Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge
Abstract
In his 2007 State of the Union address, President Bush unveiled a new strategy for the war in Iraq that involved an influx of 30,000 additional combat forces. The initial tactical objective of 'the surge' was to reduce the violence by restoring order to Baghdad. Its stated strategic objective and purpose was to give the al-Maliki government the space and time needed to progress in other areas, specifically political reconciliation. The first contingent of troops deployed to the Iraqi capital in early 2007, with the last units arriving by the end of June. The operation ended in mid 2008, when the last of the surge-related combat units headed home. In 2009, the United States began a systematic reduction of its forces from the urban outposts it had manned as part of the operation. By the end of June 2009, a total withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraqi cities and urban population centers was complete. Given the recent repositioning of American forces in Iraq and the Obama administration's stated intent to refocus US efforts on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, a critical analysis of the Iraq surge is vital to achieving strategic success, not only in the Middle East and Central Asia, but in other regions of the world as well. No one has argued that the influx of additional combat forces was the sole factor responsible for the reduction in violence in Iraq. The conventional wisdom is that the surge, working in combination with other causal factors, resulted in an improved situation.1 Some, however, question what the surge has actually accomplished, arguing that while it worked tactically from a military perspective, it failed strategically from a political perspective. The objective of this research is to gain an understanding of why that is the case by addressing three key questions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA520750
Entities
People
- Bernard Stancati
Organizations
- Air University