

EFFECTIVE USE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EFFECTIVE USE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

by

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ABSTRACT

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EFFECTIVE USE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Most strategic communication problems are not communication problems at all. They are policy and execution problems.

—Admiral Michael G. Mullen¹

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11) strategic communication continues to gain momentum as a critical component to all national instruments of power – diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME). Strategic communication resonates as an important aspect of the information part of the DIME paradigm. Many assess that the primary purpose of strategic communication is to influence some type of opinion on the domestic front and abroad. Strategic communication occupies center stage for leaders at all levels ranging from the President of the United States to an infantry squad leader on patrol in Afghanistan. For leaders at any level to leverage the effectiveness of strategic communication they must have a

deep comprehension of identities, attitudes, cultures, interests, and motives of others; awareness by leaders and practitioners that what we do matters more than what we say; institutionalized connections between a wide variety of government and civil society partners in the United States and abroad; a durable model of strategic direction that adapts quickly, transforms stovepipes, integrates knowledge and functions, and builds next generation skills and technologies.²

Across strategic, operational, or tactical levels there are good and bad examples of the use of strategic communication. And in some instances, strategic communication is not used at all, either inadvertently or purposefully. Two of the primary reasons for the ineffective application of strategic communication are the lack of a fundamental understanding of strategic communication as a process and the lack of a common definition. There is some doubt that a consensus can be met on a strategic communication definition at a lower level like within a military service let alone at a high

level that blends national and strategic players. Strategic communication is a challenging concept as "...the expression strategic communication is one of the most misused and misunderstood terms..."³ This paper will provide a fundamental understanding of strategic communication. It will provide a common definition that will assist practitioners of strategic communication. It will also assess the effectiveness of strategic communication using three different focus areas that range from practical application of policy to theoretical application of war. The examples are President Barack Obama's June 2009 Cairo, Egypt speech; the continuation of a preemption policy from the President George W. Bush administration to the President Barack Obama administration; and the use of Carl von Clausewitz's theory of war from his book, *On War*, to assist with the prosecution of military power in the 21st century. Examination of these three diverse topics will highlight examples that can facilitate successful execution of strategic communication within US policy-making agencies and assist strategic level planning and execution. These examples highlight effective methods executed in practice and theory. It is from these examples that lessons learned can be ascertained and put into practice until there is a common definition across the spectrum of the DIME.

Strategic Communication – a Definition

Before looking at these examples it is important to understand the meaning of strategic communication. "Strategic communication is at its essence, the orchestration of actions, words, and images to create cognitive information effects."⁴ However, there is a potential issue in that "there is no overarching US government definition of strategic communication."⁵ Other definitions highlight the utility of strategic communication throughout the interagency of the US government; specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap which defines strategic communication as

focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.⁶

The absence of a common definition or unified doctrine for strategic communication leads to ambiguity regarding the effective use of strategic communication. A common adhered to definition or doctrine about strategic communication would assist in this understanding. Its effects could impact numerous echelons of leadership from the President to a combat commander, like General Stanley McChrystal, in Afghanistan. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, outlines that the “United States (US) Government uses strategic communication to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations.”⁷ It goes on to define strategic communication as

focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US Government interests, policies, and objectives through the coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of power.⁸

Note the subtle differences between the QDR Roadmap definition and the JP 3-0 definition. The QDR Roadmap highlights that strategic communication is not just US Government efforts but also processes. This begs the issue of whether strategic communication is an executable process or a plan that results from the process of strategic communication. Another important difference between the two definitions is that JP 3-0 highlights the advancement of “Government...policies,”⁹ while the QDR does not acknowledge advancement of policies in its definition. The combination of

these two definitions by simply adding the “processes”¹⁰ and “policies”¹¹ verbiage would compensate for their differences and assist with a significant issue in the QDR

Roadmap that

changes in the global information environment require the Department of Defense (DoD), in conjunction with the other US Government (USG) agencies to implement more deliberate and well-developed Strategic Communication processes.¹²

The challenge is getting the proper decision makers within the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff to codify this definition in order to establish a baseline for a strategic communication definition for implementation at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the government and military. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen commented that current strategic communication should not be “a separate function, but rather a process for guiding and informing decisions.”¹³

