

U.S. Air Force commanders and their Canadian counterparts receiving update on Joint Task Force Katrina at Combined Air Operations Center, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida



1st Combat Camera Squadron (James Bowman)

North American Defense and Security after 9/11

By JOSEPH R. INGE *and* ERIC A. FINDLEY

Canada and the United States fought as partners in World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Operation *Desert Storm*, the Balkans, and most recently in Afghanistan. Our mutual participation in these conflicts and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focused on joint and combined operations in overseas theaters. We have been allies in diplomacy and in the defense of North America, planning and acting within the intent of the Ogdensburg Announcement (1940), the North Atlantic Treaty (1948), and the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Agreement (1958). Our nations have

a long history of cooperation that has resulted in the prosperity, safety, and freedom of our peoples.

In the 10 years after the Persian Gulf War, there were numerous terrorist attacks against the United States, to include the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; a car bomb in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1995; a truck bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; two U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and the bombing of the USS *Cole* near Yemen in 2000. Subsequently, force protection was enhanced in all overseas locations, and law enforcement officials investigated each of these incidents.

Throughout the 1990s and into the next century, the Canadian Department of National

Defence (DND), like the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), focused on external strategic threats to the country. During this same period, the post-Cold War peace dividend saw military budget and personnel cuts, base closures, and a military focused on the away game in the Balkans and other distant theaters.

The New Threat Environment

The synchronized terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, made it clear that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans no longer insulated our people from foreign aggression. Although the Canadian homeland was not directly attacked, the terrorists had temporarily achieved one of their goals: to damage the North American economies by targeting the United States.

Canada and the United States have the largest trade relationship of any two countries, with \$1.8 billion in trade per day in Canadian

Lieutenant General Joseph R. Inge, USA, is Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command and Deputy Head of the Bi-National Planning Group. Lieutenant General Eric A. Findley, Canadian Forces, is the Deputy Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and Head of the Bi-National Planning Group.

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 2006		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE North American Defense and Security after 9/11				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 260 Fifth Ave SW Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 6	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

dollars. Some 85 percent of Canadian exports go to the United States and 25 percent of U.S. exports go to Canada. Additionally, 39 states consider Canada their top export destination. Hence, the economic impact of the 9/11 attacks was felt by both nations at the local, state and provincial, and national levels. For instance, increased border security resulted in a 30-mile line of trucks at the border immediately after the attacks, depleting inventories that relied on just-in-time supplies. Although the impact on both economies was temporary, it became clear that an attack on one nation affects the safety, security, economy, and well-being of the other.

Both governments recognized that by working together to strengthen their partner-

Prime Minister Paul Martin emphasized the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians

ship, they could meet the challenges of this new threat environment. Homeland defense and homeland security became top priorities for our nations as articulated in *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.¹

Recognizing that we must fight the away and home games simultaneously, President George W. Bush launched the war on terror with Operation *Enduring Freedom* in October 2001. Canada began Operation *Apollo* in Afghanistan, contributing significant land, sea, and air forces totaling 2,300 men and women. As part of the United Nations International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Canada has been the lead nation in the Kabul Multinational Brigade, providing both the commander and deputy commander from 2003 through 2004. The home game has also changed. Prime Minister Paul Martin emphasized in the National Security Policy that

the September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats. . . . Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security.

Similarly, President Bush described the Canada-U.S. relationship as vital during the Summit of the Americas on January 13, 2004, emphasizing that "we share the same values: freedom and human dignity and treating people decently." He elaborated in the National Security Strategy that "there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada." Hence, both leaders have articulated their visions of a safe and secure environment for our peoples. In addition, meeting in Ottawa, Prime Minister Martin and President Bush issued the following joint statement:

Canada and the United States will work to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of our North American security arrangements by:

- *improving the coordination of intelligence-sharing, cross-border law enforcement, and counterterrorism*
- *taking further steps to secure the Canada-U.S. border while improving the flow of legitimate traffic, through investments in border infrastructure and a land pre-clearance initiative*
- *combating human trafficking*
- *increasing the security of critical infrastructure, including transportation, energy, and communications networks*
- *ensuring the security and integrity of passports issued by each country, consistent with our Consular Understanding of January 13, 2004*

■ *working toward renewing the NORAD agreement and investigating opportunities for greater cooperation on North American maritime surveillance and maritime defense.*²

Embedding these principles into new political agreements and enabling mechanisms would lead to enhanced defense and security of Canada and the United States, such that our mutual societies continue to prosper in an environment where citizens are safe and free.

Before the 9/11 attacks, no single agency in Canada or the United States was in charge of security. That changed when President Bush created the Department of Homeland Security and Prime Minister Martin created Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. Both agencies now have oversight of homeland security, to include the federal leads for emergency responses within our respective borders.

In addition, Canada and the United States signed the Smart Borders Declaration in December 2001 to secure the movement of people and goods between nations. Border security initiatives aimed to:

- *ensure biometrics in border and immigration systems*
- *enhance the design and issuance processes of travel and proof-of-status documents*
- *validate the identity of travelers at ports of entry.*

The threat environment expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetric threat from bombers, intercontinental ballistic



Airman monitoring air traffic in Alaska and Canada during Exercise *Alaska Shield/Northern Edge 2005* at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska

354th Communications Squadron (Anthony Nelson, Jr.)

missiles, and air- or sea-launched cruise missiles to a continuing symmetric threat, and an emergent asymmetric threat, which was focused across all domains, borders, and agencies. Accordingly, political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new home game. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defense of the American homeland and also to provide military assistance to civil authorities.

Canada and the United States have had integrated air operations under NORAD for almost five decades. The NORAD agreement was primarily focused on the Soviet Union and other external threats but has refocused on threats from within. In this age of transnational terrorism, nonstate actors now have the destructive capacity that once belonged only to nation-states. Therefore, Canadian and U.S. leaders determined that it was critical to study North American security and defense in other domains as well. One option may be adding new roles and missions to the successful NORAD construct.

the Bi-National Planning Group was created to study the future of cooperation in broadening bi-national defense arrangements

Bi-National Planning Group

As a result of a change in the threat environment, and at the request of the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the American Secretary of State, the Bi-National Planning Group was created to study the future of cooperation in broadening bi-national defense arrangements for North American security.³ The Canadian-U.S. Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation (December 2002) gave the group a multifaceted mandate to determine the optimal defense arrangements to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks, as well as to respond to natural disasters or other emergencies in the two countries. To ensure that all stakeholders were represented, members were designated from the Canadian Forces, NORAD, and USNORTHCOM.

The group initiated a formal analysis on enhanced military cooperation to determine

Canadian soldiers providing security at opening of elementary school in Afghanistan



55th Signal Company (Andrie Reynolds)

the changes in concepts, policies, authorities, organization, and technology needed. More specifically, it is working toward:

- reviewing existing Canadian-U.S. defense plans and protocols with a view toward improving North American land and maritime defense as well as military support to civil agencies in both countries
- preparing bi-national contingency plans to respond to threats, attacks, and other major emergencies
- maintaining awareness of emerging situations through maritime surveillance, to include assessment of maritime threats, incidents, and emergencies to advise and/or warn both governments
- designing and participating in exercises
- planning and participating in joint training programs
- establishing coordination mechanisms with relevant Canadian and U.S. federal agencies.

Plans and Protocols

The group investigated Canada-U.S. plans and agreements associated with Canadian National Defence Headquarters, NORAD, and USNORTHCOM, as well as applicable bi-national memoranda or agreements impacting the Canadian Forces and Transport-Canada and the U.S. Transportation, Pacific, Joint Forces, former Atlantic, and Army Forces Commands.

Next, the group created a Bi-National Document Library containing treaties, agreements, directives, regulations, memoranda

of understanding, and memoranda of agreement between Canada and the United States. This online library will greatly assist planners on both sides of the border working on bi-national and cross-border issues, enabling them to search by keyword, category, title, classification, and Bi-National Planning Group document number. The library also links to other online research sites such as the Canadian Forces Virtual Library and U.S. DOD documents. This is no small accomplishment, since a single repository of bi-national plans, policies, and agreements did not previously exist.

After a thorough review of these documents, researchers identified the necessity to develop strong relationships with key Canadian Department of National Defence and U.S. DOD entities, as well as other government departments and agencies to ensure the defense and security of our homelands.

Preparing Canada-U.S. Plans

Canadian and U.S. planners have created bi-national defense plans since 1940. The first was focused on countering a potential Nazi invasion of North America, while subsequent plans focused on the Japanese threat that emerged in 1941. As a result of the 9/11 attacks, Article V of the NATO agreement was invoked for the first time. But subsequent review of the Canada-U.S. family of plans determined that the *Basic Security Document*, Land Operations Plan, Maritime-East Operations Plan, and Maritime-West Operations Plan were all outdated.

These plans did not adequately address asymmetric threats, and many of the organizations in them no longer existed. In addition, although the *Basic Security Document* and the Land Operations Plan addressed military support to civil authorities, neither addressed the roles of the newly created Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada as lead agencies in homeland security. So the group followed a deliberate planning process.

First, the group focused on the Canadian National Security Policy, the 1994 *White Paper on Defence*, and the 2005 *International Policy Statement on Defense*. It then compared these documents to the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, as well as Theater Security Cooperation Guidance. The group also reviewed the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, the *Unified Command Plan*, and *Forces for Unified Commands* to ensure that the analysis was compliant with these directives.

This review initiated a revision of the *Basic Security Document*, which is being further developed between National Defence Headquarters and USNORTHCOM staffs. The revised document provides strategic level guidance for the planning of bi-national operations for the defense of the Canada-U.S. region and bi-national military support to civil authorities. The draft now incorporates overarching guidance derived from the Prime Minister's National Security Policy, the 1994 white paper, and the President's National Security Strategy, as well as guidance from other critical Department of National Defence and DOD documents. Hence, the *Basic Security Document* is similar in scope to the U.S. *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, as it is intended to provide strategic guidance from the Chief of Defence Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operational commanders from both countries: the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, NORAD Commander, USNORTHCOM Commander, and the Canada Command Commander.

Group planners also compared the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process

and the U.S. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, finding commonality in content with minor deviations in format. Using these documents, a new military-to-military support to civil authorities

the *Basic Security Document* is intended to provide strategic guidance to operational commanders from both countries

plan was developed to facilitate bi-national consequence management. Canadian Forces did a great job in supporting the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts; and once this plan is approved, it will improve the speed of bilateral responses through systemic rather than ad hoc mechanisms.

Finally, the Bi-National Planning Group has undertaken the task of creating a strategic concept plan for the joint and combined defense of North America in a Combined Defense Plan. The plan will capture the information, processes, and procedures from the former Land Operations Plan, Maritime-East Operations Plan,

and Maritime-West Operations Plan, but will add a newer focus on asymmetric threats as well as joint and combined responses to deter, detect, or defeat those threats bi-nationally.

Maritime Domain Awareness

The Honorable Paul McHale, as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and Admiral James Loy, USCG (Ret.), as the U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, created a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Group that has tackled many tough issues. *Maritime domain awareness* is defined as the effective understanding of anything in the maritime environment that could adversely affect Canadian-U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment.

