

SPENDING ON DIME NOW- WINNING LASTING PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIC E. EDIN
United States Army Reserve

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SPENDING ON DIME NOW – WINNING LASTING PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

by

Lieutenant Colonel Eric E. Edin
United States Army Reserve

Larry P. Goodson, Ph.D.
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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Recent national policy deliberations regarding prosecution of the war in Afghanistan have prompted an overall change in U.S. strategy as articulated by President Obama in his December 1, 2009 speech at West Point. The goal of the new short-term military-focused strategy is to protect the Afghan population by strengthening Afghan Security Forces in order to create time and space to develop the nation's economy and governance. However, the lack of a long-term U.S. strategy to address fundamental shortcomings in the Afghan economy and governance structure may ultimately prevent any genuine long-term sustainable progress in the Afghan security situation and thereby frustrate any near-term pullback of U.S. forces. This SRP explores the effectiveness of the current lines of operational effort (LoO). It offers and recommendations of ways to stabilize Afghanistan in the short-term, necessary to enable the transition of US forces beginning in July 2011.

SPENDING ON DIME NOW – WINNING LASTING PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

The war in Afghanistan will soon become the longest war the United States has ever fought on foreign soil. The recent national policy debate over this issue affirms the tenuous nature of our continued presence. We are now faced with the paradox of preventing a Vietnam-type defeat by staying the course or giving Al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups a significant victory by failing to complete the mission of securing Afghanistan. President Obama and Gen. McCrystal's new strategy to win the war in Afghanistan focuses on a short-term objective of "securing the people." But it falls short of any credible long-term strategy to improve the underlying conditions that enable the insurgency to flourish and thereby facilitate the eventual withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from the country. As a classic example of a "failed state," Afghanistan's failure to achieve genuine sovereignty is deep-seated. Simply strengthening its internal governance mechanisms will not suffice. The United States and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have an opportunity to execute an integrated nation-building strategy in Afghanistan that addresses both short-term security requirements and long-term development and governance efforts necessary to restore Afghan sovereignty and bring peace and security to the region.

Taliban insurgent groups organized at the operational level consist of three groups¹ of disaffected foot soldiers who fight for various combinations of tribal pride, economic opportunity, anti-government sentiment (for justice, against corruption), and religious ideology.² A successful counter-insurgency strategy will effectively and efficiently employ national power assets to combat, co-opt, and subvert these disaffected groups to win the "war of the people." Given the recent U.S. national debate

over Afghanistan strategy and our military leaders' recent research in counter-insurgency doctrine and nation-building, it is critical that a smart application of national power resources be brought to bear to defeat the insurgency in the long-term. We must efficiently and effectively employ our Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of national power to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals in the region.³

This paper examines Gen. Stanley McCrystal's counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan in the context of a counter-insurgency "DIME" paradigm organized along four specific Lines of Operation (LoO): security, governance, development, and strategic communications.⁴ Each section of this paper analyzes the background and current Afghan state of affairs regarding each LoO. This analysis then addresses problematic issues that may prevent the successful realization of the goals of each LoO. Finally, this paper offers recommendations to strengthen the strategy in order to achieve an acceptable level of security necessary to allow the successful gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces beginning in July 2011.

The Current COIN Strategy

Two primary documents articulate the counter-insurgency strategy pursued by Gen. McCrystal: the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For Support To Afghanistan (ICMCP, 10 Aug 2009) and the COMISAF Initial Assessment (30 Aug 2009). Together, these documents provide a solid counter-insurgency (COIN) framework for "securing the population" in the short-term. They provide a fairly detailed analysis of the challenges in governance, development, and strategic communications that complicate our efforts to "win the people" in the long war in Afghanistan. "Winning of the people" over the long-term is certainly a wicked challenge for coalition forces.

The ICMCP presents a coordinated US State Department and Department of Defense “whole of government” approach to integrate and synchronize civil-military teams working across security, development, and governance lines of operation.⁵ The document identifies “11 counter-insurgency transformative effects”⁶ with prioritized objectives for each effect. The strategy is designed to achieve these objectives in 12-18 months. While this document sets many end-state goals, it does not include a strategic action plan on how to accomplish them.

The COMISAF Initial Assessment endorses much of the strategy outlined in the ICMCP, including the 11 counter-insurgency transformative effects. This document formally advocates the new strategic “focus on the population,” which rests on four main pillars: 1) improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF; 2) prioritize responsive and accountable governance; 3) gain the initiative; and 4) focus resources.⁷ While the COMISAF Initial Assessment thoroughly addresses the military security strategy, it less specifically provides actionable objectives regarding the other elements of national power needed to win the COIN fight in the long-term.

Line of Operation: Security

The central aim of the new COIN strategy for Afghanistan focuses on securing the Afghan population through military means. Historically, this concept is fully developed in counter-insurgency literature; theorists such as David Galula claim that the “counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent.”⁸ Indeed, a RAND Corporation study found that “successful counter-insurgency operations require not only the capability of the United States to conduct unconventional war, but, most important, the ability to shape the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces.”⁹ For this reason, the

first pillar of the new strategy to “improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF” is suggested by theory at the outset: securing the population is vital to both short- and long-term strategic success.

The multinational ISAF faces three challenges in improving the quantity and quality of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), affecting ANSF’s ability to effectively secure the population from insurgents. First, after over five years of training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA), many units are still unable to conduct independent and sustained operations in the field; such operations are critical to counter-insurgency success. Second, the Afghan National Police (ANP) remain a serious impediment to providing population security, yet for many Afghans the ANP are the daily face of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA).¹⁰ Unfortunately, Afghans generally see corruption and incompetence in that face; it is not the comforting face of security. Finally, the sustained future growth and effectiveness of the ANSF is directly tied to the ability to attract and retain the ‘best and brightest’ Afghans.

