Nuclear Deterrence of Terrorist WMD Attacks

Abstract

Employing a nuclear punishment strategy to deter non-state terrorists from using Weapons of Mass Destruction against the United States is likely not effective. The perception of sufficient resolve to use the weapons, difficulties in targeting the terrorists, and terrorist counter-strategies work against the credibility of the deterrent. However, limiting proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD is possible using nuclear deterrence strategy. Coercion of state sponsors of terrorists to not provide WMD to those terrorists is a credible and feasible strategy provided a credible capability supporting attribution exists. Additionally, a continued policy on extended deterrence will further limit the potential for nuclear proliferation.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 2010
Accession Number
ADA520082

Entities

People

  • Patrick S. Matthews

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Commerce
  • Department Of Defense
  • Deterrence
  • Education
  • Globalization
  • Governments
  • International Security
  • National Governments
  • National Security
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Public Opinion
  • Security
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • War Colleges

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies