

PROJECTING BENEVOLENT POWER: TRANSFORMING AMERICA'S IMAGE FROM SUPERPOWER TO SUPERHERO

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PROJECTING BENEVOLENT POWER: TRANSFORMING AMERICA'S IMAGE FROM SUPERPOWER TO SUPERHERO

by

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ABSTRACT

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In his first year in office, President Obama has outlined a vision according to which the United States will seek a more liberal grand strategy so as to be seen by the world not only as powerful, but as the great benefactor. This will require a rebalancing of the United States' tendency to favor realist superpower qualities associated in part with destructive hard power. To achieve his vision, the President will concentrate more effort on constructive soft power, that is, the power to help. The principle agents of foreign affairs in the executive branch are the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). Herein lies the dilemma; DoD has great capability in constructive soft power, but is hindered by acceptability. DoS has more acceptability using constructive soft power, but currently lacks capability. If the current administration can mitigate this dilemma, it can evolve from simply a superpower to what President Obama wants America to become, a superhero.

PROJECTING BENEVOLENT POWER: TRANSFORMING AMERICA'S IMAGE FROM SUPERPOWER TO SUPERHERO

We're determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle, our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, and of overwhelming power on the other.

—General George C. Marshall¹

Power can be either destructive or constructive. While often controversial, destructive power is not synonymous with bad. If ethically used to deter or destroy an evil, then it is good. For example, the penicillin destroyed the pneumonia and the child was saved. Constructive power is normally less controversial and generally considered good, but it too has can have pitfalls. For example, the doctor saved the man's life, but the man later sold drugs to children.

In the context of the nation state, military power traditionally is associated with destructive power, or hard power and its ability to “break things and kill people.” Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the ability to fight the nation's wars are a core capability of every branch of service. But the military, especially the American military, is a very capable organization. As such, the DoD is equally capable of projecting constructive power, i.e. the ability to “make things and aid people.” In this way it projects a form of soft power.

Diplomats, represented by the United States Department of State (DoS), are in many ways on the opposite spectrum of power projection. Traditionally, the DoS is associated with soft power. While diplomacy is the core capability of the statesman, the DoS is also responsible for the constructive powers of development and

stabilization/reconstruction. In these areas, the DoS's capability faces the most challenges.

In his first year in office, President Barack Obama has outlined a vision according to which the United States will seek a more liberal grand strategy so as to be seen by the world not only as powerful, but as a benefactor. This will require a rebalancing of the tendency to favor realist superpower qualities associated in part with destructive hard power. To achieve his vision, the President will concentrate more effort on constructive soft power, that is, the power to help. The principle agents of foreign affairs in the executive branch are the Department of Defense (DoD) and the DoS. Herein lies the dilemma; DoD has great capability in constructive soft power, but is hindered by acceptability. DoS has more acceptability using constructive soft power, but currently lacks capability. If the current administration can mitigate this dilemma, it can evolve from simply a coercive superpower to what President Obama wants America to become, a benevolent superhero.

Towards an Obama Doctrine

In his January 2009 inaugural address a newly elected President Obama described America as "a friend of each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity," pledged "to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds."² For this sentiment and many similar statements, President Obama was recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples."³

President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech laid out what is becoming known as the "Obama Doctrine." First, Obama remarked that America has evolved from the

mid 1940s, when Walter Lippmann wrote the biggest problem with U.S. foreign policy was the failure of Americans “to admit that rivalry and strife and conflict among states, communities and factions are the normal condition of mankind.”⁴ Reflecting on our history and why we fight, Obama asserted that there is a struggle between good and evil in the world. Second, he accepted the concept of American exceptionalism. In the words of Rodger Whitcomb, “The American people came to the view early in their experience that they were an exceptional people, unlike any other and therefore not liable for evaluation according to normal standards of behavior.”⁵ Obama contended that due to its distinctive character the U.S. seeks to diminish the level of tyranny across the globe. Finally, looking at hard power, Obama proclaimed that history has shown the U.S. military has been used not only to repress or conquer, but also as a force for good, seeking humanitarian ends.

