

IBERIA'S ROLE IN NATO'S FUTURE: STRATEGIC RESERVE, REINFORCEMENT, AND REDOUBT

by

MAX G. MANWARING and ALAN NED SABROSKY

Most discussions of NATO's prospects in the event deterrence fails and the Soviet Union attacks Central Europe, regardless of where in the world the war might begin, tend to posit two alternative futures. The first is that NATO successfully contains the Soviet incursion and restores the inter-German border, albeit with some initial loss of territory as a function of the essential defensive posture of the alliance. In this scenario, NATO achieves its wartime objectives without recourse to nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union exercises admirable self-restraint and accepts the loss of its first (and perhaps its second) strategic echelon without resorting to its own nuclear weapons in an attempt to stave off defeat. What happens then is less certain; peace (or at least an armistice) may break out, some desultory skirmishing may ensue, or the conflict—in a replay of pre-1914 expectations and World War I realities—might settle down to a grim slugging match reminiscent of Verdun. Variants implicit or explicit in such propositions as AirLand Battle or Huntington's "conventional retaliatory strategy" alter the forms of the Western response, but not the central attributes: NATO holds, and no nuclear weapons are employed by either side.¹

The second alternative future is considerably more somber. In it, despite all of

NATO's plans and preparations, a point is reached at which it has become clear that NATO has lost the conventional battle. That point may occur as a result of prolonged, unfavorable battles of attrition, or it may coincide with an actual or incipient Soviet breakthrough executed in the classic blitzkrieg manner. In either case, NATO is at the grimmest decision point it will ever face. It must either acquiesce in the domination of the Continent by the USSR, or it must initiate the use of some type of nuclear weapons (probably tactical nuclear systems) with the concurrent risk of escalation to the ultimate counterplay of a central sanctuary exchange. Doctrine says NATO would escalate, and then hope that the USSR would eschew Armageddon. Politics, or fear that the Soviet Union would not show any more restraint than NATO itself had done, suggests that NATO might not risk a nuclear exchange. In either case, NATO loses.²

Although reasonable people may disagree about the relative merits of the assumptions upon which these alternatives are based, it is no secret that there is considerable unease within the Atlantic Alliance over what both augur in the event of war.³ Indeed, concern about NATO's capacity to defend Western Europe successfully in the case of war, coupled with an understandable

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reluctance to contemplate actually using nuclear weapons in the face of a rapidly deteriorating conventional situation on the ground, has prompted much of the current interest in emerging technologies and conventional force modernization programs.⁴

Both emerging technologies and more generalized force modernization programs have merit, and it is well worth exploring the extent to which innovative concepts of force employment such as AirLand Battle and the aforementioned Huntington thesis may improve NATO's capacity to defend well without recourse to nuclear weapons. But there is another element in the equation now. This is the addition of Spain to NATO. In fact, the presence of Spain in the alliance alongside its Iberian neighbor, Portugal, suggests two quite different ways to increase NATO's capacity and flexibility. One is the extent to which Spain, either alone or in conjunction with Portugal, can improve NATO's ability to defend Europe and larger interests elsewhere in the world successfully with conventional forces alone—that is, how Iberia may help bring about the favorable outcome posited in the first alternative future. The other way, however, seems not to have been addressed to date, yet bears considering. It is the role that Iberia in general, and Spain in particular, might play as "NATO's redoubt" in the event the Soviet Union is winning conventionally north of the Pyrenees and NATO chooses neither to use nuclear weapons nor to acquiesce in Soviet domination of the Continent. This article will explore both Iberian roles.

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In order to help determine where Spain and Portugal stand in the European power equation, we begin by examining one of several possible indicators—armed forces strength. This indicator records the number of military personnel available to fight. War, regardless of its level of intensity, must be fought with people. Territory, airspace, and critical sea lanes must be physically controlled. As a rule, the larger the armed forces of a given state, the better that nation's fighting capability in relation to that of another. However, numbers alone cannot show a complete picture. It is also necessary to comprehend how these armed forces are organized and equipped for operations. Thus, we begin by examining the missions, organization, and major weapon systems of the Spanish and Portuguese armed forces, in conjunction with their numbers, in order to appraise Iberian military capabilities.⁵

THE ARMED FORCES OF SPAIN

From the creation of the national army in 1808 through the end of the Franco era, the Spanish military and political system was dominated by the army. As a consequence, the military became a kind of "palace guard" and generally performed gendarmerie functions. The result was that the armed forces became marginal organizations incapable of performing the mission of protecting the country and its interests from outside harm. Diplomacy and other countries with like interests were expected to fill that role.⁶

Since the demise of the Franco regime, the various governments have been working hard to focus the armed forces' interests on the external threat and turn them away from their previous excessive attention and involvement with internal Spanish concerns.⁷ Thus, the armed forces are currently in the throes of an extensive and historic program of reorientation and reintroduction to the international security arena. Political rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the reorganization and modernization of the Spanish armed forces—obviously keeping NATO criteria in mind—suggest the direction in

which recent Spanish governments have been headed.

