

NATO'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH – A CHALLENGE FOR CULTURAL TRAINING

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**NATO'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH – A CHALLENGE FOR CULTURAL
TRAINING**

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper discusses the importance of leadership in the new strategic environment faced by the Allies after the end of Cold War. It examines the current security threats and the increasing set of demands and presents the current opinion regarding to the role and missions for NATO in the post conflict reconstruction. It identifies the need for a cultural training doctrine as a solution for enhancing the unity of effort for the current and future missions.

NATO'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH – A CHALLENGE FOR CULTURAL TRAINING

B.H. Liddell Hart advised us to follow the Otto von Bismarck's saying that "fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others' experience." The "regular" soldier cannot regularly practice his profession. For even the best of peace time training is more "theoretical" than "practical" experience. But Bismarck's aphorism throws a different and more encouraging light on the problem. It helps us to realize that there are two forms of practical experience, direct and indirect, and of the two, indirect practical experience may be the more valuable because it is infinitely wider. Even in the most active military career, the scope and possibilities of direct experience are extremely limited.¹

Imagine the daily challenges for an infantry battalion commander deployed somewhere in the Middle East, after four to six months of training in support of ongoing multinational operations. Internal to the coalition or alliance he is dealing with constantly rebalancing synergy of the three lines of operations: security, governance, reconstruction and development operations, with a command and control relationships amongst different nations headquarters based on coordination authority, and with different sets of services and joint culture each affected by various national caveats and language barriers.

Externally, his subordinate leaders are dealing with the "non-conventional" stability and support tasks such as negotiation with local leaders over future reconstruction projects, assisting local police with law enforcement or working with various nongovernmental organizations on social projects designed to reinvigorate the

trust of local population in the local government. He does not have many right tools in his rucksack to help him to build the desired unity of effort. This new soldier-diplomat can count only on his solid warrior ethos, on the level of interoperability within the alliance pushed to commonality, and the leader's ability to manage the diversity of this multicultural environment.

After eight years of war, coalition partners using very different national doctrines will obviously have problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical interoperability. Forces operating on different fundamental principles will lack unity of effort, and could even work at cross-purposes. Finding ways to harmonize doctrine is therefore an important means to ensure improved coalition operations.

An Evolving Strategic Context

The threats, risks and challenges now faced by the Allies are very different from those of the Cold War. NATO no longer perceives large – scale conventional military threats to Alliance territory. Instead, today's security threats include instability, ethnic and religious based rivalries, competition for natural resources, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, genocide, mass migration, organized crime, cyber attacks and terrorism.

This requires coping with an ever increasing set of demands and with new types of operations. That is why Allies are committed to pursuing the transformation of their forces: current and future operations will continue to require agile and interoperable, well-trained and well-led forces, forces that are modern, deployable, sustainable and available to undertake demanding operations far from home bases. This also places a premium on close coordination and cooperation among international organizations and

of particular importance to NATO is its relationship with the United Nations and the European Union.²

The idea of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) has gained influence in the recent past. In *The Changing Face of War: into the Fourth Generation*,³ William Lind describes 4GW as widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefield or fronts. The distinction between civilian and military may disappear. Action will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.⁴ The author also describes two possible drivers of 4GW that future adversaries will employ: technology driven and idea driven. Technology driven 4GW is characterized by small, highly mobile elements composed of very intelligent soldiers armed with high-technological weapons that may range over wide areas seeking critical targets.⁵ Idea driven 4GW is characterized by the emergence of non-Western cultural traditions which the author purports to be visible in today's terrorism. Today's successful terrorists operate on broad mission orders down to the individual level and use our society's greatest strength, our freedom and openness, against us.⁶

