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The Spectrum of Warfare Challenge

Irregular ***Hybrid*** ***Conventional***



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JCOA Journal Survey

The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is currently running a survey to determine the relevance and impact of the Journal to our readers. The survey questions involve the timeliness of subject areas and their relevance to those who receive the Journal. The Journal Survey is available on the JCOA Homepage on the JFCOM Portal website, or at the external link below. At the external site, you can also access all previous editions of the JCOA Journal in a pdf format that is available for downloading.

Journal Survey link: *<http://jecs.jfcom.mil/jcoa/>*



Message From the Director

BG Anthony G. Crutchfield, USA
Director, JCOA

In February 2009, General James Mattis, Commander United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), stated that the US military must transform to a hybrid force capable of both conventional and irregular warfare (IW). He also stated that the US will fight future wars within hybrid conditions and that IW must become a core competency for US forces. This Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Journal presents articles that provide insights and lessons into hybrid warfare (HW). As used here, HW refers to the use of a combination of actions and reactions that incorporate aspects of both conventional and irregular warfare by both state and non-state combatants to achieve their goals. HW can include insurgent forces as well as nation states. Currently, there is no official Department of Defense (DOD) definition for HW, but its use in the military and public arena has become widespread.

Likewise, according to Joint Pub 1, IW is “marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” IW can incorporate insurgency, terrorism, organized criminal activity, and information operations to influence the local populace. As presented in the USJFCOM seminar on HW in February 2008, “IW has emerged as a major and pervasive form of



warfare, where a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force, which often represents the nation’s established regime.”

Hybrid warfare, then, represents the ability of a military force to accommodate and shift between the demands of conventional and irregular warfare during a conflict.

Included in this Journal is an article on the *Second Lebanon War – Three Perspectives*; an article from the Asymmetric Warfare Group on the *Russia – Georgia conflict*; an article on *Multinational Force - Iraq Strategic Communications* lessons learned; and an article on the Sadr City engagement. We have also included two articles from the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs dealing with Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The final two articles are an historical comparison between the conflicts in Iraq and Viet Nam, and an article discussing the need for modern US soldiers to be diplomats as well as soldiers.

My hope is that this issue of the JCOA Journal will prove to be of great benefit to you in the field and those who are planning for future contingencies.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Anthony G. Crutchfield".

Anthony G. Crutchfield
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis



JCOA UPDATE

The United States Joint Forces Command 2009 Lessons Learned Conference, hosted by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), was held 17–20 March 2009, in Newport News, Virginia. The conference welcomed 169 participants—including 29 United States (US) and multinational general/flag officers (GO/FO) and US Senior Executive Service (SES) members—from the US and eight partner nations. The purpose of the conference was to capture lessons from recent complex joint/combined operations around the world, and to support near-and long-term improvement of joint capabilities. The four day event was organized into plenary and working group (WG) sessions with the WGs divided into four focus areas derived from the US National Defense Strategy: Joint Adaptation to Irregular Warfare (JAIW), Joint Warfighting (JWFX), Homeland Defense (HLD), and Security Cooperation (TSC). To encourage candid discussion of the issues, the WG discussions were considered “not for attribution”; therefore, the conference report does not list the identities of presenters or participants in any of the four groups. JCOA provided a senior US military lead (O-6), a senior civilian analyst, and two recorders for each working group to facilitate the discussions and document the findings and recommendations. The WG met for five sessions over the first two days of the conference and for a back-brief production and preparation session on the third day. On the final day of the conference, each working group presented their group’s findings and recommendations to all conference participants, including the GO/FO and SES members who were in attendance. The final conference report summarizes the findings and way ahead strategy for integrating the findings into the appropriate organizations and institutions.

We have completed the Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study (CAI) and have executed a very robust roll out plan that includes 4-star and AMB level engagements. Requested by GEN Petraeus, this Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State

(DOS) combined study captures the innovations, best practices, successes, and challenges of the 2007 and 2008 comprehensive counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq, with emphasis on the civil-military cooperation from the strategic to tactical levels. The resultant Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) changes are in various stages of development. Next up in support of Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and requested by GEN Odierno, is an Information Operations (IO) study to identify, capture, and disseminate successes, lessons learned, and remaining challenges at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. We will be conducting Continental US (CONUS) and Outside CONUS (OCONUS) data collection and interviews from May through June 2009, with findings presented by the end of August 2009 and a written report produced later.

As the nation’s priority shifts to Afghanistan, so will JCOA’s. The IO study could be the last major study we do in Iraq as the shift has already begun. The new JCOA strategy is rapidly being developed and executed accordingly.

“... we’ll see a lot of conventional, but there will also be irregular warfare there. Hybrid is where we take the same geographical area at the same time and mix these together. We can not go in with a purely conventional mindset or a purely counterinsurgency mindset – we are going to have to mix our responses.”

Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

Mr. Bruce Beville
Deputy Director JCOA

Contents

The Second Lebanon War: Three Perspectives	1
Russian-Republic of Georgia Conflict	9
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008	14
“One T-Wall at a Time”: Battle of Phase Line Gold, Sadr City, Iraq, March – May 2008	25
COIN Revisited: Lessons of the classical literature on counterinsurgency and its applicability to the Afghan hybrid insurgency	48
“Flipping the COIN”: Unity of Effort and Special Operations Forces	70
Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam	80
“Soldier-Diplomat” - Lessons from Captain George Pickett and The Pig War	83
JCOA Products List	92
Points of Contact	101

JCOA Journal Staff:

BG Anthony G. Crutchfield, US Army, *Director JCOA*
Mr. Alan D. Preisser, *Editor and Layout Designer*
JWFC Graphics, *Cover Design*

757-203-7317
757-203-7497

anthony.crutchfield@jfcom.mil
alan.preisser@jfcom.mil



The Second Lebanon War: Three Perspectives

Major Tom Nelson, USA
JCOA Analyst

Since the 1970s, the Israel-Lebanon border has been a source of continuing conflict. The Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel resulted in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) responding with equal force. Only rarely did events escalate beyond measured responses.¹ In order to secure the restive border, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982, withdrawing in 2000 after eighteen years of occupation.

In 2006, the world watched as Israel responded to the 12 July killing of three IDF soldiers and the kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers by fighters of the Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hezbollah. Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to use military force and diplomacy to achieve the goals set out by Prime Minister Olmert in his 17 July address to the Knesset:

- The return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev
- Fulfillment of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1559²
- A complete cease fire
- Deployment of the Lebanese army into all of southern Lebanon
- Expulsion of Hezbollah from the area³

When Israel did not achieve these goals through an aggressive air campaign and a subsequent ground invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began to question Israel's military capabilities. As one officer stated:

Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a reputation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors until last year.⁴

What happened? Why? And what are the implications for future conflicts?

Lessons Learned

What follows is an attempt to view the Second Lebanon War through three lenses---those of the United States, Israel, and Hezbollah. Generally, the American view of the lessons learned and the failure of the IDF to achieve the goals delineated by Prime Minister Olmert is the same as the Israeli view, with a few exceptions. The American view is primarily informed by Israeli sources, and tends to be largely focused on performance at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Lessons range from the failure to identify achievable strategic goals by the civilian leadership, to the failure of infantry and armor to properly maneuver in a saturated environment.

The Israeli analysis informs and concurs with many of these same observations, but also looks a layer deeper. Their impressions of the Second Lebanon War are often viewed through the prism of Israeli society as a whole. Their analysis tends to be more emotional and introspective, and takes into account the implications of current failure extrapolated into future conflict. The Winograd Commission spent a significant amount of time characterizing these failings:

We chose to begin the discussion of the weaknesses we found with a discussion of the degree to which the IDF's values are observed and implemented because one of the main facts we discovered throughout the war was that many of the flaws and failings in the IDF's performance did not result from the fact that operational norms were not good or appropriate, but because the norms the IDF itself was supposed to assimilate and pursue were not observed.⁵

It is noteworthy that the commission dedicated considerable time to discussing the failure of the IDF to adhere to its core values as a reflection of Israeli society at large.

The Hezbollah perspective of the war is less well known to us. Because of limited sources of data and lack of American access to this organization, we base much of our analysis on leader Hassan Nasrallah's public comments to the media, as well as Hezbollah's actions since the war. From these, we can infer some of their key lessons learned.

Lessons Learned - Israeli and American Perspectives

Many of the major strategic, operational, and tactical lessons from the Second Lebanon War, as agreed upon by Israelis and Americans alike, are a product of Israel's willingness to openly and publicly discuss its failures and subsequent insights. The discussion of these failings below illuminates several key lessons.

The Israeli military was unprepared for the Second Lebanon War, a high intensity conflict (HIC). Years of counterinsurgency and security operations (low intensity conflict, or LIC) in the West Bank and Gaza prior to the 2005 withdrawal left an Army that was ill-prepared for maneuver warfare. US Army Captain Daniel Helmer discusses this issue:

Throughout the [2006] war, the toll taken on readiness by occupation duty in the West Bank and Gaza was evident. Infantry, artillery, and armor coordination, once the focal point of Israeli doctrine, was significantly degraded. Tactical expertise and innovation were almost entirely absent all along the border, where Hezbollah had spent six years preparing for a defense in depth, IDF forces launched frontal attacks. The IDF reserves, on which the IDF relies heavily, had not received maneuver training since the inception of the Intifada in 2000 - they were too busy with occupation duty. Even the active duty forces had not completed a major maneuver training operation in more than a year.⁶

In consonance with the Israeli military's focus on LIC operations, readiness and training for maneuver warfare had fallen short. Funding for high levels of readiness across active and Reserve forces had fallen, and commitment of forces to realistic exercises had been allowed to atrophy. Training, including challenging command post exercises, small unit and combined arms training, Reserve call ups, and large scale maneuvers, was not conducted.⁷ Prior to the 2006 conflict some organizations had not completed a large scale maneuver exercise since 2000.⁸

The focus on LIC, and the subsequent degradation of the IDF's ability to conduct maneuver warfare, reveals a host of tactical lessons concerning anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), cover and concealment, the use of tunnels, improvised explosive devices (IED), swarming tactics, and other tactics that were employed by Hezbollah on the battlefield. Additionally, changes in Israeli logistics doctrine and organization that were made in support of relatively stationary brigades conducting security operations reduced the IDF's ability to sustain itself on the battlefield.

The government of Israel failed to define clear, achievable, strategic level goals that could be translated into operational objectives by the military. Anthony Cordesman characterized this as a failing even before the war began, stating that there was not a clear linkage between the heads of state, "diplomatic actions, war fighting, and focus on conflict termination."⁹

During wartime, simplicity is critical in analyzing the military mission, defining objectives, creating plans, and communicating orders. There were weaknesses in communicating the Israeli commanders' intent to lower echelon leaders-and there were overly-intellectualized concepts for planning that complicated and confused Israeli planners (both at the strategic and operational levels). Many American analysts have blamed this on an overemphasis or reliance on effects based operations (EBO). Israeli critics and the *Winograd Report* have blamed multiple sources but not EBO specifically. Regardless, orders, commands, and intent were not clearly articulated in a concise manner from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical levels.

The use of airpower in conflict is often critical; however, its role, effects, and overall impact in asymmetric warfare should not be overestimated. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is credited in the *Winograd Report* and by many analysts for destroying half of Hezbollah's long range rocket capability and much of its re-supply infrastructure.¹⁰ However, the IAF was not effective in eliminating the Katyusha rockets that had an overwhelmingly strategic impact on the Israeli population.¹¹ Some analysts have referred to the Israeli overestimation of airpower's effects against Lebanese Hezbollah as "fighting another military's last war," referring to the successful North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign in Kosovo in 1999.¹² Lieutenant General Halutz, the Israeli Chief of Staff (and an Air Force pilot), was sharply criticized for his misperceptions of

airpower's role in resolving asymmetric conflict, and is widely believed to have overestimated its capabilities and effects. Halutz resigned his position in January 2007 under heavy criticism for his "personal conduct and the Army's performance during the 34 day war."¹³ In the end,

Airpower did not achieve Israel's strategic objectives-the two soldiers [were not] returned and Hezbollah was still launching 100 rockets a day into Israel up until the tenuous UN-sponsored cease-fire ...¹⁴

There were significant Israeli intelligence failures regarding the capabilities of the enemy. The IDF underestimated the short-range Qassam and Katyusha rocket threat and its strategic impact upon the Israeli population.¹⁵ As Ralph Peters wrote, "Although capable of identifying key fixed or substantial mobile targets, Israeli intelligence missed sites; underestimated the amount of weaponry available to Hezbollah; [and] missed some late-generation weapons entirely." Intelligence that was available did not make it to the ground commanders who needed it. In some cases, arcane and stove-piped intelligence functions prevented intelligence from reaching the tactical fight.¹⁶

Joint operations and synchronization of combined arms capabilities were shown to be critical for success. There were significant differences and challenges between the IDF ground force commander and the air force commander. The lack of synergy was clearly evident in the early hours of the campaign. "The consequences of having no viable campaign plan and inadequate joint training were quick to appear and punishing in their impact."¹⁷ This lesson reinforced the need for "jointness" and highlighted the problems that can arise when operations are not coordinated and planned in a joint environment.

Israel fell victim to a misplaced faith in high technology. Cordesman describes this overreliance on technology when he argues that the government and the military cannot rely solely on technological solutions to asymmetric warfare.¹⁸ Avi Kober, an Israeli strategic studies analyst, wrote about the over-reliance on high technology, including sophisticated airpower and network-centric warfare:

... the Israeli case is representative of both Western democratic and high-technology countries waging asymmetrical wars. It is a warning sign against

the over-reliance on technology in general and on airpower or network-centric warfare in particular, or the illusion that thanks to technology such countries can rely on 'small but smart' militaries, and that technology minimizes fatalities, eliminates friction, decreases the dependence on logistics, breaks the enemy's will, and can achieve quick victory by itself. RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs] conceptions may be elegant and sophisticated, but they cannot replace simple military notions that have been held by military thinkers for centuries, such as the identification of and operation against centers of gravity-not just creating 'effects'; the role played by ground forces in battlefield success; the importance of inflicting physical damage on the enemy-not just 'burning its consciousness'; and the fact that the enemy does not abide by the rules one wishes to dictate.¹⁹

American and Israeli analysts agree that there was an exaggerated expectation that technology would reduce manpower requirements on the ground. In an asymmetric fight, the situational awareness provided by a human being on the ground often outweighs the capabilities of technology. At the same time, it is important to leverage the many useful technologies available to support the warfighter.

A number of American analysts concur with Israeli conclusions that there was an "excessive concern regarding IDF casualties."²⁰ The overwhelming need to maintain public support in the face of potentially large numbers of Israeli casualties drove some leaders and commanders to become overly hesitant in closing with the enemy. Hezbollah, on the other hand, was not concerned with taking large numbers of casualties as long as it did not equate to defeat; partially as a result, the casualties on the Hezbollah side were much higher. The hesitancy on the part of commanders on the Israeli side contributed to their ineffectiveness. The lessons derived from this experience reveal that clear communication of operational and strategic level objectives, along with a sober analysis of risk, must be undertaken by leaders at the start of conflict.

The ineffective use of strategic communications was a major failing of the Israeli government. At the beginning of the conflict, many nations felt the Israeli response to Hezbollah was justified; however, as time progressed and Hezbollah successfully manipulated print, broadcast, and online media, the world increasingly saw images of civilian casualties (both doctored and real) and the tide of public opinion turned. There

was a widespread sentiment regarding Israel's "disproportionate response," and Israel was not successful in turning this tide.²¹ This hard-won lesson on the use of strategic communications reinforced the need for the state to have clearly articulated, achievable objectives that can be communicated to the world via the media. Additionally, nations who consider themselves morally and ethically bound by standards of evidence in reporting must begin an open dialogue on the best ways to counter the manipulation of world opinion by media not bound by the same standards.

The above Israeli lessons from the Second Lebanon War of 2006 are generally agreed upon by American analysts as well. Additionally, American pundits have many views on the implications of that war for future conflict. Highlights of two of these views are summarized below:

- Clarity and simplicity are essential to military thought and communications
 - There is a need to broaden understanding of insurgencies
 - Militaries must be capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict
 - Joint operations remain essential
 - Leaders need training, too
 - It is important not to overreact to failure²²
- o The "Long War" is complex – its threats are broad and deep
 - o Joint warfare is essential for success
 - o The war causes us to need to rethink force transformation
 - o Short-term tactical "fixes" are case specific and largely field-driven
 - o New forms of situational awareness are required
 - o New types of force protection are needed
 - o It is time to reassess use of ISR, missiles/rockets, and targeting²³

The implications described by military thinkers range from tactical to strategic level concerns. Despite differences, however, analysts agree that this conflict has serious implications for the future – and it is imperative that we learn and adapt now.

Additional Israeli Perceptions

The Israelis, with the threat on their border, have significant interest in the above implications for future

conflict. But their analysis of the war often contains an element of national concern that goes beyond that described above.

Israeli writings and analysis of the Second Lebanon War often touch on something deeper and more intangible than military success or failure. They speak of the strategic miscalculations that senior leaders made in handling the threat on the northern border, using language that conveys the sense that Israeli society didn't think it would go to war in the ways it had previously. There was no sense of overwhelming confidence that one might associate with Israel's history of defeating Arab armies up to 2006. There appeared to be a real change in Israeli thinking. This, in turn, affected the IDF from the lowest echelons to the senior leadership.

There was a hesitancy that eroded the fighting spirit of the IDF. "Some [soldiers] may have been eroded even before the war, during the long years of hope that there would be no 'real' war anymore and as a result of social processes that are deeply rooted in the Western and Israeli societies, which have seeped into the Army."²⁴ The Winograd Commission's final report reflected this deep rooted change when it used the IDF's Values as a framework for discussing the weaknesses in the IDF.²⁵

The Israelis determined that there was a failure of the IDF to adhere to the mission and fight at all costs to achieve that mission. They recognized heroic actions of key individuals; however, as a whole, the IDF was not seen as embodying the warrior spirit. Examples were given of hesitant commanders, and the halting and stalling of formations for many reasons. This tied into the fear of excess casualties, unclear orders, commanders' lack of understanding of these orders, lack of maneuver, and a general lack of taking an aggressive fight to the enemy. Judge Winograd summarizes:

The belief in the justness of the war – which existed here, too – is not enough. It is equally important to believe that the war and the victory are important. Toward that end, it is imperative that there should be the faith that the political and military echelons are operating in a manner that is commensurate with the importance of the war and of victory in it.²⁶

Even as late as March 2008, almost two years after the war, there is evidence of a continued focus on this issue by the media. News reports describing the lessons learned from the 2006 conflict, as applied during recent operations in Gaza, essentially describe the heroism

and gallantry of soldiers and officers in combat, giving the reader a sense that the IDF is gaining back its warrior ethos that it had lost prior to 2006.²⁷

Israelis have identified a lack of discipline in the military as a source of weakness. This contributed to the loss of a fighting culture in the military; however, it had broader implications to include weaknesses in operational security (OPSEC), dedication to mission assignments, quality of professionalism, qualification in training, fire discipline, and dedication to the overall fight. Neglecting to observe certain operational instructions led to sloppy work, cost lives, and was a contributing factor in the abduction of the two IDF soldiers on 12 July 2006.²⁸

The Winograd Commission also had very sharp criticism for the lack of leadership in the Israeli military. Commanders operating on static bases with robust fixed systems, over the many years spent securing the West Bank and Gaza, became comfortable leading from the rear. In 2006, criticism fell on commanders who, in many cases, stayed in Israeli territory in robust command centers while their forces moved forward into Lebanon. This was determined to be detrimental to the fight and caused the IDF to stall. The Winograd Commission reinforced the idea of an army with leaders that lead from the front:

The command message delivered to the fighters when their commanders are with them in the field, endangering themselves together with them, serving as role models, and encouraging them to carry on is a central part of the ability to sustain a quality and resolute army.²⁹

Israel found significant flaws in its Reserve activation plan. A number of factors contributed to the slow activation of Reserve forces in the summer of 2006, including a failure by senior leadership to properly recognize the nature of the conflict/war, budget cuts that had significantly reduced the level of Reserve readiness and training, and an overall unclear operational plan for activation and integration of Reserve forces into the active fight. Each of these lessons deserves study as an independent topic, but all hint at an underlying theme present throughout the Israeli lessons – Israeli society and the IDF were softened by years of occupation and security missions. The psychological change in Israeli society and the IDF had significant impact on their readiness.

The final paragraph of the *Winograd Report* of Chapter 11, “Conclusions on the IDF,” summarizes the situation well:

We have already noted that some of the flawed norms that we found in the IDF have permeated it from the Israel society--or perhaps from the Western society as a whole. This is understandable and even natural in an army founded on general conscription. Nonetheless, it is important for us to note that the IDF plays a critical role in the Israeli society precisely on this point. It is essential to take action to improve the norms and values among all the parts of the Israeli society. Yet the IDF is in charge of our security, and we entrust it with our well being and that of our sons. The IDF, furthermore, has the tools to assimilate and implement discipline that are absent in the society at large, and it enjoys a lot of resources, trust, and prestige. It embodies an important value in the Israeli society. It should utilize all these to ensure that the IDF values that are important to national security will filter into the society through those who serve in it, like the pillar of fire that leads the camp. Israel cannot afford to embrace the culture of ‘trust me’ or ‘everything will be okay’ in any context. However, in the IDF, this battle must be certain and firm, because our lives depend on it.³⁰

Exacerbating the psychological and social impacts on the IDF described above, a “perfect storm” was brewing within the leadership of the Israeli government. “Unlike Israel’s first Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion who, once in charge of the prestate Jewish community’s defense, a year before the establishment of the State of Israel, took a six-week ‘self seminar’ to study the defense challenges and crystallize a defense conception, neither Olmert nor Peretz did anything similar.”³¹ In fact, while Vice Premier in 2005, Olmert said, “We are tired of fighting; we are tired of being courageous; we are tired of winning; we are tired of defeating our enemies.”³² As Kober has written:

The 2006 case was unique in the sense that a Prime Minister and a Defense Minister having no military background (for the Defense Minister, who was in charge of the most complex ministry, it was the first ministerial position), coincided with a Chief of Staff who had been a pilot and had only poor experience in running inter-arm and inter-service operations. Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer put it blatantly: ‘One day the PM woke up and found out he had become Prime Minister...

Defense matters are alien to him. Defense Minister [Peretz] wished to be Minister of the Treasury, but accepted [Olmert's] invitation to serve as Defense Minister. And the Chief of Staff was not fit for the job from the start. Is it reasonable that in a state like Israel, which is still conducting existential wars, the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister would be without any military background?' Ben-Eliezer asked rhetorically.³³

Thus, there were internal factors, both from changes in Israeli society and from inexperienced political leadership, which significantly influenced the IDF's performance during the Second Lebanon War.

Hezbollah Perspective

The lessons from the summer of 2006 may be very different for Hezbollah than for Israel. Much of Hezbollah's views and perceptions of the conflict remains unknown to us. Certainly, and at a minimum, they emerged from the conflict with a stronger sense of self-worth and confidence, being the only Middle East actor to stand up to the strength of the Israeli military and declare victory.

As described previously, Hezbollah's use of print, broadcast, and online media to shape world opinion was especially effective. We continue to see robust media campaigns from Hezbollah as they promulgate their messages worldwide. Clearly, all sides recognize the power of this forum to wage war on public opinion, the international community, and the government's will.

Long and short range rockets were determined to be the strategic weapon of choice by Hezbollah. Today, Hamas attempts to apply this Hezbollah lesson in Gaza. Hamas' rocket attacks on Sderot and Ashkelon have placed the Israeli Prime Minister in a precarious position as he tries to deal with that threat. Recent news reports suggest that Hezbollah has reconstituted its long range missile capability, and is using the lessons from the 2006 conflict to cover and better conceal the missiles and rockets from Israeli forces. This is a clear indication of the strategic importance that Hezbollah places on this weapon.

On 27 August 2006, Nasrallah admitted that he did not anticipate the level of Israel's response to the 12 July kidnappings.³⁴ This, and the recent news reporting that Hezbollah is concerned about Israel's response to a

possible retaliation strike for the Mugniya assassination (and, perhaps causally, the fact that the retaliation strike has not occurred), may indicate that Hezbollah has learned that they must more carefully measure their actions against their potential effects.

The war also emboldened Nasrallah to continue his message that Hezbollah is the defender of Lebanon. He stated in 2006, "I am carrying my weapons to defend the country which Israel wants to gobble up, and whose waters Israel wants to plunder ... Today, Hezbollah, along with its friends and allies, is the first defender of genuine sovereignty, genuine independence, and genuine freedom—and I add to them national dignity, honor, and pride."³⁵ This highlights a possibility that Nasrallah, with his reinforced sense of purpose, may take on a greater role as an ally of sponsoring organizations.

It is likely that there are many lessons from the Second Lebanon War that Hezbollah will apply to any future conflict with Israel. Analysts continue to watch Hezbollah's actions to try to gauge their intent. There is little doubt, however, that Hezbollah gained status in the world as a contender to be dealt with, and it is assumed that they will use this position of strength.

Summary

In summary, the IDF and Israeli government failures during the Second Lebanon War can be attributed to any number of causes. Lack of clearly defined and achievable objectives by a militarily-inexperienced civilian leadership, lack of recognition as to the type of conflict and the capabilities of the enemy, over-reliance on airpower and other high technology warfare, failure to counter the strategic effects of Hezbollah's use of the world media, atrophy of training and readiness for maneuver warfare, failure to call up Reserve forces, and overall intelligence failures characterize the loss. The implications for future conflict are enormous, and require a reassessment of the ways in which asymmetric warfare is conducted.

Endnotes:

¹ Moore, Sharon MAJ, "Road to War," *Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal*, Volume X, Issue I, Joint War fighting Center, Suffolk, VA, page 13.

² The UN Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2 September 2004 required, in part, the restoration of "integrity, unity,

and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon," the expulsion of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon, the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and supported the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory.

³ Glenn, Russell, "All Glory is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War," RAND National Defense Research Institute report prepared for USJFCOM, November 2007, page 4.

⁴ Zagdanski, Jonathan, CPT, "Round 2 in Lebanon: How the IDF Focused Exclusively on COIN and Lost the Ability to Fight Maneuver War," *Infantry*, September-October 2007, page 32.

⁵ *Final Winograd Report*, Chapter II, "Conclusions on IDF," 30 January 2008, accessed at Open Source Center online.

⁶ Helmer, Daniel CPT, "Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction," *Armor*, January/February 2007, page 9.

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About the Author:

MAJ Thomas Nelson is an Operations Analyst assigned to the US Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA). He was commissioned in the United States Army in 1993 after graduating from the Virginia Military Institute with a Bachelor's Degree in History and Minor in International Relations. His assignments have included tours in Panama, Turkey, Colorado, Washington, and Italy. His most recent operational assignment was with the 173rd Airborne Brigade where he also completed a one year tour to Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan. He received a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Over the last two years with JCOA, MAJ Nelson has spent most of his time researching Middle East related operations and more specifically Levant related national security and military related issues.



Area of Conflict



Hassan Nasrallah

Map of
Lebanon

Russian-Republic of Georgia Conflict

Asymmetric Warfare Group

The purpose of this report is to describe Asymmetric Warfare Group observations regarding the recent conflict between Russia, South Ossetian separatists, and the Republic of Georgia (RoG). The research was conducted in-country, during a post-conflict assessment from 20 Sep 08 to 15 Oct 08. The field team conducted key leader engagements with RoG land forces, US Embassy, and US Army personnel to collect effective enemy and friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and identify capability gaps between Russian force capabilities and current US practices.

Summary

The recent conflict between Russia and the Republic of Georgia presented an opportunity to view the growing trend of hybrid warfare, and offered a stark example of the challenges tactical leaders face in understanding the complexities of today's contemporary operating environment (COE) and how that understanding affects tactical decisions. Although Russia used Soviet-era doctrine to mass and overwhelm its opponent, they also employed deceptive practices as a means to circumvent compliance with international treaties and laws.

In South Ossetia, the Russians conducted effective combined arms operations, using standard Soviet practices of attacking in column and employing overwhelming (air, artillery, mechanized, special operations (SOF)) force and numbers to rapidly achieve objectives. They leveraged employments of a Chechen battalion more skilled in irregular warfare, SOF-trained paramilitary forces, and prepositioned peacekeeping forces conducting reconnaissance operations prior to the start of open hostilities to gain advantages. Conventional operations did not deviate from former tactics, but the employment of a battalion of former insurgents and paramilitary forces demonstrated the ability to integrate additional capabilities with conventional operations.

Russian forces operating in Georgia used more asymmetric approaches, employing computer network attack (CNA), targeting economic objectives such as factories and ports, and setting fire to tourist and lumber producing areas. The CNA complemented the conventional attack by degrading command and control (C2), and the destruction of economic targets will hinder Georgia's ability to recover.

Russian use of information operations (IO) appears to be greatly improved over past operations. It dominated battlefield and regional IO, and Russian operations seem to indicate an awareness of international scrutiny, which may have tempered operations inside Georgia proper.

Russian jamming of both communications and data links appears to have been effective, although Georgian technical capabilities contributed to their degradation. Russian unmanned aerial systems proved capable of disrupting global positioning system (GPS)-enabled communications; however, the overall effectiveness of its capability could not be verified.

Analysis of the Russian-Republic of Georgia Conflict

Historical Background: The recent conflict in the Republic of Georgia, and more specifically, the autonomous region of South Ossetia, has its history deeply entrenched with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In 1989 South Ossetia declared itself separate from Georgia, leading to several months of armed conflict. As the USSR broke up in 1991, Georgia gained its independence and was admitted to the United Nations as a sovereign state within its previous Soviet-era borders. The Republic of Georgia felt that the attempted breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were internal Georgian issues and, from 1990-1992, Georgia and South Ossetia continued to fight during which Georgia abolished their autonomous status. Russia has continued to support South Ossetia with "technical advisors" for the South Ossetian militia, and more than a dozen members of the current South Ossetian separatist government, to include the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Interior Minister, are from Russia. In June of 1992, the Georgian, Russian, and South Ossetian leaders signed an armistice to create a tripartite peacekeeping force to stabilize the region. Tensions continued as South Ossetia drafted its own constitution (1993), elected its first president (1996), and in 2002 asked to be recognized as an independent republic and absorbed into Russia. In 2006, South Ossetia overwhelmingly voted to split with Georgia. The Prime Minister of Georgia felt this was a direct provocation of war, heavily influenced by Russia.

By the summer of 2008, tensions were continuing to mount between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia.

- 3 July: The head of the Georgian-backed administration of South Ossetia narrowly escapes an assassination attempt.
- 4 July: South Ossetia begins a general mobilization of its militia.
- 8 July: Russian aircraft violate Georgian airspace by flying over South Ossetia.
- 1 August: Two improvised explosive devices (IED) explode in Georgian-controlled territory injuring five Georgian policemen. A firefight breaks out the following day killing six South Ossetians.
- 4 August: Hundreds of women and children are evacuated to Russia.
- 5 August: Russia issues a statement that it will defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia (during the previous decade, almost all South Ossetian residents have been given Russian passports).
- 6 August: Georgia and South Ossetia accuse each other of direct attacks on villages in the region.

The Conflict: 7-12 August 2008: Early in morning of 7 August 2008, the Georgian land forces received the order to move to the vicinity of Gori and prepare for hostilities with South Ossetian military forces that were reportedly attacking RoG peacekeepers. RoG land forces felt confident in the composition,

disposition, and location of the South Ossetian paramilitary forces and other insurgents supporting them (to include Cossacks and Chechens). In addition, there existed the possibility of a confrontation with Russian peacekeepers in the Tskhinvali region but they would only be engaged if they fired upon Georgian forces. The Georgians did not expect the entrance of a Russian Army group into South Ossetia. Tskhinvali, the capital city of South Ossetia, would become the center of gravity for the conflict.

The RoG land forces were initially arrayed as follows:

- One brigade was responsible for maintaining order and securing the towns west of Tskhinvali, followed closely by units that would push northwest to Java.
- A brigade was responsible for maintaining order and securing the towns east and northeast of Tskhinvali, followed closely by a battalion out of another brigade.
- A separate infantry battalion would initially be tasked to attack into the western center of Tskhinvali with armor and SOF support.

The majority of 1st Brigade was still in Iraq with the remaining elements of the 11th IN Battalion conducting peacekeeping operations within South Ossetia.



Figure 1 - Republic of Georgia

Tactical Operations

Russia used effective combined arms tactics to achieve their objectives. Russian forces used fires, indirect and aerial, to overwhelm Georgian units rather than rely on ground-based fire and maneuver to seize terrain. Indirect fires and air attack inflicted significant casualties on Georgian forces. Use of separatist, non-conventional, and peacekeeping units enabled Russian operations, by providing information and reconnaissance.

In direct fire engagements, Georgian units fared better, largely due to improvements in armor weapon systems. The armor battalion had two companies of T-72 tanks that were upgraded with enhanced capabilities. These upgrades gave them an initial advantage over the Russian armor, and the technical advantage became apparent during several night engagements.

On the evening of 9 August, numerous Russian armor convoys were coming out of the mountains northwest of Tskhinvali and identified by a reconnaissance company. The RoG tanks engaged and a commander stated

that the convoy never returned fire and acted as if was coming under artillery fire.

The RoG tanks continued to have success in several engagements that evening. As Russian/paramilitary infantry and vehicles attempted to attack west out of Tskhinvali, the RoG tanks and BMPs [Soviet mechanized infantry vehicle] were able to quickly destroy those elements (in a hunter-killer combination). However, by 0200 on 10 August, the RoG armor was ordered back to a defensive line as the unit was retreating.

The swift defeat of the Georgian ground brigades showed the vulnerability of a dispersed ground force with limited air defense and ineffective command and control.

Peacekeeping Status

In contravention to established international peacekeeping principles, an agreement existed that not only allowed the Georgians and South Ossetians, but also Russia (with a vested interest in South Ossetia), to serve as peacekeepers in the contested region of South

Ossetia. In preparation for the conflict, Georgian rules of engagement (ROE) initially recognized the neutrality of Russian peacekeepers – they were not the enemy and were not to be engaged. However, prior to Russian deployment into South Ossetia, Georgian soldiers cited numerous events where they allege that Russian peacekeepers engaged them without provocation and often with lethal consequences. Additionally, they allege Russia used the peacekeeping force to facilitate the invasion by their general purpose forces by providing targeting information and logistical support.




Figure 2 – Military Operations in South Ossetia

Paramilitary/Irregular Forces

In South Ossetia, Russia employed (contracted) ex-militants who fought against Russian troops in the first and/or second Chechen Wars (1994-96). At the end of the Chechen War, these militants surrendered their weapons, received amnesty, and subsequently swore allegiance to Russia. They were formed into an ethnic Chechen battalion and are outside any control of the leaders of Chechen Republic. Employment of the Chechen battalion has many advantages when viewed in the context of Russia's long desire to annex South Ossetia: legendary as ruthless, brutal fighters, their reputation no doubt instilled fear and intimidation on the populace and thus ensured compliance.

South Ossetian paramilitary forces¹ used a mix of conventional and irregular tactics against the RoG forces. They used several deceptive practices against RoG forces with success. Initially, they were the lead elements facing the conventional brigades of the RoG land forces. As the Russian Army entered Tskhinvali, their role became a supporting element for the Russians.

Paramilitary forces had limited capacity to perform combat operations: engagements were generally limited to hit and run tactics. These tactics were effectively executed within their capabilities. They served as harassing forces and picked engagements based on survivability. Use of civilian clothes enabled them to blend in with the local populace as well as conduct reconnaissance.

Russian Information Operations (IO)

As defined by US doctrine for information operations, the Russians achieved information superiority to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, enabling more effective decision-making and faster execution while managing local, regional, and international perceptions. Their efforts denied the Republic of Georgia the ability to accurately detect and respond to the full spectrum of Russian information operations. Russian Forces controlled the overriding narrative of the engagement providing the Russian forces the ability to gain both tactical and operational advantage over the Republic of Georgia. This included the use of deception, psychological operations, computer network attack, electronic warfare, and operational security. Even with relatively outdated equipment and tactics, Russia's information operations, combined with the effective use of irregular

forces, provided a potent advantage that facilitated a rapid military success.

Russia deftly used embedded reporters and gave nightly debriefings from front line commanders to shape the narrative. With control of the majority of the news outlets, they quickly exploited western military equipment captured from the battlefield to state that the Republic of Georgia was a surrogate for the US to test Russia. Prime Minister Putin was seen pinning medals on Russian soldiers in North Ossetia, and Russia was the first to deliver humanitarian aid with pictures and videos of soldiers handing out watermelons and apples to locals.

Once the military conflict started, Russia used military forces to complete its objectives within South Ossetia, using an indiscriminant application of combat power to destroy both military and non-military targets. They displayed little regard for collateral damage or casualties as a means of eliminating any local resistance to Russian intervention. Russia also conducted operations in the Republic of Georgia proper, but with a clear understanding of what could cause international condemnation. Russian units operated with restraint and attacked targets that crippled the economy and instilled fear while minimizing casualties.

Russian Tactics

Soviet-era military tactics still endure. In general, Russia was prepared for the conflict in South Ossetia. Russia was able to alert their forces in advance, and some reports suggest Russian forces were staging in the Roki tunnel as early as 7 August. Once hostilities began, Russia quickly established air superiority and began striking military ground targets. This was followed by Russian armored columns attacking south through the Roki tunnel towards the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Russian artillery provided supporting fires as required.

Russian armor tactics were simplistic but effective. Though initially terrain restricted, Russian armored forces remained in column formations throughout the conflict. They fought from the lead elements, always continuing to press forward. They showed no attempt to stop, establish support by fire positions, maneuver elements to flank, etc. Overall, Russian combat operations against Georgian forces were assessed as good. Once they shifted to the defense, they chose

defensible terrain, selecting positions that allowed for good observation and control of key terrain. Russian positions were often set back off of the major supply routes and, where possible, elevated.

