

Retooling the Nationbuilding Strategy in Afghanistan

By VINCENT M. DREYER



SPECIAL FEATURE

The United States began the war on terror October 7, 2001, by attacking Taliban and al Qaeda targets throughout Afghanistan. Special Operations Forces embedded with indigenous Northern Alliance fighters and followed by a small conventional force of coalition units defeated the enemy in 2 months and forced its retreat along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Once major combat operations ended, however, we faced a crucial question: What next? While intricate preparation had ensured the destruction of the enemy, the short timeline between 9/11 and 10/7 precluded adequate postconflict planning, often referred to as stability and support operations.¹ It quickly became apparent, however, that a major effort to rebuild Afghanistan was necessary

to ensure that it would never again lapse into a terrorist breeding ground or sanctuary. Even President George W. Bush, who campaigned against military involvement in “peripheral” operations and reiterated his opposition to nationbuilding² prior to launching Operation *Enduring Freedom*, changed his opinion soon after major fighting ended. Thus, the United States embarked on a concerted nationbuilding effort.

The importance of nationbuilding is codified in various high-level U.S. policy documents. The President’s National Security Strategy specifically mentions Afghanistan: “As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations . . . as well as nongovernmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again . . . provide a haven for terrorists.”³ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s National Defense Strategy calls for the capability to defeat adversaries in two separate theaters and to turn one of these operations into a more

decisive and enduring result. To achieve this more ambitious endstate, “we must plan for . . . extended stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring the rapid and sustained application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of state power.”⁴ Likewise, one National Military Strategy goal directs us to “prevail against adversaries.” Stability operations are specified as one way to accomplish this end:

*Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations, and significant postconflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security. . . . The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously.*⁵

The lack of planning for and erratic execution of postconflict operations in recent American endeavors (particularly in Iraq) likely prompted the publication of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–44 and Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 mandating unprecedented government attention to this significant issue. NSPD–44 empowers the Secretary of State to lead and coordinate the Nation’s efforts to plan and execute reconstruction and stabilization assistance. In particular, the State Department will “identify states at risk of instability . . . and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated . . . reconstruction and stabilization efforts . . . which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate.”⁶ The directive also

Lieutenant Colonel Vincent M. Dreyer, USA, wrote this essay as a student of the U.S. Army War College. This paper won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest.

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mandates all other executive departments and agencies to identify skilled personnel who can be deployed for postconflict missions and establishes a Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.⁷ DOD Directive 3000.05 places emphasis on stability operations, stating that they are “a core U.S. military mission” and should “be given priority comparable to combat operations.”⁸ These documents either directly or indirectly underscore the importance of Afghanistan’s future to America’s security. The translation of emerging doctrine to actual strategy, however, has been ad hoc and inconsistent.

Current Strategy

The strategic objective for Afghanistan is to rebuild the country in such a way that it will never again become a terrorist sanctuary. Complicating this goal is the latent Taliban/al Qaeda–led insurgency that threatens all participants in the reconstruction effort. Given this circumstance, the U.S. Government is pursuing several ways, in cooperation with the international community, to solidify Afghanistan’s future as a stable, peaceful, and self-sufficient nation. Most of the

Photos Top to Bottom:
20-watt broadcast tower built by Iranian government for Afghan Television; Afghan poppy farmer in Tora Bora region; International Security Assistance Force prepares for mission; Afghans building school with resources provided by Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team and coalition forces; Special Forces Soldier in front of bomb site in Kabul, now used as Afghan training site

55th Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell)

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Jeremy T. Lock)

DOD (Al Lowry)

55th Signal Company (Thomas Bray)

55th Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell)



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ways predictably employ the military element of national power; however, American leaders are also utilizing diplomatic tools to build consensus and economic measures to jump-start a broken economy. Analysis of the three primary ways being used to reconstitute the “failed state” of Afghanistan—security sector reform, extension of government influence via provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), and economic assistance—reveals serious disconnects in the strategy, particularly with regard to the resources (or means) being applied to accomplish the designated ways.

Security sector reform refers to concerted efforts by the international community to share the burden of rebuilding Afghanistan’s basic security institutions. At a Geneva conference in 2002, various nations agreed to assume the role of “lead donor” in the five most critical tasks at hand: the United States is responsible for creating an Afghan National Army; Germany is working to build a national police force; Italy is charged with judicial reform; Great Britain is leading efforts to combat opium cultivation; and Japan is responsible for the disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration of the militias operating throughout the country. Each effort has experienced its share of setbacks. Even the American program, the most successful of the five, suffers from major ends/ways mismatches.

