

TOWARD A TWO-STATE SOLUTION: EXPANDING U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES

BY

COLONEL THOMAS J. KARDOS
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES**

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Colonel Thomas J Kardos
United States Army

Dr. Larry P. Goodson
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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Many contend that the inability to resolve "Final Status" issues is the primary cause for the continual failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. However, enduring violence between Palestinian militants and Israeli Defense Forces has interrupted the Peace Process more often than any other reason. Until the Palestinian government establishes complete authority over the use of force within the Palestinian territories, to include the containment of terrorism, Palestinian statehood will not be achieved. A unique political-military environment has emerged in which the Defense Department should serve as a leading element of the U.S. Two-State policy. The Department must expand Palestinian security assistance programs and develop a long-term plan to increase the counter-terrorism capacity and capability of Palestinian security forces. This paper examines the ongoing efforts of the United States Security Coordinator mission to assist Palestinian security force development. Recommendations are presented to enhance this program and prepare for future requirements.

TOWARD A TWO-STATE SOLUTION: EXPANDING U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES

Middle East conflict has been an enduring national security challenge since the region came to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy following World War II. More recently, attempts to secure lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians through a Two-State Solution¹ have been a centerpiece to U.S. diplomatic activity in the region. While this effort has consistently taken a comprehensive approach to resolve the conflict, a single obstacle has proven insurmountable in furthering this broad agenda – security.

The State Department is the lead foreign policy agency for the United States. In peacetime, the Defense Department administers programs to reinforce policy and diplomatic objectives and promote regional stability. Most often these activities are designed to increase the military capacity of foreign partners through training and materiel support, known as security assistance.

In times of crisis, conflict, and war, Defense Department activities become more prominent, often assuming a transitory leading role. These activities aim to ensure allied victory and degrade enemy capabilities in order to establish a sufficiently secure setting in which diplomacy can resume. While the Defense Department in no way determines the foreign policy the United States pursues, establishing security and stability is a fundamental provision for successful political resolution and is most effectively undertaken by the military.

However, how is this State Department-Defense Department, lead-support relationship altered when the unstable security environment exists between two governments ostensibly aligned to the United States and U.S. interests? What if U.S.

foreign policy goals include the requirement for both governments to succeed? This is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The United States concedes that an enduring, peaceful resolution to this interminable conflict will only be achieved through diplomatic agreement, consent, and mutual compromise between the two governments. Nonetheless, persistent violence has been perhaps the greatest obstacle to the Peace Process. Diplomatic efforts have been unable to educe sufficient security to allow either government to conclude an enduring political settlement.

This paper proposes that the United States must place a higher priority and devote more attention, effort, and resources to shape the Israeli-Palestinian security environment. Specifically, the Department of Defense must commit itself to a long-term approach to increase the capacity and capability of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) and institutions. This will require the State and Defense Departments to reexamine current statutes and restrictions, practices and priorities in order to develop programs best suited to this particular circumstance.

To place this proposal in context, this paper provides a brief historical overview of the Two-State concept. This summary highlights how security has emerged as the foundational element of the Two-State policy of the United States and underscores the critical role of DoD security assistance. Finally, current assistance programs for the Palestinian Security Forces are examined and recommendations are made to enhance these efforts.

This paper does not suggest a U.S. military intervention into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor is it a critique of past or present U.S. policy. Moreover, it does not presume that a more favorable security environment will automatically and ultimately guarantee a final conclusion to the political struggle.² Rather, it demonstrates that a unique political-military atmosphere has emerged in which it would be appropriate for DoD to serve as a leading element of foreign policy.

Security in the Context of the Two-State Solution

To understand why this approach makes sense, one must appreciate how events in recent decades have radically altered the context of the Peace Process and amplified the centrality of security to these changes. Differentiating security as the principal issue for U.S. efforts requires a general awareness of the contemporary advent of a credible Two-State Solution to this conflict.

Setting Conditions for Two States. While hostility and violence stained the region well prior to 1948, conflict between the recognized State of Israel and Arab countries began quite literally at the moment Israel declared its independence. For most, it might seem unfathomable that in the past 62 years an equitable, political compromise has not been reached, allowing for the creation of two independent states - one for Israelis and one for Palestinians. This protracted and sorrowful course can be ascribed to the absence of a principal component needed for any peace plan to succeed – a single authoritative organization within the Palestinian lands, that represents and protects the political, economic, societal, and security interests of the Palestinian people and recognizes the legitimacy of the State of Israel. Lacking this, there was little prospect for the much hoped-for peaceful division of British Mandate Palestine.