Russian Tactical Movement

Russian combat forces mainly moved in armored vehicles and stayed in column formation, conducting frontal attacks with their lead element with few attempts to maneuver. The Russian Army used T-72 tanks, BMP 1/2 and BTR armored vehicles, but evidently no T-80/90 tanks or BMP 3 armored vehicles.

RoG commanders expressed surprise that Russian forces did not seize key high ground to over watch and support by fire the movement of their column formations. However, it is likely that speed of advance was more critical than precise execution of textbook tactics given Russian success with frontal attacks. Russian forces used transport helicopters to conduct offensive operations as well. Several RoG soldiers identified the use of Mi-8 HIP aircraft being used to insert air assault forces.

Deception Operations

Russian deception operations created enough ambiguity in the Georgian decision makers to prompt troop movements that favored the Russian campaign. The ambiguity surrounding the intention to attack the Georgian capitol prompted President Saakashvili to order the military to withdraw from South Ossetia and immediately return to Tbilisi. He felt that Russia's intent was to attack the capitol and remove his administration.

Russian Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, and Acquisition (RSTA) Operations

Russian SOF most likely conducted covert operations (sabotage, espionage, or terrorism) in Georgia. Several reports specified seeing helicopters dropping off small groups of soldiers in "black uniforms" (thought to be SOF) forward of known areas under Russian control. The most likely purpose of these operations was to degrade Georgia's industrial military base. Though short in duration, these operations were widespread and specifically targeted the military

facilities and equipment in Senaki, Gori, and the port city of Poti. Russia used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) extensively; however, their complete and precise purposes are uncertain.

Russian Counter-RSTA Operations

The Russians actively denied Georgia's UAV capability prior to the conflict. RoG had four UAVs, three of which were shot down prior to the August conflict. During the conflict the UAV commander attempted to fly the remaining RoG UAV, but Russian attack aircraft identified their site and immediately bombed the location. The continued presence of Russian aircraft precluded additional attempts before they were ordered to hide the remaining UAV to prevent its destruction. The RoG UAV commander attempted to deploy their remaining UAV system on several other occasions with limited success.

Russian Sustainment Operations

Russian forces provided some logistical support to separatist paramilitary forces. Several RoG leaders stated that Russian SOF and peacekeepers were providing this type of logistical support to include the following:

- A Cossack militia element operated out of the Russian peacekeeping compound at the southern entrance to Tskhinvali.
- Russian peacekeepers allowed Russian SOF to use the bases to conduct resupply of ammo, food, and shelter.
- Russian peacekeepers used their ambulance to pick up wounded conventional force Russians.

Endnote:

¹ The term, "South Ossetian paramilitary forces" is a term that is loosely applied to the following elements: 1) South Ossetian militia made up of local civilians and 2) Northern Caucasus mercenaries (Cossacks) that are probably trained and funded by Spetznatz (Russian SOF). The RoG SOF identifies them as "bandit formations" under the separatist authorities' control.

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Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008

Mr. Bradford H. Baylor
Project Lead
USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis

BACKGROUND

In April 2008, at the request of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Chief of Staff, the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Deputy Director for Strategic Communication undertook a data collection effort to document MNF-I strategic communication best practices and their DOTMLPF [Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities] implications. That effort culminated in a brief that was disseminated to appropriate customers within the Department of Defense (DOD). The USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) reviewed the brief and felt that the recent successes in MNF-I strategic communications needed to be further documented and shared with other combatant commands and joint task forces. This JCOA paper therefore builds upon the foundation laid by the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and presents a further look at the key elements of this good news story.

Based upon an increased understanding of the importance of strategic communication, MNF-I changed its approach in early 2007. The combination of knowledgeable, experienced senior leadership and the right mix of unique resources created an evolutionary change in the ways in which MNF-I viewed the role that strategic communication played in a complex irregular warfare environment. This report highlights MNF-I's capability and success in leveraging messages, facilitating media analysis and assessment, and creating a synergistic team of diverse and experienced personnel. Although the study confirmed that great strides have been made

in bringing strategic communication language into joint doctrine, there remains work to be done in the development of a comprehensive, interdependent framework of policy and doctrine.

As with all JCOA studies, our primary goal is to document operational experiences, capture lessons learned, and return the findings to commanders and their staffs as quickly as possible. These findings can be used by joint force commanders and other stakeholders to adjust operations and processes as needed.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategic communication is an integral part of current war fighting and reconstruction efforts in the Middle East, and in particular is woven into the fabric that is MNF-I. The MNF-I strategic communication initiatives and processes work in concert to support each of its lines of operation (LOO): political, diplomatic, economic, and security. On a daily basis, MNF-I communications proactively promote Iraqi political, economic, and security progress; refute inaccurate and misleading media coverage; and help the Government of Iraq develop strategic communication capabilities for itself.

In 2007, MNF-I instituted sweeping changes in its approach to and conduct of strategic communication. This study attempts to capture lessons and best practices documenting the significant improvements that emerged from the institution of these changes. Four key findings emerged from the study analysis:

1. The development of coherent, aligned, and responsive messages was significantly improved.

2. An aggressive strategic communication analysis and assessment process enabled success.
3. The right mix and placement of knowledgeable, experienced, and trained personnel greatly accelerated the success of MNF-I strategic communication efforts.
4. Although DOD strategic communication policy and doctrine is evolving, the joint community must continue to refine its understanding of the impact of strategic communication on joint operations and capture this understanding in joint doctrine.

The MNF-I Commander's focus on strategic communication and its critical role in supporting MNF-I LOOs translated into both a comprehensive and coherent campaign plan, and a much more attuned and educated staff to execute that plan. The increased focus ultimately resulted in significantly improved, aligned, and responsive messages to a myriad of audiences whose understanding of those messages was critical to progress overall.

In mid-2007, the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) was revised and designated strategic communication a critical enabler of operations. To ensure desired effects were achieved, a flexible, responsive, and methodical approach was needed to monitor, measure, analyze, and assess strategic communication. MNF-I asked for an in-depth review by an on-site inspection team in order to establish a comprehensive, well-integrated communications strategy and operational framework to better support the overarching MNF-I Campaign Plan. Accepting the team's recommendations, MNF-I expended significant energy and resources to enhance its strategic communication assessment process and capability. The products developed from the assessment efforts helped maintain a higher level of situational awareness, and provided direct support to MNF-I and US Mission-Iraq (USM-I) senior leaders for daily decision-making.

The number one concern raised by the 2007 inspection team was that MNF-I lacked the necessary personnel with communications-related knowledge, skills, and experience. Based on this concern, the MNF-I Commander immediately

requested that the US Navy Chief of Information (CHINFO), a one-star flag officer, lead development of the new MNF-I communications initiatives. This flag officer had been a member of the 2007 inspection team and was intimately familiar with the challenges associated with the environment and the necessary actions required to catapult the division forward. The new, experienced leadership and the addition of other personnel with communications-related skill sets, including analysis and assessment skills, directly contributed to the MNF-I strategic communication improvements observed over the past year.

The importance of strategic communication has only recently been fully recognized within DOD, and therefore relevant policy and doctrine are still evolving. Doctrine does exist for each of the major military capabilities that contribute to strategic communication (public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations), however, there is minimal doctrine that expands upon and describes the integration and synchronization of these capabilities and their potential impact on joint operations. Many of the recent strategic communication activities and efforts, both successes and failures, have shed light on potential organizational constructs, processes, and technology-related solutions that can assist commanders in developing strategic communication programs. These advances must be captured in policy and doctrine.

STUDY HISTORY

In the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2006), the USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) and other observers identified a critical void in strategic communication and its supporting capabilities. An overarching communication strategy, dedicated communication resources, and a recognized executive authority were all missing. The opinion at the time was that these problems—coupled with many other issues—significantly undermined the overall effectiveness of US government efforts in Iraq.

In 2007, leadership focus on the role of strategic communication and the application of its principles within MNF-I led to significant improvements. In May 2007, MNF-I asked for an in-depth review of its strategic communication practices by an on-site inspection team in order to establish a comprehensive, well-integrated communications strategy and operational framework to better support the overarching MNF-I Campaign Plan. The inspection team consisted of the deputy public affairs officers from each Service, the CHINFO, DOD's senior military visual information officer, and USJFCOM's Deputy Director for Strategic Communication. This team of senior public affairs officers recommended more than 30 specific changes. MNF-I leadership accepted and incorporated most of the recommendations into its operations during the June 2007 to August 2007 time frame.¹ The 2007 inspection galvanized thought on strategic communication, and supported the application of additional resources to the organization's communication activities.

In February 2008, as a result of the improvements being observed by MNF-I leadership, the MNF-I Chief of Staff requested that USJFCOM help them identify MNF-I strategic communication best practices and to consider potential DOTMLPF implications. In April 2008, a study team consisting of the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and a Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) team chief deployed to Iraq for two weeks. The team observed MNF-I staff operations on a daily basis and collected documents for review. In addition, the team conducted one-on-one interviews with 32 people working in the MNF-I Strategic Effects Communication Division (renamed MNF-I CJ9 Strategic Communication Division in August 2008) in areas of information operations, intelligence, assessments, visual information, and public affairs. The interviews also included discussions with the MNF-I Commanding General (CG) and Chief of Staff, as well as one US Embassy representative. Upon completion of the data collection effort, the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication developed an MNF-I Communication Division best practices

brief and shared those best practices and DOTMLPF implications to a wide range of DOD customers.

JCOA reviewed the brief and felt that the recent successes in MNF-I strategic communication needed to be further documented and shared with other combatant commands and joint task forces. As a result, this JCOA paper builds upon the foundation laid by the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and presents a further look at the key elements of this good news story.

STUDY ASSUMPTIONS

Strategic communication is described in a multitude of ways by different segments of the US government and partner organizations. Despite disagreement on a definition even within DOD, there is now a doctrinal definition that depicts strategic communication as:

“Focused US government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”²

The 2008 strategic communication study team approached their review of MNF-I with this definition in mind.

The study team used three critical assumptions to frame their interviews and analysis of findings. The assumptions were based on observations and opinions developed from media coverage of OIF activities, review of internal DOD documents, and conversation with MNF-I Strategic Effects Communication Division personnel.

The first study team assumption was that positive changes had taken place in the information environment. According to the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication, “The US [and] the Coalition were absolutely making a difference and having an impact with getting their word out. Images were coming out that we wanted released. Information was coming out

in a very timely way that we wanted to release. We were breaking new ground regularly with using the adversary's words against him...and the adversary's actions against him...supported by evidence."

The second assumption of the study team was that the MNF-I CG was personally committed to strategic communication as an integral part of his leadership and operations. This assumption was based on the important role that strategic communication had in the MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan. It was also based upon the increased CG focus on strategic communication in his daily battle update assessments.

The third assumption was that Iraqi government officials was taking a more active approach to their public speaking roles. This assumption was based on knowledge that personnel from the prime minister's office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Interior were participating in news events, whereas previously they were simply present and did not take on speaking roles.

MNF-I STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT

In order to understand the context of this study, it is important to briefly describe the communication environment within which MNF-I operated. There were three dominant themes that characterized this environment.

First, MNF-I operated within an extremely complex irregular warfare, counterinsurgency environment that included a myriad of good, bad, and neutral players. These players comprised a wide mix of political, religious, and tribal groups; regional and international actors; al-Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM); and other violent militias and insurgents.

Second, the environment included an enemy, AQAM, which actively waged communication warfare using advanced global technologies. AQAM considered winning the war of ideas to be a precondition for victory in Jihad.³ As explained

by Ayman al-Zawahiri: "More than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media...we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and mind of our *ummah*." The overarching purpose of AQAM's strategic communication efforts, therefore, was to increase the number of recruits willing to directly engage in violent acts, as well as garner additional general support for their cause. This enemy's approach to strategic communication was that its actions were the message, espousing a mindset of, "What I do is what I say." Often, the messages were built on exploitation of religious and cultural themes that resonated with the targeted populace.⁴

And third, the environment included advances in technology made over the last two decades that led to a revolution in media capabilities. The viral nature of electronic media, coupled with the growing proliferation of electronic communication devices, meant that almost every action or operation that could be witnessed could also be recorded, distributed, manipulated, and distorted. Individual actions were amplified. In military situations, small, tactical actions could be viewed globally and take on strategic significance.⁵

The characterizations mentioned above, combined with a predominantly hostile Iraqi and Pan-Arab media, and an International/Western media that was focused primarily on security and political failures, created an extremely challenging strategic communication environment. The situation demanded that people directly involved in MNF-I and USM-I leadership roles clearly understand the ways in which strategic communication could support decision-making and the achievement of campaign goals and objectives.

CRITICAL FINDINGS OF MNF-I STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Coherent Message Development, Message Alignment, and Responsiveness

As described in David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, it is critical that a counterinsur-

gency effort have a coherent message or “counter cause” that is more acceptable to the primary impacted populace than the insurgent’s cause.⁶ The OIF JCP developed by MNF-I and USM-I was consistent with that thinking. It included a coherent, comprehensive strategic communication plan, whose sole purpose was to support the MNF-I political, economic, diplomatic, and security LOOs. As described earlier, the development of strategic communication messages in the MNF-I operating environment was a complicated process. The strategic communication plan therefore included multiple tasks, themes, and messages across a spectrum of public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations for each specific population segment (for example, Sunni, Kurd, Shi’a, AQAM, coalition, etc). The plan served as the foundation that allowed MNF-I and USM-I to improve communication activities in order to reinforce message alignment across the large, diverse stakeholder environment.

It is clear that bad news will happen during war. As the MNF-I Commander, General David Petraeus, said on many occasions during daily operational update meetings, “Even if you put lipstick on a pig, it’s still a pig.” The commander’s philosophy was to be first with the truth. What does this mean? The guidance was two-fold. First, continually develop accurate messages aligned with the MNF-I strategic communication plan for use in speaking opportunities—and aggressively pursue the incorporation of these accurate messages into the Western, Iraqi, and Pan-Arab media outlets. Second, emphasize the need for consistency and persistence in communicating through multiple tools and venues. Portions of the commander’s guidance are highlighted below:

Be first with the truth. Get accurate information of significant activities to the chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don’t put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we’ve learned and how we’ll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let

*facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies’ bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.*⁸

Fight the information war relentlessly. Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.⁸

The strategic communication study team observed that the MNF-I CG took personal interest in and responsibility for MNF-I strategic communication. The commander provided his intent during the daily battle meeting and twice weekly at the Strategic Effects Communication Division meetings. With this, the team found that the commander willingly accepted a higher level of risk in order to ensure timely release of information. The Strategic Communication Division developed daily battle update assessment (BUA) slides to not only inform the staff on the current media environment, but more importantly, to prompt discussion and obtain guidance from the CG. This process provided direct and instantaneous feedback to all senior leadership, and developed opportunities to reinforce the messaging with other MNF-I staff and partners.

According to the former MNF-I Analysis and Assessment Branch chief, all MNF-I senior leaders were required to attend the daily updates or review the published notes from the updates. This requirement helped ensure that all those who might be interviewed by the media, participate in a press conference, or engage in another venue, could speak on the same topics and carry the same message.⁹

With its ability and authority to release information rapidly, MNF-I closely coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and focused on US media needs and production schedules. This cooperation supported the MNF-I Media Operations Center (MOC), Office of the Secretary of Defense media briefings, and

continually generated an expanded pool of military speakers on key operational topics. The MOC was a core component of the media relations process and was designed to foster real-time news monitoring and translation capabilities associated with the release of information, as well as monitoring the news coverage across print, television, radio, and web-based outlets. A challenge for the MOC, as noted by the MNF-I Communication Division, was the capability to maintain 24/7 operations with senior-level duty officers. Additionally, media translation capabilities continued to be problematic.


The close interaction among MNF-I partners stimulated message alignment. MNF-I emphasized an integrated, decentralized, and proactive approach to key leader engagement amongst MNF-I, USM-I, and major subordinate commands. This approach was used to engage with US government agency partners including the US Embassy, Department of State, and others. For example, the US Ambassador to Iraq and the MNF-I Commander enjoyed a close working relationship which permeated the two organizations' communications divisions. The MNF-I Communications Division assigned liaison officers to the USM-I Public Affairs team where the members shared planning, execution, and assessment resources. In addition, MNF-I supported host nation leaders from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and the prime minister's office in order to help them build their own communications initiatives. For the host nation relationships, US liaison officers provided communications support through common language, interpretation, culture, and experiences that facilitated building long-term relationships and shared understanding of issues. With this, MNF-I actively facilitated what it called "key leader engagements" to build relationships with local Iraqi leaders and coalition military members. These activities reinforced the value of aligning communication messages among partners as a way to develop, pursue, and sustain local and regional projects that advanced stability.

An underlying premise behind the commander's directive to "be first with the truth" and "fight the

information war relentlessly" was to ultimately improve responsiveness on issues and incidents, and beat the enemy to headlines in order to preempt rumors. The guidance helped overcome the always present institutional resistance to release bad news and avoid simply promoting a drumbeat of good news stories. From the study team's observations, a critical validation of the commander's directive was that there was no sign of attempts to suppress or spin stories, and the staff appeared to take a proactive position with information release on a broad spectrum of operational activities. The MOC provided immediate actionable information through real time monitoring, translation, and connection to operating forces. The communications team aggressively engaged media outlets for corrections and clarifications several times a day.

Information, including visual information products and storyboards, was given to media representatives in an expedited way. The staff invested significant resources and effort to continuously challenge enemy disinformation campaigns and to turn the disinformation against them. From 2007 to 2008, the MNF-I Strategic Communication Division emphasized two main practices to combat misinformation and disinformation. First, the communications team used an expanded media monitoring process to rapidly identify erroneous media coverage. Their proactive approach enabled rapid contact with media outlets for accurate, real time information. The analysis and assessment branch reported that the communications team was able to reduce the time it took to address erroneous information with a given media outlet by four hours. The response time went from 5.2 hours in September 2007 to 1.2 hours in March 2008. Second, the communications team aggressively conducted news conferences and prepared news releases for broad distribution to Western, Iraqi, and Pan-Arab media outlets. A challenge they continued to have, according to the assessment and analysis branch, was that the Pan-Arab outlets were not always open to making corrections and clarifications about information. Despite this obstacle, the analysis and assessment branch reported overall noticeable improvement between September 2007 and March 2008.

Another key element of the MNF-I Communication Division's ability to be first with the truth and fight the information war relentlessly was the Combined Press Information Center (CPIC). The MOC's rapid response was anchored by the CPIC's persistent support to and engagement with Western and Pan Arab media. If the MOC was a clearinghouse for the real time release of cleared information, the CPIC was the one-stop shop for support to journalists. Collocated with American Forces Network-Iraq, and often providing mutual support, the CPIC provided a large press briefing facility with simultaneous translation capability and satellite uplink, support to embedded journalists to include transportation and accommodations, and the media credentialing center. CPIC personnel also supported an auxiliary studio in the embassy annex, provided media escort within the International Zone and to media events throughout Iraq, and supervised an additional team of Arabic media monitors which captured Arabic newspaper and radio coverage. Together, these elements of the communication division provided the CG with a full spectrum of strategic communication tools and capabilities.



**Photos of
MNF-I Media
Operations
Center**



Aggressive Strategic Communication Analysis and Assessment Process

“The biggest requirement is to see how facts on the ground, reality, and media portrayal are aligned for the LOO. If one is misaligned, then things quickly fall out of balance for the LOO.” – Analysis and Assessment Branch Chief, MNF-I¹⁰

Within the communication division, a dedicated analysis and assessment branch implemented new methods and processes in order to provide MNF-I and USM-I senior leaders continuous feedback on the impact and effectiveness of specific strategic communication activities. The depth of qualitative and quantitative research allowed for products that increased situational awareness and directly supported the senior leaders in their daily decision-making.

MNF-I worked closely with the USM-I Public Affairs section and other elements to conduct and analyze a variety of data. The former analysis and assessment branch chief reported that the MNF-I Communication Division “partnered operations research analysts, media analysts, and cultural experts to create innovative methods and practices to provide USM-I and MNF-I senior leaders with timely media situational awareness.” This partnership instituted assessment methods used to measure the extent to which strategic communication efforts were achieving desired effects across seven main areas: an understanding of the Iraqi and Pan-Arab media; media penetration of key themes; alignment of key messages; Iraqi perceptions; prevalence of misinformation and disinformation in media stories; resonance of news conferences, key themes, and messages; and effect of embedded reporters. A brief summary of each of these areas is included below:

Iraqi and Pan-Arab media. This assessment sought to gain a better understanding of the primary sources from which the Iraqi populace obtained their news. The purpose was to understand the medium itself, and to determine the presence or absence of bias towards a particular audience. Media sources were categorized as pro-Government of Iraq (GOI), pro-Shia, pro-Sunni, pro-Kurd, anti-coalition,

or “no known bias.” With this, a database was created of more than 160 different Iraqi and Pan-Arab media sources and, by May 2008, contained over 15,000 references. This searchable database allowed the MNF-I and USM-I organizations an archival capability to discern trends, key themes, and messaging.

Media and key themes. This effort involved the categorization and analysis of media stories linked to the primary themes of political, economic, diplomatic, and security. This analysis allowed MNF-I and partners to assess and share information on broad trends over time in Iraqi, Pan-Arab, and Western media coverage. A main benefit for working in partnership with various agencies for the monitoring, analysis, and assessment of media coverage was the reduction in duplication of efforts. For example, MNF-I reported that after streamlining the way in which various media outlets were monitored by specific agencies, they experienced a 41 percent reduction in redundancy of effort from May 2007 to May 2008.

Alignment of key messages. This effort involved the daily capture, categorization, and sharing of key quotes from MNF-I, USM-I, and GOI senior leaders. On a weekly basis, the most significant key quotes were consolidated and disseminated to help frame events and highlight specific key messages that should be reinforced in media engagements. The assessment and analysis branch also kept a historical record of these key quotes and messages to make it easier to identify major changes or shifts in messaging.

Iraqi perceptions. This effort included a monthly analysis of the key themes and messages that appeared in Western, Iraqi, and Pan-Arab media; comparing those messages to facts on the ground; and examining Iraqi perceptions from polls conducted by outside agencies. Although polling in Iraq was problematic, and the resulting data often not reliable, the trends over time were important to provide perspective. Additionally, the conduct of specific focus groups of Iraqi citizens allowed for insights not provided by polling data.

Managing erroneous stories. This effort assessed the two primary methods used by the communication division to diminish the effect and proliferation of erroneous stories transmitted by the media. The first method used the real time monitoring capability of the MOC to rapidly identify an erroneous story, and then to quickly contact the source and provide clarifying information. The second method involved using timely and effective press releases from MNF-I. These press releases provided major media outlets with notification of breaking, newsworthy events that included factual information vetted through operational channels. These efforts significantly reduced the amount of time an erroneous story resonated within the media, and additionally helped to curtail misinformation and disinformation opportunities. For example, the branch reported a reduction in the length of time erroneous stories remained in media outlets from September 2007 to March 2008 – the average time went from 3.2 days of coverage to 2.1 days of coverage.

Resonance of key themes and messages. This effort involved a monthly analysis of MNF-I press conferences, press releases, battlefield circulations, interviews, and roundtables to determine which themes and messages resonated in the media. The focus of the analysis helped determine if MNF-I’s desired themes and messages were effective with target audiences.

Effect of embedded reporters. A significant number of embedded reporters continued to provide a “boots on the ground” perspective of OIF. For example, in March 2008 there were 42 embedded reporters who produced 68 stories in major Western media and 892 stories in regional Western media. MNF-I believed that, for the most part, embedded reporters gave readers an excellent first hand perspective and a strong dose of realism of what military members experience and feel.

The methods described above provided MNF-I leadership with better situational awareness and unbiased, accurate information for decision

making. These strategic communication analysis and assessment initiatives, which existed at no other location within DOD, are believed worthy of further study and evaluation.

Knowledgeable, Experienced, Multidisciplinary Staff

As discussed above, the number one concern raised by the 2007 on-site inspection team was that MNF-I personnel lacked the necessary levels of communications-related knowledge, skills, and experience. Based on this concern, the MNF-I CG immediately requested that the CHINFO, a one-star flag officer, lead development of the new MNF-I communications initiatives. Because CHINFO had been part of the 2007 inspection team, he was intimately familiar with the challenges associated with the environment and the actions required to catapult the division forward. This new, experienced leadership, combined with the recommendations from the 2007 on-site inspection team, accelerated the MNF-I Strategic Effects Communication Division transformation. The division grew to comprise experts from public affairs, visual information, intelligence, special operations, and assessment.

MNF-I determined that deliberate identification and placement of qualified personnel were imperative if the overarching effort was to succeed. Key experienced officers were selected to lead each of the strategic effects communication division areas, to include a Navy O-6 intelligence officer connected to the intelligence network, an Air Force O-6 with special operations forces experience, and an Army operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) O-6 as lead for the assessments branch. These officers' prior experiences and connections significantly improved situational awareness and allowed the communication division to be much more proactive in terms of public affairs and media release activities. There was a better understanding of the potential strategic communication impact that specific tactical operations could produce. Communication division personnel noted that message alignment, responsiveness, and overall coordination between tactical operations and strategic communication activities was much

improved. As a result, great strides were made in using assessment products of strategic communication activities to support the MNF-I LOOs and leadership decision-making.

In addition to regular staffing positions, MNF-I used specific contract support for unique skills and expertise. For example, contract support enabled media monitoring and assessment, key leader engagement activities, message penetration, and message alignment. Contractors served in a number of positions, including interpreters, polling experts, and political campaign experts.

The study team considered all of the aforementioned personnel initiatives primary reasons for the recent surge (2007-2008) in MNF-I strategic communication success.

Evolving Department of Defense Policy and Doctrine

During the last decade, strategic communication has become a prominent topic of discussion and research. Significant attention began with the Defense Science Board (DSB) report on *Managed Information Dissemination* in October 2001, followed by two additional reports by the DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication, dated September 2004 and January 2008. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and associated Strategic Communication Roadmap documented specific recommendations. Each of these documents challenged DOD thinking on its communications approaches and called for renewal of focus.

MNF-I success in the area of strategic communication provided DOD with applicable processes to help policy and doctrine evolve. During 2007 and 2008, several important documents were developed with MNF-I as an example or model. These include the *Principles of Strategic Communication*¹¹ and the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication*.¹² Another emerging document is the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* which is scheduled for release soon. These documents reflect DOD's doctrinal

definition of strategic communication; they focus on the operational level with some reference to the national-strategic level.

The *Principles of Strategic Communication*, disseminated in August 2008, and promoted by the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, provides key descriptors to guide joint commanders and their staffs in establishing or refining a more strategic approach to their communications program. The principles are:

- Leadership-Driven – Leaders must lead communications processes
- Credible – Appreciate that perception of truthfulness and respect is vital
- Understanding – Embrace deep comprehension of others
- Dialogue – Encourage multifaceted exchange of ideas
- Pervasive – Acknowledge every action sends a message
- Unity of Effort – Integrate and coordinate
- Results-Based – Encourage actions to tie to desired end state
- Responsive – Be attuned to the right audience, the message, time, and place
- Continuous – Facilitate analysis, planning, execution, and assessment¹³

From a broad perspective, strategic communication is a relatively new concept and DOD policy and joint doctrine are at the beginning stages of development and understanding. The pace of this development has recently increased with the aforementioned publication of the *Principles of Strategic Communication*, the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication*, and the upcoming *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*. While doctrine does exist for each of the major military capabilities that contribute to strategic communication (public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations), there is minimal joint doctrine that describes the integration and synchronization of these capabilities and their significant impact on joint operations. Many of the recent strategic communication activities and efforts, both successes and failures, have

shed light on potential organizational constructs, processes, and technology-related solutions that can assist commanders in developing strategic communication programs. These advances must be captured in policy and doctrine.

CONCLUSION

In early 2007, MNF-I changed its understanding of strategic communication and proactively implemented a multifaceted program addressing the unique communication needs of its operational environment. The Strategic Effects Communication Division steered its activities based on the imperative to embrace and respond to the situational contexts in which MNF-I found itself. The MNF-I Commander took ownership and ultimate responsibility for strategic communications activities, and challenged his staff to synchronize messages and activities in order to support the objectives and goals of each and every campaign LOO.

Critical factors enabling success within the unique communication environment included the combination of multidisciplinary, knowledgeable, and experienced senior leaders and operators, in conjunction with a strong assessment and analysis function. These elements of the strategic communication effort reflect an evolving definition and understanding of what strategic communication is and is not, and ways to engage at the joint operational level. For MNF-I, this meant confronting subtle, as well as obvious, challenges associated with its dynamic political, economic, and military operational environment.

Although significant progress has been made in the overall communications assessment process, the ability to capture accurate and timely data on the level of influence that MNF-I and USM-I communication efforts have on Iraqi population perceptions and attitudes remains a difficult undertaking. Because numerous factors influence perception, it is arguably an impossible task to correlate communications related activity to actions taken or attitudes influenced. These factors compound the complexity of the strategic

communication environment and MNF-I efforts to enhance its confidence in the best ways to apply resources to its multifaceted communications program.

The study findings indicate that skill sets and experience are vital for a program's success. MNF-I made progress in matching skills and experience with particular communications related jobs; however, more work is needed to detail requirements, positions, and desired skills and experience so that qualified people can be identified and assigned. This is particularly important to the MNF-I operational environment which relied on the recruitment and placement of individual augmentees to fill open positions.

Lastly, strategic communication is a relatively new concept and DOD policy and joint doctrine are still evolving. To bolster recent efforts such as the development of the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication* and other publications, the joint community needs to publish strategic communication policy and further expand joint doctrine. Many of the recent strategic communication activities and efforts, both successes and failures, have shed significant light on potential organizational constructs, processes, and technology-related solutions that can greatly assist commanders. These lessons support the importance of offering commanders realistic and relevant information about the capabilities required for a comprehensive program that effectively integrates strategic communication as a core aspect of successful operations.

Endnotes:

¹ Transcript of interview with JFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication conducted on 1 October 2008. This individual was also a member of the 2007 on-site inspection team described above.

² JP 1-02, Department of Defense *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

³ Stout, M. E., Huckabey, J. M., Schindler, J. R., & Lacey, J. (2008). *The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Members*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, pp 164-196. This report is the culmination of in-depth research conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis for US Joint Forces Command.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Schneider, W. (2008). *Report of the Defense Science Board: Task Force on Strategic Communication*. January 2008. Readers may also be interested in the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication*, dated 1 September 2008, published by the JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, and the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* which, at the writing of this report, is in final draft.

⁶ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, reprint 2006. Praeger Security International, West Port, CT.

⁷ Multinational Force-Iraq Commander's *Counterinsurgency Guidance*, 21 June 2008.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ JCOA interview conducted September 2008 with former Analysis and Assessment Branch Chief, MNF-I.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ R. Hastings, *Principles of Strategic Communication*, DOD Memorandum dated 15 August 2008.

¹² *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication*, JFCOM Publication dated 1 September 2008.

¹³ R. Hastings, *Principles of Strategic Communication*, DOD Memorandum dated 15 August 2008.

Prepared and Edited by:

Mr. Bradford H. Baylor, Project Lead, USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis, with major contributions from COL Thomas M. Cioppa, US Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center; Col Anne R. Morris, Deputy Director CJ9 Strategic Communication, MNF-I, Baghdad; and Ms. Janet D. Cox, Strategic Communication Advisor, Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM.

“One T-Wall at a Time”: Battle of Phase Line Gold, Sadr City, Iraq, March – May 2008

Commander Doreen Fussman

Major Tom Sills

Multinational Corps –Iraq

INTRODUCTION

From March to May 2008, Iraqi and coalition forces (CF) defeated the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and, for the first time since the invasion, brought Sadr City – a hotbed of Shia militia activity – firmly under the control of the central government. The Iraqi and coalition victory in this enclave may be deemed the strategic victory which cemented sustainable peace for the country. Along with similar operations in Basra in the south and Mosul in the north, the Battle for Sadr City demonstrated the growing capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces, in particular the Iraqi Army (IA), and the expanding confidence in and support for the government of Iraq Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki. During the battle, there were days when the fate of Maliki’s government seemed to hang in the balance, with the task insurmountable. Sadr City, an impoverished enclave of 2.2 million people, threatened to become a large-scale Mogadishu. Early in the operation, Iraqi forces seemed on the verge of crumbling, with only a few coalition companies available to support them. However, the Prime Minister was steadfast, Iraqi forces were willing, and the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (3/4 ID) brought to the fight the enhanced capabilities and tactics needed to prevail and break the Mahdi Army’s (Jaysh al Mahdi) (JAM)) grip on Sadr City. The fighting featured amazing combinations of ancient, modern, and futuristic tactics, from siege warfare to urban operations by air weapons teams and clever information operations focusing on Iraqi leadership. The results, the Mahdi Army in disarray and mounting successes for Iraqi forces and the Iraqi government, are a tribute to the 3rd Brigade’s innovative approach to urban combat and to soldiers’ devotion to the mission. Moreover, Sadr City, under Iraqi government control, was a strong marker that the surge had been successful as there were significant signs of growing security and stability in the area.

The Battle of Phase Line (PL) Gold began in Sadr City after the Mahdi Army and various militia groups began a general uprising while events in southern Iraq, in Basra, were unfolding in March 2008. Two months later, the conflict culminated after an intense and

prolonged battle in which the enemy simply realized they could not stop the coalition. In May, five days after completing a 12 foot-high wall which extended the length of Sadr City, the Iraqi Army moved nearly unopposed into the northern three quarters of Sadr City and reestablished Government of Iraqi (GOI) control over the entire enclave. The IA found militia cache sites containing tremendous amounts of weapons and explosive materials hidden or buried throughout this northern area. During the initial outbreak, JAM and militia groups fired a substantial number of rockets at the Green Zone and fought to repel elements of the 3/4 ID and Iraqi security forces (ISF) from inside and around Sadr City. In order to clear and isolate key southern parts of the enclave from the remainder of Sadr City, the IA established checkpoints along Route Gold and the 3rd Brigade constructed a 4.6 kilometer wall of concrete T-Walls, known as the Gold Wall. Militia elements quickly understood the hindrance the walls would create. These walls were successfully introduced throughout much of Baghdad under the Multinational Division Baghdad’s (MND-B) Safe Neighborhoods program. The militias counterattacked the progress of erecting the wall by using snipers, small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and explosively formed projectiles (EFP) to try to defeat coalition forces. Coalition and Iraqi resolve was never in question. Establishing control of the enclave by the ISF appeared a daunting task. Militias were able to significantly hamper the construction project. The coalition, with the aid of enhanced weapons systems – optics and firepower, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), air weapons teams (AWT), precision rockets, a robust Navy Seal sniper team, Iraqi Army infantrymen, and continuous warfare adaptation – simply wore down the enemy’s ability to sustain a fight.

BACKGROUND - OPPOSING FORCES

Shia Militia Groups

Developed in the late 1950’s to provide housing for the Iraqi poor, the area currently known as Sadr City had been called Saddam City. After coalition forces

toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, the area was renamed Sadr City to honor Mohammed Sadiq Sadr (father of al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr), revered Ayatollah who was assassinated in 1998 by Hussein's security personnel. In June 2003, JAM socially, militarily, and economically began to dominate the enclave. In 2005 and 2006, coalition and Iraqi forces locked down the enclave to search for hostages and death squads. During the negotiation for cabinet positions under the Maliki government, the Sadrist bloc received cabinet positions over the Departments of Transportation, Health, Agriculture and Tourism, and the Facilities Protection Services. By controlling these divisions, the Sadrist controlled a significant amount of power and resources within Baghdad. Inside Sadr City and other heavily Shia populated areas of Baghdad, young men affiliated with JAM posed as neighborhood guards protecting the residents from Sunni car bombs and other terrorist attacks. They branded themselves as protectors of the Shia faith. After establishing their presence, these JAM forces pushed Sunni residents out of mixed neighborhoods and committed ruthless sectarian violence. Many of the victims were dumped blindfolded, bound, and had holes drilled inside their bodies. Inside these JAM controlled sectors, women were punished for not being veiled. The Sadrist developed courts to punish those not meeting their version of Islam.¹ By March 2008, Sadr City appeared to operate like a separate nation, where Sadr's word was synonymous with the law. The cleric's influence was everywhere including the hospital, Islamic courts, the police department, the municipality, and the mosques.² During the most recent years, this tightly regulated Sadr stronghold became one of Baghdad's poorest neighborhoods.

In August 2007, al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr issued an order "suspending the activities of the Mahdi Army for a six-month period."³ In February 2008, al-Sadr extended this ceasefire. However, intelligence indicated the enclave was heavily protected from external threats with improvised explosive devices (IED), EFPs, and small arms systems to include sniper teams, rockets, mortars, and anti-aircraft weapons.⁴ Indirect fire (IDF) and various bombings against Iraqi and coalition forces were initiated or supported from these networks that were headquartered within Sadr City. With an estimated population of 2.2 million residents, special group networks maintained approximately 1,000-2,000 active fighters.⁵ Potentially, the area could produce up to 20,000 fighters if Muqtada al-Sadr called for a general uprising.