Until a universal definition is agreed on and put into practice one must understand the importance of strategic communication and execute accordingly within constructs ranging from anecdotal examples to the numerous published definitions. The following examples highlight effective strategic communication in the absence of a common definition but leverage the need to get a message disseminated that will ultimately affect the national security of the U.S. For the purpose of this paper and for future recommendations to a common strategic communication meaning the following definition is offered,

focused US Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.¹⁴

Case Studies

Cairo Speech. A good example of effective strategic communication at the national level is President Barack Obama's "New Beginning," speech at Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt June 4, 2009.¹⁵ The speech's impact is highlighted by numerous assessments that "...the speech already stands as one of the most successful public diplomacy and strategic communications [sic] campaigns..."¹⁶ The key to this success was that President Obama's speech was a significant change from President George W. Bush's administration's ways of articulating how the United States perceived and interacted with the rest of the world, particularly the Muslim world. The speech

represents a welcome break from the former President George W. Bush administration's approach to strategic communication. Bush's rhetorical strategy was to divide the world...Obama tried to reframe the challenges facing America and the Muslim world as one of rejecting that division in favor of a story of shared progress.¹⁷

President Obama appeals to the Muslim crowd by relating to them using his personal experiences. He attempts to hone in on the Muslim culture and his understanding of it by stating the he "came from a Kenyan family that includes generations of Muslims."¹⁸ This appeal supports "winning the hearts, minds, trust, and credibility, [which] in the end, requires a local approach"¹⁹ since President Obama made this speech to Muslims in Egypt. President Obama breeches the divide of the past administration during the introduction of the speech that enthusiastically highlights its theme of a *new beginning*,

I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles...²⁰

President Obama concludes his speech with quotes from the Holy Koran, the Talmud, and the Holy Bible. He ties these spiritual works together by saying that, “the people of the world can live together in peace. We know that is God's vision. Now that must be our work here on Earth.”²¹ President Obama’s use of religion serves as a bridge to positively reengage the Muslim community on the future of United States and Muslim policy and interactions. It also will assist with the US campaign against extremism that is associated with the certain parts of the Muslim world and go a long way in addressing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen’s, concern that our “extremist information campaigns lack credibility, because we haven’t invested enough in building trust and relationships...”²²

The content of President Obama’s speech is highlighted by his impeccable delivery and text book public speaking. However, the speech is also a perfect example of President Obama and his administration exercising strategic communication to leverage the popularity of the President to change the attitude of world opinion that generally personified disdain for the United States. This opinion was based on actions and perceptions of the previous administration under President George W. Bush which is highlighted by a 2009 Pew Research Poll.²³ Analysis of President Obama’s speech highlights effective strategic communication. Although the speech does not articulate any significant changes to already espoused Administration policies its backdrop is symbolic and significant. The venue where the speech is given; the immediate audience present for the speech; and the issues articulated by President Obama make an important statement about the way-ahead and commitment of his policies between the U.S. and the Muslim world. President Obama draws on his personal life and

experiences to serve as a lens to describe a realistic America. Also, he leverages these experiences to enhance his popularity with the crowd and at the time, with the U.S. and world opinion.

The audience for this speech ranged from Muslim world; US policy makers and citizens; US allies; and US adversaries. The Administration wanted to ensure the speech was widely disseminated as they leveraged: a live webcast of the speech on the White House web site; remarks translated into thirteen languages; text messages in numerous languages; and disseminated to social networking sites like, MySpace, Twitter and Facebook.²⁴ Judith McHale, the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, commented in her confirmation testimony that "...technology, used effectively and creatively, can be a game changer."²⁵ The Obama administration use of social networking sites and the simple posting of his speech on-line made for an effective way to disseminate the President's message to these various audiences.

President Obama and his Administration's way-ahead regarding reinforcement of the message is highlighted by, "Muslims will judge Obama by actions more than words;"²⁶ and for that matter so will the perceptions of the American people, and the US allies and adversaries. These actions will reinforce the strategic communication initiative displayed by President Obama and his administration. They also are in line with the proposed strategic communication definition outlined in this paper. Specifically, President Obama's speech focuses on the Muslim community whose support is important to the success of the United States. That success is influenced by the political, economic, and military interactions with Muslims, especially those in the Mideast, that advocate United States national interests. President Obama speech

provides the baseline for future interactions with Muslims that are positive and favorable to the United States. The commitment to these messages is the challenge for the Obama administration. It highlights that strategic communication is not just a single action, rather it requires a comprehensive strategy to fulfill the intent and end state of the messages articulated in the speech. This consideration is not exclusively for future policy development. It is also an integral component to the continued execution of standing policy.

Preemption Policy. An issue that is of equal importance as current US conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the U.S.'s ability to prevent another 9/11 attack on American soil. Employment of an effective strategic communication effort is an important component to assist with this prevention. The current strategy of "preemption" employed by the Obama administration is a carry-over from the Bush administration.

