an arms control agreement in 1987. Even though Kohl gave his assent to the Soviet-American agreement to cut back or eliminate nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, he wanted to keep West Germany's Pershing 1A missiles.¹¹⁵⁹ Reagan suggested privately to Kohl to eliminate these missiles and finally Kohl yielded.¹¹⁶⁰ Matlock recalled, “We made it clear to Kohl and Genscher that they weren't going to queer this agreement.”¹¹⁶¹ The elimination of the objection by West Germany was important for the agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev. In 1986, skeptical Kohl had made an analogy between Gorbachev and the Nazi propagandist Goebbels. By two years later, he had changed his views. As Mann reports:

In 1988, there was a growing awareness on Gorbachev's part that he needed Western help,” recalled Kohl. “He told me that he had to find a suitable partner. It was not to be expected that the Americans would help him. The Europeans might, and the strongest role among the Europeans was played by the Germans.”¹¹⁶²

Kohl visited Moscow on October 24, 1988. He wanted to develop the West German relationship with the Soviet Union and expressed his support for Gorbachev's policy. Kohl told Gorbachev:

War and violence have ceased to be a means of politics, and to think otherwise is to head for the destruction of mankind. In the context of glasnost, we must also establish a completely new kind of personal

¹¹⁵⁸ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 225. Mann's interviews with Horst Teltschik, October 5, 2005, and December 7, 2005.

¹¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 239.

¹¹⁶⁰ Reagan, *An American Life*, 686.

¹¹⁶¹ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 239. Mann's interview with Jack F. Matlock, Jr.

¹¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 311–312.

contact. I would welcome an active personal dialogue with you—we could exchange letters, telephone each other and send personal envoys.¹¹⁶³

Gorbachev was very satisfied with the summit meeting with Kohl. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs, “I must admit that I was impressed by Mr Kohl’s approach, both from the personal and business points of view. I believed that, in the new emerging international climate, personal ‘compatibility’ and understanding of your partner’s motives would become increasingly important in world politics.”¹¹⁶⁴

Gorbachev made a return visit in June 1989. He was impressed by the public support in West Germany. Gorbachev said:

And I will never forget our encounter with the citizens of Bonn in the Town Hall Square. We were literally overwhelmed by manifestations of goodwill and friendship, the cheering crowds expressing their support and solidarity. I remember some of the slogans people were shouting: ‘Gorbi! Make love, not walls!’ ‘Please, Gorbachev, stay the course!’¹¹⁶⁵

As a result, Gorbachev was inspired by the impression that West Germany really supported his reassurance strategy toward the United States and Europe. Because of Gorbachev’s popularity with Western European publics and his good relations with Western European leaders, the alliance politics of the United States supported reciprocity of Soviet reassurance.

E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DV): SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY

Question 13: Was there any positive response to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy from the United States? Or, was there no response or rejection from the United States, followed by an increase in tensions?

Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy is a case of success because there were a series of positive responses from the United States, and consequently significant tension

¹¹⁶³ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 670.

¹¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 671.

reduction between the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev rated his reassurance strategy a high success when he left office. Gorbachev said, in his address to the Soviet citizens on December 25, 1991, that one of his achievements was no threat of a world war. He said, “We live in a new world: An end has been put to the ‘Cold War,’ the arms race and the insane militarization of our country, which crippled our economy, distorted our thinking and undermined our morals. The threat of a world war is no more.”¹¹⁶⁶ As Gorbachev interpreted it, the Cold War was over because he had implemented a reassurance strategy and the United States had shown a series of positive responses to his strategy. Consequently, Gorbachev’s reassurance between 1985 and 1989 can be categorized as a success with positive responses from the Reagan administration and tension reduction between the two countries.

There had been rejections from the United States at the beginning of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1986. When Gorbachev announced the moratorium on the further deployment of INF in 1985 and the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and its extension from August 1985 to the end of 1986, he called for positive responses, such as the resumption of talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty from the United States. However, the Reagan administration rejected Gorbachev’s demands and the United States conducted some 20 tests during the Soviet moratorium period.¹¹⁶⁷ The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test since 1985 on February 26, 1987, and Gorbachev ended the Soviet Union’s 19-month unilateral moratorium.¹¹⁶⁸

However, there were more positive responses by the Reagan administration to Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy starting in 1987 onwards. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union changed significantly. The Reagan administration adopted “a much more accommodationist approach”¹¹⁶⁹ to the Soviet Union. Negotiation is the typical step for a positive response to a reassurance strategy. Reagan suggested that “the United States would seek to reduce the cost of national security ‘in negotiations with

¹¹⁶⁶ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, xxxv.

¹¹⁶⁷ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 275.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 279.

¹¹⁶⁹ McCormick, *American Foreign Policy*, 139.

the Soviet Union’.”¹¹⁷⁰ The United States showed its positive responses at the summit meetings. Even though Reagan could not have any talks with the Soviet leaders during his first term, he had five meetings with Gorbachev between 1985 and 1988, more than any other American president. These included: the Geneva summit in November 1985, the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, the Washington summit in December 1987, the Moscow summit in May-June 1988, and brief one-day meetings in New York in December 1988.¹¹⁷¹

In the third summit in 1987, Reagan signed the INF Treaty, which was a significant arms control achievement for Gorbachev and the most significant positive response from Reagan. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to destroy about 1,500 nuclear warheads of the Soviet Union that could reach Western Europe and about 350 of the United States deployed in Europe.¹¹⁷² The Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20s and the United States did likewise with its Pershing missiles and removed its ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Former Secretary of State George Shultz considered the INF Treaty as a turning point for the end of the Cold War:

The INF Treaty...was a watershed agreement, not only because of its terms but also because it showed that large-scale reductions in nuclear weapons were possible: the United States and the Soviet Union could work out a complex problem of great importance.¹¹⁷³

The INF Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 93 to 5 on May 27, 1988 and it was “the first time since the beginning of the Cold War—not merely reducing number of weapons, but eliminating them and agreeing to enforce the ban.”¹¹⁷⁴ In addition, progress toward the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) began during the second Reagan administration and the treaty was signed in July 1991.¹¹⁷⁵

¹¹⁷⁰ McCormick, *American Foreign Policy*, 139.

¹¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 140–141 and Crockatt, “The End of the Cold War,” 99.

¹¹⁷² Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 273.

¹¹⁷³ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1130–1, quoted in John Baylis, “Arms Control and Disarmaments,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, eds., John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 194.

¹¹⁷⁴ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 290.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

After the Washington summit, Reagan made a return visit to Moscow from May 29 to June 1, 1988. During his visit, Reagan said that his description of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” was from “another time and another era.”¹¹⁷⁶ On May 31, Reagan and Gorbachev attended the official signing ceremony for an agreement on prior notification of ICBM and SLBM flight tests signed by Shevardnadze and Shultz (see Appendix N).¹¹⁷⁷ Reagan suggested “a co-operation and exchange program for 1989 and 1990, including an annual school exchange of 1,000 pupils from 100 Soviet and American schools.”¹¹⁷⁸ Gorbachev accepted his suggestion and signed the program. Also, Reagan and Gorbachev exchanged the ratification documents for the INF treaty on June 1. Gorbachev interpreted the INF treaty as “the first step” to remove all nuclear weapons.¹¹⁷⁹ Gorbachev’s continuous implementation of a reassurance strategy and the change from rejection to a positive response from the United States helped end the Cold War.

F. OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION

1. Hypotheses and Their Outcomes

The outcomes of the hypotheses applied to the Soviet Union and the United States during the Gorbachev time between 1985 and 1989 are as follows (Figure 4.5). All of the intervening variables changed and provided favorable conditions for the success of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States. Gorbachev changed his perceptions of Reagan and the United States (IntV 1). Reagan also altered his perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union through summit meetings (IntV 2). Also, both Gorbachev and Reagan had open minds without psychological biases. Domestic politics of the Soviet Union and the United States supported Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy

¹¹⁷⁶ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, xiii.

¹¹⁷⁷ *Nuclearfiles.org*, “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 27 I.L.M. 1200 (1988),” http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/treaties/usa-ussr/trty_us-ussr_agreement-missile-launch_1988-05-31.htm (accessed on November 23, 2009).

¹¹⁷⁸ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 591.

¹¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 592.

and the acceptance of the United States, respectively (IntV 3 and 4). There was support from the Warsaw Pact countries, especially from the ordinary people for Gorbachev's reassurance strategy (IntV 5). Lastly, leaders of key allies of the United States in Europe pushed Reagan to accept Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. Also, the nuclear protest movement in Europe showed public demands to stop arms race (IntV 6). In sum, the supportive conditions from changes in all of six intervening variable led to the success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy (Figure 4.5).

IV	→	IntV	→	DV
Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 (Reassurance strategy through GRIT, restraint, and irrevocable commitment)	→	1. Change in Gorbachev's beliefs and perceptions of Reagan and the United States 2. Change in Reagan's beliefs and perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union 3. Support in domestic politics of the Soviet Union 4. Support in domestic politics of the United States 5. Support from alliance politics (Warsaw Pact countries) of the Soviet Union 6. Support from alliance politics (NATO countries) of the United States	→	Success of reassurance strategy (INF Treaty and Summit meetings)

X

CV 1	→	CV 2
Circumstances and relations between a sending state and a receiving state	→	The United States' motivating factors
- Favorable balance of power to the United States - Low interdependence - Change in enemy identity - Aversion to war		Mixed (Greedy and insecure)

Figure 4.5 Hypotheses and Their Outcomes (CV, IV, IntV, and DV)

2. Results of Hypotheses

The conditions of success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy can be explained by the results of the hypotheses.

Results of hypotheses:

H1: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was *more* likely to succeed when it altered his beliefs and perceptions about Reagan and the United States.

H2: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was *more* likely to succeed when it altered Reagan's beliefs and perceptions about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.

H3: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was *more* likely to succeed when it altered domestic politics in the Soviet Union towards support for foreign policy change.

H4: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was *more* likely to succeed when it altered domestic politics in the United States towards support for foreign policy change.

H5: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was *more* likely to succeed when it altered alliance politics of the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact countries) towards support for foreign policy change.

H6: Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 was *more* likely to succeed when it altered alliance politics of the United States (NATO countries) towards support for foreign policy change.

Consequently, all intervening variables provided positive conditions for success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. Because leader's perceptions and domestic and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States offered positive conditions for success, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was more likely to succeed.

3. Conclusion

a. *The Importance of Leader's Perceptions, Domestic Politics, and Alliance Politics of the Sending and Receiving States*

To understand the conditions for success or failure of a reassurance strategy, it is necessary to consider both the sending and receiving state. Many explanations about the end of the Cold War and the roles of Gorbachev and Reagan are not convincing because they focused only one side. However, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy, Reagan's positive response, and domestic and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States must be considered as a whole. As Matlock said, "No country can ensure its own security without regarding the security of others."¹¹⁸⁰

As shown in the previous case studies, any reassurance strategy must be analyzed in the context of individual, domestic, and international factors of both the sending and receiving states. The case study of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 toward the Reagan administration shows that the cognition of leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States altered; as a result, Gorbachev's reassurance strategy induced a positive response from the Reagan administration.

In the case study, both Gorbachev and Reagan changed their perceptions of each other. As Matlock put it, "Once Gorbachev started the reform process, Reagan recognized that it was in the American interest to encourage it."¹¹⁸¹ Gorbachev and Reagan became good partners in 1988 and 1989. Also, the implementation of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was supported by domestic and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Domestic and alliance politics of the United States were important factors for the success of reassurance strategy. The domestic conditions in the United States made it more likely to respond positively to Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. Gorbachev and Reagan understood that it was important to have

¹¹⁸⁰ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 328.