The enemy evolved from three distinct entities:⁶ JAM fighters consisted of young, unemployed men who wanted the prestige of carrying a weapon and defending the Shia sect. These fighters were deemed to have paramilitary backing. They stayed in their local communities and did not normally initiate attacks. The enemy known as "special groups" (SG) included specialized fighters who often received training and/or funding from Iran. They have been referred to as JAM special forces. They were involved in ongoing EFP attacks, weapons trafficking, and rocket attacks. The third group was commonly referred to as "special group criminals" (SGC). This group most closely resembled a mafia or gangster organization rather than a paramilitary organization. They focused on robbery, intimidation, and other criminal activities rather than actual attacks aimed at coalition forces. These groups received support from elements in Iran in the form of weapons, training, and a destination to flee to avoid capture.⁷ Some of the weapon caches discovered in Sadr City and identified as having been produced in Iran were manufactured as late as February 2008.⁸

Iraqi Security Forces - 11th Iraqi Army (IA) Division

In March 2008, the Iraqi Government had minimal combat power and only a National Police (NP) battalion that operated inside the area known as Operating Environment (OE) Gold. Although an Iraqi brigade was dedicated to Sadr City, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) did not spend too much time in the enclave. Sadr City Iraqi Police (IP) were essentially controlled by JAM.⁹ The 11th Iraqi Army Division served as the IA ground controlling headquarters for the Sadr City area and the northeast portion of the Baghdad province. The division was authorized three maneuver brigades and the standard complement of enabling units. One brigade was created out of existing and new units in March 2007, the second was created in January 2008, and the third in the Spring 2008. The specialized units (enablers) were being developed when the uprising began. The IA division had a number of significant challenges which could have easily led to mission failure.

1. The division was very new and not battle tested. Many of the Jundi (Iraqi Army Soldiers) came from the Sadr City area. JAM knew where to find the family members of the Jundi on the checkpoints. Because of this situation, there were a significant number of losses from the 11th IA in the first week of fighting.¹⁰

2. Over the past few years, the Iraqi Army had not taken a lead in clearing operations that lasted for a sustained period. During the upcoming battle, the IA would move up to PL Gold and re-establish checkpoints. To complete this mission, IA platoons and companies would move under fire, clear areas of militia fighters and resupply themselves. Although coalition forces assisted the Iraqis, the Iraqi Army was out front during operations. The coalition and ISF were determined to put an IA face on establishing security. However, this new role represented a major shift in operational responsibility.
3. The 11th IA Division enabling units were noticeably short of key equipment. The unit was the first IA division to be fielded by the GOI. Logistical issues in obtaining specialized equipment were yet to be resolved. Key divisional units had not been formed by March 2008. The division lacked a bomb disposal company, an intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) company, a motor transport company, and an engineer company.
4. Iraqi ground tactics were, in many ways, fundamentally flawed. Within military transition teams (MiTT), there existed a term known as the “Iraqi bloom.” This term referred to the practice of IA units returning fire to such a large degree that the unit would run out of ammunition after the first engagement. “They would receive one or two sniper rounds and the whole platoon would open up at every window and everywhere. You want to be on the inside of the bloom, not on the outside,” said Col Richard G. Jung of the 11th IA MiTT. “The next thing you know is the commander (IA commander) is pulling his unit back because they are out of ammunition.”¹¹
5. The 11th IA had only five of its nine battalions with one brigade attached to the Karkh Area Command on the west side of the Tigris. The division simply did not have the available pool of infantrymen available to fully prosecute the upcoming effort.
6. The division commander, Staff Major General Muzhir Shakir Missaif was on leave in late March. His absence left the division chief of staff (CoS), Staff Brigadier General Dhif, to manage operations. While the CoS was a very competent administrator, he did not possess the same experience and dynamic leadership qualities found in MG Muzhir.¹² Leadership, in many ways, was the key factor in whether an IA unit succeeds or fails. As a general rule, Iraqi military units conduct little planning, pre-combat checks (PCC) or pre-combat inspections (PCI). They simply get the mission and move to the objective. They accomplish the mission on the sheer will of the commander.
7. The Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) managed the isolation of Sadr City and eventual clearing of OE Gold, despite the fact that the 11th IA served as the ground controlling headquarters for much of the area. At one point, the BOC directed the movement of companies within the 11th IA, usually via mobile phone communications. Additionally, the BOC refused to allow MG Muzhir to rotate his units out of the enclave to replace worn units with fresher troops.
8. Perhaps the most significant factor causing desertions and other dereliction of duty was the fear of the Mahdi Army that existed within the Iraqi Army ranks. JAM fighters had the reputation of being highly competent fighters who received superior training in Iran.¹³

Coalition Forces

Since 2004, coalition forces and militia elements within Sadr City engaged in several iterations of significant fighting. In April 2004, the Mahdi Army ambushed a patrol from 1st Cavalry Division inside the enclave resulting in eight soldiers killed and 57 wounded.¹⁴ The coalition and ISF placed short term blockades around the city in 2005 and 2006. In November 2007, both the Coalition and ISF maintained a low-profile presence in the enclave, resulting from a political backlash that occurred following a mission inside Sadr City led by Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) with support from CF. That operation developed into a significant firefight in which the 1st Cavalry Division brought in Apache gunships for support. The raid resulted in significant local damage and had the potential to be politically embarrassing for the GOI. Therefore, the GOI restricted the ability of CF and ISF to conduct raids and other operations within Sadr City.¹⁵ In December 2007, Multinational Corp Iraq (MNC-I) directed that all raids in Sadr City must have the approval of the MNC-I Commander and include prior notification to the Iraqi Prime Minister.¹⁶ The directive allowed militia networks to find sanctuary and develop stockpiles of various weapons within Sadr City. The troubling situation was quickly noticed by 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne. However, the directive restricted the brigade’s ability to root out and eliminate insurgent elements. But, with rockets killing innocent civilians in March 2008 and JAM overplaying their hand, the restrictions became less relevant. Coalition planners wanted to clear the

area of the militia influence. The militants in the sanctuary status had the support of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Eventually the Prime Minister came to understand that the enclave provided a safe haven for the militias who were undermining the Iraqi government. Al-Maliki authorized Iraqi and coalition forces to begin operations within Sadr City. The 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division under Col John Hort began to prepare themselves to stop the IDF and reestablish security. Hort's Commander, Maj Gen Jeffrey Hammond, Commander of MND-B, recognized the need to place US soldier on the ground to push the rocket teams north of PL Gold.¹⁷


Operation Steadfast Falcon

In December 2007, MND-B developed Operation Steadfast Falcon with the objective of restoring GOI control of Sadr City when the timing was right. The plan called for placing coalition forces and Iraqi security forces in and around Sadr City, in a series of joint security stations (JSS) and combat outposts (COP), to be able to project combat power in Sadr City when



Photo 1: COL. John Hort (left), who is the commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division; MG Jeffrey Hammond (2nd left), serves as the commander of the 4th Inf. Div. and Multinational Division – Baghdad; and Col. James Rainey (center), operations officer, MND-B, watch as Iraqi army Lt. Col. Yahyea Rasoull Abdallah al-Zubadie, commander 3rd Battalion, 42nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, describes a planned operation over a terrain model to partnered coalition forces, April 3, at the 11th IA Div. headquarters in Adhamiyah. (VIRIN #080407-A-6937H-002, April 3, 2008 by MAJ Michael Humphreys)

necessary. Key tasks included the eliminating the influence of militia leaders, implementing civil military operations (CMO), and promoting psychological information awareness. The creation of Joint JSSs and COPs became critical with the outbreak of violence as it would soon allow 3/4 ID and the ISF units to rapidly maneuver within the city areas to maintain some semblance of security within the area. The coalition had intended to isolate the militia eventually, but the JAM uprising caused the acceleration and immediate implementation of Operation Steadfast Falcon.



Map1: Sadr City Phase Line Gold Operation Steadfast Falcon called for the establishment of checkpoints around Sadr City. When 4th ID arrived in December 2007, there were few forward positions around Sadr City and thus the creation of the COPs and JSSs became critical in March/April of 2008 because they facilitated the movement of combat power to the area.

MAJOR EVENTS

From 23 March to 31 March 2008, JAM and/or special group networks fired 86 rockets at the International Zone (IZ).¹⁸ The majority of the rounds were 107mm rockets fired from points of origin (POO) sites in the southern part of Sadr City. Often the rockets missed the intended targets in the IZ, killing innocent Iraqi civilians living in the area. By the end March, MND-B experienced an average of 68 attacks per day.¹⁹ The increase in attacks by Shia based militia groups corresponded with the Iraqi Army offensive (“Charge of the Knights”) launched on 22 March to reestablish security and control from militias in southern Iraq. Essentially, the conflict arose from an internal struggle between Shia militias and the Maliki government. Attacks

around Baghdad included small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire on ISF and CF, mortar and rocket attacks on US/Iraqi bases and camps, and a significant increase in the number of IED roadside bombs. Beginning on 25 March, almost all the ISF checkpoints in and immediately around the enclave were overrun and/or abandoned.²⁰

As militia elements overtook the Iraqi checkpoints around the enclave, 3/4 ID moved to bolster and/or to reestablish ISF checkpoints. The brigade brought their internal armored assets from Camp Taji and additional armor and Stryker companies arrived from other brigades in the division. Armor reinforcements arrived from the 9th IA and Multinational Division-Center (MND-C). The 1st Squadron of the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (1/2 SCR) attached to 3/4 ID would fight to secure and eventually resupply overwatch sites in the Tharwa area (southeast part of Sadr City). On 27 March, 1/68 Infantry (IN) secured the Jamilla area (southwest corner of Sadr City). At the same time, the 11th Iraqi Army, with support from 3/4 ID, began to conduct the first of many humanitarian missions within Sadr City. They delivered needed food, water, and other supplies directly to local residents.

In addition to reestablishing the checkpoints and eliminating POO sites within 107mm rocket targeting range of the IZ, the brigade coordinated assets to defeat rocket teams operating in the enclave. During this deep fight, the Brigade utilized ISR platforms and various delivery assets, such as AWTs and close air support, to successfully target and destroy rocket teams and/or their systems.

On 6 April, the 3rd Battalion of the 42nd Iraqi Army Brigade (3/42 IA) moved into the southern part of Sadr City to push militia elements above PL Gold. Entering from the south along Route Florida, the IA companies marched north and established checkpoints along Route Gold. The Iraqi leadership sent the 2/42 IA Battalion into the area after the 3rd Battalion encountered substantial resistance from local militias. MND-B MiTTs and ground commanders from 1/68 IN, 1/2 SCR, and 3/4 ID were able to persuade the Iraqi ground commanders to push through the resistance.

In mid-April, 3/4 ID began constructing a wall comprised of concrete barriers, known as T-walls, along Route Gold (aka Phase Line Gold). The walls extended across Sadr City from Route Aeros to Route Grizzlies and created what would be known as the Gold Wall.

Realizing the negative tactical and strategic implications of the wall, SG/JAM elements engaged coalition forces all along the construction site. Eventually, the wall served to isolate the southern part of Sadr City (known henceforth as OE Gold) so CF and ISF could reestablish security and begin significant infrastructure projects that were designed to improve the quality of life of local residents.

On 22 April, the brigade established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) at JSS Sadr City in the southern part of OE Gold. Inside the CMOC, the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC) was opened to assist residents with compensation claims related to collateral damage from the fighting and to continue to provide basic living essentials in the form of food and water.

On 15 May, after a considerable construction effort and heavy fighting, the Gold Wall reached Route Grizzlies. To succeed in construction of the wall, the brigade utilized a variety of assets to include infantry, armor, engineers, ISR systems, aerial weapons platforms, and special operators. Intelligence reports indicated that high level SG leaders departed Sadr City for Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Sadrist bloc began negotiations with GOI to allow the Iraqi Army to enter the northern areas of Sadr City. On 20 May, two brigades of the Iraqi Army entered Sadr City and began to establish GOI control.

On 30 May, MND-B created Task Force (TF) Gold to bring synergy and expertise to reconstruction and humanitarian relief efforts.

This operational narrative is the summation of the ISF and CF efforts from 23 March to mid-May 2008 which includes the reestablishment of ISF checkpoints around Sadr City and the creation of security within OE Gold. It includes the efforts of MND-B elements with the Iraqi Security Forces, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) assets, and other enablers utilizing counterinsurgency (COIN) principles inside OE Gold that would lead to the eventual reintegration of Sadr City into Baghdad for the first time since 2004.

Iraqi Army/Coalition Force counter offensive to reestablish security

The 44th IA Brigade had three battalions manning checkpoints around Sadr City. One battalion maintained a security presence along Route Aeros for

the entire length of the enclave. Another battalion maintained checkpoints along Route Grizzlies. The third unit, an NP battalion, had positions within Tharwa and Jamilla. With the exception of a couple of checkpoints along Route Grizzlies, the militia pushed these units off their checkpoints during the initial points of the uprising.²¹ A number of units simply stopped working with the government and surrendered their weapons to Sadr officials.²² Many NP checkpoints were overrun without a serious defense.²³ One of the greatest challenges to be overcome by the ISF was the intimidation by militia members. In some cases, the family members of ISF were told that they would be killed if the ISF member performed his duties.²⁴ Several of the NP commanders refused to command and control (C2) their units and conduct operations against Special Groups.²⁵ After the increase of violence concluded, 700 Shurta (National Policemen) were dismissed due to dereliction of duty.²⁶ Additionally, four battalion commanders remained under house arrest for complicity with militia elements.²⁷ At one point the division had six additional company teams in the area, as well as one route clearance company (+) from the 35th Engineer Brigade. The armored and Stryker systems provided moral support to the ISF, increased the force protection level for occupants of the checkpoint and delivered a strong message of coalition commitment against the militias to their ISF partners and the residents of Sadr City.

One of the first steps by the Iraqi Army to reestablish security was to replace the National Police battalion inside the southern part of Sadr City in the area of OE Gold. This NP unit was basically a light infantry organization with pickup trucks. They lacked the armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and heavier systems found in the IA. It was noted early on that the enemy was going to fight much more diligently to try and keep Sadr City under their control. Therefore, the Iraqi leadership pulled this battalion out of OE Gold and would later insert two battalions from the 42nd IA Brigade.

The 42nd IA Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division received the mission to reestablish checkpoints along PL Gold and at key places within OE Gold in early April. Operating in the Adhamiyah area where the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) attacks generally consisted of bombing and short small arms fire. The Jundi had to adjust to the Shia militias which utilized heavier weapon systems and different tactics. Armed with small arm weapons and a few RPGs, the 11th IA division did not (initially)

have the confidence to match the firepower of JAM/SGC elements, which consisted of EFPs, snipers, mortars, and RPGs.²⁸

Iraqi Army Push into Sadr City

On the morning of 6 April, infantry companies from the 3rd Battalion from the 42nd IA Brigade moved along north-south routes toward PL Gold. Local tribal leaders gave their support to Lt Gen Karim, Commander of the Rusafa Area Command, and thus the Iraqis believed the entry would be permissive.²⁹ Instead, the JAM/SG fighters ambushed the Iraqi Army.³⁰ Initially, some companies of the 42nd IA Brigade secured positions at or near Route Gold. In some cases, the militia counterattacked and pushed the Jundi off their checkpoints. However, the battalion would later retake those positions. To retake these positions, the IA would have to advance up roads that had since been seeded with roadside bombs. Therefore, the brigade utilized route clearance teams to clear the routes and prodded the IA to move north.³¹ US military MiTTs and leaders from 3/4 ID cajoled and pushed the Iraqis to continue their forward movements. Of particular note was the performance of LTC Michael Pemrick, the 3/4 ID Deputy Commander. He worked with his IA counterparts every night – constantly rallying, pushing, and coordinating.³²

When describing the impact of MND-B leadership in influencing the performance of the 11th IA, BGen Grimsley, MND-B Deputy Commander, commented:

“In many cases, especially once we started the offensive operations to secure Phase Line Gold, the effectiveness of the operations was a direct result of the influence of the transition teams or in many cases because a lot of us (commanders) were out there. It would be very difficult for an Iraqi battalion commander or even company commander who might not be quite so confident in his ability to maneuver his battalion, because he’s never done it before. They haven’t really been doing this for five years. Most of these guys who are battalion commanders now were at most captains maybe in the old Army. It became very difficult for them not to be out there leading their soldiers, when they knew we were out in front. If all of us, the American leadership, were willing to go stand there halfway up to Gold and get shot at in the middle of the night, it’s a face thing, it’s an honor thing. They’re not going to let it happen. They might not want to be there, but once they find out we’re there, it’s no going back.”³³

Throughout the ISF movement into OE Gold, MND-B promoted the message that the ISF was in the lead. LTC Jeffrey R. White, a senior staff officer at MND-B, commented:

“The world saw the Iraqi Army in the lead in Sadr City and it wasn’t the American Army entering Sadr City. The key...the lynchpin... the enabler that made that successful, more than anything, is the ability of the 11th Iraqi Army Division. If they had not had the minimum level of skills, the command and control capability and professionalism, there is nothing we could have done to have been successful and to maintain that public perception that they were in the lead.....The key was the Iraqi Army. They were tenacious.....If you look at their uniforms they have a 2nd ID patch on one shoulder, a 1st CAV patch on the other shoulder, and a 4th ID patch on their helmet. They have been hanging out with some serious professional soldiers for a while now and they have buds (US soldiers) from those divisions that have taught them something.”³⁴

When the Iraqi Army began seizing parts of OE Gold in early April, maneuver companies from 3/4 ID partnered with an Iraqi Army company.³⁵ It was a one-to-one partnership – US company commander paired with an Iraqi company commander. MND-B units remained behind the ISF and provided mentorship and reinforcement as needed. Potentially, the international perception of events could have been substantially different if CF ground soldiers decided to “take charge” of events with their overwhelming firepower assets. Likewise, any excessive use of force involving CF troops with civilian casualties could have strategically negative repercussions.

Lt Col Pemrick recalled:

“It was a constant push to get them up there (Route Gold). I think one of the issues was that a lot of soldiers were from Sadr City. They knew some of the people they were fighting and their families felt threatened... The fact is that they did an offensive operation and stood there despite the lack of presence of any Strykers or Bradleys. The commanders kept them in the fight. It wasn’t always pretty but I was damn pleased with what they did. You can now see the increased confidence.”³⁶

Counter Indirect Fire Fight

The 3rd Brigade observed rocket fire coming from Sadr City into the IZ on the morning of the 23 April around

0530 in the morning and subsequent volleys every few hours. The brigade immediately began developing areas for ISR assets to observe. The brigade could not conduct traditional counterfire with field artillery (FA) and rocket systems, fearing they might harm innocent civilians and for other classified reasons. Therefore, the brigade was limited on how to engage rocket teams inside the enclave. Ironically, the brigade trained at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, to respond to enemy rocket and mortar attacks with US indirect fire assets. However, the realities on the ground prevented the brigade from implementing these procedures. Therefore, the brigade destroyed these enemy teams with Close Air Support, AWTs, and armed Predator systems. The brigade developed unprecedented new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to adjust to the situation on the ground and the large number of additional assets that would be pushed down the unit.³⁷

The rocket teams needed the freedom to operate in Jamilla and Tharwa. The 107mm rockets did not have the range to hit the IZ when launched from areas north of Route Gold. To secure these two areas in Sadr City, 1/2 SCR, route clearance teams, and enablers fought to seize rocket launching sites inside OE Gold. When these brigade elements entered the city, there was heavy contact on every route. Before the maneuver forces could enter into the area, the route clearance teams had to establish a safe route. According to Major Scott Hauser, 107th



Photo 2: An Iraqi army soldier from the 42nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division takes cover and points to where his men need to go during a firefight against armed militiamen in the Sadr City district of Baghdad April 17. During this period of the conflict, the insurgents utilized sandstorms for cover with limited success. (US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Adrian Cadiz).

Engineer Battalion Operations Officer, “The ground fight against IDF teams in OE Gold was successful on the backs of the route clearance teams. Tanks would not go forward. The route clearance teams were the FLOT (Forward Line of Troops). It was weapons free for 120mm (M1 Abrams tank systems) or smaller weapon systems north of PL Gold and weapons free for 50 caliber fire south of PL Gold. There was a lot of shooting. We had one Husky driver [whose vehicle got] hit five times in one night. We had days where we would only move 75 meters and then have to pull back because of damage to our vehicles. Route clearance teams withstood multiple significant attacks beginning on 25 March and continuing until late May.”³⁸

The enemy began placing EFPs behind the wall to avoid detection from coalition and Iraqi observation. To counteract this technique, route clearance teams utilized the extendable camera system on the Husky vehicle (Photo 3) to look on the north side of the wall. In short time, the Husky seemed to be the militia’s #1 target. At one point, the 107th Engineer Battalion had only two operable Husky’s out of twelve.³⁹ “The enemy went crazy trying to eliminate the Husky. But, we kept turning (fixing) them around. To the enemy, I’m sure it looked like we had an endless supply of them.....For a two week period, the maintenance teams were run pretty hard. In some cases, the teams would bring two huskies back (to Battalion headquarters at Camp Liberty).”

During a battlefield tour of Jamilla with B Company 1/14th IN, COL Hort and MG Hammond observed a significant amount of rocket and machine gun fire.



During the exfiltration of this patrol, the commands observed constant fire. “After going in there that first day, I just knew we were in for a tough fight,” recalled the 3rd Brigade Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Dailey, “After this event, the Stryker units established patrol bases inside Jamilla and Thrawa. The commander determined that holding the ground wasn’t enough as the enemy had the ability to launch rockets. Therefore, COL Hort and MG Hammond made the assessment to secure the entire area known as OE GOLD.” Jamilla and Tharwa became the next areas for the division’s Safe Neighborhood Program.

While overseeing a ground fight, 3/4 ID managed numerous aerial assets to include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and AWTs to identify and target IDF teams operating outside of Sadr City. Also used were critical intelligence assets, including high powered cameras/optics mounted on aerostat balloons and observation towers, and specialized assets above the division level. Task Force XII, the division’s combat aviation brigade, increased their operational tempo (OPTEMPO) from one AWT over Sadr City to three teams.⁴⁰ In total, two predators UAVs, two shadow UAVs, three AWTs, and two fixed wing units of close air support aircraft were utilized over Sadr City over the next two months.

As the division learned the enemy’s techniques, they developed countermeasures and continued to eliminate a number of rocket teams. In a Department of Defense (DOD) press conference on 1 June 2008, MG Hammond described one of the attacks:

“Following a rocket launch from a position in Sadr City, one of our air weapons teams -- that’s two Apaches [helicopter] -- responded to the launch site at about 5:30 p.m. one evening. They stayed on station, rotating other teams out for five hours. Keeping an eye on these rocket rails, because they’d [militia members] fired, and then they moved on, knowing that they’d come back to get [the rails], because the precious commodity was more the rails than it was the rockets. Now, after five hours, three enemy personnel returned to retrieve the launchers. Our

Photo 3: The Husky vehicle often served as the lead vehicle during route clearance mission. Equipped with an extended arm and camera, this one man vehicle often took the brunt of the EFP attacks during the battle of Sadr City. US Army photo by Spc. Opal Vaughn

air weapons team engaged them with one Hellfire missile, killed two of the enemy, destroyed the launch system, and destroyed the second rocket that they had erected and were preparing to fire. Remarkable work by a patient, very patient professional Army/Air team.”⁴¹

One of the keys to success in the brigade’s efforts to eliminate IDF teams operating inside the enclave was the ability of staff officers at the division and brigade to remain flexible, and to constantly question or develop innovative methods to improve efficiencies. For example, the brigade separated the city into quadrants using a baseball diamond identification system to quickly allow UAV operators/analysts and pilots to quickly orient towards a potential target. For example, the southwest corner of the enclave was home base; the southeast corner became 1st base; the northeast corner became 2nd base; and the northwest corner was designated as 3rd base.

Over time, analysts determined various IDF anomalies which indicated activity or the presence of IDF teams. These indicators were shared with UAV operators and AWT pilots. More analysis indicated that the critical piece to winning was the massing of intelligence assets and scrutiny down to the brigade level. The brigade received an unprecedented amount of additional assets. Prior to the event, MNC-I dispersed these assets throughout the theater to ensure coverage is available for all parts of Iraq. The practice of decentralization of assets down to the ground commander proved successful. Field Manual (FM) 3/24 states “Effective counterinsurgency operations are decentralized and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible to the lower levels.” The net result of these changes was that the brigade, in many cases, could locate, track, and destroy a rocket team within a matter of 30-45 seconds if desired.⁴² In a 60 Minutes television interview, COL Hort explained, “The rocket teams went from 20-30 man groups, down to 4, and in some cases only one or two. The Predator and Shadow were phenomenal in their ability to see the enemy, in particular after the team shot a rocket.”⁴³

To attack rocket teams on the streets or inside their bases, the brigade utilized the following system for delivery of munitions:

1. AWTs (Apache gunships with hellfire munitions) – most common and responsive delivery system
2. Close Air Support (utilized low collateral damage munitions)
3. UAV Predator systems armed with Hellfire munitions

From 23-31 March, TF XII (4/3 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)) conducted 29 engagements: killing 81 insurgents; and destroying 17 rocket rails and 4 vehicles. By early April, MND-B had substantially degraded the enemy’s ability to conduct multiple rocket attacks at the IZ (see chart below)

2008 Number of Rocket attacks on the IZ by day:									
<u>26 Mar</u>	<u>27 Mar</u>	<u>28 Mar</u>	<u>29 Mar</u>	<u>30 Mar</u>	<u>31 Mar</u>	<u>1 Apr</u>	<u>2 Apr</u>		
14	15	16	11	1	2	0	1		
<u>3 Apr</u>	<u>4 Apr</u>	<u>5 Apr</u>	<u>6 Apr</u>	<u>7 Apr</u>	<u>8 Apr</u>	<u>9 Apr</u>	<u>10 Apr</u>	<u>11 Apr</u>	
1	0	0	1	1	3	2	1	0	

The Gold Wall

As sectarianism continued to spread in mid to late 2006, MND-B, under the 1st Cavalry Division, devised a plan to separate hostile Sunni and Shia areas by surrounding communities with twelve-foot-high barriers. Known as “safe neighborhoods,” the strategy also had the benefit of limiting the freedom of movement of insurgent groups. Checkpoints were created at certain points. Residents had to pass by an Iraqi Army soldier and present an identification card to pass thru the barriers. Begun in the volatile Adhamiyah area of Baghdad in 2007, the program proved very successful. The barriers were later emplaced in many parts of Iraq and along major routes. The brigade began construction of the Gold Wall in Sadr City on the 19 April and completed the project on 15 May. Initially, the 1/2 SCR and 1/68 IN simultaneously constructed the Gold Wall in each of their OEs during 12 hour night-time shifts. The brigade determined that this strategy gave the enemy the opportunity to regain the offensive during the hours of light. Therefore, the brigade transitioned to one build site with 24 hour/7 day per week (24/7) construction. The negative side of 24 hour operations became that ground companies would have to build the wall in broad daylight. The firefights at the wall were extremely intense. COL Hort commented that “Every type of weapon system the enemy had they

tried to use against us at the wall. It was step, by step, by step. It was literally fighting every hour of the day.” However, the construction site had a layer of protection which would eventually decimate the enemy attackers. Additionally, the 24/7 shift helped the wall progress at a more substantial rate.

Initially, the large number of EFPs kept 1/68 IN and 1/2 SCR from making decent progress in construction of the wall. A key decision by the 3/4 ID, which dramatically reduced construction time, was the approval for units to implement the technique called “stand-off munitions disruption” (SMUD) procedures. Established protocol indicated that when encountering IEDs or EFPs, units would secure the site and attempt to recover the explosive device so that experts may examine the components. This protocol was costly in terms of time. COL Hort authorized the use of SMUD during this operational period. SMUD involved blowing an explosive in place without any time-consuming recovery actions. Often this meant destroying the explosives via direct fire from a Stryker or M1 Abrams Tank.

Coalition psychological operations (PSYOP) action provided significant assistance in allowing the ISF to root-out militia members within OE Gold. Leaflet drops by US and Iraqis helped to influence the perception of the Iraqis taking charge of the situation and to inform the public of telephone tip lines. After the Iraqis conducted their leaflet drops, coalition forces dropped around six million leaflets over Sadr City. These drops had a positive effect on the number of phone calls received at tips lines and by patrols. “Last time we went into Sadr City, it was very, very ugly,” commented LTC White, “This time it seemed like everyone living in the neighborhood was eager to pass on the information.”⁴⁴



Photo 4: To conceal their rockets from UAV and AWTs, IDF teams concealed their rockets under tarps. Within short time, reconnaissance operators learned this technique. When the rocket team returned, MND-B successfully delivered fire to eliminate the team and rocket system. US Army Photo. Date: Unknown

During the daylight phase of construction, companies faced a major task simply moving to the construction site. The enemy would place IEDs and EFPs along the routes that they knew the units were utilizing. “So, we would have to fight from the southern portion of Tharwa all the way back north. Some nights we spent our whole time just getting to Gold. We realized that we were not emplacing many barriers and it (the Gold Wall) would take forever to finish.”⁴⁵ The courage and contributions of route clearance was once again remarkable. Corporal Stephen Defino received five EFP strikes while serving as a Husky driver for the battalion’s route clearance company. “For one soldier to get hit by one EFP during their rotation is a pretty traumatic event.” Remarked Command Sgt Major Dailey, “But, this soldier continued to drive on after getting hit by five. When talking to this soldier in the CASH (combat hospital), I could see he wanted to continue on and finish the job.”⁴⁶

The toughest part of the fight occurred when the wall reached Tharwa II (halfway point). The enemy occupied three story buildings which gave them a huge advantage against soldiers in the construction site. To a greater degree, the enemy was able to engage the infantrymen without being spotted. The brigade mapped and numbered major buildings overseeing the construction site. In advance, the unit considered collateral damage for each major structure and worked to fire munitions that would accomplish the objective and minimize damage to the area.

The amount of protection provided to the infantrymen building the wall was substantial and had a remarkable impact. First, the company on the ground utilized Bradley, M1 Tanks, or Stryker vehicles for near and far security. The advanced optics and high powered weapons systems gave a distinct advantage to the coalition. Charlie Company 1/68 Armored Regiment (AR) eliminated 188 enemy fighters during the construction period.⁴⁷ Second, UAVs and AWTs provided rapid observation and, in some cases, allowed for the brigade to immediately engage enemy formations moving toward the construction site. On a number of occasions, JAM/SG elements conducted offensive actions while under the cover of a thick dust storm. They believed wrongly that they were safe from observation and attack. During three separate sandstorms, MND-B employed the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GLMRS) at militia elements attacking the wall construction site.⁴⁸ And third, ground soldiers from a

US Navy SEAL sniper team and Iraqi Army elements made noteworthy contributions as well.

Within MND-B, the 35th Engineer brigade⁴⁹ managed the 769th Construction Effects Battalion and the 107th Engineer Battalion. The 769th oversaw the construction of vertical and horizontal projects throughout the MND-B area. The 107th Engineer Battalion focused on clearing routes of roadside bombs. Various sapper companies from the 107th battalion and organic route clearance units belonging to 3/4 ID became critical in ensuring freedom of movement along the construction site. The 821st Engineer Company from the 769th Battalion operated the cranes and armored forklifts along the wall construction site (Photo 5). Prior to receiving the task to construct this wall, the 821st built walls along major roads, JSSs, and COPs. These were relatively quiet missions which involved little combat. These sapper companies would soon learn that building this wall would become a combat task.

BUILDING THE WALL – THE INFANTRYMAN'S STORY

Charlie Company “Team Steel”, 1/68 IN

Operating out of JSS Ur, Charlie Company, 1/68 IN, began reinforcing Iraqi Army checkpoints along Route Grizzlies, on 25 March. During these actions,

Photo 5: As the sun begins to set; Soldiers rig a 14,000-pound T-wall barrier to a crane before it is placed along a 3.2 mile barrier wall along Al Quds street in Sadr City. The Soldiers of the 821st Horizontal Engineer Company from Summersville, WV, 769th Eng. Bn., 35th Eng Bde MND-B, are constructing the T-wall structure that separates the neighborhoods of Tharwa to the north and Jamilla to the south. (US Army photo/Sgt. Henry Bauer, 769th Eng. Bn., 35th Eng. Bde. MND-B)



the unit became involved in a 96 hour sporadic fire-fight, which erupted every two to four hours. Three days later, the company shifted to clearing operations in the southern area of Sadr City, which would be known as OE Gold. In mid-April, the company began assisting with the completion of the wall. M1 Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles provided security for the construction site along PL Gold, oriented north towards Sadr City. The company's attached infantry platoon from Bravo Company, 1/68 IN, provided the ground labor to emplace the walls. During the construction, the company was involved in a significant number of firefights. The extraordinary courage and bravery of the infantry soldiers was cited by all who witnessed the construction of the wall, including the members of the Navy Special Warfare (NSW) SEAL sniper team. One of the more harrowing tasks involved climbing the ladder to unhook the barriers from the crane. In doing so, the soldier would expose his upper body to militia gunners operating north of PL Gold. Although there were substantial amounts of reconnaissance and firepower monitoring the area, the enemy had the advantage of being able to hide and wait for exposed soldiers. While constructing the wall, the unit became engaged in daily contact. “It wasn't a matter of if there was [going to be] a fight, but when the fight was going to happen,” recalled Pvt Brandon J. Blake, 1/68 IN. When the wall was completed, the company accounted for the elimination of 188 enemy fighters.⁵⁰ The unit's contributions can best be demonstrated by the number of awards and medals submitted. In total, the unit submitted a 44 Army Commendation medals (40 approved), seven Bronze Stars medals with valor, and 14 Purple Heart medals.⁵¹ Over half of the unit personnel received an award with a valor recommendation.

Bushmaster Company, 1/14th IN

Around 1000 on 29 April, Bushmaster Company, 1/14th IN, became decisively engaged while emplacing barriers on Route Gold. During the mission a tank platoon provided outer security, while 2nd platoon and Strykers from the company HQ provided local security. The Bushmaster Company Commander, Cpt Logan Veath, along with members of 2nd platoon dismounted to emplace the barriers. Action began when an EFP struck one of the tanks. After securing the wounded tanker in a Stryker vehicle, the commander created a cordon to extract the wounded to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Callahan. During this consolidation, an

IED exploded underneath a Stryker vehicle engulfing it in flames. The enemy engaged the unit from multiple positions with small arms and RPG fire. Cpt Veath and another soldier, Sgt. Vandercook, ran 50 meters to remove soldiers from the burning vehicle. One of the soldiers was on fire and burst from the vehicle. Cpt Veath chased this soldier down to put out the fire and removed his burning clothes. Cpt Veath tossed the soldier over his shoulder and carried him 50 meters away to a Stryker vehicle. In one last heroic act, Cpt Veath and Sgt. Vandercook exposed themselves again to enemy fire as they moved obstacles from the roadway that prohibited the evacuation of the wounded.⁵²

Logistics – Building the wall

The 64th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) served as the primary logistical operator for actions around Sadr City. The high operational tempo forced the battalion to operate at twice the unit's normal level and capacity.⁵³ One of their more critical tasks became the estab-



Photo 6: Even with protection from a SEAL sniper team, M1 Abrams tanks, Air Weapons teams, and other infantrymen, the four to six man construction team from Bravo 1-68 IN (attached to Charlie Company 1-68 Armor) came under daily enemy fire from buildings north of PL Gold. From left to right: (just helmet) CPT Boyes, XO/C/1-68; (standing next to helmet) 1LT Poole, XO/C/1-6; (kneeling) PFC Nguyen B/1-68; (on ladder) SPC Ervin, C/1-68; (under ladder) SSG Lewis, C/1-68; (running towards camera) SGT Ziska, C/1-68.

lishment of two forward barrier holding areas. Located at the intersection of Route Gold and Route Aeros, the first holding area faced constant harassment from small arms and mortar fire. The second holding area, located at route Plutos, inside OE Gold, conducted 24 hour operations when the wall reached the halfway mark. To help Iraqi and US forces secure key areas inside OE Gold, the BSB delivered and emplaced a significant

amount of barrier materials, to include large concrete towers to JSS Sadr City and along the intersection of Route Gold and Delta. The Brigade repaired 27 M1 Abrams tanks, 16 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 16 Huskies, and 27 Mine Resistant Ambush Protection (MRAP) vehicles.⁵⁴

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) Actions

On 7 May, a 30-man NSW SEAL sniper team began the first of four operations to protect the infantrymen who were constructing the Gold Wall. When describing the infantrymen, a SEAL team officer stated, "They were awesome. They are our heroes. They are guys on the ground who exposed themselves to (enemy) shooters in high positions....these young guys from Idaho.... we idolized them...I wished we could have helped them out some more."⁵⁵ This specialized team developed their unique techniques in Ramadi and Fallujah during the construction of COPs. The strength of the team was the ability to deploy a substantial number of snipers into one position. They established over-watch positions forward of the Gold Wall construction site to protect the infantrymen and to allow them to target enemy forces. In essence, they created a mini-strong point armed with experienced, well trained snipers. On their mission, the team encountered enemy fire from 360-degrees. After expending much of their ammunition, the team had to be extracted with the assistance of Bradley fighting vehicles from the 3rd Brigade. However, the team's next three missions were more successful. The team often acted like "rodeo clowns" to direct enemy fire upon themselves rather than the construction site. The highest number (46) of enemy killed in action (EKIA) during one day occurred during a dust storm. Frequently, the enemy would utilize sandstorms to avoid detection by aerial observation platforms. In total, the snipers had 67 confirmed EKIA's during their eight days in support of the construction efforts along PL Gold.⁵⁶ In the end, this non-conventional team supplied the ground commander with the ability to locate, target, and eliminate a quick enemy – one who understood how to maneuver in an urban terrain. The militia fighters normally would dart out of alleys or rooftops before coalition armor and Stryker systems could acquire and engage them. The SEALs relied upon conventional forces for delivery of heavy firepower, and extraction

support as needed. This integration proved complementary since both the conventional and non-conventional forces benefitted from the strengths of each other. In describing the contributions of this team, BG Grimsley stated that the NSW SEAL sniper teams fundamentally changed the dynamics of the battlefield by their ability to get in and shake things up....because of their skills.⁵⁷ The SEALs utilized expertise and advanced systems to provide a buffer of protection for the ground forces. Through the efforts of many, the wall became a reality.

