

THE NATIONAL GUARD: RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEVELOP THE JOINT FUTURE FORCE

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 30 MAR 2010		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The National Guard: Recommendations to Develop the Joint Future Force				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Steven Hilsdon				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College ,122 Forbes Ave.,Carlisle,PA,17013-5220				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see attached					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE NATIONAL GUARD: RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEVELOP THE JOINT FUTURE FORCE

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Steven R. Hilsdon

TITLE: The National Guard: Recommendations to Develop the Joint Future Force

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2010 WORD COUNT: 5,736 PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Reserve Component

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper will provide a background on the direction of the National Guard (NG) as a joint activity of the Department of Defense (DOD), and present an argument that the NG is uniquely suited to present new models for joint activity. In doing so, five of the six major conclusions of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves report will be used to validate strengths and provide areas for improvement to allow the NG to mature in the joint arena. Before presenting arguments, a brief historical background on the concept of jointness is presented for the DOD. The paper concludes that in order for the NG to react with the speed required by the American public in its state or federal role, it must improve on jointness. However, it is uniquely qualified to lead the way for quality integration of Army and Air Forces at all levels of contingencies due to the dual-status role of the NG.

THE NATIONAL GUARD: RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEVELOP THE JOINT FUTURE FORCE

While at times human failure and misdirected zeal have been responsible for duplications, inefficiencies, and publicized disputes, the truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization.

— President Dwight Eisenhower, April 3, 1958

The strategic direction of the Reserve Component (RC) is of national importance and that future must be joint in nature.¹ This paper will provide a background on the direction of the National Guard (NG) as a joint activity of the Department of Defense (DOD), and present an argument that the NG is uniquely suited to present new models for joint activity. In doing so, five of the six major conclusions of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) report will be used to validate strengths and provide areas for improvement to allow the NG to mature in the joint arena.

It is clear the Obama Administration embraces the concepts of joint, and the DOD can expect to continue its current trend toward jointness. This hypothesis is supported through the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, published in January 2009, which outlined three primary objectives for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Increase synergy across the Department's Components, improve the effectiveness of joint and interagency operations, and ensure the Department continues to invest efficiently to meet the asymmetric challenges of the 21st century.² While one objective specifies joint, the other two imply it as well. Additionally, the 2010 QDR report itself highlighted "more than ever before, the United States requires joint military forces..." supporting a greater need to strengthen the joint team.³ This strategic direction, coupled with the fact that the RC comprises almost 50% of the military force, and the NG comprises almost 50% of the RC, the joint team simply cannot afford to

decelerate any efforts to integrate and increase NG jointness.⁴ Utilizing the Joint Operations Concepts Development Process (JOpsC-DP), integration efforts will “link strategic guidance to the development and employment of future joint force capabilities and serve as engines for transformation.”⁵

Historical Background

The requirement for joint concepts goes back to the formation of both the Army and the Navy in 1775, when the first two distinct services needed to cooperate with each other to achieve the same objective, to win independence from England.⁶ With the expansion of aviation at the turn of the 20th century in 1919, Army Air Corps Brigadier General ‘Billy’ Mitchell foretold, “If we look forward, there will be a ministry of defense, combining army, navy, and air force under one direction.”⁷ As can be imagined at the time, the War and Navy Departments often thought Mitchell made, “gross exaggerations.”⁸ As the century continued, powerful presidents like Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower attempted to unify the military, but the dominant muscle of WWII generals prevented any real change from occurring.⁹ The period brought about terms like “mutual cooperation”, “unified command,” and “joint chiefs of staff,” but for The Greatest Generation, change was slow.¹⁰ 40 years after WWII the United States would take its first substantial action to integrate three services since reorganizing into a “National Military Establishment, with three subordinate departments: army, navy, and an independent air force.”¹¹ Ironically, an Air Force general would lead the charge to fulfill Mitchell’s prophecy, 55 years after his court martial for insubordination.¹²