At 230,000 strong, the Spanish army is the third largest in Western Europe,⁸ after those of the Federal Republic of Germany and France. It is divided into a Territorial Army and an Immediate Intervention Force. These are, in turn, divided into six divisions, 16 independent brigades, and 15 special regiments. As a result, the army gives the impression of being larger than it really is. For example, each of the divisions has only two brigades, and most of the brigades and regiments do not have as many subordinate units as might be assumed.⁹ Other factors qualify the apparent size, strength, and effectiveness of the army: a large percentage of units fall below NATO standards not only in terms of size, but also in terms of equipment and the number and duration of exercises and maneuvers performed over a given period of time;¹⁰ of the 230,000 personnel, 170,000 are conscripts who now serve for only a year or less;¹¹ the army is being reduced to a projected strength of 195,000;¹² and many members of the officer corps are now involved in activities outside the army—business, defense industry, the Ministry of Defense, the professions, and the civil bureaucracy.¹³ Consequently, some units have the necessary training and equipment to deal with a NATO contingency, but a number of others fall below acceptable levels of operational readiness. The former category includes the armored division, the two mountain divisions, the Spanish Legion, the parachute brigade, and the “Regulares” (air-portable) brigade, all of which are considered to meet NATO standards.¹⁴ Through its Plan for the Modernization of the Land Army (META), Spain is attempting to bring the remainder of the army up to the level of these “elite” units and to help solve the problems inherent in an organization in transition from an internal to an external defense posture. The point of departure for this is the Joint Strategic Plan (PEC), whose goal is to create a force capable of achieving the fundamental strategic objectives of a nation-state no longer willing to leave the defense of its interests to diplomacy or to others.¹⁵

Perhaps the most relevant change in the organization of the army is a territorial reorganization which will reduce the current eight military regions to six, reorganize the Immediate Intervention Force, and deploy units more in accordance with perceived threats to Spain and its interests abroad.¹⁶ Additionally, eight of the nine separate infantry brigades assigned to the Territorial Army are to be disbanded. They performed a gendarmerie mission and experienced chronic low levels of readiness.¹⁷ Earlier, this part of the army included one corps with an armored division, a mechanized division, a motorized division, a separate armored brigade, appropriate support and service units, and two fast-intervention units—a paratroop brigade and an air-portable brigade.¹⁸ The META calls for disbanding the corps and providing the armored, mechanized, and motorized divisions with their own service and support units; changing the separate armored brigade to a separate armored cavalry brigade; adding an electronic warfare battalion or regiment to the support and service base; and increasing the size of each fast-reaction brigade by one battalion, giving them three battalions instead of two.¹⁹

This reorganization is seemingly designed to accomplish at least two purposes. First, it permits the mobilization of three corps in the event of a major crisis. At the same time, the fast-reaction brigades are being given more assets to increase their capability as rapid deployment forces. For mobilization purposes, there is a large pool of manpower in Spain which has had military service and which could be brought back into

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the service within a relatively short period of time. This reserve is estimated to be 1,085,000 men, the third largest reserve in Western Europe after those of the FRG and France.²⁰

The new structure of the army is to be accompanied by an ambitious project for modernizing its equipment. This project includes the possible purchase and coproduction of the German Lince tank, which reportedly has the technology of the Leopard 2 and 3; acquiring wire-guided antitank missiles; acquiring 105mm towed artillery and M-108 105mm and M-109 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and converting M-107 175mm self-propelled artillery to M-110 8-inch howitzers; acquiring 35/90mm anti-aircraft guns and medium- and high-level missiles, including Roland, Chaparral, and Skyguard air defense systems; equipping all units with BMR armored personnel vehicles; equipping all units with small arms equivalent to the most modern now available, and all of national manufacture (CETNE assault rifle, etc.); and replacing all wheeled vehicles with models that meet NATO specifications and are of national manufacture.²¹

Presently, Spanish army equipment is a complicated mix of new and dated materiel of national and foreign manufacture. From 1970 to 1975, modernization in the army was based on the purchase of various weapon systems in the international market. Starting in 1976, however, several programs were initiated which used Spanish technology and workers to transform older weapons to acceptable systems at lesser cost.²² For example, the main battle tanks are US M-47s and M-48s. However, the 460 of these in the Spanish inventory have recently been modernized with diesel engines and 105mm guns.²³ These tanks are supplemented by 319 French AMX-30s built in Spain under license.²⁴ Other examples of modernization include the transformation of the old M-41 tank into an antitank-missile-launcher vehicle; and the possible transformation of M-113 armored personnel carriers into carriers for the Spanish 120mm mortar and medium and heavy machine guns.²⁵ Also in 1976, new equipment began to be manufactured for the army by national firms. This includes Teruel rockets, the

multibarrel AA Meraka, BMR vehicles for the infantry, new Pegaso cross-country vehicles, the CETNE 5.56mm assault rifle, and new models of the 81mm and 120mm mortars.²⁶ Thus, Spanish army equipment is not really as obsolescent as might appear to be the case at first glance.