According to the Asia Foundation, the Afghan National Army (ANA) remains one of the most respected institutions of the Government of Afghanistan.¹¹ Many of the initial shortcomings over pay, training, and equipment have been satisfactorily addressed since the ANA was rebuilt after the fall of the Taliban. A persistent critique of the ANA, much like that of other Third World armies, questions its ability to conduct sustained independent operations in the field. Moreover, another overlooked and unintended consequence of this rebuilding may be the ANA’s adoption of U.S. force protection tactics against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Excessive concern for force protection undercuts the ANA’s inherent tactical capability to negotiate the

forbidding home terrain and deny the insurgents advantage in this area. Useful models in this regard are the British operations in Malaysia in the 1960s or U.S. irregular warfare conducted in El Salvador in the 1980s. Both operations combined a host-nation light infantry capability with foreign infantry or special forces units to leverage the host's inherent knowledge of the home terrain. While this strategy carries inherent risk to U.S. forces and advisors, the model is sound and can provide the mentorship at the unit, leader, and soldier level to improve the ANA's proficiency and professionalism needed to sustain population security over the long-term.

In stark contrast to the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) institutional model requires fundamental reform. A recent independent assessment by Gen. (Ret) Barry McCaffrey suggests that the ANP is badly equipped, corrupt, and untrained. It will take "a decade" for the ANP to operate "in a competent manner."¹² Additional anecdotal field reporting suggests that incompetent and underpaid ANP are often placed into assigned areas where they are just as alien to the local tribal structure and language as an ISAF soldier. It seems ironic that developed Western countries with long histories of regional municipal and rural police forces would advocate a 'one size fits all' police force for a nation comprised of multiple diverse ethnicities, languages, and cultures. With no local responsibility for providing their own law enforcement, locally elected Afghan officials are not held accountable for area security. Our strategists should reassess the utility for a national police force rather than local municipal forces. Perhaps Afghan security should be built from the grassroots, from the bottom up, not from the top down. National funding for the 92,000 authorized ANP positions should be distributed locally, although national police

standards could still be ensured through a national academy program. As with other central GoA institutions, a lack of regional support for the ANP further alienates the rural population from a federal government seeking to protect it.

As the size of the ANSF force grows over the next 12-15 months, the challenge to attract and retain Afghans with the requisite skills and abilities will continue to grow in an environment of limited literacy and opportunity. If the insurgency continues at the current pace over the next several years, combat fatigue of ANSF personnel could result in a perpetual training cycle that never crosses over into a professional force due to attrition. Moreover, while a persistently anemic Afghan economy may force some Afghans to enlist and reenlist in what remains a dangerous occupation, an important vulnerability of this model is the lack of future sustainment. To address this vulnerability, occupational specialties should be expanded to further incentivize top quality ANSF soldiers. Capability gaps exist primarily in the engineer (road and facility repair) and medical fields, and the promise of further occupational training after serving an initial tour in the ANSF is a strong incentive in a literacy- and skill-challenged country like Afghanistan.

Finally, training, equipping, and fielding a professional host nation security force in the midst of fighting a persistent insurgency is enormously difficult. Satisfactorily addressing the aforementioned three challenges will improve ANSF's capability to conduct tactical force-on-force engagements against Taliban fighters in the short-term. Further, it will enable institutional reforms necessary for sustaining a credible professional force necessary to ensure security in the long-term. What remains to be seen is whether the new COIN strategy will produce an ANSF that is proficient in

conducting long-term counter-insurgency warfare. Agile Afghan National Security Forces will be required to conduct independent operations while building community support by “winning the hearts and minds” of those they seek to protect. The enormity of this task is evident in the ongoing challenges faced by the highly trained U.S. military to subdue the insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that time is on the side of the insurgents, it becomes even more urgent to train the ANSF at the outset to conduct this most challenging type of warfare in order to meet the short-term objective of securing the Afghan people through military means.

Line of Operation: Governance

The second pillar of the McCrystal strategy calls for defeating the insurgency through “responsive and accountable governance.”¹³ This task is essential for winning the “hearts and minds” campaign of the counter-insurgency effort. In academic nation-building literature, Afghanistan exhibits a “creeping sovereignty gap” because its government has been historically unable to provide essential services to the people.¹⁴ Moreover, as Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries and it has used practically every type of government known to mankind in the last century, including monarchy, military government, communism, anarchy, theocracy, and constitutional democracy.¹⁵ Each of these attempts to establish Westphalian central state control over a complex mosaic of independent and geographically separated tribes, ethnicities, and cultures has been relatively short-lived. The often violent overthrow and replacement of the central state political apparatus has reinforced attitudes among rural Afghans that the “state” is not to be trusted. As Goodson summarizes: “the multitude of Afghan governance suggests that formal systems of government are not well established, but informal governance (local jirga-shura system)...has wide legitimacy.”¹⁶ Given this

historical resistance to submit to Afghan central governmental control, fixing this “failed state” will require fundamental changes to the Afghan political system in order to validate the central government in Kabul with the tribes and villagers at the local level.

Since the Bonn Accords in 2001, the United States government (both Department of State and Department of Defense) has enthusiastically supported the idea of an Afghan democratic government. Many of the structural changes to the political process might require amendments to the Afghan constitution. But needed changes will disturb current power dynamics, so these changes will be resisted. There are three core problems with the current Afghan political model that must be reformed for this LoO to become an effective tool in the counter-insurgency fight. First, the Kabul central government’s political power and decision-making needs to be devolved down to the lowest possible level. Second, executive power should be checked by a stronger parliament and judiciary. Finally, the Afghan national elections process should be reformed and creation of political parties should be encouraged.

In the abstract, Afghan resistance to a Kabul central government is understandable given the dismal historical record of the nation’s attempts to build a strong central government. Despite a current democratic model that seeks to encourage individual participation through the national electoral process, the practical effect is marginalization of rural Afghans through the Presidential appointment of government ministers, provincial governors, and district sub-governors. If money is power, then the top-down disbursement of government funds channeled through the myriad of government ministries to political appointees at the provincial and district levels is an accurate indication of how governance works in Afghanistan. The

underlying theory that appointed government officials in Kabul will disburse funds to the most worthy and needed local projects in a fractured and diverse cultural environment like Afghanistan is far too utopian. While the Afghan constitution appears to have anticipated this impediment by providing for provincial councils, these regional bodies have little practical influence because they lack “power over the purse.”¹⁷ Recent efforts in 2007 by the opposition group United National Front, formed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, former president of Afghanistan, to revise the constitution to provide for provincial gubernatorial elections¹⁸ might have merit as a mechanism for regional and local elites to reclaim some power. Moreover, rechanneling government funding through elected rather than appointed officials will increase the effectiveness of population-centric projects – and thus legitimize the central government.

