

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION STRUCTURES IN STABILIZATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION STRUCTURES IN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS by Major Heather A. Levy, 95 pages.

Examination of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO) planning and execution following Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom has revealed critical shortfalls in the United States' ability to conduct interagency operations and planning. This paper evaluates six interagency coordination structures: the Incident Command System, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, Civil-Military Operations Center and the Vietnam-era Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). When evaluated with respect to the SRO criteria of legitimacy, reach, expertise, responsiveness and unity of effort, two of these coordination structures show the greatest advantages: the ICS, commonly used for domestic interagency coordination, and CORDS, an integrated coordination structure that has not been repeated since Vietnam. This paper recommends that these structures be evaluated further for integration into SRO. The ICS, in particular, is already used by multiple agencies for coordination during emergency response to domestic disasters. The ICS integrates DoD, DHS, state and local agencies during disaster response, and could be adopted as an interagency coordination structure during stabilization and reconstruction operations.

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ACRONYMS

ACT	Advance Civilian Team
AfPak	Afghanistan-Pakistan
ANA	Afghan National Army
APA	Afghan National Police
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
COCOM	Combatant Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support
DAT	District Advisory Team
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	State Department
ePRT	embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
FACT	Field Advance Civilian Team
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEST	Forward Engineer Support Team
IA	Iraqi Army
ICS	Incident Command System
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IP	Iraqi Police
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
NGO	Non-governmental Organization

NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSS	National Security Strategy
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PAT	Provincial Advisory Team
Iraq PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
S/CRS	State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SRO	Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
USOCO	United States Organization for Contingency Operations

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Stabilization operations require active engagement in governance and development using unity of effort and concentration of effort between agencies to accomplish our goals.

— CGSC Guest Speaker, 2010

Introduction

Examination of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO) planning and execution following Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed critical shortfalls in the United States' ability to conduct interagency operations and planning.¹ These shortfalls have been identified and noted by both USG personnel and independent organizations. In the former category, assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) identified interagency coordination as inadequate. The International Crisis Group (ICG), during its assessments in Afghanistan, identified poor interagency coordination and lack of unity as significant problems that compromise USG efforts in Afghanistan. This lack of interagency coordination extends from the strategic to the tactical level. The reports mentioned above, along with journal articles from prominent members of the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) have highlighted and promoted an increasing interest and concern in facilitating unity of effort between disparate federal and non-governmental agencies that contribute to SRO. This paper will describe and evaluate some of the potential interagency

coordination structures that could be used to facilitate interagency planning and operations in SRO.

Potential solutions, in terms of interagency coordination structures, have been proposed and enacted at the strategic and operational level.² This paper will briefly discuss some of these structures. At the tactical level of SRO, interagency coordination remains confusing and ineffective. A recent SIGIR report detailed the potential waste of \$2 billion in programs due ultimately to poor interagency coordination at the tactical level.³

Strategic and Operational Level Coordination Structures

Looking at “whole of government” coordination structures highlights the differences between interagency coordination at the strategic and tactical levels.⁴ At the strategic level, beginning with the National Security Council (NSC), interagency coordination structures are working to integrate across agencies. Under President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 1, for example, the NSC incorporates statutory members, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Homeland Security. In addition, PPD-1 creates or continues a number of interagency policy committees designed to create unity of effort in USG strategic policy and to provide a breadth of analysis on particular issues.⁵ Specifically focusing on SRO, another government initiative designed to ensure unity of effort at the strategic and operational levels is the 2005 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which designates the State Department as the lead agency for all aspects of “reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities.” In this same document, DoS is given the requirement to coordinate its efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. To facilitate this mission,

DoS established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (O/CRS), intended to be the single focus of SRO for the United States Government (USG). Since SRO require both military and diplomatic efforts, the lead agency must coordinate with DoD to successfully plan and conduct these operations.⁶

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force is another example of how a whole of government approach is starting to focus our interagency effort.⁷ This Task Force includes representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce, as well as many additional agency representatives. Ambassador Holbrooke's mission is to coordinate across the entire USG to achieve US strategic goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁸

Also at the operational level, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), working with interagency partners, pioneered the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG's role is to enhance interagency coordination by providing agency input to the Combatant Command (COCOM) planning staff, and to pass information back to the members' respective agencies.⁹ The JIACG includes representatives of DoS, USAID, Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal agencies. JIACG members provide an IA perspective to the military planning and execution process. They also serve as liaisons to their respective departments, providing their agency leadership with information on the military objectives and potential tasks for the IA in conjunction with these operations. The JIACG is an example of a higher level coordination structure designed to integrate military and interagency elements at the COCOM level.

Another whole-of-government initiative at the operational level is the 2009 USG Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. Signed by Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and GEN Stanley McChrystal, the plan is designed to provide unity of

effort between agencies operating in Afghanistan. The plan gives interagency objectives to military and interagency personnel and units. This document lays out priorities at the national, provincial, and community level. It also emphasizes the importance of civil-military integration at all levels.¹⁰

Interagency Coordination Shortfalls at the Tactical Level

The coordination structures described above show the importance that interagency coordination has to our strategic and operational efforts. This paper will not evaluate any of these structures in detail. Although interagency coordination provides for common objectives and operations at the strategic and operational levels of war, this effort does not always filter down to the tactical level. At the tactical level, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and Battalions interact with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, host nation city and village leaders, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).¹¹ Lack of interagency coordination structures at this level causes a variety of challenges to strategic communication, security, and prioritization of resources. This disconnect can also be confusing and frustrating to host nation city and village leaders who receive different information and guidance from representatives of different agencies. This paper will focus on evaluating coordination structures that attempt to ensure unity of effort between multiple agencies at the tactical level in the same area of operations.