In its on-going war against "terrorism," the US continues to pursue a policy of preemption, also known as a policy of "anticipatory self-defense," regardless of the objections and reservations of allies and the United Nations (UN).²⁷

To date President Obama has not officially rescinded the current policy of preemption. Also, no significant comments have been made about the direction that this policy will or will not move, thus allowing President Obama flexibility in the future.

The preemption policy was initially disseminated in a speech that President Bush gave to the graduation class at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, on June 1, 2002.

Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive...our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.²⁸

On numerous occasions since 9/11 President Bush publicly stated that he would not tolerate another attack similar to the one on the World Trade Center in New York City by any enemy, especially terrorists who use safe havens in other countries to plan, prepare and sometimes launch attacks and violence against the US and its allies. The policy along with the speech was implementation of strategic communication used to influence current and potential enemies, allies, and American population whose psyche was greatly affected by the 9/11 attacks. Thus, the speech in June 2002 laid the groundwork for the Bush administration's preemption policy. There were some challenges with dissemination of the policy, and strategic communication in general, as seen in 2002 with the National Security Council's attempt to implement a strategic communication agency that "generated more frustration than results, say participants."²⁹ However, this preemption policy was officially codified in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies (NSS). The 2006 NSS specifically states:

To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression.³⁰

Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's National Security Advisor, summed up the administration's need for the preemption policy, "Preemption is not a new concept and that there could be no moral or legal justification for a country to wait to be attacked before it can address the existential threat."³¹

The preemption policy's primary objective is "to protect the American people and American interests."³² The ends for this preemption policy appear to be very broad, but the essence of "the first duty of the United States Government"³³ is outlined in the Bush

administration's 2006 NSS. The Obama Administration has not published their NSS, nor have they officially rescinded the preemption policy. To understand the policy of preemption and embed its theme into some aspect of strategic communication it is important to understand its important details.

The US has the means to execute a policy of preemption. The biggest challenge in continuing to execute this policy is the impact of on-going requirements around the globe, like the execution of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the preemption policy was announced and published in 2002 by the Bush Administration there has been much controversy. This controversy ranged from people within the US to allies of the US. Although many support the preemption policy's merits of providing security for American citizens and American interests, there is concern from US allies and others, like Russia and China. The primary concern is the perception by adversaries or potential adversaries that based on the fact that these countries are supportive of the U.S. there is a potential for some type of negative reaction towards them.

Many who are opposed to the policy assess "that the doctrine was always at odds with international law and norms."³⁴ However, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations approves the spirit of a policy of preemption. It states that, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense..."³⁵ This article of the UN Charter gives the US the necessary authorization to execute a preemption policy; however, the challenge is providing credible evidence that the US is threatened to the point that requires self-defense.

The bottom line is that since the policy of preemption was adopted in 2002 there have been no attacks by terrorists or terrorist organizations on US soil. Other policies, efforts, and measures across the spectrum of the US government assisted with this success. Although there have been few planned terrorist type activities on US soil since 9/11, all were thwarted and none were assessed to have the magnitude of 9/11. An important part of this success is attributed to the policy of preemption combined with a strategic communication plan that facilitated dissemination of this policy as evidenced by the discussion below.

The Council on Foreign Relations published an article in 2002 by Ivo Daddler, *Policy Implications of the Bush Doctrine on Preemption*. It highlighted some of the associated risks of executing a preemption policy. Daddler provides a balanced analysis of the pros and cons associated with the preemption policy. However, it is his analysis supporting the preemption policy that is most compelling. Daddler highlights significant reasons for the policy that are still valid today. He emphasizes that our adversaries, especially terrorists, “are much more risk-prone than our cold war adversaries, and much less likely to care about the consequences of their actions for the lives of those who support or live among them.”³⁶ It is this lack of value for human life that makes dealing with contemporary enemies a challenging paradox, especially on implementation of a strategy to adequately counter their threat. Thus, it is the proper implementation of strategic communication that serves as an enabler of this success. “It is indeed a contest for the hearts and minds of potential terrorists, not an intellectual debate about the legitimacy of an extreme interpretation of a religious message.”³⁷

When the preemption policy was developed by the Bush administration in 2002, it primarily focused on terrorist type threats that attacked the World Trade Center and those that we defeated in Afghanistan in October of 2001. However, today there are nation-state actors that may threaten the security of the US. An October 15, 2009 *Boston Globe* article highlighted Russia as one of these nation-state actors that potentially could pose this type of threat to the US. Specifically, it quoted the Russian Presidential Security Council Chief, Nikolai Patrushev, who said, “Moscow reserves the right to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes to safeguard the country against aggression both a large and a local scale.”³⁸ Patrushev also discussed that conventional and nuclear preemption would be used “in situations critical to national security.”³⁹