Closely tied to the empowerment of local Afghans would be a reform of the presidential-parliamentary balance of power to provide a truly collective, inclusive, and legitimate national political system. Structural issues with the current electoral process can be traced to the deliberations and interactions with members of the Afghan Constitution Commission appointed by Hamid Karzai. This Commission eventually produced the Afghan constitution in January 2004.¹⁹ Karzai’s efforts to shape the future electoral process were designed to advance his personal ambitions to be President. So, constitutional relations of the President with the National Assembly are at the core of the current problems facing the Afghan government.

The Afghan constitution requires the president to be elected by 50% + 1 of the votes cast in a direct voting process; a run-off election is held in two weeks following the election if the absolute majority threshold is not reached in the first round.²⁰ This

“second ballot system,” based on the French model, seems to have resulted from “Washington’s desire for a strong presidential system”²¹ with the likely expectation that the future president would assume a “George Washington” role in the leadership of the new nation.²² This model appealed to U.S. interests and seemed practicable during the early part of President Karzai’s first term, when performance expectations were quite low. However, given the latest results of the 2009 Afghan presidential election - with its structural dependence upon a single individual to pull together a nation historically fractured along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines, and in a regional environment where corruption and graft are the norm of everyday business and political life - in retrospect this majority requirement appears to have been a highly unrealistic expectation. An acceptable alternative would be to work with the Afghan government to amend the Afghan constitution, or use an informal process, such as the current election delays, to adopt a parliamentary model that would provide a dual executive. Common similar models would include a head of government responsible to the parliament, leaving Karzai to serve as the head of state in the figurehead position of president. This reformed system would provide an Afghan head of government from among a group of skilled politicians within the National Assembly. The system would foster coalition politics, ostensibly with broad appeal and corresponding power-sharing among different Afghan political groups through the apportionment of cabinet ministries. An obvious benefit would be a larger pool of candidates for executive office who could reshape the national government quickly after corruption and scandal, instead of waiting perhaps five years for the next presidential election.

In addition to reform of the executive branch, the process for electing the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) members of the lower house of the Afghan National Assembly is equally important and closely linked to improved legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan political process. Currently, the Wolesi Jirga is elected through the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which, can be attributed to Hamid Karzai's desire for "a fragmented opposition in the legislature, rather than strong and disciplined political parties."²³ Anyone who has watched Afghan television knows that this is a dysfunctional and inefficient political process that strengthens provincial perceptions of illegitimate governance. A reconsideration of a list-based proportional representation (PR) system as a mechanism to foster political parties in the Wolesi Jirga²⁴ should be explored in an effort to increase grass root political participation at the local level. Although critics may voice concerns regarding the possibility of ethnic, tribal, or religious political parties further stressing an already fractured society, these concerns are preemptively addressed in Article 35 of the Afghan constitution, which specifically forbids formations of parties along such lines.²⁵

Another opportunity to build a viable Afghan political structure is the consolidation of multiple elections with national implications that will take place in Afghanistan over the next 13 years. Some form of national election will occur in every year except three until the year 2023. Many observers point to the difficulties that modern democratic states still encounter when running "routine" elections.²⁶ Voter fatigue and resulting malaise will likely occur with Afghans voters, especially if they do not see significant or satisfactory changes in local, regional, or national policy – or in the quality of their lives. For the singular practical reason of fighting the current insurgency and for sake of

simplicity, this process needs to be simplified through a consolidation of elections. Again, this can be accomplished through an informal process such as the current delays, until a better electoral system is legally adopted. This quick solution will ease the burdens on ANSF and ISAF soldiers charged with election security; it will also reduce the political turmoil that an almost yearly electoral change would likely produce. Consolidation will also reduce the very likely chance that a multiplicity of national elections will create voter fatigue that leads to malaise and one more Afghan grievance against the central government.

Since the introduction of U.S. forces into Afghanistan, engagement of the Afghan political-governing apparatus can be summarized as personality-centric engagement. That is, it focuses on reforming individual personalities such as President Karzai, rather than reform of the political model itself. Given Afghans' historical tolerance for corrupt governance that contributes to the "arc of crisis" that characterizes Central Asian governments,²⁷ reform of the Afghan governing structure should also be explored. For, as Katharine Adeney points out, "institutions matter."²⁸ So enhancing the Government of Afghanistan's legitimacy by restructuring the Afghan political system to a more culturally attuned and local approach is the best method for reducing the "sovereignty gap" between the government and the Afghan people.

In summary, the Afghan "sovereignty gap" may be closed by empowering elected provincial and sub-district political officials through direct budgetary authority over government spending in their local areas. Second, reform of the Afghan executive and legislative branches should be undertaken to limit presidential powers and foster the creation of political parties through the adoption of a more parliamentary system.

Finally, consolidation of Afghan elections may provide electoral stability and predictability to Afghan voters and unburden ISAF and ANSF from the almost yearly election security duties, freeing them to focus on defeating the insurgency. While all these recommendations will require diplomatic engagement with Afghan politicians and eventual modification of the Afghan constitution, they seem to be vitally necessary to establish the Afghan government's legitimacy with the people.

Line of Operation: Development

After 35 years of continuous warfare, the Afghan economy has been reduced to one of the poorest in the world: "The legacy of poverty, violence, and war keep the majority of Afghans insecure."²⁹ Afghanistan's poverty is well documented in social indices such as the UN Human Development Index (HDI) and by measures like average per capita income, life expectancy, child mortality, and caloric consumption.³⁰ Despite the nine-year infusion of international monetary and developmental assistance, much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs.³¹ Perhaps because of the dire economic circumstances of the country, this LoO has received scant attention since U.S. intervention and receives little mention in the new Obama/McCrystal strategy. Moreover, despite the well-documented fact that the poor Afghan economy is serving as a breeding ground for future insurgents and as a daily reminder of the ineffectiveness of the current Afghan government, this profound problem is often 'wished away' onto GoA, USAID, or other organizations. With little economic improvement to show for foreign financial investments thus far, this Line of Operation requires both structural reform and further substantive development efforts to complement the short-term security strategy.

