Strategy Research Project

MENTORSHIP: A JOINT PERSPECTIVE FROM A DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENT

BY

COLONEL BURL RANDOLPH, JR.
United States Army

USAWC CLASS OF 2010

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED
30 MAR 2010		

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Mentorship: A Joint Perspective from a Deployed Environment	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Burl Randolph Jr.	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army War College ,122 Forbes Ave.,Carlisle,PA,17013-5220	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
see attached

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			
unclassified	**unclassified**	**unclassified**		**30**	

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

MENTORSHIP: A JOINT PERSPECTIVE FROM A DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENT

by

Colonel Burl Randolph, Jr.
United States Army

Dr. Craig Bullis
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Burl Randolph, Jr.

TITLE: Mentorship: A Joint Perspective from a Deployed Environment

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 March 2010 WORD COUNT: 5,865 PAGES: 30

KEY TERMS: Leadership, Tacit Knowledge, Trust, Cohesion

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In an era of increasingly joint operations, it is more imperative than ever that strategic leaders are interservice savvy on how to lead and develop officers from sister services. With this premise in mind, one must wonder what role Goldwaters-Nichols has played in setting the stage for joint mentorship. This paper assesses that the components of the Mentorship Model: Leadership, Tacit Knowledge and Trust, are applicable not only to the individual services, but also during joint operations in the Current Operating Environment (COE). During the extended deployments of combat operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Army officers have worked closely with sister service officers. Consequently this paper proposes that the cohesion developed during extended joint combat deployments in the COE enhances the mentorship relationship between service officers, and allows joint mentorship a role in developing and stimulating strategic thinking and leading.

MENTORSHIP: A JOINT PERSPECTIVE FROM A DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENT

What We Want from Strategic Leadership

The US Army War College (AWC) defines strategic art as "The skillful formulation, coordination and application of ends, ways and means to promote and defend the national interest."[1] The college further divides strategic art into the three categories of Strategic Leader, Strategic Theorists and Strategic Practitioner, but focuses on the concept of strategic leadership – how strategic leader, theorist and practitioners interact to improve the effectiveness of an organization. As Senior Officers departing the War College in June of 2010, most will definitely be required to think strategically on senior level staffs. The Strategic Theorist or Thinker is defined as "one who develops strategic concepts and theories, integrates all elements of power and components of national security, studies the history of warfare, teaches and mentors the strategic art and formulates ends, ways and means."[2]

The above definition implies a responsibility to the graduates of any US Senior Service College to teach and mentor the strategic art, ensuring that "…anyone in a staff position working for a strategic leader be well-trained as a strategic thinker…"[3] This is one of the key objectives we want from strategic leadership: to promote the strategic art through the mentorship of teaching others how to think critically and strategically, and is in line with the military tradition that "Great leaders produce great subordinates who, in turn, become great leaders in their own time."[4] This tradition aptly applies to the Current Operating Environment (COE) in helping develop tomorrow's strategic leaders.

This paper will discuss how junior officers across the military services, deployed to combat in joint environments, might receive the unique opportunity of joint

mentorship. This joint mentorship relationship will be a broadening experience which will transcend the COE through the officers' tacit knowledge, shaping the development of tomorrow's strategic leaders.

Strategic Leadership, Jointness, and Goldwater-Nichols

With Strategic Leadership defined, what role does jointness play in strategic leadership? With the nation at war for over eight years, operating in joint and coalition environments has become commonplace. Officers from one service often work with, work for and provide efficiency ratings on officers from another service or coalition army. Does counseling, coaching and mentoring[5] occur during deployments, and if so, does it occur differently within each of the services or coalition counterparts? What role does mentorship play in officer development? This paper seeks to illustrate how developing effective strategic leaders and joint officers occurs through joint mentorship in the COE.

Jointness and Goldwater-Nichols

The terms Jointness and Goldwater-Nichols have almost become synonymous since the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act was established to address two major issues[6]:

- To improve the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct joint (interservice) and combined (interallied) operations in the field.
- To improve the DoD budget process

The three major changes the act imposed were:

- Increased the authority and the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Increased the authority and influence of the unified combatant commands that control U.S. forces in the United States and around the world.

- Created a “joint officer specialization” within each service to improve the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff.