On the surface, the acceptance speech for a Nobel Peace Prize seems an odd place to venerate the use of force in the form of destructive hard power. However, President Obama recognized pacifism and peace are not synonymous terms. “There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” He went on to cite examples, “The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans.” Expanding on his recognition that as head of state he may be called upon to confront evil as a vital national interest, he rejected the pacifist notion of never resorting to armed force. “A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force is

sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.” Interestingly, this is consistent with perhaps the most notable pacifist and fellow Nobel Peace Prize winner Mahatma Gandhi who stated, “Even a believer in non-violence has to say between combatants which is less bad or whose cause is just”⁶

Arguably and ironically, President Obama’s view of just wars and American exceptionalism are remarkably similar to those of his predecessor, President George W. Bush. President Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) asserts that “The path of fear – isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment – appeals to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities. Yet history teaches that every time American leaders have taken this path, the challenges have only increased and the missed opportunities have left future generations less secure.”⁷

Perhaps the reason the Obama and Bush viewpoints are similar in many ways is because they are not particularly new. The concept of engaging U.S. hard power outside of war as a force for good was already articulated in The Truman Doctrine. In a speech before a joint session of Congress in March of 1947, President Truman stated, “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”⁸ The Department of State public affairs office underscored the impact of the speech, explaining, “The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts.”⁹

Soft Power and the U.S. Military

Joseph Nye suggests that soft power is the ability to get others to seek the same outcome as you want by co-opting them as opposed to using hard power to coerce them. He states, "A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it."¹⁰ The military, while traditionally being thought of as a hard power asset, has immense capability to be used as a soft power asset as well.

A case in point is the Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949, which had a lasting impact beyond that of breaking the blockade imposed upon Berlin by the Soviet Union. Heinz-Gerd Reese, the director of the Berlin Airlift Gratitude Foundation, explained the significance of the operation. "The Berlin Airlift veterans changed the world," he said. "It was the greatest airlift ever, and you can be proud of it and your continued humanitarian operations today, worldwide, wherever needed."¹¹ The hero of the Berlin airlift, retired Colonel Gail Halvorsen, is remembered for the many deliveries of coal, food and other humanitarian relief supplies, but also as the "Candy Bomber" for dropping candy bars and sticks of gum to the children of Berlin in handkerchief parachutes as he approached Tempelhof Air Base.

In late 2005 a devastating 7.6 magnitude earthquake in northern Pakistan left more than 73,000 people dead, 128,000 injured and 3.4 million homeless with winter fast approaching.¹² The U.S. military responded with the relief program Operation Lifeline within 2 days. In concert with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, Rear Admiral Michael LeFever led a Joint Task Force (JTF) and organized an international

coalition of both governmental and non-governmental organizations. As in the case of the Berlin Airlift, the humanitarian mission was a colossal success, delivering relief supplies, rebuilding roads and establishing field hospitals. Within two months, the U.S. military moved nearly 15.2 million pounds of humanitarian cargo, transferred 4,481 pallets, and loaded 587 trucks with supplies that included 93,000 sleeping bags and 292,000 blankets. The strategic gain however, was in public opinion. Before the earthquake, polls showed a U.S. approval rating by the Pakistani people at 23 percent. By December of 2005, U.S. approval was over 50 percent.¹³

The work of U.S. forces in Pakistan was highlighted in non-traditional outlets for strategic communications. An Iranian medical bus was unable to be off-loaded from the plane it was delivered in. U.S. Air Force port operators devised a creative way to retrieve the bus and worked side by side with Iranian forces to make it happen. This act was recognized in an unusual place to find praise for the American military, the state run Iranian Defense Forum website.¹⁴ General John Abazaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command, was elated with the results, "Never before in history have such a small group of people had such an historic impact on the impressions of the United States on the Muslim world population."¹⁵

The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti is a recent example of what Mark Thompson of *Time Magazine* calls "a compassionate invasion."¹⁶ President Obama outlined the strategic imperative for U.S. involvement: "Our nation has a unique capacity to reach out quickly and broadly and to deliver assistance that can save lives."¹⁷ Initial responders included the U.S. military and USAID's Disaster Assistance

Response Team (DART), as well as strategic leaders including Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough and Secretary of State Hillary-Rodham Clinton.