Well before the 1947 partition of the Mandate, the Jewish community in Palestine possessed all the ingredients necessary to make the transition to statehood. Politics was conducted through the Jewish Agency, founded in the 1920s and which became the Government of Israel.³ Economic and social affairs were largely represented by the labor organizations (histadrut)⁴ and the socialist agricultural networks (kibbutzim and moshavim),⁵ that later became Israel's modern economic and union systems. Security was provided by local militias, as well as more conventional military organizations (such as Haganah Bet), which were united in 1948 to form the modern-day Israeli Defense Forces.⁶

Conversely, following the partition, the Palestinian people resided in areas that were neither economically viable nor geographically suited for national governance or defense. At the conclusion of the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, Palestinian local government, economy, and society were further fractured. Under the terms of the peace treaty, Palestinian territories were partitioned yet again. The State of Israel acquired additional territory, as did Jordan and Egypt.

Palestinian Arabs within Israel acquiesced to Jewish regulation or were forced to relocate.⁷ Western Palestine became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Lands east of the Jordan River were incorporated into Transjordan and Palestinian Arabs were granted Jordanian citizenship. Lands west of the Jordan were annexed under Jordanian administrative control and became known simply as the West Bank.⁸ As part of the cease-fire agreement, Israel consented to an Egyptian military presence in southwest Palestine, known as the Gaza Strip.⁹ After 1949, the name Palestine could no longer be found on the maps of any of the three countries.¹⁰

Israel and the surrounding Arab nations went to war again in 1956, 1967, and once more in 1973. These wars resulted in the expulsion of both Jordan and Egypt from their Palestinian landholdings. The Israeli government and military occupied and established administrative and security control for both the West Bank and Gaza. By 1973, not a single element existed from which a Palestinian State could be formed.¹¹

Nonetheless, events came to pass in the period following these conflicts that renewed the prospect of Palestinian statehood. In 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO – the Palestinian “government in exile” located in Tunisia) was designated the sole, legitimate representative of Palestinians, wherever they lived.¹² In 1977, the Palestinian National Council (PNC – the political arm of the PLO) called for an “independent national state in any part of Palestine;” implicitly accepting that Palestinian statehood was not mutually exclusive of the State of Israel.¹³ In conformity with the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords, Egypt relinquished authority over the Gaza Strip,¹⁴ leaving the fate of Palestinian autonomy as a matter for future negotiations. Similarly, the Government of Jordan renounced jurisdiction of all Palestinian lands and peoples in the West Bank in 1988,¹⁵ thereby removing itself from direct deliberation regarding Palestinian statehood. Later that year, the PNC declared independence for the Palestinian state and accepted the specifications of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, thereby explicitly recognizing the Israeli State.¹⁶

As a result of the 1994 Oslo Accords, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA – more commonly known as the Palestinian Authority (PA)) was created to serve as the local Palestinian government within the Occupied Palestinian Territories.¹⁷ Later that year, Israel allowed PLO Chairman and PA President Yasser Arafat and the PA to enter

the Occupied Territories as the interim governing body until a permanent government could be created. Two years later, the PNC revised the PLO Charter, explicitly removing language that had previously questioned Israel's legitimacy.¹⁸

Thus 1996, it would appear as though the Palestinians had crossed significant hurdles toward statehood. In the PLO, they possessed a single authoritative institution. The PA was their internationally recognized local governing body. The Palestinian national charter and policy conceded Israeli sovereignty. Yet, to this day Palestinians do not hold autonomy over their economy, society, and security.

Breakdown on the Road to Two States. Many argue that failure to resolve "Final Status" issues is the primary reason for the breakdown of the Peace Process and prevents the emergence of an independent Palestinian state. Resolution of Israeli-Palestinian borders, the rights of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, disposition of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and equitable use of water must and will be part of any final peace agreement. However, it is not these issues in and of themselves that have suspended the Peace Process. To presume it is simply the intractability of Palestinians and Israelis to address "final status" issues would be to ignore substantial peace agreements and initiatives of the past two decades, particularly the two Oslo Accords and the 2003 Road Map for Peace.