While much of the blame for the dysfunction under this LoO can be traced to the reluctance of both the George W. Bush³² and Barrack Obama³³ administrations to commit to “nation-building,” any short-term counter-insurgency gains are probably doomed to failure unless the long-term viability of the Afghan economy is addressed. Long overdue is the development of an economic development “Marshall Plan”³⁴ for Afghanistan that incorporates the licit Afghan agricultural economy with an adequate infrastructure and manufacturing projects that promote trade. Moreover, the appointment of a responsible “Czar” to manage the synchronization of U.S., NATO/ISAF, and international NGO/PVO projects and funding of the plan could promote the economic development necessary to sustain short-term security successes won in the field.

The longstanding failure to develop an economic “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan continues to undermine the effectiveness of international monies spent to date. The Afghan economy resembles those of post-World War II Europe or South Korea after the 1954 truce, so it seems incredible that strategies used to rebuild those economies from scratch would be ignored in the current effort. An economic “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan would serve to coordinate, synchronize, and maximize the strategic effects of the disparate military, USAID, Non-Governmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations, and United Nations projects currently dispersed throughout the country. A developmental master plan would incorporate the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) goals with U.S. strategic regional goals to form a comprehensive economic approach to build sustainable job growth in the long term. As Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart argue in Fixing Failed States: “wealth and opportunity lie in linking

these financial, infrastructural, human, and institutional stocks...(creating) nodes of value.”³⁵ Accordingly, linking Afghan infrastructure, transit, trade, and agricultural projects into regional centers of commerce would efficiently foster greater small and medium business development and job creation. The absence of a comprehensive economic development plan for Afghanistan continues to undermine the powerful impact the synchronization of the many independent projects could generate.

In addition to a coordinated, over-arching economic development plan for Afghanistan, strategic leaders should consider creating an International Economic Aid Czar (IEAC) to coordinate all international aid and oversee execution of funded projects. Recently the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan appointed a Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs to oversee all U.S. government non-military assistance to Afghanistan.³⁶ Similarly, an IEAC should be designated. Since 2002, over \$25 billion have been pledged in international aid at donor conferences, yet only \$15 billion of those pledges been delivered due to concerns about corruption, inefficiency, and the lack of accountability.³⁷ Ideally, the International Economic Aid Czar would be sanctioned by the United Nations. This individual would operate closely with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to coordinate international monetary pledges with the ANDS, would address concerns regarding GoA's transparency, and would assist in channeling donor funds to projects that would have the greatest strategic effects on the economy. The IEAC would relieve the burden of orchestrating annual International Donor Conferences and resolving issues that impede the international community's delivery on its pledges. Concerns regarding the IEAC becoming mired in politics with GoA, U.S. Embassy, and the International Security Assistance Force can be mitigated

by the clear and narrow definition of his role as fundraiser and guarantor of services rendered for the international donor community. The IEAC's viability will be determined by the amount of international donor funds solicited and ultimately delivered to the Afghan people.

Perhaps the single most significant inhibitor to economic growth in Afghanistan is its pervasive and fundamental lack of electricity. An increased availability of electricity directly contributes to an increase in the country's Gross Domestic Product by enabling capital investment in both small and large industries, including commercial food storage (cold and dry), in increases in operating hours for commercial establishments, in improved quality of life (electrical appliances, television, air conditioning, etc), and in increased communications (cellular service, media companies, etc). Currently, most of the power supplied to northern and central Afghanistan comes through the North East Power Transmission System (NEPS) originating from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The majority of this power goes to the capital city Kabul.³⁸ Much of the country goes without power, despite untapped potential hydroelectric resources throughout the country. A concerted effort to develop internal sources of electrical generating power is fundamentally important to Afghanistan's long-term economic development.

Another area for economic growth is promoting the licit Afghan agriculture sector, which is a major source of income and livelihood for approximately 85% of the Afghan population.³⁹ In addition to an inadequate electrical infrastructure that keeps local Afghan companies from processing, storing, and transporting foodstuffs to market, the country's well-documented illicit opium crops compete for the 12% of arable land that

was previously devoted to self-sustaining agriculture production. An integrated economic development plan would link transit, agriculture, electricity, and production projects to enable Afghan farmers to profit from products that are currently undeliverable. A reliable agricultural infrastructure would attract investments in traditional economic centers such as Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Khost. Subsequent investments in commercial zones would leverage electrical generation projects and regional preferences for licit agricultural crops. Much like the POM juice company operation in the San Joaquin Valley of California,⁴⁰ the close proximity of pomegranate orchards to processing and bottling operations offers a splendid agribusiness venture. Moreover, the “beacon will attract lost ships.”⁴¹ a flourishing licit agribusiness offers a credible alternative to the current growth and production of narcotics. Success in revitalizing licit agriculture not only provides jobs and improves an historically traditional segment of the Afghan economy toward self-sufficiency, but most importantly it denies insurgents of drug revenue and reduces localized corruption and criminal behavior that undermine GoA credibility.

The continued lack of an Afghan “Marshall Plan” may have contributed in other ways to the Afghan people’s false expectation that social services are free. This entitlement attitude does not promote self-sufficiency. Increasingly, Afghans have assumed this entitlement mentality because of policy-makers’ misguided attempts to engender trust and loyalty between the Afghan people and GoA. In fact, much of the infrastructure spending since 2002 has gone to building rural health clinics, schools, and district-center garrisons. Although in the short term these services are worthwhile and put a positive face on GoA, they are in the long term unsustainable in a relatively tax-

free economy that depends on foreign assistance. Moreover, building the government service industry does not generate income or promote economic growth. In fact, it encourages an historically independent people to become dependent upon the government. Strategists should be concerned about creating unrealistic expectations for government services by a population that does not contribute to their cost. A population that expects too much from its poor and weak government will soon become unsupportive of that government.

