Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007
Abstract
When the Bush administration elected to invade Iraq in 2003 to remove Saddam Hussein from power, no senior policymaker anticipated that there would be extensive and protracted armed resistance after the dictator was gone. The administration assumed that the Iraqi bureaucracy and security forces-both military and police-would return to work once they had new leadership untainted by association with Hussein. But American policymakers did not understand how fragile and precarious Iraq was after decades of pathological rule. As Iraqi security forces disappeared, the nation collapsed into a spasm of looting and street crime. All administration and public order collapsed. It was "Lord of the Flies" on a monumental scale. Anarchy sparked public anger which gathered energy with each passing week. Personal and sectarian hostility, which had been suppressed by Hussein, raged unfettered. Revenge haunted the streets-and it was armed. For a brief interlude, little violence was directed against Americans. But that did not last long.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA519573
Entities
People
- John R. Martin
- Steven Metz
Organizations
- United States Army War College