¹¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 318.

support from both opponents and supporters in domestic politics. Matlock rates the two leaders high in their capability to persuade their opponents. According to Matlock:

Obviously, it was important to the new general secretary not to seem weak or incompetent to those who put him in office. But the sentiment Reagan ascribed to Gorbachev applied to Reagan as well: he, too, was determined not to seem weak to his more hard-line supporters. They understood this and played on it to head off negotiations or slow them down. After Reagan began his direct interaction with Gorbachev he exhibited progressively less concern on this score than he had earlier.¹¹⁸²

Leaders in Warsaw Pact countries showed limited support for Gorbachev's reassurance strategy, yet ordinary people strongly supported it. At the same time, ordinary West Europeans supported the nuclear freeze movement and leaders were influenced by that. As a result, NATO countries supported Gorbachev's reassurance strategy and did not prevent the United States from offering positive responses. In sum, to implement a reassurance strategy successfully, it is important to know how to alter a leader's perceptions and make the opponents from domestic politics and allies accept the reassurance strategy.

b. The Importance of Intelligence

In retrospect, if there had been additional accurate intelligence in the Soviet Union and the United States, the relationship between the two countries could have been better sooner. Despite enormous intelligence efforts during the Cold War, there was still a lack of understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. Hoffman said, "As the Harvard professor observed in 1983, 'The United States cannot predict Soviet behavior because it has too little information about what goes on inside the Soviet Union; the Soviets cannot predict American behavior because they have too much information.'" ¹¹⁸³ The best method to get useful intelligence information is to have personal contacts.

¹¹⁸² Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 153.

¹¹⁸³ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 17.

For the first couple of years of the Gorbachev period, the Soviet Union and the United States did not have meetings of military leaders, government officials and regional experts.¹¹⁸⁴ The U.S. intelligence apparatus made enormous mistakes in judging Gorbachev and other new leaders and their new approaches in the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev took office, the United States did not have enough intelligence about Gorbachev. Hoffman pointed out “This was a moment when Reagan could have used fresh and penetrating insights into Gorbachev’s thinking and life experiences....And just when the United States could have used some good human intelligence about the new leader in Moscow, the CIA suffered a series of blinding catastrophes.”¹¹⁸⁵

When Gorbachev declared the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine to European Countries in 1985, American intelligence did not catch his sincerity. Also, when the Warsaw Pact military doctrine was released, after the Berlin meeting in May 1987 between Gorbachev and leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, American intelligence did not recognize it, either. James Mann said, “American intelligence agencies did not learn about this aspect of the Warsaw Pact gathering until several years later. It turned out to be an important step toward ending the Cold War.”¹¹⁸⁶ Hoffman also pointed out, “...the superpowers often wrongly judged each other’s intentions and actions. They engaged in deceptions that only deepened the dangers.”¹¹⁸⁷ Later, the Soviet Union could communicate its sincere intentions through personal contacts and exchange of people. The United States could, as well, recognize the changes of the Soviet Union from face-to-face meetings.

In conclusion, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy between 1985 and 1989 is a good example of a successful reassurance strategy caused by changes in leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev’s persistence in demonstrating restraint and offering concessions, as called for by GRIT, was especially important in bringing about changes

¹¹⁸⁴ Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 127.

¹¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁸⁶ Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 174, referring to Gates, *From the Shadows*, 423.

¹¹⁸⁷ Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 17.

in the key intervening variables. Just as important was President Reagan's willingness to be persuaded that Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader. With supportive domestic and alliance environments, the two leaders were able to set in motion the end of the Cold War.

V. CONCLUSION

Deterrence has historically been the main strategy states use to reduce the possibility of war. However, as Janice Gross Stein argues, “Under certain kinds of strategic conditions, deterrence may not only fail, it may provoke the action it is designed to deter because it intensifies the pressure on the challenger to act.”¹¹⁸⁸ Deterrence strategy can also be ineffective or irrelevant when the receiving state misinterprets or ignores the intentions of the sending state.¹¹⁸⁹ Reassurance is an alternative strategy that can be used as either a substitute for or a complement to deterrence. Its goal is to avoid the risks that deterrence will prove provocative or ineffective. Reassurance involves taking actions to show the sender’s benign intentions to the receiving state.

However, compared to deterrence strategy, reassurance strategy has less attracted scholars’ and policymakers’ attention. Therefore, the situations in which reassurance is an appropriate strategy and the necessary conditions for the success of reassurance strategy have not been studied enough. This dissertation has tried to address these gaps through the use of a case study method involving “structured, focused comparison.”¹¹⁹⁰ The comparison of the three case studies—a partial success case of South Korea toward North Korea (Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity Policy), a failure case of the United States toward North Korea (Bush’s reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008), and a success case of the Soviet Union toward the United States (Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy)—leads to several conclusions.

Those conclusions are as follows: First, reassurance is an appropriate strategy when the receiving state has “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motives. Therefore, it is very important to investigate the motivating factors of the receiving state. Second, the incentives for use of a reassurance strategy can be found in the sending state’s needs under internally or externally difficult situations. And, third, the necessary conditions for the success of a reassurance strategy are not found in any one theory, one level of

¹¹⁸⁸ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 17.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

analysis, or one party, but in an eclectic and broad approach including leaders' perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of both the sending state and the receiving state.

A. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES

1. Patterns of Success and Failure of Reassurance Strategy

This dissertation systematically analyzed the conditions affecting the success or failure of reassurance strategy. The same six hypotheses were applied to three case studies. If these hypotheses were correct, the outcome of the reassurance strategy would be influenced by the six intervening variables (leaders' perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the sending and receiving states). The dissertation hypothesized that the six intervening variables combine to produce the dependent variable (DV), the success or failure of a reassurance strategy. In other words, if the reassurance strategy triggers appropriate changes in the intervening variables, it would lead to the success of the reassurance strategy.

In Case I, there were some changes in leaders' perceptions of South Korea and North Korea. Also, there was limited support from domestic politics of South Korea. However, there were no sufficient changes in the domestic politics of North Korea and the alliance politics of the two Koreas. As a result, reassurance strategy had only partial impacts on the intervening variables. These resulted in a partial success of the reassurance strategy.

While all six variables changed in Case III, there were no changes in Case II. In Case II, there were neither changes in leaders' perceptions, nor support from domestic and alliance politics of either the United States or North Korea. It was impossible for Bush's reassurance strategy to be successful under those circumstances. On the contrary, in Case III, Gorbachev and Reagan changed their perceptions of one another. Also, domestic and alliance politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States became

¹¹⁹⁰ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 19.

supportive of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. These changes led to the success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy by inducing positive responses from the United States. That is, the obvious difference between the failure (Case II) and the success (Case III) was whether or not the six intervening variables changed. The outcomes of the three case studies focusing on the six hypotheses relating to the intervening variables (IntV) are summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Patterns of Success and Failure of Reassurance Strategy

Cases			Intervening Variables (IntV)			Dependent Variable (DV)
			Leader's perceptions	Domestic politics	Alliance politics	
Case I	The Sending State (South Korea)	Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun	Some Change	Moderate Support	Little Support	Partial Success
	The Receiving State (North Korea)	Kim Jong Il	Some Change	Little Support	Little Support	
Case II	The Sending State (U.S.)	Bush	Little Change	Little Support	Little Support	Failure
	The Receiving State (North Korea)	Kim Jong Il	Little Change	Little Support	Little Support	
Case III	The Sending State (USSR)	Gorbachev	Change	Support	Support	Success
	The Receiving State (U.S.)	Reagan	Change	Support	Support	

For more details, it is useful to compare the answers of each research question in the three case studies. Each variable in the framework has related questions to allow investigation of the causal connections among variables. The following section shows all questions and answers from the three case studies and compares them to form a conclusion.

2. Summary of Questions and Answers Related to the Variables

There are a total of 13 questions to identify the relationships among variables. Each case study has attempted to answer each question. Some answers are similar across the cases, but generally speaking, answers are different in each case. Those different answers help clarify the causal relationships among the variables.

a. *Independent Variable (IV): The Implementation of Reassurance Strategy (the Sending State)*

There are three questions related to the independent variable (IV)—the acceptance of coexistence, the incentives for use, and the type of reassurance strategy. Reassurance strategy contains the concept of coexistence because it is based on the idea that there is no malignant intention to attack. However, there are differences in the three cases. The incentives for use of reassurance strategy are similar because all three cases are based on recognition that there were some limitations and difficulties with traditional deterrent and coercive strategies. Also, there were differences in the type of reassurance strategy employed in the three case studies. There is a correlation between the intensity of the reassurance strategy (IV) and the outcome of the reassurance strategy (DV).

(1) Reassurance and Coexistence. The first question, whether the sending state's reassurance strategy communicates its willingness to accept coexistence, is relevant to the outcome of reassurance strategy. For example, in Case III, the Soviet Union and the United States could develop their relations because they accepted and communicated the concept of coexistence. On the contrary, even though South Korea and the United States showed their willingness to accept coexistence with North Korea, there were limitations and suspicions. South Korea could not offer a security guarantee to

North Korea without the assistance of the United States. Moreover, it was difficult for South Korea, especially its hard-liners, to accept communist North Korea as another legitimate state with which to coexist. The United States also could not offer a security guarantee to, or accept coexistence with North Korea without the complete dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program. In sum, the level of acceptance of coexistence is closely related to the outcome of reassurance strategy. The communication of willingness to accept coexistence in each case study is summarized in table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Question 1: Reassurance and Coexistence

Question 1	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
Did the sending state's reassurance strategy communicate its willingness to offer a security guarantee to or accept coexistence with the receiving state?	Yes, but there were limitations because it was difficult to offer a security guarantee to North Korea.	Yes, but North Korea's complete dismantlement of nuclear program was required	Yes. Gorbachev continued to express his willingness for coexistence with the United States.

(2) Incentives for Reassurance Strategy. The sending state's leader starts the reassurance strategy because of the state's own need. The leaders do not start from the beliefs about or perception of the other leader or state. All three case studies show that the sending state has its own difficulty when initiating reassurance strategy. For example, in Case I, Kim Dae Jung began reassurance strategy during the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The cost of Korean unification or North Korean collapse was estimated to be extremely high. In Case II, Bush's hard-line policy toward North Korea did not work and there was a North Korean nuclear test in 2006. In addition, there was difficulty in Iraq in 2006. In Case III, the Soviet Union had difficulty in Afghanistan and there were political problems and economic stagnation when Gorbachev took power in 1985. As shown in Table 5.3, these difficult situations provided incentives for the use of reassurance strategy.

Table 5.3. Question 2. Incentives for Use of Reassurance Strategy

Question 2	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
What was the incentive for the use of a reassurance strategy?	- Economic difficulty and expected high cost of unification or North Korean collapse	- North Korea's nuclear test on October 9, 2006 and the difficult situation in Iraq in 2006	- Nuclear threat and difficulty in Afghanistan - Economic stagnation and political problems

Also, the leader's recognition of those difficulties is necessary. Moreover, under the situation when it is difficult to change the other side with hard power and there is an aversion to war, leaders start considering a reassurance strategy. Even though there are still doubts and suspicions about the intention of the receiving state, the sending state's leaders implement a reassurance strategy in an attempt to solve their own problems. In sum, the incentive for use of a reassurance strategy results from the need for change initiated by the internal or external difficulties of the sending states. With continuous tension and the possibility of war, it is difficult to solve those problems. Therefore, the incentives of reassurance strategy are related to the goal of reassurance strategy, which is to reduce tensions and avoid war. When reliance solely on a deterrence strategy cannot achieve this objective, and it is difficult to win a war without significant damage, reassurance strategy emerges.

