

CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Who should be responsible for contractor personnel accountability on the battlefield? While commanders and Joint and Army doctrine manuals place the responsibility for contractor accountability on the human resources staff element, Department of Defense (DOD) and Army guidance and other regulations assigns the responsibility and authority to enforce contractor personnel accountability on the battlefield to the logistics community. Contractor accountability has been in the past, and will continue to be in the future, an enormous challenge to commanders at all levels. As of September 30, 2009, DOD reported there were over 242,000 DOD contract personnel in the CENTCOM theater of operations. Contract support to military forces is not a new concept and neither are contractor accountability issues. Contractor support to overseas contingency operations is a critical element to the success of the military commander's operation. The increased reliance on contractor support presents many accountability challenges to the military force. Therefore, contractor personnel accountability on the battlefield clearly lies with the human resources community.

CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Contract support to military forces is not a new concept. Reliance on contractors has increased due to reductions in military force structure, increased operations tempo, and advanced weapons and equipment technology.¹ Contract support is critical to the success of a military commander's mission accomplishment during overseas contingency operations. The commander benefits in many ways using contractors to fill immediate needs and to perform non-combat activities or missions. Contractors are able to provide expertise in specialized fields and services that the military does not possess, such as linguists, maintenance and base support personnel.² Contractors filling these specialized fields allow military personnel the freedom to conduct combat missions in support of the commander's overall plan. While contracting support is a critical component of and beneficial to the commander's plan, the increased reliance on contractor support presents many challenges to commanders and the military force.

One long-standing challenge with contracting is maintaining accurate contractor personnel accountability. As of September 30, 2009, Department of Defense (DOD) reported there were over 242,000 DOD contract personnel in the United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) theater of operations.³ How accurate is this number? Contractor accountability on the battlefield is an integral piece of the information requirements for commanders.⁴ Accuracy of contractor personnel numbers and accountability of contractors is necessary to properly plan for and integrate contractor personnel into the commander's overall support plan. Inaccurate contractor personnel data affects the management and resourcing of support requirements for contract personnel and the services contractors provide for military service members.

The lack of accountability of contractor personnel contributes to the already overwhelming and very difficult task of contract management. Inaccuracy in contractor numbers can lead to fraud, waste and abuse. Without accurate accountability of contractors and the location where the contractor is performing the service, management and quality control of the contractor is problematic. Quality control eliminates fraud against the government by ensuring contractors provide the services specified in the contract. Accurate contractor personnel numbers allows the commander and their staff to properly plan and allocate resources for protection and life support. Providing too few or too many assets and resources in support of contractors leads to waste of those resources and inefficiency in operations. Waste and inefficient operations can lead to abuse of the contracting process by both the contractor and contracting officer. Without the sufficient management of contractors, military service members may not receive the support required to fulfill their duties in support of the mission. In addition, the Wartime Contracting Commission said unaccounted for contractors by the government on the battlefield poses security risks to United States forces.⁵ Contractor accountability has been in the past, and will continue to be in the future, an enormous challenge to commanders at all levels.⁶

The starting point to address many challenges of contract management is timely, accurate and complete contractor personnel data. Collecting contractor personnel accountability data, that is both timely and accurate, is an arduous process complicated by many different factors. These factors include conflicting guidance at all levels of the government, a lack of a standardized personnel accounting processes, and dwindling resources and personnel to perform the mission.

Conflicting Guidance

Conflicting guidance attributing to the inaccuracy of contractor personnel accountability begins with the lack of understanding and a common definition used to track and account for contractors in reporting. DOD and the Army do not agree on the definition and types of contractors to capture and record personnel information. Joint Publication 1-0 and the Army's Field Manual 1-0 refer only to the term contractor. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (CAAF), defines numerous types of contracting personnel. Contingency contracting personnel and contractors deploying with the force are the two main groups of contractors on the battlefield within the instruction.⁷

Contingency contracting personnel are defense contractors, their employees and associated subcontractors who the U.S. authorizes to accompany U.S. military forces in areas designated by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).⁸ This category includes United States citizens, legal aliens, third country nationals and host nation citizens. These contractors are identified most notably with a common access card.