These peace agreements were never intended to conclusively resolve each aspect of "final status," but simply outlined an incremental agenda to transition Occupied Palestine to statehood. This approach was agreed upon by both parties and set forth a pragmatic and gradual evolution toward Palestinian autonomy. The failure to

maintain a secure environment during the implementation of these plans ended each endeavor.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir once stated that: “Security takes precedence over peace.”¹⁹ Not much has changed in the 25 years since. From the Israeli perspective, defining and addressing the security threat is fairly straightforward. Violence emanates from armed militants within Palestinian areas and must be contained with military force. Control of the Palestinian government, citizens, economy, and land by the Israeli Defense Forces and territorial authorities²⁰ is a necessary tool. Through the occupation, Israel is able to preserve an acceptable level of security.

The Israeli government is apprehensive that increased Palestinian autonomy through concessions to the Peace Process undermines Israel’s primary instrument for maintaining control and carries the genuine risk of worsening security. Whereas the need to coerce Palestinian compliance to this security regime is objectionable, there is scarce incentive to hazard any far-reaching adjustments for the time being.

From the perspective of the Palestinian militants, Israel wages political, economic, and social warfare through the occupation, in order to proscribe Palestinian sovereignty. To many militants, the very existence of a Jewish state on Arab soil is intolerable. Unable to compete proportionally with Israel’s considerable resources, these terrorists resort to the use of violence as the means to bring about the destruction of Israel and achieve statehood.

The Oslo Accords, Road Map for Peace, and U.S. policy specify that security must be addressed first and foremost for Israeli-Palestinian relations to improve. Security entails not only the cessation of violence between Israeli and Palestinian

security forces (which has already been achieved), but also a willingness on the part of the PA government to eradicate violent rejectionist elements within Palestinian territories (such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)). Security requires that prepared and capable Palestinian security forces prevent external agents seeking the destruction of the Israeli State (such as Hizbollah) from entering and using Palestinian lands as staging grounds for attack.

U.S. Involvement Is Critical to Shaping the Israeli-Palestinian Security

Environment. Although a meaningful peace can only occur as a matter of consent and compromise between the two governments, U.S. involvement is singularly important for several reasons. As the implicit underwriter of Israeli regional security, only the United States is in the position to provide the Israeli government with sufficient inducements to accept the risk of increasing the capability of the Palestinian security forces. For Palestinians, it is the U.S. willingness to work toward their statehood, along with our ability to persuade Israel to take these risks, which creates the need for this partnership.²¹ The state of affairs between Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States is, as one senior military officer described, a careful balance between “Israeli caution,” “Palestinian impatience,” and “hope;” in other words – Security, Statehood, and Trust.²²

U.S. Assistance to Palestinian Security Forces and the Road Map for Peace

Prior to the Oslo Accords, the United States provided no overt assistance to the government of Yasser Arafat and the PLO.²³ In 1993, with the creation of the Palestinian Authority, the United States initiated programs to transform Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and other security and intelligence organizations into a single internal security force to conduct police and counter-terrorism operations.²⁴ Through 1995, the United States provided nearly \$5 million to this effort,²⁵ but relied primarily on

regional and European nations to supply the majority of the resources and all security force training.²⁶ In 1996, in light of increasing Palestinian violence against Israel, President Clinton authorized U.S. agencies to provide direct aid to assist in restoring stability and subduing terrorist groups.²⁷ For the next several years, relative calm returned.

In March 2003, a multinational group known as the Quartet, consisting of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, endorsed the “Road Map for Peace” and began to solicit international assistance to fulfill its provisions. Unlike preceding peace plans, the Road Map was brief and concise. It included tightly-phased sets of “performance-based” and “goals-driven” objectives.²⁸ The plan called for broad-ranging support to reorganize and reform Palestinian institutions across the government and ambitiously set 2005 as the year to conclude a final status agreement and put an end to the conflict. Additionally, the Road Map stipulated support from the international community and specified the responsibilities for countries providing donor assistance.

During a meeting in early 2005, the Quartet reviewed performance benchmarks outlined in the Road Map, as well as the previous commitments made by leading donor nations. The Quartet gave scrupulous attention to the following excerpts from the Road Map: “Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training, and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (United States-Egypt-Jordan).” and, “Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation ... including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.”²⁹

Conspicuously, in early 2005 there was no U.S. effort to rebuild and train Palestinian security forces, nor were any U.S. security officials designated to conduct senior leader meetings. Within days, the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) was created and the Defense Department was given the mission.