(3) Types of Reassurance Strategy and Their Level of Commitment to Produce Change. As explained earlier, according to Stein, there are five general ways to implement a reassurance strategy: (1) reassurance through restraint; (2) reassurance through norms of competition; (3) reassurance through irrevocable commitment; (4) reassurance through limited security regimes; and (5) reassurance through reciprocity strategies such as Tit-for-Tat or GRIT. Some of those involve greater risk or cost for the sending state, but because of this they send a stronger signal of intent

to change the relationship with the other side. Each case study shows differences in how the state leaders implemented reassurance strategy (Table 5.4):

Table 5.4. Question 3. Types of Reassurance Strategy

Question 3	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
What kind of reassurance strategy did the sending state offer to the receiving state?	- Reassurance through irrevocable commitment: summit meetings and Joint Declarations - Reassurance through limited security regimes: Inter-Korean talks	- Reassurance through limited security regimes: the Six-Party Talks - Reassurance through reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat)	- Reassurance through GRIT : the unilateral nuclear moratorium and its continuous extension - Reassurance through restraint: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and defensive military doctrine - Reassurance through irrevocable commitment: summit meetings - Reassurance through norms of competition - Reassurance through limited security regimes

For example, in Case III, Gorbachev implemented his reassurance strategy mainly through GRIT, restraint, and summit meetings, but his actions included elements of all five reassurance strategies. The unilateral nuclear moratorium and its continuous extension in 1985 and 1986 were not only an example of reassurance through restraint but also a part of GRIT. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the change of military doctrine were similar examples.

However, in Cases I and II, there were limitations on the use of reassurance. In Case I, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun implemented their reassurance strategies through summit meetings and inter-Korean talks. However, there were limitations. Summit meetings were held only once for each president and Kim Jong Il did not visit Seoul. Inter-Korean talks resulted in agreements on many things, yet a lot of the agreements were not put into practice. Moreover, there was neither reassurance through significant restraint nor through reciprocity. Also, South Korea could not fully attempt to reassure through the development of norms of competition in areas of disputed interests such as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. In Case II, the Bush administration implemented the reassurance strategy only through the Six-Party Talks and Tit-for-Tat. The other methods, such as restraint, norms of competition, irrevocable commitment and GRIT, were not considered seriously after the Six-Party Talks and Tit-for-Tat failed to produce significant progress.

In sum, although all three cases involved the implementation of reassurance strategy, there were some differences in terms of the levels of commitment and positive intentions they conveyed. Gorbachev's reassurance strategy was the most proactive in implementation. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategies were not as proactive as Gorbachev's. Bush's reassurance strategy was the least bold. These different levels of commitment resulted in different outcomes of the reassurance strategies in the end. The more persistent and potentially costly the reassurance strategy, the more success it achieved in the three cases.

b. Condition Variable 1 (CV 1): Circumstances and Relations Between the Sending and Receiving States

The question related to the first condition variable is what were the circumstances and relations between the two countries over the time period when the reassurance strategy was attempted (Question 4). As shown in the diagram of the main argument and hypotheses, circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states drawn from three theoretical perspectives—balance of power (realist), interdependence (liberal), or identity (constructivist)—influence the motivating factors of the receiving state and the intervening variables. However, even though those circumstances provide conditions that affect reassurance, they are not sufficient for explaining the causal mechanisms for success or failure of reassurance strategy.

(1) Balance of Power (the Realist Perspective). The balance of power is not sufficient to explain the incentive for use or the success or failure of reassurance strategy. Even though the balance of power was more favorable to the sending states (South Korea and the United States) in Case I and Case II, Case III involved the opposite situation (Table 5.5). However, the simple power comparison does not explain the calculations of the sending and receiving states. Even though South Korea and the United States were more favorable than North Korea in terms of the balance of power, North Korea's nuclear program as well as asymmetric forces compensated for its unfavorable balance of power. Therefore, war against North Korea would bring significant damage to South Korea and the United States, even if they would win. Leaders and domestic and alliance politics cannot ignore these circumstances. They are one of reasons why Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and George W. Bush implemented their reassurance strategies. In Case III, Gorbachev did not implement his reassurance strategy because the Soviet Union faced on unfavorable balance of power. It was a part of his considerations, yet the danger of nuclear war against human beings and the Soviet suffering from the arms race were more important factors. Overall, the three cases suggest the balance of power is not a significant factor in determining reassurance outcomes.

Table 5.5. Question 4-a. Balance of Power

Question 4-a (from the Realist Approach)	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
What was the “balance of power” between the two countries?	- Unfavorable balance of power to North Korea	- Unfavorable balance of power to North Korea	- Unfavorable balance of power to the Soviet Union
Was it changing and, if so, in what direction?	- North Korea’s nuclear program to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power	- North Korea’s nuclear program to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power	- Soviet nuclear weapons to compensate for the unfavorable balance of power
Is there evidence the balance of power affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state?			

(2) Interdependence (the Liberal Perspective). There was almost no interdependence between any of the pairs of states examined in the three case studies (Table 5.6). Therefore, this dissertation cannot reach any conclusions about the influence of interdependence on the outcome of reassurance except to observe that both success and failure are possible under no interdependence. Further study is necessary to investigate the role of interdependence on the reassurance strategy.

Table 5.6. Question 4-b. Interdependence

Question 4-b (from the Liberal Approach)	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
What was the level of “interdependence” between the two countries?			
Was it changing and, if so, in what direction?	No interdependence.	No interdependence.	No interdependence.
Is there evidence that interdependence affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state?			

(3) Identity (the Constructivist Perspective). There are correlations between mutual identity and the outcome of reassurance strategy (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7. Question 4-c. Identity

Question 4-c (from the Constructivist Approach)	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
To what extent was there a shared identity between the two countries? Was the degree of shared understanding changing and if so in what direction? Is there evidence that identity affected the calculations of either the sending or receiving state?	Limited rise of new identity - South Korea: from enemy to partner - North Korea: from revolutionary object to competing object	Continuation of shared enemy identity (axis of evil vs. empire of devil)	Rise of new identity from Hobbesian culture (enemy) to Lockean culture (rival)

Identity influences all three levels of analysis of both the sending and receiving states. In Case II, a shared Hobbesian enemy identity among leaders and in domestic and alliance politics between the United States and North Korea contributed to the failure of reassurance strategy. In contrast, in Case III, the rise of a new identity suggesting movement from Hobbesian culture (enemy) to Lockean culture (rival) among leaders and in domestic and alliance politics between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Gorbachev and Reagan period helped produce the success of the reassurance strategy. When there were positive responses from the Reagan administration and more rewards from the Soviet Union, like the arms reduction announcement in Gorbachev's UN speech in 1988, the relationship changed further toward one of partners rather than rivals.

In Case I, there was a limited rise of new identity from enemy (Hobbesian culture) to rival or partner (Lockean culture) in leaders and domestic politics in South Korea. However, the majority of South Koreans considered North Korea as a threat. Also, there was very limited identity change from revolutionary object to competing object in North Korea's image of South Korea. The dominant identity of North Korea toward South Korea was still enemy identity. That resulted in the partial success of South Korea's reassurance strategy toward North Korea.

Also, it is hard to sustain a reassurance strategy over the long run if the receiving state never reciprocates, and to that extent its success will eventually depend on the emergence of shared norms of collective identity and recognition of danger from a security dilemma. At the same time, to generate shared norms of collective identity and awareness of the security dilemma in leaders, and in domestic and alliance politics, requires fortitude and persistence. That is why the success of a reassurance strategy is difficult to achieve. In sum, the other's reciprocation to generate shared norms of collective identity and recognition of danger from a security dilemma is essential for the success of a reassurance strategy.

c. Condition Variable 2 (CV 2): Motivating Factors of the Receiving State

(1) Motivating Factors of the Receiving State. If the receiving state has only "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors, reassurance strategy will fail. Therefore, for the success or failure of the reassurance strategy, it is important to know the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV 2). It is difficult to know the real motivating factors of the receiving state, but it is necessary to consider them. As shown in Figure 1.1. Diagram of Main Argument and Hypotheses (IV, CV, IntV, and DV) in Chapter 1, circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states (CV 1) provide a clue to what the motivating factors of the receiving state are. In all three case studies, the receiving states not only had "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motivating factors but also "not-greedy" and "need-oriented" motivating factors (Table 5.8).

Table 5.8. Question 5. Motivating Factors of the Receiving State

Question 5	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
What were the receiving state's motivations? Is the state best seen as greedy, insecure, or having mixed motivations? What was the sending state's perception of the receiving state's motivations?	Mixed motivations	Mixed motivations	Mixed motivations

The intelligence community and the military arms of government should focus on how to identify these motivating factors. If the target state has only a “greedy” motivating factor, a deterrence strategy rather than reassurance strategy should be considered. There are always limitations ascertaining motivations through reliance on intelligence's technical data. In the face of uncertainty, the intelligence and military services usually exaggerate the “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors of the target state. They have a tendency to ignore the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the target state. The best way to identify motivations of the receiving state is to increase any kind of contacts, such as summit meetings and exchanges of people, in order to “test” or draw out a response from the receiving state. The number of summit meetings and interchange of people is obviously different in the three case studies. The level of contact is in proportion to the outcome of reassurance strategy. The more they met, the better they understood the real motivating factors of the other side.

In addition, no matter what motivating factor the receiving state has, the sending state's perceptions of the receiving state's motivations are also important. As shown in the three case studies, generally speaking, progressive soft-liners focus on

the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors and conservative hard-liners emphasize the “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors. How much soft-liners or hard-liners can influence policy making, how much leaders support which side, and how much either side supports its state’s leaders are all important factors in order to understand the intervening variables and their impact on the outcome of reassurance strategy. In sum, both the motivating factors of the receiving state and perceptions of the sending state need to be considered in the analysis.

(2) Aversion to War. In all three cases, win or lose, states had an aversion to war based on calculations of the cost of war (Table 5.9).

Table 5.9. Question 6. Aversion to War

Question 6	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
Did the two parties share an aversion to war?	Yes	Yes	Yes

An aversion to war provides the sending state with an incentive for use of a reassurance strategy and the receiving state with “not-greedy” motivating factors. In Case I, the two Koreas have built up military forces since the Korean War. Another Korean war will bring unrecoverable damage to the Korean peninsula. In Case II, considering an estimate of the cost of war on the Korean peninsula and possible strike on the continental United States, it would not be easy for the United States to use military action against North Korea. In Case III, both the Soviet Union and the United States shared an aversion to war, especially nuclear war. The damage from nuclear war between the two countries could not be calculated and rebuilding would be impossible. A shared aversion to war may be a necessary condition for reassurance, but is it not sufficient to guarantee success since it was present in cases in which reassurance failed.

d. Intervening Variables (IntV) and Six Hypotheses

The individual level (leader's perceptions), domestic level (domestic politics), and international level (alliance politics) all matter. A theory that focuses on one level to the exclusion of the others misses important aspects of their interaction and generates incomplete explanations and unsatisfactory predictions about the outcome of a reassurance strategy. As Philip E. Tetlock points out, "What excites the attention of investigators working at one level of analysis may well be invisible to investigators working at other levels of analysis."¹¹⁹¹ One level of analysis is not sufficient to understand the causal mechanisms involved in reassurance strategy. This dissertation has argued that the three levels of analysis are equally important to foresee the outcome of a reassurance strategy.