In his *Time* report, Thompson opines, “Sometimes it takes a catastrophe to demonstrate just how much more the U.S. military is able to do than simply kill the enemy.”¹⁸ Special operations forces from Florida and a USAF Air Mobility Command Contingency Response Group from New Jersey reopened the Port-au-Prince airport. Military cargo planes delivered personnel, equipment, and other supplies; then returned to the U.S. with both injured and non-injured evacuees. Coastguard cutters and Navy ships responded with medical supplies, helicopters, and personnel, not to mention the ability to generate 400,000 gallons of fresh water a day from seawater.¹⁹ Even a Global Hawk spy drone from California, originally destined for Afghanistan, was sent with the capability to capture over 1000 high resolution photos a day over Port-au-Prince.²⁰

Military personnel sent to Haiti welcomed the new mission, even in the midst of ongoing wars. Marine Captain Clark Carpenter captured the sentiment of his company. “Marines are definitely warriors first, but we are equally as compassionate when we need to be, and this is a role that we like to show – a compassionate warrior that can reach out that helping hand to those who need it.”²¹

Clausewitz reminds us, “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”²² Likewise, everything in responding to a humanitarian crisis is simple, but given the many players involved and divergent interests, even the simplest things are difficult. Logistics and command and control become a pickup game when there is no plan or recognized authority. There is no Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for relief supplies from foreign governments and charitable Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGOs). Resources are sparse and demand is high. Getting the right things and people at the right time inevitably becomes a matter of consternation for responders who mean well, but often have divergent opinions on priorities.

Initial response to Haiti in 2010 was a prime case. “We took some heat at the airfield early on for the large number of divers international flights were executing,”²³ explained Colonel Buck Elton, Commander of Joint Special Operations Air Component-Haiti. “We had to hand off load a Chinese A330...It took over 8 hours and they blocked half the ramp because the pilots wouldn’t taxi where we directed them to park.”²⁴ Colonel Elton expressed frustration, noting issues like military air traffic controllers having to work from a card table off the end of a runway, while U.S. security forces held back fence jumpers, rioters and looters. “We landed over 250 aircraft per day without phones, computers, or electricity and people were complaining about the log jam at the airport.”²⁵

Aid groups and foreign officials voiced concerns over the U.S. military’s role at the Port-au-Prince airport, asserting they gave priority to military flights. Doctors Without Borders claimed, “its specialists were 48 hours behind on performing surgery for critically injured patients because three cargo planes loaded with supplies were denied clearance and forced to land almost 200 miles away in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.”²⁶ Alain Joyandet, France’s cooperation minister, asserted that the Americans were “occupying” Haiti.²⁷

But Haiti is and remains a sovereign nation. Two days before Joyandet made his statement, Haitian President Rene Preval and Secretary Clinton explained the expanded U.S. role. “President Preval, on behalf of the Government and people of

Haiti, welcomes as essential the efforts in Haiti by the government and people of the United States to support the immediate recovery, stability and long-term rebuilding of Haiti and requests the United States to assist as needed in augmenting security in support of the government and people of Haiti and the United Nations, international partners and organizations on the ground.”²⁸

Acceptability of the U.S. military in performing constructive soft power tasks is not limited to recent experience in Haiti. One of the biggest hurdles is that many aid organizations simply do not want to work with military forces. This is especially true for some NGOs. Anna Husarka, senior policy adviser for the International Rescue Committee, speaks for many in claiming that “Security and development are two distinct objectives that require different approaches. To give priority to the political-military objective of a security agenda over development and humanitarian concerns is dangerous.”²⁹

