Understanding Iran's Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support
Abstract
Insurgent conflicts are conspicuously at the center of today's international security landscape. After decades of neglect, the U.S. military has spent the last few years feverishly trying to relearn some of the counterinsurgent lessons from its past. Arguably the most discussed lesson concerns the ultimate "prize" in insurgent conflicts - winning the hearts and minds of an indigenous population. In Iraq, increasing attention has focused on how to improve our politico-military policies in an effort to garner the support of Iraqis. However, Iraq also reminds us of another critical lesson from our past - the role and impact external supporters can have vis a vis successful insurgencies. While insurgencies are ultimately won or lost in the domestic political arena, successful efforts often depend on some measure of external support. By understanding an external supporter's motivations, counterinsurgents can work to more effectively offset such support, which can bolster their chances of fostering an acceptable outcome. As such, the U.S. should reevaluate its operating assumptions concerning Iran's support of the Iraqi insurgency, in order to improve its prospects for the long-term stabilization of Iraq and the region.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA520269
Entities
People
- Ryan Carr
Organizations
- United States Department of Homeland Security