(1) IntV 1 and Hypothesis 1: Sending State's Leader's Perceptions. Leadership is central to the implementation of a reassurance strategy because it needs to be initiated and supported by a leader. In Case I and III, without Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun in South Korea and Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, it is hard to imagine that South Korea and the Soviet Union would have implemented a reassurance strategy. South Korea and the Soviet Union changed their strategies toward North Korea and the United States, respectively. In Case II, Bush's policy change toward North Korea was necessary for the reassurance strategy. I added the sending state's leader's perceptions of the receiving state and its leader as one of intervening variables because in each case reassurance strategies were initiated even though there were doubts about the leader of the receiving state. As they implemented their reassurance strategies, Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Gorbachev changed their perceptions of Kim Jong Il and Reagan, respectively; Bush did not change his perceptions of Kim Jong Il (Table 5.10). These are all related to the outcome of the reassurance strategies. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is plausible:

¹¹⁹¹ Philip E. Tetlock, "Methodological Themes and Variations," in *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1, eds, Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 339.

H1: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the sending state leader's perceptions about the receiving state.

In addition, although the leader's role is important, a leader cannot implement a reassurance strategy alone. Domestic and alliance support (IntV 3, 4, 5 and 6) are necessary to continuously implement reassurance strategy and lead to a successful outcome.

Table 5.10. Question 7. Sending State's Leader's Perceptions

Question 7	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
How did the sending state's leader perceive the receiving state and its leader? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led the sending state leader to misperceive the receiving state's leader? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome the sending state leader's cognitive barriers to changing his/her image of the receiving state?	Some change in Kim Dae Jung's and Roh Moo Hyun's beliefs and perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.	Little change in Bush's beliefs and perceptions of Kim Jong Il and North Korea.	Change in Gorbachev's perceptions of Reagan and the United States.

(2) IntV 2 and Hypothesis 2: Receiving State's Leader's Perceptions. The receiving state's leader's perceptions are directly related to the outcome of a reassurance strategy. Without the change of the receiving state's leader's perceptions, it is almost impossible to have a positive response to the reassurance strategy. The three

case studies show this (Table 5.11). In Case I, some change in Kim Jong Il's perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea resulted in a partial success. In Case II, without a change in Kim Jong Il's perceptions of Bush and the United States, there was no significant positive response from North Korea. By contrast, in Case III, Reagan changed his perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union through their personal interactions at various summit meetings and the exchange of letters. Reagan's change was important for providing positive responses to Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. The fact that, unlike Reagan, some conservative hard-liners remained suspicious of Gorbachev shows how much the leadership in the receiving state is central to the success of reassurance strategy. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is probable:

H2: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters the receiving state leader's perceptions about the sending state.

Table 5.11. Question 8. Receiving State's Leader's Perceptions

Question 8	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
How did the receiving state's leader perceive the reassurance strategy offered by the sending state? Is there evidence that common psychological biases led the receiving state's leader to discount the reassurance strategy? Or was reassurance implemented in a way that was sufficient to overcome the receiver's cognitive barriers to changing its image of the sender?	Some change in Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun and South Korea.	Little change in Kim Jong Il's beliefs and perceptions of Bush and the United States.	Significant change in Reagan's perceptions of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.

(3) IntV 3 and Hypothesis 3: Domestic Politics of the Sending State. There are always supporters and opponents of reassurance strategies in the sending state. The relative influence of the two sides affects the prospects for success. In Case I, there was a rise of progressives that supported Kim Dae Jung's and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy toward North Korea. However, conservative groups that opposed Kim Dae Jung's and Roh Moo Hyun's reassurance strategy had strong power to influence domestic politics in South Korea. Therefore, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun did not have enough domestic support for implementation of their reassurance strategy. This led to the partial success of this strategy. In Case II, Bush's reassurance strategy could only be initiated with the rise of soft-liners within his administration. However, it was constrained by the strong opposition of remaining hard-liners as well as Bush's low popularity in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, without sufficient domestic support, the Bush administration had difficulty in implementing a reassurance strategy toward North Korea in 2007 and 2008. This contributed to the failure of Bush's reassurance strategy toward North Korea.

By contrast, in Case III, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy without the strong opposition from domestic politics. Gorbachev's inner circle advisor group and the broad professional class provided both intellectual and political support that produced changes in Soviet policy. Also, there was a decline in opposition from hard-liners, such as the military, communist party, and KGB. The more authoritarian Soviet system also gave the leader more autonomy relative to democracies. Jack Snyder argues, "Ironically, the Stalinist legacy of centralized institutions suited to the task of social transformation from above."¹¹⁹² As a result, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy with less opposition from domestic politics. This resulted in the success of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. As shown in Table 5.12, these different domestic politics are in parallel with the outcome of the reassurance strategy. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is reasonable:

¹¹⁹² Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution," 110.

H3: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic politics in the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.

Table 5.12. Question 9. Domestic Politics of the Sending State

Question 9	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
How did key domestic actors in the sending state perceive the leader's reassurance strategy offer to the receiving state? Did the reassurance strategy generate domestic support in the sending state? Was there sufficient domestic support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?	- Limited support and gradual change in domestic politics of South Korea -Conservative and Progressive split - Strong opposition of conservatives.	- Opposition from hard-liners - Little support in domestic politics of the United States.	- Decline of opposition against Gorbachev and support from inner circle advisor group and epistemic communities.

(4) IntV 4 and Hypothesis 4: Domestic Politics of the Receiving State. Just as there are domestic politics in the sending state, there are always supporters and opponents for reciprocity to the reassurance strategy in the receiving state. Therefore, the relative influence of the two sides also affects the prospects for success. In Cases I and II, there were signs of disagreement between the military and the diplomats in North Korea. It is difficult to identify those who disagreed with the military and supported reciprocity to reassurance strategy in North Korea due to lack of information. However, the conservative military seemed to have been a key domestic actor and there was little change in domestic politics in North Korea.

By contrast, in Case III, there was a rise of supporters for arms control among ordinary people. Also, there was a decline of hard-liners and a rise of soft-liners in the Cabinet. Therefore, Reagan could provide a positive response to Gorbachev's reassurance strategy without strong opposition from hard-liners. To understand the target state and predict the outcome of reassurance, it is necessary to consider the state's domestic politics and how leaders are influenced by it. As shown in Table 5.13, these different domestic politics in the receiving states are in parallel with the outcome of the reassurance strategies. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is believable:

H4: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters domestic politics in the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.

Table 5.13. Question 10. Domestic Politics of the Receiving State

Question 10	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
How did key domestic actors in the receiving state perceive the reassurance strategy offered by the sending state? Did the reassurance strategy generate domestic support in the receiving state for reciprocity? Did powerful domestic actors try to prevent the receiving state from offering a positive response?	Little change in domestic politics of North Korea.	Little change in domestic politics of North Korea - Military first policy.	Rise of supporters for arms control and changes in Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union.

(5) IntV 5 and Hypothesis 5: Alliance Politics of the Sending State. The support or opposition of allies of the sending state also influences the outcome of the reassurance strategy. In Cases I and II, alliance politics provided little support for the implementation of the reassurance strategies. In Case I, when Kim Dae Jung and Roh

Moo Hyun implemented reassurance strategies, the United States maintained a more hard-line policy, such as deterrence or threat of a preemptive attack. Without support from the United States, it was difficult for Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun to implement their reassurance strategy and induce a positive response from North Korea. In Case II, when Bush changed his policy into a reassurance strategy, the new South Korean government switched to a more hard-line policy. Japan also kept raising the kidnapping issue.

By contrast, in Case III, in the Warsaw Pact countries, leaders grudgingly accepted Gorbachev's reassurance strategy and ordinary people showed strong support for it. With support from ordinary East Europeans discouraging leaders from opposing him, Gorbachev could implement his reassurance strategy. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is persuasive:

H5: Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance politics of the sending state towards support for foreign policy change.

Table 5.14. Question 11. Alliance Politics of the Sending State

Question 11	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
How did key allies of the sending state affect the reassurance strategy to the receiving state? Was there sufficient alliance support to make the reassurance credible, or was the government constrained from fully implementing its reassurance strategy?	Little support from alliance politics (the United States).	Little support from alliance politics (South Korea and Japan).	Support from Eastern Europe, especially from ordinary people.

(6) IntV 6 and Hypothesis 6: Alliance Politics of the Receiving State. Alliance politics of the receiving state also have an impact on the outcome of a reassurance strategy. In Cases I and II, China and Russia, North Korea's two allies, had limited influence on North Korea to reciprocate the reassurance strategy from South Korea or the United States, respectively. In addition, even though both China and Russia wanted to improve their relations with South Korea and the United States, they could not ignore their interests in supporting North Korea. By contrast, in Case III, West European leaders influenced Reagan to reciprocate Gorbachev's reassurance strategy. Also, those leaders could not ignore the anti-nuclear weapons movement and its support among ordinary people. There were no key allies of the United States that tried to prevent it from offering a positive response, with the potential exception of the INF Treaty, where domestic peace movements ultimately kept European governments from actively opposing the deal. Overall, NATO countries mostly pressured the Reagan administration to change the hard-line U.S. policy and talk with Gorbachev. As shown in Table 5.15, the situations in Cases I and II were different from that in Case III. In sum, hypothesis 6 is credible:

H6. Reassurance strategy is more likely to succeed when it alters alliance politics of the receiving state towards support for foreign policy change.

Table 5.15. Question 12. Alliance Politics of the Receiving State

Question 12	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
How did key allies of the receiving state perceive the reassurance strategy? Did the reassurance strategy generate alliance support for the receiving state's reciprocity? Did key allies try to prevent the receiving state from offering a positive response?	Little support from allies (China and Russia) and limitations on their leverage with North Korea.	Little support from allies (China and Russia) and limitations on their leverage with North Korea.	Support from NATO allies (leaders and their public).

e. Dependent Variable (DV)

As shown in Table 5.16, the three cases are distinguishable in terms of the outcome of reassurance strategy.

Table 5.16. Question 13. Success or Failure of Reassurance Strategy

Question 13	Answers		
	Case Study I ROK-DPRK	Case Study II U.S.-DPRK	Case Study III U.S.-USSR
Was there any positive response to the reassurance strategy from the receiving state? Or, was there no response or rejection from the receiving state, followed by an increase in tensions?	Partial success of reassurance strategy: - Positive response (two summit meetings and agreements reached) - Negative response (Continuous North Korean provocative actions).	Failure of reassurance strategy: - Rejection from North Korea on verification protocol - North Korea's nuclear test in 2009.	Success of reassurance strategy: - Summit meetings - INF treaty - Agreement on prior notification of ICBM and SLBM flight tests - End of the Cold War

In Case I, North Korea showed both positive and negative responses to Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Peace and Prosperity Policy. The two Koreas reached the 2000 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration after summit meetings in 2000 and 2007, respectively. There was an increase of interchange of people and trade. However, North Korea's nuclear threat and provocative actions never dissipated. The case hence represents partial success and partial failure of the reassurance strategy. In Case II, there were no substantial actions to follow the two agreements in the Six-Party Talks on February 13 and October 3, 2007. Furthermore, North Korea carried out missile and nuclear tests in 2009, which showed the total failure of Bush's reassurance strategy in 2007 and 2008.

By contrast, in Case III, the United States, as the receiving state of Gorbachev's reassurance strategy, offered a series of positive actions, such as summit meetings, the INF treaty, and the agreement on prior notification of ICBM and SLBM flight tests. Moreover, there was significant tension reduction between the Soviet Union and the United States, which led to the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it is an example of the success of a reassurance strategy.