Frank Hoffman and General James Mattis describe the concept of a "hybrid war" in their article, *Future Warfare: the Rise of Hybrid Wars*.⁷ Similar to the old military saying that the enemy has a vote, the authors remind us that the enemy has both the intent and capacity to react creatively. Hybrid warfare is a combination of both conventional and irregular warfare. As one example, in hybrid war the landpower professional could expect to simultaneously operate in a failing state environment,

combating an ideologically motivated adversary displaced from their homes while providing humanitarian aid to refugees. The key to understanding hybrid war is that the adversary may not fully dispense with conventionally style attacks; in fact, the adversary may choose conventional style attacks against perceived weakness while simultaneously employing terrorist or irregular warfare style attacks throughout or outside the battle space against critical infrastructure.⁸ General Charles Krulak, the former Commandant of Marine Corps, referred to the “three block war” in various articles and speeches over the years.⁹ This reference is a perfect example on the complex nature of the hybrid fight. On one block the soldier is involved in a fierce firefight, the next block the soldier is handing out humanitarian assistance, while on the third block the soldier is negotiating to keep warring factions apart. Hoffman argues that landpower professionals of the future will also operating on a Fourth block: a block characterized by information warfare that is embedded in the three previously mentioned blocks.¹⁰

Rapid rotation (every four to nine months) of national contingents of intervention forces can generate problems and occasionally these rotations arouse the mistrust of the local population, who do not understand the need for such rotation but are affected by the constraints that they impose. In his article *Cross-Culture Management: Worker in a Multicultural Environment*, Zdenka Konecna describes the process of assimilation with a foreign culture by four phases: observation, collision, consolidation and departure. According to the author, especially the second phase, so-called collision phase, is the most critical one. Usually, the first phase, observation, starts without serious problems because everything is prearranged and a great attention is paid by the accepting

organization. But during the next two to six months, the first problems occur: the new colleagues are not as reliable in some situation as they originally seemed to be. The worker continuously develops a critical attitude towards the foreign environment, experiencing uncertainty, decrease of self confidence, especially because the expectancy and demands on his or her efficiency are simultaneously increasing. Stressful situations, the intensity of which depends on how strongly the worker perceives the cultural departure, may occur.¹¹

Interoperability problems, originally perceived by military planners as technical and tactical concerns, may occur at strategic and operational levels of warfare. However, interoperability may also be affected by disagreement over the political objectives of military operations. Furthermore, during NATO's force generation process, troop-contributing nations may place declared "caveats" over their forces. These caveats can restrict forces' operational capacity according to such factors as geography, logistics, time, rules of engagement, or command status. These caveats can also have a particularly detrimental effect on commander's planning and flexibility.¹²

Knowledge of the terrain is often incomplete or superficial, especially when intervention forces are dealing with rival parties whose psychological antagonism is deeply rooted in the distant past. Tactical mastery of the terrain and an understanding of climatology, economic exchanges, and the various socio-political and ethno-religious cultures resulting from local experience require constant vigilance and long term commitment. The restoration of a climate of confidence and hope often depends on convincing economic results and a minimum level of socio-economic predictability, and these developments take time.

All these political and military constraints must be tackled before a reconstruction operation can start, and it is essential to foster dialogue and trust between the battered and bruised parties, who are forced to deal with their differences and frustrations in a framework imposed and regulated by external authorities. The right mix of military force, political training and socio-economic legitimacy is required. As always in politico-military affairs, material assets need to be carefully combined with human resources.¹³

Different languages within a multinational force can present a real challenge to the unity of effort. Language content is conveyed by word choice, mannerism, and other means, with information lost, miscommunications, and misunderstandings having a negative effect on operations. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity – the result of language, values, societal norms, history, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation. Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems the commander must resolve or mitigate. Often, the commander will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.¹⁴

Planning information operations to support multinational operation is more difficult because of complex approval and security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers. The

size, composition, and mission of the multinational force, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how multinational operation is planned.¹⁵

NATO's Comprehensive Approach – Evolution of Concept

International conflicts since the early 1990s have shown that military operations are just one aspect of stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR). PCR incorporates military and civilian tasks across five distinct areas:

- Providing security, including military and policing functions
- Delivering essential services i.e. water, electricity, health services
- Creating political structures i.e. writing a constitution, electoral system
- Creating an economic infrastructure
- Facilitating reconciliation between formerly fighting groups

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not only highlighted the need for comprehensive civil – military approach to PCR: they have also drawn unprecedented political attention to the issue. This opens a window of opportunity for a major institutional change.¹⁶

Prior to the 1990s, few anticipated that post-conflict reconstruction would become one of the most serious, lasting challenges of post-Cold War military engagements. There was little planning, training or even knowledge of who specialized in it. This lack of preparation has led to the failure of nation-building attempts by both national and international organizations, and in some cases, their efforts have even exacerbated the problem.