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General David Jones (USAF) gave the concept of ‘joint’ a true vision in the 1980s. Under strong opposition from many in the Pentagon, Jones ostracized himself in the eyes of numerous other

service generals. Supported by the bipartisanship of Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Nichols, groundbreaking legislation was enacted after four years and 241 days.¹³ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 was the most significant defense reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947.¹⁴ Beyond significant structural changes at the highest levels to streamline access to the President, the Goldwater-Nichols Act changed the way DOD was to organize, train, and equip the force...it was to become genuinely *joint*. The premise was to improve on two basic concepts, to make the force more effective, and more efficient.¹⁵

The failed hostage rescue in Iran in April of 1980 was the tipping point that convinced General Jones to go public with the critical need for a truly joint force.¹⁶ Almost two months later in a Senate Arms Services Committee hearing on his nomination for a second term as Chairman, General Jones responded to Senator Strom Thurmond's question regarding the inter-service rivalry by clearly stating, "No; I am not satisfied." Jones stressed that, "We need more joint....We need to do much more in being an integrated fighting force in the days ahead."¹⁷ A little over a year and a half later, Jones struggled to determine exactly how to present what he knew was required. The General said he was, "still collecting my thoughts" on the way to Capitol Hill for what might be his last House Arms Services Committee meeting.¹⁸ What emerged in his opening remarks was the start of a complex and volatile battle in the DOD that lasted for almost five years by stating to the Chairman that, "We do not have an adequate organizational structure today."¹⁹

The term *joint* has become popular for many years now, but its application is still debated more than 21 years after the GNA because of the inter-service rivalries and bureaucracy.²⁰ As a unified command, the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is responsible for providing mission-ready joint-capable forces and for supporting the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.²¹ Almost 10 years after the establishment of JFCOM in 1993, failures in the services to unite as a joint force were evident by the preplanning and coordination between air and land forces during a less than stellar Operation Anaconda in 2002.²² For the most part JFCOM has had more success than failure, however, with fighting still in Afghanistan, its Commander recognized in his testimony last year to the HASC that improvements are still required.²³

The New Reserve Component

The 2008 National Defense Strategy defines its objectives as Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and to Win our Nation's Wars.²⁴ One of the five key considerations for achieving those objectives is to "Integrate and unify our efforts: A new 'Jointness'." ²⁵ The National Guard began a transformation into a new joint organization in May of 2003, when LTG Blum took steps to ensure the NG would be ready, reliable, and relevant in the joint fight by announcing a new Joint Staff for the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and a Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) for each of the 54 states and territories.²⁶ Five years later on May 21, 2008, Secretary Gates signed DOD Directive 5105.77 officially establishing the NGB as a joint activity.²⁷ Additionally, the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act authorized a four-star NG general for the first time in history, further realizing Blum's vision by providing an equal

voice at the Joint Chiefs of Staff table.²⁸ Today there is not much debate that to be the most effective force we must be joint at all levels; joint intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically...but there is much debate in how to do this, and significant doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facility (DOTMLPF) issues to overcome.²⁹

The National Guard, simply based on its organizational structure, community basing, and state-to-state partnerships implies a joint force. However, community based militias simply cooperating with each other is not enough. To be truly effective requires proper levels of resourcing, training, and equipment. In January 2008, the final CNGR report was submitted to the Department of Defense highlighting the enormity of this task for the United States.

It has taken the U.S. armed forces two decades to approach the level of jointness envisioned by the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which did not address the reserve component. Achieving total force integration of the active and reserve components will require changes to the defense establishment of a magnitude comparable to those required by Goldwater-Nichols for the active component.³⁰

Although 20 years apart, General Jones and LTG Blum shared a vision to unify the armed forces through robust joint activity. Following in the footsteps of the GNA, the CNGR was nearly a five-year process that proposed changes to ensure that the NG and other RCs are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national security.³¹ The final report contained six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings.³²

The five CNGR areas discussed in this paper are: Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve, Enhancing the Defense Department's Role in the Homeland, Creating a Continuum of Service, Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available

Operational Reserve, and Supporting Service Members, Families and Employers.³³ The first four can easily transition to joint concepts, and the last one presents an opportunity for policy makers to apply the concepts of jointness to non-traditional areas. All five areas require significant improvements to meet the DOD transformation goals.³⁴