Conflicting cultural and objective interests are often opposed. Looking at the issue from the NGO perspective, the U.S. military’s requests may sometimes be a hindrance. For example, a Swedish charity was outraged following an incident at a hospital in Wardak province, southwest of Kabul. According to a report by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, members of the U.S. military entered the hospital without permission, tied up hospital employees and patient family members, and then forced patients out of beds in a search for Taliban insurgents. Leaving two hours later, the U.S. forces ordered the NGO to inform coalition forces if any wounded militants came seeking care. Anders Frange, the charity’s country director said the staff refused the order, claiming “That would put our staff at risk and make the hospital a target.”³⁰

Doctors without Borders (DWB) observes neutrality and impartiality in the name of universal medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance and demands full and unhindered freedom in the exercise of its functions.³¹ Officially they are completely neutral, only accepting donations from private donors. “Our interventions are based on needs alone, not on political, economic, religious or social agendas.”³² DWB withdrew from Afghanistan in 2004 after five of its members were killed, but returned shortly after President Obama was sworn into office in January 2009. DWB now works out of the no fee Ahmed Shah Baba district hospital, in eastern Kabul, and has a strict no weapon rule. “That rule applies to policemen and military, but equally to members of ISAF.”³³

Just War Tradition and the Power to Help

J. Boone Bartholomees states that, “The United States is developing a reputation much like Germany had in the twentieth century of being tactically and operationally superb but strategically inept.”³⁴ In the strategic context, if the U.S. does not seek only to repress or conquer, but also to act as a force for good, seeking humanitarian ends, the just war tradition and the concepts of *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bello*, are of vital importance.

Normally, the ethical reasoning and justification for going to war, *jus ad bellum*, is made by political leaders. It becomes a matter of diplomacy, where the DoS has both the legitimacy and capability to act as the United States’ primary agent. This is not to say *jus ad bellum* is irrelevant to the DoD. Indeed, if the decision to go to war is highly contested, then it becomes imperative for military leaders to be able to articulate why the decision to use military force is just. In the words of Robert Kagan, “Legitimacy matters, if only because the American people like to believe they are acting for

legitimate purposes and are troubled, sometimes deeply, if other peoples accuse them of selfish, immoral or otherwise illegitimate actions.”³⁵

When the strategic message of U.S. military intervention is “we’re here to help,” DoD is directly responsible for the ethical manner in which the war is waged, *jus in bello*. The term *jus post bello*, or just conduct in post conflict operations, has also recently become fashionable. However, the ethical behavior discussion in this paper does not focus on the war continuum. For simplicity it treats *jus in bello* and *jus post bello* as synonymous.

Jus in bello is defined by two principles, discrimination and proportionality. The principle of discrimination defines who and what can justly be attacked in war, while the principle of proportionality looks into ways one should use for attacking the enemy.³⁶ Both these principles form the basis for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and are used by military commanders in developing Rules of Engagement (ROE) for combat operations.³⁷

Jus in bello becomes a key factor in evaluating the acceptability of a military action. Michael Walzer makes the point; “The need for civilian support has turned out to be both variable and expansive; modern warfare requires the support of different civilian populations, extending beyond the population immediately at risk.”³⁸ For example, the abuses of Abu Ghraib inmates by members of the 372nd Military Police Company were more than simply tactical level blunders. In today’s globalized world with instant mass media coverage, the abuses caused significant strategic damage to the war effort in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and more broadly in the previously termed “Global War on Terrorism” by validating insurgent propaganda. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen asserts, “There is no doubt that Abu Ghraib was a stain on our national character, and it reminded us yet again of the power of our actions. The incidents there likely inspired many young men and women to fight against us, and they still do as a matter of fact.”³⁹

In Abu Ghraib, the guards were members of the United States Army, but for a military commander, the fiduciary responsibility for *jus in bello* includes all personnel working for the DoD, including contractors, further complicating the problem. Tucker Carlson, a journalist working in Iraq for *Esquire* magazine explains a tactical decision security contractors made trying to get gas from a civilian station outside of Baghdad. The DoD contract stipulated fuel and billeting acquisitions were the responsibility of the contractor, not to be provided by any U.S. Government agency.