Contractors deploying with the force is a sub-category of contingency contractor personnel. This group also includes those employees specifically authorized to deploy, through a deployment center, and provide support to U.S. military forces in areas designated by the GCC. Contractors deploying with the force provide services directly to U.S. military forces and receive support similar to that which the government provides to civilians. Contractors deploying with the force does not include those who are host nation citizens or third country nationals that are hired within the theater of operations through local procurement methods.⁹

Subsequent guidance at the DOD level does not distinguish in the differences between contractors as in DODI 3020.41. Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum Class Deviation 2007-00010 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause 252.225-7040 refer to contractors only as CAAF. CAAF is a very broad and inclusive category of contractors that may include many more groups than the two previously mentioned.

When reporting the number of contractors within the theater of operations, which definition is followed? DODI 3020.41 requires that by name accountability be maintained for all contractors deploying with the force in a joint database.¹⁰ Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum Class Deviation 2007-00010 requires contractors to maintain CAAF employees' personnel data on U.S. citizens, U.S. legal aliens, third country nationals and host nation locals.¹¹ However, DOD allows two exclusions for entering contractor personnel data in a joint database. Contractors are not required to enter data on personnel hired under contracts that do not exceed \$25K and under 30 days, and embarked contractor personnel while afloat.¹² To confuse matters further, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Class Deviation 2007-00010 with DOD, the Department of State (DOS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allows different exclusions. In the MOU, while all three agencies agreed to use a joint database, the requirement is to capture contractor information for contracts that only last more than 14 days or valued at more than \$100,000.¹³

Compounding the contractor definition challenge that DOD and other government agencies face to gain contractor visibility is the nature of procuring and assigning contracts for execution. Numerous agencies in multiple locations have the authority to

award and manage contracts.¹⁴ Individual units, at the same base, may contract for like or similar services with the same or different contracting companies. These different organizations and agencies contracting for equivalent services compound the uncertainty for which contractors to count in the personnel accounting process. Contracting for linguists is one example of a mutually supporting contract that causes confusion when accounting for contractors. Clear guidance is paramount for all leaders and human resources support personnel involved to preclude the possibility of inaccurate accountability through redundant counting of the same contractor or elimination altogether of the contractor during the reporting process. Without a clear and coordinated definition, confusion on which contractors to track will remain a liability in the accountability process.

Adding to the confusion of contractor definitions is inconsistent and contradicting guidance prescribing the process and responsibility for collecting, managing and enforcing contractor personnel accountability starting with DOD and carrying through to the Department of the Army regulations and field manuals. This conflicting guidance pits the human resources managers against the logisticians and contractors for the responsibility to collect report and enforce accountability of contractors on the battlefield. While commanders and Joint and Army doctrine manuals place the responsibility for contractor accountability on the human resources staff element (J-1/G-1/S-1), DOD and Army guidance and regulations assign the responsibility and authority to enforce contractor personnel accountability on the battlefield to the logistics community (J-4/G-4/S-4). Personnel accountability includes all military personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors.¹⁵ The personnel accountability

process involves the capture and by name recording of detailed data on individuals to include rank or grade, arrival and departure dates, current location, special skills or codes and other pertinent data as necessary. Accountability also maintains a contractor's qualifications and deployment certifications.

Who then should be responsible for contractor personnel accountability on the battlefield? In accordance with joint doctrine, the J-1 is the responsible agent and accomplishes personnel accountability for the commander.¹⁶ Likewise, Army doctrine says that human resources managers are responsible for the accountability of contractors who deploy with the force, just as with military personnel and Department of the Army Civilians.¹⁷ It is illogical to hold the J-1/G-1/S-1's responsible for contractor accountability numbers in which they have no authority or means to enforce the input of contractor data. Yet, it is the human resources staff element's task to report daily the numbers of contractors to the commander.

DOD guidance is also unclear on a single agency for establishing accountability policy and guidance. DODI 3020.41 designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) to serve as the principle staff assistant of the instruction.¹⁸ The instruction also designates the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness with monitoring and management of the instruction.¹⁹ The instruction further assigns responsibility to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)), in coordination with the USD (AT&L), to establish procedures and maintain contractor accountability and relevant contract capability information.²⁰ Also, the USD (P&R) is given the responsibility

for the development of a web-based joint database of record for all CDF personnel, again in coordination with the USD (AT&L).²¹

Joint doctrine is no less ambiguous. The J-1 is responsible for developing contractor accountability policy, but the J-4 is responsible for developing and implementing CAAF accountability policy and procedures.²² Having two primary staff elements responsible for the same task promotes inefficiency through the duplication of efforts, in an already resource constrained environment, and leads to confusion for subordinate units. Joint doctrine also says the J-1 is responsible for establishing a standardized method of accountability, within the operational area, for all personnel in a deployed environment.²³ Further complicating who is the single focal point and lead for contractor accountability, the joint publications refer back to DODI 3020.41. The common belief in the logistics community is that they are in charge of contracts but not the people. The human resources community acknowledges the personnel accountability mission, but without the enforcement authority or capability, accuracy in the numbers contractor personnel is subject to those who oversee the contracts.