Consequently, the causal relations among variables are made clearer by reiterating the questions related to each variable and comparing answers from the three cases studies. This "structured, focused comparison" helped develop "contingent generalizations" about the conditions of the success or failure of reassurance strategies. Answers relating to the six intervening variables are noteworthy based on the dependent variable, the success or failure of reassurance strategy. Each intervening variable affects the probability of the success of reassurance strategies. However, as shown in the case studies, the most important necessary conditions for the success of a reassurance strategy are the changes in leaders' perceptions in both the sending and receiving states (IntV 1 and 2). Without these shifts, the success of a reassurance strategy is impossible.

B. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF REASSURANCE STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation has explored specific ways to answer the research questions: under what conditions is reassurance to be an appropriate strategy, and what factors are associated with the success or failure of reassurance strategy? Explanations based on any one theory (realism, liberalism, or constructivism), any one level of analysis (individual, state, or alliance), or any one party (sending or receiving state) alone cannot provide a satisfactory account for the outcome of reassurance strategy. This requires an adequate analytical framework for better understanding.

To answer the research questions, this dissertation offers two, related frameworks—(1) a variable framework; and (2) a "two-by-three" framework to analyze reassurance strategy. The variable framework emphasizes the importance of a complete theoretical model. It has an independent variable (IV), condition variables (CV),

intervening variables (IntV) and dependent variable (DV). On the other hand, the “two-by-three” framework focuses on the two parties and the different levels of analysis, which produce the intervening variables (IntV). Also, as explained in the previous section, this dissertation proposed six hypotheses to explain the relations among independent variable (IV), intervening variables (IntV), and dependent variable (DV). The frameworks and hypotheses make it possible to systematically analyze the incentives for use and conditions for success of reassurance strategy.

1. Variable Framework

As proposed in Chapter I, this dissertation offers a variable framework for analysis of reassurance strategy. The framework tried to reflect two debates—the level of analysis and the theory vs. practice—and to solve their problems in international relations.

a. Level of Analysis

First, the “level of analysis” issue has been a main debate among international relations scholars.¹¹⁹³ There have been debates between *atomistic/reductionist* and *holistic/systemic* approaches since Kenneth Waltz’s establishment of the “three images” in *Man, the State, and War* in 1959.¹¹⁹⁴ Many scholars have argued that one level of analysis is more important than the other levels. For example, some scholars explained the end of the Cold War by crediting Gorbachev or Reagan, others by referring to the nature of the Soviet Union or the United States, and others by citing the international system as a whole. The variable framework in this dissertation argues that all three levels of analysis—leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics—matter and they interact. One level of analysis is not sufficient to explain the incentive for use and the outcome of a reassurance strategy. It is necessary to consider all three level of analysis together.

¹¹⁹³ Refer to J.D. Singer, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 77–92 and Barry Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered,” in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steven Smith (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 198–216.

¹¹⁹⁴ Buzan, 199–202.

The three levels of analysis (the leaders' perceptions and domestic and alliance politics) all play important roles in influencing the outcome of reassurance strategies. The sending state's leader's recognition of the need for a reassurance strategy is necessary for its implementation. The leaders' perceptions of the sending and receiving states (IntV 1 and 2) need to change for the success of a reassurance strategy. Without the change of the leaders' perceptions, it is difficult for the sending state leader to continue implementing a reassurance strategy and for the receiving state leader to show positive responses. Also, the impact of domestic politics of the sending and receiving states (IntV 3 and 4) has much to contribute to explaining the outcome of a reassurance strategy. Without the support of domestic politics, it is difficult to make a reassurance strategy successful. There is always resistance to reassurance strategies in domestic politics of the sending and receiving states.

Lastly, alliance politics of the sending and receiving states (IntV 5 and 6) cannot be ignored when looking for explanations for the outcome of a reassurance strategy. Without support or at least acquiescence from allies, it is also difficult for the sending state to implement a reassurance strategy and for the receiving state to show positive responses. In sum, this dissertation rejects the arguments for an exclusively *atomistic/reductionist* or *holistic/systemic* approach and argues that each level of analysis is significant.

b. *Theory (Condition Variable) and Practice (Intervening Variable)*

Second, there has been a gap between theory and practice. Samuel W. Lewis, President of United States Institute of Peace argues: "From the standpoint of the policymaker, the scholar is 'too academic,' all too often too prone to abstraction and jargon....Scholars, on the other hand, may complain that practitioners are too haphazard and ad hoc in their approaches to situations, and too ready to apply pat formulas or supposed lessons of history in uncritical ways."¹¹⁹⁵ To narrow the gap, this dissertation considers theory and practice together. The framework not only includes abstract

¹¹⁹⁵ Samuel W. Lewis, "Foreword," in Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), ix.

theoretical explanations but also investigates the changes in leader's perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics to know what really happens in practice. That is, by linking circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states (CV1), and three levels of analysis of both the sending and receiving states (IntV), a "big picture" is provided for understanding the outcome of the use of reassurance strategies.

IV	→	IntV	→	DV
The implementation of reassurance strategy	→	1. Sending state leader's perceptions about the receiving state and its leader 2. Receiving state leader's perceptions about the sending state and its leader. 3. Domestic politics of the sending state 4. Domestic politics of the receiving state 5. Alliance politics of the sending state 6. Alliance politics of the receiving state	→	Success or failure of reassurance strategy

X

CV 1	→	CV 2
Circumstances and relations between a sending state and a receiving state	→	Receiving state's motivating factors
1. Balance of Power 2. Interdependence 3. Identity / Norms		1. Greed 2. Insecurity 3. Mixed

Figure 5.1. A Framework for Analysis of Reassurance Strategy (IV, CV, IntV, and DV)¹¹⁹⁶

¹¹⁹⁶ Van Evera, *Guidance to Methods*, 7–48.

This dissertation accepts the importance of theory and investigates the influence of balance of power (realism), interdependence (liberalism), and identity (constructivism) as condition variables (CV 1) on intervening variables (IV: leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics). The combined explanation including condition variables and intervening variables captures the causal connections between the implementation of reassurance and its outcome better than a separate explanation. In sum, the united explanation of condition variables and intervening variables in one framework has stronger explanatory power. As shown in Figure 5.1, “a framework for analysis of reassurance strategy” including all variables can be drawn in an arrow-diagram.

2. Two-Party and Three-Level (“Two-by-Three”) Framework for Analysis

As shown in Figure 5.2, the variable framework can be described in a different way. This dissertation also offers a two-party and three-level (two-by-three) analysis framework to emphasize the importance of consideration of both the sending and receiving states. It is important to know how reassurance strategy appears not only to the receiving state but also to the sending state.




Figure 5.2. Diagram of Two-Party and Three-Level (“Two-by-Three”) analysis

I have argued that the success or failure of reassurance strategy in the three cases resulted from the interplay of the sending and receiving states at all three levels of analysis—individual, domestic, and alliances. Therefore, two-party (the sending and receiving states) and three-level (leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics), or “two-by-three analysis” is necessary for understanding the situation and predicting the outcome of reassurance strategies. This eclectic and broad approach can explain the relationship between the sending and receiving states and the influence of leaders’ perceptions and domestic and alliance politics in the two parties. As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the outcome of a reassurance strategy is dependent on all six intervening variables between the sending and receiving states, which are in turn affected by the condition variables.

It is difficult to achieve the absolute success of a reassurance strategy, which would mean no threat and no war in the world. By applying the “two-by-three” analysis framework, this situation is understandable, because each leader has different perspectives and there is always debate in domestic politics between conservative and progressives about security strategy. Also, allies can have different perspectives, which can have significant impact. However, if there is tension reduction and a decrease of the possibility of war caused by changes in leaders’ perceptions, and favorable factors within the domestic and alliance politics of two states, that situation can be categorized as a success or a partial success.

In sum, the lessons that one should draw from the conditions of success and failure of reassurance strategy relate mainly to how leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics can be changed in both the sending and receiving states.

3. Questions to Apply to Evaluate Reassurance Strategy: Motivating Factors and Effects

To apply and evaluate reassurance strategy, it is necessary to ask two fundamental questions. The first question is what the motivating factors of the target state are (Is a reassurance strategy relevant)? If the target state has “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors, a reassurance strategy would be a relevant strategy. If the target state

has only “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, reassurance strategy could be counterproductive because the target state could take advantage of any reassurance strategy for its benefit.

Motivating factors are influenced by circumstances and relations between the sending state and the receiving state (CV 1). They are also influenced by internal factors. However, these variables do not necessarily provide clear answers about the motivating factors of the receiving state. For example, identity change in the receiving state is very difficult to determine. A primary task for intelligence organizations and the military should be to investigate the motivating factors of the target state. The best way to determine the motivating factors is not only to develop technology but also to have direct meetings. As Hoffman notes, “The United States deployed remarkably accurate satellites to collect technical data on missiles, but it lacked the textured and revealing intelligence on the new leader that came only from human sources.”¹¹⁹⁷ Hoffman also points out, “The United States had never recruited a spy who provided political information at a high level inside the Kremlin.”¹¹⁹⁸ There were many missed opportunities to know the “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev period. Also, because of the lack of information caused by the lack of contacts, it is difficult to investigate the motivating factors of North Korea. However, there are signs of “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” motivating factors in North Korea. In sum, it is a basic and important requirement to investigate the motivating factors of the receiving state.

The second question is if reassurance strategy will or did have a positive impact on the leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the sending state as well as the receiving state. In the three case studies, all of the target states had mixed motivating factors. Therefore, reassurance strategy was relevant. In these circumstances, how much the reassurance strategy affected the leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the sending and receiving states decided the outcome of the reassurance strategy. If there were impacts on the leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the sending and

¹¹⁹⁷ Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 192.

¹¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

receiving states, then reassurance would succeed. On the contrary, if there were no impacts on leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics, then reassurance would most likely fail. If there is neither relevance with the target state nor impacts on the sending and receiving states, it can be categorized as an irrelevant case. In cases where the target state is not appropriate for reassurance, using it can even be counterproductive if it is interpreted as a signal of weakness. Considering the first and second questions above, an evaluation diagram of reassurance strategy can be made, as shown in Table 5.17.

Table 5.17. Evaluation Diagram of Reassurance Strategy¹¹⁹⁹

	Relevant	Not Relevant
Will/Has Impact	Success	Counterproductive
Will Not /Has No Impact	Failure	Irrelevant

Compared to the successful case of Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the Reagan administration in Case III, Bush’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea in Case II was a failure because it did not have sufficient impact on all the intervening variables such as leaders’ perceptions, and domestic and alliance politics of the United States and North Korea, even though it was relevant. Although there was a possibility of success for the reassurance strategy because North Korea had mixed motivating factors, the effort had almost no effect on leaders’ perceptions, domestic politics, or alliance politics of both the United States and North Korea. Under these conditions, it would have been almost impossible to have successful results from a reassurance strategy.

Compared to the first two case studies, Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States in Case III was a success case because it was relevant and had impacts on all of the intervening variables. It was relevant because the United States had not only “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” motivating factors, but also “not-greedy” and “need-

¹¹⁹⁹ Professor Jeffrey W. Knopf’s lectures and class discussions, NS 4669 Conflict and Cooperation in World Politics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2, 2009.

oriented” ones. Also, it had impacts on Gorbachev’s and Reagan’s perceptions, domestic politics, and alliance politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. In sum, the three case studies can be applied to the evaluation diagram of reassurance strategy, as shown in Table 5.18.