All standing military services currently count on the RC to accomplish a wide variety of missions, certainly they could not fight a major war without them, and that war would require effective employment of a joint force. Each military service embraces the concept of a Total Force that “distributes and balances skills across each of its constituent elements: the active component, the reserve component, and the civilian workforce. Each element relies on the other to accomplish the mission; none can act independently of the other to accomplish the mission.”³⁵ The area for greater improvement, the joint arena, requires more attention, especially as the RC is reclassified as an *operational*, versus, a *strategic* force.³⁶

Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve

The threats our nation will face for the next decades, fiscal realities that include the spiraling cost of personnel and a shrinking discretionary budget, and the value the reserves provide—through their lower costs, ties to their communities, and civilian skill base—together necessitate the operational employment of our reserve components, a change that has occurred with little public discussion or debate among our appointed or elected officials. From the Commission’s analysis, it is clear that no feasible alternative to a continued reliance on the reserves exists.³⁷

History has shown that every major conflict of the United States was dependent upon the RC.³⁸ In recent history, in addition to the roles reservists played in Desert Storm and the decade following, there have been almost 725,000 mobilizations since September 11, 2001; beyond this, thousands of RC members have volunteered for extended periods of active duty service.³⁹ The CNGR points out that “the current

reliance on the reserve components as an operational force, however, is something entirely new, unforeseen, and unplanned.”⁴⁰ This unintended evolution to an operational reserve has also caused unanticipated problems in managing such a force.⁴¹ The DOD, Congress, and numerous journals and publications use the term *operational reserve* a great deal, but have done very little to actually make it so. The Joint Staff proposed a 10-line paragraph in 2007 in an attempt to describe an operational reserve⁴², but in 2009, the official joint definition is “an emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation.”⁴³

The CNGR believes there is much to debate, and the debate is overdue on discussing major changes in the roles and missions of the RC. They believe the issues must be examined, discussed, and accepted by the public and Congress if they are to succeed.⁴⁴ This author believes the time to debate is over since the RC has participated in every major conflict, led domestic operations, and is required for successful current and future operations.⁴⁵ From Desert Storm to the current global fight against terrorism, 20 years of high operational tempo have developed an operational reserve by default. Getting the major stakeholders to end the deliberation process and move into the execution stage is of primary concern. The recent release of the 2010 QDR failed to facilitate this argument and simply stated that the RC would employ as “an operational reserve to fulfill requirements” without any strategic direction to move from the status quo.⁴⁶ In fact, it likely will exacerbate the issue by stating, “The Department will explore the potential to redefine the role of the RC for both domestic and overseas operations.”⁴⁷

Moving the RC to an official operational force will take more than DOD policy, it will also take significant changes in the law. Both Title 10 and 32 of the United States Code would require substantial restructuring, an issue for elected officials to resolve more than the uniformed services. However, current domestic concerns like health care, employment rates, and the economy dominate congressional debates. Building consensus and gaining support to push a bill to the floor is an arduous task and publicly elected representatives are most sensitive to their constituents. Although the RC represents a significant number of communities with its end strength of 844,500 spread across all 54 states, territories and most Congressional Districts, the number is relatively low in comparison to the domestic concerns that demand congressional attention.⁴⁸ Furthermore, a study by the RAND Corporation suggests moving military legislation requires quality bipartisan relationships in Congress and popular support of the President, something the country does not have right now.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the debate over the reserve component as a whole needs to end and it needs to “be equipped, funded, and trained” as a joint force “in a way that makes such deployments sustainable and affordable.”⁵⁰ The National Guard has been working as a joint entity prior to the changes LTG Blum made in 2003, most notably with the formation of Civil Support Teams (CST) in 1998.⁵¹ This unique state mission has placed soldiers and airmen in close quarters as a true joint force providing an example for the larger force to follow. Immediate changes to the law and policy could have direct benefits to the overall joint force and not just specialized pockets like CSTs. If Congress formalizes an operational reserve, the NG could realize its full potential, reverse

adverse readiness trends, and provide the strategic and operational joint integration framework that has served it so well for many years.⁵²