The government of Denmark, with the support of NATO members, took the initiative in late 2004 to put the concept of comprehensive approach in the Alliance

agenda, initially under the heading *Concerted Planning and Action*. There was no defined frame of reference or codification of existing practices, especially regarding NATO's collaboration with other actors in the field. The aim was not to develop new, independent NATO capabilities but to strengthen the Alliance ability to engage with, not control of, other actors and to improve NATO mission in these areas.¹⁷

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders endorsed an Action plan for the development and implementation of NATO's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. Since then, NATO has been seeking to improve its own crisis-management instruments and to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities.¹⁸

PCR requires a combination of military and civilian expertise. No single organization has both of these capacities combined under one roof. The process of creating an effective cooperation interface between military and civilian personnel poses significant cultural and coordination challenges.

In autumn of 2009, Colonel Gian P. Gentile argued that the American Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine outlined in FM 3-24 provides only one way to counter insurgencies and deal with the world's instabilities, and that way is population centric counterinsurgency. The manual offers no other alternatives, no other strategies or methodologies. There is a short five-line paragraph in Chapter 5 that considers more limited options. That short paragraph should have been turned into half of the manual.¹⁹

As a result of the experience of a wide range of peace operations, more and more actors – both governmental and non-governmental – have recognized the need to integrate all available instruments in recent years. In this way, new coordinating bodies

have been created in many capitals and innovative cooperative procedures adopted on the ground to embrace the cross – governmental and multidisciplinary nature of the challenge.²⁰

Manjana Milkoreit gives her personal view that NATO could be the best equipped organization for four reasons:

First, NATO has mastered the military component of PCR: providing security and stability in crises regions after violent conflict.

Second, NATO is already testing a combined military approach with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. PRTs and a military – civilian NATO have essentially the same task: a comprehensive approach to reconstruction, drawing on both military and civilian expertise and capabilities. Developing NATO as the world's primary reconstruction organization builds and expands this civil – military cooperation.

Although operating within different military command structures, and emphasizing different aspects of activity and composition as determined by the local conditions and terrain, the core task of the PRTs are consistent across the network, and with NATO Operational Plan 10302: a PRT is a combination of international military and civilian personnel based in provincial areas of Afghanistan with the aim of extending the authority of the Afghan central government and helping to facilitate development and reconstruction, primarily by contributing to an improved security environment. PRTs also aim to support reform of the Afghan security sector (security sector reform) the demobilization and disarmament of militias, to building an accountable national army and national police force under democratic control, stamping out the drug trade, and building a legal system.²¹

Third, NATO's role as a regional defense alliance depends on permanent cooperation, communication, and joint planning between numerous military entities. This expertise would be vital in coordinating and managing diverse PCR networks. And NATO's recent focus on building partnerships with states and organizations bodes well for the creation of PCR networks not just on the military, but also on the civil – PCR side.

Fourth, NATO is redefining its purpose and mission. NATO needs to demonstrate its ability to adapt continuously to new challenges in 21st century military. Reshaping its mission, ambitions, and geographic reach by serving on a global rather than regional basis would build on NATO's strength. NATO is uniquely poised to add a tremendous amount of value relative to other national, regional and international organizations.²²

The coordination of the military and civilian effort should take place on both a national and an international scale. Both NATO and EU have a working practical knowledge of such cooperation. Nevertheless it needs to be internalized in the organizations and become a firm part of the planning and conduct of operations.