Small Unit Actions

Arriving from the eastern part of Baghdad, A Company, 1/21 Infantry deployed to JSS Ur on the evening of 25 March. Located northwest from the center of Sadr City, JSS Ur allowed for rapid projection of combat power and increased the coalition's ability to interdict militia fighters moving in or out of Sadr City and, therefore, is key terrain for coalition forces. On 20 April, two platoons (+) of 1/21 IN became decisively engaged against an EFP team and an armed group.⁵⁸ Around 0100, 2nd Platoon, A/1/21 Infantry placed three OPs west of JSS Ur to interdict and kill an active EFP team. At 0645, SFC Morris' team interdicted a five man EFP emplacement team. The ensuing fighting resulted in three enemy combatants killed, one enemy captured, and one enemy escaped. Thirty minutes later, SGT Litzler, from another OP, observed 15-20 suspected militia members receiving instructions from leaders. As the group moved to flank 2nd platoon, Litzler's team engaged nine combatants with various weapons. During the engagement, the OP received small arms and RPG fire. As they became compromised, 4th Platoon, B/1/21 IN maneuvered to extract the team. In doing so, the platoon discovered and eliminated two enemy personnel on rooftops. Various classified reports would later indicate that the 1/21 IN soldiers eliminated two key militia leaders, known as "high value individuals" (HVI). To recognize the actions of these soldiers, MG Hammond, awarded seven impact bronze star medals.⁵⁹

In early March, Sergeant Erik Olson, a member of the Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) assigned to Comanche Company 1/2 SCR, sensed that violence was brewing in the area. Around 15 March 2008, he noticed the attitude of the local population changed overnight. "They were scared of cooperating with coalition forces and

were afraid to allow us to come into their homes. Some (local residents) mentioned that the time was right for a showdown between Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and the coalition. The locals were scared of JAM. They wanted a way out, but there was nothing they could do," commented Sgt Olson

In the week prior to the uprising, Sgt Olson helped his unit and ISF members distribute 80,000 tip cards that asked for locals to provide information on criminal elements within the area. The cards included the phone number for the tip line at JSS Sadr City. During 1/2 SCR's fight to secure overwatch sites in OE Gold, Sgt Olson utilized the Long Range Audio Device (LRAD), to deliver the following message: "Everywhere else in Iraq is safe, except here. Think. Why is that?" At one point the local mosque played counter messages: "Don't listen to the lies spewed by the box of lies." Additionally, Sgt Olson used a dismounted loudspeaker system to inform the citizens that the militia was attacking the ISF and to request local residents call the tip line. He praised the citizens of Sadr City for utilizing the tip line even though it could mean death if they were exposed as a coalition or ISF informant. "It would have been easy for locals to stay at home and not call," explained Sgt Olson, "They knew they risked being killed if found to be helping (the coalition)."

In describing the violence, Sgt Olson comments, "On 26 March, after dark, on that day is when Hell on Earth just broke out. At that point I was an infantryman. We were fighting for our lives. It was just god awful craziness. A couple of times I was trying to play civilian non-interference messages, but we were taking it (enemy fire) from everywhere – rooftops, alleyways, cars, sewers. We were getting attacked from every direction, every angle," Olson said. "We were sent to an Iraqi Army checkpoint to bail them out, but we were asking 'Who is going to bail us out?' It was a macabre scene. There were tracers, wounded, and dead everywhere. At one point, one of the IA tanks was getting ready to engage one of our Strykers. I got on my loudspeaker and put out an anti-fratricide message. They were getting ready to engage with a 125mm main gun. It was just chaos everywhere."

Sgt. Alex Plitsas, a TPT leader from the 321st TPC assigned to Bravo Company 1/14th Infantry, helped draw out insurgent fighters. During the fighting in early April, insurgents engaged Bravo Company with small

arms or rocket propelled grenades RPGs from alleyways and other hidden positions. The US gunners on the Stryker vehicles simply did not have the opportunity to acquire and engage many of their attackers. To counter these “shoot and hide” attacks, Sgt Plitsas, through an interpreter, broadcasted taunts. The insults were defaming the honor of their attackers by casting them as cowards. He credits this tactic with bringing at least 10 fighters into the open, which were promptly eliminated by Bravo Company.

Restoration of Normalcy in OE Gold

After completion of the wall, elements from 821st Engineer Company became involved in route sanitation. This task included clearing debris and other unnecessary items that are used in obscure roadside bombs. They utilized heavy construction equipment such as D7 Dozers to clear (removal of debris, trash, rubble, and burnt out cars) routes that allowed Iraqi and coalition forces freedom of movement, and began the first steps in improving the appearance of a community. The soldiers would remove debris and trash from the roadway and the sides of the roads out 20-40 meters. Additionally, the unit smoothed rough areas along the roadway and roadside area. This particular technique assisted maneuver elements and route clearance teams to better locate disturbances in the ground that might indicate the presence of a roadside bomb. The amount of debris and trash was substantial as the area had not seen any government trash services in a long time. On one night mission, the company removed 60 dump truck loads of trash within a one mile stretch. In late April, brigade civil affairs teams began to develop contracts to employ hundreds of military age males to remove debris and to rebuild the war torn community.⁶⁰



Photo 7: The Iraqi Army distributed these types of fliers informing the residents of upcoming humanitarian missions.

By assisting the Iraqi Army to conduct humanitarian assistance (HA) operations, coalition forces helped demonstrate that the ISF was proactive and taking responsibility for much of the fight. LTC Haitham, the Civil Military Operations Officer for the 11th IA, led the way in planning and developing HA missions. LTC Haitham understood the military significance of winning over the population by first providing humanitarian assistance. To execute these HA missions, 3/4 ID and elements of the 1st Sustainment Brigade provided the 11th IA with humanitarian meals and bottled water during the night.⁶¹ Then, elements of the Iraqi Army distributed these goods to the residents of Sadr City during the daylight hours. The division utilized external media and coalition resource assets (Public Affairs, PSYOP Fliers (Photo 7), and Combat Camera) to portray the event as an “Iraqi” event. The net result was a significant improvement of the credibility of the Iraqi Army. Often, the residents expressed support for the Iraqi Army and asked them to stay in Sadr City and help eliminate JAM from the community.⁶²

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CMOC AT JSS SADR CITY

On 22 April 2008, the Sadr City Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) became operational at joint surveillance station Tharwa I (also known as JSS Sadr City) within OE Gold. The purpose was “to expand non-kinetic operations in OE Gold with the intent to energize civil military operations in Sadr City and as soon as possible establishing a direct relationship with local residents and establishing an IAC (Iraqi Assistance Center).”⁶³ The enemy was still very active when the brigade established the CMOC. On 28 April, militia elements attacked JSS Sadr City with powerful short range bombs, often referred as “lob bombs.” The building was hammered and would eventually be demolished. Fortunately, US and Iraqi casualties were relatively low as many bombs missed the building.

Task Force Gold transformed the area

The CMOC engaged with the local leaders and helped to establish the Neighborhood Advisor Council (NAC) and District Advisory Council (DAC) with OE Gold. Around June 2008, these groups had their first meeting in 14 months. Sadr City was a strategic center of



Photo 8: Soldiers with Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, provide security on a street in the Sadr City District of Baghdad as Iraqi army soldiers from 11th IA Division, conduct a humanitarian-aid mission on 5 April. Terrorist elements attacked innocent civilians, who had gathered to receive food and water. The Iraqi security forces, with support from MND-B soldiers, repulsed the criminal elements and regained security in the area. (U.S. Army photo/Sgt. Mark Matthews)

gravity within the MND-B OE. Therefore, the MND-B Commander and staff created an assistance and reconstruction task force on 30 May for OE Gold that would quickly develop projects to benefit the local residents. Commanded by Col Jared W. Olson, Deputy Commander 769th Engineer Brigade, TF Gold energized the efforts to revitalize the area and win the trust of the population. Although the 3rd Brigade continued to be the battlespace owner, TF Gold took control of project management and reported directly to the division. The task force had a number of unique peculiarities. First, the organization was comprised of engineers and civil affair teams. Second, the battlespace owner remained the 3rd Brigade, while Task Force Gold reported directly to the division. Third, TF Gold chose to quickly begin projects without receiving the ideal amount of input from GOI officials. They determined that getting projects started rapidly was simply too important⁶⁴ and the GOI's centralized approach often



Photo 9: SGT Nathan Leigh from the 432nd Civil Affairs Battalion (attached to 3-4 ID) processes the claim of a resident whose home may have been damaged at some point during the fighting with coalition forces. Inside the CMOC, the brigade established the Iraqi Assistance Center for compensation requests.



Photos 10: Conducting short duration, high impact projects became a key element in establishing a sense of normalcy in AO Gold. In the Hasha village, the CF developed contracts for locals to remove large trash piles. On Route Kansas, US funds paid for improvements to repair broken water systems. These photos are arranged in chronological order with the far left photos being taken prior to coalition reconstruction efforts. The photos to the right are at the completion of the reconstruction project. Courtesy: US Army 10 June 2008

caused delays in decision making and allocation of resources. Therefore, TF Gold worked through the local district advisory council to help identify and prioritize reconstruction projects.

The engineer and CA teams assessed areas and hired local contractors. They focused on removing debris; repairing key essential services such as sewer, electricity, and water; rebuilding parks, schools, soccer fields, and the Jamilla market; and revitalizing key areas that would lead to economic improvement. The overall concept of improving areas was not unique to Sadr City. MND-B had transformed Karkh, Dora, and other areas of Baghdad after conducting deliberate clearing operations. The response from the population to TF Gold was very positive. The enclave had not seen any essential services to any significant degree inside this area, and many of the residents had been without food rations for three months.⁶⁵ By June 2008, the CMOC initiated 200 micro-grant programs, valued at over \$400,000 in US dollars, and 83 reconstruction projects, valued at over \$13M US dollars. Within four months, Task Force Gold provided millions of dollars in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Over the next few months, a sense of normalcy returned to the area because of the massive amounts of dollars pouring into the area. The message became clear to the residents inside OE Gold and the rest of Sadr City – “If you cooperate with the Government of Iraq and the coalition, then economic benefits will follow.”

CONCLUSION

Previous attempts from 2004 to root out the insurgency inside Sadr City failed because

1) JAM held too much popular support and military strength, 2) coalition forces didn’t have sufficient troops to control much of Iraq and Sadr City, and 3) Iraqi Security Forces capabilities and confidence wasn’t sufficient to take on the JAM and the splinter militia groups. Many military leaders believed the residents were simply tired of JAM and other militia elements. The locals did not see a great need for “protection” as the Sunni insurgent activity and sectarian killings had dramatically declined in the last year. By 2008, the sophistication of the capabilities of coalition forces, and the development of the Iraqi Army had dramatically improved. The IA made significant strides in

Photo 11: A young Iraqi girl and her sisters give the thumbs up signal of approval to US Army Multinational Force - Iraq Commander GEN David Petraeus and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih as they walk through the Thawra 1 neighborhood in the Sadr City district of Baghdad after visiting TF Gold operations at JSS Sadr City on 4 June. (US Air Force photo/Tech Sgt. Cohen A. Young)



personnel, equipment, and professionalism of the officer and noncommissioned officer corp. By the summer of 2008, the population might not trust the IPs or NPs, but the Iraqi Army appeared to have secured the confidence and faith of the Iraqi populace.⁶⁶

The CF and ISF understood that for a number of years the Jamilla Market (wholesale produce market for Baghdad) was a revenue generating area. The 11th IA Commander, MG Muzhir, estimated that JAM collected at least two million Iraqi dinars per month in extra taxes from this source. Controlling this area was critical to the militia's ability to retain these sources of money. After the removal of the JAM influence from the market, the residents of Baghdad began paying fair market value for produce for the first time in years. For example, in many areas the retail price of fruits and vegetables dropped by 25 percent.

An analysis of the Battle of PL Gold shows the enemy made two critical errors that the coalition and Iraqi Government were able to exploit. First, by firing a substantial number of the rockets at the IZ, the populace turned away from JAM and the CF/ISF had an identifiable reason to accelerate efforts to restore GOI control of Sadr City. MND-B employed information operation measures to influence the citizens of Sadr City to the fact that the deteriorating conditions (ISF cordon, failing essential services, and coalition kinetic strikes) in Sadr City were caused by these criminal elements. When the IA entered Sadr City (above PL Gold) in May 2008, the residents welcomed their arrival. Second, the enemy became heavily engaged in direct firefights with CF along PL Gold. This strategy shift failed because the coalition was more easily able to target and destroy the enemy. Some US military leaders were surprised by the ferocity by which the militia was able to fight, not only for OE Gold, but against the US forces along the Gold Wall construction site.⁶⁷ In the end, the enemy lost over 700 fights and a number of their leaders, who were either captured or killed. Toward the end of May, the enemy appeared to be few in number and was less like to maneuver against the construction site.

There were three decisive points in this battle. First, on three consecutive days from 1-3 May, TF 17 and MND-B conducted precision strikes against SG/JAM HVIs⁶⁸ north of PL Gold. The targeting of senior militia leaders represented a significant shift in strategy since previous air strikes eliminated ground elements involved in direct fighting. By 12 May, the cumulative effect of these strikes persuaded many SG leaders to flee Sadr City and greatly demoralized

SGC fighters.⁶⁹ The second decisive point occurred during the construction of the Gold Wall. The enemy suffered a major setback when trying to contest the construction of this structure. During the five weeks of construction, the enemy lost his best and most committed forces, and the division demonstrated the ability to impose its will.⁷⁰ In many ways, the wall was like a bugzapper; it drew in the fighters which then allowed CF to target and destroy these groups. The wall provided the mechanism to give MND-B and other elements the opportunity to directly engage and defeat the JAM/SG fighters. Last, the ability of the Iraqi Army to regain their composure and establish check-points after JAM/SG seized the initiative was critical. Various ISF companies broke apart under JAM/SG pressure in March and April. Eventually the IA moved troops and armor to reestablish their positions. Overall, the IA kept their resolve and demonstrated that they have remarkably improved their capabilities.

None of the MiTT teams could cite a specific decision or event which could be characterized as a turning point for the 11th IA Division during the March/April timeframe. However, the Iraqis gradually gained confidence as they continued to operate and achieve battlefield successes. Some of the factors specifically cited as improving the ISF confidence include improvements in the ISF leadership, CF firepower from armored systems and AWTs, and ISF successes on the check-points and within OE Gold. By May 2008, the myth of the "ten foot" Mahdi soldiers disappeared and the 11th Iraqi Army soldiers developed confidence in their abilities.⁷¹

The coalition succeeded because of their determination and flexibility. Innovative ideas included massing ISR, analysts and AWT assets down to the brigade level; constructing a four kilometer barrier while under constant fire; utilizing a 30 man special operations sniper team in a conventional battle, and instituting a dynamic TF element that combined civil affairs and engineers. Perhaps the most significant impact of recovering the OE Gold area was the empowerment of the Iraqi Army. With CF support, the 11th IA Division accomplished their goal of establishing a security presence and clearing militia groups from OE Gold. This victory helped instill renewed confidence in the Jundi.

In a DOD press conference, COL Hort explained "Today, I think, as a result of the Basra fight, the Sadr City fight, as well as the fighting that was really going on all around Baghdad, against the special groups, we have seen a very focused and confident Iraqi security

force today that are actually going after the special groups of criminals. So I'd say that's a huge change, a significant change that we did not see as little as seven months ago. The other part of this is the government of Iraq's confidence in this, in getting after this part of the enemy that has been somewhat operating behind



Photo 12: On May 21, 2008 IA Soldiers from the 49th Brigade seized this huge cache near the al-Sadr Hospital. The cache included mortars, EFP, small arms rounds, RPG systems and a variety of other munitions. During clearing operations in Basra, the IA found huge caches of weapons and munitions, many of which appeared to have been recently supplied by Iran. In Sadr City, the results were very similar. By the end of June, the IA found several caches, including 175 IED, 76 EFP, numerous RPG, rifles, and over 320 mortar rounds. US Army Date Unknown

the scenes and affecting not only the coalition forces but the Iraqi security forces, not only in Baghdad but throughout the country.

Today we see a tremendous amount of confidence in the government of Iraq and their willingness to go after this part of the insurgency that has been relatively untouched for the last couple years. Today, it is definitely on the run and has the government and the Iraqi Security Force focused on that.”⁷²

On 12 May, the GOI and representatives of al-Sadr sign a 14-point agreement granting Iraqi military forces permission by the Mahdi Army to enter the district to establish security checkpoints and to hunt for rogue militiamen. Under the agreement, the US military would not enter areas of Sadr City north of al-Quds Street,

but the Mahdi Army promised to stop rocket attacks on US military bases and the Green Zone. On 20 May, two Iraqi Army brigades, without coalition ground support, moved unopposed north of PL Gold into the rest of Sadr City. Generally, the residents welcomed the arrival of the Army. JAM elements handed them

copies of the Koran as a sign of friend-ship. Once inside this section of the enclave, the Iraqi Army confiscated enemy caches, detained SGCs, maneuvered forces, and made a number of tactical decisions. By late June, the IA recovered over 205 caches comprised of mortars, rockets, various small arms, EFPs, and other types of weaponry. However, the groundwork for this success was laid when the Iraqi Army, with support from CF, regained their checkpoints and seized OE Gold. Two days prior to the Iraqi Army entry into northern Sadr City, al-Sadr agreed to a cease fire. During a subsequent phone conversation, an anonymous senior Sadrist said to MG Muhzir, 11th IA Division Commander, that

“Sadr City was special and required special treatment.”⁷³ The division commander responded: “I am the Iraq Army; there is no place that an Iraqi Army soldier cannot go ... including Sadr City.”

About the Authors:

Commander Doreen Fussman served as the 2nd Navy Military History Detachment Commander and the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian during January - August 2008. Prior to the mobilization, she spent three years serving at the Naval Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard. She is currently serving as the Training and Education Officer for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Command Transformation Headquarters in Norfolk, VA. CDR Fussman is employed by the University of Michigan, where she serves as the administrative manager of the Mathematics Department.

Major Tom Sills served as the Military History Detachment (MHD) Commander in support of Multinational Division-Baghdad in 2007 and 2008. In his previous Operation IRAQI FREEDOM deployment, he was a plans officer with the 30th Brigade Combat Team in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. He holds both a Bachelor of Arts and a Master of Arts degree from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. After completing his tour in Iraq in August of 2008, he returned to the North Carolina Army National Guard and his civilian occupation as a Deputy Sheriff with the Mecklenburg County

Sheriff's Office. In the May/June 2008 edition of *Military Review*, he authors a story of counterinsurgency and the actions of 1/4 Cavalry unit in southern Baghdad.

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⁵⁶ Oral history interview, Navy Seal team chief (names confidential), with CDR Doreen Fussman and MAJ Tom Sills, 5 July 2008.

⁵⁷ Oral interview, BG Grimsley, June 2008.

⁵⁸ 1/21 Infantry Monthly history Report, April 2008.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Email correspondence, SSG Frank Lugo, Team Sergeant, C/404th CA BN with MAJ Tom Sills, December 2008.

⁶¹ Brief, MND-B Humanitarian Assistance CONOPS, 2 April 2008.

⁶² Oral history interview, LTC Haitham & COL Qaism, HQ, 11th Iraqi Army Div, MAJ Tom Sills and Mass Communications Specialist John Curtis (US Navy history Detachment) 3 July 2008.

⁶³ Oral history interview with Majors Berman and Bailey with MAJ Tom Sills TF Gold, 9 June 2008.

⁶⁴ Oral history interview Col. Jared W. Olson, TF Gold Commander and Deputy Commander, 35th Engineer Brigade with Dave Spies 29 Sept 08.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Oral interview, Col Richard G. Jung, 11th IA MiTT Chief with MAJ Tom Sills, 3 July 2008.

⁶⁷ Oral interview, BG Grimsley, June 2008.

⁶⁸ Oral interview, MAJ Gibby, 3/4 S2.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ MND-B G3 Notes on the Battle of PL Gold, June 2008.

⁷¹ Oral interview, LTC David Mount, 11th IA Executive Officer with MAJ Tom Sills, 3 July 2008.

⁷² DOD news briefing with Col Hort, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 17 Nov 2008.

⁷³ Oral interview, Col Richard G. Jung, 11th IA MiTT Chief with MAJ Tom Sills, 3 July 2008.



Photo 12: Sewage from pipes damaged by special groups and criminal attacks on the Jamilla Market of the Sadr City district of Baghdad is hauled away by workers to pave the way for infrastructure improvements June 2. As soon as the sewage was removed, underground pipes were repaired and Iraqi workers began working on the road to speed the flow of traffic into one of Baghdad's largest market places. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech Sgt. Cohen Young)

Timeline of Events

Chronology of Key Events	
4th ID Assumes the MND-B OE from the 1 st Calvary Division	19-Dec (2007)
Muqtada al-Sadr extends his ceasefire	22-Feb (2008)
3/4 ID assumes Sadr City OE from 2/82 ABN	15-Mar
GOI initiate Operation Charge of the Knights in Basra to take control of the city from JAM and other militia groups	22-Mar
Setting the conditions - MND-B isolates and targets militia cells in Sadr City (Mar 23- April 5)	
al Sadr calls for 'Day of Civil Disobedience	25-Mar
MND-B begins to observe significantly elevated attacks levels from Special Groups. Many units around Sadr City crumble under pressure from SG/ JAM forces.	25-Mar
3/4 ID receives authorization to conduct operations south of PL Gold in Sadr City without approval from the MNC-I commander	26-Mar
An Air Weapons Teams from TF XII Aviation conducts the first of many successful engagements on IED/EFP and IDF teams in or around Sadr City	26-Mar
4/10 MTN & 11th IA Div limit vehicle movement into Northern Sadr City to 3 entry points	27-Mar
3/4 ID begins Striker Denial 1-2 SCR seizes POO sites south of PL Gold	26-7 Mar
1-68 CAB assumes Jamilla and additional combat power (7 companies of Abrams/Strykers) arrive or begin movement into the sector	27-Mar
After receiving small arms fire, C/1-68 AR directs the first GMLRs strike into a building along Route Gold (check date)	27-Mar
1-2 SCR begin clearing operations in Sadr City, south of PL Gold	27-Mar
11th IA conducts the 1st ISF humanitarian mission since the conflict erupted. During this food and water distribution in Tharwa, the IA come under mortar fire	27-Mar
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki issues an around the clock curfew for Baghdad	28-Mar
al- Sadr orders a ceasefire and issues a list of demands to the GOI	30-Mar
The GOI lifts the Baghdad Curfew. The Sadr City curfew remains in effect until April.	31-Mar

312 Tactical PSYOP Co. established 93.9 FM Radio Free Baghdad at JSS Sadr City	1-Apr
Iraqi Army secures OE Gold and the construction of the Gold Wall (April 6 - May 15)	
ISF re-establish checkpoints around Sadr City	5-Apr
3/4 ID conducts a follow & support mission of the 3/42/11IA movement into Sadr City to secure key areas south of PL GOLD	6-Apr
The Iraqi National Security Council issues statement calling on all political parties to disband the militias if they want to participate in national elections	6-Apr
A RPG attack on B/1-2 SCR results in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA	7-Apr
3-1 Iraqi Army finds 7 caches and 3 IEDs in Sadr City	8-Apr
An Armed Predator kills 10 SGCs along PL Gold	8-Apr
Major Mark Rosenberg, MiTT Chief to 2 nd Battalion, 42 nd IA Brigade is killed by an EFP	8-Apr
From JSS Ur, 3/4 raises an aerostat observation balloon observing Sadr City	10-Apr
C/1-68 AR kill 15 SGC members during enemy initiated complex attack along PL Gold	11-Apr
GOI lifts vehicle ban in Sadr City	12-Apr
Seven companies attached to 4/10 and 3/4 ID in support of containing SG uprising begin incremental movements back to parent units (need to figure out when they got there)	12-Apr
Sadrists initiate negotiations with the GOI	14-Apr
A company of Iraqi police inside Sadr City desert their station to militiamen. An ISF specialized unit recovers it the next day.	15-Apr
9 th IA and 3/7 Cav emplace barriers along Route Delta – separating Jamilla and Tharwa	16-Apr
Under the cover of a dust storm, militiamen began assaulting CF/ISF positions	17-Apr
3/4 BCT begins emplacement of the Gold Wall to seal off Jamilla and Tharwa from the rest of Sadr City	19-Apr
MND-B establishes a Civil-Military Operations Center in Sadr City	22-Apr
3/4 Establishes the ePRT Cell at the CMOC	23-Apr
Essential Service Projects begin in OE Gold	26-Apr

Under the cover of a heavy dust storm, insurgent launch attacks at Coalition and Iraqi positions. In two separate engagements, 22 and 16 militiamen were killed.	27-Apr
IRAM (aka-Lob Bombs) strike JSS Sadr City and FOB Loyalty resulting in 15 US WIA and extensive damage to 3 buildings	28-Apr
PM Maliki directs the BOC to prepare plans to clear Sadr City of SGCs and weapons	28-Apr
BOC directed by the Iraqi PM to develop a plan to clear Sadr City	28-Apr
During an engagement between elements of 1-68 AR/IN and SGCs, 3 M1A Abrams tanks are damaged, 1 Stryker vehicle destroyed, 6 US WIA and 28 SGCs KIA	29-Apr
MND-B and Task Force 17 conduct three key precision strikes that force many SGC leaders to depart Sadr City	1-3 May
30 man Navy Special Warfare (Snipers) team begins operations along PL Gold	7-May
LTG Abud briefs PM Maliki on the Sadr City security plan	7-May
Five engagements in Sadr City result in 18 EKIA, 4 EWIA and 5 IA WIA	9-May
TF 1-6 IN completes TOA with 1-68 AR for southern portion of OE Gold	10-May
Al Sadr announces a ceasefire and 14 Point Agreement (grants Iraqi forces permission to enter Sadr City)	11-May
The GOI and representatives of al-Sadr sign a 14-point agreement	12-May
The 3 rd Brigade completes the Gold Wall – sealing off Jamilla and Tharwa from the remaining two-thirds of Sadr City	15-May
Iraqi Army secures the northern portion of Sadr City and the Coalition accelerates humanitarian and reconstruction projects inside OE Gold (15May--	
Representatives from the Iraqi Alliance Party and the Office of Muqtada al-Sadr reach a 14 point agreement granting the Iraqi military (without US troops) permission to enter the remaining parts of Sadr City	18-May
Six battalions of Iraqi Army troops move into the northern districts of Sadr City as part of Operation Salaam (“Peace” in Arabic)	20-May
MND-B establishes Task Force Gold (Sadr City)	30-May
105 men begin in the first of several Neighborhood Watch Programs in Sadr City	10-Jun

COIN Revisited: Lessons of the classical literature on counterinsurgency and its applicability to the Afghan hybrid insurgency

Harald Håvoll
Norwegian Institute Norskof

[Overview] Prior to the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, little attention had been paid to counterinsurgency (COIN) in the USA and Europe, despite the considerable literature and experiences with this form of conflict since 1945. The limited focus that existed was primarily military in nature, despite the insistence of the classic literature on the political and civilian primacy of COIN. Experiences in Afghanistan since 2001 and in particular in Iraq since 2003 have put the focus on COIN. Combined with a renewed reading of the classics on COIN, this has resulted in a new and updated COIN Doctrine within the US Military: the FM 3-24. This report shows that the conflict in Afghanistan, although far more complex and thus to a degree qualitatively different from the insurgencies of the mid-20th century, can still be informed by the lessons and recommendations from the classic era. Greater attention to these lessons in the earlier phases of the conflict would probably have put the COIN Coalition in a better position than today. However, the situation in Afghanistan is grave, but not hopeless. Applying some of the lessons from the classical literature reviewed in this report, in particular unity of effort, might help to make the situation more manageable for the Afghan government, and improve the prospects of the Afghan people in the long run.

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Introduction

In December 2006 the United States issued a new official COIN doctrine, a joint US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) doctrine known as FM 3-24 in the Army and MCWP 3-33.5 in the USMC. This doctrine is unique in several aspects: first, the fact that it is com-

mon to the two services; second, it is the first official COIN doctrine since 1966; thirdly, it ranks higher in the US doctrine hierarchy than any previous doctrine related to irregular warfare (see Kronwall 2007: 6); and finally, its content signals a significantly new and more sophisticated approach to the phenomenon of COIN.

Otto von Bismarck once said that fools learn from their own mistakes whereas smart men learn from other peoples' mistakes (quoted in Waltz 1959: 220). It is clear from reading the doctrine that the USA has learnt not only from recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also from experience going decades back. In addition, the comprehensive reference literature shows that the USA has been willing to learn from the experiences of others as well. What impact this doctrine will have on procurement, training, organizational culture, and ultimately on practical results in the field, in particular for the Army, remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether this will have any effect on the traditionally military-heavy approach to COIN and whether the US civilian authorities will take it as seriously as the US military appear to have done.

This report inquires into the origin of COIN by studying some of the classical literature (the literature on the insurgencies and the "revolutionary wars" of the mid-20th century) and then analyses of the current conflict in Afghanistan in light of these findings. This will be done with reference to two questions:

1. What features characterize classical "revolutionary war," insurgencies, and counter-insurgencies?
2. To what extent is the current conflict in Afghanistan a classical insurgency and to what extent is it something different, and to what extent are the lessons from the classical era applicable?

The report looks into the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan in general, to see whether the recommendations in the classical COIN literature (and the FM 3-24) are being followed in this conflict. More specifically, it will discuss to what extent following these recommendations might enhance the COIN effort.

The term “war” will in this report be used only in its most narrow definition (except when in reference to the literature). First, when a term is used so very broadly, covering all aspects from thermonuclear war to war on drugs, it loses its analytical applicability; second, by calling something “war,” at least in the Western world, attention is drawn towards a problem that is seen as primarily of a military nature and requiring a military solution. Therefore, usage of the term war is here limited to a conventional interstate armed conflict of medium to high intensity.

Insurgency is a form of irregular conflict. Irregular conflict is a broad term defined by what it is not: it is everything but a conventional interstate armed conflict (war). It is an intrastate conflict where at least one of the actors is a sub-national or non-state actor and involves the use of organized armed violence of low to medium intensity (not necessarily continuously throughout the conflict but at least in some phases).¹ Insurgents, militias, terrorists, and organized crime are types of irregular actors, and guerrilla and terror possible methods or tactics used by such actors.

What is an insurgency?

Insurgency is an internal conflict – a form of civil war, but with the marked difference that in a civil war a nation is normally split into two or more parts, each occupied by different groups and armed by the remnants of the state’s former armed forces. As noted by Galula (2006:2–3), the ensuing fight soon resembles a conventional (regular) war. Nagl (2002: 24), as well as FM 3-24, describe insurgency as a form of revolutionary war. Galula uses the two as synonyms in his book, but with the evolved form of insurgencies we see today it is more correct to say the converse: that revolutionary war is a form of insurgency. O’Neill (2005) states this clearly: “Not all insurgencies are revolutionary wars.”

An insurgency involves a group challenging the local ruling power that controls the administration, police, and armed forces. The objective is to topple the existing government and seize power. An insurgency is therefore about regime change, and this is what distinguishes it from other forms of irregular conflict like organized crime and transnational terrorism. The insurgents have a strategy; they have clearly defined political objectives, and have at their disposal some means that they employ in certain ways in order to reach their goals. Organized crime, by contrast, is purely

parasitic, with little or no sense of serving a constituency other than its own members, and no other goals than self-aggrandizement. (Cf. Metz 2007: 29.) Insofar as the conflict contributes to these ends, perpetuation of the conflict is in their interest.

Insurgencies can also be classified by their founding motivation. The United Nations’ (UN) Manual on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups, operates with three categories of armed groups based on the underlying motivation: reactionary (reacting to some situation or something that the members of the group experienced or with which they identify); opportunistic (seizing on a political or economical opportunity to enhance their own power or position); or ideological (political ideology, ethnicity, religion, etc.). The classical insurgencies of the mid- to late 20th century (revolutionary wars) were primarily of an ideological nature, while today’s organized crime is opportunistic, and most militias are reactionary or opportunistic. Ideological groups may, however, engage in criminal activity in order to finance their struggle.

According to Galula, the classical, or revolutionary, insurgency can take one of two forms: the orthodox pattern and the bourgeois-nationalist pattern. The orthodox (or communist) pattern is almost identical to Mao Tse-tung’s “people’s war” concept. Mao formulated the concept of a protracted ideological struggle based on three phases, while Galula’s orthodox pattern consists of five steps. Mao’s three phases are, however, fully incorporated in Galula’s five steps:

1. Creation of a Party
2. United front
3. Guerrilla warfare
4. Movement warfare
5. Annihilation campaign

Both Mao and Galula stress that the areas affected by the insurgency may not be in the same phase or step at the same time, and that a reversal to a previous phase might become necessary when an unavoidable setback is faced. Indeed, this happened to Mao as well as to the other prominent practitioner of “people’s war,” Ho Chi Minh, in the two Indochina wars. A further interesting point with these theories is that Galula as well as Mao (and other authors included in the literature studied) unequivocally state that a guerrilla movement cannot win an armed struggle, and that a conventional force has to be built by the insurgents. Mao’s phase 3 and

Galula's steps 4 and 5 include the forming of a conventional military force that defeats the counterinsurgents in conventional battle.

The bourgeois-nationalist pattern is a shortcut bypassing the long and demanding work of building a solid platform in the form of a party, an armed wing, and solid support from the population. In this pattern a small group, or cadre, of insurgents engages in blind and random terrorism soon after establishing the group. The idea is that random bombings, arson, and assassinations conducted in a spectacular fashion by concentrated, coordinated, and synchronized waves will attract publicity for the cause and recruit new members. This phase of blind terrorism is followed by one of more selected terrorism. If successful, this pattern will then rejoin the orthodox pattern at step 3. (See Galula 2006, ch. 3.)

This pattern also covers what is called "focoism," a term associated with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Where, in the orthodox pattern, the mobilization of the masses makes possible the subsequent employment of violence, the focoists claim that initiating violence will work as a catalyst and mobilize popular support, and much more quickly. Except for Castro's success in Cuba, history shows that this approach, however plausible, is not effective. Mao and Ho Chi Minh would have said that 'foco' violence, rather than catalysing revolution, would instead expose the revolutionary movement at its weakest moment to a counterattack, as happened in Bolivia. Shy and Collier (1986: 850–51) claim that focoism is a product of the Latin temperament, and of the classic arrogance of young intellectuals to the real needs and grievances of the impoverished peasantry.

Characteristics²

Even though most insurgencies develop in much the same way, each insurgency is unique. The significance of the context was underlined by Mao:

- The laws of war – this is a problem that anyone directing a war must study and solve.
- The laws of revolutionary war – this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.
- The laws of China's revolutionary war – this is a problem anyone directing a revolutionary war in China must study and solve. (quoted in Galula 2006:xi)

Some characteristics common to most insurgencies are:

1. Political primacy of the struggle

In a conventional "Jominian" war, politics will act as an instrument of war. Diplomacy, propaganda, and economic actions support the military operations, which represent the main effort. In an insurgency, the converse applies: the violent actions undertaken by the military arm of the insurgency are not the main effort but merely actions executed to support the propaganda effort, which in turn contributes to the overall political struggle. Rupert Smith (2005: 167) calls this "the propaganda of the deed"; a strategy where the primary role of the armed actions is to provoke (over) reactions on behalf of the counterinsurgents he calls "a strategy of provocations." A classical insurgency is first and foremost a political struggle, so all actions must be evaluated against their political effect before undertaken.

2. The population is the objective

As a corollary of the above, in a political struggle the population becomes the objective. It would be stupid for the insurgents to confront the government in a conventional attack before the balance has shifted to their advantage. According to Mao, the first two phases in a revolutionary war are about changing the correlation of forces in the insurgents' favour. Common sense therefore indicates that an alternative battlefield more in the insurgents' favour has to be found. This battlefield is the population. If the insurgents succeed in alienating the population from the government, controlling them physically and winning their support, then the insurgency will eventually succeed. The fight is for the people and as Rupert Smith would say: amongst the people.

The support of the population thus becomes the *sine qua non* for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. The insurgents need the support for food, shelter, information, and sometimes weapons. The insurgents make full use of their ability to dissipate into the populace, something Mao described being able "to swim like fish in the water."

The counterinsurgents are totally dependent on reliable intelligence in order to defeat the insurgents, and only the population can provide this. But the people will not provide this information unless they feel safe from reprisals from the insurgents. The dilemma

for the counterinsurgents is that they need this information in order to win the conflict, but people will not provide this information before the counterinsurgents can prove that they are at least beginning to win the fight (Nagl 2002:3). In order to achieve this they will have to separate “the fish from the water,” as the British succeeded in doing during the Boer War of 1899–1902 and the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s. This strategy was also pursued by the French in Algeria.³

Support from the population will vary in degree, from active participation to passive acceptance. The population as a whole will consist of a small group of active supporters on the one side and small group of active opponents on the other side. In the middle the largest group is to be found – those that either passively support one of the sides or are disengaged observers. The struggle is first and foremost over this last group.

The insurgents will employ a combination of “sticks and carrots” to gather necessary support. Force will eliminate the open enemies and intimidate potential ones into submission. Persuasion brings a minority of supporters – they are indispensable – but force rallies the rest. (Galula 2006: 34)

3. Role of propaganda

The insurgents will build their rhetoric on a narrative that explains the origin of the struggle, its objective and purpose. The narrative need not overlap completely with the cause as long as it serves its purpose: to gather support from the population and to undermine the government narrative (if it has one!). This narrative is distributed and transmitted by propaganda. As noted, earlier armed actions tend to support the propaganda rather than the other way around, as typically is the case with traditional Western military campaigns.

