Structuring the Force: Finding and Funding the Right Mix
Abstract
From roughly 1975 to 2005, the U.S. focused on achieving high intensity, decisive victory in a major theater war. Shifting force structure and culture to address the requirements of irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a costly, difficult, and necessary task. But the effort has revived timely questions about how American forces must prepare for the broad range of missions future contingencies will require. Analysts should perhaps be wary of a taking an exclusive approach. The hybrid nature of modern combat, in which conventional and irregular tactics often merge, may favor a mixed strategy. Common technologies also blur the line between the two ends of the intensity spectrum. Nevertheless, the distinction between "high intensity" (artillery, missile, tank, air) and "low intensity" (counterinsurgency, stability, peacekeeping, occupation) has often been a valuable tool for conceptualizing future force planning options. Participants of NDU's recent conference tended to draw upon identical assumptions about the state of the DoD and its challenges ahead, finding far more room for agreement than for disagreement. Military experts differed primarily on the degree of acceptable high end risk American forces should bear.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 09, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA522858
Entities
People
- Christopher Mann
Organizations
- National Defense University