At the tactical level, it is clear that different agencies do not always understand one another's goals and missions, and are unable to translate similar strategic objectives into consolidated tactical level goals and initiatives.¹² This became clear during SRO in

Taji, Iraq, in 2006. Most of the actors in the area--USG, multinational, and NGO alike--would agree that they support the increased professionalism of the Iraqi Police, including better facilities. But on the ground this does not always translate into unity of effort and certainly not into a coordinated stabilization plan. One example appears in efforts directed at the Iraqi Police (IP) Forces. Near Taji, Iraq, in 2006 there were several concurrent reconstruction projects. A United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) sponsored a local contractor to construct a community police station; the BCT emplaced traffic control points in conjunction with IP requests; the Iraq PRT funded purchases of buildings for police headquarters in other areas; and the Police Transition Team recommended yet another course of action. One agency funded the purchase of a complicated, linked 911-type emergency system. A different agency, however, involved with training local police dispatchers identified specific logistics impediments to the installation of the 911-type system. The city police chief constantly received conflicting offers and recommendations for his security plan, all from agencies trying to achieve similar objectives.¹³ The lack of coordination wasted time, money, and effort, and demonstrated some of the worst aspects of a complicated bureaucracy. A coordination structure designed to facilitate unity of effort may have identified these conflicts early. It also could have helped the agencies develop a plan to integrate their capabilities and assist the Iraqi Police in a unified manner.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., in his report *The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction* noticed a similar series of issues in an audit of civil police training in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁴ In both locations, the lack of interagency coordination and defined responsibilities led to poor oversight and the potential waste of \$2 billion.

Following the audit in Afghanistan, the entire responsibility for civil police training was given to DoD for management. In Iraq, in contrast, a similar audit resulted in the turnover of the civil police training program to DoS. In both cases, the problems stemmed from what Bowen called “balkanized, ad hoc structures.”¹⁵

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question for this paper is “what are the best interagency coordination structures for use between DoD and other agencies in stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO) at the tactical level?” This paper will also address the following secondary research questions:

1. How do agencies currently coordinate with one another in SRO at the tactical level?
2. What are other possible tactical-level coordination structures for interagency coordination? To what extent have these structures been used in SRO? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
3. What criteria are relevant to evaluation of coordination structures in SRO?

Assumptions

This paper assumes that the coordination structures, as described in doctrine or policy papers, are fully manned and deployable in accordance with the direction of the parent agency. This assumption is valid since this paper is designed to evaluate the models, rather than their likelihood of full personnel strength. It is necessary to make this assumption in order to avoid the current discussions of whether DoD should, by reason of

deployable personnel, take the lead in stabilization operations, a topic which is outside the scope of this paper.

Limitations

Interagency policy and military doctrine regarding interagency coordination are rapidly changing and emerging; the information used in this study was collected and analyzed as of April 2010. This study is limited to using published coordination structures for coordination. There are many different coordination structures used for interagency coordination; due to time and space constraints this paper will only evaluate six of these structures. These six structures were identified through a selection process designed to include the maximum variety of coordination organizations in terms of type and lead agency. This selection process will be described in chapter 3.

Delimitations

This thesis is focused on identifying structures at BCT and battalion level. It will not address strategic or operational level interagency coordination or planning. This study will only consider USG missions which involve the military and additional USG agencies, and which involve the attempt to rebuild/create a host nation government, while simultaneously establishing security. DoS, and most USG civilian agencies refer to these as “stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO),” and this is the term that this paper will adopt as a generic term. When referring to DoD-specific doctrine, this paper will use the DoD term “stability operations.”

Significance of Thesis

SRO have been steadily gaining in national importance since the end of the Cold War, and are likely to continue as a significant aspect of the United States' foreign policy over the next decade. The National Defense Strategy describes the importance of "collaboration with interagency and international partners" as the Department of Defense conducts stability operations.¹⁶ The United States Government has focused on developing "whole of government" initiatives that provide for interagency planning and coordination at the strategic and operational levels; however, there remains no single effective system for coordinating goals, sharing information, and creating unity of effort at the tactical level. This thesis will propose recommended methods for ameliorating this void, improving USG effectiveness and efficiency in SRO.

¹Andrew Burton, "Developing a Whole-of-Government Approach to Complex Problems," <http://doelib.jfsc.ndu.edu/2007Burton.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2009).

²David C. Gompert, *Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 132.

³Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Operations, "Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 32-36.

⁴Clark A. Murdock and Michele Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Phase 2 Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 2-3.

⁵The White House, "Presidential Policy Directive 1" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009)

⁶Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson. *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 46-48.

⁷The White House, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 12 November 2009).

⁸Congressional Research Service, “Pakistan-US Relations” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 5-6.

⁹United States Joint Forces Command, *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 2007), vi.

¹⁰Embassy of the United States of America, Kabul/U.S. Forces Afghanistan, “United States Government Integrated Civilian–Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan” 10 August 2009, <http://info.publicintelligence.net/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf> (accessed 6 June 2010), 28.

¹¹Murdock and Flournoy, 2.

¹²Gompert, 82-85.

¹³101st Commander, “1/101st Commanders Update” (PowerPoint Presentation, Kirkuk, Iraq, February 2006).