4. A protracted struggle

An insurgency is a methodical and painstakingly long and often slow process of rallying support and building strength. Mao’s fight against the Chinese nationalist and the Japanese occupation took 22 years (if 1927 is taken as the starting year); Ho Chi Minh’s struggle against the French, Americans, and the South Vietnamese took 30 years; the Malayan Emergency lasted 12 years and the Algerian insurgency eight. In the first phases when the political platform and the organization are being built by cadres, it is imperative to avoid confronting the strength of the counterinsurgents.

Thus, only sporadic hit-and-run actions will take place, aimed at rallying support and undermining the image of the counterinsurgents by showing that they are not able to provide security for the population. In the beginning the insurgents’ operational objective will be to avoid defeat, whereas what the counterinsurgents need is an early victory. As time passes without any decisive results, the insurgency will grow in force and combating the counterinsurgency will become harder and harder. One of the insurgents’ primary assets is patience, while impatience is the counterinsurgents’ liability.

5. Asymmetry in resources and motivation

The relationship between insurgents and counterinsurgents is from the outset characterized by an asymmetry that will gradually be reduced as the insurgency gains support and resources. From the outset the counterinsurgents will have at their disposal an overwhelming advantage in tangible resources: formal diplomatic recognition (international legitimacy) as well as control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of national power; control of the administration and police; financial resources; industrial and agricultural resources; control of transport and communications facilities; and command of the armed forces. In terms of intangible resources, however, the situation is reversed. Here the insurgents have a formidable asset – the ideological power of their cause. The counterinsurgents have everything but a cause, while the insurgents have nothing but a cause. The insurgents’ strategy is to turn their intangible assets into concrete ones, while the counterinsurgents’ strategy is to prevent their own intangible liabilities from weakening their concrete assets (Galula 2006: 3–4)

6. Asymmetry in organization

A classical insurgency will normally be built around a core group or cadre of very dedicated members organized centrally and hierarchical. The actual armed struggle, however, will be conducted by small and independent units operating outside of direct and continuous control from the political leadership. They are guided in their actions by a common idea or vision. The counterinsurgents – consisting of the government, the administration, the police, and the armed forces – are normally rigid bureaucracies. When these receive external support it will generally come in the form of conventional armed forces. These rigid forces, often doctrinally based on the conventional military wisdom

of mass, will have great problems in defeating the more fluid and networked insurgent organization that very quickly can disperse into the population or into rough terrain. Large military units present a larger footprint in the engagement space: they tend to be slow, noisy, and highly visible, thus presenting themselves more as targets than as an efficient counterinsurgent force. “It takes a network to defeat a network,” so the counterinsurgents must either seek to reorganize according to this wisdom or find other ways of reducing the negative effect of their organization.⁴

Prerequisites for a successful insurgency

David Galula holds that there are two necessary prerequisites for a successful insurgency: a cause, and a weak state. In addition, other factors will influence the outcome, like the environment, outside support, and the presence of sanctuaries.

A cause

A solid and lasting cause is required in order to attract as many supporters as possible at the outset, while alienating as few as possible. The ideological foundation of the classic insurgencies serves this purpose better than the motivation for the opportunistic and reactionary groups. In addition to the political ideologies of the mid-20th century, today’s ideologically-based insurgencies also include nationalism, ethnicity, and religion.

Most people would prefer the absence of violence to active participation in an armed struggle, so motivation for the latter must be strong. Ideology alone is seldom sufficient to stir up a mass mobilization, because ideology is often associated with elite (Rekkedal 2004: 8). Insurgents will therefore seek to supplement their ideological cause with something that can resound more deeply among the target population, such as a strong sense of falling victim to injustice, the presence of foreign occupiers, or on deep-felt grievances. The cause does not have to be static but may be dynamic. The movement may manipulate, even create causes as the struggle progresses if this serves their ends. (Tomes 2004: 27).

A weak state

Insurgencies appear almost exclusively in weak or failing states. After all, the definition of a strong state is that it holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of organized armed violence internally and externally, and that it can meet the population’s basic needs like security, shelter, medical care, and sustenance. Attempting an insurgency in a strong state means courting failure, as support from the people will not materialize and thus the counterinsurgency forces will have little problem crushing the insurgents. By contrast, in a weak state, the widespread grievances and injustice needed for the insurgents to augment their ideologically founded cause will often be present. Insurgencies are bottom-up movements; an administrative vacuum at the bottom, the local level, caused by incompetent and corrupt public servants, will play the population into the arms of the insurgents (Galula 2006: 19).

Other factors

Other factors that influence the outcome include the environment, which is made up of geographic factors, demographic factors, and economic factors; outside support, which can take the form of moral, political, technical, financial, or military support; and the presence of sanctuaries, either within the disputed territory or in neighbouring states, thus becoming part of outside support. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents might come to rely heavily on external support, whether occasionally or throughout the struggle.

To sum up the potential influence of these other factors: the ideal situation for an insurgency would be a landlocked country with the approximate shape of a blunt armed star, with large swaths of jungle, swamps and/or mountainous terrain, particularly in the border areas; in a tempered zone with a large and dispersed rural population (a concentrated urban population is easier to control); a primitive economy; and with outside support available.

The territory in question can be divided into three zones: the “white” zone is where there is a high support for the government and where the insurgents are severely restricted in their operations. In the “pink” area, support for the two sides is reasonably evenly distributed and the insurgents will be able to operate, albeit with caution. This is the transit and support zone for the insurgents. The “red” areas are the insurgents’

strongholds, with the majority of the population either actively supporting them, or at least acquiescing. This is where the insurgents' safe havens or sanctuaries are found.

Counterinsurgency in the classical era

Provided that Galula's prerequisites are correct, the most efficient way to fight an insurgency would either be to fight its cause and/or to strengthen the state. The active and correct use of propaganda that undermines the insurgents' narrative will contribute to the first of these. However, propaganda alone will seldom suffice, as the insurgents' narrative is normally stronger (in the view of the population) than that of the government.

Another very efficient strategy would be to co-opt the insurgents' cause. In practice, this is rarely a viable course of action as it usually would mean that the government relinquishes the very power it is fighting for. In those historical cases where this approach has been followed, however, it has proven highly successful. When General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner for Malaya and Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Malaya in 1951, he was given an in-brief in Whitehall which began with: "The Policy of Her Majesty's Government in Great Britain is that Malaya should in due course become a fully self governing nation" (Nagl 2002: 88). The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had adopted a nationalistic rhetoric in order to augment their narrative, but when the British co-opted this nationalistic rhetoric the MCP was left with only the political ideology. The majority of the Malayan population was traditionally conservative peasants, intuitively sceptical to a radical ideology like communism, so the MCP lost much of its recruitment base.

It can be equally difficult to strengthen a weak state. Such a state is weak for a reason. However, allocating the limited resources available into the stricken areas combined with political reforms will contribute to the counterinsurgency effort. It is important not to focus solely on re-establishing the monopoly on armed violence but also to improve the state's ability to alleviate the suffering and grievances of the population, as the insurgents' narrative is closely related to this.

Normally co-opting the cause is not an option and the limited will and resources available for strengthening the state will not be sufficient to quell the insurgency. If

the insurgency has reached the stage where it has grown strong and is employing guerrilla forces, a broader counterinsurgency effort is required. Depending on the weight and role of the military component, this effort can take two forms: a direct or an indirect approach. These must be regarded as ideal types and will not appear in their purest forms, but the major characteristics will be evident: the direct approach is predominantly a military effort guided by military logic, while the indirect approach is predominantly a civilian effort, civilian-led and dominated by a civilian (political) logic.

The Direct Approach

The logic behind this predominantly military approach is that "a war is a war is a war" (Col Harry Summers, quoted in Nagl 2002:27). Thus an insurgency is just another variant of war and is best approached with conventional forces that seek to defeat the opponent on the battlefield, or as Eisenhower once said: "If we have the weapons to win a big war we certainly can win a small one" (quoted in Nagl 2002:49). This approach is based on employing massive and overwhelming firepower against the armed insurgent groups, as without its military arm the insurgent's will to fight is irrelevant. This approach is equivalent to the attrition approach in conventional war. One seeks to avoid civilian casualties – not because the population is the objective, but as a means to an end; civilian casualties tend to undermine the counterinsurgents' legitimacy. This approach may include other activities than military ones, but these are secondary and serve to back up the military effort. The campaign is military-led and the military effort is regarded not only as a necessary but, indeed, a sufficient condition for success.

The problem with this approach is that it is very costly and that it deals with the symptoms rather than the root causes of the insurgency. This has traditionally been the American approach to these types of conflicts (pre-2003). Although the historical record does not support this approach, the main opposition to the new COIN doctrine has come from proponents of this tradition. Dr. Conrad Crane, lead author of the Field Manual (FM) 3-24, listed some of the criticisms against the doctrine during a COIN seminar in October 2007: the doctrine is wrongheaded because only brutality can quell an insurgency; the doctrine should focus more on the enemy; and the doctrine undervalues the contribution that technology can make to COIN. (See Wipfli & Metz 2007).

Whereas the indirect approach takes full account of the importance of winning the “hearts and minds” of the people, the direct approach is more about “sticks” than “carrots” and can best be illustrated by a comment the Sir Jim Hackett character delivers in the final scene in one of the episodes of the brilliant British comedy series “Yes, Minister: If you got them by the balls – their hearts and minds will follow!”

The Indirect Approach

The indirect approach takes into account the civilian and political nature of an insurgency. The population is regarded not just as a means to an end, but as the end itself. A marginalized insurgency is in the worst case merely a law-and-order challenge and not an existential problem for the government and an insurgency without popular support remains marginal. The challenge consists of separating “the fish from the water” without alienating the water. In this approach the military effort is both necessary and important, but it is not the dominating and controlling instrument. The effort is civilian-led and as many instruments and actions as possible are integrated under this leadership. Together with the military effort this approach involves an extensive police operation, an intensive propaganda effort, as well as a broad social programme (Trinquier 2006: 37). According to Galula (2006), a good counter-insurgency campaign is 80 percent civilian effort and 20 percent military.

The main guiding principle is unity of effort (alternatively unity of purpose). An integrated, comprehensive or “whole of government” approach is a recurrent theme in all the literature on COIN since the 1960s. Within the military, unity of effort is normally achieved through Unity of Command, but where this is not possible some level of unity of effort can be achieved by sharing a common vision and by sharing information on plans and intentions. Information (hearts and minds) campaigns become as central to the effort as kinetic force. An alternative to Unity of Command can be something like what the British introduced in Malaya – a committee system.

The expanding ink spot

Based on their experience in the Boer War and the Malayan Emergency, the British developed a concept dubbed “the expanding ink spot.” Seldom will the counterinsurgents enjoy the luxury of having at their

disposal enough forces (military and police) to secure the whole territory at the same time.⁵ With limited forces available, the worst tactic would be to establish secure islands in an ocean of insurgents and hostile population. During the Malayan Emergency, the British established a defensible secure area to where they relocated about 400,000 Chinese squatters into 400 so-called New Villages. To reduce the inconvenience inevitably associated with this, the British ensured that these New Villages had a functioning local administration, their own schools and hospitals, and sufficient supplies to sustain the population. Static military forces provided external security for the villages, while police provided internal security. Initially, a strict curfew was enforced, adding to the inconvenience but aiding “the separation of the fish from the water.” During the curfew it could be assumed that anyone moving in or out of the villages was either an insurgent or an insurgent supporter. Eventually a local home guard was established which gradually took over responsibility for security as its members gained competence and proved loyal. This freed the static military forces for other tasks like helping to expand the area under government control. As the people in the villages felt secure and had some of their needs fulfilled, the word spread to people outside the area under control, easing the task of expanding the ink spot. Intelligence also began trickling in when the locals felt secure from the insurgents. Acting on this intelligence, the mobile forces could put pressure on the insurgents and thus aid the ever-expanding ink spot.

Use of force in an indirect approach

Despite Galula’s recommended 80–20 distribution between the civilian and military effort in an indirect approach, the relationship is almost opposite when it comes to the focus of the literature studied, measured in scope of the text. One explanation might be that most authors who have written on the subject are military or ex-military, augmenting the tendency to a military-heavy focus in COIN.

Some central characteristics of COIN and some guiding principles are as follows:

- Learning and adapting
- Minimum use of force
- Focusing on static forces, particularly the police
- Empowering the affected nation’s security forces, institutions, and capacity to govern.

The struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents is a fight over who learns and adapts the quickest. FM 3-24 states: “Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic do not” (p.x). In high-intensity manoeuvre wars, the one that can collect information, make decisions, and act the fastest will win. But outpacing the enemy’s decision cycle (the so-called “observation, orientation, decision, act (OODA) loop”) is irrelevant in COIN, since it is a low-frequency conflict. What is relevant is who can outpace the other’s learning cycle: who has the best learning organization that can rapidly implement changes in strategy, organization, and tactics based on recent experience.

This is a Darwinian and asymmetric competition. Those insurgents that survive the first encounters will have learnt and adapted: those that failed to learn will have perished. The surviving insurgents will continuously learn and adapt, thereby becoming more and more competent in the deadly struggle that characterizes some insurgencies. The counterinsurgents, however, and in particular their external support, rotate their forces frequently. As soon as the individuals and units have begun to grasp the complexity of the situation – including the local environment, the local culture, and the insurgents’ tactics – they are rotated, and new inexperienced forces take their place. These will have to start almost from scratch. By contrast, the insurgents are able to stay in the area over a long time, continuously acquiring new experience and adapting accordingly.

This imbalance can be compensated to a certain degree by institutional learning and producing relevant doctrines. Experience shows that doctrines, tactics, and training are most efficient when developed and conducted locally, because a centralized process will take too long. This can, however, remedy the learning lag in relation to the insurgents only to a limited degree. The lag will inevitably grow with time, and in order to compensate for the insurgents’ faster learning cycle the counterinsurgents should not have shorter rotations than 12 months; they should develop local training and doctrine centres and reorganize similar to networks, at least for their mobile forces.

In order not to lose the support of the people, the counterinsurgents must exercise minimum use of force and concentrate the bulk of their forces on protecting the population (Nagl 2002: 30). Most of the military forces should be employed in a static role, as local patrols and perimeter defence of villages and hamlets.

The more capable forces will be employed as mobile forces operating in small, agile units which seek out and engage the guerrilla. The static forces should not be quartered in fortified bases separated from those they are meant to protect, but rather live and operate among the local population.

The mobile forces will harass the guerrilla and force them to be constantly on the move, thus preventing them from recovering, gaining force, and planning new attacks. A guerrilla on the move is also more susceptible to detection and subsequent attacks, at the same time as they are prevented from approaching the population for support and intelligence, or from intimidating the local people.

The static (defensive) as well as the mobile (offensive) units are necessary contributions to the overall effort, but only when employed in concert. The one is inefficient without the other. It is the synergy that produces the desired effect. The static forces are the most important contribution, but without the mobile forces the insurgents will be able to continue their operations unabated and may eventually wear down the counterinsurgents.

A counterinsurgency is a police mission more than a military mission. As soon as an area or village is cleared of insurgents by the mobile forces and static forces have taken up defensive positions on the perimeter, police forces should be employed within the cleared and secured area. This police force should be indigenous, preferably locally recruited. Local police have a better understanding of the local conditions. Moreover, because they symbolize local ownership, they stand a better chance of collecting actionable intelligence from the population. The police’s *modus operandi* is also more in line with the minimum use of force principle so crucial in COIN.

The insurgents are criminals, not legitimate warriors. Leaving as much as possible of the security operations to the police will support the labeling of the insurgents as petty (albeit armed) criminals with the local population and thus undermine their narrative and legitimacy.

With time, also the static military forces should be replaced by locally recruited paramilitary or home guard forces. This can give the local population a stronger sense and share of their own security – as was so successfully done by the British in Malaya.⁶ The static military forces can then be released for more

demanding tasks elsewhere, thus contributing to expanding the ink spot.

The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the nation affected by the insurgency will have to win on its own. Achieving this requires the development of viable local leaders and institutions. External forces and agencies can help, but local elements must assume responsibility in order to achieve real victory. While it may be easier for external military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. Eventually, all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers: the sooner the main effort can be transferred to local institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better (FM 3-24: Para. 1-147).

The special nature and characteristics of an insurgency and the discussion above can be illustrated by the nine paradoxes of COIN listed in FM 3-24 (1-26 and 1-28):

- Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be
- Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is
- The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
- Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
- The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than external forces doing it well
- If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next
- Tactical success guarantees nothing (understood as tactical military success)
- Many important decisions are not made by generals

The Afghanistan conflict and the relevance of classic COIN

Nature of the Insurgency

In addition to the critique of the FM 3-24 noted above, Dr. Crane mentioned some other factors at the same seminar: the doctrine reflects 20th-century

insurgencies more than contemporary ones; and the doctrine is irrelevant because contemporary internal wars may include elements of insurgency, but are not insurgencies, strictly speaking. The natural question relating to today's situation in Afghanistan thus becomes: is it a classical insurgency or is it something different? And if it is something different, does this necessarily mean that the lessons learned from the classic insurgencies are irrelevant?

Most of the modern literature on insurgencies and irregular conflict uses the term 'insurgency' to describe the situation in Afghanistan, but with variations in the degree to which this term is associated with the classical form. Many authors seem to hold that it is an evolved form of insurgency, but they differ as to whether it is an insurgency of a different kind or is merely different in degree.

Some hold that the considerable increase in variables – with many actors and their sprawling motives – makes the Afghan insurgency different in nature from the monolithic, black-and-white national insurgencies of the revolutionary wars or the classic insurgencies of the 20th century. Despite their unconventional and irregular nature, these conflicts were relatively clear. It was basically a question of two kinds of actors opposing each other: the government and its supporters against the insurgents and their support. Today's insurgents in Afghanistan, however, consist of a plethora of actors ranging from the Taliban, via a multitude of militias and criminal gangs, to al-Qaida and its global jihad. In addition, the counterinsurgent camp consists of a multitude of actors with sometimes varying degrees of commitment and different motives and understandings of the conflict. All actors within each camp are interconnected and interdependent (sometimes across the camps), making the increase in complexity exponential. A holistic point of departure would support the conclusion that the Afghan insurgency is an irregular conflict of a different kind than the classic form.

The Taliban's fight against the Afghan government and its external support bears many similarities to a classical insurgency. The Taliban has an ideologically (religious) based cause, augmented by a nationalistic rhetoric ("expel the foreign and infidel troops") to form a narrative that resounds at least among parts of the population (in particular among the Pashtuns). They have a strategy in which the political objective is to oust the Karzai government and the foreign troops, and to re-establish their own government. The

means they are employing is a propaganda campaign supported by terror and guerrilla warfare in a fight with the government and its supporters, mainly the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The struggle is first and foremost a political struggle for support from and control over the population. It seems to be a protracted fight (more than six years so far with no end in sight) characterized by an asymmetry in resources and organization. Afghanistan is a weak state with limited capacity to control the use of violence and to alleviate the grievances of the population. Incompetent and corrupt public servants further compound the grievances and injustice felt by the local population. This adds up very closely to a classical insurgency, with the small difference from the revolutionary wars being that Taliban has already been in power but was ousted and is now fighting to regain power.

Another factor that makes the Taliban insurgency different from the classic form is that the first phase in Mao's Peoples War, the slow and methodical building of a party and an organization, is long past. The second of Mao's phases seems to fit with the present situation, with an armed guerrilla struggle at its core; however, phase three will probably never materialize. It is not likely that the Taliban will organize as a conventional army to face the Afghan Army and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a traditional battlefield setting – and why should they?⁷ Today's insurgencies do not seek a military victory (cf. Hammes in Terriff et al. 2008: 109). That would be to play to the counterinsurgents' strength. Patience is the insurgents' greatest asset while impatience is the counterinsurgents' liability – and this is particularly true with regard to external support from Western countries. With their current approach, the Taliban seem to be winning by not losing. Because of the impatience and risk aversion expressed by domestic media and among the home audience of countries providing foreign support, the counterinsurgents may lose by not being seen to be winning.

Thus, at the core of the conflict in Afghanistan lies an approximately classical insurgency, but there are also a wide range of other actors with greatly differing objectives and motivations. The Taliban insurgency is only one part of the Afghan conflict, albeit a significant one. In addition, the Afghan insurgency is embedded into the global jihadist insurgency run by al-Qaida. For al-Qaida, Afghanistan is but one of several battlefields in their struggle to reinstate the "Caliphate." Their

objectives and means overlap to a large degree, both sharing the same world view and the same objective for Afghanistan. Their means and methods include guerrilla operations and terrorism to support an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at the local and global audience alike. To complicate matters further, many different militias and criminal organizations make up the insurgent camp. These groups are a heterogeneous lot with differing objectives, motivation, and means at their disposal.

The "regular" actors include the COIN forces comprising the government with all its aspects, and the international support in the shape of international organizations like the United Nations (UN), NATO, the World Bank and the European Union (EU), as well as national actors (the United States (US) and many of the nations comprising the ISAF play national roles as well). The presence of neutral actors not counted as COIN forces, like non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the international media, further contributes to the Afghan mosaic. Moreover, the population of Afghanistan is heterogeneous and fragmented by a tribal structure with a range of ethnicities and languages. These people do not have a tradition of loyalty to a central government, but identify with those with similar kinship ties or patrilineal descent. (Jones 2008: 32)

This wide variety of actors with their broad range of motivations and activities certainly makes Afghanistan something other than a classic insurgency – but is this a question of degree, or in fact a different kind of irregular conflict? The answer to this question has implications for how one approaches the conflict. If it is a difference in degree only, then the recommendations from the classical counterinsurgency literature should be applicable and sufficient. If, however, it is a difference in kind, a totally different approach might be needed. Some of the recent literature (e.g. Metz, Hammes) tends to favour the view that it is a new kind of conflict, but their motivation for doing so seems more to provide a wake-up call to shake the traditional US military (direct) approach to COIN and force a rethinking within the US establishment, rather than promoting a totally new nature of insurgencies. They still call it "insurgency" and their understanding of contemporary irregular conflict seems to be more along the lines of an evolved form of insurgency. Their recommendations for a rethinking of insurgency are similar in kind to what in this paper has been described

as an indirect approach. The compromise position, and one that seems to overlap to a large degree with most commentators, is that it is a hybrid form of insurgency: it contains major elements of the classical form, but is also qualitatively different because of its complexity. Knowledge of, and lessons learned from, the classical form are necessary but not sufficient to understand the nature of the insurgency and to choose courses of action for managing it.

Contributing to the complexity facing the counterinsurgents are the different understandings and uses of the terms “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency.” Several commentators and the media tend to apply the term insurgency exclusively to the armed operations of the insurgents and counterinsurgency exclusively to the security (military and police) operations of the government and its supporters. This usage should be discouraged. According to the majority of authors writing on insurgencies (including the classics), insurgency and counterinsurgency are umbrella terms for the whole range of operations, instruments, and actions undertaken by each side. They stress the importance of understanding an insurgency as mainly a political struggle, and the primacy of political and civilian measures in a counterinsurgency. This reflects the problem alluded to earlier in this report: most authors and commentators on COIN have been military or ex-military, contributing to this misunderstanding. This link between the terms and the military tends to reinforce a military heavy approach despite these authors’ recurring emphasis on the political and civilian nature of an insurgency. Their use of the words “war” and “warfare” in connection with “insurgency” and “COIN” (as in COIN warfare, 4th generation warfare, irregular warfare, etc.) further contributes to this confusion.⁸

The following case study of the Afghan insurgency is based on the assumption that it is an evolved and complex form of insurgency, a hybrid insurgency, containing elements of a classical insurgency but only to a certain extent. The lessons and recommendations from these insurgencies are a necessary prerequisite for understanding and conducting a successful COIN campaign in Afghanistan, but they are not sufficient in themselves. Bearing this in mind, the following discussion will focus on these lessons and recommendations.

The Afghan hybrid insurgency

The earlier the better

The earlier the government and its supporters recognize the presence of an insurgency and understand its nature, the greater the probability of success for the COIN forces. Understanding the nature of the conflict makes it easier to choose the right strategy, and acting early before the insurgency has had the time to mature and grow strong increases the possibility of this strategy being effective. Today’s problematic situation in Afghanistan for the COIN effort stems from not meeting these two requirements from the outset.⁹

The initial campaign for the predominantly US forces was counter-terrorist in concept and physical and military in focus, and the main military effort was dominated by a direct approach in the form of the OEF’s terrorist hunt (Mackinlay & Al-Baddaway 2008: 2).

Crushing the Taliban regime was seen as a necessary part of this campaign – a means to an end – since the Taliban regime had provided support to al-Qaida’s global jihad in the form of a sanctuary for the arming, training, and deployment of terrorists worldwide.

Nation-building was not, however, initially regarded as a necessary part of the international campaign (Barno 2007). As recently as October-November 2000 President Bush stated in several pre-election speeches and television debates that US Armed Forces should not be involved in nation building.

“Let me tell you what else I’m worried about: I’m worried about an opponent (Gore) who uses nation building and the military in the same sentence. See, our view of the military is for our military to be properly prepared to fight and win war...” (Speech in Chattanooga, Tennessee, 6 Nov 2000).

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine was still dominant, according to which US military force was to be employed in an intervention only as a last resort, with clear political backing and overwhelming force, and with the aim of getting the work done quickly and then pulling out. This all pointed towards a light footprint approach from the international community, including the UN. This has provided the insurgents in Afghanistan with a head start, as they were given time to recuperate and reorganize with impunity, mainly in

Pakistan. Moreover, the lack of social and developmental support to the impoverished Afghan people has made them more susceptible to the Taliban narrative and cause than necessary. The conflict soon became transformed from a war of regime change and terrorist hunt into a full-blown insurgency, but without the new Afghan government and the international community recognizing this initially.¹⁰

The US entered the Afghan conflict with no updated and valid doctrine for counterinsurgencies.¹¹ The new US COIN doctrine (FM 3-24) is a product of the errors (and successes) made initially in Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the lessons from the insurgencies of the Cold War. Reading the FM 3-24, it seems the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq have validated most the recommendations put forward in the classic literature on COIN. With hindsight, a better reading and implementation of these lessons prior to 2001 would most probably have resulted in a better situation in Afghanistan from the COIN perspective.

The heavy-handed, military focused, direct approach did achieve some of its more limited tactical objectives of capturing and killing terrorists and insurgents. However, that culturally insensitive approach has probably created more insurgents than it has captured or killed. In particular, the limited focus on the population typical of the direct approach has contributed to making large parts of the Pashtun population more attentive to the insurgent cause and narrative.

By mid-2003, concurrent with the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the growing insurgency there, the coalition was starting to recognize the real nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, and a new approach and strategy began to emerge. Today (2008) there is little doubt among observers of the conflict that it is an insurgency and that an indirect COIN approach is a better remedy. However, executing such an approach in theatre has proven difficult, partly due to the initial mistakes made.

The Actors

The greater numbers and types of actors are what distinguish classical insurgencies from modern (hybrid) ones, also according to Steven Metz (2007). Insurgencies during the Cold War involved mainly what he calls “first” forces (the insurgents and counterinsurgents themselves) and sometimes “second”

forces (other states that supported either the insurgents or the counterinsurgents). Modern insurgencies are made much more complex by the inclusion of “third” forces (armed elements other than the first forces, like militias, criminal organizations, and private military companies) and “fourth” forces (unarmed elements which affect and shape the conflict, like inter-governmental organizations (IGO) and NGOs, multinational corporations, and international media). Afghanistan, as a hybrid insurgency, involves all four types of forces.

The Insurgents

On the insurgency side, the first forces consist mainly of the Taliban. Other states actively supporting the insurgency (second forces) are hard to identify, but Pakistan is said to be implicitly supporting the insurgency by not fighting it hard enough on its own territory. Some studies even claim that high-ranking officials within the Pakistani administration have actively supported the Taliban insurgency and al-Qaida’s global jihad indirectly, as well as directly (Jones 2008: 56–57). The third forces consist of al-Qaida, the militias, and armed criminal gangs. These actors vary in their organization, motivation, and strategy (ends, ways, and means).

In Afghanistan, the militias operate predominantly as private armies for the warlords and clan leaders. They are normally more hierarchically organized than the Taliban or al-Qaida, and their ambitions are usually not on the level of state control. They are content to enhance the conditions for their constituency and own members by taking local control and power. Examples of militias are Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, who are Pashtuns and strong supporters of the insurgency, and the Haqqani network, which also is part of the insurgent alliance. Other militias, however, are of different ethnicity and religious zeal than the Taliban/al-Qaida/H-i-I alliance, and their level of motivation and support for the insurgency varies considerably. In accordance with their sub-national focus, they might shift loyalty if that is perceived to benefit their leader or their group.

Criminal organizations are generally purely parasitic, focused on self-aggrandizement and profit for their members. In Afghanistan, criminal organizations are mainly concentrated around the drug traffic.

Fluid delineations

The delineation between these groups can be fluid and blurred. For example, the Taliban can be described as a militia for the Pashtuns fighting mainly for the interests of this group against the other peoples and tribes of Afghanistan (the Durrani, Tajiks, Hazaris, etc). Furthermore, some militias operate in the border zone between criminal activity and constituency support, making delineation fluid and sometimes irrelevant.

Unified front

One of Mao's principles for his people's war was the necessity of combining all forces fighting the government (Chiang Kai-shek) or the occupiers (Japan) in a united front dominated by his communist forces. In today's Afghanistan, what binds the different actors together on the insurgent side is their common goal: to expel the occupiers. The actors all have different motives and ways and means to achieve this:

- For the Taliban, this is a necessary objective in order to seize national power and to change the society according to their values.
- For the militias, the COIN forces and increased government control inevitably mean reduced local power and control for the warlords. They do not necessarily seek a different government – only a weak one. External forces are seen to strengthen the government.
- Criminal gangs and drug lords are, as noted, purely parasitic, seeking only profit and self-aggrandizement. Chaos and limited governmental power will increase their room for manoeuvre and expand their profit-making potential.

The lowest common denominator is that the presence of foreign support to the Karzai government, especially security forces, is against the interests of all the above. This shared goal is, however, an operational goal, a means to an end – and not necessarily their strategic goals. The strategic goals, more often than not, differ among the various insurgent groups, and to a significant degree. Organized crime – like the drug lords – thrives in disorder and limited government control and therefore supports the fight against the counterinsurgents. The Taliban are also fighting the counterinsurgents, but their strategic goal is to remove the Karzai government and the foreign troops in order to install their own government, which then will impose strict

control over Afghanistan – as they did when last in power. The Taliban and some drug lords have entered into a tactical marriage of convenience, but the Taliban's strategic goal is in direct contradiction to the interests of criminal gangs and some of the militias.

Consequently, if the insurgents' operational goal is achieved, heavy in-fighting will probably follow soon, throwing the country yet again into the kind of civil war that Afghanistan knows only too well. This fact, together with the shaky foundations of these marriages of convenience, should be exploited more by the counterinsurgency propaganda.

The counterinsurgents

On the counterinsurgency side, the numbers and range of actors are equally multifaceted. The first forces consist of the Afghan Security Forces (ASF)¹² and the international security forces.¹³ The second forces comprise first and foremost the individual states active in the area, predominantly the same states that constitute the coalition. These states can be said to operate with two hats – an ISAF/OEF one and a national one. In addition there are others, mainly neighbouring states, involved to a varying degree on the COIN side, among them Pakistan, India, Russia, and Iran. The third forces are some private military companies (PMC) like the US DynCorp company, which is involved in training the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Jones 2008: 69), and fourth forces include a plethora of NGOs, the UN, EU, and other IGOs, as well as the international media.

Summary

The conflict in Afghanistan has a classic insurgency at its core, but the sheer number and diversity of actors on both sides indicates that one should be careful in unconditionally applying the lessons from the classic COINs. Each recommendation found in the literature from these conflicts must be evaluated against the unique aspects of the Afghan insurgency – particularly the number and diversity of the actors on the insurgent side. The COIN effort in Afghanistan is further complicated by a similar diversity of actors on the COIN side and the fact that these actors are interdependent. An apt metaphor for the situation is a "mosaic": in a mosaic, each piece does not make much sense in and by itself, but, when seen in combination with all the other pieces, some sense starts to emerge. In a

system of interdependent actors, the actions and effects of these actions make sense only when seen in relation to the actions and effects of the other actors. (See Friis & Jarmyr 2008.)

The next section evaluates some of the lessons learned and recommendations of the classic literature deemed relevant to the hybrid insurgency of Afghanistan.

Lessons from the Classic COIN and the Afghan Insurgency

Political (and civilian) primacy of the struggle

The fallacy of the military focus

Despite the strong emphasis on the political nature and civilian primacy of counterinsurgency in the classic as well as recent literature, the international effort in Afghanistan has been predominantly military. There is also an overwhelming array of literature on the subject that is predominantly military in nature, or written by people related to the military effort, and consequently focuses more on the armed activities of the insurgents than on the political, civilian, and propaganda effort. Interestingly, most of these authors begin by underlining the political nature of COIN – and then go on to talk predominantly about the military effort.

In connection with the recent donor conference on Afghanistan in Paris, Al Jazeera aired a report on how the international money has been spent in Afghanistan (Al Jazeera, English edition, 12 June 2008). Local figures including academics complained that the money follows the security operations (i.e., the donors tend to invest their money with their military operations in order to support them). Ideally, it should be the other way around.

Galula's claim of 80 percent civilian and 20 percent military distribution of the effort should also be made valid in Afghanistan. Further, within the 20 percent military effort, 80 percent should involve static defence of the population and 20 percent mobile and offensive operations against the insurgents. In Afghanistan today the relationship is almost reversed.¹⁴ In fact, both efforts are necessary, and should be conducted in a coordinated manner, so that a mobile operation clears an area of insurgents while static forces take up positions to protect and defend the newly cleared

area. Too often, military operations in Afghanistan have been uncoordinated actions where mobile forces have cleared an area of insurgents only to move on to a new area, without static forces to fill the void. The result has been an inevitable re-influx of insurgents shortly thereafter – with considerable resources having been spent on achieving nil. With too few “boots on the ground,” the priority among the military seems to be on the mobile forces, leaving an inadequate number of forces to fill the static defence role. The training of indigenous forces should focus more on this task than on making them an elite mobile force. The training of the Afghan security forces by the international forces displays this lopsided priority. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has received priority and focus among the Afghan Security Forces (ASF), resulting in a relatively competent military force employed in several offensive campaigns (Jones 2008: 73–75). Again, the focus of the training and organizing of the ANA has been towards mobile operations rather than static ones.¹⁵ The ANP, however, received less focus and resources for their training, resulting in an incompetent and underpaid force. The consequence is described in a RAND Study in the following words:

The available evidence suggests that ANP was corrupt and often unable to perform basic patrolling, conduct counterinsurgency operations, protect reconstruction projects, prevent border incursions, or conduct counternarcotics operations. (Ibid: 69)

A better understanding of COIN as primarily a police operation, as the classics emphasize, might have helped improve security in the rural areas. This view is also supported by the International Crisis Group (ICG):

An Army is by no means Afghanistan's foremost institutional need. A functioning judicial and policing system would have had far greater impact on daily lives by providing security to communities and mitigating the sources of local grievances, such as criminality and land disputes, which lead to conflict and impede development' (ICG 2008:6)

It seems that the insurgents have grasped the importance of the police better than the coalition has. In 2007 more than 800 police officers were killed by the insurgents, and the figures for 2008 so far indicate the same trend.¹⁶ It is the police that eventually must sustain the government's hold on territory, and this fact has not been lost on the insurgents. Together with the vulnerability of the poorly trained and equipped

police forces, this adds up to the high casualty figures among the police.

A version of the expanding ink spot concept of the classics has been implemented with success on some occasions in Afghanistan under the military slogan of “clear, hold, and build” or “clear, hold and expand” (Jones 2008:94). This concept should be included in the COIN strategy to a greater extent. Ideally, this approach should comprise coalition and ANA elite forces as the mobile element (under ANA leadership) clearing the area in question, the bulk of the ANA as static forces complemented by ISAF holding the cleared area, and with a revamped ANP ensuring the sustained security within the “spot.” Once this has been achieved, the mobile forces and the majority of the ANA static forces, plus the international forces, can be re-employed in expanding the spot.

Among the other military concepts that have become truisms for fighting a conventional war but are less fruitful in COIN, we may note the concepts of “victory; the objective-end state exit” nexus; and “mission creep is to be avoided at all cost.” Insurgencies and wars are, in many ways, mutually exclusive (Terriff et al. 2008: 92). What works and is logical in war might not be applicable in COIN. What constitutes victory in COIN is elusive. Insurgencies are managed to death; they are not won (ibid: 93). Joseph Collins suggests: “We still persist in defining desired end states in measurable and concrete terms rather than accepting that simply changing from an old process to a new process may be the best we can hope for” (in Polk, ch. 10 in Cerami & Boggs 2007). The relentless search for a measurable end state to initiate the exit may be counterproductive, as it undermines the resolve to stay the course. This will encourage the insurgents to accelerate their efforts, as it implies that the external support is not willing to hold out.

Furthermore, the aversion to mission creep is indicative of a rigid and inflexible force. Learning and adapting is the *sine qua non* for the military forces involved in COIN, and adapting not only tactics but also strategy should be the norm rather than the exception for COIN forces. Politicians tend to keep all options open for as long as possible in order to keep their room for manoeuvre as broad as possible. This may lead to changes in policy. If one accepts the premise that COIN is first and foremost a political struggle, one must consequently also accept the political logic to dominate.

