Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach
Abstract
America is embarking on a new way of war in Afghanistan and elsewhere in which battlefield restraint, cultural subtleties, and armed nation-building enterprises matter more than destruction of the enemy. These innovations represent a doctrinal break from how the United States historically waged war in its most heroic chapters. The new doctrine relies heavily on the use of indigenous surrogate troops, the goodwill of the local people, societal reconstruction, and the host government's legitimacy, policies, and conduct. These underpinnings of the Indirect Approach, it must be emphasized, often lie beyond Washington's complete control or even limited influence. By working through -- and being greatly reliant on -- the agency of others, the recently evolved American strategy strives to defeat insurgencies and to deny terrorists safe havens from which to launch destructive attacks against the American people and their interests. Even exponents of the Indirect Approach, however, acknowledge that the strategy can never substitute as an alternative for the United States to ensure its own defense. Yet America cannot directly intervene into every planetary ungoverned space to eliminate terrorist nests from mounting strikes against the United States. The costs in blood, treasure, and moral authority are too steep.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA519331
Entities
People
- Thomas H. Henriksen
Organizations
- Joint Special Operations University