¹⁴Stuart W. Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan on “An Urgent Need: Coordinating Stabilization and Reconstruction in Contingency Operations” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 22 February 2010), 4.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁶Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 8.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The previous chapter gave a short overview of interagency coordination at the different levels of war and explained some of the problems with coordination structures at the tactical level. This chapter will describe some of the references available for identifying interagency coordination structures in the USG today; the goals of interagency coordination, which are the same at all levels of operation; and how these coordination structures have worked in practice. The final two groups of references comprise those which advocate criteria that this paper will use in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the coordination structures; and those which provide insight on how each of the coordination structures fulfils those criteria.

There are several categories of literature that I have analyzed for this thesis. The first group of resources is comprised of joint doctrine and interagency policy, which are emerging rapidly to meet the current challenges of coordination and DoD-interagency planning. This includes the *National Incident Management System* (NIMS) core documents from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), USAID's *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, the Secretary of Reconstruction and Stability Operations' basic guidelines, and DoD's joint doctrine. Each of these resources includes a unique and critical perspective of the respective agency's goals and structure, and its methods for interagency and multinational coordination.

The second category includes the articles and studies covering unity of effort in general, and its relevance to COIN from the strategic to the tactical level. These resources illuminate the aspects of coordination structures that provide the most contribution to

achieving unity of effort. This group of resources includes articles and monographs on the theoretical importance of unity of effort in COIN, and specific analyses on interagency teams in reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. Overall, these references lay out the tremendous value that interagency coordination can bring to stabilization efforts in a hostile or semi-permissive environment. These works articulate the strategic and operational importance of interagency coordination structures, and the value-added from interagency teams. They give the theoretical and strategic underpinnings that emphasize the importance of unity of effort, especially in areas where civilian agencies require military assistance.

The third category of references that contribute to this paper are evaluations of specific coordination structures and models. These are important in selecting coordination structures for evaluation, and in ascertaining some of the advantages and disadvantages of the coordination structures which were selected. These references include articles, books, and memorandums covering lessons learned on how some of these coordination structures worked in practice. This set of resources includes a historical look at the Vietnam-era Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), internal FEMA “after action reports” evaluating the results of the Incident Command System (ICS), and papers evaluating coordination structures in the Philippines, Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Fourth, this paper used a group of resources to identify criteria that will be important in analyzing the coordination structures. These criteria were based on agency and strategist analyses of what characteristics are important in SRO. These references

include counterinsurgency-focused articles and books which detail the importance of certain criteria when developing reconstruction and stabilization plans and operations.

Finally, this chapter will describe those references which assess how the coordination structures under consideration meet or fail to meet the proposed evaluation criteria. These references include after action reports generated by internal committees from agencies that manage the coordination structures, Government Accountability Office reports, RAND studies, testimony before Congress, and independent articles evaluating agency performance.

Policy and Doctrine

This paper references policy and doctrine both generated by, and describing, coordination structures used by the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, and subordinate agencies of those departments. This specifically includes USAID and FEMA, both of which document their methods of coordinating with outside agencies.

By Presidential directive, DoS acknowledges and is recognized as the lead agency for SRO. For this reason, this paper will use the DoS term “stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO),” except when specifically referring to DoD “stability” doctrine. In the role of lead federal agency, DoS is rapidly codifying and producing new policy and guidelines concerning these operations¹--including incorporating military liaisons at various levels of DoS management, placing DoS liaisons at Combatant Commander (COCOM) level within the military, delineating coordination structures, creating civil-military cooperation sections within the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and USAID, and training military cooperation measures at the Foreign Studies

Institute. These actions are described in both department policy, and evaluations of agency policies conducted by sources outside the departments. Externally, RAND has published several key studies on DoS's role in SRO: *Improving Capacity in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, and *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*. These reference DoS team organization, and shortfalls that challenge the department's ability to provide sufficient resources and personnel. Internally, USAID's "Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy" details the agency's commitment to a "whole of government" approach and outlines its guiding principles:

Cooperation with the DoD will not divert USAID resources away from its development mission or the principles of effective development assistance. USAID is the lead U.S. government agency for U.S. foreign assistance planning and programming. It works in fragile states and post-conflict environments which often require program adjustments without compromise of its overarching mission to improve the capacity of local institutions, improve the host country's ability to assure stability, and achieve sustainable development.²

The United States Institute for Peace has published the 2009 *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, a manual which "seeks to provide a foundation for decision-makers, planners, and practitioners--both international and host nation--to construct priorities for specific missions."³ This, again, shows the commitment of the civilian agencies involved in SRO, though it also generates concerns about whether or not true "unity of effort" is possible between DoD and other agencies. USIP does not describe coordination structures below the strategic level, but does delineate the conditions which make unity of effort possible at any level of coordination.

The Department of Defense has likewise both internal doctrine and external evaluations and recommendations for its conduct of stability operations, the military equivalent of reconstruction and stabilization. The Army Field Manual (FM) *Stability*

Operations covers many of the military tasks and missions that comprise stability, including coordination with civilian agencies and the importance of unity of effort in this type of operation.⁴ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, also describes interagency coordination in detail.

RAND's studies have given insight to the Department of Defense role as well, including *The Role of the Department of Defense in the Provincial Reconstruction Team*. These studies have generally focused on strategic and operational-level coordination, from the COCOM level down to the Division level. They briefly discuss but do not focus on the BCT and Battalion level, where military forces interact with other agencies and village-level leaders. Many of the military's lessons learned have been integrated into emerging doctrine and journal articles.

Interagency coordination structures go beyond DoS and DoD agencies. FEMA has an extensive series of documents describing its USG-mandated structures, beginning with the *National Interagency Management System*, and continuing with other papers and memoranda covering the Incident Command System. Many of these were available online as part of the nationwide training program for emergency responders, mandated by the *National Response Framework* of 2008. Though these documents only apply domestically, they provide additional insight on integrating federal agencies, local government, NGOs and other entities under one "unified command."