Engaging one’s forces in operations they are not trained or equipped for is a sure way towards defeat. Modifying and adapting the organization, doctrine, training, and mind-set of the military COIN forces towards greater mission flexibility should be a priority for most Western militaries.¹⁷

This said, it should be noted that in Afghanistan not all insurgents are seeking political power. For some, being part of an insurgency fills an economic and psychological need. It can also be a source of identity, belonging, and influence for people who have few other such sources available. Without weapons, some insurgents are only poor, uneducated, and weak youth without prospects for the future. The insurgency changes all this: it gives the same people some purpose and influence. For these, the insurgency is not part of the problem: it is the answer. (Metz 2007:10–11)

The population is the objective

In order to eradicate mosquitoes it is more efficient to drain the swamp than try to swat every individual insect. A direct and military heavy approach tends to focus on the enemy (the mosquitoes) rather than the surrounding swamp (the population). This seems to have been the case in Afghanistan at least during the first five years of the conflict. Even today, with an ostensibly more indirect approach, security operations still seem to focus more on fighting the insurgents directly, and less on providing protection for the population. The logic is that eradicating the insurgents will eventually provide security for the people. However, history shows that with such an approach it will take a very long time to achieve the desired level of security – if ever. Very few, if any, COIN campaigns have ever succeeded on the basis of such an approach. A central lesson from the classic era, and one still highly valid in hybrid insurgencies, is that the main effort should be directed at static protection of the population.

Local ownership

Only the Afghan government can address, in a sustainable way, the root cause of the insurgency, establish its legitimacy, and remove or reintegrate the insurgents. The main thrust of external support needs to be guided by this imperative, but that is not always the case in Afghanistan today. One reason for this is that the Afghan government and administration lacks competence and capacity to take full responsibility for the COIN effort.

Helping the Afghans to build up this capacity in the areas of security, development, and governance should be the highest priority with the coalition. The more of the burden that falls on the international presence, the more it undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and the more it plays to the insurgents' narrative.

Paradox number 6 of the nine paradoxes from FM 3-24 listed above states: "The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than external forces doing it well." This applies as much to Afghanistan as to any other insurgency, but it is a double-edged sword. It is true only if the local government can in fact "do something tolerably." If it does it poorly, that will be worse than if the external forces should do it well. Inadequate competence and capacity on the Afghan side is a fact in several areas, so capacity building must therefore predate the handover of full responsibility within certain functional areas.

Particularly relevant in this regard is the role of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), as it reveals the dilemmas inherent in local ownership. The general impression is that the PRTs are doing a fairly good tactical job in extending the reach of the civilian and reconstruction/development part of the counterinsurgency effort.¹⁸ However, the PRTs have a negative strategic impact on the overall COIN effort: first, by representing the international community (i.e., the foreigners) more than the Afghan government, thus undermining efforts towards local ownership (afghanization); and second, with their predominantly national leadership the PRTs do not contribute to unity of effort.¹⁹ The International Crisis Group in particular has been sceptical to the role of the PRTs, claiming that they should focus on security matters like security sector reform (SSR) and leaving reconstruction and development to more civilian-led approaches like those of the UN and others, as appropriate (ICG 2008: 18–19). By focusing on SSR, their mandates can more easily be harmonized. If the PRTs can be seen to be coordinating more with the Afghan government and its priorities, the negative strategic effects on local ownership and unity of effort could be reversed.

The role of propaganda²⁰

A powerful counter-narrative is needed on behalf of the COIN campaign. All actions should be planned and executed to support this narrative, and not the other way around. Propaganda must be seen as an

instrument in its own right and not as information operations (IO) supporting the military effort. It is also of utmost importance not to undertake actions and produce effects that can contradict this narrative – as has been the case only too frequently with the military operations in Afghanistan since 2001. At the same time as it buttresses the COIN legitimacy, the narrative and its supporting actions should aim to undermine the insurgents' narrative and legitimacy.

This narrative must build on the Afghan ownership of the conflict, stressing that the best way to end the foreign presence is through strengthening the Karzai government. Further, in order to undermine the insurgents' religious narrative, engaging with the moderate Muslim clerics of Afghanistan is the right approach. A number of Afghan Islamic clerics and the Ulema Council have on several occasions declared the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad un-Islamic and have issued fatwas that oppose suicide bombings (Jones 2008: 102)

The low support for the Taliban among the Afghan population²¹ and the recent experience of the Afghan people with the oppressive rule of the Taliban should also be exploited to further undermine the latter's narrative and cause.

As noted, the value of the propaganda of the deed overrides the military value of the deed itself – but just as importantly: it is the interpretation of the events rather than the events themselves that matters. How one presents one's actions and effects is as important as what these actions and effects are. The insurgents in Afghanistan have shown themselves considerably more sophisticated and adept at this crucial element of the insurgency than have the COIN forces. It seems that the coalition is still ruled by a military logic where information operations are regarded as merely a supporting activity to kinetic operations. Propaganda (or an information campaign) is an instrument in its own right as important as the military, economic, and reconstruction/development instruments.²²

Legitimacy is crucial

The path towards winning the support of the population goes through legitimacy. The narrative is first and foremost about building and securing the legitimacy of the government and its supporters in the eyes of the vital population.²³ Actions that run counter to the narrative thus will undermine the legitimacy of the COIN effort. The possible undesired effects of under-

mining the counterinsurgents' narrative, and thus their legitimacy, must take priority over tactical military gains when planning military operations.

Among the factors and actions that support or undermine the counterinsurgents' legitimacy in Afghanistan we may note:

- Corruption and incompetence on the government side undermines legitimacy.
- The impunity which seems to apply to corrupt politicians and administrators is also detrimental to COIN legitimacy. Co-opting rather than challenging the warlords and commanders, and embedding them in the new institutions in the early phases after the fall of the Taliban, initiated the culture of impunity seen today. (ICG 2008: 3)
- Local ownership enhances legitimacy, provided sufficient capacity is present with the local government and administration.
- Calling an insurgency "war" and the insurgents "warriors" supports the insurgents' legitimacy. Naming the increased insurgent activity that normally occurs each spring the Spring Offensive likewise tends to link this to a legitimate type of military operation rather than the criminal activity it is.
- Actions by coalition forces that contradict the narrative diminish both government and coalition legitimacy.

Role of external support

Volume 4 of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study puts considerable emphasis on the importance of external support to the eventual success (or failure) of the Afghan counterinsurgency, particularly in the form of sanctuary for insurgents. This is listed as one of three critical variables correlated with the success (or failure) of the counterinsurgency efforts of the 90 historical insurgencies studied. The role of external support is also mentioned in the classical literature, but only to a limited extent compared to the other factors noted in this report. When dealing with the issue of external support, the literature focuses mainly on support in the form of resources (arms, food, money, etc). The importance of sanctuaries for the insurgents is also central to this literature, but they are mostly treated as safe havens within the disputed territory. In the case of Afghanistan, the importance of the external support for the insurgents in both forms (resources and sanctuary) cannot be overstated.

The classic literature strongly suggests that denying the insurgent sanctuaries is a critical success factor for the counterinsurgents.²⁴ Working with the Pakistani government to increase their efforts to clamp down on Taliban strongholds in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan province along the Afghan border may prove decisive for the COIN campaign.

Unity of Effort

The factors treated so far might seem to have been presented in a random manner. The last factor is where these variables and recommendations all come together. Ideally they will all be translated into a coherent whole through a unity of effort (UoE).

There is one recurrent theme that runs through all the literature studied and on which all authors agree: unity of effort, alternatively unity of purpose, is critical to a successful COIN campaign. The need for an inter-agency or comprehensive approach (CA) in Afghanistan is also recognized by all observers: politicians, military, police, civil servants, and academics alike. What is needed in Afghanistan is a COIN-informed strategy that is executed through a CA. Implementing and executing a CA is, however, a different story than producing theories and concepts.

A functioning interagency approach has been compounded by the well-known obstacles to coordination and cooperation: bureaucratic inertia, organizational culture, and national caveats. The tendency for a bureaucratic organization like the military or government ministries when confronted with new and unknown challenges is to revert to their comfort zones, doing the tasks they were designed to do, and to protect the interests of their own organization – resulting in sub-optimal outcomes for the overall endeavour (Edelman 2007). In addition to resistance from various different organizational cultures, the multitude of national interest and caveats further complicates coordination. In particular, the national caveats stemming from the extreme risk aversion found among some European Coalition members is working counter to the overall effort in general and UoE in particular.²⁵ By not showing willingness to shoulder all the burdens, including physical risk, such national caveats serve to fragment the effort.²⁶

In Algiers, the French achieved UoE to some degree through unity of command and the British even more so in Malaya through a committee system.

The French had a military commander as the highest command authority in Algeria, while the British Malaya campaign was under civilian command. Unity of command is normally the default approach, particularly for the military but also for the civilian bureaucracy – for the first and second forces, but not necessarily for the third and fourth forces. The challenges facing the French and British were fairly straightforward compared to the hybrid and complex insurgency in Afghanistan, as the former mainly had national and the local forces to deal with. The sheer number and diversity of actors on the counterinsurgent side make the challenge in achieving UoE in Afghanistan that much more daunting. Coordinating the effort of the first and second forces is a challenge in itself, but adding third and fourth forces to the mix the challenge becomes overwhelming, as has proven the case in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen to which degree the newly appointed UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Kai Eide, will be given unity of command. If not, an adapted form of the committee system should be considered in order to achieve UoE.²⁷

The crucial area for further work is the important middle level where policy and concepts are to be translated into concrete action – what the military call the operational or theatre level and some civilians (like the UN) call the country level. A comprehensive Approach cannot be decreed from the political level – it has to be built from above and from below, coming together at the operational level. This is where programmes like the multinational experiment (MNE) fit in – producing concepts, techniques, and procedures (the tools) for the execution of a CA. One should, however, not wait until a complete set of tools has been developed but start working with what is at hand. The development of concepts, techniques, and procedures is a parallel and iterative process with real-life experiences.²⁸

The USA has come far in its work towards interagency coordination since Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 of the Clinton administration. This was an attempt at decreeing interagency coordination, and a good one as well. Unfortunately, it did not work to the extent it was supposed to. As John Troxell (2007) explains: “PDD-56 and a host of follow-on adjustments and initiatives have done a good job of focusing on the challenge of better planning. But better planning without the capacity or capability to execute the plan is fruitless.”

Particularly in recent years, a range of initiatives has been tabled in the USA, including the establishment of the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); the work in progress for a government-wide approach to COIN,²⁹ and the various efforts undertaken through the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) like the MNE programme and the NATO Comprehensive Approach. In addition there is an initiative underway towards a new attempt at decreeing interagency through a Goldwater/Nichols type of act.³⁰ Like the Goldwater/Nichols Act, this new act is intended to force interagency on a reluctant bureaucracy. The initiative is led by the chief architect of the original Goldwater/Nichols Act, Jim Locher. (See Feil, ch. 9, and Polk, ch. 10, in Cerami & Boggs 2007.).

The problem of coordination in Afghanistan is multifaceted: there are challenges not only within and among the military (mil–mil coordination), but between the military and the plethora of civilian actors (civ–mil coordination); and within and among the vastly differing civilian actors (civ–civ coordination); and also between the Afghan government and its security forces and the international presence (local–international coordination). These problems and challenges are found at each level, albeit to varying degrees. There are examples of good interagency coordination on the lowest tactical level, as in the PRTs, but limited coordination on the next level, where coordination of the different PRTs is to take place.³¹

Writing in *The Military Review*, Lt Gen David W. Barno, Commander of Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan from 2003–2005, presents an excellent record of a COIN-informed strategy and a comprehensive execution of this strategy in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2005 (Barno 2007). This article is highly recommended reading for those interested in COIN and CA – particularly the combination of the two.³² Barno dates the change in strategy, from an antiterrorist to a counterinsurgency, to October 2003. When he took command that month, he immediately started working on a new COIN strategy that was heavily influenced by the classics, but still recognized the uniqueness of the Afghan situation (ibid: 34). The only main difference between that strategy and the recommendations in this report is Barno’s view of information operations as a supporting activity to the other efforts.

Some of the traditional interagency obstacles were partly overcome through personal chemistry. The

new US Ambassador, Khalizaid, took office in Kabul about the same time as Barno. Barno and Khalizaid established a strong personal relationship, and Barno moved his headquarters from the base 40 km from Kabul into the embassy compound. Thereafter they had daily coordination meetings, and no military action was planned without the Ambassador's knowledge and approval: "Through daily meetings of key players in the embassy, we developed a common view of the fight that further cemented the unity of our integrated effort. This shared view significantly shaped our unified interagency approach. It also had a major impact on the direction of our military efforts" (ibid: 37).

In part, this was possible since the US at that time was the major player in Afghanistan, much more so than today. That made its situation more akin to that of the British and the French in Malaya and Algeria respectively. According to Barno, statistics from the 2003–2005 timeframe support the success of their approach. Still according to Barno, this approach came to an end when a new ambassador and commander replaced Khalizaid and himself, and NATO took command of ISAF. The lack of personal relationships and competence in COIN, together with the more complex command relationship involving ISAF and OEF, contributed to the fragmentation of the effort and breakdown of UoE. Statistics from 2006 and 2007 display an increase in insurgent activity and correlate with Barno's claims.

Other factors not focused in the classics but relevant to the Afghan Insurgency

Negotiations

Some actors (mainly high-level British officials) have been talking about the potential of initiating negotiations with the Taliban. The International Crisis Group is particularly skeptical of this: "Such ill thought-out approaches are dangerous" (ICG 2008: 16). The classical literature supports this scepticism. In a struggle against insurgents with an absolutist (black or white) goal there is no middle ground. Mao used negotiations instrumentally to further his cause, either as an interval to recover or to undermine the opponent's cause and resolve. Mao never intended to settle for anything short of absolute victory on his own terms.

The Taliban's cause and goals are equally absolutist and incompatible with the continued existence of the Karzai government. Negotiations will only serve the insurgent cause by giving the impression of weakness on the part of the COIN forces, thus providing the insurgents with an incentive to step up their efforts. The same message is sent to the population, giving them even less incentive to resist the insurgents and to support the government (ibid). The advice from the classics is to undertake negotiations only from a position of strength!

Risk aversion

By putting heavy emphasis on force protection, the COIN forces might possibly reduce the number of own casualties and thus prevent their domestic legitimacy from dissolving. On the other hand, however, as paradox number 1 listed above states: "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be." To this can be added: "the more you protect your force, the less effective you are in achieving your objectives." These two paradoxes can be explained as follows: by showing that you are risk averse you might attract attack from the insurgents, because you give the impression of limited commitment to the fight. The insurgents will always seek to attack the weakest link; attacking and inducing losses on the less committed might endanger the cohesion of the coalition.

It is essential to recall that the people are both the end and a means to the end. Security for the people is both the ultimate goal and the way to obtain actionable intelligence in order to reach this goal. This can be achieved only if the COIN forces are seen by the people as sharing their security concerns. The people's security is the COIN force's security, and vice versa. Being overly concerned with protecting their own forces (quartering in fortresses only to emerge in heavily armed convoys to do patrols; the individual soldiers bristling with weapons, body armour, and cool sunglasses) marks one's distance to the local population and their grievances – and the less information will likely be forthcoming. Without intelligence the job cannot be done!

Conclusion

This report has shown that the insurgency in Afghanistan is a far more complex conflict than the insurgencies and revolutionary wars of the classic era. Still, several

distinct lessons and recommendations from the classic era remain relevant also for today's hybrid insurgencies. These include:

- The political primacy of the conflict
- The people as the objective
- Local ownership
- The role of propaganda
- Legitimacy is critical
- The role of external support
- Unity of effort

Unity of effort is of particular importance, as it is the means by which the other lessons are to be joined into a coherent and effective COIN strategy. The value of a functioning comprehensive approach, particularly in COIN, cannot be overemphasized, and the two should be seen as complementary. As Ambassador Eric Edelman, US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, said during a conference in March 2007: "So if I slip during the course of my remarks and say 'counterinsurgency,' please just pretend that you heard 'comprehensive approach.'" (Edelman 2007)

The situation in Afghanistan today may look grave in terms of the COIN effort. This is partly a result of not recognizing the real nature of the conflict in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of the Taliban government and, therefore, not implementing a COIN-informed strategy. Despite the errors made, the situation is not hopeless. A revised strategy more informed by the classic COIN lessons and executed through a comprehensive approach can still serve to render the insurgency manageable by the Afghan government and those forces supporting it.

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Endnotes:

¹ Intensity is here taken to consist of three elements: level of violence, frequency of the violence and scope (geographically or in resources spent)

² This section is based on Galula 2006, chapter 1.

³ The Malayan Emergency is regarded as one of very few successful counterinsurgency operations in history. In Algeria the French succeeded to a large degree in separating the FLN from the population, but this required the presence of 750,000 French troops. Eventually the tactical successes of the French amounted to little when de Gaulle, despite these successes, decided to grant sovereignty to Algeria in 1962.

⁴ 'It takes a network to defeat a network' is one conclusion found in the 1996 RAND Corporation Monograph: 'The Advent of Netwar' by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, p.81

⁵ Galula also indicates an ideal force ratio of 10–20 soldiers/police per insurgent

⁶ Ibid. The British first gave some of the locals they trusted the most some training and equipped them with shotguns only. Once their competence and loyalty were proven, they were better equipped and their numbers increased, eventually taking full responsibility for the security of their own village.

⁷ Not least because of their experience in 2001, when they as government forces had reorganized from a Mujahedin guerrilla to something more akin to a conventional army – which then was utterly destroyed in the field by US airpower and Northern Alliance ground forces.

⁸ This is also true for the most recent study of the Afghan insurgency from the RAND Corporation by Seth G Jones; see e.g. pp. 1,4,5, 7. The military heavy focus of this study can to a certain degree be attributed to the fact that it was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

⁹ Kai Eide, the new UN envoy to Afghanistan, stated at a seminar in Oslo in May 2008: 'Today's problems in Afghanistan stem from the way we entered the conflict'.

¹⁰ Barno dates the change in recognition to October 2003 (see the paragraph on Unity of Effort below).

¹¹ This was (and is) even more true for the other members of the Coalition, with the possible exception of the UK.

¹² Predominantly the ANA and ANP. An Auxiliary Police has been established, but has proven more of a liability than an asset.

¹³ Mainly ISAF and OEF

¹⁴ No statistical data on the exact distribution of emphasis between static and mobile operation have been studied. This claim is however, built on a general impression from the literature studied.

¹⁵ Probably from the logic that if one can undertake the more demanding high intensity mobile operations one can also do the less intense static operations. It is hard to improvise upwards on the intensity scale, but it is possible to improvise downwards.

¹⁶ As noted by Kai Eide at the NUPI seminar June 2008

¹⁷ The latest version of the Norwegian Armed Force's Joint Operations Doctrine, issued summer 2007, is a good example of how the imperative of flexibility is included in doctrine. Available in English on www.mil.no.

¹⁸ The performance of the different PRTs varies considerably, according to what national resources, priorities and capabilities have been available to them.

¹⁹ The PRTs are formally under the ISAF structure but are under national leadership, and domestic policy seems to have as much influence as ISAF. Of 25 PRTs 12 are US-led, 2 German and the 11 remaining are led by one individual country each. There is no body to coordinate the priorities and direction of the individual PRTs.

²⁰ 'Propaganda' is the term used in the classic literature. Today this word has negative connotations, so a different term should be found.

²¹ According to the Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey, quoted in RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol. 4, only 13% of the Afghans had a favourable view of the Taliban.

²² During the development of the EBO, later the EBAO, concept within the MNE community and NATO there was disagreement between the US view and the British view on the role of the instruments of power, as epitomized in the acronyms DIME and DME respectively. The British view held that Information (the I in DIME) was not an instrument in its own right but a cross-cutting activity that supported the three other instruments. The cross-cutting and integrating role is valid also for COIN, but not the supporting role!

²³ For the external support this also includes their legitimacy with their home constituencies.

²⁴ A central conclusion also in Jones' RAND Counterinsurgency Study (2008).

²⁵ This argument has been put forward by several observers, among them the ICG

²⁶ Germany and Norway are quoted as particularly representing this attitude by the ICG.

²⁷ Frank Kitson describes the British Committee system in Malaya in detail in his book listed in the References.

²⁸ Kai Eide was asked, when appointed Special Envoy, whether he would focus on finalizing the development of the CA concept. He replied that he would not, but would rather try to implement CA in practice. (Eide, NUPI seminar June 2008).

²⁹ US Government: 'Counterinsurgency for US Government Policy Makers – A Work in Progress'. 2007.

³⁰ The Goldwater/Nichols Act of 1986 instituted the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the power of the service chiefs.

³¹ Lt Col Arne Opperud, former Commander of the Norwegian PRT, stated at a MNE seminar in Oslo in May 2008 that the PRTs were Comprehensive Approach (CA) in practice. It would be more correct to say that they were interagency in practice on the micro-level. CA must include the majority of instruments, actors, organizations and levels to be truly comprehensive.

³² The article was written on the basis of his personal experience, and his own role is central in the article. It should be read with this in mind.

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“Flipping the COIN”: Unity of Effort and Special Operations Forces

Boye Lillerud

Norwegian Institute Norskof

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Introduction¹

This paper argues that unconventional methods and special operations should not be limited to military special operations forces (SOF). It examines a potential role for SOF in a counterinsurgency (COIN), with specific reference to unity of effort. Special forces are the sharpest instruments in the military toolbox available to policymakers, yet the great tactical success of these forces has not necessarily been translated into strategic success. The underlying argument is that the successes of unorthodox means for political ends learnt from Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War paved the way for today's SOF. The lesson learnt, however, was the wrong one. Rather, the principal lesson to be learnt from SOE activities during the Second World War is not one of employing unorthodox means for political ends, but of the need for a unity of effort towards international crises/conflicts/insurgencies that includes unconventional methods. In the present working paper, this will be done by:

- 1) Contextualizing unity of effort
- 2) Contextualizing COIN
- 3) Contrasting COIN with SOF, as seen through SOF doctrine and practice
- 4) Comparing SOF and SOE
- 5) Exploring unconventional methods and unity of effort

Unity of Effort

Drawings on experiences from Somalia, the Balkans, Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan and Iraq, several states have sought to develop their own comprehensive approaches as a strategy for managing international crises involving stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Canada has its 3D approach – Diplomacy, Development, and Defence. The United Kingdom (UK) has the PCRU – Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. The USA has S/CRS – Office of Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization. All these are examples of national, whole-of-government approaches. Also, international organizations are working to forge comprehensive approach strategies. The United Nations (UN) has its system-wide coherence in a development context and integrated missions for a peace-keeping and peace-building context. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has laboured on its EBAO – effects-based approach to operations – for years. All these efforts are based, in one way or another, on achieving a unity of effort between the various actors, agencies, and organizations.

There is, however, a gap between policy intent and field reality in all these comprehensive proposals and holistic endeavours. Ideally, the various actors involved in, for example, Afghanistan should share the same objectives: to stabilize the country, build central institutions, establish the rule of law, promote economic growth, and spread democratic ideals. Due to the complex arrangement of actors and the complex scope of activities, in managing international crisis there seem to be barriers between nations, agencies, departments, and organizations on how to engage each other effectively. The slow progress in conflicts such as Afghanistan is marked by a lack of cooperation, coherence, and coordination between actors and agencies. In addition, there is a “policy-policy” gap between different nations and organizations. In particular, there is no commonly agreed definition on what a, or the, “comprehensive approach” is.

The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated how military means alone cannot quell an insurgency. The military response, which will be discussed later, has been to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine that embodies a more holistic approach. There is a realization in military circles that “in a counterinsurgency, all efforts should be focused on supporting the local populace and host-nation government” because “political, social, and economic programs are usually far more valuable than conventional military operations in resolving the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.” (Vego, 2007: 5; see also Gompert & Gordon 2008) However, one might well ask why the military should be responsible for developing a COIN doctrine with a comprehensive approach.

An interesting historic parallel and explanation, can be found in the Vietnam War. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was an operating agency set up and tasked to support pacification efforts in Vietnam. It was organized so that it would have a single manager at each level, representing a single official voice, and that each level would be responsible for integrated military/civilian planning, programming, and operations (see Wells, 1991). In other words, CORDS sought to integrate horizontally a series of political, military, economic, and informational programmes to maximize the pacification effort in Vietnam. It did this in much the same way as a military commander would organize his efforts, rather than a coordinator or advisor, and it was led by a civilian. The breadth of CORDS was all-encompassing: “*With few exceptions, all American programs outside of Saigon, excluding American and South Vietnamese regular military forces and clandestine CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] operations, came under the operational control of CORDS*” (Scoville, 1982, cited in Wells, 1991). This example of unity of effort represents a national attempt at a comprehensive approach which, although it enjoyed considerable success, was criticized for coming too late in the US war effort in Vietnam.

The main challenge to unity of effort and a comprehensive approach in today’s context involves leadership. Military leaders are not granted control of all the organizations in the theatre of operations. The complex diplomatic, information, military, and economic context naturally precludes that (Vego: 2007: 17), as does the multinational aspect. Conversely, a comprehensive approach to the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is as much a military as a civilian process, because

there can be no civil progress without constant real security. There seems to be a schism here: between those who see economic, social, and political development as a precursor to political stability, which would then naturally foster security; and those who see military security as the first requirement to establishing effective economic, social, and political conditions. In the case of Afghanistan, the dire security situation which restricts civilian aid efforts, the complex multinational military effort (divided between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)), the limited role of the UN, and the lack of Afghan central power all add up to a situation where no single agency or force can solve the problems on its own.

Finally, the post-conflict phase of operations in Afghanistan is nothing of the sort. A renascent Taliban is leading an insurgency, made all the more complicated by the influx of cross-border fighters from Pakistan and foreign jihadists from elsewhere. The central government of Hamid Karzai is struggling to provide basic amenities and security to the Afghan population, and the NATO-led coalition ISAF is present with an ever-larger conventional force, alongside SOF contingents, to aid the Afghan government. The need for stabilization is apparent, yet the continued belligerence of the Taliban necessitates a firmer response: counterinsurgency.

COIN

Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are nothing new. Subduing insurgent populations has been a form of warfare since ancient times, from the Romans quelling Britannic and Gaul resistance to Pax Romana, through the French in Algeria, to the British in Malaya, and the United States of America (US) in Vietnam. The definition of an insurgency varies as the phenomenon has continued to evolve, ranging from revolutionary war, guerrilla war, people’s war, and so on. The US Joint Doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Joint Publication (JP) 1-02). According to the new US Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency: “*an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control*” (US Army, 2006: 1–2).

Counterinsurgency, by contrast, is understood as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (Miller, 2003: 9). It is a highly complex, resource-intensive and protracted effort, and its ultimate objective is mostly non-military (Vego, 2007: 5). In the case of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai's government should be the instigator of the COIN campaign and use the full range of policy options available to combat the insurgency. This includes military operations by the ANA (Afghan National Army), upholding law and order by policing with the ANP (Afghan National Police), development projects to improve infrastructure and provide education to children, and a host of other government actions with one overarching aim: to prove its legitimacy to govern by creating and sustaining security and managing political, economic, and social developments (US Marine Corps, 2006: 14).

On a similar note, the government of Hamid Karzai is supported by international organizations (UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA)), multinational military forces (ISAF), international government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and private volunteer organizations (PVO). The importance of non-military means in conjunction with military means cannot be overstated. As General Sir Frank Kitson (1997: 283) made clear, there "is no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity." In this he is seconded by Dr Milan Vego (2007: 5), who says that "a counterinsurgency is essentially a political problem." In sum, to succeed in a counterinsurgency one needs to have unity of effort and a comprehensive approach to the problem.

A recent RAND report identifies three main factors which influence the outcome of an insurgency: governance, external support, and the quality of security forces (Jones, 2008). Essentially, the less governance a state has, the more external support the insurgents have; and the lower the quality of the state's security forces are, the more likely an insurgency is to succeed. One could therefore assume that a COIN strategy would be the converse: to strengthen governance, mitigate external support and upgrade the quality of the security forces. In Afghanistan this is operationalized by supporting Hamid Karzai's central government through the five pillars of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. The same report also suggests that there are other

factors involved, such as the terrain, population size, and GDP, but these factors are outside the control of the counterinsurgent.

Military COIN strategy, if there is such a thing, traditionally places a premium on 1) learning and adapting; 2) minimal use of force; 3) a focus on static forces; and 4) empowering the affected nation, its forces, and institutions (Håvoll, 2008). In other words, military forces used in COIN operations must be able to learn quickly about the adversary's ever-changing tactics and adapt their own tactics accordingly. The military forces must also show restraint in the use of military power. Excessive use of force and the resultant collateral damage – a trend on the rise in Afghanistan – is strikingly counter-productive for a counterinsurgent. Military forces should also leave a light footprint, yet be able to hold and protect areas from insurgent infiltration. Finally, military forces can be used to train, support, educate, and develop the host-nation's own security forces.

The importance and relevance of these four military COIN strategies will be discussed below, with specific reference to SOF. The next section will deal with whether "SOF are tailor made for COIN," as some military commanders have claimed.

SOF

A leading role in the War on Terrorism has fallen to SOF because of their direct-action capabilities against targets in remote or denied areas. This development was spurred by the idea that there existed a cost-effective SOF solution after the successful (and spectacular) employment of a limited number of SOF personnel, in combination with overwhelming airpower and local war fighters, to bring about the downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001/02.¹ One could argue that the early successes of SOF in Afghanistan came as a result of the correct employment of these forces. SOF should be used for strategic effects: effects that have a direct bearing on the outcome of the conflict. In that sense, the initial strategic effect in Afghanistan was achieved: the Taliban were swept from power, and Al Qaida no longer had its safe haven.

SOF is surrounded by myths, and normally keeps a low public profile. Specifics with regards to numbers, capabilities, equipment, and missions are always classified. This paper will not delve into the secrecy that surrounds

these forces, nor will it discuss the reasons behind this covert stature. Instead, it will use doctrine as a basis for understanding SOF. In many ways, doctrine offers the only official and genuine glimpse into SOF. While doctrines are generalist in their descriptions, they do define the capabilities to be fielded by SOF with regard to organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Most of all, they provide guidance, for SOF and policymakers alike, on the application of SOF. Alexander Alderson, head of the panel which is currently updating the British Army's COIN doctrine, comments: "doctrine provides the bridge from theory to practice based on an understanding of experience" (Alderson, 2007/08: 4). Reality/ground truth may not necessarily reflect doctrine, but the emphasis placed on different core characteristics and missions of SOF should indicate how these are being used in COIN operations today.


In military circles, SOF is unorthodox and strikingly different from conventional military forces. As Kilcullen (2007) notes: "*They are defined by internal comparison to the rest of the military – SOF undertake tasks 'beyond the capabilities' of general-purpose forces.*" As described in the US doctrine for SOF Task Force Operations (JP 3-05.1), "Special operations forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives" (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). On a similar note, Special Operations Commander Europe (SOCEUR) notes: "*Core characteristics of SOF include specialized skills, equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures, including area expertise, language skills, and cultural awareness*" (SOCEUR, SOF Truths).

These broad definitions of SOF are then invariably narrowed down to core tasks or missions. The US now has nine standard SOF missions: direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defence (FID), counterterrorism (CT), psychological operations (PSYOP), counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), information operations (IO), and civil affairs (CA) (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, ch. 2). Thus, SOF are organized, trained, and continuously enhance their capabilities to be able to conduct these generic missions.

Grouping these generic missions into recognizable roles might further clarify what SOF actually does. The UK has a slightly different approach, narrowing their core tasks into three distinct roles: surveillance and reconnaissance, offensive action, and support and influence. These roles can be used in all phases (pre-, post- and during conflict), in isolation or to complement each other.² The point to note regardless of these SOF missions or roles is that they should be employed for *strategic effect*. That is, identifying and attacking the enemy's Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity, commonly believed to be the enemy's long-term capacity and will to fight.³ The main problem, however, is that it is not the enemy that is the centre of gravity in COIN: it is the people (Mattis, 2006: 7).

This represents the main problem with the employment of SOF in today's COIN campaigns. The perception that there exists a singular "SOF solution," or that SOF are "tailor made for COIN," is misguided. How can an elite military force like SOF win the people? While SOF certainly represent a formidable military asset, composed as they are of extremely well-trained, selected individuals with impressive individual skills, they have in essence become more of a military special weapons and tactics team (SWAT) and less of an innovative, unconventional strategic asset. Today's SOF are trained and geared for achieving direct military effects, rather than civilian effects. This is seen through the heavy emphasis on typical hard-core military operations, such as SR and DA, over more soft power operations, such as IO, CA, and PSYOPS. Another mental hurdle for all military forces in COIN, including SOF, is that military effects do not automatically translate into civilian effects: you may win all the battles, but still lose the war.

What we see in Afghanistan today is that SOF are used in their generic roles *in support of* the conventional military forces, with an emphasis on SR, DA, and, to a certain extent, FID. As Rothstein remarks: "SOF have become hyper-conventional, not unconventional" (2006: 122). The tipping point of this development came with operation Anaconda in March 2002. The graph below⁴ is a visualization of how the Taliban went from being a more or less conventional force (in Afghan terms) at the onset of hostilities in November 2001, to today's more unconventional guerrilla force. At the same time, the deployment of, and operations by, US and coalition forces shifted from highly unconventional to conventional.



The fall of Kabul on 12 November, only five days after the start of the campaign, came as the result of a relatively small SOF (and CIA) contribution, operating in conjunction with the Northern Alliance and overwhelming US airpower. The ground forces were almost entirely local nationals, advised by US SOF and supported by US airpower. Other Taliban strongholds, such as Kunduz and Kandahar, fell in rapid succession. The fall of Kandahar was also marked by the first deployment of regular combat troops to Afghanistan. One thousand US marines were deployed in the desert south of Kandahar to set up a forward operating base. A surge of conventional units to consolidate the gains in Afghanistan would soon follow, and that marked the start of “conventionalizing SOF” in Afghanistan. By December, sizeable Al Qaida and Taliban forces had retreated to the Tora Bora mountains, where they were protected in underground caverns. Once again SOF, in conjunction with local militia and US airpower, proved a formidable combination, and the enemy were either killed or managed to flee to neighbouring Pakistan. It was not until March 2002, when a large concentration of Taliban fighters were discovered hiding in the Shahi-Kot mountains in Paktia province, that SOF lost its strategic unconventional edge.

It was believed that the Taliban forces were planning to use their sanctuary in Shahi-Kot as a base for large-scale *mujahdeen* guerrilla attacks, much the same way the Afghans battled the Red Army in the 1980s. Operation Anaconda was devised to route the Taliban from this sanctuary, and it was designed as an (overly complicated) conventional military operation, with conventional units such as the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division in the lead. A sizeable contingent of SOF participated, but their role was no longer unconventional. They provided intelligence through SR and directed fire support, all in support of the

conventional units fighting the Taliban in the mountains. The only unconventional aspect in Anaconda was Task Force (TF) Hammer, a large force Afghan militia and a SOF advisory team. This force, originally intended for an assault from the west towards Shahi-Kot, was decimated by friendly fire, became demoralized from lack of promised air support, and took heavy casualties from Taliban forces before even reaching its objective.⁵ Priorities had, quite simply, shifted away from the unconventional to the conventional military forces – and yet the legacy of the early successes of SOF in Afghanistan has persisted. This is why many believe there is a “SOF solution” and that “SOF is tailor made for COIN.” If there is a SOF solution, then its success hinges on correct strategic employment, unconventionality, and local nationals.

One of the reasons for this belief is how special operations forces seem to suit the four principles of military COIN mentioned above. SOF have the ability to use precise firepower, thus minimizing collateral. They are small and highly mobile, thus leaving a light footprint. They are much faster in implementing new tactics and techniques than their conventional counterparts, much thanks to their organizational mind-set and small size. And finally, SOF are competent to train host-nation security forces through the FID portion of their doctrinal missions. To quote the new FM 3-24 COIN doctrine: “*For small-scale COIN efforts, SOF may be the only forces used. SOF organizations may be ideally suited for developing security forces through the FID (Foreign Internal Defence) portion of their doctrinal mission*” (US Army, 2006: point 6-22).

The use of SOF for FID in Afghanistan is a strategically correct use of these forces under current circumstances. Capitalizing on their “*light, agile, high-capability teams, able to operate discreetly in local communities*” (US Army, 2006: point 2-18) SOF “*emphasize training HN [host nation] forces to perform essential defence functions*” (ibid: point 2-20). This is a core SOF task and SOF have long been the lead organization in training and advising foreign armed forces.⁶ The main problem in Afghanistan is one of scale. As stated in FM 3-24 (point 6-13): “*While SOF personnel may be ideal for some training and advisory roles, their limited numbers restrict their ability to carry out large-scale missions to develop HN security forces.*” This has spurred the development of various ad hoc training regimes for Afghanistan’s security forces, ranging from OMLT (operational mentoring and liaison teams)

to ETT (embedded training teams) to outright basic military schools, where large Afghan National Army units rotate through. Most of these training arrangements are led by conventional units and do not function optimally due to complicated command relationships, national caveats, and lack of resources.

To sum up, in counterinsurgency efforts against an irregular adversary, the strategically correct and offensive use of SOF should focus on training the host nation's security forces. SOF excellence in special reconnaissance and direct action, which may provide extremely valuable intelligence or the capture of high-value targets, should by no means be dismissed. Although they are complementary activities, these endeavours remain more of a supportive, tactical nature in COIN operations, and are, in fact, defensive in an overall COIN strategy. At the latest NATO SOF symposium in 2008, Kilcullen offered some insights on this argument. He argued that keeping the insurgents unbalanced and on the run through SR and DA is essentially strategic disruption, a defensive strategy. The main purpose is to buy time for the strategic offensive, where military assistance through FID will be the most important SOF contribution. In Afghanistan today, SOF are extremely well adapted for SR and DA, with an impressive track record and a high success rate. Yet the lack of capitalization on FID means that the situation remains stagnant.