While the Army is proactive in updating and developing guidance and regulations to address the issues with accountability of contractor personnel on the battlefield, some that date back to 1999, current policy falls short and is no less confusing. In the Army, the logistics community remains the proponent for Army regulations and Field Manuals (FM) addressing CAAF on the battlefield. Army Regulation (AR) 715-9 governs CAAF. The proponent for AR 715-9 is the Army G-4.²⁴ The Army field manual that addresses contractors is FM 3-100.21, and the manual's proponent is the Combined Arms Support Command.²⁵ AR 715-9 was published in 1999 and FM 3-100.21 is dated January 2003.

The Army is working a new FM, FM 4-10 titled Commander's Guide to Contracting and Contracting Management, which upon publishing will replace FM 3-100.21.

As previously stated, the proponent for the regulation and manuals is the logistics community, but both designate the senior personnel staff officer as the responsible agent to set policy and guidance for and ensure accountability of contractors on the battlefield. At the DOD and DA, level there is a lack of emphasis and ownership of the accountability mission. The challenge that lies herein is that the senior personnel staff officer has neither the authority nor the means to enforce contractor accountability. The logistics community is the proponent for contracting policy and regulation, commands and controls the units responsible for contracting, and possesses the authority and means to enforce contractor accountability on the battlefield.

In an attempt to assign administrative oversight and accountability responsibilities for contractors, the Army has set policy stating that all Army-sponsored contractor employees shall be assigned to a military unit or installation.²⁶ While this concept seems practicable, this solution is not realistic in all situations. The regulation attempts to give the responsibility for contractor accountability to a commander and their G-1/S-1. In a deployed environment, a commander's priorities and mission sets dictate that the commander place their attention elsewhere. G-1/S-1's cannot waste valuable time and resources attempting to enforce accountability of contractors over whom they have no authority since the contractor is under no obligation to report their status to the G-1/S-1.

Uncertainty exists between all those involved on the accountability mission responsibilities and enforcement authority. The use of words like should, coordinate and

in conjunction with do not place responsibility on a single entity therefore allowing the collective to shed responsibility/accountability for the process. Current contractor accountability policy and guidance must be updated and definitive enough to reduce confusion and establish clear lanes of responsibility and enforcement for all involved to include the logistics and personnel communities as well as the contracting companies and contractors.

Lack of a Standardized Accountability Process and Database

Contributing to the conflicting guidance on the definitions of and responsibility for accountability of contractors, is the absence of a designated joint reception center and a standardized method of accountability in the CENTCOM area of operations promoting inconsistent collection of contractor data. Inconsistent collection leads to fragmented documentation of required data elements and redundancy of some data fields creating inefficiency and disparities among non-integrated systems. Data accuracy is critical to the personnel accountability process, and without it further complicates the accountability process.²⁷

Incomplete guidance from the CENTCOM J-1 adds to the inaccuracy and hodgepodge of contractor personnel data collection and reporting. One of the primary responsibilities of the J-1 is joint personnel training and tracking activities.²⁸ Within the operation area, the J-1 designates joint reception centers to receive individuals upon their arrival. A key function in both the activity and reception centers is gaining and maintaining accountability as individuals transit into and out of the operations area.

Paramount in gaining accountability at the joint reception center is a standardized accountability process. Another responsibility of the J-1 is establishing a standardized method of accountability for all personnel in a deployed environment.²⁹ After over 8

years of joint operations in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, neither a joint reception center nor a standardized method of accountability exists for personnel entering, departing and transiting throughout the area of operations.

The absence of a joint reception center and lack of accountability standardization causes numerous challenges when trying to account for contractor personnel. The result is contractors entering the CENTCOM theater via various aerial and sea ports of debarkation. Personnel accountability teams may or may not be present at the different air and sea ports that contractors use to enter the theater. At some ports, these teams may use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) to capture or validate a contractor's personnel record and others, depending on the military service, may use a very different personnel system. While entering, departing and transiting within a theater of operations, military service members, DOD civilians and contractor personnel are not tracked consistently and accurately.

