Jackson's Valley Campaign and the Operational Level of War
Abstract
The US Army has recently acknowledged the existence of a previous gap in its framework of theoretical reference by including the concept of the operational level as a category of military activity distinct from the tactical and strategic levels in its family of manuals. This expansion of the basis on which we view warfare is likely to have a profound effect on American soldiers for a long time and should be studied thoroughly by those responsible for the direction of the nation's armed forces. Our recognition of the operational level owes much to European military experience and thought. However, the operational art in warfare should not be considered an alien concept. Rather, it should be viewed equally as an American development, which sprang from the same basic source (the study of the wars of Napoleon Bonaparte) as continental military theory and developed here in parallel with European ideas on the subject. Although latent in recent years, the flowering of operational art in America is vividly portrayed in our military history. The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 must certainly be among the most remarkable campaigns in this respect. It is certainly not the only good example which can be found in the American Civil War. Grant at Vicksburg and Sherman in Georgia are names which come readily to mind. The Valley Campaign is a superior example, however, because its ratio of forces gives greater clarity to the issues of operational art.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1985
- Accession Number
- ADA521469
Entities
People
- J. F. Hennessee
- Walter P. Lang Jr.
- William E. Bush Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College