In sum, the Spanish army is undergoing significant changes designed to improve efficiency, equipment, training, and personnel. To the extent that decision-makers can muster the will and allocate the resources necessary to achieve META goals, NATO could have an additional military force that would strengthen its collective capabilities. In the meantime, the Spanish army is a large force with equipment adequate for its current missions and a clear capability to do a great deal more than provide some increased depth to the alliance.

Since the end of World War II and the beginning of significant US assistance in the 1950s, the Spanish air force has become an important part of Spain's defense structure. Despite substantial US involvement in its development, however, there was not as much contact or as many exercises with NATO countries as might have been expected. By the time the Franco regime came to an end, the air force had a strength of 35,700, an inventory of mostly US-made aircraft, and only 20 percent of the defense budget.²⁷ Since that time, its size has decreased to 33,000, most of whom are professionals rather than conscripts; its inventory includes some Spanish-made aircraft; its portion of the military budget for materiel expenditures has increased to nearly 30 percent; and the number of exercises undertaken with the air forces of other countries has increased considerably.²⁸

The Air Combat Command (MACOM) is the pride of the Spanish air force. It has three squadrons of Mirage F1s, two squadrons of Mirage II Es, two squadrons of F-4Cs, and two squadrons of SF-5As. Four squadrons of the older aircraft will be replaced by F-18s, 72 of which are scheduled for delivery beginning in 1986. There are options on additional F-18s, and procurement may eventually provide an inventory of

144.²⁹ The air force structure includes two other commands on the Spanish mainland with significant inventories, the Air Tactical Command (MATAC) and the Air Transport Command (MATRA). The former is assigned the mission of supporting the army and navy with 19 F-5A/Bs, 14 RF-5As, and six P-3As.³⁰ The Air Transport Command has the airlift mission and employs 11 C-130s, 30 DHC-4 Caribous, and 23 CASA 212s. Additionally, Spain has a separate air command for the Canary Islands, which is assigned 24 Mirage F1s and 11 CASA 212 transports.³¹ The command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) system is a Semi-Automatic Air Defense System (SADA) which allows the air force to control the airspace under its responsibility. It has eight long-range radar facilities, seven on the mainland and one in the Balearic Islands. The Canary Islands command has a separate C³I capability.³²

Air force planning for the future includes: acquiring an additional 100 aircraft for the MACOM and MATAC; doubling the number of maritime patrol aircraft; doubling the number of medium and heavy air transports, and replacing the Caribous with an aircraft with the capability to move up to eight tons over a range of 2800 kilometers; improving electronic warfare and electronic reconnaissance capabilities; improving the SADA system; and modernizing airbases in order to support new and more sophisticated weapon systems.³³ The Spanish air force thus offers NATO a modest addition to its air strength in southwestern Europe. As with the army, however, the primary value of the air force lies in its potential.³⁴

Spain's navy is critical to its defense. Spain's population and industry are concentrated along her coasts, which also form 83 percent of her international boundaries. Trade continues to be dependent on sea routes. More than 90 percent of Spain's exports go by sea, and a majority of imports—particularly raw materials and hydrocarbons—reach Spain by sea. Consequently, her international orientation has always emphasized the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.³⁵ The part of the

Mediterranean which is obviously of most importance to Spain is the western region in which the Balearic Islands occupy a dominating position. On the Atlantic side of the country, there are two areas of strategic importance. The first and more significant is the Cadiz-Canaries-Azores triangle. Most of the maritime traffic that supplies Spain and almost all the sea lines of communication "that constitute the umbilical cord of Western Europe converge there."³⁶ The northern waters of peninsular Spain are also of some interest. For example, a thousand-mile arc drawn from El Ferrol includes the Bay of Biscay, the English Channel, the North Sea, the Irish Sea, and the major sea lanes from North America to Europe. These strategic areas thus account for the location of Spain's four major naval bases: one in the Canaries, one at Cadiz/Rota oriented toward the Cadiz-Canaries-Azores triangle, one in Cartagena oriented toward the western Mediterranean, and one in El Ferrol oriented toward the eastern Atlantic.³⁷

Today, the Spanish navy continues to stress its traditional defense and foreign policy roles vis-à-vis North Africa and the Americas through an active building program and almost continuous interaction with other navies in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.³⁸ Under the current building program, for example, the 1985 budget includes funds: for continued work on the nearly completed aircraft carrier *Principe de Asturias*; for three *O. H. Perry*-class frigates; to finish two *Agosta*-class submarines; to purchase AV-9B V/STOL (Harrier) aircraft; for the purchase of helicopters; and for the modernization of the *Baleares*-class frigates, *Descubierta*-class corvettes, and *Lazaga*-class large patrol craft.³⁹ As a result, the navy is not only modernizing but also adding significantly to the fleet. The principal combat ships of the navy now include one *Independence*-class aircraft carrier (the *Dedalo*), eight submarines, 11 destroyers, 11 frigates, four corvettes, 12 large patrol craft, two attack transports, and various other patrol craft, minesweepers, and amphibious attack vessels.⁴⁰ Naval aviation assets include 11 Harriers and 51 combat helicopters.