In an endeavor to provide better accuracy of the numbers of contractors on the battlefield, the Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness designated SPOT as the database of record for all information on CAAF personnel.³⁰ Secretary of Defense Memorandum Class Deviation 2007-O0010 requires contractors to enter CAAF employees' personnel data into SPOT to include U.S. citizens, U.S. legal aliens, third country nationals and host nation locals.³¹ SPOT is a web-based system accessible from anywhere with an internet connection. AMC is the executive agent for SPOT and serves as the Army's program manager for the database. While DOD has named SPOT as the contractor database of record, data input into and enforcement of SPOT continues to have many shortcomings.

SPOT is the contractor database of record, but the Army's primary systems for personnel accountability of Soldiers, civilians and contractors in the CENTCOM theater is the Tactical Personnel System (TPS) and the Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS). DODI 3020.41 requires contractors to enter contractor personnel data in SPOT prior to deployment.³² The data fields requiring contractor input cover by-name accountability of contract personnel, minimum contract information, and the services provided or contract capability.

While DOD mandates SPOT's use, current Army guidance fails to assign responsibility for the management of the system.³³ Unless the Army assigns responsibility for the management of SPOT to the personnel community, human resources personnel accountability teams will continue to use the systems its Soldiers are trained on and familiar with to capture personnel data. SPOT will continue to be an afterthought for the personnel community in the accountability process.

The number of contractors within the area of operations is a required field on the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT).³⁴ SPOT is not programmed to generate an acceptable personnel report or feed another database that produces a JPERSTAT acceptable to the CENTCOM J-1. The current JPERSTAT requires manual input of the number of contractors onto the report. The SPOT programmers are making progress in integrating SPOT with other accountability databases to eliminate the manual input requirement, but a single deployed database of record for all service members, civilians, and contractors is not yet fielded.

Because no single responsible manager for SPOT exists and implementation guidance is not fully developed and disseminated, data entry and accuracy of contractor

accountability is suspect at best. A 2008 Army Audit found that 74% of deployed contract employees sampled had a record in SPOT.³⁵ The same audit revealed that only 26 percent of contract employee records reviewed in SPOT were accurate and complete with such information as contract number, company name and deployment status.³⁶ The challenge to overcome is how to capture personnel data on contractors entering theater via different ports and gaining accountability in SPOT.

In order to assist in the capture of contractor personnel accountability, the Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMS) is used as supporting equipment for SPOT. JAMMS captures a contractors movement through key life support and movement nodes, such as dining and medical facilities and transportation nodes.³⁷ Upon entering one of these key facilities or nodes, a contractor swipes or scans their common access card. If the contractor's personnel record is not present in SPOT, the scanning will load the contractors data and create a mini personnel record by pulling the contractors information from authoritative sources.³⁸ However, currently not at every location, JAMMS is available in dining facilities at major bases and transportation nodes throughout theater where contractors frequently travel to fulfill the terms of their contracts. JAMMS located at these different locations is an important factor in the ability to increase the accuracy of SPOT and contractor accountability. The reliability of JAMMS and SPOT allows DOD to track contractors use of facilities translating to accurate billing and budgeting.

In 2007, CENTCOM began to gather contractor personnel data via a quarterly census report.³⁹ The purpose of the census is to provide CENTCOM commanders greater visibility in the numbers of contractor personnel and aid in planning force

protection and life support.⁴⁰ The contracting companies self-report contractor data during the quarterly census period. Census contractor data assessment and enforcement is not routinely checked or enacted unless census teams notice obvious errors upon receipt of the data. Reported problems with the census data include duplicate reported numbers on contracts, incomplete data on host nation citizens, and subcontractor personnel numbers.

The logistics and human resources communities cannot perform their functions in support of contractor personnel efficiently and effectively without accurate contractor personnel accountability. Contractor support includes sustainment in basic life necessities such as feeding and billeting and other assistance for force protection and transportation within the theater of operations. AMC estimates the current inability to accurately account for contractor personnel costs \$43 million dollars a year paying for free meals for contractors who receive per diem allowance for food.⁴¹

The human resources community provides contractors with identification cards, postal and morale, welfare and recreation support, and assists in the casualty reporting process. Inaccurate contractor accountability hinders the value of the support provided. Incomplete data can cause a contractor to lose authorized identification card privileges. The common access card, used for identification, entitles the contractor to much of the support and or access required to fulfill the very service of the contract.