Joint planning of civilian and military efforts is an aspect of NATO's transformation with operational and transformational dimensions. Many of the steps needed to promote Comprehensive Approach are basic and uncomplicated. They include information sharing, promoting transparency, day – to – day contacts between actors building trust, speaking the same language in terms of understanding each other's "codes and cultures," sharing lessons learned, and using the best practices. In short, there is a need for common understanding and a more systematic approach, while taking into account - and respecting – the different roles, mandates and principles

of the actors involved. Concerted Planning and Action needs some form of interoperability if it is to become an integrated part of future multinational operations. However, there is currently little coordination of the civilian reconstruction efforts across provincial borders and no harmonization of the types of aid delivered.

While it is not possible to replicate national structures and concepts in multinational organizations like NATO, there is a need to address similar issues and develop solutions at a multilateral level. To date, however, the Alliance has primarily approached Concerted Planning and Action of Civilian and Military Activities in International Operations (CPA) on an ad-hoc basis. Useful procedures have, nevertheless, been developed in a pragmatic and incremental manner. Indeed, at the tactical level, there are several examples where peacekeeping forces operating in a specific geographic sector have been coordinating and planning with humanitarian, reconstruction and development agencies, often of the same nationality as the peacekeeping forces, to achieve local synergy. The national-led PRTs operating in Afghanistan are good current cases in point.

Moreover, the establishment of a PRT Steering Committee, which brings together representatives from the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force, the Afghan government, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, represents an ongoing attempt to adopt CPA approach to civil-military activities at the operational level. At the strategic level, a series of promising initiatives in NATO have also been proposed. Allied Command Transformation is seeking a “holistic approach” to operational planning. Allied Command Operations has put forward the idea of integrating NATO’s military response into a wider overall “collective strategy”

including non-military elements. NATO's Senior Civil Emergency planning Committee is considering how to develop a basic concept of operations to manage coordinated civil support to crisis-response operations.²³

Comprehensive Approach- A New Framework for Cultural Training

For the leaders operating in Stability and Support Operations, pre-deployment training should be focused on two dimensions: "outside the fences" to increase the ability to work with and win the hearts and minds of the people belonging to a different cultural system of values and customs, and "inside the fences" to understand the requirements of unity of effort and purpose between military allies and partners as well as between military coalition and other departments and agencies, developmental and humanitarian community and private sector representatives involved in NATO's "clear, hold, build" strategy.

According to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Manual, culture is a "web of meaning" shared by members of a particular society or group within a society. Culture is therefore:

- A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and with one another.
- Learned, through a process called enculturation.
- Shared by a member of a society; there is no "culture of one."
- Patterned, meaning that people in a society in ways forming definite, repeating patterns.
- Changeable, through social interactions between people and groups.
- Arbitrary, meaning that Soldiers and Marines should make no assumptions regarding what a society considers right and wrong, good and bad.

- Internalized, in the sense that is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as natural “by people within the society.”²⁴

Culture might also be described as an “operational code” that is valid for an entire group of people. Culture conditions the individual’s range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture also includes under what circumstances the “rules” shift and change. Perhaps most importantly, culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assesses what is important and unimportant, categorizes things, and deals with things that do not fit into existing categories.²⁵

In terms of levels of cultural capability, there are requirements that beside the cultural awareness, the personnel with duties specifically dealing with the local population, authorities or media should poses the level of cultural understanding, defined as intermediate knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their importance and impact, the ability to apply this knowledge, skill and attitude to unpredictable scenarios and contribute to analysis of the effect.²⁶

Soldiers will operate in and among the people, conducting operations in an increasingly complex and uncertain strategic security environment. In the past, separating noncombatants from the battlefield was the necessary step before engaging the enemies and seizing terrain. In the new battle space, fundamentally human in character, soldiers’ action will influence the hearts and minds of the people, having the population offering the perception of final success or failure of an operation.