“Evolutionary success in attaining jointness has been manifested perhaps most clearly in the execution of joint warfare—America now fights wars almost solely under joint commands.”[7] However, much debate remains about the effectiveness of the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) and the overall GNA itself. In its early conception, the JSO was accepted at arm’s length, as a new and divisive creature to disdain. At the 10 year mark, it was reported that the JSO was fully embraced and embedded in all the service cultures[8]. Over the last eight years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, joint qualification has taken on new meaning, with almost everyone receiving joint credit even at the junior officer level. With this being said “other than growing in size and bureaucratic procedures, this management of officers assigned to joint duty has evolved little since the initial implementation in the early years after 1986.”[9] JSOs have been deemphasized, while the ability to work jointly in the COE has become the rule vice the exception. At this juncture, the COE has also become a place to broaden professional and personal horizons, melding the best and eliminating the worst of service cultures, and provides much needed perspectives on the armed forces as a whole, in lieu of service parochialisms. The COE has also become a place where joint mentorship occurs and helps create more effective joint operations and officers.

Background. Mentorship Perspectives across the Spectrum of Society

Webster defines a mentor as a “wise advisor, teacher or coach.”[10] The term mentor is said to be as old as time itself and while not specifically described as such in the Holy Bible, Jesus mentored the 12 Disciples.[11] If one reads Homer’s *The Odyssey, a mentor is* nurturing, supportive, protective, as well as aggressive, assertive, and risk

taking. “Mentor (Odysseus friend) acted in the role of parent, teacher, friend, guide, and protector” to Odysseus’ son.”[12] Mentors can be found across the spectrum of society: in education, medical professions, business and within the civilian ranks of the Department of Defense. Mentorship may begin as early as high school. Stow-Munroe Falls High School defines a mentor as “someone in the same career field as the mentee,” and their mentorship program is designed to connect juniors and seniors with members of the community who will provide mentorship in the student’s field of interest.[13] This better prepares their students for college, while teaching how to connect with the community. Mentorship in graduate education is also highly regarded as Dr. Michelle Estevez writes, “High-quality mentorship is crucial to graduate education.”[14] Estevez attributes her graduation from the Boston University School of Medicine and the success in her current endeavors to her mentor, and noted “…apart from the dissertation, I would say that the advisor-student relationship is the single unifying component of all doctoral degree programs across all academic disciplines.”[15] The article is further replete with phrases like “...spent hours in the lab...teaching me…,” “was completely committed to my success... and complete confidence in me…,” and “…the power of building strong relationships.” Estevez was convinced that the relationships developed through mentorship lead to collaborations, which led to the greater successes of her mentor. The American Organization of Registered Nurses (AORN) defines mentorship as: “The developmental relationship between an experienced person and a less-experienced person referred to as a protégé, from the French word for *protected.”*[16] Mentorship in nursing is seen as critical in helping promote the lifelong learning model, and helps new nurses adjust to this high stress, high

demand, high turnover career field, while ensuring that seasoned nurses retain current and critical skills, which aid in the mentorship process.

Within the Department of Defense, mentorship transcends beyond the military services as Ms. Lori Leffler, Chair of the A-35 program within the National Defense Transportation Association (NDTA) writes of a conference mentoring session with senior military and civilian leaders who "Both shared life experiences and insight to assist the protégés in their personal and professional developments".[17] In business, DynCorps, part of the Combined Security and Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), is using police mentors to help train the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and states "Police mentors play an essential role to bridge the gap between theory and practice."[18] Regardless of how you define or utilize mentorship, it plays a critical role across the spectrum of society. Noted sociologist Michael Zey defines a mentor as "a person who oversees the career and development of another person, usually junior, through teaching, counseling, providing psychological support, protecting, and at times promoting or sponsoring."[19] Zey also referenced the Odyssey as a source of the definition of a mentor, and some of his characteristics can be the heart of the matter when attempting to mentor in the COE.

The military services also have their own unique definitions of mentorship. While this definition has the same nuances of all the others, it is, however, from a military perspective and most closely resembles that of the other three services. The other services define a mentor as:

Navy Mentorship. Mentoring is a mutually beneficial relationship between a Mentor and a Protégé' to share resources, time, experiences and expertise to help with personal and professional growth.[20]

Air Force Mentorship. "A trusted counselor or guide." A *relationship* in which a person with greater experience and wisdom guides another person to develop both personally and professionally.[21]

Marine Mentorship. A mentor is a trusted teacher, guide, coach, and role model who enables junior Marines to reach their highest potential and improve their ability as valued team members.[22]

Many elements of Zey's definition resonate with me from a joint combat environment: "providing psychological support, protecting and at times promoting and sponsoring." These are some of the elements required in joint operations to improve individual and unit performances, build confidences and credibility and create cohesive teams. Regardless of which definition you accept, the universal themes appear to be relationship, experience and trust, which is the construct from which we will discuss joint mentorship in the current operating environment (COE).