MDA is greater than mere surveillance since it is broad in scope and geography, acts as an enabler for all maritime missions, and must be a fully integrated effort for local, state, provincial, and federal governments as well as the private sector. Since the shipment of commodities or passengers in the maritime sector comes from other modes of transportation, many interdependencies cross this domain. Hence, MDA must be viewed as an end-to-end



U.S. and Canadian medical personnel preparing for Exercise Patriot 2005 at Volk Field, Wisconsin

167th Air Wing (Melissa Ayala)

international transportation problem as well as a subset of *global domain awareness* (GDA), which the group defines as the knowledge in all environments of anything that could adversely affect Canadian-U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment.

Global domain awareness is achieved if situational awareness and actionable intelligence are seamlessly integrated across all domains, resulting in synergy across all operational functions. Due to multiple interdependencies and interconnectivity, GDA supports a spectrum of missions across many agencies and organizations, civilian and military. Examples include:

- modes of transportation within the land domain feeding ships within the maritime domain and vice versa
- intermodal transportation blurring the boundaries between land, maritime, and air domains
- asymmetric maritime threats expanding the wide array of threat vectors
- law enforcement agencies having the best information but the military having the best response capabilities, or vice versa, reinforcing a need for interagency cooperation.

These examples help update Cold War paradigms related to threats and responses to them. Traditional thinking does little to defeat an asymmetric threat. For instance, an enemy destroyer did not attack USS *Cole*; fighter aircraft or cruise missiles did not attack the Pentagon; and the withdrawal from Mogadishu was not the result of a high-tech armored threat. The boundaries have become blurred between defense, security, and law enforcement, resulting in an even greater need for bi-national global domain awareness. Therefore, the Bi-National Planning Group assessed the state of maritime surveillance between Canada and the United States as inadequate based on seams and a lack of bi-national mechanisms, plans, policies, and procedures. Deficiencies were found at all levels:

- international (the Canadian-U.S. border)
- interagency (Department of National Defence, DOD, Department of Justice, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency)
- interservice (Canadian Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast Guard)

■ intermodal transportation (land, maritime, and air transportation).

Due to a lack of formal shared mechanisms (not ad hoc) such as fully manned and fully networked maritime information fusing capabilities between Canadian and U.S. operations centers, the group developed a maritime awareness concept that provides information sharing and awareness on vessels of interest as a temporary workaround. This proof-of-concept positioned a Canadian Forces maritime intelligence analyst inside the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center to work closely with an American analyst. Combined information on the vessel of interest is then provided to the Canadian National Defence Command Center and the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center.

Research is being conducted by the Bi-National Planning Group staff and will be conducted between the Canadian and U.S. staffs in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, automated information-sharing, intelligence fusion, and development of a common operational picture in the maritime domain. Additional gaps between military and civilian intelligence coordination centers in maritime surveillance capabilities and bi-national cooperation have been identified in the Great Lakes and Saint Lawrence Seaway System. A bi-national team is investigating activities to improve strategic MDA for this system. MDA issues were also highlighted and discussed at a tabletop exercise that involved a terrorist attack against Detroit and Windsor to outline bi-national responses and requirements. Development of additional coordination issues will naturally evolve as the group pursues the bi-national staffing of the *Basic Security Document* and Combined Defense Plan.

Bi-National Exercises and Training

Joint, bi-national training and exercises conducted across all domains would enhance defense of our homelands and could provide added benefits to Canadian and U.S. forces if they deploy to an overseas crisis. Although NORAD regularly conducts training and exercises to respond to threats in the air, the group determined that, excluding NORAD, no major Canadian-U.S. exercises have occurred in a joint and combined environment for over a decade at the strategic or

joint task force/operational levels in the land or maritime domains. This is a serious gap since training and exercises are the mechanisms that produce greater *interoperability*, which is defined as the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to operate effectively together.

In the near term, as part of its Civil Assistance Plan development, the group initiated a tabletop exercise program to provide scenario-driven discussions and analyses of natural disasters and terrorist incidents. Lessons learned from each exercise on processes, functions, and mechanisms are being embedded in both defense and civil support planning. By design, these exercises were joint and combined and included military and civilian stakeholders.