Department of Defense Assistance to Palestinian Security Reform and Training. In March 2005, the USSC was established at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, and given the mission to “coordinate international donations and mobilize resources toward restructuring and properly training a single Palestinian security force.”³⁰ Created through a joint Memorandum of Agreement between several U.S. agencies, the USSC operated under the authority and funding of the State Department.³¹ Initially led by Lieutenant General William “Kip” Ward, the USSC served as liaison between the Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Defense and Interior.

From March to December 2005, the USSC:

- facilitated the transfer of the Gaza Strip security mission to PA Security Forces (PASF) following the final withdrawal of Israeli settlers;³²
- coordinated the transfer of \$2.3 million worth of non-lethal aid to the PASF, including vehicles, radios, uniforms, and equipment;³³
- participated in negotiations concerning the Agreement of Movement and Access for Palestinian travel and commerce between Gaza and the West Bank;³⁴ and
- organized three international donor conferences with European and Arab counterparts to increase funding and reduce duplication of efforts; and,

completed the first in-depth analysis of the status and future requirements for PASF reform and training.

The most important accomplishment during this period, however, was the considerable trust and confidence built between the Israelis, Palestinians, USSC team, European allies, and neighboring Arab countries. Under the auspices of a European monitoring mission, Israeli and Palestinian security units co-occupied border and immigration control points and a joint command center to manage security, civilian movement, and commercial traffic from Egypt into Gaza, as well as from Gaza to the West Bank. Not a single incident of violence between Israelis and Palestinians occurred during the Israeli withdrawal from the settlements in Gaza. Israeli customs officials expedited the release of backlogged international security assistance equipment donations to the Palestinian Authority, as did the Government of Egypt. Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, Jordanian, U.S., and European security officials met on numerous occasions to share information and confer on measures to increase border controls. Finally, the Palestinian Interior Ministry provided unprecedented access to security force personnel and pay records to guide international security sector reform efforts.

In December 2005, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton was appointed as the new Coordinator and brought revised instructions “to professionalize and consolidate the PA forces and coordinat(e) their activity with Israeli officials pursuant to both sides’ obligations under the 2003” Road Map.³⁵ Using the Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC - the same facility the United States had used to train Iraqi

police until 2007³⁶) outside Amman, a 400-man Presidential Guard (PG) battalion was made ready to assume security duties at the Gaza Border crossing points into Israel.³⁷

Recognizing that tactical unit training would not produce an enduring effect on Palestinian security institutions, General Dayton expanded the USSC mission beyond training assistance. He initiated programs to reform and build the organizational capacity of the MOI, educate senior Palestinian security leaders, and improve security and training infrastructure throughout the West Bank.³⁸ With this expanded undertaking, the USSC secured additional personnel and acquired a new headquarters adjacent to the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem.³⁹

The USSC team currently consists of 45 persons, including 16 DoD service members and civilians, and 29 military representatives from Great Britain (8), Canada (20), and Turkey (1).⁴⁰ Twenty-two contracted law enforcement experts provide Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to oversee the JIPTC training program. A 7-man security sector reform team provides on-site training and mentorship within the MOI's Strategic Planning Division (SPD), which administers PASF recruiting, force management, and operational planning and deployment.⁴¹

Although never allocated an independent assistance budget, the USSC secured reprogrammed and appropriated funds, primarily through the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program.⁴² Over the past four years, the USSC received: \$86.4 million (FY2007); \$75 million (FY2008);⁴³ \$184 million (FY2009); and, \$100 million (FY2010). This money funded training assistance programs, non-lethal equipment, infrastructure construction, Ministry of the Interior reform, and administrative costs.⁴⁴

As of December 2009, four PASF battalions (one PG and three National Security Forces) have completed the 19-week JIPTC training course, with the goal of creating 10 National Security Force battalions for deployment in each of the West Bank governorates.⁴⁵ The intent is for these NSF “gendarmerie-style” security battalions to gradually assume responsibility for security throughout West Bank from Israeli Defense Forces.⁴⁶ The withdrawal of the IDF from around Palestinian cities and towns, as well as a gradual relaxation of the occupation regime, will have a pronounced effect on the West Bank economy and society. The visible presence of Palestinian security units should increase Palestinian confidence in the PA government and may begin to erode existing tolerance and support for terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and PIJ. The British contingent of the USSC in Ramallah works to improve the capacity, capability, and organization of the Palestinian Civil Defense (CD). The CD is the MOI’s first-responder branch and provides civilian emergency medical, ambulance, and fire department capability.⁴⁷