The Standard Mentorship Model: Leadership, Tacit Knowledge and Trust

The Standard Mentorship Model depicted in Figure 1 will be our starting point. Leadership by both mentor and protégé are required to seek the mentoring relationship. Senior leaders should seek mentorship opportunities to develop junior officers, while junior leaders should seek self-development avenues to enhance their professional skills. Mentors must be willing to share Tacit Knowledge (TK) as a means to teach, coach and mentor the protégé through personal examples, giving meaning to the expression "I've been there (where the protégé is advancing) before." Said another

way, this tacit knowledge is the content that is shared in the mentoring process. The willingness of the mentor to share personal information with the protégé may be the first step towards establishing Trust, the most important element in the Standard Mentorship Mode, and helps create the bond between mentor and protégé.



Leadership, Tacit Knowledge and Trust are the basis of Mentorship, and through effective communications can evolve from solely professional to personal mentorship as well.

Figure 1: Standard Mentorship Model

Throughout the model, effective communications must occur in an almost circular fashion, to meet the needs of both protégé and mentor. Communications can occur either face-to-face, by phone, in writing or through e-mentoring[23], a concept employed by the U.S. Navy. While e-mentoring appears rather impersonal, it is a product of what I call the electronic or e-Age. It is apparently a success with female sailors: "We were somewhat surprised at the number of women who immediately signed up,"[24] with the program expanding into its second year. The program was so successful that the Navy issued a letter of instruction outlining the implementation of its program,[25] and e-mentoring it is also used in other educational venues.[26] The model above, however, requires face-to-face interaction, and will be the basis to begin the discussion of how mentoring relationships are developed.

Leadership: What the Goldwater-Nichols Act Cannot Legislate. The Army defines Leadership as: "Influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization."[27] This definition of leadership is comprehensive because its broad content encapsulates into one sentence, everything we attempt to articulate in volumes of regulations: Army Values, leader responsibilities, purpose, direction and motivation, counseling, coaching and mentoring.

While the Army does not specify mentorship as a responsibility of a leader[28], one can only assume that this is due to mentorship's voluntary nature. Since the Army does, however, list mentorship as one of the "Army training and leader development model and tools", and further states that "Effective mentorship will positively impact personal and professional development"[29] these recognitions imply mentorship as an inherent leader responsibility at all levels. AR 600-100 (Army Leadership) further states that "As future battlefields evolve into increasingly dynamic and fluid environments, systems that facilitate the acceleration of leader development are needed."[30] While not a tacit endorsement of joint mentorship, the Army recognizes the need for systems to develop officers in all environments. While JSOs may be considered officers with superior planning skills and capabilities in a joint context, all officers at all levels and in all environments are entitled to a degree of mentorship.

In examining leadership at the strategic level, the Army chose to quote Admiral Arleigh A. Burke who said, "Leadership is understanding people and involving them to help you do a job. That takes all of the good characteristics, like integrity, dedication of purpose, selflessness, knowledge, skill, implacability, as well as determination not to

accept failure."[31] This quote was taken from the Strategic Leader chapter of Field Manuel (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership. The Army's utilization of this quote speaks volumes as to what we can learn from one another in a joint environment. While many lengthy characteristics were given of a Strategic Leader in FM 6-22, AR 600-100, and the AWC Strategic Leadership Primer, none were so eloquently stated as that of Admiral Burke. His quote, while used in the strategic leader section, can transcend each leadership level and service culture in its simplicity. It is these cultures which must be addressed in joint, combat environments, and where joint mentorship can flourish.

Many might argue that the joint and strategic environments are one in the same. Each service component has its own strategic leaders as well as billets occupied at the Unified and Functional Combatant Commands. The Joint Chiefs is the highest level where jointness occurs and from where our Joint Corporate Culture should emanate. While the current commander for United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) (formerly Multinational Force - Iraq, MNF-I) is an U.S. Army General, the Deputy Commanding General was a Coalition General and the Chief of Staff was a U.S. Marine Corps General. We cannot escape the joint environment, or the essential element of Admiral Burke's statement: "Leadership is understanding people." To understand people, one must be willing to develop people, and to develop people one must be willing to counsel, coach and mentor them. No amount of legislation, including the GNA, can replace inherent leader responsibilities. This joint mentorship will begin with a leadership relationship of some sort, and evolve from there. It may not involve an in-depth knowledge of a particular service, career field or subject matter expertise, but may involve those innate qualities not discussed or written about daily. This joint

mentorship may be imparted from the tacit knowledge which resides in us all, and may be best utilized to help develop leaders of all services in the COE.