If the goal of U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan is to reduce our military presence while turning over the reins of power to the Afghan government within the next 2-3 years, then a focused effort to provide a comprehensive economic development plan should be pursued along with the surge of forces in order to guarantee stability that will allow our eventual withdrawal from the country. While the current emphasis on fighting the Taliban and protecting the Afghan population is critical, the failure to develop an economic plan that produces corresponding results will continue to frustrate any measureable economic gains from being realized then the systemic corruption and human capital that feeds the insurgency will continue to do so. Economic development and security are inextricably linked in determining the future viability of the GoA. The issue of economic development often gets 'wished away' by military leaders in the hope that some unidentified other competent entity will take this task on. Or, as Goodson states, "let the Afghans do it."⁴² But, the economic LoO provides long-term stabilization that can co-opt insurgent human capital and provide government legitimacy through the promise of economic security and future self-worth. In this case, hope is not an option. Afghanistan's economic development cannot be left to chance.

In summary, past, present, and future spending on Afghan development projects by the disparate factions of military, USAID, NGO, PVO, and UN organizations can be maximized through a “Marshall Plan” approach. The appointment of an IEAC would encourage funding, verify fiscal responsibility, and thereby synchronize the “Marshall Plan” projects to maximize their strategic effects. A concentrated effort to increase Afghan hydroelectric power and licit agriculture output will spur long-term economic growth, enabling small businesses to create jobs and thereby provide an income base to sustain the expansion of government services in health and education.

Line of Operation: Strategic Communications

Since Afghan operations began in October 2001 and perhaps more than any other Line of Operation, Strategic Communications (SC) or Information Operations (IO) remains an under-utilized resource that continues to perform below expectations in Afghanistan. Despite the importance of being able to clearly articulate Coalition Forces’ and Afghan government’s goals and objectives for “winning the people,” this LoO faces significant organizational obstacles at the strategic and operational levels. Moreover, the compounding effects of the absence of a Strategic Communications Plan and historic lack of an Afghan media infrastructure ensures continued dysfunction and inability to positively influence the Afghan population.

At the national or strategic level, the term Strategic Communications is currently defined as: “the focused processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and strategic objectives by coordinating actions and information, synchronized with other elements of national power.”⁴³ This long and complex definition reflects our inherent difficulty in effectively synchronizing and employing this element of national

power. In 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was created to “influence foreign publics in promotion of national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans...and their counterparts abroad.”⁴⁴ Despite the organization’s effectiveness in promoting U.S. interests during the Cold War, it was dismantled after the fall of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ USIA’s roles and responsibilities were then transferred to the U.S. Department of State, albeit with reduced funding, personnel, and other resources. In the aftermath of 9/11 and growing negative world public opinion regarding the United States, the Bush administration attempted to strengthen global strategic communications efforts under the auspices of a newly appointed Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Amb. Karen Hughes. These efforts have been largely ineffective as evidenced by low favorability ratings of the United States in world opinion polling during her tenure.⁴⁶ Many observers such as Senator John McCain (R-AZ) have acknowledged that the lack of an agency to coordinate national Strategic Communications is a problem. Some have called for recreating an agency like the USIA in order to more effectively wage the information war against extremists.⁴⁷ The U.S. inability to synchronize Strategic Communication efforts at the national level makes the effort to communicate at the local level with a host nation audience even more challenging.

At the operational level in Afghanistan, Strategic Communication efforts are handled separately by each civilian organization and military unit stationed there, which include the U.S. Embassy, International Security Assistance Force, Combined Security Transition Center - Afghanistan, and other U.S. government agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the

Government of Afghanistan. Many of these organizations have some overlapping areas of responsibility in the security, governance, and development lines of operation. For example, the U.S. Embassy, International Security Assistance Force, Government of Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces Afghanistan all conduct separate advertising campaigns. Each organization issues press releases regarding unexploded ordinance awareness (mines, bombs, etc).⁴⁸ Numerous anecdotal accounts depict messages of varying quality disseminated in the same location by different offices on the same topic. These uncoordinated communications waste time and money and create confusion. This becomes an even bigger problem when the messages involve sensitive topics such as corruption, opium, and religion that evoke strong emotions among Afghans. Therefore, to reduce Strategic Communications ineffectiveness at the operational level, a concerted effort must be made to keep redundant, contradictory, and confusing messages from being disseminated to the Afghan people. This can be accomplished through the existing ISAF Strategic Communications Fusion Network⁴⁹ or other efforts to ensure information programs and activities are synchronized among the myriad of military units and civilian agencies operating in Afghanistan. Moreover, a review of redundant information units such as Psychological Operations, Information Operations, Information Operations Task Force, StratCom cell, and Media Monitoring should be conducted to eliminate redundant bureaucracy that impedes timely message dissemination to the Afghan target audience.⁵⁰

The new McCrystal strategy correctly identifies the counter-insurgency information environment in Afghanistan as one based upon “credibility” that is “deeds-based...where perceptions derive from actions.”⁵¹ This is consistent with FM 3-24

counter-insurgency doctrine: “To preserve legitimacy [counterinsurgents] must stick to the truth and make sure that words are backed up by deeds.”⁵² Perhaps most critical in this regard is the development of a strategic communications plan that provides a compelling and credible narrative encouraging Afghan support of GoA. Using a U.S. political campaign model, every effort should be made to synchronize messaging from the strategic to the tactical levels on a daily basis to insure messages are broadly disseminated across all media in a clear and culturally authentic manner. Too often, tactical commanders issue their own message regarding trivial issues. These leaders are ill-equipped to do this task. Often their messages have the unintended effect of tuning out the local population from more important messages and themes.⁵³ While successful U.S. national political campaigns are often cited for their ability to “keep on message,” so too should strategic communications “stay on message” in a counter-insurgency fight that also seeks to attract individuals (voters) to the government’s cause. A synchronized strategic communications plan that proactively supports successes realized in other Lines of Operation and effectively identifies lies and subversion in insurgent propaganda may yield positive results.