All four vehicles roared in at high speed. Two went directly to the pumps. Two formed mobile roadblocks near the entrance. (Security) contractors with guns jumped out and stopped traffic from coming in. Others took positions around the perimeter of the station...There was a large and growing crowd around us. It looked hostile. And no wonder. We’d swooped in and stolen their places in line, reminding them, as if they needed it, of the oldest rule there is: Armed people get to do exactly what they want; everyone else has to shut up and take it...There had been quite a few children there. I’d seen them watching as we forced their fathers out of the way to get to the pumps. “We neutered their dads” (a security contractor) said. He was right. We had. And we’d had no choice. It was horrible if you thought about it.⁴⁰

The issue in this case is that a tactical level contracting decision not to provide fuel compelled security contractors to make unethical decisions, at least from the occupied population’s point of view. The security contractors knew aggressive tactics at the gas pumps were ethically questionable; “neutering” the Iraqi man in front of his children was not the intent. Given the choice, the contractor would have probably preferred to use safer locations within DoD or other government compounds. However,

because of the terms of the contract and security concerns when at the civilian pumps, they felt they “had no choice.”

Captain Ian Fishback, an Army officer and West Point graduate, expressed dismay over what he perceived as routine abuse of prisoners in Iraq. After bringing up his concerns with his chain of command, in desperation he wrote a letter to Senator John McCain: “Do we sacrifice our ideals in order to preserve security? ... My response is simple. If we abandon our ideals in the face of adversity and aggression, then those ideals were never really in our possession. I would rather die fighting than to give up even the smallest part of the idea that is ‘America’.”⁴¹

The concern over losing political power as the inevitable consequence of violating *jus in bello* concepts is at the heart of more recent policy debates such as those over “enhanced interrogation techniques” and detainee operations at Guantánamo Bay. President Obama in a May 21, 2009 speech at the National Archives titled, “Our Security, Our Values” made the point that America must maintain its core values as outlined in the Constitution, namely the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness under the auspices of the rule of law. When we fail to do such, we degrade our credibility as a moral authority in world opinion. Admiral Michael Mullen echoed this strategy from a military perspective stating, “We can’t win...without earning their [the occupied population’s] trust, and providing alternatives to the violent lives many are choosing right now. And we can’t earn their trust if we aren’t credible in their eyes. As the President has said, the best weapon we have is our example.”⁴²

Giving the population of an occupied state the impression of a double standard, where America does not practice what it preaches regarding human dignity, may cause

the desired “better state of peace” in war termination to crumble. At the very least, American policy will require a significant length of time to regain credibility. Admiral Mullen advocates getting back to basics when it comes to strategic communications; “Our messages lack credibility because we haven’t invested enough in building trust and relationships, and we haven’t always delivered on promises.”⁴³ This is what he calls the “say-do” gap. “Each time we fail to live up to our values or don’t follow up on a promise, we look more and more like the arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are.”⁴⁴

This was a big part of the debate on increasing troop strength in Afghanistan in 2009. To abandon a struggling nation simply because some argue our interests are limited, is shortsighted and suggests America does not value being seen as a benevolent power. I would argue the diplomatic power of the United States in the war against radical extremist is our most powerful weapon. We need to do everything we can to maintain this power as a vital national interest. General Stanley McCrystal in his October 1, 2009 address in London made the case unambiguously: “We must show resolve. Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe. A villager recently asked me where we intended to remain in his village and provide security, to which I confidently promised him that, of course, we would. He looked at me and said, ‘Okay, but you did not stay last time’.”⁴⁵

Acceptability and Capability of DoS

In order for constructive soft power to be effective, it must be attributed to the United States, not simply an anonymous benevolent donor. In May 2003, USAID administrator Andrew Natsios expressed frustration with NGOs working in Afghanistan “for not clearly and consistently identifying their aid activities in Afghanistan as funded

by the U.S. government, and admonished them that they needed to demonstrate measurable results if they wanted to continue to receive USAID funding in the future.”⁴⁶

Unfortunately, this is the “herding cats” problem. Many of the more liberal NGOs will continue to refuse to give credit to the U.S. government, and especially the military.