Tacit Knowledge: What the Military Services Can't Regulate. Tacit Knowledge (TK) has been defined in many different ways. Horvath defines TK as "knowledge that is bound up in the activity and effort that produced it."[32] He further writes when dealing with organizations that TK is "the 'know-how' that is hidden or implicit in organizations."[33] The Dictionary of Business defines TK as "Unwritten, unspoken, and hidden vast storehouses of knowledge held by practically every normal human being, based on his or her emotions, experiences, insights, intuition, observations and internalized information. Tacit knowledge is integral to the entirety of a person's consciousness, is acquired largely through association with other people, and requires joint or shared activities to be imparted from one to another. Like the submerged part of an iceberg it constitutes the bulk of what one knows, and forms the underlying framework that makes explicit knowledge possible."[34] The Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind defines TK as "*Knowledge that enters into the production of behaviors and/or the constitution of mental states but is not ordinarily accessible to consciousness."*[35] Whatever definition you choose to embrace, the basic theme is that TK is that knowledge we all gain through our experiences, and often implement unconsciously. Study after study further indicates that TK is most effectively transferred between individuals vice organizations, which take an extensive amount of time and commitment.[36] These last two factors: time and commitment, are what made TK an integral part of the Standard Mentorship Model as explained below.

How We Know, What We Know. Tacit knowledge for military leadership (TKML)[37] list three characteristic features: intimately related to action, is relevant to the attainment of goals that people value, and is acquired with little help from others. Another way of articulating the same points is that TK is "experienced-based, practically-relevant, and acquired with little support from the environment".[38] Knowledge development in the military is based on three pillars: institutional training, self development and operational assignments. Formal educational systems are often bureaucratic in nature, focusing on requisite skills that are necessary to leadership success at the next organizational level. TK, however, is not taught formally nor is it by definition, explicitly captured or articulated, even through self development. In fact, many officers report that the most valuable component of the knowledge development process is their interaction with peers – either in the formal education process or in operational assignments. This could be inferred to mean the most important component of the knowledge development is the opportunity to exchange TK with their peers.[39] The application of our Explicit Knowledge (what we learned through formal education) and our TK, is what makes the difference in performance. Every General was a Second Lieutenant[40] however every Second Lieutenant will not be a General. It is the ability to apply both Explicit and Tacit Knowledge in the right measures at the right times and in the right situations consistently over time, which makes the difference. It is the ability and willingness to share this knowledge, that allows effective mentorship to occur whether by service or in the COE.

How We Impart, What We Know. "For knowledge to flow at the individual level, the expert (or simply more knowledgeable person) must be willing and

able to share; the novice must be willing and able to learn; and the organization must be willing and able to help them do so."[41] However obvious this may seem, we have replaced the mentoring model in many cases, with "attempting to write it (TK) down and disseminate it via books, standard operating procedures, lessons learned, Web portals, workflow systems, and other explicit knowledge approaches, which offers limited potential for efficacy."[42] Sometimes preparation for mentorship sessions allows TK be recalled to communicate an example from mentor to protégé. This process is even further cemented in the COE, where mentors must be particularly articulate when communicating TK to account for the differences in service cultures and customs, thus ensuring understanding by the protégé.

One of the best examples of how we articulate what we know is through telling the stories of our own experiences. Many of my senior leaders throughout the years used stories of their own experiences to help illustrate how they solved a problem, developed a creative concept or envisioned a future strategy. Most recently in Iraq, officers would impart TK through a mentoring group known as The ROCKS, Inc.[43] Subjects of interest would be solicited, scheduled and presented by peers and Senior Officers, with the sharing of personal experiences a mandatory part of the presentation. TK is also used heavily at all the service schools, albeit informally, as part of the learning experience. The dialogue conducted on a daily basis in the school environment is an invaluable part of the teaching and learning process. Whatever the method employed to impart TK, a stalwart mentorship relationship remains a vital link to unlock precious gems of otherwise unconscious and almost dormant knowledge. Just as important as how we impart TK is *if* we chose to impart our TK. Our *willingness* to

share our TK background and experiences may be the catalyst which promotes the most important element in mentorship: developing trust.