Table 5.18. Case Studies and Evaluation Diagram

	Relevant	Not Relevant
Will/Has Impact	Success (Case III: Gorbachev’s reassurance strategy toward the United States)	Counterproductive
Will/Has Partial Impact	Partial Success (Case I: Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea)	--
Will Not /Has No Impact	Failure (Case II: Bush’s reassurance strategy toward North Korea)	Irrelevant

4. Policy Recommendations and Issues for Future Study

To implement a reassurance strategy, there are some recommendations for successful results based on the research findings.

a. The Importance of the Motivating Factors of the Target State

First, “the motivating factors of the target state” should be investigated fully and objectively to implement an appropriate strategy. As explained earlier, if the sending state reassures or appeases a “greedy” and “opportunity-oriented” state, it can be counterproductive. Also, if the sending state deters a “not-greedy” and “need-oriented” state, the deterrence strategy can fail and result in costs to the sending state. However, it is always difficult to identify the motivating factors. Furthermore, in most cases, states

are likely to have a mixture of both “greedy” and “not-greedy” motivating factors. Further research is needed to develop methods to recognize the motivating factors of the target state. In the case studies, the military experienced limitations in analyzing the motivating factors of the target state. Rather, personal contacts through summit meetings, interchange of people, and transnational actors seem necessary to determine the motivating factors of the target states in addition to nonpersonalized information collected by traditional intelligence equipment such as satellites.

Also, not enough is known about the implementation of reassurance as a complement to deterrence. As Stein said, “If adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence.”¹²⁰⁰ The combination of reassurance and deterrence is likely to be a more effective strategy toward those receiving states with mixed motivating factors. Actually, in the three case studies of this dissertation, the receiving states showed mixed motivating factors. Also, as shown in the case studies, reassurance strategy was typically initiated by the sending state within an existing context of deterrence. When the sending state implemented its reassurance strategy, deterrence was still important. However, the interactive effects of deterrence and reassurance have not been studied. Therefore, it is necessary to research more methods to implement reassurance strategy as a complement to deterrence.

b. Application of the Framework for Analysis and Its Validity

Second, a variable framework or a “two-party and three-level (two-by-three) analysis framework” in this dissertation can be applied to implement a reassurance strategy. If you know yourself and know your enemy (two parties), you can not only win a war but also reduce tension and avoid an unnecessary war. The best way to know yourself and know your enemy is to consider a three-level analysis incorporating leaders, domestic politics, and alliance politics. In other words, it is necessary to consider one’s own perception of the other leader, the other leader’s perception of oneself, and domestic

¹²⁰⁰ Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 59.

and alliance politics of both one's own side and the other's. Efforts to change these intervening variables to be more favorable to a reassurance strategy are necessary to bring about a successful outcome.

The framework in this dissertation demonstrates the merits of combining different explanations and approaches to increase their explanatory power. The validity of the framework could be tested by applying it to more cases of reassurance strategy. Also, more research on the impact of circumstances and relations between the sending and receiving states (CV1: balance of power, interdependence, or identity), on the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV2), and on leaders' perceptions and domestic and alliance politics of both the sending and receiving states (IntV) needs to be performed. The interplay among leader, domestic politics, and alliance politics also need to be considered in future studies.

Furthermore, the framework for analysis of reassurance strategy in this dissertation may be applied to analyze other influence strategies such as deterrence, coercion, sanctions, and positive incentives and their outcomes to understand the causal relations among variables and the outcomes of influence strategies.

5. Final Thoughts

Decisions about the most appropriate strategy to reduce tensions and the possibility of war must be a function of the target state's motivating factors. If it is quite clear that the target state has its "greedy" and "opportunity-oriented" motives, the sending state needs to emphasize a deterrence strategy. But, if it is quite certain that the target state shows "not-greedy" and "need-driven" motives, the sending state should consider a reassurance strategy. When the target state seems to have mixed motivating factors, it is also necessary to consider a reassurance strategy. Therefore, it is valuable to investigate the motivating factors of the target state and consider reassurance as an option.

In addition, it is important to recognize that reassurance strategy only works under certain circumstances. Not only the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV 2) are crucial for the outcome of reassurance strategy, but also both circumstances and relations between a sending state and a receiving state (CV 1) and leaders, domestic politics, and

alliance politics of both the sending and receiving states (IntV) need to be considered for the success of reassurance strategy. The circumstances and relations between the two states (CV 1) influence the motivating factors of the receiving state (CV 2) and leader's perceptions, domestic politics and alliance politics of the sending state and the receiving state (IntV). In other words, it is important to "know yourself and your enemy" as a whole. As Sun Tzu said in *The Art of War*, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."¹²⁰¹ Just as in war, when crafting an influence strategy designed to maintain peace, it is extremely important to know yourself and your enemy.

Although this dissertation shows that many factors are important, it suggests that the most important variable among the intervening variables is each leader's beliefs and perceptions. For this reason, among the alternative forms of reassurance studied, more persistent and far-reaching strategies such as GRIT appear to have the greatest ability to produce success. As Janice Gross Stein suggests: "insofar as leaders can modify their strategies to accommodate the political, strategic, cultural, and psychological context of their adversary, reciprocal strategies of tension reduction may be useful in changing the context of an adversarial relationship, so that deterrence becomes less risky in the short-term, and ultimately, less necessary."¹²⁰² Reassurance strategies initiated by a prudent leader may be useful in changing the context of the relationship, inducing more cooperation, and ultimately avoiding war between the adversarial states. In many cases, the best policy options to reduce tensions could be reassurance strategies combined with deterrence strategies. Therefore, leaders should be more aware of both options in their decision making in order to reduce unnecessary and avoidable tensions and the possibility of war.


¹²⁰¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002), 51.

¹²⁰² Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 56.

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
APPENDIX A. THE REASSURANCE GAME

Appendix A.1. Kydd's Reassurance Game (timeline representation)¹²⁰³



¹²⁰³ Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," in *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No.2. (Spring, 2000), 330–341.

Appendix A.2. “Equilibria in the reassurance game”¹²⁰⁴



¹²⁰⁴ Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 336.

APPENDIX B. ROCK'S QUESTIONS ABOUT APPEASEMENT¹²⁰⁵

Question 1: What objective(s) did policymakers in the appeasing state seek in pursuing a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis the adversary?

Question 2: What concessions did policymakers in the appeasing state offer to their adversary?

Question 3: How did the adversary's decision makers perceive the concessions offered by the appeasing state?

Question 4: What factors accounted for the perception of the appeasing state's concessions by the adversary's decision makers?

Question 5: What was the response, if any, of the adversary's decision makers to concessions offered by the appeasing state?

Question 6: How did policymakers in the appeasing state perceive the adversary's response to their concessions?

Question 7: What decision(s) regarding the continuation of their appeasement policy did policymakers in the appeasing state make on the basis of their perception of the adversary's response?

¹²⁰⁵ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 17–20.

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APPENDIX C. THE 1991 SOUTH-NORTH BASIC AGREEMENT¹²⁰⁶

AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION, AND EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Effective February 19, 1992

South and North Korea,

In keeping with the longing of the entire Korean race for the peaceful unification of our divided fatherland; Reaffirming the three basic principles of unification set forth in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972; Determined to end the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation; Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, and to ensure the lessening of tension and the establishment of peace; Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to promote interests and prosperity common to the Korean people.; Recognizing that their relationship, not being a relationship as between states, is a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification; Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification; Hereby agreed as follows;

Chapter 1. South-North Reconciliation

Article 1. South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.

Article 2. South and North Korea shall not interfere in the internal affairs of each other.

Article 3. South and North Korea shall not slander or defame each other.

Article 4. South and North Korea shall refrain from any acts of sabotage or insurrection against each other.

Article 5. South and North Korea shall together endeavour to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace is realized.

¹²⁰⁶ USC-UCLA Joint East Asian Studies Center, "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea," <http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/korea-agreement.htm> (accessed on February 26, 2009) and CSIS Working Group Report, "Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Working Group Report of the CSIS International Security Program," 47, <http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/conventionalweapons/CSISConventionalArmsControl.pdf> (accessed on February 23, 2009).

Article 6. South and North Korea shall cease to compete with or confront each other, and instead shall cooperate and endeavour to promote the racial dignity and interests of Korea in the international arena.

Article 7. South and North Korea shall establish and operate a South-North Liaison Office at Panmunjom within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement to ensure close liaison and consultations between the two sides.

Article 8. South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Political Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to consider concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North reconciliation.

Chapter 2. Agreement of Nonaggression between South and North Korea

Article 9. South and North Korea shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.

Article 10. South and North Korea shall resolve peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation, any differences of views and disputes arising between them.

Article 11. The South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.

Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression, the South and the North shall establish a South-North Joint Military Commission within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss problems and carry out steps to build up military confidence and realize arms reduction, in particular, the mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

Article 13. South and North Korea shall install and operate a telephone line between the military authorities of each side to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed clashes.

Article 14. South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Military Sub-Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and to remove the state of military confrontation.

Chapter 3. Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea

Article 15. In order to promote the integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the South and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as intra-Korean commerce and joint ventures.

Article 16. South and North Korea shall carry out exchanges and promote cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, the environment, journalism and media including newspapers, radio, television broadcasts, and other publications.

Article 17. South and North Korea shall implement freedom of intra-Korean travel and contact among the members of the Korean people.

Article 18. South and North Korea shall permit free correspondence, movement between the two sides, meetings, and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives, promote their voluntary reunion, and take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.

Article 19. South and North Korea shall reconnect the railway and the previously severed roads, and shall open sea and air routes.

Article 20. South and North Korea shall establish and link facilities for exchanges by post and telecommunications, and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intra-Korean mail and telecommunications.

Article 21. South and North Korea shall cooperate in the international arena in the economic, cultural and other fields, and shall advance abroad together.

Article 22. In order to implement the agreement on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural, and other fields, South and North Korea shall establish joint commissions for each sector, including a Joint

South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article 23. A Sub-committee on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement, to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North exchanges and cooperation.

Chapter 4. Amendments and Effectuation

Article 24. This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 25. This Agreement shall enter into force from the date the South and the North exchange the appropriate instruments following the completion of the respective procedures necessary for its implementation.

Chung Won-shik,
Chief Delegate of the South delegation to the South-North High-Level Negotiations
Kim Dae-jung, President, The Republic of Korea,
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk,
Head of the North delegation to the South-North High-Level Negotiations
Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Signed on December 13, 1991

APPENDIX D. THE 2000 JOINT DECLARATION¹²⁰⁷

In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful reunification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to June 15, 2000.

The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South-North relations and realizing peaceful reunification, declared as follows:

1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.
2. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.
3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.
4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental and all other fields.
5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreements expeditiously.

President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong-il will visit Seoul at an appropriate time.

Kim Dae-jung, President, The Republic of Korea

¹²⁰⁷ United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection, "South-North Joint Declaration," http://www.usip.org/library/pa/n_skorea/n_skorea06152000.html (accessed on February 21, 2009).

Kim Jong-il, Chairman National Defense Commission, The Democratic
People's Republic of Korea

(Signed) June 15, 2000

APPENDIX E. OCTOBER 4 JOINT DECLARATION¹²⁰⁸

Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity

In accordance with the agreement between President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, President Roh visited Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007.

During the visit, there were historic meetings and discussions.

At the meetings and talks, the two sides have reaffirmed the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration and had frank discussions on various issues related to realizing the advancement of South-North relations, peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean people and unification of Korea.

Expressing confidence that they can forge a new era of national prosperity and unification on their own initiative if they combine their will and capabilities, the two sides declare as follows, in order to expand and advance South-North relations based on the June 15 Joint Declaration:

1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavor actively to realize the June 15 Declaration.

