Algerian Perspectives of Counterinsurgencies
Abstract
Recent scholarly work has devoted much attention to analyzing the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. The United States military has taken many of the lessons and principles offered by authors such as David Galula and Roger Trinquier based on this conflict and placed them into its doctrine. This monograph serves to explore other examples of internal conflicts in Algeria in light of the popular model normally presented by the insurgency against French occupation in 1954. It proposes that population centric counterinsurgency emphasizes a direct approach to the population. It will show that in two other instances in Algeria an indirect model of counterinsurgency proved more effective. The study will commence with a brief review of the 1954-1962 war of independence from France and the counterinsurgency theory that emerged from it. Next, the study explores the Ottoman experience in Algeria from 1515 to 1830. Subsequently, the work will review the recent Algerian Civil War (1991-2002). The monograph will conclude with an analysis of the applicability of current counterinsurgency doctrine, as derived from the French theory, to the other insurgencies in Algeria. It will further show that the US chose as a model a theory that proved strategically ineffective in Algeria.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA522997
Entities
People
- Jose R. Laguna
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College