Casualty operations are the most critical area of human resources support affected by incomplete and inaccurate contractor data. Deployed contractor personnel are reported in the casualty section of the JPERSTAT.⁴² Without accurate contractor personnel data, the margin for error is greatly increased. Errors in casualty reporting of

contractors can have the same serious consequences and impacts as those experienced in the military.

Dwindling Resources to Perform the Accountability Mission

As contractor accountability issues have continued to increase over the past 5 years, the Army human resources support staffs, and their elements responsible for personnel accountability, underwent fundamental changes in business practices. Personnel transformation aligned human resources units with the logistics community under the war fighting sustainment function.⁴³ Theater level human resources support organizations modularized and changed force structure in support of the war fighter. In addition, to meet the growing need for contractor management on the battlefield the logistics community recently stood up the Army Contracting Command under the command and control of the Army Material Command (AMC).⁴⁴

Another restraint in the collection, accuracy, and enforcement of contractor accountability is the reduction in Army resources and authorizations of personnel. The Army serves as the DOD executive agent for all contracting matters in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁵ In 2005 during the Force Design Update (FDU) process, the Army's human resources community transformed reducing its support footprint on the battlefield to meet the Army Chief of Staff's guidance.⁴⁶ As part of transformation, the Adjutant General's Corps underwent Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR). PSDR eliminates the human resources command and control headquarters, above the major command unit level, and pushes the responsibility, resources and conduct of essential personnel services down to the brigade and battalion level S-1's.⁴⁷ In addition, PSDR places theater level support for postal, casualty and personnel accountability tasks under the command and control of the sustainment community.

The Army conducts personnel accountability with five-person personnel accountability teams located at the air and sea ports of embarkation and debarkation, and other locations, throughout the area of operations. In protracted operations, as the Army is currently in the CENTCOM theater, the human resources community cannot keep pace with current rotation cycles. United States Joint Forces Command approved a request to provide Air Force and Navy personnel in lieu of Army personnel to support and perform the personnel accountability mission. Because each service accounts for their personnel using different databases, the Air Force and Navy in lieu of personnel require training on Army specific systems to execute the mission. Those Army specific accountability systems include the Deployed Tactical Accountability System (DTAS), Tactical Personnel System (TPS) and the Defense Casualty Information Processing System (DCIPS) for reporting casualties. In fiscal year 2009 the Army's Adjutant General's Corps School trained approximately 45 Air Force personnel to perform the personnel accountability functions. In fiscal year 2010, the AG school is scheduled to train another 120 personnel consisting of both Air Force Airman and Navy Sailors.⁴⁸

To complicate matters further, reductions in authorizations of the human resources staff sections in the headquarters elements of the Division, Corps, and Army Service Component Commands, responsible for setting policy and enforcing standards of personnel accountability, are as high as 50%. In addition, during the latest holistic Brigade Combat Team review, the battalion human resources staff sections sustained cuts equal to one space per battalion. The cuts in authorizations were necessary to build capability in other units, staff elements and sections throughout the Army. The

number of personnel charged with the accountability mission and management of the personnel database decreased while the number of personnel to account for increased.

Army contracting personnel have seen a 600% increase in workload while the numbers of civilians and military in the contracting workforce is stagnant or declining.⁴⁹ As stated before, DODI 3020.41 requires contracting companies to enter contractor personnel data prior to deployment. The Contracting Officer Representative (COR) is the responsible agent for ensuring contract companies input the personnel data into SPOT. CORs are an integral part of contract management and ensuring contractor personnel accountability. The increase in workload has not seen an associated increase in civilians and military providing oversight to enforce the CORs responsibility and hold contracting companies accountable.

In an effort to combat the workload increase, the commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, better known as the Gansler Report, recommended the Army stand up an Army Contracting Command (ACC).⁵⁰ The report recommends the ACC be the single point for managing the status and readiness of the Army-wide contracting workforce.⁵¹ In response to the report, the Army activated the Army Contracting Command under AMC in March of 2008. Included in the ACC's mission is operations oversight of the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC).