Clearly, this is a powerful and modern force. Included in the nearly 57,000-man navy is a 12,000-man marine corps, composed of one regular marine field regiment and five garrison regiments. The marine corps is equipped with armor, artillery, and landing vehicles, and provides a small but important complementary power-projection capability to the navy.⁴¹

The naval role of Spain has been a major one for centuries. Because of its orientation, the navy has been generally overlooked by most European and North American purveyors of conventional wisdom, i.e. "Africa begins at the Pyrenees." However, the Spanish navy's traditions, size, modernity, and experience with other navies would add considerably to the NATO alliance. The Spanish navy can contribute significant antisubmarine warfare, minesweeping, surveillance, and marine corps assets toward control of critical sea lanes. Additionally, its aircraft carriers could form the basis for naval task forces supporting the land-based rapid deployment force.

This discussion of Spanish armed forces leads to two general conclusions. First, in case of a Soviet attack on Europe, Spain cannot contribute as much as the FRG, the United Kingdom, or France, but it has the capability to contribute as much or more than any of the other European alliance partners. Second, if NATO were to accept its global responsibility, Spain has the capability to contribute as much as any of its European partners. Within these contexts, there are five specific roles Spain has the military capability to perform: to act as anchor for NATO's southern flank and at the same time contribute a minimum of three divisions to the central front; to provide bases and forces to help protect sea and air lines of communication in the western Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic; to provide one brigade or more to a European (NATO) rapid deployment force; to provide strategic depth for NATO; and to furnish a significant manpower, industrial, and airlift and sealift reserve.

THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY CAPABILITY

Portugal's armed forces have undergone a profound transition in organization, mission, size, and capability in the past decade. After the revolution of 1974, the older officer corps was retired and a younger set of officers assumed leadership positions in the government as well as the military. Then, as suddenly as the left-oriented Armed Forces Movement (MFA) had emerged as a major political force in Portugal, left-oriented officers were also retired or placed in positions of marginal importance. At that point, the MFA dissolved, moderate officers gained control, and the armed forces emerged as advocates of rule by a constitutionally elected, civilian-controlled government.⁴² Consequently, the military is no longer the controlling element in Portuguese politics. It is now "under the direct administration of the State," through the Minister of Defense. Moreover, the Army Chief of Staff, who ranked as Prime Minister, has become the "chief military adviser to the Defense Minister."⁴³

In the aftermath of the revolution, Portugal also recognized the independence of its former colonies—Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique—and accepted its position as a European nation-state. Nevertheless, it has continued to maintain a wider-than-Europe perspective. In this sense, the Portuguese perception of security against any possible threat includes the concept of an external environment which permits unfettered trade and commerce as well as the physical safety of Western Europe. Thus, Portugal's policy has been to modernize its armed forces within the context of NATO in order to contribute to the collective defense of Europe, but also to protect interests outside the confines of the legal limits of the alliance.⁴⁴

The upheaval caused by the political turmoil within the armed forces and the country, and an accompanying lack of resources, have left Portugal with a

dramatically reduced military establishment. In 1975 the armed forces were manned by more than 200,000. Since then, that number has decreased to about 73,000.⁴⁵ Within the 45,700-man army only two units are considered to be "NATO quality," the First Composite Brigade and the Special Forces Brigade. The First Composite Brigade has been assigned logistical and combat service support normally organic to a higher echelon, and has been brought up to a high level of operational readiness. As such it is earmarked for use as a small division in NATO's AFSOUTH (Italy) area of responsibility.⁴⁶ The organization of the Special Forces Brigade began in July 1984 as a response to the desire to maintain the expertise acquired in the African experience and to establish the capability to deal with the kind of threats assessed as most probable.

In Portuguese strategic thinking, a combination of geopolitical and technological developments supports the notion that the Soviet Union and the United States are most likely to test each other in far-flung locations where other countries' strategic positions, raw materials, and markets are at stake.⁴⁷ Another possible threat is that of a swift penetration of the inter-German border by Warsaw Pact forces. Both of these threats require the ability to deploy forces rapidly to areas outside NATO, or to reinforce quickly alliance forces in Europe itself.⁴⁸ In either case, the NATO-dedicated First Composite Brigade and the Special Forces Brigade allow a response to the threat. These brigades also have the capability to play other useful roles. They can be expanded to function as light infantry divisions under major NATO commands; they can perform independently, providing security in rear areas where guerrilla and *Spetsnaz*-type units are likely to be operating; or they can conduct raids, *coups de main*, and other actions behind enemy lines.⁴⁹