Trust: The Tie That Binds the Mentorship Model. Since the inherent characteristics of mentorship are superiority by either rank (military) or position (civilian or military) and advanced expertise above a more junior person, there has to be one element that creates equality between the participants, and trust is that element. With mutual trust listed as one of the key elements in our mentorship definition, trust is the tie that binds the Mentorship Model. Trust is defined as "Ones belief in and willingness to respond to another party."[44] How we trust is further categorized as either personality-based (our upbringing); knowledge-based (interaction over time); institutional-based (meeting basic needs); cognitive-based (first impressions); or calculative-based (conscious choice), with no one category as the sole basis of trust.[45] Since we are observing mentorship in joint combat environments, we will focus on institution-based and knowledge-based trust. Personality, cognitive and calculative-based trust may all be valid, but would require subject interviews to fully develop their impact on trust, and is well beyond the scope of this research.

Service members (SM) trust the institution – their military components, to provide for their basic needs: training, education, adventure, money, service to country and as such, also trust it to identify and promote them and others to competent leadership positions. This institution-based trust also extends into knowledge-based trust, based on training experiences, day-to-day activities, conduct of operations and experience over time in the military component. While trust must still be developed in the mentoring relationship, this trust is developed more rapidly within service components based on

shared knowledge and experiences over time in an institution familiar to both parties. Studies have shown that initial trust in organizations can occur sooner than most people would believe,[46] and the same can be said for joint operations in the COE due to similar values, military standards, and experiences.

It is at this point where the Standard Mentorship Model in figure 1 is expanded into The Military Mentorship Model in figure 2 below. With trust as the tie that binds in both models, it is how trust is developed in the current environment that facilitates the development of joint mentorship.



Figure 2: Military Mentorship Model

Cohesion: How Joint Mentorship is Created in Deployed Environments

Cohesion as a factor in warfighting has always been recognized. The noted strategist Carl Von Clausewitz wrote: "The fighting forces of each belligerent – whether a single state or an alliance of states – have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the center of gravity can be applied."[47] The concept of cohesion was so important that Clausewitz linked it as the initiating factor to center of gravity, a central element of any land commanders

campaign against an enemy. Sun Tzi wrote: “When he is united, divide him,”[48] and “He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious.”[49] Neither statement uses the term cohesion directly but instead uses the term unity, which requires agreement and trust, a key component of cohesion. A Commandant of the United States Marine Corps thought cohesion so important, he directed the establishment of the Marine Corps Cohesion Program, in an effort to help first term Marines and deploying units better cope with the rigors of new environments,[50] while Army Field Manuel (FM) 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, replete with references to cohesion wrote: “Cohesion is essential to success.”[51] Teambuilding, coalition or alliance building and unity of command are all efforts towards creating cohesion (teambuilding) or using cohesion (coalition building), to achieve an objective. Cohesion as a subcomponent of trust is one of the major differences between the Standard Mentoring Model depicted earlier in figure 1, and the Military Mentoring Model depicted in figure 2, and is how joint mentorship is achieved in our COE. While there is an extensive body of research on unit cohesion and cohesion as a factor of performance in combat, our discussion is how cohesion in our COE is the factor that allows joint mentoring to occur.

Cohesion is defined as “A feeling of close friendship and trust among a group of people” and “mutual beliefs and needs that cause people to act as a collective whole.”[52] These feelings of friendship, trust, beliefs and needs develop differently in combat than in non-combat environments, which is what gives the impetus for joint mentorship. The most succinct way to describe the differences between cohesion in non-combat versus combat environments can best be articulated by quoting Wm Darryl Henderson from Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, who wrote: “The chance, dispersion,

isolation, confusion, danger, stress and hardship of the future battlefield will ensure that the decades-old trend of authority and decision-making downward in the organization will continue."[53] These elements, which we'll refer to as the Characteristics of Combat, are the forcing factors of why joint mentorship occurs in the COE. While some of the Characteristics of Combat occur daily in non-combat environments – chance, confusion and stress, the bonds of trust deepen in combat because of the additional characteristics that aren't replicated in daily life: isolation and dispersion, danger and hardship. Collectively these elements alter the institutional and knowledge-based trust we discussed earlier.

The institutions in the COE have largely shifted from being the service components to the actual joint units themselves. Few would argue that "No other nation can match our ability to combine force on the battlefield and fight jointly."[54] Though the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are largely land conflicts, the sister service institutional requirements of deployed Sailors, Airmen, Marines, government civilians and contractors are now borne by a Joint – US Forces Iraq (USF-I) or Coalition – International Security Afghanistan (ISAF) unit. Necessity forces SM to trust that their new institution will provide for their basic needs, since one cannot simply dial up their service component to provide support due to the limitations imposed by isolation, dispersion and danger in the combat environment.