The US continues to pursue a policy of preemption. A strategic communication message must reinforce that “...the first duty of the United States Government remains...to protect the American people and American interests.”⁴⁰ Since adoption of the preemption policy in 2002 there have been no attacks on US soil. Other policies, efforts, and measures assisted with this success; however, the preemption policy and its use of strategic communication domestically and abroad are invaluable components to its success. One key aspect to clearly articulating our policy of preemption is an effective implementation of strategic communication. This strong message is in line with the definition proposed in this paper. Its focus is primarily on ensuring the vital security of the United States is preserved through the execution and publishing of the preemption policy. There must be synergy throughout the DIME to ensure its effectiveness. We must use strategic communication to leverage our success of

preventing a catastrophic attack on US soil since 9/11 that continues this prevention into the future.

The previous two examples outlined in this paper highlight practical application of effective strategic communication at the national level of government and the strategic level of the military. The following depicts the integration of strategic communication into a theory of war that has stood the test of time and is a theory that can survive the changes to the nature of warfare in the future.

Clausewitz. Carl von Clausewitz is a popular, and to some a controversial 18th century theorist, who explains the nature of warfare which still has utility in the twenty-first century. Peter Paret, author of *Makers of Modern Strategy*, poses a question regarding the feasibility of any theorist providing an adequate explanation of war in his introduction of Clausewitz. He asks, “whether war can be understood and by implication, intellectually mastered and controlled...”⁴¹ Combat experience and the study of history assist with an understanding of war; however, the mastery and control of war is much more difficult to attain. History and experience only provide context for specific operations and conflicts. Perspective is provided in Clausewitz’s *On War* that assists in dealing with this ambiguity of understanding, mastering and controlling war in the twenty-first century. An examination of Clausewitz’s application to warfare of the future combined with the use of strategic communication can make his *On War* truly a timeless and even more important work.

Even Clausewitz cautions throughout *On War* that war is not easy, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”⁴² Understanding and defining the environment of warfare in the twenty-first century is as complicated as any period in

history, possibly more so today than ever. In his book, *Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America's Army*, Major General (Retired) Robert Scales opines on the future of warfare in the aftermath of 9/11 and the successful operations in 2001 by the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Scales acknowledges the difficulty of categorizing war and conveys its challenges with a quote from Clausewitz on the title page of his book, "We wanted to show how every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions."^{43,44} This perspective resonates today as the complexities of today's world impact the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century.

Twenty-first century warfare operates on a full spectrum operations continuum. US forces must be prepared to execute any type of warfare that ranges from high intensity conflict to nation building to combating terrorism. Frank Jones takes a line from Clausewitz in his discussion of terrorism and how it transcends time and location, "To paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, terrorism has a grammar of its own, changing from age to age and place to place, but its logic – the rationale of terrorism – remains durable."⁴⁵ One can substitute any type of operation from the full spectrum operations continuum as we must be prepared for any type of warfare in the twenty-first century. Our leaders must be prepared to plan a strategy accordingly that can facilitate attainable ends so that adequate resources can be allocated. Bottom line, the United States must balance fighting across the full spectrum of operations to ensure our country's strategy and policies are met. However, we must embed strategic communication in these actions to ensure the proper message about our operations is disseminated to the American populous, our allies, our foes, and those that are unsure

of whose side to take. If we fail to properly incorporate strategic communication into these type conflicts or operations, we risk failure similar to that experienced during the Vietnam conflict that led to an empowered enemy and negative domestic support that ultimately led to the unsuccessful resolution of the conflict. This assessment, coupled with the understanding and application of Clausewitz's *On War*, can best explain the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century.

Recent warfare executed throughout the world, especially by the United States, depicts an unpredictable nature that ranges from state-on-state wars to wars waged by insurgents against a state. Clausewitz's insight that "war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case,"⁴⁶ aptly describes this unpredictable nature. One cannot predict the context of the next war and it seems throughout history this has been the case. One can reference the Vietnam War or use today's Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts as examples. Consider the conflict in Iraq. It began as a war using major combat operation principles but ultimately transitioned into some type of insurgency that dictates operations today. The balance of a proper strategic communication plan with other aspects of the Vietnam War may have assisted with better public opinion. Also, that balance of strategic communication with other aspects of war may be responsible for the precipice of success we are on in Iraq and ultimately assist with success in Afghanistan.