Unity of Effort

The second group of references addresses the question of why and how to take a unity of effort approach at problem-solving, both in general and particularly for COIN operations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 emphasizes the

importance of “enhancing the integration of civilian capabilities of the executive branch with the capabilities of the Armed Forces to enhance the achievement of United States national security goals and objectives.”⁵

This goal can be seen in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Interagency Working Group’s White Paper, which begins with a comment that USG strategy “will have no chance of success without better civil-military coordination by U.S. agencies,” emphasizing the growing importance of unity of effort in our national policy.⁶ A look at other references in this category reveals some of the reasoning behind this focus on interagency coordination.

In his 2006 article “A Three-Pillar Approach to Counterinsurgency,” David Kilcullen argues that

“unity of command” (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment. Instead, we need to create “unity of effort” at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least. This depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction.⁷

His article contains initial thoughts on the importance of unity of effort in SRO, and provides insights to potential evaluation characteristics of coordination structures.

David Gompert from the RAND Corporation also analyzes the need for a whole of government approach in COIN in the 2009 monograph *Reconstruction under fire: unifying civil and military counterinsurgency*. Gompert investigates methods for increasing security of “civilian COIN” missions, where civilian agencies provide essential services to a country despite a significant insurgent threat. The monograph looks at three studies: one each in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In areas where insurgents and military forces are contesting for control, this

monograph argues that whenever possible, civilian organizations co-locate in “hubs” that can be easily secured, and that the military provide mobile security for distributed civil COIN needs which must be dispersed across the province or country. It highlights the importance of information-sharing between civil-military groups at the tactical level, and emphasizes the importance of improving the government’s legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach.⁸

Specific Coordination Structures and Models

There are many references in the third category, which included descriptions and analysis of various coordination structures used by the USG, Canada, and Australia to ensure unity of effort in domestic and international operations. Some of the articles and books that describe coordination structures are referenced in more detail in chapter 3, which describes six of these structures in more detail. Even those references that describe coordination structures that are not incorporated into chapter 3 provided some input to the types of coordination that have been used for collaboration between various agencies.

CORDS was one of the most significant interagency coordination successes. Patrick Howell describes this Vietnam-era operation in his 2009 monograph *Unraveling CORDS: Lessons learned from a joint inter-agency task force (JIATF)*. He details the creation and operations of CORDS during different phases of the conflict in Vietnam, focusing on the method of leadership, which he describes as varying from whole of government to lead agency. Al Hemingway’s article, “CORDS: Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam,” also provided information on CORDS and its advantages and disadvantages. In an analysis of a more contemporary campaign, Roy Devesa provides additional information on similar coordination structures in the Philippines in his

Assessment of the Philippine counterinsurgency operational methodology. Several current articles comparing CORDS with operations in Afghanistan also provide insight on the program's advantages and disadvantages.

Several different analyses of Provincial Reconstruction Teams provide additional insight into coordination structures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Michael McNerney evaluates the unity of effort that PRTs manage in Afghanistan in his *Parameters* article "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" He comes to the conclusion that additional support and internal clarity are required to make the PRTs truly effective.⁹ The International Security Assistance Force's *Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook* also provides an overview and specific examples of Afghan PRT successes and failures. Finally, a RAND study on *The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams* includes additional insights on interagency coordination structures.

Canadian Major Ronald Fitzgerald, in his SAMS monograph on the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team, describes how a small, interagency team can have a tremendous impact on SRO. His analysis is limited, however, to this single team, and not to interaction between multiple agencies which already have their own teams in place.¹⁰ This is a common theme in successful examples of a whole of government approach—that a team created as an interagency unit, like CORDS and PRTs, can be very successful.

Theoretical coordination structures are also relevant to evaluation. The Interagency Management System, approved in 2008 for interagency coordination in SRO, is described in *Developing the United States Government's Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization: A Work in Progress*. This document lays out

the strategic, operational, and tactical components that are developing as interagency coordination structures. At the tactical level, the Advance Civilian Team “is designed to coordinate and support the execution of U.S. plans for reconstruction and stabilization under the authority of the chief of mission in the crisis country. The team can operate with or without U.S. military involvement.” Though these teams and their support systems are still being finalized, the structure is likely to be a part of future SRO.¹¹

Another theoretical coordination structure is the proposed United States Office of Contingency Operations (USOCO). This structure was suggested in the 2010 report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). This structure, like CORDS, would integrate personnel from different agencies into a single structure, with a mission to respond to overseas contingencies in the full spectrum of operations¹².

Criteria

The selection of evaluation criteria was one of the most critical aspects of this paper. This fourth group of resources included agency and strategist analyses of what characteristics are important in SRO. These references include counterinsurgency-focused articles and books which detail the importance of certain criteria when developing reconstruction and stabilization plans and operations. Agency analyses of the important characteristics of SRO include USAID’s *Civil-Military Cooperation*, which described the importance of legitimacy and reach as the most critical aspects of stabilization operations. The Department of Defense also detailed important considerations in both *Stability Operations* and *Counterinsurgency Operations*. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has published its own *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. This paper also considered independent

sources which discuss SRO, including David Kilcullen’s article “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, and Dale Andrade’s *Military Review* article “CORDS/Phoenix, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future.”