The design of the ECC is to support commanders and joint forces in overseas operations and locations. In addition, the Army will grow its contracting forces in the active, National Guard and reserve components by over 900 authorizations.⁵² The Army will also establish a contracting warrant officer specialty that will add an additional 120

personnel.⁵³ While the Army's human resources community is losing personnel authorizations, the contracting community, underneath the logistics community, is gaining precious resources and authorizations to manage contracting operations.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Contract support is critical to the success of a military commander's overall mission. Contractors are able to provide expertise in specialized fields and services that the military does not possess. Reliance on contractor support also poses many challenges. One of the increasingly difficult challenges to overcome is contractor accountability. The accurate accountability of contractors is hampered by conflicting guidance from all levels of DOD and the Army, the absence of a standardized accountability process and force structure changes that have not kept pace with the increase in numbers of the contractors providing support on the battlefield. Contractor accountability needs solid direction and guidance from a single source and a serious issue in need of urgent attention. Commanders look to their human resources staff element for accountability of all personnel under their command. The human resources community, with a core function of personnel accountability for the entire force, should be the responsible agent for contractor accountability, but the logistic community, who is designated as the executive agent for the DOD mandated contractor database of record, has the authority and ability to enforce contractor accountability data input. Accuracy of contractor personnel accountability is not going to increase until the responsibility and authority for enforcement is in the hands of the human resources professionals. The human resources community has the experience and the knowledge to solve this challenge.

To ensure personnel accountability of contractors on the battlefield, the responsibility for collecting data and authority to enforce data input should reside with the human resources professionals. Before the J-1/G-1/S-1's assume sole responsibility for contractor accountability, there must be consensus among senior leadership, clear and consistent guidance throughout DOD and the Army and a resourced human resources staff element within the Army Contracting Command.

A meeting of the Under Secretaries of Defense for AT&L and P&R, the Secretary of the Army, the AMC Commander and the Army G-4 and G-1 is necessary to agree upon the human resources community as the single focal point and lead for contractor accountability. The logistics community can remain the executive agent for SPOT, but relinquish control of contractor personnel data fields within SPOT, to include method(s) of input, integration with human resources databases, and required personnel data fields to the Army G-1.

After agreeing to a single lead for contractor accountability, the next step is elimination of the conflicting guidance. Achieving great strides in increasing the efficiency and accuracy of contractor accountability requires cohesive guidance and direction from the top. This new guidance requires enforceable penalties for those contractors and contracting companies not adhering to the requirements. New guidance must include standardized accountability methods, development of a single integrated personnel database and designation of a JRC in a deployed environment. This guidance will include the detail necessary to capture contractor personnel data on those designated for accountability and reduce the chance of missing data or double counting. Essential to successful operation of standardized accountability is a common

understandable definition of the types of contractors on which to collect personnel data and the time and location for collection.

Another key to successful contractor personnel accountability is a common personnel database of record. Current Army and DOD wide legacy systems lack the ability for a single integrated database to track and maintain personnel in a deployed theater.⁵⁴ Redundant data entry into numerous non-integrated systems results in inefficiency and inaccurate data records. In 1995, the Secretary of Defense convened the Defense Services Task Force on Military Information Management to devise a strategy for integrating the multiple service unique military personnel systems.⁵⁵ The task force recommended the creation of a single all service fully integrated human resources system, later to name the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). DIMHRS was sold as one system for all services, all components and to include civilians and contractors. Fifteen years later, in the President's Fiscal Year 2011 DOD budget, all funding for DIMHRS is to cease because the system is not delivering a joint integrated personnel and military pay database.⁵⁶

Equally important to the establishment of standardized accountability methods and a single integrated database of record for all military, civilian and contractor personnel is critical to gaining, maintaining and managing contractor personnel accountability on the battlefield is the designation of a JRC in the CENTCOM theater of operations. Designation of a JRC requires all service members, civilians and contractors to transit through a single aerial or sea port when entering and departing theater, and is critical to gaining and maintaining accurate personnel accountability. Support and entitlements can be withheld if personnel do not process through the JRC.

The final step in increasing efficiency and accuracy of contractor personnel accountability is resourcing the human resources staff elements within the Army Contracting Command to perform the mission. Resourcing includes the means and authority to enforce contractor data collection and accountability teams, starting at the battalion level through the Contracting Support Brigade to the ACC, to input data and monitor the process. Relying on contracting officer representatives for oversight and management and contracting companies for contractor accountability and personnel data input into SPOT has proven unsuccessful to date.

Until the previously mentioned recommendations are in place, the human resources community should not accept sole responsibility for contractor personnel accountability. Human resources personnel are not currently involved, nor should they be, in the contracting process. However, they must be involved in contractor accountability for commanders to have faith in the numbers of contractors reported on the battlefield.

Endnotes

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