Enhancing the Defense Department's Role in the Homeland

Today, the homeland is part of the battlefield and the federal government must use all elements of national power to protect it. Dangers to the homeland include traditional military threats, such as conventional attacks on people and property, and more unorthodox ones, such as terrorist attacks. In addition, Hurricane Katrina and other recent disasters have raised the public's awareness of the hazards posed by catastrophic natural disasters. As a result of these threats to the homeland and the new awareness of the danger, protecting the homeland has become a greater priority for all levels of government. The National Guard and Reserves are key elements of this effort, yet there are a number of obstacles to the Department of Defense's playing an enhanced role in the homeland.⁵³

The partisan debates following the December 25, 2009, terrorist bombing attempt provided more ammunition to the need for change.⁵⁴ Although, this attempt was foiled, had it succeeded the crisis response in the continental homeland would have certainly included the joint DOD community, to include the RC. Following the attack, President Obama ordered seven corrective actions for executive agencies.⁵⁵ The lack of any DOD assets, as suggested by the CNGR, reflects the administration's misinterpretation of what is required for Homeland Security.⁵⁶ In a Naval War College paper titled, *The Next Terrorist Attack: Not If, But When...Are We Prepared?* the author stresses compelling evidence that we cannot thwart every terrorist attempt.⁵⁷ This threat should be stimulating the nation to redefine a homeland strategy that includes a greater DOD joint role and "the importance of well-developed, exercised response plans cannot be overstated."⁵⁸

The CNGR report recognized that "because of its manpower, communications, and transportation capabilities, DOD is the only organization that can deal with the consequences of a catastrophe incapacitating civilian government over a substantial

geographic area.”⁵⁹ Responding to natural and man-made disasters or contingencies in the homeland is a core mission of DOD.⁶⁰ Historically, it has been the joint NG arm of the DOD that is the first military responder, a natural evolution of a community based military that gives Governors’ flexible options under state duty.⁶¹ As an example, in 2008 the NG jointly responded with over 23,000 personnel to hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding in support of the homeland.⁶² When the Guard’s capacity is exceeded and federal forces are required to augment a contingency though, a command and control battle often ensues. At this point, states’ territorial sovereignty under the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is often debated. This Bill of Rights amendment simply reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”⁶³ One of the most famous illustrations is that of hurricane Katrina.⁶⁴ The aftermath has produced modest advancement in roles, structure, and missions of the DOD to be properly integrated into homeland security.⁶⁵

To alleviate future problems from occurring, CNGR believes enhancing the DOD role in the homeland should include, if not be led by, the NG.⁶⁶ As a community-based force, the NG is filled with abundantly proficient people who represent their larger communities.⁶⁷ The diversity they bring in terms of corresponding civil-military skills, as well as their municipality-based connections with families, businesses, and local politicians bring significant value to the joint force.⁶⁸ The NG has become the domestic response expert force (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, etc.) through a natural inter-agency relationship and efficient use of part time labor pools.⁶⁹ This instinctive relationship of citizen soldiers built with America over 373 years has immeasurable

value in developing a balanced future joint force for domestic response.⁷⁰ The RC brings civilian aptitude, training, and professional experiences in their full time positions as city planners, power plant operators, waterworks directors, highly trained medical professionals, computer specialists, uniformed civil servants (fire and police chiefs), specialized equipment, etc...that cannot be found in the AC, but all support the joint DOD homeland mission.⁷¹

The CNGR stated that, "DOD needs to overcome its historic reluctance to put the National Guard and Reserves in charge, believing that the active components should control everything," and embrace that the NG, not the AC, is the expert in DSCA.⁷² The CNGR believes that this responsibility is on par with that of combat responsibilities and DOD should expedite plans for the RC to lead NORTHCOM.⁷³ As the largest RC, the NG as the home team is favorably postured to lead these integration efforts because of its habitual community relationship.⁷⁴ However, the Obama administration recently chose another AC officer to run NORTHCOM, bypassing the opportunity to bring a reserve component officer up from its ranks.⁷⁵ The question now is...will it take another Katrina before the current administration embraces the CNGR recommendations for protecting the homeland?