The USSC coordinated construction of a Presidential Guard training college and an NSF training facility and barracks in Jericho. The intent is to expand the NSF facility to accommodate Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) training as well. Construction is complete on an NSF barracks in Jenin and more barracks are planned for other towns in the West Bank.⁴⁸

During the past three years, newly trained and equipped PASF units operated within the West Bank without external assistance. In late 2007, the PG conducted a series of operations to contain violence against Israelis and target illegal militias. In 2008 and 2009, NSF battalions carried out active security missions in the West Bank

towns of Nablus, Jenin, Hebron, and Bethlehem, focusing on law and order, patrolling, and counter-smuggling.⁴⁹ Despite widespread demonstrations during the 2008-2009 Israeli incursion into Gaza, NSF units maintained order and prevented civil disturbance throughout the West Bank.⁵⁰ The most striking aspect of these operations was the tremendous level of communication, cooperation, and coordination between the PASF and the IDF.⁵¹

Considerations for the Future of the United States Security Coordinator Mission

In partnership with the Palestinians and the Israelis, the USSC has embarked upon an unprecedented course. Never before has the United States so intently and directly taken action to address the security challenges faced by the Palestinian government. The efforts of the USSC have demonstrated that a long-term commitment to Palestinian security can make a difference. The consolidation and training of Palestinian security forces has now been institutionalized and Israeli and Palestinian security forces have resumed on-the-ground coordination for the first time since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000.

However, the scope of the current program is insufficient to advance security to a level that will allow the Israeli government to completely dismantle the security regime within the West Bank and around the Gaza Strip. Until President Abbas and the PA have complete authority over the use of force within the Palestinian territories, to include the containment of terrorist militant groups, Palestinian statehood will not be achieved.

The following sections outline measures that DoD and the broader U.S. government should take to enhance the current program and prepare for future requirements. Throughout the five years since the USSC was formed, many recommendations have been made to improve the capability of the mission. The

recommendations presented below provide a deeper analysis into some of these ideas and offer new concepts as well.⁵²

The USSC as a Lead Agent for Palestinian Security Sector Reform. Several of the recommendations below suggest that the USSC should serve as a lead agent within the U.S. and international effort. Within the context of this paper, a lead agent's authority is implicit and is not synonymous with authoritative command, as one would find in a military unit. The goal of lead agency is to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is defined as: "coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily from the same command or organization."⁵³ Unity of effort is achieved through the common agreement of goals and priorities, and does not confer upon the lead agent the authority to dictate the actions of other organizations.

Recommendations for the Near-term

The level of assistance provided within the current USSC plan to train and equip ten NSF "gendarmerie-style" security battalions, improve security infrastructure, and assist the reform efforts within the PA Ministry of the Interior is appropriate. To increase the scale of this program at the present time would likely exceed the ability of the MOI to manage and sustain. Therefore, near-term improvements to the USSC should focus on institutionalizing the mission and preparing for expanded future requirements.

Recommendation: Personnel Management. The Coordinator (chief of the USSC, currently LTG Dayton) should have a DoD-recognized Joint Manning Document (JMD) that includes the specifications of service, rank, and skill set.

Personnel management within the USSC is based upon an interagency memorandum that limits the size of the U.S. contingent to 16 persons. Any temporary or permanent changes to this number must be coordinated and approved by the

signatories to the establishing memorandum. This procedure limits the ability of the Coordinator to rapidly adapt the team's personnel strength and competencies to meet the needs of the mission. If properly developed, it would confirm the requirement for regional, language, training assistance, and intelligence expertise and the responsibility for the Services to train and prepare service members prior to their assignment.

Recommendation: Organization. In coordination with the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, DoD should establish a Defense Attaché's Office (DATT) and an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC).

The USSC conducts activities within one of the most complex operational environments. DATTs serve several invaluable roles. They develop a deep understanding of the operational environment that can only be achieved through direct personal experience in the country. Through standardized reporting, they ensure that departments and agencies within DoD have access to this knowledge. They are trained to evaluate changes within the operational environment and would be able to monitor the progress made by Palestinian forces and security developments within the Occupied Territories.

ODCs are manned by personnel who are trained to coordinate security assistance programs, arrange equipment transfers to partner nations, and monitor the use of that equipment. This is particularly complicated for the USSC in that all these activities must be coordinated through the Israeli government. A permanent ODC in Jerusalem provide a cadre of experts in training assistance who could develop the long-term relationships with their Israeli counterparts and make this job much easier.