Knowledge-based trust is also accelerated in this environment due to several factors, the first being task cohesion – the necessity to focus on a common objective, namely, a very real enemy who creates the chance, confusion, stress, danger and hardship experienced in the COE. Time spent together is another factor accelerating

knowledge-based trust. Estimating over 350 days spent in a tour of the COE, the type of time spent together is what makes the difference. Work days are normally 16 hours including weekends, with only one holiday where manning was truly minimal - Christmas Day, with no other training holidays. Additionally, each meal is consumed with 1000 of your closest friends and shared living arrangements for O-4s and E-7s and below. While social opportunities are available based on your location and desire to participate[55], the elements of combat remain ever present even in those settings. Additionally, the frequency of officers assigned to the COE provides greater opportunity for joint mentorship to occur. In the same 2.6 years some officers might spend in joint non-combat assignments, other officers have deployed to the COE for two 12 month combat tours. Even with 12 months dwell time between the deployments, time spent in the JOE will double – from 350 to 700, increasing the time spent and experience gained in joint operations.

With the acceleration of institution-based and knowledge-based trust and the Characteristics of Combat to create more interpersonal interactions, joint mentoring opportunities within the COE are plentiful. The four factors that help promote joint mentorship in the COE are:

Professional Relationships (Leadership)**.** The bottom-line is that more junior officers are now receiving combat fitness evaluations from their sister service superiors. This forces leaders at all levels to learn even more about the subordinates service – customs, courtesies, procedures and most importantly – the officer evaluation or fitness reporting systems. While it's the services that promote, not the joint assignment,[56] sister services now get a vote only if through the evaluation report rendered on an officer in

combat. These more junior officers will have repetitive joint assignments in the COE prior to achieving O-4 rank, which will give them much more contact with sister service officers and interagency partners. An example of this would be the intelligence section of an Army Corps Headquarters (HQ). As the HQ deployed with its organic intelligence elements (150-200 Soldiers), the diversity of the mission required augmentation by analyst from all services, to include the Reserve Components, to supplement the expertise necessary to provide timely and accurate intelligence. While primarily a land battle in Iraq, multi-service cultures and capabilities were required to be learned by all personnel, with the most significant being the evaluation systems, as previously discussed, and the awards systems. Service mentalities in regards to awards had to be learned, adapted and in most cases, overcome for the SM to receive recognition for their service in theater. For these junior leaders to be successful, countless hours of teaching, coaching and mentoring were required, which was no issue because as one author writes, "The younger guys have got it. The senior levels…is where it becomes a zero sum game."[57] While it doesn't happen in every case, joint mentorship occurs because officers cannot simply 'check the joint block,' and return to their service as quickly as possible. Senior leaders have a new responsibility to sister services to identify the exceptional, average and mediocre performers, regardless of service, to help develop the strategic leaders of the future.

Teambuilding (Social). In the more senior environments of joint commands, teambuilding events can be far and few between due to the long hours worked and in some instances, the long distances required to travel to and from work, dampening the spirit to socialize. With the even longer hours worked in the COE, deliberate efforts

have been made to develop socialization opportunities. The leadership of Joint Base Balad (JBB) in Iraq executed such an endeavor through sponsoring a professional mixer, intended to allow Army and Air Force personnel to socialize about past, present and future assignments, while getting to know one another. "Most people are working 16-18 hour days here. It's good to balance everything out with a few laughs now and then. This is a healthy environment and actually improves combat readiness, although we may look ridiculous clowning around."[58] This is one of several possible opportunities at socialization in the COE, and helps in the establishment of personal relationships.

Personal Relationships (Trust and Cohesion). With cohesive professional relationships developed and the ardent desire and opportunities to team-build established, personal relationships are more quickly established in the COE because of the reactions to the Characteristics of Combat of stress, confusion, hardship and danger. These characteristics are more pronounced and even more difficult to mask in the COE, which requires leaders to interact on a more personal level. While loved ones may only be a phone-call away, it does not resolve the tyranny of distance created by fighting half a world away. It takes adaptive leaders that must address and attempt to resolve the issues in the COE. These issues are many times very personal – depression of the SM or a family member, personal or family illnesses, anticipated and unanticipated deaths, issues with peers, superiors and subordinates or financial issues – all requiring a greater degree of personal attention and interaction between leaders and subordinates, mentors and protégés, thus solidifying the bonds of trust.