Further compounding ISAF and GoA problems with Strategic Communications in Afghanistan is the dilapidated or non-existent host nation media infrastructure. Developing the Afghan television and radio station infrastructure, especially to reach target audiences in the rural east and south of Afghanistan, can be a “force multiplier” if it transmits culturally attuned programming and uses trained Afghan specialists. While there have been some efforts to improve Afghanistan’s radio and television media in the past nine years, the quality of Afghan power and transmission remains deficient. There

is still little capability to transmit words and pictures into Afghanistan's myriad of mountains and valleys. Moreover, the same issue of unsynchronized and disparate communications networks by the multitude of "StratCom Stakeholders" continues to confuse and turn off Afghan audiences. Building a robust media infrastructure is required in the short term to reach the isolated populations of Afghanistan with positive ISAF and GoA messaging. In the meantime, the geographically isolated rural Afghan population is most susceptible to word-of-mouth propaganda by Taliban insurgents. Isolated Afghans have little contact with ISAF, GoA, or ANSF personnel. So a rapid build-up of powerful media infrastructure to reach this target audience is even more critical.

A powerful media infrastructure is worthless without authentic Afghan regional programming. The credibility of media communications depends directly on the quality of its programs; media messages must be clear, sensitive of their audience, and culturally persuasive. Currently, there are several Kabul-based Non-Governmental and Private Volunteer Organizations that provide television, radio, and print journalism training in cooperation with Kabul University. Their instructional materials could easily be shared with regional universities outside Kabul and used to enhance media operations at the tactical level. Employment of significant numbers of local-dialect Afghans with media and journalism skills may facilitate a more authentic "positive spin" on ISAF and GoA activities and thereby increase effective communications with the Afghan people.⁵⁴

In summary, Strategic Communications (SC) will remain an ineffective Line of Effort (LoO) for "winning the people" until an organizational change is implemented that

pulls together the various international, Afghan, civilian, and military StratCom stakeholders. Building a Coalition Information Support Center, comprised of StratCom stakeholders, would enable an holistic ability to develop, synchronize, and coordinate effective marketing and advertising campaigns to positively influence the Afghan people. Moreover, the development and execution of an integrated ISAF-GoA Strategic Communications Plan would achieve effects down to the tactical level. Likewise, increased investments in Afghan media infrastructure and training local Afghan media specialists to provide authentic and credible print, radio, and television messages would greatly enhance Strategic Communications. As with any good political or product-driven advertising campaign, it will take an investment now to realize Strategic Communications gains in both the short and long-term.

Spending On DIME Now – To Win Lasting Peace In Afghanistan

The new McCrystal strategy must be complemented by additional resources in Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (the DIME acronym) elements of national power to win a lasting peace in Afghanistan. Nearly a decade of meager investments in the DIME under the Bush administration has prompted the recent public debate over future Afghan strategy. Ironically, the stubborn resistance of both the Bush to Obama administrations⁵⁵ poses a significant risk to the new McCrystal strategy in Afghanistan. That is, neither administration has acknowledged the contextual elements of time, money, and space necessary for any strategy in Afghanistan to succeed.

The unfortunate reality is that the United States cannot turn back the clock on Afghanistan to fix the mistakes of the past eight years. Given Afghanistan's numerous tribes, languages, and ethnicities, and given centuries of isolated and non-governed existence, any "quick-fix" strategy is doomed to failure. Counter-insurgency theory

informs us that successful counterinsurgencies are long-term affairs: counter-insurgents must take away “time” as an asset of the insurgent.⁵⁶ If the assessment by some experts that the Afghan insurgent strategy is to “run out the game clock,”⁵⁷ the deadline of July 2011 announced by President Obama “to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan”⁵⁸ immediately places the McCrystal strategy at risk of failure. While the deadline was ostensibly set for domestic and international political reasons, the long list of problematic challenges that face Afghanistan are historically rooted, not prone to short-term and simple solutions. Consequently, regardless of the merits of the new McCrystal strategy, there is simply not enough time to implement any new initiatives or benefit substantially from adjusted policies given the July 2011 deadline. Moreover, as suggested throughout this paper, a systemic reason for the failure in Afghanistan to date is a cultural mindset among coalition forces of fighting a short-term “one-tour” war, rather than focusing strategically on building long-term “Marshall-type plans” to guide future efforts. Given the improbability of an overt deadline shift by President Obama, the U.S. government effort in Afghanistan is left with the choice of continuing to fight one year wars, or forging ahead with developing and implementing long-term comprehensive plans to fix Afghanistan – all the while understanding that, as in previous wars, we will be occupying the ground for a long time to come. As witnessed by the results of the Iraq “surge,” success buys time with the American people, evident in the lack of pundit chatter and in polls that indicate declining public interest in Iraq. Therefore, comprehensive “Marshall-type” planning should accompany security gains derived in the short-term, thereby setting the conditions for the long-term strategy success.

As Galula states, “insurgency is cheap, counter-insurgency is costly.”⁵⁹ In the midst of a severe global recession, domestic political concerns over war spending, as demonstrated in President Obama’s speech at West Point,⁶⁰ may have created an unrealistic expectation that the war in Afghanistan can be won “on the cheap.” The eight years of the Bush administration parsimonious spending on Afghanistan should have refuted the notion of winning on “the cheap.” We are now paying the price of a disenfranchised U.S. public and a possible loss to Islamic extremists. We have been unable to measurably improve Afghan security, development, and governance. While the United States spent \$53 billion on rebuilding the Iraqi economy,⁶¹ it spent only \$33 billion on Afghanistan during the same period.⁶² The stark contrast between the relatively modern Iraqi economy and the primitive Afghan economy suggests that even more funding for the Afghans was and is needed. Moreover, when considering the positive impact that building services and manufacturing infrastructure in Iraq contributed to the relative tranquility now enjoyed in that country, increased spending on DIME in counter-insurgency efforts does seem like a way to increase stability. As the global economy founders, the new McCrystal strategy is at risk of failure if it does not receive adequate funding to accomplish its objectives. Simply stated, the failure to provide the means to resource a strategy’s ends will doom it to failure, regardless of its merits.