SOE

The Second World War may be a limited analogy, but some of the lessons identified have not become outdated. Despite the obvious and numerous differences compared to the current situation in Afghanistan, parallels can be drawn, and some aspects are more or less a direct consequence of the Second World War. Indeed, one of these consequences is the development of SOF itself.

SOF can trace their origin to Special Operations Executive (and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the US). Today's SOF are, as discussed above, elite military forces with highly specialized capabilities optimized for nine standard missions, whilst SOE was a mixed civilian–military organization that took on whatever missions were demanded, building capabilities as needed.⁷ During the Second World War the British SOE carried out a broad range of operations against the Axis powers, on enemy soil. The SOE was, in this author's opinion, the true special force of the

Second World War, and it should be recognized as an important aspect of the British war effort.

In the same way as SOF represent only one aspect of operations in Afghanistan, so does SOE represent only one aspect of the broader British war effort. The most substantial difference between the two lies in the comprehensiveness of the war effort. The British were forced to adopt a whole-of-government approach, by unifying their political, military, and civilian efforts in order to defeat Nazi Germany. It was a matter of national survival – but the same cannot be said of Western involvement in Afghanistan today. My point is that the British war effort was made all the more comprehensive by establishing an unorthodox organization tasked to undertake unconventional warfare against the Axis powers in conjunction with other government agencies, own and foreign military, own and foreign ministries, foreign governments, and local collaborators.

A broad description and discussion of SOE activities is beyond the scope of this paper.⁸ Instead, I will focus on some of its roles, traits, and successes, contrasting it with modern-day SOF. The underlying premise is that objectives and techniques are not so different now from then. There has been a renaissance in the use of covert operations in international politics, not least those undertaken in the War on Terror.

Often referred to as “the Ministry for Ungentlemanly Warfare,” SOE was responsible to the Minister of Economic Warfare. It was also, initially, led by Hugh Dalton, then minister of Economic Warfare, who acquired the additional title of Minister of Special Operations. It was formed from three different existing departments: Section D of MI6, Military Intelligence Research from the War Office, and the propaganda organization called Department EH (“Electra House”). It included a substantial number of civilians as well as military personnel; experts in a wide range of fields – linguistics, anthropology, physics, and so on. Finally, SOE was organized in two distinct sections: SO1 and SO2.⁹ SO1 was tasked with “black propaganda”¹⁰ (information) and SO2 carried out “special operations” (operations). The connection between special operations and black propaganda lay at the heart of SOE.

Three things stand out here: the connection between information operations (propaganda) and special operations; the role of local nationals; and the innovative strategic-effects thinking.

First, SO1 operated numerous radio stations, broadcasting from mainland UK and occupied territories. F4 Radio Gaulle¹¹ is an example of the innovative information operations conducted by SO1. The speakers were members of the Free French, broadcasting a content intended to train the resistance groups. True innovation appears when one contrasts it with F1 Radio Inconnue,¹² another SO1 operation. Supposedly broadcasting from Paris, its subversive content was meant to promote passive resistance to the Nazi occupation of France. It was “attached” to Pétain and the Vichy regime, and was kept secret from the Free French and de Gaulle. It was recognized that the “who” that was sending the message was more important than “what” of the message. SO2, on the other hand, supported the various national resistance movements more directly. SOE agents would train in Britain and be transported into occupied territories to organize, support, provide intelligence, and train local resistance groups. The combined effects of operations and information meant that SOE achieved a value-added effect. Radio broadcasts would encourage people to resist German occupation, support the Allied war effort, promote recruitment to resistance movements, and so on. They would also be used to send encrypted messages to operatives in occupied territories.

This is strikingly similar to how Al Qaida and other Islamic Jihadist groups operate in today’s information world. They combine operations with information when they publish video clips of successful ambushes against Western military on the internet or against Danish caricatures. These clips serve the same objectives as SO1 radio broadcasts: they subvert the audience to their cause, they encourage recruitment to their cause, they boost morale for their cause, and so on. In addition, they have an added impact by the very nature of “who” is sending the message. They rally/mobilize the Centre of Gravity, the people, to their cause by ‘propaganda of the deed’, whereby the ‘political and emotional impact of the event is...achieved by the instruments of the virtual dimension, not by the physical circumstances of the attack itself’ (Mackinlay, 2008: 37). Al Qaida also use the internet for communication, either to send encrypted messages to other cells or to communicate with operatives (Vego, 2007: 4), much as SOE used radio broadcasts and wireless operators in the occupied territories of Europe during the Second World War.

Second, SOE recognized, and used, the importance of local nationals in the same way that it was recognized and used by US strategic planners for the initial

campaign in Afghanistan. To be able to operate discreetly and successfully in occupied territories or foreign states, SOE agents relied on local nationals for local and cultural knowledge. Such in-depth knowledge was crucial for collaboration with foreign resistance movements, gaining influence in the society, and remaining undetected by the enemy.

The principal challenge was how to gain access to such knowledge, because it can normally be acquired in only two ways: either by long-term immersion in foreign societies or by recruiting from those societies. Britain, as an imperial power with many colonies at that time, had a distinct advantage, with many expats and colonial officers living in foreign countries. These people not only had intimate knowledge of their “turf,” in many cases they were also empowered through their positions in local, colonial administration. In occupied Europe the situation was different, and SOE recruited its agents directly from those countries. These agents would be trained by SOE in a range of skills, from commando training to parachute training, demolition training, and so on. These skills would then be used in clandestine operations or transferred to local resistance groups. This bears more than a passing resemblance to how SOF is conducting FID in Afghanistan today.

Third, the innovative strategic-effects thinking behind many SOE operations can provide excellent examples of how to think unconventionally and asymmetrically. As pointed out, special operations should have strategic effects (i.e., a direct impact on the outcome of the conflict, as opposed to a supporting impact). The Allied bombing of Germany was undertaken for the strategic effect of “bombing the Nazis to surrender” – a concept that later research has shown had a marginal effect on the German will to fight. Interestingly enough, Bomber Command was not very fond of SOE and resented having to lend aircraft for “unethical” clandestine missions. They wanted to win the war by bombing Germany to its knees (Morris, 2001) – an effort that would require thousands of aircraft, crew members, and explosives. By contrast, SOE Operation Gunnerside, involving only six or seven SOE agents, effectively halted the Nazi nuclear-weapons programme to such an extent that Germany was never able to develop its own nuclear weapons, a prospect that definitely would have altered the outcome of the war.

One might object to the comparison between SOE and SOF. True, SOE was an insurgent force rather than a counterinsurgent force. It was, after all, tasked

by Churchill himself to “set Europe ablaze” by means of sabotage and subversion. Perhaps SOE became so innovative because it was an insurgent force, as opposed to a counterinsurgent force? Might SOE bear more resemblance to Al Qaida than SOF? SOE was an agency whose actions, not unlike today’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, took place in public view. Its role was essentially that of a facilitator. Its success hinged on its ability to collaborate with foreign resistance movements or allied services, which pursued their own national, political, or sectional interest with scant regard for the wishes of the British government (Wylie, 2005: 3).

To sum up, SOE was an organisation capable of operating in a wide variety of different contexts. According to Wylie,

[i]ts methods went beyond the traditional realms of irregular warfare and embraced a raft of operations whose principal focus was political, economic, financial, or even psychological. While clearly SOE was unable to demonstrate a proficiency in all those areas, all of the time, in mastering these arts, it showed itself very much in tune with the context of ‘total war’ into which it was born. In SOE ‘special operations’ became more than simply an adjunct to Britain’s military operations, but instead came to embody a distinctly ‘modern’ approach to secret service activity, an activity which remains as central to a state’s politico-military armoury today as it did 60 years ago. (Wylie, 2005:11)

Unity of Effort and Unconventional Methods

Perhaps the chief lesson that should be learned from Afghanistan and Iraq is the limited capacity of conventional government machinery to cope flexibly with unconventional insurgency problems. Unified management of political, military, and economic conflict will produce the best results, both where policy is made and in the field (Wells, 1991). Thus, combining a unity of effort between the actors with unconventional methods will enhance counterinsurgency efforts. This was tried with CORDS in Vietnam, but it represented a national effort, involving primarily US government agencies and US organizations.

The concept of multinational, allied interagency cooperation, multiagency coordination, and whole-of-government approach emerged during the Second

World War. As with all other conflicts, the conditions were unique, in that it was a fight for national survival and, ultimately, a global conflict. The way ahead should be to develop a comprehensive approach that could include unconventional means, used for strategic effects.

To this end, special operations should be regarded not only as an adjunct to military operations, undertaken by military SOF. Today’s military SOF are ideally suited for only part of a comprehensive approach to insurgencies, despite the apparent comprehensiveness of their nine standard missions. Special operations should be regarded as those unconventional actions taken to affect the strategic centre of gravity in the conflict: the people. To be blunt: special operations should not be left solely to SOF, or the military.

One possibility is to establish an unconventional department, or a Ministry of Special Operations, to serve as an integral part of the strategic decision-making process, strategic planning, management, and evaluation, on the same lines as military forces, governmental organizations, and so on. The idea is not new, but it is a bold one. Senior Fellow in National Security Studies Max Boot (2006) has argued that we again need something like the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of the Second World War, which included analysis, intelligence, anthropology, special operations, information, psychological operations, and technology capabilities. He is seconded by Dr Kilcullen in his “*New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflicts*” (2007), where he underlines the importance of developing “Capabilities for dealing with non-elite, grassroots threats (that) include cultural and ethnographic intelligence, social systems analysis, information operations, early-entry or high-threat humanitarian and governance teams, field negotiation and mediation teams, biometric reconnaissance, and a variety of other strategically relevant capabilities.” Such a strategic service does not, however, represent a multinational effort. The USA, for instance, would be an example of a state with the capacity to build such an organization, whilst other, smaller nations would not.

CORDS sought to integrate horizontally a series of political, military, economic, and informational programmes to maximize the US pacification effort in Vietnam. One should not neglect two crucial aspects: leadership and unconventionality. CORDS was led in much the same way as a military commander – rather than a coordinator, facilitator, or advisor – would

organize his efforts. Unconventionality, on the other hand, was achieved by having a civilian leader, who was on par with the military commander, working closely together and unifying their efforts, drawing on the same resources, sharing intelligence, and synchronizing efforts to vanquish irregular adversaries in Vietnam.

Finally, let us recall that this paper set out to explore a potential role for special operations forces in a counterinsurgency. Have SOF been flipped away from COIN? Absolutely not. Doctrine may already have an answer. After describing the many complicated, inter-related, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new US Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) states, "Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force." And, as argued by Nagl (2005: xiv), foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them.

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¹ On the overthrow of the Taliban regime, see Schroen, 2005; Biddle, 2002; Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005; Woodward, 2002.

² Private discussion with UK SOF officer in Afghanistan, June 2005

³ Ibid.

⁴ I am most grateful to LtC Halvor Johansen, Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, for this graph. It is inspired by Rothstein, Afghanistan and the troubled future of unconventional warfare

⁵ For an excellent description and analysis of Operation Anaconda, see Naylor, 2005.

⁶ FM 31-20-3 outlines Army Special Forces training programmes and tactics, techniques, and procedures. (US Army, 1994)

⁷ Inspired by Kilcullen, 2007.

⁸ For more on SOE see Foot, 1999; and MacKenzie, 2002.

⁹ A third section, SO3, was an administrative unit.

¹⁰ As to the difference between White, Grey, and Black propaganda: Black propaganda is false material where the source is disguised. It is propaganda that purports to be from a source on one side of a conflict, but is actually from the opposing side. It contrasts with grey propaganda, the source of which is not identified, and white propaganda, in which the real source is declared. Source: www.wikipedia.org (accessed 23 September 2008)

¹¹ 426 programmes, 25.8.41 – 15.11.42. from http://clutch.open.ac.uk/schools/emerson00/s_o_epage%203.html (accessed 28 August 2008)

¹² 1145 programmes, 15.11.40 – 10.1.44. from http://clutch.open.ac.uk/schools/emerson00/s_o_epage%203.html (accessed 28 August 2008)

About the Author:

Mr. Boye Garder Lillerud (b. 1975) is a commissioned officer in the Norwegian Army. He is currently studying for a MSc in Intelligence and Strategic Studies at Aberystwyth University in Wales. Until Fall 2008 he was seconded by the Military Academy in Oslo as a Military Advisor to NUPI.

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Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam

Norman L. Olsen

An Analysis of the Similarities and Differences Between Two Controversial Conflicts

Historical forces and international pressures make this an era of persistent conflict. The United States has a mixed record in dealing with these conflicts. We tend to win the invasion and botch the follow up. Two monumental disasters, Vietnam and Iraq/ Afghanistan, dominate the historical record. Our failure in those two arenas is a major driving force for change. In response to Vietnam, the US Army did an excellent job of rebuilding itself to fight conventional wars, but seemed to think of Vietnam as a bad dream best ignored. The key civilian agencies, US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State), were similarly myopic.

To its substantial credit, the US military — and especially the Army — response to Iraq/Afghanistan is substantially more proactive. The military has stood up US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) to more directly and effectively respond to conflicts and disasters in Africa. The military revised its strategy to conduct the war in Iraq and seems to be similarly engaged in Afghanistan. Over the past two years, the Army has issued three field manuals on 1) counterinsurgency, 2) post conflict, and 3) stability operations. The issuance of field manuals will strike some as a tepid, bureaucratic response to an enormous national disaster. However, it is a major attempt to change the corporate culture by codifying the lessons learned in the past several decades. In producing the manuals, the military reached out to other agencies and the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) community in an attempt to develop a valid whole of government approach. The military is executing the changes in Iraq and Afghanistan, which provides a real world test as to the validity of the doctrine. One hopes implementation of the revised doctrine works and comes in time to rescue the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At a minimum, the effort of revising military doctrine to fit existing circumstances is a significant step forward and reflects a widespread recognition that purely armed intervention is an insufficient response to most conflicts. Specifically, within the military, there is recognition that winning the peace

is an essential element in any effective national security strategy. Critically, winning the peace requires an enduring commitment to comprehensive, cooperative, and competent post invasion follow-on action.

Implicit in the military perspective is the view that a prime reason for the failure of the US government to meet its objectives is that the civilian agencies have not stepped up to the plate and adequately performed their missions. There is much justification for this criticism. Partly it is the two disastrous decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and totally purge the Iraqi government to the lowest levels of any even nominal Baath party members. Equally important, none of the civilian agencies has adequately staffed province level programs. This has led to a view in the military that never again will the military go it alone.

The driver of change is the attempt to achieve true military civilian integration, that is, a whole of government approach including the State, USAID, US Institute for Peace (USIP), and Interaction (representing the NGO community). This requires development of a shared doctrine for stability operations and codifying that doctrine, so that field commanders and personnel can effectively implement the doctrine in actual operations. It involves recognition that both the military and civilian agencies have substantial experience in counterinsurgency and stability operations since World War II, much of it successful; however, while individual officers learned, neither the military nor civilian agencies as organizations, nor the US government as an institution adequately absorbed the lessons.

In seeking a solution, one must deal with at least two and generally three different time lines: the United States, the host country government, and the adversary. The US timeline is the shortest, generally much shorter than the host country, and is based on a plan for quick decisive victory. Victory is often left undefined or, worse, expressed in a vague utopian hope for a local version of liberal constitutional democracy. The host country government is generally a status quo power that needs US assistance, and thus pays lip service to the need for change. However, it is reluc-

tant to embrace the challenges and disruptions change inevitably brings because they represent a potential diminution of their position. Our adversaries typically have a long timeframe; generally, a key element in their strategy is outlasting the US and host government. Often for the adversary, not losing represents a victory of sorts.

There is a pronounced tendency for the national leadership, especially the elected US political leadership, to believe the challenge they face is a unique calling for a distinctly new approach. Looking back from the perspective of history, the new challenge often seems reasonably similar to previous challenges. While no two situations are identical, we have much to learn from past experiences. Had the US leadership conscientiously reviewed the lessons of Vietnam, Laos, Panama, Kosovo, etc., and then adapted those lessons to Iraq and Afghanistan, execution of those wars would have been significantly more effective. Vietnam and Iraq have particularly close parallels.

Vietnam and Iraq: Similarities

1. *Weak political support among US voters* because of a widespread and growing view that the war and the way each was being fought was a strategic mistake.
2. *Ineffective governance on the part of the host government*, in particular high levels of corruption and the inability to unite their nations politically.
3. *Ineffective senior US political leadership*. Two Secretaries of Defense with large egos and allegedly superior intellects that prevented them from listening to anything with which they might disagree were given free rein by two Texas presidents.
4. *Difficulty at the operational level in forging an effective whole of government approach to the conflicts*. Ultimately, the US adopted such an approach in Vietnam, and it seems to be coming in Iraq, but it took far too long.
5. *Opposition within the State and USAID bureaucracies to the wars* resulting in a weak organizational response to the wars. This inertia is especially noticeable in Iraq and Afghanistan.
6. *Establishment of the Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) programs*. In the face of slow indecisive overall progress, the US political

leadership established CORDS in Vietnam and the PRTs in Iraq/Afghanistan to deal with the stability phase of the total effort. In Vietnam, there were CORDS province teams composed of military advisors, USAID officers, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers, and public affairs personnel. A Province Senior Advisor (PSA) and Deputy Province Senior Advisor (DPSA) led the CORDS province teams. If the PSA was a military officer, typically an Army colonel, his deputy would be a civilian officer (typically USAID) of similar rank. In about half the provinces, the civilian was PSA and the deputy military. A typical CORDS province team had police, rural development, health, and agriculture specialists. At the CORPS level, a range of technical specialists backstopped the province teams. A typical CORDS province team had approximately 200 personnel. Provincial reconstruction teams are much smaller, typically 27 – 28 US personnel, but similarly structured and having many of the same functions.

Vietnam and Iraq: Differences

1. *Greater public tolerance of the prolonged efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan because of lower casualties and an all-volunteer army*. Although voters are critical of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and want them ended, the level of disenchantment has not approached that of the Vietnam era.
2. *Operational freedom*. CORDS province teams had wide discretion on all operations within their provinces; contrastingly, the PRTs seem far more restricted in their scope of action. Contracting authority for even local projects is limited on the PRTs; in Vietnam, on CORDS team one could promptly implement just about any project the PSA/DPSA thought appropriate. In Iraq/Afghanistan PRT travel is subject to multi level review by security officers. PRTs have an assigned security officer who can do his job by telling other team members they cannot travel. Alternatively, one can call Baghdad or Kabul for permission. In two or three days, one generally gets an answer, which even if positive does not lead to a rapid response in a dynamic environment. In Vietnam CORDS officers made their own travel arrangements based on their assessment of local security.
3. *Recruiting*. When the military states that Department of State and USAID lacks the capacity, they really mean those agencies do not have enough staff to meet their responsibilities. In Iraq and Afghanistan, both State and USAID are attempting to fill province level positions

from internal resources. It is not working. In Vietnam, USAID largely solved the problem by recruiting outside the agency for CORDS. Generally, it was former Peace Corps or similar volunteers, or retired military officers, that USAID specifically recruited to staff the CORDS field positions. Neither USAID nor State has adequately staffed the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID does not have adequate staff for its worldwide responsibilities. Partly it has addressed the worldwide issue by making extensive use of contractors. There are of course thousands of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, few are on the PRTs, which the administration sees as one of the keys to ultimate success. The ostensible reason being that USAID cannot delegate contracting authority to contractors for local projects, even though that authority is often granted in other bilateral programs.

Significantly higher visibility of the senior leadership of the CORDS program. Bill Colby, Vietnam chief of CORDS, became Director of Central Intelligence; John Paul Vann, CORDS field leader, was the subject of a Pulitzer prize winning biography. Contrastingly, the PRTs and their leadership are largely invisible to the US public.

What is to be done?

The military response is encouraging in that it recognizes this type of challenge is likely to be an enduring one and the United States needs a more effective approach to deal with it. In particular, the efforts to build common doctrine are encouraging.



Hopefully, out of this effort will come a greater unity of effort and increased effectiveness.

Department of State and USAID promise to do better. Department of State is standing up a quick response corps of up to 4,000 officers. USAID hopes to double it staff in the next two years from the current number of approximately 1,200. While a laudable goal, success seems unlikely in what seems certain to be an austere budget climate in the wake of the current financial crisis.

Encouragingly, the Obama campaign is proposing mobile development teams for embassies in Africa. At the moment, State is taking a “not invented here” attitude but that could change [following] November 8 [with the new administration].

What is missing is - inclusion of the role of the contractors in the doctrine making process. Contractors are typically the people who actually do the work on the civilian - particularly - USAID side. The reluctance of USAID to use contractors on PRTs and give them authority to sub-contract for local projects is a substantial obstacle to progress. Now seems like an opportune time for the contracting and NGO community to marshal forces and present its views to the new administration as to how it can most effectively serve the common cause.

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Photo at left shows a Viet Cong vehicle bomb in Saigon, 1965. Photo at right shows the results of a vehicle borne improvised explosive device in Salam, Mosul, Iraq, Aug. 21, 2008. (DOD Image Library)

“Soldier-Diplomat” - Lessons from Captain George Pickett and The Pig War

Major Erich Wagner
Congressional Liaison Office, USMC

“It is to be observed that every case of war averted is a gain in general, for it helps to form a habit of peace, and community habits long continued become standards of conduct.” Elihu Root

“Whether war or peace, we must find rare men, soldier-diplomats who can command the respect and admiration as well as the animosity of enemy zealots.” Lawrence J. McNamee

As he watched 12,500 of the Confederacy’s finest get mowed down as they crossed an open field, it is safe to say that the last thing going through



General George Pickett

Major General George Pickett’s mind on the hot afternoon of 3 July 1863 was a porcine-encounter four years earlier in the Pacific Northwest. A review of that encounter, however, can be educational for today’s soldiers at the “tip” of America’s reach.

In this 21st century world, the military professional must not only be a competent warfighter, but a humanitarian and a soldier-diplomat, prepared to function in an inter-agency, international environment. Contemporary political-military author Robert Kaplan believes this soldier-diplomat is “a new breed of American soldier” interpreting “policy on his own, on the ground, in dozens upon dozens of countries every week, ...”¹ Other terms have been proffered such as “imperial grunt” and “strategic-corporal” to describe the growing complexity of American servicemen’s responsibilities in the international sphere while advancing US national security interests. This is largely due to the addition of non-combative imperatives.

The new-millennium soldier must be able to quickly transition the relations-spectrum from a “close-quarters” conventional fight to supervising civil affairs or acting diplomatically as he meets with local religious, civic, and government officials. Thus, inseparable from his conventional training, his diplomatic skills arsenal requires even greater measures of savvy, patience, rapport, and understanding of the foreign cultures not heretofore seen to this degree in our nation’s military. The new-millennium soldier must deftly meet these higher standards by having the proclivity, wisdom, and cool-headedness to prevent conflicts from escalating. Such feats can only evolve to have the greatest strategic impact if the new era officer is skilled sufficiently to affect such matters. Today’s American officer is best described as a “diplomacy multiplier,” a role far beyond simply a “manager of violence” at the tactical level.

Often this military professional deployed around the world will be the only fireman at the sight of a powder keg, where a spark in a small town in some obscure province could flame into instability. The preparation and training of our military personnel to operate effectively in ambiguous, decentralized environments is a curriculum challenge for military service academies and officer programs for this generation and beyond. Producing effective leaders able to operate in a multiplicity of capacities concurrently in any given environment is no doubt difficult, and rests not only with the quality of education received, but equally with the personality and character of the individual soldier or marine.

As evidenced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not have the capability to supply the necessary liaisons in those far-flung

regions. As a result, the military has had to assume these responsibilities, while in tandem managing a kinetic security environment. Recently, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted the creeping militarization of US foreign policy by saying: “There has been a migration of functions and authorities from US civilian agencies to the Department of Defense.”² Army Brigadier General Steven Salazar commented that such roles in Iraq were “not what I was trained to do as a young officer,” and noted that “it requires more sophistication and some talented people to do it.”³ As every Naval Academy midshipman must memorize from his first day, an officer must be a person “of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor . . . and the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity.” Technical skills must not be valued above human skills: in today’s isolated outposts lieutenants and captains find themselves making spur of the moment decisions in unique socio-political-military scenarios, requiring diplomatic prowess and “a firm, moral belief system, of which secular patriotism could form but a part.”⁴

The impact of mid-level officers and enlisted personnel with unprecedented decision-making authorities in America’s projection of its power is immense – both in winning battles and in preventing them through soft power. Far from being a “new” phenomenon, America’s military has had many examples of such soldier-diplomats in the past. A unique case study of Captain George Pickett, USA, during the crisis on San Juan Island in the years 1859-1860, provides an object lesson for officers on how effectively to execute military duties, while deftly managing fragile international situations and preventing them from erupting into violence. The importance of tactical-level conflict management skills in the “arsenal of response” for the soldier in management of volatile situations is reflected in this emergency. Prior to passing the flash point, two nations would slither to the brink of the third Anglo-American military clash, only to be restrained by the coolness and moderation of military professionals. In 1928, Dr. Marcellus

Donald Redlich, author of *International Law as a Substitute for Diplomacy*, wrote “There are three professions to which a country may intrust the settlements of its international disputes – the soldier, the diplomat, and the international lawyer.” George Bancroft, that great statesman and American historian, believed the international crisis of San Juan Island involved all three of these, to include “questions of geography, of history and of international law.”⁵

The Puget Sound predicament amalgamated Redlich’s “soldier and diplomat” into a “soldier/diplomat,” and the conflict resolution course embarked upon by the American and British officers – *backed up by bayonets* -- demonstrates an orchestration of soft power (cooperation, negotiation, conflict management skills) with hard power (military force). In order for such an approach to be accomplished, several qualifying factors need to exist: soldiers must be aware of inherent cultural challenges and possess essential diplomatic and negotiation skills which are components to success. The dilemmas that will arise for the modern soldier, whose rules of engagement (ROE) stress mollifying approaches whenever possible and increasingly involve the use of negotiation rather than kinetics, at least in the initial response, demand innovative leaders able to placate as well as kill, in the words of soft-power scholar Joseph Nye, “co-opting rather than destroying.”⁶ The military protagonists during the standoff in the San Juan Islands demonstrated the use of *smart power* -- defined by Ernest J. Wilson III as an amalgamation of hard and soft power “in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently” without necessarily resorting to a clash of arms.⁷

The San Juan Imbroglio

Despite being elected under the slogan “’54°-40 or fight!,” Franklin Polk’s administration agreed to The Treaty of Oregon in 1846. The treaty stated that the 49th Parallel would divide the territories of the United States and Great Britain. It was a good treaty, save for one problem: it failed to

designate where the water boundaries should be, and which country owned the islands amidst the two channels east of Vancouver Island. It simply said that the boundary would be “the middle of the channel which separates the continent from the Vancouver’s Island.” The treaty signers were vaguely aware that there were two channels – the Haro Strait to the west, near Vancouver Island, and the Rosario Strait to the east, near the mainland. (See figure 1) If the international boundary went through Haro Strait, the Americans would get the San Juan Islands. If it went through the Rosario Strait, the British would own them. However, in the interest of keeping the peace and pushing through the treaty, the signers on both sides conveniently ignored the issue. Thirteen years later, a British pig would wander into an American potato patch and be the catalyst for the reexamination of this line and, in the process, set off the longest single military conflict on US soil: The Pig War, a tense international imbroglio which continued for the next 12 years.



Figure 1

The pig had already been warned by Lyman Cutlar several times before to stay off his property and quit eating his potatoes. Cutlar, a Kentuckian, was an American miner who had settled in the Pacific Northwest on San Juan Island in 1859, and built

a farm in the middle of Charles Griffin’s main sheep run. Griffin, owner of a ranch and the pig in question, was an employee of the Hudson’s Bay Company. He had ignored Cutlar’s three previous complaints since he felt that the American should not have a farm on the land claimed by Britain. American settlers, however, believed the island fell under US jurisdiction.

Awakened by the boar’s squeals on the morning of June 15, and aggravated by the laughter of the company’s black herdsman watching the boar rooting in his potatoes, Lyman Cutlar shot it. Griffin was outraged, and sought to have Cutlar tried in a British court. Cutlar offered to pay \$10 for the pig – an immense sum at the time – but was told the pig was a champion Berkshire boar and breeder, worth ten times that. “Better chance for lightning to strike you than for you to get a hundred dollars for that hog,” Cutlar retorted, while threatening to kill any more animals he found in his garden, to include Griffin if he trespassed.⁸

The governor of Vancouver Island, James Douglas, also an employee of the company, dispatched a sloop to arrest what he considered the trespassing American. Cutlar, rifle in hand, epitomizing all that Americans hold dear, challenged them to take him from what he believed was American soil, making it plain that he would blow the emissary’s head off rather than submit to arrest.⁹ Soon the story circulated that the Hudson’s Bay Company had threatened to arrest an American for killing a British pig, and the argument between two men had become an international incident between two nations.

Shortly thereafter, General William S. Harney, USA, Commander of the Department of Oregon, was inspecting various northwestern Army posts and heard the narrative from eighteen American settlers, including Cutlar himself. When they related the recent events of the pig shooting and the attempt by British authorities to take an American citizen by armed force, Harney -- already suspect of British motives and described by many historians as an easily-angered Anglophobe -- was infuriated.

In collusion with Governor Stevens in Olympia, Washington, General Harney devised a bold and aggressive plan to protect American honor and the US flag.¹⁰ Having sought and received a written petition from the American residents on San Juan Island for safeguard from the aggressive Northern Indians,¹¹ he was equipped with what he considered proof as to the British policy of attempting to exclude American settlers from the Island. Harney made a snap decision to send a company of US regulars to the area to secure their protection. During the night of 26 July 1859, Captain George Pickett and 68 soldiers of Company D, 9th US Infantry, were silently landed from Fort Bellingham on the mainland to the Island of San Juan via the *USS Massachusetts*, a Navy steamer.¹²

Pickett, the “Goat” of his West Point class of 1846, had earned renown for bravery in the Mexican War when he placed the US flag atop the castle fortress of Chapultepec. He was now in an extraordinary position for his rank with the highest kind of independent responsibility ordinarily granted to only senior officers, being made essentially the supreme commander in the upper Puget Sound.¹³

Pickett was under specific instructions labeled Special Orders No. 72. First, he was to protect the inhabitants of the island from the incursions by the Indians of British Columbia, and second, to “afford adequate protection to the American citizens in their rights as such, and to resist all attempts at interference by the British authorities residing on Vancouver’s Island, by intimidation or force, in the controversies which may arise.”¹⁴

Pickett’s first act was a bold one, and in retrospect, perhaps rash and provocative. Once he had established camp, he ordered his adjutant to post a proclamation above the loading dock, stating, in part, “no laws, other than those of the United States, nor courts, except such as are held by virtue of said laws, would be recognized or allowed on this island.”¹⁵ As Pickett’s orders were to protect Americans from Indians and to resist any British attempts to interfere in disputes between American settlers and the Hudson’s Bay Company personnel, this announcement was a direct provocation.

While reasonable as a result of the Cutlar incident, in hindsight the proclamation was conceivably unnecessary at that moment.

Understandably, Pickett’s claim of exclusive American jurisdiction enraged the British settlers and the employees of the Hudson’s Bay Company. Within days, Governor Douglas sent five British man-of-war ships, armed with 167 guns and a compliment of 2,000 sailors, engineers, and Royal Marines. His instructions to the British force under Captain Geoffrey Hornby -- just 33 years old (a few months younger than Pickett) -- were to get the Americans already on the island to leave and prevent any more from arriving. Two days later, Hornby questioned the authority for Pickett’s actions, and asked him to remove his company from British territory, while warning Pickett that if he did not immediately abandon his position, or at least agree to a joint occupation of the island, he risked an armed confrontation.

“I am here,” Pickett responded, “by virtue of an order from my government and shall remain until recalled by that same authority.”¹⁶ As an infantry officer under such orders as Pickett was dispatched with, there was no other acceptable answer for him to utter. According to one witness, Pickett added in response to the threat of force, that if pushed, he would “make a Bunker Hill of it,” fighting to the last man – a bloody allusion definitely not lost on Pickett’s British audience.¹⁷ The line in the San Juan Island sand was drawn, with over a thousand men facing each other with instructions to fight if the other side made a false move.¹⁸ Although nominally under the civilian Douglas’ command, Hornby had to answer directly to station Rear Admiral Lambert Baynes, as British Royal Navy officers at the time had wide discretion in deciding whether to initiate hostilities. “I must ask that an express [directions] be sent to me immediately on my future guidance,” Captain Hornby requested, as “I do not think there are any moments to waste.”

Captain Hornby was prepared – and actually under orders from Douglas – to land his contingent of Royal Marines and co-occupy the Island to balance the American forces, but he did not want

to provoke hostilities. Pickett wisely insisted -- albeit inaccurately -- that his commanding officer's orders came from Washington, DC, and announced that he would have no choice but to fight any British Marines landed. Hornby was convinced that Pickett was not bluffing -- a tribute to Pickett's resolute determination.¹⁹ Pickett, who in private correspondence with his commanding officer, stated that his thin blue line was so inferior that it would be annihilated with ease, had succeeded in soldier-diplomat lesson number 1: **Convince one's opponent that, if forced, the "stick" will be wielded with terrible resolve.**²⁰ General Harney, in his report to Lieutenant General Scott, believed that Pickett's resoluteness in action was the reason the British did not act upon their threat.²¹

Pickett's doggedness contributed only in part to the success of avoiding a clash. Royal Navy Captain Hornby's diplomatic acumen was equally profound. Given the tensions, it seems almost remarkable that real conflict was avoided. "It was by only the greatest tact and diplomacy," historian Tracy Elmer Stervey wrote, "that Captain Pickett avoided a conflict upon his first arrival on the island, convincing the British that he was there by the order of his government, that he could not leave until so ordered, and that he could not accept the joint occupation offered by the British until he had communicated with his commanding officers, and if the British attempted to land by force, the cause of the conflict would rest with them."²² Here, then, are soldier-diplomat lessons number 2 and 3: **Place the onus of responsibility on the other side for initiating a conflict but do it in the most gentlemanly, non-acidic manner, full of courtesy and respect for those on the parallel side.** (*It is understood by the author that this rule does have more hope of success with an opponent who likewise subscribes to the Laws of War and a common legal heritage with us.*)

Pickett, by bringing out in a "very diplomatic way that he did not imagine anything would happen on the island which would render military interference necessary, [and] that by remaining in their present positions no discredit could reflect upon either flag," exhibited textbook psychology, convincing Captain Hornby to rationalize the consequences of a violent solution.²³ The collision could be avoided, Pickett pointed out, by maintaining the *status quo* and awaiting a diplomatic solution,

while upholding the credit to both flags. "I hope, most sincerely, sir, you will reflect on this, and hope you may coincide with me in my conclusion. Should you see fit to act otherwise, you will then be the person who will bring on a most disastrous difficulty, and not the United States officials. I have hurriedly answered your communication in order to avoid delay and its consequences."²⁴ Pickett used all the self-discipline the Army had installed in him and tried to be courteous, but firm, and tried to avoid making diplomatic decisions, not the purview of a military officer.²⁵ By placing the situation in such a manner before the British representatives, he increased *their* responsibility in any ensuing bloodshed, while at the same time remaining true to his orders from higher authority.

The fact that the American population outnumbered the British five-to-one in that section of the continent was no doubt an important factor in prompting the British to proceed slowly. Pickett told his officers, "We won't begin the fighting -- we can't put up much of a fight, until more reinforcements and heavy guns arrive. So -- we remain calm. Let the British begin it without provocation by us."²⁶ Captain Hornby, impressed with Pickett's manner, bravery against terrific odds, and personality, commended him to his wife saying "He speaks more like a Devonshire man than a Yankee."²⁷ Pickett's tone was mollifying the entire time, ensuring Captain Hornby that "my wish corresponds with yours to preserve harmony between our respective governments."²⁸ As a result, Hornby was the first actor of this drama not to escalate events, and this turning point was crucial.

Restraint and Civility

"It is difficult for the reader to appreciate fully . . . the great responsibility resting upon Captain Pickett in his position on San Juan. Upon his firmness and courage hung the honor of his country; upon his coolness and discretion depended the lives of untold thousands, with millions of treasure." Mrs. La Salle Corbell Pickett, wife of Captain Pickett, 1899

While Captain Pickett's initial answer was bold and resolute, it was also tactful, which contributed

to the avoidance of actual conflict.²⁹ If Pickett's gentlemanly rejoinder definitely aided in mitigating the wrath of the British commander, so did the rapport that he was able to engender and foster amongst his British "adversaries." Lauds must also be accredited to the senior commanders on both sides. "Each leader," as author Keith Murray wrote, "had to feel his way in a haze of uncertainty and poor communication with his government."³⁰ When 84 Royal Marines under Captain George Bazelgette were eventually landed on 21 March 1860, his superior ordered him not to create an incident, but to "place yourself in frank and free communication with the commanding officer of the US troops . . . and establish a perfect and cordial understanding. . . ."³¹ Similarly, General Harney – who was eventually relieved by Lieutenant General Winfield Scott for his presumed hotheadedness – met this British landing by instructing Captain Pickett to (1) not oppose the British occupations and (2) avoid committing the government of the United States by any act of his, while (3) preserving cordial relations between the military forces and maintaining peace on the island.³² Pickett was an exemplar of diplomacy and established with his counterpart, George Bazelgette, a precedent for friendship and cooperation between the two sides which continued over 12 years, despite the fact that such feelings did not translate to the US citizens on the island.³³



Captain George Bazelgette

The *Pioneer-Democrat*, while no doubt biased, noted that "Pickett is a perfect gentleman, of decidedly polished manners, [who] entertained the hope that no offense would result."³⁴ Pickett spared no effort to be accommodating,

which seems a far cry from the man who is remembered for the hard-nosed, belligerent stance he displayed during the initial days of the crisis.³⁵ Historian Mike Vouri notes that Pickett was so cooperative that he ordered American Deputy Collector of Customs Paul K. Hubbs, Jr., neither to attempt to himself settle -- nor to encourage other Americans to settle -- on plots within the British military reservation.³⁶ (Forty years later Hubbs would write glowingly of Pickett's conduct in the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*).