(Over) Communications (Action and Feedback). As the Military Mentoring Model outlines, the combination of Leadership, TK, Trust and cohesion through constant

communications, is also a critical element to joint mentorship. With many actions in the COE ranging from life and death at the tactical level, to international incidents and policies at the strategic level, a practice known as over-communication is highly encouraged and in some HQ, is demanded since “wait till Monday” doesn’t exist. This extensive communications apparatus affects the performance of the organization and its individuals, and almost forces action on the part of the protégé to execute the mentors much sought after advice, and to provide solicited and unsolicited feedback on what advice worked and what didn’t. The Characteristics of Combat coupled with the elements of the Mentorship Model, truly help create the cohesion and trust necessary for joint mentorship to occur in the COE.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The COE provides a unique opportunity to develop programs that encourage and support joint mentorship. However, for a joint mentorship program to persist, it must also be functional in non-combat joint environments.

Fully and formally implementing joint mentorship in the non-combat joint environment will undoubtedly take time. We presumably will not remain at war forever, so depending on the cohesion developed in the COE to simply transcend to the non-combat joint environments is naïve. While the basic elements of the Mentorship Model will remain the same: Leadership, Tacit Knowledge and Trust, capturing the lessons learned through TK will be key to socializing the joint mentorship concept. As mentorship should remain a voluntary action, the opportunity to receive it should still be made available to all officers who seek it, regardless of service. Below are some recommendations on how we might begin to change the culture to better utilize mentorship in the joint environment.

- Affirm Mentorship as one of the basic tenants of Joint Leadership
- Establish a formal, voluntary mentoring program for JSOs
- Expose junior leaders to joint doctrine earlier in the PME cycle
- Identify potential JSOs at earlier grades: senior O-3, junior O-4 grades
- Develop a Joint Officer Evaluation System (JOES)
- Codify Joint Warfare as a profession

If I could choose one recommendation to focus on, it would be the development of a Joint Officer Evaluation System (JOES). "Officers may be assigned to a joint staff, but in the end, it's the service they belong to that will determine their promotion prospects."[59] "Thus with the intent of enhancing the quality, stability, and experience of officers in joint assignments, which, in turn, would improve the performance and effectiveness of joint organizations, Congress created a detailed system of joint officer management, including assignment policies, promotion objectives, and educational and experience requirements."[60] Where GNA falls short was in not establishing a Joint Officer Evaluation System (JOES). Upon implementation of the GNA, an evaluation for the JSOs could have been established as the test bed for all services. Current service evaluations consist of the same basic parameters: Values, Competencies and subjective narratives. The services must unite on which values and competencies are most important, and that articulating performance is the most important aspect of the subject narratives vice upholding service parochialisms. JOES could also be the driver to move us further in creating a joint warfare profession.

The joint environment has a tremendous ability to codify any tactic, technique, procedure or doctrine it identifies. It could utilize this same approach in developing the

JOES. Implementation could begin with the JSOs and all deployed personnel receiving evaluations, which would be less than 10% of the total force. Codifying JOES and joint mentorship provides the driver and the framework which allows the other recommendations to occur. The facts are that we have already had JSOs for over 20 years, and operated jointly in the COE over the last eight years, lending credence for a requirement to emplace a joint officer evaluation system and professional development tools in the COE.

The joint mentorship program would follow the same voluntary path established by the services, but could also create the recognition required for change and development of joint warfare as a profession. While the initial concept of Joint Mentorship may be hard to grasp by more senior leaders, our current junior officers – the recipients of the concept and future strategic leaders and thinkers, will be the driving force that brings the joint mentorship concept to fruition.

Endnotes

[1] Colonel Stephen A. Shambach, "Strategic Leadership Primer, "Department of Command, Leadership and Management, United States Army War College, 2nd Edition (2004): 1.

[2] Ibid, 2.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid, 50.

[5] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Field Manual *6*-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 12, 2006), 8-11.

[6] Goldwater-Nichols Act, http://www.answers.com/topic/goldwater-nichols-act (accessed on November 5, 2009)

[7] Don M. Snider, "Jointness, Defense Transformation and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession", *Parameters Online*, Autumn 2003, 17 www.**carlisle.army.mil**/USAWC/ parameters/03autumn/snider.pdf (accessed on 2 January 2010)

[8] Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Officer*", Joint Forces Quarterly Online*, Autumn 1996, 53.

[9] Snider, *Jointness, Defense Transformation*,18.

[10] Webster's New World Dictionary, Warner Communications Company, (New York, NY, 1984), 377.

[11] Matthew 4:19, *The Holy Bible* - King James Version, (Camden, NJ, Thomas Nelson Inc, 1970), 3.

[12] The Mentorship Handbook: A Guide for SLA (Special Library Association) Chapters and Divisions to Establish Mentorship Programs, 1.