Within the context of these varying requirements, the Special Forces Brigade has only the headquarters, two commando battalions,⁵⁰ and combat service support detachments permanently assigned to it. Depending on the task it may be given, the

brigade may be reinforced with up to four other infantry or parachute battalions, one reconnaissance squadron, a field artillery battalion, and helicopter and air defense units.⁵¹ The existence of the NATO Brigade and the Special Forces Brigade "accentuates the urgent need to modernize and upgrade the entire Army."⁵² The other units of the Portuguese army continue to be under-equipped, undertrained, and undermanned.⁵³

The Portuguese air force suffers from some of the same problems. First, there is a transport squadron, equipped with five C-130Hs, which has the mission of moving the First Composite Brigade to its NATO assignment.⁵⁴ Then, again, there is the rest of the air force. As an example, Portugal has no aircraft adequate for an air defense role. This mission is being performed by the three attack squadrons, equipped with 20 A-7Ps, 20 FIAT G-91R3s, and 20 FIAT G-91R4s.⁵⁵ These squadrons can perform only within a small area of the threat spectrum. Given the lack of aircraft and no C³I, the Portuguese would appear to depend on some sort of integration with other NATO air forces to obtain an adequate air defense system.

Similar problems exist in the Portuguese navy. In the East-West context and in terms of protecting external interests and commerce, the main threats are submarines and mines which might close sea lanes and ports on which Portugal and the whole of Europe are dependent. The navy, with seven frigates, ten corvettes, and three submarines, can make only a small contribution to the protection of these vital interests.⁵⁶ It possesses a small antisubmarine capability (the frigates and submarines), some surveillance capability (the corvettes), a limited amphibious warfare capability (the two infantry battalions of the marine corps),⁵⁷ no minesweeping capability, no air reconnaissance capability, and therefore virtually no ability to play an effective role in the critical Portugal-Azores-Madeira triangle.

Recognizing the problems outlined above, and understanding that a nation-state cannot expect others to protect its interests, Portugal has made plans to improve its military capability. They include: formation

of three additional composite brigades similar in structure to, but smaller than, the NATO brigade; improvement of the level of combat and combat service support for these new units; organization of electronic warfare, army aviation, and antiaircraft units; improvement and establishment of antisubmarine warfare, reconnaissance, and mine-sweeping capabilities; construction of additional naval and air support installations in the Azores and Madeira; improvement of the amphibious warfare capability; and organization of a serious air defense system.⁵⁸ These plans notwithstanding, it is clear that Portugal does not presently have the military capability to defend herself or her interests against any kind of serious aggression. At best, the NATO Brigade and the Special Forces Brigade could be dispatched for service in the collective defense of Europe or NATO interests in the Third World. How long Portugal could maintain these brigades abroad without significant outside aid is another question.

Aside from its location on the Iberian Peninsula in a position from which NATO can control "nearly two-thirds of the oil and other important tonnage from the Persian Gulf, Africa, the Pacific, and South America [that] must pass en route to Europe,"⁵⁹ Portugal's most important contribution to NATO might well be political. It can use its links with its former colonies to help diminish the present pro-Soviet/Cuban relationship and play a major role in bringing the strategically located countries of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau to a more Western, or at least more neutral, position. Portugal's policy is to develop these countries to obtain lucrative markets for Portuguese products, to encourage a more friendly orientation, and to help make the south Atlantic Ocean secure for shipping. For example, the 1984 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique encourages increased trade and the establishment of technical schools, and provides millions of dollars in credits for Mozambique in Portugal.⁶⁰ More important for NATO, however, is the fact that Portugal's new relationship with Mozambique

includes a military role. Through subsequent agreements, Portugal has broken the Soviet monopoly there and has become Mozambique's second-largest arms supplier. Portugal is also providing conventional military and counterinsurgency training for the Mozambique Defense Force.⁶¹ Thus, this small Iberian nation is beginning to play a very pragmatic role as a bridge between the West and the African part of the Third World. This role underscores the reality that Portugal can contribute significantly to NATO's ability to deal with what has been termed "out of area" events or conflicts, which could well determine whether the alliance stands or falls in the decade ahead.

IBERIA AS REDOUBT

It is, of course, difficult to ascertain the extent to which the aforementioned contributions of the Iberian members of the Atlantic Alliance can affect the outcome of the main conventional battle in Europe. If NATO is already winning, these measures will help NATO win earlier, and at less cost, than would otherwise be the case. If the remainder of NATO is losing, however, the best that can be expected is that the Iberian contribution may buy NATO some additional time before it faces the grim choice noted earlier: go nuclear or concede Europe to the Soviet Union.