Cross-cultural training will help soldiers reduce anxiety and stress when deployed to a new environment. Some describe the process similar to that of a lobster shedding

its protective shell as it grows. What emerges is a larger lobster with a new shell that is still the same inside. The same can be said for soldiers who live overseas and adapt to new surroundings- one sees the world differently because of the experiences but are still the same on the inside.²⁷

This process, called cultural adaptation or acculturation, helps to explain the four phases of “culture shock” an individual may experience. During the initial contact with a different culture, soldiers may experience a “honeymoon” phase where behaviors are restrained and non-aggressive. As the soldier continues to remain in contact with the different culture, a hostile or aggressive attitude may surface toward the “foreign culture” as the stresses of reconciling the cultural differences emerge. The stresses may become particularly acute when a soldier is operating in a combat environment. A common response to these stressors may include withdrawal and stereotyping of the host country. Finally, if the stressors do not cause withdrawal from the “foreign culture”, the soldier will likely adjust and develop coping strategies to include learning some of the language and becoming self-sufficient.²⁸

Commenting on the widely read *Small Wars Journal* blog, Major Ike Sallee, an infantry officer with two combat tours in Iraq, stated:

The army, if we want to remain a profession, is best served in adhering to core values, principles, and capabilities. If the core is strong...then we are able to transfer capability to other methods. If we are thrown into a condition requiring counterinsurgency tactics, we will be able to adapt because of our well-trained competencies.

The essential point and concern expressed by Major Sallee is that an army’s core capacity is to fight at every level of command. If it can do that, it can do almost anything.²⁹ In my opinion, the core capacity to fight covers just one phase of post conflict reconstruction. Security is the sine qua non condition of the stabilization and

reconstruction process- the thing without which nothing else can happen. But security cannot be simply imposed on an unwilling and desperate population. The social and political fabric of the country must be simultaneously and painstakingly rewoven, creating rule of law and legitimate institutions to transform or eliminate the roots and the perpetrators of conflict.³⁰

First, NATO must determine the military resources necessary to achieve initial stability and the return of essential services in the immediate wake of military operations. Initially, the military assets such as military police, civil-military cooperation units, construction engineers and military personnel can move into an area in the wake of conflict and provide public security and the most basic of services.

Multinational Operations

NATO military organizations at all levels must be able to prepare and conduct integrated military civil multinational missions, including co-equal organizational interface. Coalition exercises and training are crucial to ensuring common understanding of the different organizations' approach, culture and objectives. Another challenge is the task of communicating across dissimilar cultures. Just as NATO's militaries have cultural differences, so too each civilian organization has a unique culture.

In this respect, swift adaptation and unity of effort in a multinational operation could be achieved using a cultural understanding oriented pre-deployment training.

Welding together the elements of an alliance or coalition into an effective team, in addition to political acumen, patience and tact requires cultural sensitivity. The effect of previous war and operations on different nations' military culture may be manifest in

different attitudes to risk and decision making. Language and cultural differences may result in the incorrect interpretation of intent.³¹

Multinational unity of effort is greatly enhanced through standardization. The basic purpose of standardization programs is to achieve the closest practical cooperation among alliance or coalition partners through the efficient use of resources and the reduction of operational, logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational military operations.

Standardization is a four level process beginning with efforts for compatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with commonality. Alliances provide a forum to work towards standardization of national equipment, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures. Standardization is not an end in itself, but it does provide a framework for commanders and their staffs to use. Coalitions, however, are by definition created for a single purpose and usually (but not always) for finite lengths of time and, as such, are ad hoc arrangements. They may not provide commanders with the same commonality of aim or degree of organizational maturity as alliances.³²

In assigning missions, the commander must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. Among respect, personal, direct relationships and patience, knowledge of partners has an important role. Commanders and their staff should have an understanding of each member of the multinational force. Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner.³³

The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. This goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate and occasionally incompatible capabilities, rules of engagement, equipment, and procedures. In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest results in varying levels of commitment by alliance and coalition members. While some countries might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their country's forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles.³⁴ Factors that inhibit interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary defense information; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; differences in military organization, security, language doctrine and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting personalities.³⁵

In the preface of the Army-Marine Counterinsurgency Manual, General James Conway assesses that the capability of integrating culture in the military domain is not, in principle at odds with existing military doctrine. In preparing for military operations, there are standard considerations during the mission planning phase. These come under the rubric of METT-T: Mission, Enemy, Troops and support available, Terrain and weather, and Time.³⁶ In some cases, particularly in urban environments, METT-T becomes METT-TC, for Civilian considerations. In a world of COIN, all those things that add up to irregular and hybrid wars where "the population... becomes the objective" – METT-TC becomes most useful if we recast it slightly.³⁷ Additionally, Marines also consider MC- the "military culture" of forces against and alongside which they operate. The Irregular Warrior must therefore plan and operate while accounting for the whole spectrum of METT-TC-MC considerations.³⁸