Germany’s efforts at police reform have been plagued by poor planning and lack of commitment. Although officials offered a strategy paper to address the situation, they failed to distribute and coordinate it with other donors, particularly the United States, the largest financial contributor. Germany also was slow in prompting the United States to begin a training program for patrolmen while Berlin concentrated on the officer corps. Until a credible, competent, and honest police force is operational throughout the country, it will be impossible for the central government to extend its influence and enforce its policies.

Italy has fallen short in reforming the Afghan judicial system, currently “characterized by a conflicting mix of civil, religious, and customary laws, with few trained judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel.”⁹ This reform program seriously lags behind the other sectors due to Italy’s failure to allocate adequate personnel and financial resources

(it has provided only \$10 million annually). In addition, the international community’s inability to address the problem in a holistic fashion and the Afghan Interior Ministry’s failure to integrate its own internal and police reforms with judicial restructuring impede what is arguably the most important of the five sectors.¹⁰

Although Great Britain is tackling the

current U.S. strategy fails to adequately address many of the obstacles to an enduring peace

opium issue in close coordination with the Afghan Interior Ministry, the United States, and the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime, the drug trade continues to be not only destabilizing but also one of the most profitable income sources for the common farmer, accounting for more than half of the economy. Eradication policies that do not provide options for alternative livelihoods run the risk of alienating a large percentage of the population. This problem is compounded by the active involvement of many senior government officials in the drug trade, including cabinet officials and provincial governors. President Hamid Karzai has denounced Afghanistan’s opium cultivation (he declared a “holy war” against drugs last year), but little progress has been made to reduce it. Until a viable program takes effect, the warlords who process and smuggle drugs will continue to hinder government efforts.

The disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration program led by Japan, in close cooperation with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Development Programme, has enjoyed considerable success, accounting for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of over 60,000 former Afghan military forces and more than 11,000 heavy weapons. Numerous militias (some estimates report as many as 850 groups totaling over 65,000 members), however, are not part of the program. These groups are controlled and supplied by local warlords, drug bosses, and, in some cases, government officials.¹¹ Until the Karzai administration takes a firm stand on eliminating these “undocumented” militias, they will remain a latent source of instability and rebellion. Complicating this

issue is the paradoxical reliance of coalition commanders on warlords and their fighters to prosecute the counterinsurgency.

Another overarching challenge associated with security sector reform is the interdependent nature of the five tasks, which combine to form a complex system of systems where progress is constrained when task execution does not proceed evenly. For example, a credible police force is essential for opium eradication, but it is useless without a functioning judicial system. This reality makes coordinated, concerted effort on behalf of all five lead nations essential.

Furthermore, economic reconstruction is inherently linked with the success of security sector reform. Barnett Rubin, an architect of the Bonn Agreement, notes that if people cannot make an honest living, they will gravitate toward criminal activity (for example, the heroin industry). Lawbreakers will seek protection from the historic power brokers—the warlords—thereby diminishing the rule of law. This environment fosters an economy based on illegal transactions, significantly reducing the tax base essential for the development and maintenance of an army and police force.¹² The bottom line is that insufficient means (planning, people, and money) have been provided for security sector reform. Although the strategy is prudent, inadequate resources, as well as insufficient coordination among the lead donors, jeopardize success.

Extension of authority to the outlying provinces is another linchpin in America’s strategy to rebuild Afghanistan’s central government. Provincial reconstruction teams—“joint civilian-military organizations whose mission is to promote governance, security, and reconstruction throughout the country”¹³—are the coalition’s primary means for addressing this critical goal. Comprised of a robust military contingent and interagency representatives from the sponsoring country, as well as an Afghan government official, these teams are designed to “export” the stable environment currently provided by the United Nations–mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

These teams generally have been praised for their ability to extend central governmental influence outside the capital, but numerous problems limit their effectiveness. First, the goals of the PRTs are not clear

and vary depending on their sponsoring countries. For example, Americans focus on quick-impact reconstruction projects and internal force protection; British teams concentrate on security sector reform and are willing to intervene in warlord confrontations; German teams are much larger (up to 300 personnel) with a substantial civilian contingent. A British study notes that the lack of common operating protocols and objectives weakens unity of effort and “leads to confusion among national and international actors who cannot predict from one PRT to the next what to expect in terms of expertise, level or sustainability of engagement, or focus.”¹⁴ For example, the unwillingness of American PRTs to provide security for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has arguably limited the ability of more qualified agencies to provide reconstruction assistance. Maintaining a clear distinction between NGOs and PRTs has been another source of friction. James Bishop, Director of InterAction, notes that soldiers carrying weapons and wearing civilian clothes while engaging in humanitarian missions have “blurred the necessary distinction between members of the military and humanitarian workers, potentially putting the latter at risk.”¹⁵ Although a PRT Steering Committee headed by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior is in place, it has yet to synchronize and standardize PRT operations throughout the country.