While humanitarian missions and stabilization/reconstruction missions are *reactive* uses of constructive soft power, development is the *proactive* method. Development is gaining increasing importance as a tool in national security strategy. In a January 2010 speech to the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C., Secretary of State Clinton proclaimed, “Development was once the province of humanitarians, charities, and governments looking to gain allies in global struggles. Today it is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative -- as central to advancing American interests and solving global problems as diplomacy or defense.”⁴⁷ She explains development needs to be “the third pillar” of foreign policy. “The work of...development experts helps make future military action more remote. It is much cheaper to pay for development up front than to pay for war over the long run.”⁴⁸ Secretary Clinton outlines a vision for development to integrate more closely in the field with defense and diplomacy, so as to “leverage the expertise of our diplomats and military on behalf of development, and vice versa. The three Ds must be mutually reinforcing.”⁴⁹

National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 signed December 7, 2005, provides strategic guidance concerning management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization for foreign states and regions in risk of, in or in transition from conflicts or civil strife. In this directive the Department of State is tasked to

“coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”⁵⁰ This task is normally delegated to the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

The S/CRS is specifically tasked in NSPD-44 to “lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities.”⁵¹ The need for this capability was emphasized by President Bush in his January 2007 State of the Union address:

A second task we can take on together is to design and establish a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps. Such a corps would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time.⁵²

On the basis of this guidance DoS established the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) with 250 active component members. In addition, it called for 2,000 standby members who are full time employees of the U.S. Government, but work primarily outside of the CRC. In other words, standby members are assigned to the CRC as an “additional duty.” The active component members are able to deploy within 48 hours notice; standby members within 30 days. Of the 250 active members, many are staff positions, to include administrative staff, IT specialist, trainers, and strategic communications professionals.

The Civilian Response Corps does not have weapons, but does have modern body armor, communications equipment, and medical kits. They will take delivery of twenty-eight armored vehicles in 2010 “to maintain freedom of movement in semi and non-permissive environments.”⁵³ The initial Corps members received training on the

use of this equipment in the newly designed Security for Non-Traditional Operating Environments (SNOE) course, running it first class in the summer of 2009.⁵⁴ The course curriculum is similar to what every military member receives in individual skills pre-deployment training.

According to Ambassador John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at DoS, between January 2008 and May 2009, 56 CRC members have deployed to eleven countries, including Afghanistan. Herbst expects to have the full 250 man active component, plus 1,000 man standby component ready to deploy by the end of 2010.⁵⁵

Capability is limited by funding, calling attention to the fact that Congress does not always agree with presidential policy decisions. Of the \$248.6 million President Bush requested in the FY09 budget, only \$55 million was appropriated for the CFC under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).⁵⁶ Additional funds were provided by the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2009 (Div. H, P.L. 111-8).⁵⁷ Much of the funding for the CRC came from outside the DoS. From 2006 to 2009, over \$300 million came from the DoD under Section 1207 transfer authority for reconstructions, stabilization, and security purposes.⁵⁸

While something is better than nothing, 250 active personnel in the CRC cannot compare to the 1.4 million active duty personnel in DoD.⁵⁹ And for 56 CRC members being deployed over an 18 month period, as of September 2009, there were over 164,000 uniformed military members deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom, plus over 66,000 in Operation Enduring Freedom.⁶⁰ Finally, CRC's budget is a mere fraction

compared to the Total Operating Authority of \$534 billion in the DoD baseline budget for FY10.⁶¹