The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-themselves.”

The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.

2. The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.

The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other and agreed to resolve inter-Korean issues in the spirit of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.

¹²⁰⁸ The Ministry of Unification, the Republic of Korea, Inter-Korean Dialogue, “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” “http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFdialogue_agreements (accessed on March 3, 2009).

The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean relations in a reunification-oriented direction.

The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas, in order to resolve matters concerning the expansion and advancement of inter-Korean relations in a way that meets the aspirations of the entire Korean people.

3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, reduce military tension, and resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and negotiation.

The South and the North have agreed to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to adhere strictly to their obligation to nonaggression.

The South and the North have agreed to hold talks between the South's Minister of Defense and the North's Minister of the People's Armed Forces in Pyongyang in November to discuss ways of designating a joint fishing area in the West Sea to avoid accidental clashes and turning it into a peace area and also to discuss measures to build military confidence, including security guarantees for various cooperative projects.

4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.

With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

5. The South and the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further develop inter-Korean economic cooperation projects on a continual basis

for balanced economic development and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the principles of common interests, co-prosperity and mutual aid.

The South and the North reached an agreement on promoting economic cooperation, including investments, pushing forward with the building of infrastructure and the development of natural resources. Given the special nature of inter-Korean cooperative projects, the South and the North have agreed to grant preferential conditions and benefits to those projects.

The South and the North have agreed to create a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea” encompassing Haeju and vicinity in a bid to proactively push ahead with the creation of a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone, establishment of a special economic zone, utilization of Haeju harbor, passage of civilian vessels via direct routes in Haeju and the joint use of the Han River estuary.

The South and the North have agreed to complete the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex at an early date and embark on the second-stage development project. The South and the North have agreed to open freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong and promptly complete various institutional measures, including those related to passage, communication, and customs clearance procedures.

The South and the North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.

The South and the North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo, while continuing cooperative projects in various areas such as agriculture, health and medical services and environmental protection.

The South and the North have agreed to upgrade the status of the existing Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to be headed by deputy prime minister-level officials.

6. The South and the North have agreed to boost exchanges and cooperation in the social areas covering history, language, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports to highlight the long history and excellent culture of the Korean people.

The South and the North have agreed to carry out tours to Mt. Baekdu and open nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu for this purpose.

The South and the North have agreed to send a joint cheering squad from both sides to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The squad will use the Gyeongui Railway Line for the first-ever joint Olympic cheering.

7. The South and the North have agreed to actively promote humanitarian cooperation projects.

The South and the North have agreed to expand reunion of separated family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video messages.

To this end, the South and the North have agreed to station resident representatives from each side at the reunion center at Mt. Geumgang when it is completed and regularize reunions of separated family members and their relatives.

The South and the North have agreed to actively cooperate in case of emergencies, including natural disasters, according to the principles of fraternal love, humanitarianism and mutual assistance.

8. The South and the North have agreed to increase cooperation to promote the interests of the Korean people and the rights and interests of overseas Koreans on the international stage.

The South and the North have agreed to hold inter-Korean prime ministers' talks for the implementation of this Declaration and have agreed to hold the first round of meetings in November 2007 in Seoul.

The South and the North have agreed that their highest authorities will meet frequently for the advancement of relations between the two sides.

Oct. 4, 2007 Pyongyang

Roh Moo-hyun
President
Republic of Korea

Kim Jong Il
Chairman, National Defense Commission
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

APPENDIX F. CHRONOLOGY OF INTER-KOREAN MILITARY TALKS DURING THE KIM DAE JUNG AND ROH MOO HYUN ADMINISTRATIONS¹²⁰⁹

Classification	Date	Place	Details of Major Consultations/Agreements
1st Round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministers Talks	Sep. 24-26, 2000	Jeju Island	• Adoption of the five-point joint press release of the inter-Korean defense ministers talks
1st Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 28, 2000	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Assurances - Designation of the timing and scope of the Joint Administration Area (JAA), locating of the roads, and construction of facilities in the JAA - Security assurance issue for DMZ construction works - Simultaneous commencement of landmine removal in the DMZ
2nd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Dec. 5, 2000	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Assurances - Finalization of the routes of the inter-Korean roads - Discussion of the designation and operation of the JAA as well as joint regulations - Agreement of signature/entry into force of the agreements regarding safety issues during construction in the ministerial talks - Narrowing the differences regarding the simultaneous commencement of landmine removal in the DMZ
3rd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Dec. 21, 2000	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Centering around the South's response to the issue regarding the concept of main enemy posed by the North. - The meeting ends after the South explained and delivered its proposed agreement to the North. The two sides decided to discuss the proposed agreement in ensuring talks
4th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Jan. 31, 2001	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Major details of the discussion: (proposed) Inter-Korean Agreement on Military Assurances - Designation and operation of the JAA - Mine removal in the DMZ, method of road & railway reconnection works, and the method of contact and communication between the military personnel in charge of the construction sites - Security on construction personnel & equipments and safety assurance issues

¹²⁰⁹ The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, *2008 Defense White Paper*, 330–335.

5th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Feb. 8, 2001	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Agreement on Military Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administration Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North * Signature/entry into force was delayed on the excuse of the concept of main enemy
6th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Sep. 14, 2002	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Adoption of the Military Assurance Agreement for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North → agreed to sign/exchange/come into force agreement through additional two rounds of talks (September 16/17)
7th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Sep. 16, 2002	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Confirmation and initial exchange of the text of the Military Assurance Agreement, and discussion of the procedures of the 7th Inter-Korean Military Working-Level Talks
8th Round of the inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Sep. 17, 2002	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Exchange and effectuation of the Agreement on Military Assurance for Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connection in South and North
9th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Oct. 3, 2002	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Exchange and discussion of the mutual construction plans by timeline and route diagrams for the reconstruction of railways and roads. • Issue to support of communication equipments
10th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Oct. 11, 2002	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Balanced construction works for inter-Korean railway & road reconnection and demining in DMZ
11th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Oct. 16, 2002	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Consultation over balanced construction works for inter-Korean railway and road reconnection in DMZ
12th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Oct. 25, 2002	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Discussion of matters regarding verification of balanced construction of road & railway construction, joint survey and communication line connection for the Donghae Line
13th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 13, 2002	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Discussion of matters regarding verification of balanced construction of road & railway construction, joint survey and communication line connection for the Donghae Line

14th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Dec. 23, 2002	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Consultations over the (proposed) makeshift road passage agreement regarding the Gyeongui Line and Donghae Line, and connection of the communication lines concerning the Donghae Line
15th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Jan. 27, 2003	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Adoption and effectuation of the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for passage of Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts
16th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	June 4, 2003	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Agreement on mutual visits to the construction sites for inspections (Number of personnel : 10 persons each for the east and west coast districts on June 11)
17th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Sep. 17, 2003	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Adoption and effectuation of the Supplementary Agreement on the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances for Passage of Makeshift Roads in the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts
18th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 14, 2003	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Expression of mutual positions on the proposed Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint Administration Area • Consultation of date for the contact between persons in charge of communication in relation to connection of communication lines of Donghae line
19th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 28, 2003	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Consultation over Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts
20 Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Dec. 23, 2003	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Exchange and effectuation of the Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint Administration Area in the East and West Coast Districts
1st Round of the Inter-Korean General Officer-level Talks	May 26, 2004	Mt. Geumgang	• Expression of mutual positions regarding measures to prevent accidental armed conflict in the West Sea and to stop propaganda activities and remove propaganda tools from the DMZ
2nd Round of the Inter-Korean General Officer-level Talks	June 3-4, 2004	Mt. Seorak	• Adoption and effectuation of the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ

21st Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	June 10-12, 2004	Gaeseong	• Adoption and effectuation of the Subsequent Agreement on the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval clashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ
22nd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	June 29-30, 2004	Paju	• Assessment regarding prevention of accidental naval clashes in the West Sea and first-stage propaganda apparatus removal
23rd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	July 5, 2004	Gaeseong	• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of first-stage propaganda apparatus removal, agreement to implement second-stage works. ROK, suggested improvement measures to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea
24th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	July 20, 2005	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of second-stage propaganda apparatus removal • Consultation over initiating third-stage propaganda apparatus removal (July25-Aug.13) • Agreement to setting up the communication liaison office to prevent accidental naval clashes in the West Sea (since August13) • Suggestion of the Supplementary Agreement Pertaining to Improvement Measures to Prevent Accidental Clashes in the West Sea
25th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Aug. 12, 2005	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Consultation over differences regarding the subjects of third-stage propaganda apparatus removal
26th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 3, 2005	Panmunjeom	• Agreement to discuss the Agenda for General Officer-level Talks and the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road Passage
27th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Feb. 3, 2006	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Agreement to convene the third round of the General-Officer level Talks • Agreement to discuss the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road Passage
3rd Round of the Inter-Korean General Officer-level Talks	Mar. 2-3, 2006	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• ROK, to make proposals on prevention of accidental clashes in the West Sea and establishment of Joint fishing area, and conclusion of the Military Assurance Agreement on Railway/Road Passage • North Korea, to bring up issues on re-establishing the West Sea Maritime Borderline

4th Round of the Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks	May 16-18, 2006	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• ROK, expression of the intention to discuss in the inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks on the basis of following two principles as regards Maritime Borderline in the West Sea 1. Respect/observe NLL as agreed in the Basic Agreement 2. Comprehensive implementation as for agreed items of military area in the Basic Agreement • North Korea, to deny insisting that re-establishing West Sea Maritime Borderline is the basic problem that must be resolved first.
28th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Oct. 2, 2006	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• North Korea, to protect against scattering leaflets and violation of East/West area transportation order • ROK, to raise military assurance measures for economic cooperation project and expansion of confidence-building
5th Round of the Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks	May 8-11, 2007	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Joint press release for the General Officer-level Talks. • Adopting of the Provisional Agreement on Military Assurances of Railroad Test Runs.
29th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Jun. 8, 2007	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Discussion about implementation of agreements from the joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer-level Talks.
30th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Jun. 10, 2007	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Discussion about implementation of agreements from the joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer-level Talks.
31st Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	July 16, 2007	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Discussion about implementation of agreements from the joint press release of the fifth round of the General Officer-level Talks.
6th Round of the Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks	July 24-26, 2007	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Discussed prevention of west sea clashes, establishment of joint fishing area, and military assurances to inter-Korean economic cooperation but ended with no progress.
32nd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 12, 2007	Panmunjeom Unification Pavilion	• Discussion about working-level issues on the second round of inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks.
33rd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 20, 2007	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Discussed working-level procedures yet to be agreed and fine-tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of the Defense Ministerial Talks.

34th Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Nov. 24, 2007	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Fine-tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of the Defense Ministerial Talks.
2nd Round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks	Nov. 27-29, 2007	Pyongyang Songjeon Pavilion	• Adoption of the Agreements from inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks to implement the Declaration for inter-Korean Development and Peaceful Prosperity, consisting of seven Sections and 21 Paragraphs.
35rd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Dec. 5, 2007	Panmunjeom Unification Pavillion	• Military Assurance Agreement on Railway Freight Transport between Munsan-Bongdong
7th Round of the Inter-Korean General Officer-level Talks	Dec. 12-14, 2007	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Adopted the Agreements on Military Assurances for Passage/Communication/Customs for Joint Administrative Area in East/West Area, but it failed to be implemented 1. Extending passage time (07:00-22:00) and guaranteeing passage everyday 2. Allowing wire/wireless communication and internet communication from 2008 3. Simplifying procedures to shorten passage time, etc. • Discussed the establishment of joint fishing area and peace zone but it ended with no progress due to contentions on location of joint fishing areas.
36rd Round of the Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks	Jan. 25, 2008	Panmunjeom House of Peace	• Discussion about railroad cargo transportation between Munsan and Bongdong

APPENDIX G. JOINT PRESS STATEMENT OF THE INTER-KOREAN DEFENSE MINISTERIAL TALKS¹²¹⁰

Talks between the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were held on Cheju Island in the South on September 25~26 to provide a military assurance for the implementation of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration adopted during the historic Inter-Korean Summit.