The insurgents’ freedom of movement in Pakistan’s tribal areas⁶³ remains a significant obstacle to the successful implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. U.S. Army counter-insurgency doctrine informs us that “access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies.”⁶⁴

Historically, the challenge of uncontested border space immediately brings the United States experience in the Vietnam conflict to mind. Indeed, President Obama has acknowledged “that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.”⁶⁵ The well-documented issues of rugged terrain, an uncontested border of over 2,500 kilometers, and the unimpeded training and recruiting activities are significant challenges that will continue to threaten counter-insurgency strategic gains in Afghanistan. Due to sovereignty issues, this situation cannot be addressed without the active cooperation of the Pakistan national government, including its military and intelligence services. Otherwise, the U.S. has no other choice than to impose our will on Pakistan by military means. Engagement of Pakistan to arrive at cross-border free trade agreements, to develop infrastructure, and to re-institute civilian government in the tribal areas are all initiatives that may assist in creating the conditions to enhance counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.

Vital to winning lasting peace in Afghanistan is a renewed commitment to the counter-insurgency fight through adequate investments in Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of national power. The new McCrystal strategy is a necessary, albeit dangerously, late first step towards addressing systemic issues in security, governance, and development that have plagued Afghanistan for much of its modern history. Strengthening Gen. McCrystal’s Lines of Operation with this paper’s recommendations might help provide the stability necessary to allow the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. Domestic political pressures that prompted President Obama’s contextual constraints of time, money, and space can be mitigated in the short term by successes on the ground gained by the 30,000 additional U.S.

soldiers and by retooling of Afghan National Security Forces. The short-term security gains from this “surge” can enable a long-term strategy developed in the interim to provide the long-term solutions required to win lasting peace in Afghanistan.

Endnotes

¹ Alan K. Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, *Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: CRS, November 21, 2008), 3. The three groups are defined as: Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Haqqani Network, and Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar.

² The weighting percentage of these groups varies according to insurgent organization, but most observers place a generic equal weight of 25%.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication No. 1-02 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, August 31, 2005), 417. Under “power projection” is listed the elements of national power of political, economic, informational, and military.

⁴ Stanley A. McChrystal, *Commander's Initial Assessment* (Kabul, AFG: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 30 Aug 2009), A-1, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html> (accessed September 21, 2009).

⁵ Ibid., C-1.

⁶ Ibid.. The 11 transformative effects are: Population security; Claim the information initiative; Access to justice; Expansion of accountable and transparent governance; Elections and continuity of governance; Action against irreconcilables; Creating sustainable jobs; Agricultural opportunity and market access; Countering the nexus of narcotics; Corruption, insurgency and criminality; Community and government led reintegration; and Cross-border access for commerce not insurgents.

⁷ Ibid., 1-3.

⁸ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006) 83.

⁹ Seth G. Jones, *Improving U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan*, (Santa Monica: RAND, Jun 2008), 2, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595/> (accessed December 26, 2009).

¹⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Corruption In Afghanistan: Bribery As Reported By The Victims*, (New York: UN, Jan 2010), 5, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2010). See “Bad Examples” (i).

¹¹ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People*, (Kabul: AINA, 2009), 41, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2009.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2010). Afghans were asked the question: “ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people.” 91% of respondents Strongly Agree & Agree Somewhat with that statement.

¹² GEN (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report – Visit to Kuwait and Afghanistan – 10-18 November 2009,” United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, December 5, 2009, 6, http://www.cffc.navy.mil/091206_AAR_-_November_2009.pdf (accessed December 12, 2009).

¹³ McCrystal, “Initial Assessment,” 1-3.

¹⁴ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework For Rebuilding A Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 21. Throughout the book Afghanistan is cited as a failed state. The authors define “sovereignty gap” as: “the disjunction between the de jure assumptions that all states are “sovereign” regardless of their performance in practice – and the de facto reality that many are malfunctioning or collapsed states, incapable of providing their citizens with even the most basic services, and where reciprocal set of rights and obligations are not a reality.”

¹⁵ Larry P. Goodson, “Searching for Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” U.S. Army War College, Unpublished, 2009, 1.

¹⁶ Ibid., 1.

¹⁷ Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon, *Provincial Governance Structures in Afghanistan: From Confusion to Vision?*, (Kabul: AREU, May 2006), 2, quoted in Katharine Adeney, “Constitutional Design And The Political Salience Of ‘Community’ Identity In Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era,” *Asian Survey* 48/4 (July/Aug 2008): 544.

¹⁸ “Former Afghan President to Head Opposition Group,” Radio Free Europe, April 4, 2007, <http://www.rferl.org>, quoted in Katharine Adeney, “Constitutional Design And The Political Salience Of ‘Community’ Identity In Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era,” *Asian Survey* 48/4 (July/Aug 2008): 556.

¹⁹ Barnett Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, No. 3 (July 2004): 10-14, quoted in Katharine Adeney, “Constitutional Design And The Political Salience Of ‘Community’ Identity In Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era,” *Asian Survey* 48/4 (July/Aug 2008): 540.

²⁰ Katharine Adeney, “Constitutional Design And The Political Salience Of ‘Community’ Identity In Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era,” *Asian Survey* 48/4 (July/Aug 2008): 537. Also see Afghan Constitution, Article 61, Ch. 3, Art. 2 at http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html#chapterthree, “The President is elected by receiving more than 50% of the votes cast through free, general, secret, and direct voting.”

²¹ Barnett Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, No. 3 (July 2004): 12, 14, quoted in Katharine Adeney, “Constitutional Design And The Political

Salience Of 'Community' Identity In Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era," *Asian Survey* 48/4 (July/Aug 2008): 541.

²² Larry Goodson remarks at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) conference, June 13, 2008.

²³ Adeney, "Constitutional Design," 547.

²⁴ David Ennis, "Analysis Of The Electoral Legal Framework Of Afghanistan," International Foundation for Electoral Systems (February 28, 2006): 7-8, [http://www.ifes.org/publication/6edc69156bd6b8b2ff4b042d9fc49557/Analysis LegalFramework.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/publication/6edc69156bd6b8b2ff4b042d9fc49557/Analysis%20LegalFramework.pdf) (accessed February 15, 2010). Also see: Transitional Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Decree of the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan on the Adoption of Electoral Law*, (Kabul: T-IRoA, May 27, 2004), 2.

²⁵ Afghan Constitution, Article 35, Ch. 2, Art. 14, http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html#chapterthree.