Assessments

The final set of references are those which illuminate how the coordination structures under consideration meet or fail to meet the proposed evaluation criteria. These references include after action reports generated by internal committees from agencies that manage the coordination structures, Government Accountability Office reports, RAND studies, and independent articles evaluating agency performance.

Testimony before Congress and associated reports provided an essential component of assessment. James R. Kunder, USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, testified on “USAID’s Progress in Helping the People of Afghanistan,” which provided information on USAID efforts in SRO. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, Jr., testified before Congress that “poor coordination and weak integration . . . continue to inhibit SRO execution.”¹³ His full report, *Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, discussed the shortfalls in interagency coordination structures below the operational level, resulting in reduced effectiveness of USG policies and strategies.¹⁴ Mark Schneider testified on the results of the International Crisis Group’s assessments in Afghanistan, which included insights on interagency coordination structures, and Seth Jones testified on RAND Corporation’s observations on the same topic.

Literature shortfalls

The above-described literature covers many aspects of tactical-level coordination structures in SRO. Shortfalls arise, however, in the area of assessment. Many references assess individual coordination structures in SRO, but very little literature exists which compares the success of different coordination structures in similar environments. This paper may fill some of that gap.

Summary

This chapter describes some of the literature available for identifying interagency coordination structures in the USG today; the goals of interagency coordination, which are the same at all levels of operation; and how these coordination structures have worked in practice. The final two groups of references comprise those which advocate criteria that this paper will use in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the coordination structures; and those which provide insight on how each of the coordination structures fulfills those criteria. These references include agency policy and doctrine, articles and books by agency representatives and external sources, and testimony before Congress discussing strengths and weaknesses in the US conduct of SRO.

The next chapter will explain the methodology that will be used to answer the research questions. It will identify several of the coordination structures that are currently being used for interagency coordination, and describe them in detail. In order to identify the best structures, this chapter will go on to identify relevant and significant criteria that are important to coordination structures. The analysis of the coordination structures in the light of the evaluation criteria then leads to the identification of strengths and weaknesses of the coordination structures, and to the final recommendations of this thesis.

¹USAID. PD-ACL-777, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2.

²USAID, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, 2.

³United States Institute for Peace. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 2-3.

⁴US Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 9-13.

⁵Janet Beik, “Developing the United States Government’s Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization” (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007), 1.

⁶The White House, “AfPak White Paper,” 1.

⁷David Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency” (Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, 28 September 2006), 1-3.

⁸Gompert, 86-94.

⁹Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 32-46.

¹⁰Ronald Fitzgerald, “The Canadian Strategic Advisory Team to Afghanistan” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), 21-35.

¹¹Beik, 1-3.

¹²Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Operations, “Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” 2-6.

¹³Bowen, Testimony Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 1.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 4.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter described some of the references that are available to describe tactical-level interagency coordination structures in SRO and the literature which assesses these coordination structures. It also described references which advocate evaluation criteria which this paper will use in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the coordination structures.

This chapter will explain the methodology that will be used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Many different coordination methods exist within the context of SRO. These range from voluntary coordination among participants to a formal agreement between agencies. This chapter will describe some of the interagency coordination structures that are being used in SRO, and identify six of those structures that will be subjected to more detailed analysis. It will then identify relevant and significant criteria that are important to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of these coordination structures. This chapter will discuss how the coordination structures and evaluation criteria were selected, then describe the conduct of the analysis. It will also identify the most significant strengths and weaknesses of this methodology.

Selection of Coordination Structures

The shifting priorities and techniques in both military and interagency programs offered a large number of coordination structures from which to choose. For purposes of brevity, this paper will present and evaluate six of those coordination structures. Four of them are currently in use in SRO, one in humanitarian assistance, and one has been used

in SRO in the past. These six structures were selected with three considerations in mind. First, the coordination structures are all viable, in the sense that they have been used to some degree of success in SRO or humanitarian assistance operations. Second, some of the coordination structures come from the main participants in SRO: USAID, DoS, and DoD, and represent a variety of agencies. Third, the coordination structures vary in type: parallel command, integrated, or unified command. As seen in *Multinational Command Relationships*, coordination structures with parallel command have each member reporting to his or her own chain of command, with limited authority to the leader of the coordination structure. The same doctrine describes an integrated coordination structure involves team members officially assigned to the coordination structure, with responsibility and authority invested solely in the team leader. A unified command, as described in the *National Incident Management System*, gives members of the command team authority over disparate agencies, but the command team must come to a consensus on taskings, goals, and objectives.

The six coordination structures selected provide the maximum variety possible in terms of lead agency and type. Selecting six coordination structures is intended to include a broad variety of coordination structures, while keeping the sample size small enough to allow for a detailed look at each coordination structure. The selection process will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. In the analysis phase, this paper discusses other coordination structures which are not presented in detail, but which are similar in environment, type, and lead agency to the six coordination structures that are the focus of this evaluation.

Evaluation Criteria and Analysis

Once the coordination structures have been presented, this paper will discuss five evaluation criteria that will be identified and described later in this chapter. These criteria were selected based on principles which were reflected in both DoS and DoD documents as important for SRO, and which were discussed in outside assessments as strengths or weaknesses of interagency coordination. The criteria originated in three sources: principles of SRO that are part of DoS policy; principles of stability operations in accordance with DoD doctrine; and the overarching principle of “unity of effort” as directed by presidential guidance and as identified by several assessments as critical to SRO. Each of the six coordination structures will be examined with respect to the criteria, identifying strengths and weaknesses for each coordination structure. This analysis leads to a comparison of the coordination structures’ advantages and disadvantages, and identifies the results of the research questions, recommendations, and avenues for future research.

