Organizing for Operational Deception
Abstract
The operationalization of Military Deception (MILDEC) requires a unique combination of resources, detailed intelligence, significant preparation, operational security and secrecy to achieve maximum effects. It requires close synchronization horizontally and vertically through staffs regardless of echelon, while controlling the dissemination of information to maintain secrecy. Unfortunately, this has been lost in the process of deconstructing operational staffs and reorganizing them to manage complexity, and gain perceived efficacies by the decentralization of battle command functions. This monograph provides historical case studies and a doctrinal review of operational deception that provides a basis from which to evaluate theories of complexity and organizational design to provide recommendations for the organization of a special staff section to conduct MILDEC. Two case studies from British and Soviet experiences during the Second World War (WWII) are used to assess the development and organization of General Staffs to conduct operational deception. This monograph provides two recommendations for operational level commanders. First, commanders should establish Military Deception Officers and Deception Working Groups as described in FM 3-13. Second, commanders should ensure that Military Deception Officers and Deception Working Groups are supported by all cross functional and general staff sections through supervision by the Chief of Staff rather than through coordination by the G5 or G7.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 20, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA523132
Entities
People
- Warren S. Weaver
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College