Figure 2

Despite the initial bellicose manner exhibited by both sides, the military professionals, both English and American, developed cordial social dealings which strengthened their working relationship. While lovers the world-over have long acknowledged the international language of *amour*, so too is there a unique bond between soldiers. "Camp Pickett," which the American encampment became known as, often entertained the British officers, who in turn reciprocated on board their vessels.³⁷ Officers got together frequently for dinners, sermons, and outings.³⁸ There were celebrations of national holidays, and at Christmas and New Year's both camps gave parties for the settlers and each other.³⁹ A military road was built between the Royal Marine base and

that of the US regulars so both sides could exchange visits. Captains Bazelgette and Pickett cooperated in dealing with the major headaches created by the Northern Indians and liquor dealers, the recurrent island affliction. Sometimes joint US Army/Royal Marine patrols were performed along the coast.⁴⁰ Before long, the officers were traveling together to Victoria, where they were known to have a drink or two at the Colonial House.⁴¹ Officers and enlisted men mingled on board the ships and in the camps, and soldiers, sailors, and Marines swapped British cigars for Oregon whiskey.⁴² (See figure 2)

The American citizens of Washington Territory were pleased with Pickett as well. An extract from *The Pioneer-Democrat* remarks that “Captain Pickett is just the man to be put in command. With every attribute of a gentleman, he is a perfect soldier, a man of great prudence and self-control, and with decision, promptitude, and energy he will be equal to any emergency that may arise.” Pickett’s status as a military officer was crucial to his diplomatic role: he reassured American citizens that he would shield them while restraining some of his more antagonistic and unruly countrymen, and concurrently convincing the British of his intentions and his duties.

The Royal Navy and Marine officers, particularly Captain Hornby, Rear Admiral Baynes, and Captain Bazelgette are models of how officers should behave when a nation’s interests are at stake. They were not bluffing either, but they knew that war would be ruinous to their nation, which relied heavily on US trade and was the largest investor in the then still young American nation. The role of the Royal Navy was to maintain the peace: Hornby and Baynes never forgot this, contrary to what the British diplomats advocated.⁴³

When he resigned his commission in the opening days of the Civil War in preparation for service with the Confederacy, Pickett advised Bazelgette of his parting, and thanked him for the harmonious relationship they developed:

“I cannot take leave without expressing to you both in my own name and that of my officers, the gratification we have experienced from our very pleasant intercourse with you during the passed year, and our sincere regrets at having to break up these associations.”⁴⁴

On 24 July 1861, Pickett left the island three days after the First Battle of Bull Run had occurred. In the end, one of these captains would find immortality four years later, leading his division in a mile-long, grain-swept field outside an obscure crossroads town in Pennsylvania; the other would remain on San Juan Island until July 1867, and retire in England in 1872.

In his book, *The Pig War: Standoff at Griffin Bay*, scholar Mike Vouri pens that the conflict was settled nonviolently because veteran military men, who knew the revulsion of war firsthand, exercised decision-making authority sometimes contrary to hawkish diplomatic direction. Once the matter of joint occupation was settled-upon, the two nations’ camps existed in peace, and events proceeded benignly for the next 12 years until Kaiser Wilhelm I arbitrated the boundary dispute in favor of the United States on 21 October 1872.

Today, San Juan Island is marked by two stone monuments commemorating two military equals: Captains Pickett and Bazelgette—soldier-diplomats who averted war. “The lessons of diplomacy are found right here,” said British Consular Representative Mike Upton in Seattle in 1998. The case study they provide on conflict de-escalation is worthy to be taught to military professionals venturing into potentially hostile environments. As today, elements such as culture, communication, power, character, and competitiveness, aligned with the mission, time and restrictive rules of engagement, together formed and influenced the essential components of the tactical-level military discussions that occurred.⁴⁵ Perceptive actions from military officers led to de-escalation and peaceful negotiations. The conclusion to the “Crisis of Griffin’s Pig” could have been much more confrontational for all involved -- save the pig—had soldier-diplomats not exercised prudence, caution, wisdom, and levelheadedness.

The necessity for soldier-diplomats to function as conflict-resolvers and negotiators in the “4th Generation Warfare” environment is greater now than ever before in our nation’s history. In the context of events in the near-East and South Asia, the requisite for sophisticated approaches in defusing volatile tensions under duress is critical. Officer selection must be sagacious, and negotiation training initiated or enhanced to develop these skills fully in our junior and mid-level leaders. The cultural programs and curricula embarked upon by our Armed Services educating our servicemen and women must be continued regardless of whether the current crises pass. The Pig War provides an excellent example of soldiers stepping out of their traditional roles of hard power instruments into the realm of smart power practitioners. This capability is of dire necessary in today’s stability and counterinsurgency environments.

About the Author:

Erich Wagner is a Major in the US Marine Corps and a graduate of the US Naval Academy and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In the past decade as an infantry officer he has served in defense of the American Embassy in Panama, trained foreign personnel in Croatia, Australia, Argentina, Korea, Japan, Curacao, and most recently, Iraq. He is currently a Congressional Liaison for the Marine Corps.

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¹ Robert Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts*, (New York: Random House, 2005) 5.

² Walter Pincus, “How Foreign Policy Functions Shifted To The Pentagon,” *Washington Post*, August 4, 2008, 9.

³ Charlie Coon, “Troops in Iraq Are Also Diplomats,” *Stars & Stripes*, Mideast Edition, March 24, 2005.

⁴ Kaplan, 5.

⁵ Tracy Elmer Strevey, “Pickett on Puget Sound,” (Masters of Arts Thesis, University of Washington, 1973), 58.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Cambridge: *Public Affairs*, 2004, 5.

⁷ Ernest J. Wilson, III, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616 (March 2008), 115.

⁸ Deborah Franklin, “Boar War,” *Smithsonian*, June 2005, accessed at <<http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/boar.html?c=y&page=1>> (July 26, 2008); see also Keith Murray, *The Pig War*, (Tacoma, WA: Washington State Historical Society, 1968) 33.

⁹ Warren G. Magnuson, “One Shot War With England,” accessed at <http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1960/3/1960_3_62.shtml> (12 July 2008).

¹⁰ Strevey, 25

¹¹ Note that the petition did not complain about the Hudson’s Bay Company nor about the threats to Cutlar with regards to the pig, most likely on the advice of General Harney. “Until decimated by smallpox in the early 1860s, the Northern Indians (Haida, Tsimshian, Tlingit, Bella Bella, and other nations from the northern British Columbia coast and Queen Charlotte Islands continued a tradition of sending raiding parties to the San Juans and Puget Sound, occasionally targeting settlers in addition to local Indians.” See Warren G. Magnuson’s “One-shot War With England” and Mike Vouri’s “The Pig War: Conflict and Resolution in the Pacific Northwest,” San Juan Island National Historical Park, n.d., accessed at <http://www.nps.gov/archive/sajh/pig_war_resource_guide.htm> (12 July 2008).

¹² Strevey, 25. Note that half of Pickett’s company were raw recruits from Ireland, ill-supplied and underpaid, and the frontier army as a whole was ragged after the Mexican War.

¹³ Murray, 36.

¹⁴ La Salle Corbell Pickett, *Pickett and His Men*, (Atlanta, GA: Foote & Davies Company, 1899) 112.

¹⁵ Edmond S. Meany, *History of the State of Washington* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909) 245.

¹⁶ Lesley Jill Gordon, *General George E. Pickett in Life and Legend*, (North Carolina: UNC Press, 1998) 56.

¹⁷ Franklin, 112.

¹⁸ G.P.V Akrigg and Helen B. Akrigg, *British Columbia Chronicle, 1847-1871: Gold & Colonists*, *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), (University of California Press: CA) 174.

¹⁹ Warren G. Magnuson, “One Shot War With England,” *American Heritage*, April 1960, Volume 11, Issue 3.

²⁰ James S. Robbins, *Last in Their Class: Custer, Pickett and the Goats of West Point*. (NY: Encounter Books), 177.

²¹ La Salle Corbell Pickett, 112.

²² Strevey, 57.

²³ Strevey, 27.

²⁴ Pickett to Captain Hornby, August 3, 1859, as quoted in La Salle Corbell Pickett, *Pickett and His Men*, Foote and Davies: 1899, 120.

²⁵ Gordon, 58.

²⁶ Will Dawson, *The War That Was Never Fought*, (Princeton, N.J.: 1971), 72.

²⁷ Robbins, 177.

²⁸ Pickett to Hornby, August 3, 1859.

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³⁰ Murray, 42-43.

³¹ William Fitzwilliam Milton, *A History of the San Juan Water Boundary Question, as Affecting the Division of Territory Between Great Britain and the United States*, (London: Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, 1869) 345.

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³³ NAGB, FO14/414 Lyons to Cass to Admiralty March 28, 1860, Inc. #3 in #56.

³⁴ *Pioneer-Democrat*, Olympia, May 25, 1860.

³⁵ NA, RG567 MF, Pickett to Bazalgette, Sept. 9, 1860; Pickett to Babbitt, Sept. 1, 1860.

³⁶ Mike Vouri, "Pig War to Civil War: George Pickett and James Alden, Jr.," San Juan Island NHP, 2008.

³⁷ Vouri, 57.

³⁸ Robbins 178.

³⁹ Vouri, 61.

⁴⁰ Vouri, phone conversation with author, 24 June 2008.

⁴¹ Warren G. Magnuson, "One-Shot War with England," <http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1960/3/1960_3_62.shtml> (July 6, 2008).

⁴² Mike Vouri, "George Pickett and the 'Pig War Crisis'," San Juan Island National Historical Park, accessed at <<http://www.pickettsociety.com/pigwar.html>>; (July 5, 2008).

⁴³ Mike Vouri, email message to author, July 6, 2008.

⁴⁴ NA RG393, Pickett to Bazalgette, June 20, 1861.

⁴⁵ Deborah Goodwin, *The Military and Negotiation: The Role of the Soldier-Diplomat*, (New York: Rutledge, 2005) 12. Goodwin's work is one of the finest ever written on the subject and highly recommended.



**American
Camp
San Juan
Island 1862.
Courtesy San
Juan Island
Historical
Archives**



United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)

JCOA Products List

(5 June 2009)

This is a list and description of JCOA products. All are, or soon will be, available on SIPRNET at <http://www.jfcom.smil.mil/jcoa>.

Although some of the products listed below are classified, all of the descriptions herein are unclassified.

HOMELAND DEFENSE PRODUCTS

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) –Applying the Lessons of Hurricane Katrina (2007)

A follow-on to the Hurricane Katrina report, this study develops a framework for analyzing incident management and highlights challenges that affect the level of unmet requirements in a catastrophe. It illustrates ways in which post-Katrina improvements can close the response gap. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Hurricane Katrina National Response to Catastrophic Event –Applied Lessons for Consequence Management (2006)

The report and briefing focus on the national response to Hurricane Katrina by local, state, and federal agencies during the month between the storm's formation in the Atlantic Ocean and the post-hurricane stabilization of conditions in the Gulf Coast region. The report concentrates on response – as opposed to disaster mitigation or recovery – because the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in coping with domestic disasters lies primarily in providing civil authorities with response capabilities, not in providing assets for long-term recovery. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

National Response to Biological Contagion: Lessons from Pandemic Planning (2006)

Future biotechnology advancements will make it easier for a wide range of adversaries – including terrorist organizations – to launch a biological attack. This

product studies biological incidents and examines USNORTHCOM's role as the Global Synchronizer for Pandemic Influenza planning. The study goes beyond the example of Pandemic Influenza to inform decision makers and planners to help mitigate the effects of pandemic or similar biological threats. It identifies gaps and shortfalls in DOD's participation in the nation's preparation and response to a significant pandemic. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/ DISASTER RELIEF PRODUCTS

International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Operations - Annotated Brief (2007)

The HADR study analyzes four major Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) events: the Haiti Peacekeeping mission (2004), the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Pakistan Earthquake (2005), and the Guatemala Mudslides (2005). Analysis of these events revealed a number of common enabling capabilities that were critical for success in a HADR response. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

GUATEMALA Disaster Relief - US Response to Hurricane Stan, Oct 2005 (2006)

In October 2005 a team of JCOA observers, in conjunction with USSOUTHCOM, conducted a study of JTF-Bravo's quick response in the initial phase of helping the Guatemalan government deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Stan. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Humanitarian Assistance - Disaster Relief in Pakistan (2006)

In October 2005 a devastating earthquake caused widespread destruction in northern Pakistan and adjacent areas. In response, CENTCOM designated Expeditionary Support Group One as the Combined Disaster Assistance Command – Pakistan to assist the Pakistani government in recovery efforts. A team from JCOA observed and detailed the effectiveness of US forces in accomplishing the mission and strengthening the strategic ties which bind Pakistan and the US in the global war on terror. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Operation Secure Tomorrow (Haiti) 5 March- 30 June 2004 (2005)

This study focuses on issues that concerned US Southern Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Haiti, and their staffs as US-led multinational forces conducted a transition of military responsibility to the United Nations. The report describes these issues along with others developed through follow-on analyses of data and observations. It catalogs the team's important findings, places those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address shortcomings. This product is classified.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM PRODUCTS

Iraqi Information Operations (I2O) (2009)

MNF-I requested a study on Information Operations in Iraq to identify, document, and disseminate success, lessons learned, and challenges remaining across the spectrum of operations. The study focuses on success brought about by organizational structure; horizontal and vertical processes and partnering efforts; lessons learned and the synchronization of IO with strategic communications, Public Affairs, and Public Diplomacy. Additionally, the study will identify any divergence in IO practices with current IO doctrine and will include methods and TTPs used to incorporate IO into planning, targeting, and operational processes focusing on psychological operations, military deception, and computer network operations. This study will serve as a mechanism that enables IO planners in Iraq to reach out to IO planners in Afghanistan and other locations to inform and shape future operations and DOTMLPF change recommendations. This study is classified.

A Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study (CAI) (2008)

GEN Petraeus requested that JCOA capture successes in the Coalition's integrated counterinsurgency efforts against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) during 2007-2008 ("Anaconda Strategy"). GEN Odierno and AMB Crocker added that the study should emphasize civil-military cooperation from strategic to tactical levels. This study focuses on four main themes: unifying efforts; attacking insurgent networks; separating the population from the insurgents; and building Government of Iraq capabilities. It will include a jointly written DOS-JCOA monograph focused on the civil-military cooperation aspects to the overall approach. The study began in September 2008 and continues into 2009. This study will have both classified and unclassified products.

Joint Tactical Environment (JTE) (2008)

The JTE study originated from a request by MNF-I to JFCOM to document the innovation in Iraq between air-weapons teams and UAVs during operations in Sadr City. That task expanded to include other urban areas in Iraq and the critical command and control and airspace operations in those urban environments. Ultimately, the JTE mission documented innovation and best practices involving the integration of joint capabilities in urban operations. Specifically, the study was tasked to address four main pillars: C2, Fires, ISR, and Airspace from the joint perspective in an effort to better understand how units in environments such as Sadr City, Basrah, Mosul, and others, employed joint or non-organic capabilities for their specific operational environment. This product is classified.

Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (CTI) (2008)

MNF-I requested this study to capture, document, and validate ISR best practices and lessons learned to improve ISR employment in support of COIN targeting in Iraq. JCOA collected data from almost all brigades, some battalions, and selected companies, in addition to higher echelon headquarters. Team members observed operations, conducted interviews, and collected data to document best practices important to success or failure in COIN targeting. While conducting this study it became clear that ISR support to COIN targeting had to be understood in relation to ISR support to the broader spectrum of COIN missions. This product is classified.

Operation Iraqi Freedom Counter-insurgency (COIN) Operations (2007)

The COIN study examines the shift in focus from reconstruction operations in 2003 to COIN operations (supported by a “surge” of US troops) in 2007. It focuses on the following areas: 1) evolution of US coalition strategy in Iraq, 2) elements of the latest strategy, and 3) impact of implementation of the latest strategy. This product is available in classified and unclassified versions.

A Team Approach: TF-Freedom, Mosul Iraq (2007)

This is the story of Task Force Freedom and how teamwork between those conducting operations and those providing intelligence led to success. Task Force Freedom adapted to a severely degraded security situation by developing a streamlined targeting cycle, lowering the threshold of actionable intelligence, and enabling distributed execution –underpinned by shared awareness and purpose. This product is classified.

Emerging Solutions: Al Anbar Best Practice Study (2007)

This study examines how Al Anbar changed dramatically between autumn 2006 and spring 2007, from one of the most violent, anti-coalition insurgent strongholds to one where local tribal leaders partnered with coalition forces in an effort to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Violence dropped significantly. Reconstruction projects are underway, the economy is resurging, and normalcy is returning. This product is classified.

Transition to Sovereignty, (2007)

This study examines OIF from June 2004 to December 2005. This period began when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred sovereignty to the newly elected Iraq government. During this period the insurgency gained momentum, as it became apparent that the capabilities of other elements of USG could not be brought to bear on the situation because of the deteriorating security situation. This product is classified.

Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (SSTR) [Combined] (2006)

The Joint Staff and JCOA collected lessons during OIF. Each evaluated SSTR operations from the end of JCCO in May 2003 until the transition to Iraqi sovereignty

on 28 June 2004. This publication combines the two efforts to allow the reader to review them in a single document, if desired. This product is classified.

UK and US Friendly Fire in Recent Combat Operations (2006)

The Technical Cooperation Programme - a cooperative venture between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States - Joint Systems and Analysis Group established Action Group 13 on Fratricide Mitigation with an objective, among others, of collaborative sharing of records, analyses and findings on friendly fire and fratricide. This report presents the results of an event-by-event collaborative comparison of friendly fire records between the UK and the US, covering three recent Coalition warfighting operations: Operation Desert Storm/Granby, Operation Enduring Freedom/Herrick, and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Telic. This product is unclassified.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Communications Architecture and Bandwidth Analyses (2005)

The study characterizes the OIF communications architecture and bandwidth used by USCENTCOM in theatre, including: joint command centers; service component operational and tactical centers; and the last tactical mile, including global reach back. The study covered Joint Combined Combat Operations. It expresses bandwidths in terms of allocated data rate equivalent capacity and performance based on actual usage derived from historical logs. This product is classified.

Lessons-Learned on Modern Irregular Warfare- (2005)

This study provides an executive-level lessons learned overview of modern irregular warfare operations. It focuses on the nature of insurgencies and countering insurgencies, while recognizing that terrorism and intimidation are popular tools for insurgents. This product is unclassified.

JCOA – Joint Health Service Operations - Medical Lessons Learned (2005)

The DOD medical community has had great success in the treatment of combat casualties in Iraq. Combat mortality, defined as a measurement of the percentage of all battle casualties that result in death (Killed in Action + Died of Wounds/Total Battle Casualties),

is the lowest level in recorded warfare. Despite the success in the reduction of combat mortality among coalition combat casualties, DOD medical treatment facilities still face many difficult challenges. These medical support challenges are examined in the JCOA medical study. The product is classified.

Synchronizing Counter-IED Efforts in Iraq (2005)

This study examines the challenges of synchronizing and coordinating the activities of multiple entities working to counter adversaries' use of improvised explosive devices (IED). This product is classified.

Joint Combined Combat Operations (JCCO) (2004)

This study compiles operational insights gathered during major combat operations and assesses their impact on future joint warfighting at the operational level. It catalogs important findings, puts those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address them. This product is classified.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM PRODUCTS

Combined Security Transition Command –Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Police Reform Challenges (2008)

This study identifies and documents challenges associated with CSTC-A's organizing, training and equipping of the ANP forces and capture lessons learned associated with transitioning security responsibilities from coalition forces to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) during a counterinsurgency. Since April 2005, CSTC-A has been tasked to organize, train, and equip the Afghanistan National Police forces. CSTC-A's mission supports Security Sector Reform for Afghanistan, to counter internal and external threats and ultimately ensure the long term success of the Afghan government. This study is classified.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment (2006)

In October 2005 a team from the US Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and JCOA assessed PRT operations in Afghanistan as part of an

effort to distill best practices. The goals of the assessment were to: 1) generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination among various USG departments and agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings, 2) determine key lessons to inform the transition of PRTs to ISAF, and 3) analyze the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other current and future US peace and stability operations. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

JALLC Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Re-flagging: Lessons Learned from Stage 2 Expansion (2006)

The NATO Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked to: 1) Analyze the relief-in-place of a US PRT – either under NATO control or just prior to NATO assuming the control of the PRT – to another NATO or Non-NATO relieving nation, and 2) Use the PRT located in Herat, Afghanistan as the case study to identify lessons to improve the relief-in place process. This product is classified.

IRAQI PERSPECTIVE PROJECT PRODUCTS

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) was a Secretary of Defense directed research project, sponsored by JCOA, and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP). This project examined the perspective of the former Iraqi regime's civilian and military leadership on issues of interest to the US military, using information gathered through interviews and reviews of captured documents. The goal of this project was to determine how US operations were viewed and understood by the enemy. The following products emerged from this project:

Mother of All Battles (MOAB) Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (2008)

Events in this report on the 'Mother of All Battles,' as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, videos, audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime's archives and never intended for outsiders eyes. The report is part of a JCOA research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary's

archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, this balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of unique access to material. This product is unclassified.

Iraqi Perspectives Project Book (2007)

This book presents a historical analysis of the forces and motivation that drove our opponent's decisions during Phase III (Mar03-May03) of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders, and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, it substantively examines Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process, revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' points of view. This product is unclassified.

Saddam and the Tribes - Regime Adaptation to Internal Challenges (2007)

This study explores the complex relationship between Saddam's regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. This product explores the dynamics between tribe and state in dictatorial societies, and the ways in which tribal leadership can impact success or failure of central governance. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Saddam and Terrorism - Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents (2007)

This study uses captured former regime documents to examine the links and motivations behind Saddam Hussein's interactions with regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. This product is classified.

Toward an Operational-Level Understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2005)

This report is the classified report associated with the *Iraqi Perspectives Project Book*. In addition to providing the Iraqi view of combat operations from early preparation through the collapse of the regime during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, it also presents the Iraqi understanding of our capabilities and their

efforts to exploit that understanding. A classified briefing and audio narrative slide show version is also available for this product. This product is classified.

TERRORIST PERSPECTIVE PROJECT PRODUCTS

The Terrorist Perspective Project (TPP) examines the perspectives of the members of Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups which share its theology and world view, on issues of interest to the United States military, using primary source information principally gathered through open source and captured enemy documents. The goal of the project was to better "know the enemy" and to develop insights into enemy weaknesses and potential "Blue" strategies.

The Call to Global Islamic Jihad - The Jihad Manifesto (2008)

US intelligence has identified Abu Musab Al-Suri as the most important theorist of the global Islamic jihad, and considers his manifesto to be the definitive strategic document produced by al Qaeda or any jihadi organization in more than a decade. But to Americans, his 1600-page manuscript largely consists of incomprehensible, impenetrable Islamic scholarship. This publication is a distillation of Al-Suri's Call to Global Islamic Resistance. This product is unclassified.

The Terrorist Perspective Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated Movements (2008)

This book synthesizes the perspectives of Osama bin Laden and his fellow Salafi jihadists on how to wage war on their enemies. This product is unclassified.

The Canons of Jihad: A Terrorists' Perspective of Warfare and Defeating America (2008)

Noting that the best way to understand Salafi jihadists is to ignore statements they release to the West in favor of examining what they say to each other, this book provides a definitive collection of the writings that intellectually underpin the jihadi movement. This product is unclassified.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 1 (2007)

This project approaches Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) as a movement rather than as a network, and tries to understand whether and in what ways its members think above the tactical level. Drawing on the enemy's own words both from open source materials and captured documents, it identifies seams and subjects of concern within the AQAM community. It explores the dichotomy between those members of AQAM who think instrumentally about their war and those who do not, and discuss topics such as the evolution of the enemy's political and military thought, enemy assessments of the United States, their comparative views of their media and our media, and their concerns about attracting people to the movement. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Voices of the Enemy Quotations from Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) (2007)

AQAM have been living in a state of war for more than four decades. Salafi jihadist leaders have developed a powerful narrative of history that appeals to and mobilizes their membership, though this narrative is based on questionable historical interpretations and future assumptions. Their strategists have learned that they will need to have a sound strategy and leaders who will ensure that such strategy is followed. The IDA study team used the enemy's own words from more than 250,000 documents from open and classified sources, including documents captured during OEF and OIF, to illustrate the enemy message for the reader. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements Phase 2 (2007)

This study draws upon words of AQAM found in captured documents and open-source pronouncements to describe a revolutionary movement which does not think of itself as a network. Intellectual leaders of AQAM are very concerned about the status of this movement, believing that the uncoordinated actions of its members repel the very Muslims that they need to attract. They are also concerned that they are losing

the war of ideas and are isolated in an overwhelming hostile media environment. In response, the movement's intellectual leadership engages in a vigorous process of analysis, self-criticism and adaptation. Unfortunately for them, their ability to implement their adaptive policies is imperfect. This product is classified.

IRREGULAR WARFARE PRODUCTS

Second Lebanon War: Applied Lessons Learned (2008)

In 2006 the world watched as Israel responded to the 12 July killing of three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and the kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers by fighters of the Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hizballah. Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to use military force and diplomacy to achieve the goals set out by Prime Minister Olmert. When Israel did not achieve these goals through an aggressive air campaign and subsequent ground invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began to question Israel's military capabilities. As one officer stated, "Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a reputation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors, until last year." What happened? Why? And what are the implications for future conflicts? Many institutions, government agencies, and military services have studied the 2nd Lebanon War. None, however, have reported all the major findings in one holistic account. Using those previous studies as primary data sources, this JCOA study seeks to identify, synthesize, and present the lessons learned about the hybrid threat that seemed to emerge in the 2nd Lebanon War. This study is classified.

Super-Empowered Threat (2008)

A follow-on to the JCOA *Techno-Guerilla* (TG) and *National Response to Biological Contagion* (NRBC), *Super-Empowered Threat* (SET) examines the development of modern terrorist groups and the changes in the asymmetric threat. Work in *TG* and *NRBC* demonstrated the exponential increase in the operational and destructive capabilities of small terrorist groups. The threat continues to evolve. Alliances between state sponsors, terrorists groups, organized crime, and trans-national gangs are expanding. Terrorists groups are becoming more

sophisticated in their use of commercially available electronic and modern telecommunications networks. Their influence is spreading across the globe while our focus is on the Middle East. The study evaluates the emerging terrorist threat using a law enforcement model analyzing behavioral resolve, operational practicality, and technical feasibility. This product is available classified and unclassified–FOUO.

Georgia-Russia Conflict (2008)

This study, tasked by the Joint Staff and conducted in coordination with EUCOM and several USG agencies, examines the summer 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict in terms of background, conduct of the conflict, and the resulting regional/strategic implications. The analysis highlights direct military action in conventional approaches that at the same time used irregular approaches which shaped this conflict for well over a decade. The study offers an opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of a reemergent Russia, as well as the impact of the evolving nature of hybrid warfare with its impact on policy, plans, and preparations for future conflict. This product is classified.

Techno-Guerrilla: The Changing Face of Asymmetric Warfare (2007)

This study explores the evolution of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The Techno-Guerrilla is an asymmetric force with conventional techniques and capabilities that utilizes open source warfare (“Wiki Warfare”) and systems disruption, as it seeks to create a transnational insurgency. The study examines the phenomenon of super-empowerment – which is defined as the point at which a small group of individuals can create social-network disruption to an entire society with global effect, aka the 9/11 Effect. This product is unclassified – FOUO.

OTHER PRODUCTS

MNF-I Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008 (2009)

In April 2008, at the request of the MNF-I Chief of Staff, the US Joint Forces Command Deputy Director for Strategic Communication undertook a data collection effort to document MNF-I strategic communication best practices and their DOTMLPF implications. That effort culminated in a brief that was disseminated

to appropriate customers within the Department of Defense. The JFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) reviewed the brief and felt that the recent successes in MNF-I strategic communications needed to be further documented and shared with other combatant commands and joint task forces. This JCOA paper therefore builds upon the foundation laid by the JFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and presents a further look at the key elements of this good news story.

Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) Case Study (2009)

Originating in response to a request from the US Ambassador to Haiti through USSOUTHCOM, the Haiti study’s purpose is to assess, document lessons learned, and capture best practices of the “comprehensive approach” implementation of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). The HSI is a pilot project designed to test and demonstrate a highly integrated civilian stabilization program, funded by DOD Section 1207, and designed and implemented by elements of the US State Department and USAID. The ongoing HSI effort is focused on Cite Soleil, an area of metropolitan Port-au-Prince that was completely lost to Government of Haiti (GOH) control until reclaimed by United Nations Stabilization Mission – Haiti (MINUSTAH) military operations at the beginning of 2007. The study will lead to insights into whether this approach supported both the SOUTHCOM Theater Security Strategy and AMEMBASSY Haiti’s Mission Strategic Plans and has potential wider application in other stability operations.

9-11 Commission Report/Global War on Terrorism Brief - Compare and Contrast (2005)

This briefing compares the purposes, approaches, and results of the 9-11 Commission Report to JCOA observations. This product is classified.

Joint Lessons Learned: Kosovo LL Brief (2004)

This is a combined study by NATO JALLC and USJFCOM Joint Center for Lessons Learned on operations in Kosovo and surrounding regions. This product is classified.

Joint Center for Operational Analysis

<http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/jcjl/>
<http://www.jfcom.smil.mil/jcoa-ll>

116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
BG Anthony Crutchfield, Director	(anthony.crutchfield)	x7317
CDR Don Hughes, Engagement Div	(donald.hughes)	x7339
Mr. Mike Barker	(hugh.barker)	x7270

DSN: 668 Comm: (757) 203 - XXXX
Internet: (username)@jfcom.mil
SIPRNET: (username)@hq.jfcom.smil.mil

Joint Staff, J7 JTD

7000 Joint Staff Pentagon RM 2C714
Washington, D.C. 20318-7000

	<u>user name</u>	<u>DSN</u>	<u>phone #</u>
LTC Rick Fenoli	(richard.fenoli)	227	697-3665
Mr. S. Ball (JLPPS)	(shelby.ball)	225	695-2263

Comm: (703) XXX - XXXX
Internet: (username)@js.pentagon.mil
SIPRNET: (username)@pentagon.js.smil.mil

FEMA

FCP 200-H
500 C St. SW
Washington, D.C. 20472

Office of National Preparedness

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. K. Iacobacci	(kevin.iacobacci)	x3293

Comm: (202) 646 - XXXX
Internet: (username)@fema.gov

CENTCOM

US Central Command
7115 South Boundary Blvd.
MacDill AFB, FL 33621 - 5101

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. L. Underwood	(underwlm)	x3384
Ms. M. Avery	(averyma)	x6301
Mr. Jerry Swartz (JLLS)	(swartzjc)	x3450

DSN: 651 Comm: (813) 827 - XXXX
Internet: (username)@centcom.mil
SIPRNET: (username)@centcom.smil.mil

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security
DHS/S & T
Washington D.C., 20528

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. Bill Lyerly	(william.lyerly)	x8344

Internet: (username)@dhs.gov
Comm: (202) 205 - xxxx

Joint Lessons Learned Points of Contact

PACOM

HQ US Pacific Command
ATTN: J723
Camp Smith, HI 96861

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. Thom Acton (JLLS)	(thomas.acton)	x7767

DSN 315-477 Comm: (808) 477 - XXXX
Internet: (username)@pacom.mil

TRANSCOM

US Transportation Command (TCJ3-TN)
508 Scott Drive
Scott AFB, IL 62225 - 5357

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. R. Netemeyer	(robert.netemeyer)	x1782
Mr. T. Behne (JLLS)	(todd.behne.ctr)	x1141

DSN: 779 Comm: (618) 229 - XXXX
Internet: (username)@ustranscom.mil
SIPRNET: (username)@ustranscom.smil.mil

SOUTHCOM

US Southern Command
3511 NW 91st Avenue
Miami, FL 33172 - 1217

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Joe Cormack (JLLS)	(cormackj)	x3380

DSN: 567 Comm: (305) 437 - XXXX
Internet: (username)@hq.southcom.mil

STRATCOM

US Strategic Command (J732)
901 SAC Blvd. Suite M133
Offutt AFB, NE 68113-6500

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
LCDR Mike Manisidor	(michael.manisidor)	x5098
Mr. Mike ProcellaFrye	(michael.procella)	x5156

DSN: 272 Comm: (402) 232 - XXXX FAX: 5045
Internet: (username)@stratcom.mil
SIPRNET: (username)@stratnets.stratcom.smil.mil

ALSA CENTER

Air Land Sea Application Center
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB, VA 23665

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Director	(alsadirector)	x0902

DSN: 575 Comm: (757) 225 - XXXX
Internet: alsadirector@langley.af.mil
SIPRNET: (username)@langley.af.smil.mil

EUCOM

USEUCOM/ECJ37

Unit 30400

APO AE, 09131

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Lt Col R. Haddock	(haddockr)	x4246
Ms. Kathleen Smith (JLLPS)	(smithkat)	x4247

DSN: (314) 430 - XXXX

Internet: (username)@eucom.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@eucom.smil.mil

SOCOM

SOKF-J7-DL

HQ Special Operations Command

7701 Tampa Point Blvd.

Maddill AFB, FL 33621 - 5323

	<u>user name</u>	<u>SIPRNET</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. J. Kiser	(kiserj)	(john.kiser)	x9322
Mr. M. Hallal	(hallalm)	(marc.hallal)	x4787
Mr. B. Bailey	(baileyr)	(robert.bailey)	x9323

DSN: 299 COMM: (813) 828 - XXXX

Internet: (username)@socom.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@hqsocom.socom.smil.mil

NORAD

NORAD US Northern Command/J7

250 Vandenberg Street, Ste. B016

Peterson AFB, CO 80914

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. Don Fisk (JLLS)	(donald.fisk)	x9762

DSN: 692 COMM: (719) 474 - 8331

Internet: (username)@norad.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@northcom.smil.mil

NORTHCOM

NORAD US Northern Command/J7

250 Vandenberg Street, Ste. B016

Peterson AFB, CO 80914

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. Ken Jorgensen (JLLS)	(kenneth.jorgensen)	x3656

DSN: 834 Comm: (719) 556 - XXXX

Internet: (username)@northcom.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@northcom.smil.mil

Joint Information Operations Warfare Command

(J72 JLLP-IO)

2 Hall Blvd STE 217

San Antonio, TX 78243-7008

	<u>user</u>	<u>namephone</u>
Ms Regina Walker (Director)	(regina.walker)	x11
LTC Alan Welch	(alan.welch)	x31
Mr. James Bowden	(james.bowden)	x32
Mr. Greg Gibbons	(gregory.gibbons)	x33

DSN: 969-6293 Comm: (210)-670-2676 Ext. xx Fax: x4233

Internet: (username)@jiowc.osis.gov

SIPRNet: (username)@jiowc.smil.mil

US Marine Corps<http://www.mccll.usmc.mil><http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil>

Marine Corp Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

1019 Elliot Rd.

Quantico, VA 22134

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Col Monte Dunard (Director)	(monte.dunard)	x1286
LtCol Scott Hawkins (OPSO)	(donald.hawkins)	x1282
Mr. Mark Satterly (JLLPS)	(mark.satterly)	x1316

DSN: 378 Comm: (703) 432-XXXX FAX: 1287

Internet: (username)@usmc.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@mccdc.usmc.smil.mil

US Navy<http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/nlls>

1530 Gilbert Street Ste 2128

Norfolk, VA 23511-2733

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Mr. Mark Henning	(mark.henning)	*444-8010
Mr. David Perretta	(david.perretta.ctr)	x2921
Mr. Steve Poniatowski (JLLS)	(steve.poniatowski1)	x2918

DSN: *564 / 262 COMM: (757) 322- XXXX

Internet: (username)@nwdc.navy.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@nwdc.navy.smil.mil

US Air Force

HQ USAF/A9L

Office of Air Force Lessons Learned

1777 N Kent St, Floor 6

Rosslyn, VA 22209-2110

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Col Philip Smith (Dir)	(philip.smith)	x8877
Mr. Paul McViney	(paul.mcvinney)	x8884
Ms. Becky Harper	(rebecca.harper.ctr)	x8927

DSN: 425 Comm:(703) 588-XXXX FAX: 696-8738

Internet: (username)@pentagon.af.mil

SIPRNET: (username)@af.pentagon.smil.mil

US Army

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

10 Meade Avenue Bldg. 50

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
COL Robert Forrester, Director	(robert.forrester)	x3035
Mr. Larry Hollars (JOIB)	(larry.hollars)	x9581

DSN: 552 Comm: (913) 684 - XXXX

Internet: (username)@us.army.mil

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

1680 Texas St., SE

Kirtland AFB, NM 87117 - 5669

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
Ms. Linda Qassim	(linda.qassim)	x8673

DSN: 246 Comm: (505) 846 - 8734

Internet: (username)@abq.dtra.mil

US Coast Guard<http://www.uscg.mil>

Commandant (CG-535)

2100 2nd St. S.W., RM 3414

Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

Office of Contingency Exercises

	<u>user name</u>	<u>phone#</u>
CAPT Mike Mohn, Chief	(michael.a.mohn)	x2141
CDR Mark Ledbetter	(mark.a.ledbetter)	x2143

Comm: (202) 372-xxxx

Internet: (username)@comdt.uscg.mil

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COMMANDER

USJFCOM JWFC CODE JCOA
116 LAKE VIEW PKWY
SUFFOLK VA 23435-2697

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