Clausewitz's explanation about the characteristics that comprise the nature of warfare can also be applied to twenty-first century warfare. Clausewitz describes a "paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity...the play of chance and probability....and its element of subordination, as an instrument of

policy..."⁴⁷ Effective strategic communication is vital to influencing Clausewitz's trinity. And although "strategic communication was not in his vocabulary...he envisioned persuasive communication as an element of leadership among the three elements of national will."⁴⁸ Success hinges on the ability of our leadership, government and military, at any level to incorporate a message that leverages the energy and support that Clausewitz's trinity can generate.

Professor Leonard Fullenkamp's lecture on September 03, 2009 to the United States Army War College class further explained Clausewitz's trinity and its relationships highlighting Clausewitz's thought about theory "that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."⁴⁹ There are numerous examples throughout history that validate the use of Clausewitz's trinity to better understand the nature of warfare. Christopher Daase used the Vietnam War to depict this perspective of Clausewitz, "Henry Kissinger summarized this Clausewitzian insight, when he reflected on the US experience in Vietnam by declaring that 'the guerrilla wins if it does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.'"⁵⁰ All this is compounded by an absence or lack of effective strategic communication that articulates the US perspective to influence the enemy and our allies, and inform and engage the American public. And ultimately this led to an unsuccessful resolution of the Vietnam conflict. Although the fight in Iraq today is not what Vietnam was then, the same parallels can be drawn. Specifically, the influence of the elements of Clausewitz's trinity can shape the nature of warfare. Policy and strategy makers must be cognizant of these elements along with effective strategic

communication. Their influence when planning for warfare in the twenty-first century or the United States may fall victim to the same perils of previous failures.

Operations along the full spectrum operations continuum continue to build momentum as the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan continue and the future remains unpredictable. Throughout this era and many eras prior, Carl von Clausewitz provided a “theory...meant to educate the mind of the future commander...to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.”⁵¹ Application of Clausewitz’s theory while incorporating an effective strategic communication message will assist commanders and policy and strategy makers with the insights that will ultimately lead to the successful execution of warfare in the twenty-first century. The definition proposed in this paper will assist the future leaders as it provides commonality at the strategic level where often there is ambiguity on certain issues or minimal consensus to their meaning. Specifically, our leaders must understand that strategic communication serves as an enabler to the processes and efforts that provide successful synergy to the DIME and thus, implementation of successful United States policy. Ultimately the combination of Clausewitz and strategic communication will enhance those future leaders,

...we must educate leaders, particularly warfighters, about what strategic communication is...and what it isn’t. The difficulty, of course, is that there is no military doctrine for strategic communication, leaving both its definition and the process associated with it open to interpretation.⁵²

Leveraging Clausewitz’s work with implementation of effective strategic communication will assist our future leaders in crafting military strategies to support any national policy set forth by our leaders; and when necessary, fight and win our nations wars.

Conclusion

History continually provides examples of leaders at all levels of government and the military effectively using strategic communication to assist with their objectives. Their constant efforts to articulate and disseminate a message are indicative that "...the instrument of strategic communication is vital to America's future, and must be transformed at strategic and operational levels."⁵³ To assist with this transformation and reinforcement of the successful uses of strategic communication in history a common definition must be codified. The following definition was put forward in this paper,

focused US Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.⁵⁴

The challenge is getting the proper decision makers within the US Government agencies and the Armed Forces to come to a consensus on any definition to facilitate a common understanding of strategic communication. Regardless, a codified definition and studying the examples of President Barack Obama's June 2009 Cairo, Egypt speech; the continuation of a preemption policy from the Bush administration to the Obama administration; and the use of Clausewitz's *On War* to fight 21st century conflicts can assist in providing an effective blue print for future strategic communication.

Endnotes

¹ Al Pessin, "Top Officer Criticizes US Military 'Strategic Communications,'" August 28, 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-28-voa57.cfm> (accessed October 1, 2009).

² Defense Science Board, "Task Force on Strategic Communication, Executive Summary," January 2008, x-xi, http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org/action/2008_01_strategic_co_1c55f0.pdf (accessed March 14, 2010).

³ Brigadier General Mari K. Eder, "Toward Strategic Communication," *Military Review*, (July-August 2007), 62.

⁴ Dennis M. Murphy, "In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication," *Parameters* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009-10): 105.

⁵ Dennis Murphy, "The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)," *US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, Issue Paper*, vol. 2-08 (January 2008), 1.

⁶ Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, "2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Strategic Communication (SC) Execution Roadmap," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous other Directors, Attachment, Washington, DC, September 25, 2006, 3.

⁷ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, September 17, 2006, Incorporating Change 1, February 13, 2008, I-2.

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