Creating a Continuum of Service

The 21st century presents a completely different set of challenges to planners focusing on our national security and on military manpower. They must recruit, train, and maintain a technologically advanced force in an era that will be characterized by ever-increasing competition for a shrinking pool of qualified individuals whose expectations about career paths and mobility are changing dramatically. It is essential that the nation recognize these new strategic and demographic realities by developing a personnel management strategy for the new century and by reforming laws, policies, and systems to effect it.⁷⁶

Creating a continuum of service encompassed a wide range of topics from pay and benefits to modern human resource applications. This section will narrowly focus on three key areas for joint reserve component improvements: Officer Personnel Management, Assignments, and Duty Statuses. These three are areas in which the joint fight can be strengthened by improvements to the joint team.

The starting point is accepting the CNGR recommendation that the “Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) should be merged into a single system.”⁷⁷ Outdated, and based on Cold War models, DOPMA has not been substantially updated since 1980.⁷⁸ ROPMA, although newer in comparison with an effective date of 01 Oct 1996, was the first major change to reserve officer management since 1954.⁷⁹ Neither of these laws adequately covers joint management to the level required to meet the growing joint force. Although the DOD has a Joint Officer Management Program, it lacks the unifying effort to bring manpower, personnel, and training functions together into one strategic initiative.⁸⁰ This program states the “next step will be to create a system, or systems, capable of capturing and tracking that expanded joint experience pool.”⁸¹ The CNGR highlights the need for an integrated personnel management system, but this should also extend to a joint integrated personnel management system. By combining joint officer management with DOPMA/ROPMA reform, a broader DOD wide human capital overhaul can be obtained.

Another key area the CNGR addresses is ensuring the reserve component has the opportunity to gain broadening joint experiences through a revamped assignment system.⁸² While the bulk of the RC members are part-time military, bringing a wealth of

civilian experience to the overall DOD team, the RC has always needed full time personnel “for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components.”⁸³ All reserve component personnel need an assignment system that affords them the opportunity to be competitive for joint positions, duty, and deployments.⁸⁴ Additionally, the AC should broaden its assignment system to allow active officer assignments at traditional RC units, especially at cross service bases. For example, the Army could send an engineer to an ANG Red Horse Squadron and vice-versa. These two simple management tools could be implemented without a change in the law, yet provide immediate dividends to total and joint force, combining initiatives to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.⁸⁵

A more complex recommendation by the CNGR that would take additional congressional action was to reduce the duty statuses of the military from 29 to 2.⁸⁶ The premise is simple; a member is either on duty or off. The current reserve system is the result of years of piecemeal policy that resulted in a wide variety of US Code, appropriation rules, complicated commitment levels, mission types, duty statuses, and end strength accounting (active, reserve, or active guard reserve).⁸⁷ Over time, as the need arose, the system became more complex to ensure personnel utilization in one form or another.⁸⁸ It has turned into a convoluted process that does not serve the mission or the member’s best interests.⁸⁹ Reducing duty statuses almost sounds too simple to work, however it is a critical baseline requirement that does more than build efficiencies into the system, it gives commanders access to people when they need them most.⁹⁰ Duty status reform has the potential to save substantial amounts of money

and allow greater flexibility in resourcing the joint fight at home, or abroad, through newer cost-effective models.⁹¹

Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve

The reserve forces can make an effective contribution to our national security only if they are readily accessible to accomplish assigned missions. Yet this access cannot be maintained without bringing predictability to deployments. Getting the balance right will require that a “train, mobilize, deploy” readiness cycle be implemented for all reserve components, that service integration be improved, and that reserve component capabilities be fully resourced.⁹²

One of the primary CNGR recommendations in this area is the necessity of the services and Congress to resource the operational portion of the reserve components in all readiness requirements for overseas and homeland missions.⁹³ A national level resources debate requires more than just service budget adjustments, it should include a comprehensive overhaul of how joint manpower and equipment is funded.