Despite problems, the overwhelming consensus is that the PRT program has had a positive impact on stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan, a reality that highlights a final deficiency: there are not enough teams to engage the major population centers, let alone the more rural areas.

Michael McNerney notes that “establishing 22 PRTs in the 3 years after the collapse of the Taliban government is a snail’s pace when dealing with an insurgency.”¹⁶ Future plans call for the establishment of only four additional PRTs by the end of 2007. This would leave at least 8 of the 34 provinces without a team. Absent significantly more PRTs in the hinterland, local militias will remain unstable, police will be ineffective, and widespread poppy production will continue.

Economic assistance is the third major focus of U.S. strategy. Afghanistan was already one of the world’s poorest nations

before it suffered through 23 years of conflict. The cost of creating government institutions and a functioning infrastructure is staggering, so several donor conferences have been held to solicit funds. The Afghan government projects the reconstruction bill to be as high as \$27.5 billion for 2002–2010.¹⁷ The United States is the largest contributor to this effort, providing over a third of the \$3.6 billion pledged by the international community for 2004.¹⁸ Unfortunately, many countries have failed to deliver their pledges, causing a significant shortage of funds for designated projects. Despite the best of intentions, many designated projects have not met the stated goals. For example, only 85 schools of the 286 planned were built or refurbished in 2004.¹⁹

The United States is seeking other funding sources for reconstruction. The Treasury Department unblocked \$145 million in Afghan assets that were frozen in 1999; likewise, nearly all of the sanctions imposed during Taliban rule have been lifted. The Bush administration is also working on a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement designed to “create a bilateral forum to deepen trade and investment relations” with Afghanistan and is supporting the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization.²⁰ While many of these programs will provide more money for nationbuilding in Afghanistan, the efficiency with which the funds are spent is the ultimate determinant of success. Thus far, the record is disappointing.

Alternate Strategies

Most critics of the current strategy contend that it is woefully under-resourced or that the ways employed do not adequately

a larger military presence might incite the largely Islamic population and feed claims that “imperial” America is occupying Afghanistan

address the fundamental requirements of nationbuilding. A few pundits even argue that the endstate itself is flawed. James Dobbins’ RAND study of past postconflict efforts shows a direct correlation between resources and the capacity to provide security, build democratic institutions, and foster economic development.²¹ Citing Kosovo as a success, he notes that the “United States and its allies have put 25 times more money

and 50 times more troops per capita into postconflict Kosovo than into postconflict Afghanistan.”²² Substantial increases in money and manpower would undoubtedly contribute to the success of security sector reform and facilitate the formation of many more PRTs, but there are risks associated with this approach.

Other critics agree with the endstate of Afghan nationbuilding but advocate changes to the ways this strategy is pursued. Kathy Gannon argues that U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation with the warlords and their militias presents the most ominous obstacle to Afghanistan’s transition.²³ She recommends that we cut all ties to the warlords as quickly as possible. While eliminating their influence would contribute to national unification and perhaps weaken the opium trade, the difficulty of such an undertaking must be acknowledged. These warlords are the same individuals who fought side by side with Operation *Enduring Freedom* forces to defeat the Taliban and who continue to support coalition forces in their counterinsurgency/counterterrorist campaign. Gannon contends, however, that continued reliance on the militias and our ongoing provision of weapons and money to them have increased the warlords’ prestige and influence and eroded Karzai’s authority. Yet her proposal to sever relations involves significant risk as well. If the warlords become disenfranchised, they could easily muster sufficient forces to challenge the government in Kabul and return the country to chaos. ISAF is neither large enough nor equipped to counter such retaliation. The United States could quickly find itself in a

quagmire comparable to the Soviet experience, compounded by a probable resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Although seeing former Taliban leaders and current warlords (some accused of war crimes) assume seats in the recently elected parliament

is disturbing to many Afghans and outside observers, integration of these individuals into the political process is the only realistic way to bolster their collaboration in building a democratic, institution-based state.