Other criteria do exist for stabilization and reconstruction operations. For example, effectiveness is one of DoS’s principles of stabilization. This criterion was not analyzed as it was too general to permit a detailed analysis and changed with different situational variables. DoD doctrine provides a wealth of criteria that are relevant to what it calls stability operations, but many of these, such as restraint, are military-specific. This paper selected only criteria that could be effectively analyzed without respect to the particular situation in which the coordination structure was used, that apply to all the coordination structures under consideration, and which are endorsed by multiple agencies.

Methodology

The primary strength of this methodology lies in the inclusion of coordination structures from a breadth of sources, including current and historical examples from different agencies. The inclusion of a variety of perspectives allows this analysis to identify the strengths in several different coordination structures, and circumstances that might be particularly favorable to these strengths.

This methodology also exhibits some weaknesses. Many of the models are still evolving or vary slightly from region to region. This could result in an evaluation that does not accurately reflect changes made in the application of coordination structures. This is a weakness by design. Comparing six coordination structures provides sufficient breadth without becoming unwieldy. Attempting to identify all the permutations of a particular coordination structure would have made this paper too cumbersome given constraints on time and length. This paper did incorporate after action reports and evaluations conducted by the agencies whenever possible. These documents were used to assist in identifying strengths and weaknesses, not to alter the coordination structure as described in policy and doctrine.

Coordination Structure Selection

There are six specific coordination structures that this paper will compare as possibilities for interagency coordination in SRO. This study considered a number of coordination structures for analysis. The primary criterion for selection was to use a variety of significant coordination structures from as many agencies as possible, focusing on those which are major contributors to SRO. Coordination structures were only selected if they worked at the tactical level. The Department of State has several

coordination structures that were candidates for this paper: embedded PRTs, PRTs, and Forward Advance Civil Teams (FACTs). FACTs are described briefly, later in this chapter, as the proposed updated structure to the Iraq PRT, but there is no assessment yet of FACT operations, so it was not included as one of the structures in this analysis. In addition, the ePRT and Iraq PRT are two of the most widely used interagency coordination structures used in SRO today. The Department of Defense coordination structures under consideration included their CMOC, which has been the primary method of civil-military coordination run by DoD elements since 2003. USAID's current coordination structure was also selected. This structure has been in place for the past 40 years, making it the only viable representative coordination structure for USAID. One of these structures came from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): the Incident Command System. This was included because it is the single interagency coordination structure used domestically, it has been used for the past 5 years, and as a DHS structure, its inclusion added breadth to the structures under consideration. Finally, as the only example of an integrated command system for interagency coordination, this paper will analyze CORDS. Other proposed integrated structures, such as the notional USOCO, have no possible assessments at this time. The coordination structures selected for analysis are listed in table 1.

Table 1. Coordination Structures		
Model	Approach	Lead Agency
Incident Command System (ICS)	Unified	DHS
Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT)	Unified/parallel	DoS
Provincial Reconstruction Team (Iraq PRT)	Unified/parallel	DoS
Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)	Integrated	DoS
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	Parallel	DoS
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)	Parallel	DoD

Source: Created by author.

Incident Command System

The first coordination structure evaluated in this paper is the Department of Homeland Security's Incident Command System (ICS), a federally mandated structure that provides for unified command and interagency coordination / planning for domestic disasters. The ICS coordination structure is a part of the National Incident Management System, which includes common terminology and exercise requirements.

The Incident Command System is designed to bring a variety of domestic agencies under the same umbrella of command during a natural or man-made disaster. It begins with a common terminology and structure, and is set up to provide unity of command among disparate agencies. As described in the Incident Command System's core document, the *National Incident Management System* (NIMS):

As a system, ICS is extremely useful; not only does it provide an organizational structure for incident management, but it also guides the process

for planning, building, and adapting that structure. Using ICS for every incident or planned event helps hone and maintain skills needed for the large-scale incidents.¹

ICS is used by all levels of government--Federal, State, tribal, and local--as well as by many NGOs and the private sector. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration.² At the highest level, it also contains a “unified command” team, which consists of a Federal Coordinating Officer, State Coordinating Officer, and Defense Coordinating Officer. These three representatives agree on joint objectives and strategy, and dictate taskings along their individual chains of command. Unified command, therefore, is not what DoD would describe as command, but rather a unity of effort mechanism among disparate agencies.³

The ICS, therefore, has several distinct advantages as a coordination structure--it was created specifically to integrate units with different command structures. In addition, it operates at the operational and tactical level. This study will evaluate the JFO-level system, rather than emergency response activities conducted in accordance with the ICS. Looking at this aspect of the ICS allows this study to make a more direct comparison of interagency planning and coordination in a broader environment than a single disaster response.

ePRT

The second coordination structure is an embedded system, such as that used by the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRT), which are integrated into the BCT special staff. Smaller than an Iraq PRT, the ePRT consists of four core members (a team leader, senior development specialist, civil affairs officer, and bilingual-bicultural

adviser), 8-12 civilian specialists and several military officers. They are designed to operate within either an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCTs) or a Marine Corps Regiment., and receive security support from that unit.⁴

The “embedded” Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) embodies one of the initiatives designed to ensure unity of effort at the provincial and village level. This design integrated the Iraq PRT structure into the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) staff, wherever the BCT commander deems appropriate. In some BCTs the ePRT was placed under the Civil Affairs officer. In other units, the ePRT was incorporated into the BCT as a separate staff section under the Brigade Executive Officer or Deputy Commander. This integrated coordination structure provides the tremendous advantage of placing the individuals responsible for USAID, DoS, and DoD efforts together in the same physical area.⁵ In Iraq, the ePRT and the BCT operate under a Joint Command Plan, with the ePRT responsible for the lead in political and economic initiatives, and the BCT leading in security, reconciliation, and movement issues.⁶