Specifically, the operational reserves require an immediate change to the NG joint funding process. Funding for NGB Joint Staff positions are still managed by the individual service components for Army and Air. This conceals the real improvements required to move joint to the next level since positions are not necessarily filled by the best person, but by which guard component's turn it is to place an applicant.⁹⁴

Additionally, although DODD 5105.77 established the NGB as a joint activity and the NGB Joint Staff is now managed under a *joint manpower document (JMD)*, State JFHQs are not.⁹⁵ This imbalance has led to only a handful of states that resourced their joint staffs in a true ‘purple’ force since compliance with a JMD is not required.

A key reason for this is highlighted in part by the Joint Staff draft definition of *operational reserve* where, “the Services organize resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and Reserve components....”⁹⁶ Currently the ‘services’ (Army, Air Force,

etc.) run the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) cycle for the respective reserve components. The problem is that at the state levels where NGB successfully convinced all 54 states and territories to follow suit with JFHQs concept, there are no joint resources. The Army National Guard (ARNG), through the Department of the Army, is given selective labor authorizations through a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).⁹⁷ Similarly, the Air National Guard (ANG), through the Department of the Air Force receives Secretary authorizations and translates them to Unit Manning Documents (UMDs).⁹⁸ Neither of which has any allocations for joint billets at the state level.

By calling for an immediate change to establish a Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for State JFHQ units, it will ensure that joint activities have the minimum manpower required to fulfill its assigned joint missions.⁹⁹ Additionally, it will realize the envisioned mission of the State JFHQ “to maintain trained and equipped forces as reserve components of the Army and Air Force and performs missions as directed by state or federal authorities.”¹⁰⁰ DOD could implement this recommendation immediately in current NGB activities below the federal level; however, an executive agent needs to be assigned as the overall lead. Although a potential exists for service-biased arguments between the Army and the Air Force, it could be mitigated by placing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as the executive agent for all guard joint manpower programming.

Another recommendation, based solely on the opinion of the author of this paper, is a requirement to educate the military personnel on total force and joint concepts from the earliest stages. Aristotle once said, “All who have meditated on the art of governing

mankind have been convinced that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth.”¹⁰¹ For far too long the military education system has stove-piped parochial service branch specific education at the national basic training and officer schools. The DOD recognized the value of joint education and began reform in intermediate and senior level schools, but more is required.¹⁰² Service education should reflect the type of decisions being made by junior uniformed personnel, which are having a strategic impact in the digital information age.¹⁰³ A former Chief of the Australian Army said in 2002, “The era of the strategic corporal is here. The soldier of today must possess professional mastery of warfare, but match this with political and media sensitivity.”¹⁰⁴ A key component of everyone on today’s battlefields should be where they fit into the joint fight. Day one of any DOD profession of arms education should include the importance of total force and joint requirements, expanded and built upon at every developmental stair. In doing so, soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines have the potential to interact more effectively with each other. Training objectives should include lowering service parochial arguments and growing future leaders with a vision groomed to meet the complex environment certain to surround them in every domain.

Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers

To maintain an operational reserve force over the long term, DOD must appropriately support not only the service members themselves but also the two major influencers of members’ decisions to remain in the military—their families and employers. Significant improvements in current programs in all three areas are essential to sustain an operational reserve force both today and in the future.¹⁰⁵

In this section, the CNGR recognized the importance of support architectures for recruitment, readiness, and retention, all critical to sustainment of the RC. The section was broken down into compensation, member protections, health care, family support,

employer support, and demobilization and transition assistance.¹⁰⁶ Although outside the traditional scope of joint, this area provides a glimpse of where the AC can mirror RC programs to extend the concept of joint. The RC is unique because of its part-time nature. This uniqueness extends to families and employers of the RC who should be considered as an integral part of any solution that optimizes the RC force for a joint fight. Although the CNGR recognized that the DOD has been making positive changes in all six areas to the RC support systems, the NG's Joint Service Support (JSS) is worth discussion as it applies to the joint community.

