Command and Control of Airpower in Irregular Warfare
Abstract
The Luftwaffe's defeat of Allied airpower in the Kasserine Pass in 1943 imprinted the principle of mass upon the U.S. Air Force's organizational psyche. The then Army Air Corps recognized the necessity of consolidating airpower under the command and control of a single airman to mass airpower. This belief in centralized control of airpower became a central reason for the creation of an independent Air Force in 1947. The linkage between centralized control and the origin of the Air Force plays a significant role in Air Force culture. This study examines the Air Force's ability to apply the centralized control approach to irregular warfare. The growing focus and literature on the differences between traditional warfare and irregular warfare challenge the U.S. Air Force's adherence to centralized control. This study asks "Is the Air Force's command and control structure able to integrate airpower effectively into Irregular Warfare operations?" This research question leads to a review of irregular warfare theory and organizational theory and the application of these theories in the current context to determine the effectiveness of centralized control in irregular warfare. The study compares the requirements identified by theory against the Air Force's command and control structure: the Theater Air Control System (TACS). Subsequent chapters discuss the TACS' performance in contemporary irregular warfare environments. The discussion leads to limitations of the TACS in irregular warfare and potential improvements.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 21, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA522723
Entities
People
- J. I. Chambers
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College