In his essay, *Command in Afghanistan 2003-2005- 3 Key Lessons Learned*, LTG David Barno considers that three lessons pertaining to strategic and operational command in irregular warfare stand out. First, the central task is to focus on the big picture: strategy not tactics, winning not simple battles, but winning the war. Second, the vital importance of integrating the civil-military effort at the most senior levels was crucial to success. Finally, the essential task of communicating and building relationships of trust with key players of very different backgrounds was a prerequisite to effective results.³⁹

Role of Doctrine

Some nations possess doctrine and training programs with a full treatment of strategic, operational and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs smaller in both scope and capability to match their national goals and objectives. As a part of the effort to reform the process that began with the development of the current *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, General James Mattis recently issued a “Vision for Joint Concept Development.” The document recognizes three tiers of military knowledge: ‘*unofficial*’ *concepts* - ideas that are exploratory in nature, are less mature and do not carry the weight of Joint Operations Concepts (JOPSC), “*official*” *concepts*, a small number of mature concepts accepted into the JOPSC family of concepts which, if validated through experimentation, are transitioned into doctrine, and *Doctrine*, authoritative guidance that has been accepted by the institution, guides the current conduct of operations, and also influence force development.⁴⁰

Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, and execute operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Administrative Publication – 6,

“NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions,” defines doctrine as the “Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”⁴¹ The principles and tenets of doctrine take into account all of the basic elements of a military force: weapons and other systems, skill levels, experience and training, deployment and sustainment capabilities, organizational issues, C2 philosophy and issues, and command arrangements.

Doctrine is more than just words in a document- it provides substantial guidance to the army and others for an extended period of time. It influences force structure and organizational design, training, materiel development and acquisition, leadership and education, as well as soldiers’ concerns.⁴²

United Kingdom doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.⁴³

Conclusion

Meeting today’s security challenges requires a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. This calls for regular coordination, consultation and interactions among all actors involved. NATO has developed a set of pragmatic proposals aimed at promoting such a Comprehensive Approach to crises management by the International Community. Experience in Afghanistan and the Balkans has demonstrated the importance of contributing to the International Community’s Comprehensive Approach for the success of operations, which are increasingly of an integrating civilian-military character.⁴⁴

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

Developing a comprehensive approach to civil-military cooperation represents one of the major challenges facing the Alliance today. Well coordinated capabilities must be planned and exercised during integrated training. Best practices and lessons learned must update training and education programs to be understood and employed. They cannot be achieved through ad hoc methods. Thus far, as an alliance, we have not found the path to go beyond ad hoc. However, that has and continues to cost Allies in wasted resources and longer deployments.⁴⁵

LtG William Caldwell noted the need for a comprehensive approach as a solution that allows us to move beyond that unity of command to forge a unity of effort among the many diverse actors in this community. The comprehensive approach represents the greatest challenge NATO leaders will face in the next generation. NATO leaders must understand that military force, although necessary, will never be sufficient; that military force, in fact will win every battle engagement of which we are engaged in, but the military alone will never be able to win the peace. By forging the comprehensive approach to operations, NATO in fact gets at the very core of leader development for its military.⁴⁶

Knowledge of culture is one of the most important aspects in meeting the challenges of employing a comprehensive approach. Not only may people from different cultures behave in different ways, they may also think about the world in different ways.

To understand why they do what they do, we need to try to see their world in the way that they do. Enhancing cultural capability contributes to the success of operations through risk reduction and exploitation of opportunities, including the potential to influence behaviors and perceptions. It improves the ability to calculate and plan military outcomes, and leads to better informed strategic, operational and tactical decision-making by commanders and individuals of all ranks. Cultural capability can also enhance routine relations with friendly and neutral actors, including allies and partners.⁴⁷

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