"Iberia-as-redoubt" does not contradict the intent of the contributions described above. It does give NATO planners a third option that avoids the imminent prospect of utter defeat or nuclear disaster. It has the twofold objective of allowing NATO forces north of Iberia to undertake a strategic withdrawal behind the Pyrenees, where they can recover their strength and return to fight another day, in the event an acceptable negotiated settlement to the conflict is not reached; and of limiting the extent to which the Soviet Union would be able to capitalize on its initial military victory in Europe. In many respects, Iberia-as-redoubt suggests a parallel with the experience of the Napoleonic Wars—that is, it gives the allies a toehold on the Continent which, as time permits them to

mobilize and to bring their resources to bear, can serve as a "sally port." (There may not be a Wellington on the allied side, to be sure, but it is not obvious that the Warsaw Pact has yet produced a Napoleon!) A more recent example, compounded by the obstacle posed by the English Channel, was the role that Great Britain played as a springboard for the liberation of Europe in World War II.

In addition to serving as an eventual strategic sally port of sorts, Iberia as NATO's strategic redoubt could accomplish other things. At a political and diplomatic level, it would signal the continued determination of NATO to resist the USSR and not to acquiesce in the loss of Western Europe. Precisely such a signal—an internal "confidence-building measure" in some ways for the alliance—all too likely would be necessary to avoid a precipitous loss of confidence in the still-independent members of NATO as the enormity of what had happened, and the losses their countries had sustained in the course of events, came to be more fully understood. The image of a redoubt resisting the heretofore successful Soviet attacks could well strike a singular chord in the American political psyche which directs particular admiration for individuals, nations, or armies caught in such a situation.

From a strategic perspective, giving weight to the military dimension thereof, NATO forces in Iberia—whether Spanish or Portuguese, or from other nations—could do a great deal to make life difficult for the Soviets while the remainder of NATO was recovering from the setback. One obvious measure would be to restrict Soviet access to the Atlantic by interdicting Soviet naval efforts to transit the Straits of Gibraltar. Air and naval bases in both Spain and Portugal, to say nothing of the British bases on Gibraltar itself, have excellent potential in this regard, as was all too obvious in World War II and would become obvious again in a nonnuclear conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A second measure would be to use airbases on the Iberian Peninsula as launch-points to interdict Soviet lines of communication in Western Europe proper, and to conduct long-range antisubmarine

missions against Soviet forces attempting to use the English Channel or the Bay of Biscay in the event French facilities fell to the Soviets intact (or could be made operational in short order). A third approach would be for NATO forces to conduct "spoiling" attacks against occupied territories in Western Europe to prevent the USSR from consolidating its position, to inflict continual losses on Soviet occupation forces, and to remind the inhabitants of Western Europe that NATO forces, in the classical sense, would return.

To accomplish any of these missions, much less all of them together, would be a formidable task, and much needs to be done to prepare both facilities and forces on the Iberian Peninsula to be ready for this contingency. First, careful attention must be given to constructing a conventional defensive system along the strategically significant Pyrenees and behind them.⁶² Geographical obstacles are certainly no longer the barriers to operations they once were, of course, but the cutting edge of the Soviet army—its armor-heavy combined arms force—is likely to find the Pyrenees to be considerably more difficult to traverse than the plains of Western Europe, and the destruction of key bridges and road systems through that region could render the rapid movement of Soviet armor all but impossible. Preparations must be made to do just that, with appropriate demolition equipment available and carefully trained personnel in place to execute that mission.

Second, the conventional defensive capabilities of both Spanish and Portuguese forces must be upgraded considerably. Here, it is less important for their ground forces to be able to maneuver rapidly than it is for them to be able to "hedgehog" in depth along the already obstacle-strewn avenues of approach across the Pyrenees and in northern Spain. The same applies to air and naval forces. The latter, of course, need to emphasize antisubmarine, mine counter-measure, and antiaircraft capabilities; what the US Sixth Fleet (plus the navies of the other NATO allies along the Mediterranean littoral that fight alongside it) cannot handle is unlikely to be stopped, or even significantly

slowed, by what the Spanish and Portuguese navies are likely to muster for the foreseeable future, although PGMs may provide a cost-effective way of keeping Soviet surface vessels at some distance from the Iberian Peninsula. As for the Spanish and Portuguese air forces, lightness and versatility are the key. Some of the attack aircraft being designed and employed by Switzerland, for example, might be applicable in this context, while tactical aircraft such as the A-10 and various attack helicopters would be of more value than air-superiority aircraft. Finally, Spanish and Portuguese forces must be able to assume the principal responsibility for rear-area security within the Iberian redoubt against formidable Soviet *Spetsnaz* and airborne assault threats.⁶³ The Spanish Territorial Army, as well as paramilitary formations such as the 63,500-man Civil Guard and the 47,000-man National Police,⁶⁴ could take the lead in this critical mission area, if adequately modernized and given appropriate training.