Future tabletop exercises will also assist in validating plans prior to submission for bi-national approval, which is compliant with the deliberate planning processes of the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process and the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (in which a plan is developed and then exercised to refine it). These exercises helped establish and improve appropriate coordination processes and mechanisms among relevant Canadian departments and U.S. Federal agencies.

In addition to the tabletop exercises, 28 members of Canadian Forces along with personnel from government departments and agencies observed USNORTHCOM's Exercise *Unified Defense 04*, which introduced National Defence Headquarters and J-Staff representatives to the command's operational processes and key personnel. That was a good first step toward enhanced cooperation in training and exercises, but the next step must be actual participation at the strategic and operational levels, geared toward joint and combined mission-essential tasks.

Enhanced Cooperation

Alliances, like partnerships, require time and attention. Canada and the United States have had a unique relationship: a common heritage and goals, an undefended border, and integrated and expanding economies.

The greatest threat to our economy, security, and relationship could be a terrorist attack launched from Canadian territory against the United States, or vice versa. Enhanced military cooperation is necessary to ensure the defense and security of the North American homeland in view of

today's asymmetric threats and to provide fast, efficient, and trained military assets to assist in civil support missions. Building, sustaining, and enhancing relationships between the Department of National Defence and the Department of Defense, as well as intergovernmental and interagency relationships with federal departments and agencies, provinces, states, local organizations, and other entities, are critical.

Forces that train in a joint and combined environment increase interoperability. The increases in interoperability between forces in the domestic land, maritime, and air domains will have a synergistic effect on future coalition operations in the international environment as well.

Canadian-U.S. military cooperation should be based on the 47-year success of NORAD. As the first step, our nations should continue to improve information-sharing among all relevant departments and agencies across the border. The Bi-National Planning Group recommends a seamless sharing of information and intelligence on defense and security issues.

members of Canadian Forces along with personnel from government departments and agencies observed USNORTHCOM's Exercise *Unified Defense 04*

The group's *Interim Report on Enhanced Military Cooperation* concluded that the new threat paradigm requires new perspectives; hence, there is a need to move from a "need to know" to a "need to share" culture of information protection between nations. This paradigm shift is supported not only by Canada's National Security Policy, but also by the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence: "All [Intelligence Community] members are hereby directed to . . . develop supporting policies, processes, procedures, and training needed to achieve the maximum degree of information exchange among IC agencies, with our customers, and with our foreign partners."⁴



Members of Royal Canadian Air Force planning rescue route during Exercise *Patriot 2005*

179° Air Wing (Robert Jones)

Although this directive preceded the 9/11 Commission Report, it complements the report's finding that shifting to a "need to share" paradigm is critical to preclude another surprise attack.

On March 23, 2005, the elected leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States gathered in Texas to announce the establishment of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. One of the stated goals is to establish a common approach

to security to protect North America from external threats, prevent and respond to threats within North America, and further streamline the secure and efficient movement of legitimate, low-risk traffic across our shared borders. Likewise, during the discussions that will lead to the 2006 renewal of the NORAD Agreement, Canada and the United States have the opportunity to consider expansion of bi-national cooperation in information sharing in maritime and land domains, as well as in bi-national military assistance to civil authorities in the event of emergency. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, April 2004), and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2004).

² Joint Statement by Canada and the United States on "Common Security, Common Prosperity: A New Partnership in North America," Ottawa, November 30, 2004.

³ The entire diplomatic note is in appendix I of the Bi-National Planning Group's *Interim Report on Enhanced Military Cooperation*, October 13, 2004, available at <www.hsdec.org/research.aspx>.

⁴ Director of Central Intelligence, Directive 8/1, "Intelligence Community Policy on Intelligence Information Sharing," June 9, 2004.

The authors wish to express their appreciation to Biff Baker of the Science Applications International Corporation from the Bi-National Planning Group for his research and editorial assistance.