The National Guard represents two services and has a "purple" *Family Program* at the national level and within each state and territory.¹⁰⁷ Each NG headquarters has one or more state family program offices, at least one wing family program coordinator, and one state family program coordinator.¹⁰⁸ The *Family Program* is one vital piece that makes up a comprehensive network of services provided through the NGB JSS office. Additionally, the JSS office offers Yellow Ribbon Reintegration, Employer Support, Psychological Health, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, and Warrior Support programs.¹⁰⁹ This joint support concept is distinctive to the NG, and provides an excellent example for DOD to expand its concept of joint. Although implied in the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission for Joint Basing, there still is not a consolidated DOD AC service support program to seize the "opportunity to reduce duplication of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities requirements capable of generating savings."¹¹⁰

As outlined in the CNGR report, the "DOD should create a 'purple' system, available to employees of any DOD family assistance center via the Internet and phone,

that would allow any family member access to needed information.”¹¹¹ Directed to all branches and all duty statuses of military personnel, this joint level of support is the future of support networks. One of the Goldwater-Nichols Act objectives was efficient use of defenses resources.¹¹² As the DOD continues a major transformation in joint basing, JSS provides an opportunity to do more than save money. This blending of resources would provide desirable support services, cultivate a greater understanding of unifying the force, and generate efficiencies across the board by preventing duplication between services.

Conclusion

In 1982, the Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, expressed more than his discontent with joint operations, he also understood the inability of the force to learn from its mistakes:

Although most history books glorify our military accomplishments, a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern: unpreparedness at the start of a war; initial failures; reorganizing while fighting; cranking up our industrial base; and ultimately prevailing by wearing down the enemy-by being bigger, not smarter.¹¹³

Unfortunately, this statement could be repeated today concerning the current war and the challenges of Homeland Security and Defense. Each of the issues he points out are prevalent in the Global War on Terrorism, emphasizing that the DOD still fails to learn from its biggest mistakes.¹¹⁴

Learning from mistakes also includes ensuring this nation has a ready and reliable reserve component for both strategic and operational depth. The CNGR clearly recognized that, “for the foreseeable future, there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continuing increased reliance on its reserve components for missions at home and abroad, as part of an operational force.”¹¹⁵ In order for the NG to react with the

speed required by the American public in its state or federal role, it must improve on jointness. Having said that, it is uniquely qualified to lead the way for quality integration of Army and Air Forces at all levels of contingencies, but particularly for the Homeland. The reserve component, especially the NG, serves as an enabler to the joint community at large.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, it provides a complexity of civil-military skills, thought processes, and concepts that compliment the joint force.

In review of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, one must ask if joint starts at the top or the bottom? The NG leadership at the federal and state levels has proven that it is both. Only a clear commitment to meeting national objectives will provide the unity of force required to sustain shrinking budgets and defeat complex enemies. The Guard, with its first responder state mission has a unique capability to train as it will fight daily and has proven success at home and abroad with a diverse joint force capable of flexible full spectrum operations. This distinctive dual-status role compliments the QRM objectives for the QDR to increase synergy across the DOD components, improve the effectiveness of joint and interagency operations, and ensure the DOD efficiently invests to meet the asymmetric challenges of the 21st Century.¹¹⁷

Establishing the National Guard as a joint activity DOD, was one of 20 recommendations implemented in whole or in part by the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, but more is required.¹¹⁸ This report outlined five focus areas from the CNGR report that require DOD and congressional attention if significant changes in the joint reserve component structure are to be made.¹¹⁹ These changes, although some are radical in nature, are representative of the type of reforms required to build a more efficient joint force as the United States faces record deficits and tightened discretionary

spending.¹²⁰ Furthermore, these improvements are consistent with the CJCS Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in that the joint force, as part of the total force, will be the key to overcoming the, “uncertain, complex, and changing future characterized by persistent conflict.”¹²¹ The DOD “will need to select, educate, train, equip, and manage our people differently.”¹²² As this process continues to unfold, “We will need to envision and create new organizations,” and the reserve component will need to be included.¹²³ Moving the NG into a more adaptable joint force will meet all three Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report objectives as well as fulfill some recommendations made by the CNGR Report.¹²⁴

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