The Importance of Treating Culture as a System: Lessons on Counter-Insurgency Strategy from the British Iraqi Mandate
Abstract
The United States and its coalition partners have been militarily involved in Iraq since March 19, 2003, when Operation Iraqi Freedom I began. Two years later, Operation Iraqi Freedom I has ended, "major combat operations" have ceased--and Operation Iraqi Freedom II is now in full swing, with coalition forces stabilizing the country until full sovereignty for Iraq becomes a practical reality. Aside from traditional generic concerns about nation-building, one could be forgiven for thinking that there would be relatively little that region-specific recent history might have to offer coalition forces as they confront a nascent Iraqi insurgency; but less than 80 years ago, America's closest coalition partner--Great Britain--had similar experiences in the same country during their governance of it as a mandate. British lessons from the 1920s--when Iraq was first founded--are more pertinent for us than ever. In this paper, I argue that British "lessons learned" can be summarized in one sentence: during occupation and reconstruction, great powers must be sensitive to the fact that culture is a system. If political realities are to shift and nations are to be built, or at least reconfigured, then we must take into account political and social mechanisms operative on the ground in the region we wish to influence.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA521458
Entities
People
- William D. Casebeer
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School