²⁶ McCaffrey, "After Action Report," 8. GEN McCaffrey asks whether the US State of Florida (ostensibly picked because it struggled with the US Presidential election in 2000) could handle the pace of yearly elections that is before Afghanistan through 2023.

²⁷ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 21. The authors define the "arc of crisis" as being the 40-60 countries that "extends from Africa through the Middle East and Central and East Asia, (where) the crucial, mutual relationship between citizens and their governments is missing."

²⁸ Adeney, "Constitutional Design," 556.

²⁹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction, Vol. 1*, (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 21, 2008), 45.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 45-51.

³¹ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Afghanistan: Economy," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed December 28, 2009).

³² Larry P. Goodson, "The Lessons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan," in *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 145-169. This is pretty well documented by Prof. Goodson throughout the entire chapter.

³³ Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY; December 1, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> (accessed December 10, 2009). Quote: "and resist commitment to "nation building" projects."

³⁴ James Dao, "A Nation Challenged: The President; Bush Sets Role for U.S. in Afghan Rebuilding," *The New York Times*, April 18, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/18/world/a-nation-challenged-the-president-bush-sets-role-for-us-in-afghan-rebuilding.html> (accessed February 25, 2010). This was recognized by President Bush in 2002 when he called for a "major American role in rebuilding Afghanistan, calling for a plan he compared to the one Gen. George C. Marshall devised for Europe after World War II." Yet, no plan has been developed to date.

³⁵ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 51.

³⁶ Job title and function of Assistant Ambassador Earl Anthony "Tony" Wayne Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs can be found on the website: http://Kabul.usembassy.gov/assistant_ambassador.html.

³⁷ John Ward Anderson, "International Donors Pledge Additional \$21 Billion for Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, June 13, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061200269.html> (accessed December 27, 2009).

³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Afghanistan Report 2009*, (Brussels: NATO, 2009), 38-40, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_03/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf (accessed December 12, 2009). The NEPS graphic on page 39 illustrates the dependency on foreign country electricity generating capacity.

³⁹ Karl W. Eikenberry and Stanley A. McChrystal, *United States Government Integrated Civilian – Military Campaign Plan For Support To Afghanistan* (Kabul, AFG: August 10, 2009), 11, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2009).

⁴⁰ POM Wonderful, is a pomegranate juice company located in the Central Valley of California "that grows, harvests, processes and ships" their own pomegranates worldwide. See <http://www.pomwonderful.com/> for more information.

⁴¹ Mehar Omar Khan, "Don't Try To Arrest The Sea: An Alternative Approach For Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal*, Oct 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/an-alternative-approach-for-af/> (accessed Dec 28, 2009).

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⁴³ U.S. Army War College, *Information Operations Primer: Fundamentals of Information Operations*, (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2009), 29. This is a revised definition submitted for inclusion in Joint Publication 5-0 update.

⁴⁴ United States Information Agency website, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usis/usiahome/oldoview.htm#overview> (accessed February 18, 2010). "This web site is an archive of the former USIA site as it stood in September 2009, and is now maintained as part of the Electronic Research Collection of historic State Department materials by the federal depository library at the University of Illinois at Chicago." Full mission quote: "to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in promotion of national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad."

⁴⁵ Alvin A. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1995), 269. This book provides a fascinating historical account of USIA during the Cold War. In addition to the fall of the “Iron Curtain,” advances in new media such as Television, FM Stereo, audio-cassettes, etc., are generally attributed to USIA’s demise.

⁴⁶ Pew Research Center, “25-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey” (Washington, D.C.: Pew, July 23, 2009), 1, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/264.pdf> (accessed February 16, 2010). The U.S. favorability rating among Muslim countries for the period 2002-2008 fluctuates up and down, reflecting a negligible impact of current U.S. national efforts in the information domain.

⁴⁷ John McCain, “Hone U.S. Message of Freedom,” *Orlando Sentinel*, June 28, 2007, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2007-06-28/news/MCCAIN28_1_public-diplomacy-america-and-americans-ideas (accessed Jan 7, 2010). An editorial by U.S. Presidential candidate John McCain calls for recreation of USIA.

⁴⁸ Psywarrior Website, PSYOP and Mine Awareness Page, <http://psywarrior.com/MineawarenessHerb.html> (accessed February 18, 2010). Under the Afghanistan tab there are examples of numerous mine awareness (UXO) leaflets, handbills, and posters that have been created by four different organizations for the same purpose. Numerous anecdotal accounts suggest multiple billboard advertisements for the same UXO message being placed in the same location along an Afghan highway.

⁴⁹ McCrystal, “Initial Assessment,” D-5.

⁵⁰ Authors note: Within ISAF Headquarters (2008) there were three staff information type organizations alone.

⁵¹ McCrystal, “Initial Assessment,” 1-2.

⁵² U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 5.

⁵³ Based upon personal observation in 2008, while serving as the Commander, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force - Afghanistan.

⁵⁴ Authors note: There are small companies operating now in Kabul that provide media training on a limited scale. This was also done in 1986 with a USIA \$500,000 grant to Boston University’s Afghan Media Project to “teach newsgathering to Afghan refugees...to counter Soviet propaganda.” See: <http://www.bu.edu/bridge/archive/2001/11-23/afghanmedia.htm>.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Obama. “one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.”

⁵⁶ Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study Of Guerrilla Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2002), 20. The author identifies that “time – which is both money and political capital – works in his (guerrilla) favor.”

⁵⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, “Barno: This is the Taliban Strategy,” Foreign Policy Web Log, September 28, 2009, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/28/barno_this_is_the_taliban_

strategy (accessed February 6, 2010). Quoting LTG (Ret) David Barno: “their (Taliban) strategy is simply to run out the clock.”

⁵⁸ Ibid., Obama. “*and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.*”

⁵⁹ Galula, “Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 6.

⁶⁰ Obama. “Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort – one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.”

⁶¹ Timothy Williams, “U.S. Fears Iraqis Will Not Keep Up Rebuilt Projects,” *The New York Times*, November 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/world/middleeast/21reconstruct.html> (accessed February 6, 2010).

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⁶³ Defined as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP).

⁶⁴ Field Manual No. 3-24, 28.

⁶⁵ Obama.