Another group of experts advocates more sweeping modifications to current strategy, claiming that the endstate itself is flawed. Subodh Atal argues that the United States should eschew the goal of

nationbuilding in Afghanistan for four reasons.²⁴ First, external aid has proven to be only marginally effective in reconstituting failed states. Second, entanglement in Afghan internal affairs diverts American attention from the primary mission of defeating the Taliban and their terrorist guests. Third, coalition and Afghan forces have been unable to provide the security necessary for reconstruction. Fourth, the Afghan people may begin to resent the presence of foreign soldiers. Atal recommends that the United States dedicate all efforts toward defeating the insurgency along the Afghan-Pakistan border and then exit immediately to prevent America from becoming entangled in the “great game” that has plagued other world powers (Britain and Russia) for centuries. While this proposal would limit the duration of American involvement in Afghanistan, the short-term savings would pale in comparison to the dangers generated.

Retrofitting Strategy

There is no lack of proposed “fixes” to improve the current policy. Most seem constructive, yet many involve excessive risk. Proceeding on the assumption that a reformed Afghanistan is a vital U.S. interest, the following recommendations would retool the current approach rather than discard it wholesale. In addition to dedicating adequate funding for reconstruction, the Bush administration should immediately implement the following courses of action.

Continue the current security sector reform program, but apply diplomatic pressure (and perhaps economic incentives) to persuade the lead donor countries to redouble their commitment and efforts in terms of personnel assigned and money spent. To align the progress of the five most critical tasks, the United States should volunteer to act as security sector reform coordinator and devise a system of accountability and regular synchronization meetings to provide a forum for cooperation. Rather than lamenting the problems caused by the interdependence of the tasks, we should capitalize on this interdependence and use it as a catalyst to drive collaboration.

To relieve some of the burden on the lead countries, the United Nations should be lobbied aggressively to assume a more prominent role in security sector reform, particu-

larly in training police and providing local security during reform activities. UNAMA has the mandate to promote national reconciliation, fulfill the tasks outlined in the Bonn Agreement, and manage all UN humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in-country. While it has done an admirable job, particularly with organizing and monitoring the national elections, its expertise has not been fully tapped.

Increase the number of PRTs operating in the country and expand their mandate to include a more active security function. The forces for this expansion should come from ISAF and the new Afghan National Army. NATO has declared that Afghanistan is its highest priority, stressing that the country is the Alliance’s “first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area.”²⁵ Yet NATO members are currently contributing only 25 percent of their available forces to ISAF. Although NATO has conducted initial planning to expand its operations into the more dangerous eastern

the National Security Council is probably the only organization capable of orchestrating development of a comprehensive design of assistance

and southern portions of the country, a significant increase in the number of PRTs is not currently planned.

Including the Afghan army in PRTs will not only alleviate the demand for foreign forces but also add to the legitimacy of the PRT mission and refine the training of Afghan soldiers as they are mentored by their ISAF counterparts. Increased numbers of teams will strengthen the government’s authority beyond Kabul and enable judiciary reform, disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration, as well as opium eradication. While there is risk that a larger foreign footprint will incite nationalistic backlash and provide more targets for insurgents, the RAND study noted earlier suggests that more soldiers will enhance the probability of eventual success. As the PRTs facilitate improvements of basic living conditions, indigenous support will increase, which will generate beneficial second- and third-order effects, such as improved intelligence regarding criminal or insurgent activity.

Develop mechanisms to channel a much greater percentage of foreign aid funds through

the Afghan government. For projects controlled by outsiders, concrete measures must be taken to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and focus on the maximum employment of indigenous workers. This initiative provides an exceptional opportunity to merge security and economic objectives; contracting warlords and their militias to execute construction projects “would give both leaders and their foot soldiers a stake in the rebuilding.”²⁶ James Phillips advocates this approach, arguing that dependence on foreign contractors should be reduced as quickly as possible. The United States should place greater effort on “building the Afghan government’s capacity to help its own people by improving public administration and training government officials and Afghan NGOs to train other Afghans.”²⁷ While U.S. officials will have to encourage the international community to contribute significant amounts to this effort, the more difficult task will be applying those assets effectively. In particular,

projects that provide immediate improvement in the lives of war-weary, impoverished people are most likely to produce long-lasting results.

Develop and execute a public diplomacy

campaign to capitalize on the “information” element of national power. Ray Millen proposes the construction of a network of studios and transmission towers that would target the entire country.²⁸ He recommends implementing a public awareness campaign designed to educate the population regarding government programs and to foster “buy-in” to the reform process. An initiative such as this will be particularly important in the government’s effort to combat narcotics trafficking. Not only will Karzai’s exhortations against opium production reach a wider audience, but also information regarding alternate employment programs will be easier to disseminate. Given the low literacy rate of the country, the information architecture should focus initially on oral and visual media to transmit desired messages.