A delegation of five headed by Minister of Defense Cho Seong-tae of the Republic of Korea represented the South while a delegation of five headed by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il-chol of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the North in the talks.

In the talks, the two sides held the same view that since the adoption of the Joint Declaration various projects are being promoted in earnest to implement it and that proper military measures are needed to hasten the process. Based on this, the two sides agreed as follows:

1. Both sides shall do their utmost to implement the Joint Declaration made by the heads of the South and the North and actively cooperate with each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians.
2. Both sides held the same view that to reduce military tension on the Korean Peninsula and remove the threat of war by establishing a durable and stable peace is a matter of vital importance and agreed that they shall work together towards this end.
3. Both sides shall allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and materials into their respective sections of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the construction of a railway and a road that connects the South and the North, which is a pending issue between the South and the North, and guarantee their safety. The working-level officials from both sides shall meet in early October to discuss the details related to this.
4. The two sides will handle the problem of opening the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the areas around the railway and the road that connect the South and the North on the basis of the armistice treaty.

¹²¹⁰ Inter-Korean Document, "Joint Press Statement of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks," <http://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/> (accessed on February 20, 2009).

5. Both sides agreed to hold the second round of the talks at a location in the North in mid-November.

September 26, 2000

Cheju Island

APPENDIX H. SURVEY QUESTIONS ABOUT NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND THE SUNSHINE POLICY¹²¹¹

NORTH KOREAN THREAT	
THRTSK2	Please rate the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear weapon to South Korea. (0 = a very serious threat; 10 = not a threat)
TRNKNUKE3	To what extent will North Korean possession of nuclear weapons pose a threat to South Korean national interest? (0 = a very serious threat; 10 = not a threat)
TRNKSALE	To what extent will North Korea's sale of nuclear materials and weapons pose a threat to South Korean national interest? (0 = a very serious threat; 10 = not a threat)
PROJECTS	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "South Korea should suspend the Mount Geumgang tourism and the Gaesung industrial park projects." (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
UNSNCTN	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "South Korea should carry out the sanctions imposed by the United Nations." (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
SUPPORTUS	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "South Korea should support US military action to prevent North Korea from transferring nuclear materials or weapons to third parties." (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
DEVPNUKE	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons to counter North Korean nuclear weapons." (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
PSI4	Should South Korea participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative? (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
USNKPLCY4	To what extent do you support or oppose the policies the U.S. employs to eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons? (0 = strongly support; 10 = strongly oppose)
FEELNK2	How would you rate your feelings towards North Korea? (0 = dislike very much; 10 = like very much)
FEELKIM2	How would you rate your feelings towards North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-Il and the North Korean regime? (0 = dislike very much; 10 = like very much)
SPCOLLPS	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "Since the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime can lead to chaos in the Korean peninsula, South Korea should prevent regime collapse in North Korea." (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)

¹²¹¹ Appendix to "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea" by Chae Hae Sook and Steven Kim, Survey Questions used in the Analysis, <http://www.bw.edu/academics/pol/faculty/chae/appendix.pdf> (accessed on March 30, 2009)

SUNSHINE POLICY	
VIEWNK	Is North Korea a partner in inter-Korean détente or an ongoing military threat? (0 = an ongoing military threat; 10 = a partner in inter-Korean détente)
VIEWSP	What is your view regarding whether South Korea needs to change the Sunshine Policy in the future? (0 = abandon completely; 5 = status quo; 10 = pursue more vigorously)
SPCHANGE	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “Sunshine policy can lead to positive change in North Korea.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)
SPREUNFY	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The Sunshine Policy is absolutely necessary to insure that South Korea maintains control over the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)
SPPREVNT	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “Pursuing the Sunshine Policy is the only way South Korea can prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)
SPPEACE	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The Sunshine Policy will help in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)
SPTENSN	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The Sunshine Policy enables South and North Korea to reduce tension and avoid military conflict.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)
SPBOLSTR	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The Sunshine Policy only maintains the dictatorial regime in North Korea and heightens the threat posed by that regime.” (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
SPFAILUR	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “The fact that North Korea conducted a nuclear experiment means that the Sunshine Policy has been a failure.” (0 = strongly agree; 10 = strongly disagree)
SPWTOCON1	Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “South Korea should provide economic aid to North Korea without any preconditions.” (0 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree)

APPENDIX I. JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS IN BEIJING ON SEPTEMBER 19, 2005¹²¹²

The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexander Alekseyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this context, to the following:

1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory. The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented. The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

¹²¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," and U.S. Department of State, "Six-party Talks, Beijing China."

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations. The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.
3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.
4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".
6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

APPENDIX J. INITIAL ACTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT IN BEIJING ON FEBRUARY 13, 2007¹²¹³

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for action".

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.
3. The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The

¹²¹³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," and U.S. Department of State, "Six-party Talks, Beijing China."

U.S. will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase – which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant – economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

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APPENDIX K. PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE HEAD OF DELEGATION MEETING OF THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE SIX- PARTY TALKS IN BEIJING ON JULY 20, 2007¹²¹⁴

I. The Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing from 18 to 20 July 2007. Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States; and Mr. Vladimir Rakhmanin, Ambassador of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the meeting.

II. The Parties reviewed the work and progress since the First Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, expressed satisfaction with the constructive efforts made by all parties to advance the Six-Party Talks process, and welcomed that productive bilateral consultations and coordination were conducted to enhance their mutual trust and improve relations with each other.

III. For the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of relations between the countries concerned and lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia, the Six Parties held candid and practical discussions on the work during the period of the next phase and reached the following general consensus:

1. The Parties reiterated that they will earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 and the agreement of 13 February 2007.
2. The DPRK side reiterated that it will earnestly implement its commitments to a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities.
3. Economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will be provided to the DPRK.
4. All other parties undertook to fulfill their respective obligations as listed in the September 19 Joint Statement and February 13 agreement in line with the principle of "action for action".

¹²¹⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Press Communiqué of the Head of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, July 20, 2007."

IV. To implement the above-mentioned general consensus, the Parties decided to take the following steps:

1. Before the end of August, the Working Groups for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations, Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations, Economy and Energy Cooperation and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism will convene their respective meetings to discuss plans for the implementation of the general consensus.
2. In early September, the Parties will hold the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing to hear reports of all Working Groups and work out the roadmap for the implementation of the general consensus.
3. Following the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, the Parties will hold a ministerial meeting in Beijing as soon as possible to confirm and promote the implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement, the February 13 agreement and the general consensus, and explore ways and means to enhance security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

APPENDIX L. SECOND-PHASE ACTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT IN BEIJING ON OCTOBER 3, 2007¹²¹⁵

The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 27 to 30 September 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States, attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five Working Groups, confirmed the implementation of the initial actions provided for in the February 13 agreement, agreed to push forward the Six-Party Talks process in accordance with the consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Groups and reached agreement on second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement.

The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon will be completed by 31 December 2007. Specific measures recommended by the expert group will be adopted by heads of delegation in line with the principles of being acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe, verifiable, and consistent with international standards. At the request of the other Parties, the United

¹²¹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement"; U.S. Department of State, "Six Parties October 3, 2007 Agreement on 'Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement'"; and U.S. Department of State, "Six-party Talks -- Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement."

States will lead disablement activities and provide the initial funding for those activities. As a first step, the U.S. side will lead the expert group to the DPRK within the next two weeks to prepare for disablement.

2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007.

3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.

II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant Countries

1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their bilateral relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship. The two sides will increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-U.S. Relations.

2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize their relations expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. The DPRK and Japan committed themselves to taking specific actions toward this end through intensive consultations between them.

III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK

In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 tons of HFO already delivered) will be provided to the DPRK. Specific modalities will be finalized through discussion by the Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation.

IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting

The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropriate time.

The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting prior to the Ministerial Meeting to discuss the agenda for the Meeting.

**APPENDIX M. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES DISCUSSED
AT THE 27TH CONGRESS OF CPSU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION)¹²¹⁶**

A. In the Military Sphere:

1. renunciation by the nuclear powers of war—both nuclear and conventional—against each other or against their countries;
2. prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on the destruction of chemical weapons, and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation;
3. a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable sufficiency;
4. disbandment of military alliances, and, as a stage toward this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones;
5. balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets.

B. In the Political Sphere:

1. strict respect in international practice for the right of each people to choose the way and forms of its development independently;
2. a just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts;
3. elaboration of a set of measures aimed at building confidence between states and the creation of effective guarantees against attack from without and for inviolability of their frontiers;
4. elaboration of effective methods of preventing international terrorism, including those ensuring the safety of international land, air and sea communications.

C. In the Economic Sphere:

1. exclusion of all forms of discrimination from international practice; renunciation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions if this is not directly envisaged in the recommendations of the world community;
2. joint quests for ways of a just settlement of the problem of debts;
3. establishment of a new world economic order guaranteeing equal economic security to all countries;
4. elaboration of principles for utilizing part of the funds released as a result of a reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community, of developing nations in the first place;
5. the pooling of efforts in exploring and making peaceful use of outer space and in resolving global problems on which the destinies of civilization depend.

¹²¹⁶ Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 231.

D. In the Humanitarian Sphere:

1. cooperation in the dissemination of the ideas of peace, disarmament, and international security; greater flow of general objective information and broader contact between peoples for the purpose of learning about one another; reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and concord in relations between them;
2. extirpation of genocide, apartheid, advocacy of fascism and every other form of racial, national or religious exclusiveness, and also of discrimination against people on this basis;
3. extension—while respecting the laws of each country—of international cooperation in the implementation of the political, social and personal rights of people;
4. solution in a humane and positive spirit to questions related to the reuniting of families, marriage, and the promotion of contacts between people and between organizations;
5. strengthening of and the quests for new forms of cooperation in culture, art, science, education, and medicine.

**APPENDIX N. AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR ON
NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED
BALLISTIC MISSILES 27 I.L.M. 1200 (1988)¹²¹⁷**

Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988, Entered into Force May 31, 1988

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident, believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, and the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no less than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter "ICBM") or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").

Article II

A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM shall be valid for four days counting from the launch date indicated in such a notification. In case of postponement of the launch date within the indicated four days, or cancellation of the launch, no notification thereof shall be required.

Article III

1. For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the notification shall indicate the area from which the launch is planned to take place.

¹²¹⁷ *Nuclearfiles.org*, "Agreement between the United States."

2. For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the notification shall indicate the general area from which the missile will be launched. Such notification shall indicate either the quadrant within the ocean (that is, the ninety-degree sector encompassing approximately one-fourth of the area of the ocean) or the body of water (for example, sea or bay) from which the launch is planned to take place.

3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification shall indicate the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area or areas of the reentry vehicles. Such an area shall be specified either by indicating the geographic coordinates of the boundary points of the area, or by indicating the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The size of the impact area shall be determined by the notifying Party at its discretion.

Article IV

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

Article V

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

Done at Moscow on May 31, 1988, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America: George P. Shultz

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic: Eduard A. Shevardnadze

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