PRTs

Third, this paper will evaluate the non-embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Included with this coordination structure are the proposed Forward Advance Civil Teams (FACTs), a new evolution of the PRTs designed to operate without military augmentation.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have evolved into a coordination structure with the Brigade Combat Teams that is worthy of study in this paper, though certainly not an overarching solution. In 2008-2009, U.S. military forces increased their transition rate, transferring control of security operations to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),

comprised of Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, Infrastructure Security Battalions, and other local security forces. During this process, the PRTs gradually emerged as the lead entity coordinating SRO, with US and ISF providing assistance along the security line of operations. This transition to Iraq PRT lead, in terms of USG support to Iraq, is tremendously important, but may not have the potential to be a coordination structure for a less secure environment.

Also under this heading, this paper will briefly discuss the DoS Advance Civilian Teams (ACT) and Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACT), which are distinguishable in their composition in that they are civilian-only teams, without the military fills in security, engineering, leadership, and other positions. As described in a 2009 RAND Study, *Improving Capacity in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs) are similar to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The key difference is that FACTs consist only of civilians, whereas Iraq PRT staff are a mix of civilian and military personnel. Part of the rationale for civilian-only teams is that such teams can be deployed with or without military personnel, depending on the situation.

ACTs and FACTs could be deployed in support of a UN peacekeeping mission without U.S. military participation. When U.S. military forces are present, ACTs and FACTs would mirror the military command structure, including the areas of operation. Where possible, the teams would be collocated with counterpart military units and would exchange liaison officers with those units. When the teams must operate in an insecure environment, it is hard to imagine that they would not require additional military staff beyond liaison officers, especially to provide security.⁷

Due to their similar structure, nature, and challenges to coordination, FACT and ACT will not be discussed separately from the PRTs. The challenge for village-level coordination structures is not how the Iraq PRT, ACT, or FACT is organized, but rather

how that team coordinates with military, local, and other agency teams and representatives in the area.

CORDS

The fourth coordination structure is the Vietnam-era Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), which was created as an integrated interagency organization. At the tactical level, CORDS's coordination structures included a provincial advisory team, which worked with the Vietnamese province chief, who supervised both the provincial government, provincial militia, and local militias in the villages. The Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) was comprised of three parts--a province-wide area development section, a plans and operations section, and District Advisory Teams (DATs). The area development section included public health experts, engineers, community development experts, education specialists, and agriculturists. In addition to these civilian experts, area development included the CIA's Rural Development cadre, military civil affairs teams, the Joint US Public Affairs Office's field psychological operations teams, and any other agencies operating in the province.⁸

The DATs worked for the province senior advisor, and advised the Vietnamese District Chief. They coordinated the area development programs with the district chief, and advised the chief on civil and military programs within the district. Any military advising teams that trained Vietnamese military forces in the district were also assigned to the DAT.⁹ As the tactical-level coordination structures in CORDS, the PATs and DATs will be analyzed in this paper.

The PATs and DATs emerged as interagency coordination structures during the Vietnam war. From 1964-5, nearly each of the 243 provinces in South Vietnam had

advisors from multiple civilian agencies providing different recommendations regarding the pacification effort. In 1966, however, President Johnson appointed a single Special Assistant to coordinate and supervise all “civil and military programs” in South Vietnam. It would take another 18 months and direct Presidential intervention before the various civilian agencies came together under the newly created Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). CORDS was a stand-alone coordination structure that incorporated members of various agencies under a single team and leadership. Eight agencies (Defense, State, USAID, CIA, USIS, Treasury and Health-Education-Welfare and Agriculture) involved with pacification ceded control of their resources and personnel to a single person, Ambassador Robert Komer.¹⁰ CORDS has been touted as an ideal coordination structure for coordination between various agencies, but its structure would be difficult to duplicate on short notice, and it didn’t specifically include nongovernmental organizations.¹¹ Programs managed by CORDS included territorial security forces, civic action projects, public education, and CIA-sponsored attacks on insurgent networks.¹²

USAID

USAID’s policy on Civil-Military Cooperation provides a fifth coordination structure. USAID’s overarching guidance is that

opportunities for civil-military cooperation will take place at many levels and will depend upon the context and USG objectives. At the regional level, USAID will exchange officers with all appropriate Geographic Combatant Commands, and place Senior Development Advisors within the Combatant Commands to improve coordination and communication and to promote program synchronization and effectiveness. In the field, USAID staff collaborate with US military officials at post to develop integrated approaches to country-specific security and development challenges.¹³

The United States Agency for International Development has developed its own structures for coordination between various agencies, including civil-military coordination structures. James Stephenson, an Iraq mission director for USAID during Operation Iraqi Freedom, described the importance of coordination between military and civilian agencies in SRO, but noted that “if co-location is viewed by either [interagency] party as an instrument of control, the partnership never develops.”¹⁴ USAID documents describe the “Integrated Reconstruction Working Group,” designed to integrate the Iraq PRT, military organizations, and NGOs, but prefers to organize with a “lead agency” approach rather than solely a coordination structure.¹⁵ This system is tenable in a more permissive environment, but can become ineffective when security deteriorates.¹⁶

CMOC

The final coordination structure is a BCT version of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) designed to integrate military and interagency components into a more unified team. The CMOC as described in this analysis is the DoD civil-military coordination structure, as defined in US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and in military civil affairs doctrine. This paper will not discuss generic “civil-military operations centers” which may vary in form or function from the military CMOC.