Internal Acceptably: Embracing a New Core Mission in DoD

Ideally, the DoD does not want to be the lead in non-war fighting missions such as stabilization and reconstruction operations, but often it is the only government agency capable of achieving national objectives in a contingency crisis. As visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Nathan Freier, explains, “An undeniable strategic reality for DoD today is: If a contingency is big, bad, sudden, complex, expensive, actually or potentially violent, and strategically important, it is likely to vault to the top of the Defense priority list.”⁶² Freire goes on to argue traditional military missions will remain, but the majority of future demands on the military will differ significantly from traditional warfighting. “It is not clear, however, whether DoD corporately accepts this notion and, thus, is postured to operationalize it.”⁶³

This is what can be called the Bayonet vs. the Swiss Army knife dilemma for the military. The bayonet is associated with one thing, its destructive power to kill the enemy. On the other hand, the Swiss Army knife has a blade and can be used as a light duty weapon, but it is more relevant as a tool to be used for a myriad of tasks, most of them constructive. Traditionally, the military culture is considered by its own members as well as by others as being more like the bayonet. Transformation to Swiss Army knife qualities is controversial both within and outside of the military for a myriad of reasons.

In preparation for Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf addressed his senior military leadership from the bayonet perspective. “It is going to take, for lack of a

better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there...They are going up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have commanders who do not understand this; it is attack, attack, attack, attack, and destroy every step of the way.”⁶⁴

Noting the capability limitations of DoS and other civilian agencies in stability operations, DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.5 states the military must be able to perform a complete array of civilian tasks when civilian agencies cannot. ⁶⁵ DoDD 3000.5 specifically states, stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”⁶⁶

The vast majority of the most senior uniformed leaders in the military come from combat arms backgrounds. Despite clear guidance in DoDD 3000.05, stability operations are still culturally considered as mission support or combat support and often considered a second tier mission to its core mission, actual combat. Thus, despite great capability in stability and reconstruction operations, cultural factors within the uniformed military indirectly challenge acceptability.

To his credit, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognizes the issues and has called for better balance of capability in the Department of Defense. He also realizes there are many obstacles to broad based institutional support, i.e. acceptability. In an address to the National Defense University, Gates states, “Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry and in Congress.”⁶⁷ He goes on to state, “My fundamental concern is

that there is not commensurate institutional support – including in the Pentagon – for the capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of mission we are most likely to undertake in the future.”⁶⁸

Economic issues will put pressure on the DoD to make tuff decisions on priorities. In his annual CJCS policy guidance letter for 2009-2010, Admiral Mullen notes, “The country faces mounting deficits and growing debt. That will require difficult budget decisions for our government. As we carry out our assigned missions and reset a tired force, we must guard against growing hollow. The quality of the force remains paramount.”⁶⁹ While Admiral Mullen most certainly embraces the stability role of the military, if pressed to make an either or choice, it is very likely that the Chairman will face enormous pressure to retain “quality” in the traditional role of the military as a combat force first.

Conclusion

Some argue that not since NSC68 have we had a cohesive grand strategy that plays to our strengths. President Obama makes the case our strength is really our national character. Despite our great power and ability to conquer and destroy, we hold back, determined to be a force of good for the world. Likewise, our hard power capability should not dictate our primary strategy. In the words of General Abizaid, “What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide. It’s an idea often overlooked by people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks.”⁷⁰ America’s great conventional warfare force will be avoided, in much the same way the French Maginot line was bypassed during WWII, and our enemies will find ways to avoid our strengths and attack by another means.

While these attacks will come in many forms, discrediting our national character will always be a prime target.

Moving America from superpower to superhero is a herculean task. Both DoD and DoS know they are the key players, but because of cultural identities, limited resources and core responsibilities, both Defense and State are reluctant to fully embrace the transformation and additional responsibilities. The fight is not solely on the battlefield, but in the minds of the world's population; winning will take tremendous resolve. President John Kennedy, in a prophetic address to the graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy, June 6, 1962 said, "When there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat...many serve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long slow struggle, with no immediate visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed."⁷¹ Unquestionably the national security dilemmas America faces today are "hard indeed." Dealing with them takes more than superpower strength. Superhero like character and resolve is the key.

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