DATTs and ODCs are typically established within the embassies of recognized countries. However, due to the importance of Palestinian security assistance and the long-term vision and commitment by the United States, DoD should make the investment to establish these two organizations as soon as possible.

Recommendation: Funding. The USSC should be authorized a dedicated budget from DoD. Palestinian Security Sector Reform is a long-term obligation that will take many years to accomplish. For the Palestinian security force to achieve the operational capability it will need, the USSC need to plan and program resources well in advance. The year-to-year funding currently provided through the State Department is not adequate to serve this purpose, nor is it flexible or robust enough to respond to significant changes should they arise.

This dedicated budget should have the same provisions offered to other high priority missions (such as the Iraq Stability Support Fund). Most valuable of these provisions are the ability to spend appropriated funds over several budget years and the authority to use funds to support non-military security organizations. Multi-year funding would provide the flexibility to adjust programs to the rate that Palestinian security forces training progresses. The ability to fund civil security forces would allow the USSC to continue to train the NSF should they take on law enforcement tasks and the ability to train PA civil police if they begin to work in close concert with the NSF.

Recommendation: Travel and Coordination Authority for USSC Members. The Coordinator should be given the authority to establish travel regulations that best support the unique needs of the USSC mission. The USSC should be augmented with a dedicated detachment to provide security during movement within the West Bank. The

Coordinator, and USSC members as the Coordinator directs, should be authorized to meet with both military and civilian officials within both the Israeli and Palestinian governments and determine where these meetings should take place.

The USSC currently operates under the authority of the State Department. All travel within the West Bank must be scheduled and approved by the Consulate well in advance and is subject to the availability of State Department security personnel. Palestinians cannot easily or regularly travel to Jerusalem; therefore the USSC must have the flexibility to travel to the West Bank when requested by the Palestinian leadership. The inability of the USSC to respond quickly does not convey the level of commitment or trust the Palestinians assume of the United States.

The USSC is restricted from meeting with non-military government officials from either government without a State Department representative present, nor can meetings be held with Israeli officials in or along the boundary of the West Bank. The USSC gains significant attention from officials within both the Israeli and Palestinian governments. Provided that USSC members do not discuss matters outside their immediate authority and do not make commitments on behalf of the U.S. government, the non-military meeting restriction is not needed. The West Bank restriction has some validity. This is a standing U.S. policy to ensure that the United States does not appear to be complicit with the Israeli occupation. While this makes sense from a political perspective, it complicates the Coordinator's ability to gain an appreciation of "ground truth" from the Israeli perspective. In the future, the United States will solicit the Israelis to ease Palestinian travel within the West Bank. Without the ability to understand the IDF ground commander's perspective, our requests will appear uninformed. While the

authority for West Bank meetings must be severely limited, it should be left to the discretion of the Coordinator.

Recommendation: Institutional. Based upon the previous recommendations regarding personnel management, organization, funding, and authorities, the Department of Defense should consider reestablishing the USSC as a Joint Task Force (JTF).

Establishing a JTF would alleviate most of the issues mentioned above, without counteracting the authority of the Consulate General in Jerusalem or the Ambassador in Tel Aviv. Establishing a JTF would require DoD to take responsibility for the financial and personnel support for the mission. Although DoD already supports the USSC with personnel through individual augmentation orders, a JTF would mandate the development of a Joint Manning Document. A JTF would increase the visibility of the USSC mission within DoD and across the interagency. Many departments and agencies are not aware that the USSC exists. Within these organizations are many regional and country experts who could benefit from and provide assistance to the USSC if a connection was established.

If a JTF is adopted, DoD should consider establishing it as a Combined JTF (CJTF). International partners currently account for nearly two-thirds of the USSC. Their contribution is immense in that that they bring skills, knowledge, and experience atypical of U.S. service members. A CJTF would make it easier to institutionalize foreign partner contributions.

Finally, although the USSC is performing its mission in superior fashion, it is still managed as an ad hoc, temporary organization. This point is not lost among our

Palestinian, Israeli, and foreign military counterparts. The creation of a JTF or CJTF would demonstrate the permanence of our commitment and would reinforce the importance the United States places on its efforts.