Third, preparations should be made for the insertion of US forces to the Iberian Peninsula in sufficient strength to augment Spanish and Portuguese forces and to provide the initial architecture upon which NATO forces could regroup and recover if that became necessary. For example, some POMCUS sets should be prepositioned in Spain, and perhaps in Portugal as well, not only in the more exposed and vulnerable countries north of the Pyrenees. Plans should be made for the deployment of at least one US light infantry division to Spain concurrent with the deployment of heavier US formations to the FRG upon mobilization. Indeed, it is in the conduct of a mobile defense along and behind the Pyrenees that the light infantry division may actually be able to make a contribution to the defense of Europe without experiencing the liabilities inherent in its "lightness" (absent the addition of corps "plugs") if employed further to the north.⁶⁵ The movement of combat engineer formations to facilitate blocking operations along likely avenues of approach for Soviet forces should be planned, along with those combat support and combat

service support units that will be so necessary for the recovery of NATO forces withdrawing across the Pyrenees. Similar plans need to be made for the deployment forward of both Army aviation and USAF Tactical Air Command squadrons, rather than assuming that there would be the sequential progression of all US land and air forces into the Central European cauldron until some decision had been attained there.

CONCLUSION

Given this outline of the realities of military power and strategic purpose on the Iberian Peninsula, it would appear that the United States and the rest of the Atlantic Alliance should adjust to these strategic realities and accept a new division of labor which would allow Spain and Portugal a more meaningful contribution to the defense of Western interests in Europe and elsewhere. Such a division of labor would represent nothing less than the maturation of NATO.

None of these measures can guarantee success, nor are all of them together an argument for not proceeding with the modernization of NATO's conventional forces along the inter-German border, consistent with global US requirements. At a political level, for example, it is clear that Spain's own participation in NATO is by no means either unconditional or assured. Spanish ambivalence about its NATO connection would make it difficult to proceed with any of the cited initiatives.⁶⁶ Care must also be taken with regard to the potential impact of a prepared redoubt on the FRG's confidence in NATO. It would be necessary, for example, to reassure the Germans that an Iberian redoubt—by making it less likely that a Soviet attack could ultimately succeed—actually enhances deterrence and, thus, indirectly helps protect the FRG. Moreover, at a military level, the name of the game for NATO remains deterrence and, if deterrence fails, containing a Soviet invasion and reestablishing the geopolitical *status quo ante* on the Continent. Those objectives, and particularly that of deterrence, should continue to receive pride of place. But plans

do not always go as their originators intended. War is a dicey game at best, and it is only prudent for NATO planners to hedge against the possibility that they may lose the first battle in Europe. Iberia-as-redoubt provides one such hedge against such an eventuality, while allowing additional time before the momentous decision to cross the nuclear threshold would have to be taken.

NOTES

1. See K. A. Dunn and W. O. Staudenmaier, eds., *Military Strategy in Transition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), especially the chapter on "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe" by Samuel P. Huntington. See also Thomas A. Cardwell III, "One Step Beyond: AirLand Battle, Doctrine and Dogma," *Military Review*, 64 (April 1984), and J. W. Woodmansee, Jr., "Blitzkrieg and the AirLand Battle," *Military Review*, 64 (August 1984).
2. Variants of this theme appear in Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Great Fear of War: A Personal Argument," *Atlantic Quarterly*, 1 (Spring 1983); and Pierre Hassner, "Pacifism and Terror," *Atlantic Quarterly*, 1 (Winter 1983).
3. William Durch and Peter Almquist, "NATO in 1984—An Update," in Barry M. Blechman and Edward Luttwak, eds., *International Security Yearbook 1984/85* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Henry G. Gole, "NATO Defense Through European Eyes," in Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein, eds., *The Defense of the West* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Alan Ned Sabrosky, "America in NATO: The Conventional Delusion," *Orbis*, 25 (Summer 1981); and John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security*, 9 (Winter 1984-85).
4. For differing views on these initiatives, see European Security Study, *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); and Steven L. Canby, "The Operational Limits of Emerging Technology," *International Defense Review*, 18 (No. 6, 1985).
5. The merchant marine, civil air fleet, and arms export industries of any given nation are proven force multipliers. Traditional strategic indicators would include population and space (depth). Other variables measure a nation-state's ability to sustain and increase armed forces' strength and reach. All would be included in a comprehensive analysis of substantive, projectable military power, although such an approach is beyond the scope of this paper.
6. Kenneth Maxwell, "The Emergence of Democracy in Spain and Portugal," *Orbis*, 27 (Spring 1983), 182.
7. It is envisioned that the major part of the reorganization, reform, and modernization effort will be accomplished by 1990. The slow pace of the program is dictated not only by economic constraints, but also by the need to avoid a crisis within the military that could precipitate a *coup* which might restore the previous prerequisites. See Francisco L. de Sepulveda, "Restructuring Spain's Defense Organization," *International Defense Review*, 17 (No. 10, 1984), 1432.
8. This figure does not include the Civil Guard (63,500) or the National Police (47,000). These paramilitary

organizations are officered by the army, and in time of crisis they would act as light infantry and military police units.

9. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1985-1986* (London: IISS, 1985), pp. 57-59.
10. H. P. Klepak, *Spain: NATO or Neutrality* (Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defense, 1980), pp. 34, 36.
11. Sepulveda, p. 1434.
12. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 57.
13. H. C. F. Mansilla, "Algunos Aspectos Socio-politicos de Proceso de Modernizacion de las Fuerzas Armadas Espanolas," *Foro Internacional* (January-March 1982), p. 298.
14. Klepak, p. 36.
15. Ramon de Ascanio y Togores, "The Spanish Army: Modernization and Transformation," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 28 (Special Issue 1, 1983), 79; and interview with Defense Minister Narciso Serra in *El Pais*, 20 January 1985, pp. 20-21.
16. *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 28 July 1984, p. 94.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*; Togores, p. 79.
19. *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 28 July 1984, p. 94.
20. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 57.
21. Togores, p. 78.
22. D. Carlos Gil Munoz, "Spanish Army Modernization—Armament and Equipment," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 30 (Special Issue 1, 1985), 82.
23. Togores, p. 78; Sepulveda, p. 1437.
24. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 57; Klepak, p. 37.
25. Munoz, p. 82.
26. *Ibid.*
27. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: IISS, 1976), p. 29; Sepulveda, p. 1435.
28. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, pp. 58-59; Jose Santos Peralba, "The Spanish Air Force in the 1980s and Beyond," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 29 (Special Edition, 11 December 1984), 27; Klepak, pp. 45-46; and *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 13 April 1985, p. 615.
29. *Jane's Defense Review*, 4 (No. 6, 1983), 581.
30. Peralba, p. 27.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. D. G. de Salas Cardinal, "The Strategic Concept of the Spanish Navy," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 29 (Special Issue 1, 1984), 86.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
36. Klepak, p. 42.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
38. *Jane's Defense Review*, 4 (No. 6, 1983), 615.
39. *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 58.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Lawrence S. Graham, "The Military in Politics: The Politization of the Portuguese Armed Forces," in Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, eds., *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and its Antecedents* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1979), p. 221.
42. Alvaro Vasconcelos, "View From Lisbon," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, 27 (October-November 1982), 81.
43. Rui Machete, reported in *Dario de Noticias*, 16 April 1985, p. 2; and A. Garcia dos Santos, "A New Army for Portugal," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 28 (Special Issue 1, 1983), 72-74.
44. *The Military Balance, 1975-1976*, p. 25; and *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, p. 56.

45. Garcia dos Santos, p. 73; *The Military Balance*, 1985-1986, p. 56.
46. Jorge da Costa Salga Braga, "Special Forces—Operations and Training," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 30 (Special Issue 1, 1985), 76.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. The traditional Portuguese commando organization is based on a five-man team, within the combat group (platoon equivalent) and the company. It is trained to fight and survive outside the normal operational structure and without conventional support.
51. Braga, p. 76.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Dennis Culklin, "Iberia: The New Blood for a Sorely-Tried Europe," *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, 9 (December 1981), 30.
55. Jorge Manuel Brochado de Miranda, "The Need for an Integrated Air Defense," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 29 (Special Issue 2, 1984), 68.
56. Antonio Egidio de Sousa Leitao, "The Portuguese Navy," *Naval Forces*, 4 (No. 5, 1983), 25.
57. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
58. Garcia dos Santos, p. 74; Brochado de Miranda, pp. 68-69; Antonio Egidio de Sousa Leitao, "The Strategic Relevance of the Azores," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 29 (Special Issue 1, 1984), 82; and Sousa Leitao, p. 26.
59. Louis A. Williams, "The Atlantic Connection—Iberlant," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 28 (Special Issue 1, 1983), 31.
60. A summary of the accord is found in *Dario de Noticias*, 13 October 1983, p. 3.
61. Jose A. Santos, "Portugal: From Empire to Nation-State," *The Fletcher Forum*, 9 (Winter 1985), 152.
62. The possibility that border fortifications can still play a major role in defensive operations is explored in John Keegan, "Nuclear Shadows on Conventional Conflicts," *Parameters*, 15 (Summer 1985).
63. These threats are discussed in Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," *Military Review*, 64 (March 1984); and Kenneth Allard, "Soviet Airborne Forces and Preemptive Power Projection," *Parameters*, 10 (December 1980).
64. For current capabilities of these forces, see *The Military Balance 1985-1986*, p. 59.
65. The capabilities of the light infantry division in a European context are examined in David H. Petraeus, "Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence," *Military Review*, 64 (December 1984), and Robert B. Killebrew, "NATO, Deterrence and Light Divisions," *Military Review*, 65 (May 1985).
66. See George R. Allin, "Spain's NATO Dilemma," *Military Review*, 65 (January 1985); and Antony Korenstein, "Two Soft Points Threaten NATO Stability," *Defense Systems Review*, 2 (July-August 1984), especially pp. 33-35.