Develop a comprehensive plan that coordinates the plethora of activities. Currently, no single party is in charge of the overarching reconstruction effort: “ostensibly, the United Nations is, but that is as good as saying that no one is.”²⁹ The U.S. Embassy in Kabul is striving to guide the rebuilding process, but

its limited resources and modest span of control of the contributing countries impede effectiveness. Although there is an Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction Steering Group co-chaired by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, it has thus far been unsuccessful in establishing a comprehensive blueprint to establish goals and track results. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit recommends mechanisms to align priorities and reduce overlap among the numerous lower-level coordinating bodies. In particular, the plan should address:

- specific roles and responsibilities of the various security organizations
- measures to fill security vacuums created by implementation of the disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration program
- fielding a professional police force
- the need to synchronize information operations.³⁰

Planning per se is not normally considered a component of strategy, but in the case of Afghanistan, events have moved so quickly that the strategy has become disjointed at best and incoherent at worst. Fundamental strategic adaptations are necessary, including new planning. Leaders of this process must dedicate the time to develop a concept that aligns their efforts to realize the vision of a transformed Afghanistan. The National Security Council (NSC) is probably the only organization capable of orchestrating the development of a comprehensive design that addresses all aspects of assistance: military, nongovernmental, and economic. Therefore, President Bush should immediately task the NSC to work with key allies to accomplish this critical task. Once a plan is in place, a fully manned U.S. Embassy should be capable of guiding it to a successful outcome.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan is a monumental endeavor, complicated by the nearly total destruction of the infrastructure and an ongoing insurgency. Helping Afghanistan become a stable, representative democracy that enforces the rule of law and respects human rights will be challenging. While it is difficult to find an all-encompassing document outlining a single integrated approach, the principal elements of the strategy are described in various government agency

publications. Close examination of key aspects reveals a major imbalance in the strategic ends/ways/means construct. In particular, we are not applying sufficient resources to ensure strategy success. Furthermore, we are not employing the complete range of our national elements and instruments of power to effect the outcome. A good portion of the international community is engaged in assisting this war-torn nation; thus, the challenge is not in convincing others that something must be done, but rather in encouraging the willing to share the burden more equitably and to synchronize the efforts of key actors. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Stability and support operations include peace operations, foreign internal defense, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to counterdrug operations, and combating terrorism. See U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 20, 2003), 1-4.

² The term *nationbuilding* has various meanings depending on the context. For the purpose of this paper, it refers to activities aimed at securing long-term stability in a country after war or conflict, including establishment or reestablishment of democratic government and national institutions (police, military, and so forth), revitalization of the economy, and physical reconstruction.

³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 17, 2002), 7.

⁴ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, March 2005), 17.

⁵ Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2004), 13.

⁶ National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, December 7, 2005, available at <fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, November 28, 2005, available at <dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Security: Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2005), 29-32.

¹⁰ Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Phillip Wilkinson, "Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan," Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 1, 2004, 18, available at <areu.org.af>.

¹¹ Amin Tarzi, "Disarmament in Afghanistan—Which Militias and What Weapons?" April 5, 2005, available at <reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RMOI-6BN3NB?OpenDocument>.

¹² Barnett R. Rubin, "(Re) Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy," *Current History* 103 (April 2004), 165.

¹³ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, October 2005), 1.

¹⁴ Dylan Hendrickson et al., *A Review of DFID Involvement in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan*, report commissioned by the U.K. Department for International Development (London: King's College, July 8, 2005), 7.

¹⁵ James K. Bishop, "Combat Role Strains Relations between America's Military and its NGOs," *Humanitarian Review* (Summer 2003).

¹⁶ Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 4 (Winter 2005/2006), 44.

¹⁷ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2005), 43.

¹⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2005), 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, "New Initiatives for a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Democratic Afghanistan," June 15, 2004, available at <state.gov/p/sa/rls/fs/33575.htm>.

²¹ James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 146.

²² Ibid., 161. Larry Goodson of the Army War College has also been critical of the "small footprint" approach, noting that "by 2003, the disorder had gotten so bad that in certain locales people had even begun to miss the Taliban's ability to enforce at least a rough kind of justice and suppress some of the grosser crimes." See Larry Goodson, "Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005), 25.

²³ Kathy Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (May/June 2004), 35.

²⁴ Subodh Atal, *At a Crossroads in Afghanistan: Should the United States Be Engaged in Nation Building?* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, September 24, 2003), 1.

²⁵ Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: NATO Looks to Expand Mission After September Elections," September 5, 2005, available at <eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp090505_pr.shtml>.

²⁶ Goodson, 29.

²⁷ Phillips, 2.