Recommendations for the Mid-term

The Palestinian security forces and the Ministry of the Interior are currently receiving as much assistance as they can manage. Newly trained PASF battalions will undoubtedly increase the confidence of the Palestinian people and possibly erode some of the popular support for militant factions. This will not be enough. The Palestinian Authority will eventually have to contend with the security threat posed by terrorist organizations and illegal militias. The PASF will require new units, training, equipment, and intelligence capabilities. Additionally, in order to sustain the support of the Palestinian society, USSC efforts must be integrated with those of other government agencies to improve social, economic, health, and educational conditions.

Recommendation: Authority for Expanded Mission. In the coming years, the USSC must be given the authorities and resources to reorient PASF training from law and order and civil disturbance control to counter-terrorism capacity building.

After years of investment by the USSC to gain the trust and confidence of the Palestinian and Israeli leadership it would be unwise to transfer this mission to another department or agency. However, as a DoD organization, the USSC is restricted from providing certain types of training to foreign counter-terrorism forces, police units, and intelligence agencies. This policy needs to be reexamined.

Recommendation: Whole of Government Approach. With the expanded mission to build counter-terrorism capability within the PASF, the United States should consider reestablishing the CJTF as a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF).

Once the PA commits itself to address the terrorism problem, the United States must be postured to reinforce all elements of their government. A JIATF would alleviate some problems caused by current DoD restrictions. It would be recognized as the lead agent for security capacity building and counter-terrorism and would also be able to access the capabilities and resources of non-security related departments and agencies within our government.

For factions willing to disarm and demobilize, the PA will need help during the reconciliation process. For irreconcilable militant organizations, the PA will require assistance in creating strong military, police, intelligence, and judicial capabilities and infrastructure. As these militant organizations are dismantled, violence will likely increase and the Palestinian population will be caught in the middle of this struggle. The PA will require the support of non-DoD agencies to assist in providing meaningful health, education, and economic incentives to maintain the support of the Palestinian people. If a JIATF is considered, the United States should consider establishing it as a Combined JIATF (CJIATF) for the same reasons a CJTF was recommended previously.

Recommendation: Enhanced Intelligence. The United States should establish an intelligence analysis and information sharing system within the JIATF to assist Palestinian counter-terrorism operations. Palestinian security forces will require support to locate and track the terrorist threat that resides within its borders, as well as the threat posed by foreign nations and non-state organizations. Without robust assistance, these operations will quickly exceed the capability of the Palestinian intelligence services. The United States has learned during the past nine years of countering terrorism that we can only be effective through combined efforts and intelligence sharing

within our own government and in cooperation and coordination with our partners and allies.

Recommendations for the Long-term

After a stable and secure environment is established and the PA and Israeli governments reach a peace agreement, DoD assistance will still be required. The United States is currently preparing to transfer certain DoD programs and activities in Iraq to the State Department. Similarly, some of the JIATF efforts will be transferred once stability and peace are achieved. While the Palestinian Authority will need extensive support in establishing a functioning government and economy, these activities will clearly belong to the State Department.

The future Palestinian State will continue to be subject to the influence and threats from other states and external non-state actors. Palestine will likely become the target of violence, just as happened to Egypt and Jordan following their peace agreements with Israel. Additionally, these external actors will continue to attempt to use Palestine as a staging ground for attacks against Israel. The Palestinian government and security forces will require DoD assistance for many years to come.

Recommendation: Permanent Presence. After a final peace agreement is reached between Israel and a new Palestinian State, DoD should establish an enduring Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) with a permanent training assistance component. DoD typically establishes DATTs and ODCs within U.S. embassies to maintain situational awareness and coordinate training assistance and equipment sales and transfers. When the internal or external security threat to a partner nation is excessive, or when the need exists for extensive and continual security cooperation, DoD can establish a more robust, permanent presence. An OMC for a Palestine state need not

be as large as the 800-man U.S. Military Training Mission Saudi Arabia or the OMC in Kuwait. Nonetheless, DoD must be prepared to maintain a sizeable security assistance presence in Palestine.

Conclusion

The Palestinian government, security forces, and society have a tremendously difficult journey ahead as they strive for statehood. They will be unable to make this trip without the assistance, patience, and trust of dedicated partners who are willing to stay the course. Only the United States has the wherewithal to organize and sustain the international effort that will be required. Likewise, only DoD has the resources and expertise to ensure the permanence of the security assistance effort. However, our current level of effort will not carry us through to the destination of a Two-State Solution. The opportunity now exists to begin the preparation for these future requirements to ensure that the United States is ready to respond when our assistance is needed most.