[13] Career Mentorship Program Stow-Monroe Falls High School, "Opening up New Worlds", http://www.stow.summit.k12.oh.us/mentorship.htm

[14] Estevez, M. (2009). Mentorship in Graduate Education. Change, 41(1), 55-56. Retrieved October 24, 2009, from Research Library. (Document ID: 1631527581), 55.

[15] Ibid, 56.

[16] Banschbach, S. (2008). The Rewards of Being Both a Mentor and a Protégé'. Association of Operating Room Nurses. AORN Journal, 88(2), 175-6. Retrieved October 24, 2009, from Research Library. (Document ID: 1538599441).

[17] Lori Leffler, Mentorship, Defense Transportation Journal, Sep 2009, 65, 5, Military Module, (accessed on 23 October 2009), 4.

[18] Inspectors General, Departments of Defense and State, Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, Nov 2006, *oig.state.gov/documents/ organization/76103.pdf, 25.*

[19] Michael G. Zey, *The Mentor Connection*, (Dow-Jones Irwin, 1984), 6.

[20] U.S. Department of the Navy, NAF MISAWA INSTRUCTION 1700.1, Subj: MENTORSHIP PROGRAM.

[21] Air Force Policy Directive 36-34 1 JULY 2000, Personnel Air Force Mentoring Program.

[22] ALMAR 008/06, Marine Corps Mentoring Program (MCMP), Feb 14, 2006

[23] Lt. Cmdr. Elizabeth Zimmermann, *eMentoring Helps Build Productive Relationships*, The Military Family Network, e-Military.org, accessed on 15 Feb 2010.

[24] Ibid.

[25]NAVY WOMEN E-MENTORING PILOT, 261722Z SEP 08, FM CNO WASHINGTON DC

[26] MSPnet, Virtual Mentoring for Student Success (VMSS), National Science Teachers Association, accessed on 15 Feb 2010.

[27] U.S. Department of the Army, Army *Leadership,* 1-2.

[28] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership,* 6.

[29] Ibid, 6.

[30] Ibid,

[31] U.S. Department of the Army, Army *Leadership,* 12-2.

[32] Joseph A. Horvath et al, *Tacit Knowledge in Professional Practice*, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1999), ix.

[33] Joseph A. Horvath, "Working with Tacit Knowledge", *IBM Institute for Knowledge*, providersedge.com/docs/km_articles/Working_With_Tacit_K.pdf, 3 (accessed on 2 Jan 10)

[34] Dictionary of Business, www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tacit-knowledge.html (accessed on 30 December 2009)

[35] Dictionary of Philosophy of the Mind, http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/ tacitknowledge.html (accessed on 30 December 2009)

[36] Knowledge Power, www.idea-group.com/downloads/excerpts/NissenHarn01.pdf , 5, (30 December 2009)

[37] Horvath, Tacit Knowledge*,* 45.

[38] Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership, Army Research Institute (ARI) Newsletter, Spring 2001, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/ari_spr01_tacit.pdf (accessed on 30 December 2009)

[39] Ibid.

[40] Horvath, Tacit Knowledge, 62.

[41] Knowledge Power,5, (30 December 2009)

[42] Ibid.

[43] The ROCKS, Inc, Organizational Presentation, Jan 2009.

[44] D. Harrison McKnight, Larry L. Cummings, Norman L. Chervany, Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational Relationships, Management Review, Vol 23, No. 3 (Jul, 1998), pp 473-490, Academy of Management, http://www.jstor.org/stable/259290 ,pp 474

[45] Ibid, 475

[46] McKnight et al, Initial Trust, 473.

[47] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 1976, 485-486.

[48] Sun Tzi, The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963, 69.

[49] Sun Tzi, Art of War, 82.

[50] Marine Corps Order 3500.28 The Marine Corps Cohesion Program Standing Operating Procedures, May 1999, 27.

[51] U.S. Army Field Manuel 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, 83.

[52] Wm Darryl Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1985, XI.

[53] Henderson, Cohesion, XVIII.

[54] Thomas Donnelly, What Lies Beyond Goldwater-Nichols?, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 2008, 4.

[55] JBB PROFESSIONAL MIXER SPARKS CAMARADERIE BETWEEN SERVICE MEMBERS. 2009. US Fed News Service, Including US State News, November 20, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy.usawcpubs.org/ (accessed January 18, 2010).

[56] Michael Peck, Joint Staff Officers Unprepared for New Jobs, National Defense Industry Association Business and Technology Magazine, December 2005, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2005/DECEMBER/Pages/Joint_Staff5 (accessed February 3, 2010)

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid

[59] JSOs Unprepared, 2.

[60] Snider, Joint Transformation, 11.