Just as a final resolution must be the mutual creation of Israel and the Palestine government and people, so too must each step along this journey. The U.S. government cannot force a peace arrangement upon these two governments and at the same time preserve the goal of a negotiated bilateral settlement. Likewise, the United States must resist the temptation to press for changes before both Israelis and Palestinians are willing and able to accept the associated risk. As stated earlier, the peace process is a delicate balance of security, patience, and trust. Any attempt by the United States to seize control of the security agenda, for any ulterior reasons, will be a breach of trust against our partners from which the United States might not recover.

Endnotes

¹ The idea of a “two-state” plan, to resolve the dispute between Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, dates back to the beginning of the 20th century. The term “Two-State Solution” in this thesis specifically refers to those efforts following the PLO declaration recognizing the sovereignty of the State of Israel in 1988. See Alan Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2003), 32-38.

² Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, “Peace through Security,” lecture, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, May 7, 2009.

³ Bernard Reich, *A Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 272.

⁴ Baylis Thomas, *How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Lexington Books, 1999), 22.

⁵ Yaacov Lozowick, *Right to Exist* (New York: Doubleday-Random House Inc., 2003), 48, 61, and Dershowitz, 33.

⁶ Reich, 246-48.

⁷ Deborah J. Gerner, *One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict Over Palestine* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 50-54.

⁸ Thomas, 95-97.

⁹ *Ibid*, 88.

¹⁰ Gerner, 46.

¹¹ Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two People* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 188-207.

¹² Aaron David Miller, *The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace* (New York: Bantam Dell-Random House Inc., 2008), 145.

¹³ Gerner, 124-125.

¹⁴ David W. Lesch, ed., *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2007), 175.

¹⁵ Lozowick, 175.

¹⁶ Alan R. Taylor, *The Superpowers and the Middle East* (Syracuse, New York: University of Syracuse Press, 1991), 173, 104.

¹⁷ Tamara Cofman Wittes, ed., *How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 23.

¹⁸ Lesch, 240.

¹⁹ Thomas, 263.

²⁰ Since August 2005, the administration of Palestinian territories by the Israeli government has been performed by the Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) for the West Bank, and the Coordination and Liaison Administration for the Gaza Strip.

²¹ Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 9-10.

²² Dayton, "Peace through Security".

²³ Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians: A CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, October 9, 2007) 2.

²⁴ Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority: A CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, January 8, 2010) 5.

²⁵ CRS (2007), 2.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 5-6.

²⁸ Mitchell G. Bard, *Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 2006), 335.

²⁹ Kurtzer, 163-164.

³⁰ Talley Helfont, "Palestinian Security Reform: A Moment of Truth," June 2009, linked from *Foreign Policy Research Institute Homepage* at "E-Notes," <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200906.helfont.palestiniansecurity.html> (accessed December 7, 2009).

³¹ Colonel Tom Kardos was a member of the USSC team, serving in 2005-2006. He continued to support the USSC mission from the U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany from 2006 until 2009. Due to the scarcity of published information regarding this undertaking, unless otherwise noted, the author has relied upon his personal participation with the USSC to complete the narrative.

³² Dayton, "Peace through Security."

³³ CRS (2007), 5.

³⁴ Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, "Report of the U.S. Security Coordinator," prepared statement, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 15, 2006.

³⁵ CRS (2010), 1.

³⁶ David Bedein and Arlene Kushner, *The Implications of United States Training of Palestinian Security Forces* (Washington, DC: The Center for Near East Policy Research, Ltd., 2009), 6.

³⁷ CRS (2010), 7.

³⁸ Dayton, "Peace through Security."

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ CRS (2010), 14.

⁴¹ Ibid., 14-15.

⁴² Ibid., 15.

⁴³ Dayton, "Peace through Security."

⁴⁴ CRS (2010), 15.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3 and 16-17.

⁴⁶ Dayton, "Peace through Security."

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ CRS (2010), 20-21.

⁴⁹ Dayton, "Peace through Security."

⁵⁰ CRS (2010), 22.

⁵¹ Bedein and Kushner, *Implications*, 15.

⁵² See CRS (2007), CRS (2010), as well as, J. D. Crouch, Montgomery C. Miegs, and Walter B. Slocombe, "Security First," *Washington Post*, January 12, 2009.

⁵³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 13, 2007), 564.