The Civil Military Operations Center is a military-organized operations center, run by a Civil Affairs Brigade, designed to facilitate coordination between interagency, military, and various multinational agencies in any type of environment. According to Department of the Army doctrine:

The CMOC is the location for assessment, planning, coordination, knowledge management (collaboration, information management, and information sharing), integration, deconfliction of CMO, and numerous other activities. The term “CMOC” leaves most with an image of a place. However, as the quote above demonstrates, a CMOC is more about function and effect than architecture. FM 3-05.40 indicates the CMOC is a standing capability formed by all CA units from the company level to the COCOM level. The CMOC serves as the primary coordination and knowledge management interface for the U.S. armed forces between OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and multinational military forces.¹⁷

This coordination structure is, according to Army doctrine, run by Civil Affairs companies, a unit usually located at a division-level or higher, making the CMOC unlikely to be established at the village level, where the biggest disconnect occurs. This paper includes the CMOC coordination structure, however, because it could be adapted to village level applications, though not without additional resources.

Criteria

Looking at civil-military missions and requirements for success in reconstruction and stabilization efforts leads to several evaluation criteria, which are listed in table 2.

The assessment questions will be used to determine advantages and disadvantages of each coordination structure.

Table 2. Evaluation Criteria				
Criteria	Definition	Measure of Effectiveness	Assessment Questions	Source
Legitimacy	Incorporates indigenous actors at the village level ¹⁸	Degree of incorporation	Indigenous personnel at tactical level? In the decision-making process?	DoS
Reach	Geographic extent of operations, increases with increasing security ¹⁹	Ability to operate in environments from permissive to hostile	Fixed site security? Mobile security?	DoS
Expertise	Experts in technical fields ²⁰	Areas of expertise	How many areas of expertise are contained in the structure?	DoS
Responsiveness	Decision-making tempo ²¹	Levels of bureaucracy between village-level agency rep to the decision-maker	At what level are decisions made?	DoD
Unity of effort	All agencies working toward the same purposes ²²	Nesting of plans and operations through leadership	Command structure type: parallel command, unified command, integrated?	DoD

Source: Created by author.

Table 3. Assessment of Advantages and Disadvantages		
Criteria	Assessment Questions	Ranking
Legitimacy	Indigenous personnel at tactical level? In the decision-making process?	Both = yes (Advantage) One of the two = yes Both = no (Disadvantage)
Reach	Fixed site security? Mobile security?	Both = yes (Advantage) One of the two = yes Both = no (Disadvantage)
Expertise	How many areas of expertise are contained in the structure?	More = Better More than three = Advantage Less than three = Disadvantage
Responsiveness	At what level are decisions made?	Within the coordination structure = Adv. Higher than the coordination structure = Disadv.
Unity of effort	Command structure type: parallel command, unified command, integrated?	Unified Command = Advantage Integrated Parallel No unity of effort = Disadvantage

Source: Created by author.

Legitimacy comes from the incorporation of indigenous personnel into the village level coordination and planning of SRO. Legitimacy is the first of DoS's principles of SRO.²³ It is described in USIP's *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* as the main critical factor which leads to success in SRO. This criterion is also listed as of primary concern in DoD's *Stability Operations*. Legitimacy is further supported by a RAND study indicating that "France in Indo-China and in Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the United States in Indo-China could not prevail despite superior force, at least partly because the governments lacked legitimacy."²⁴ Legitimacy means not only lawful, but accepted as lawful and fair by the populace. Based on counterinsurgency

doctrine, this paper will evaluate legitimacy in accordance with whether the coordination structure incorporates local personnel at the village level (usually as local hires), and the extent to which the coordination structure incorporates indigenous leaders at the village level into its decision-making process. This definition is supported by the USG's Counterinsurgency Document, which states that "the perceived capacity of local government to provide for the population is critical to national government legitimacy."²⁵

Reach is the geographic extent of SRO, an aspect of operations that grows as the element's security increases. The RAND study *Reconstruction under Fire* found that "there is more or less sufficient capacity-in-being to meet current civil COIN needs among the United States, its major partners, and international institutions but that insurgent violence inhibits the deployment of this capacity."²⁶

Expertise is the underlying principle that USAID and DoS rely on as the backbone of SRO, which was reinforced in USIP's *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.²⁷ According to USAID and DoS policy, expertise refers to the inclusion of technical experts. Each of the coordination structures has a different number and variety of experts in a given field – engineering, agriculture, economics, security and statecraft. Expertise is valuable because it equates to influencing civil functions in the broadest manner possible. This paper will measure expertise by analyzing the number of areas of expertise in the structure's task organization. More variety of experts in the task organization will be considered an advantage for a given coordination structure, and less variety of experts will be considered a disadvantage. Thus, a structure with experts in both agriculture and security would provide more expertise than a structure with only security experts. The second area that this paper will evaluate is the ability of the

coordination structure to transfer expertise to the local population through long term training or partnership programs. A coordination structure with a large variety of expertise and a long term training program would be the most advantageous. As detailed in USAID's conflict assessment framework, responsiveness is a critical aspect of interagency coordination. According to an Iraq PRT panel evaluating operations in Afghanistan, responsiveness in SRO equates to tempo in military operations.²⁸ Being responsive requires that agencies can react quickly and make decisions regarding the complex and rapidly changing situation. In terms of coordination structures, responsiveness is the ability for the members of the coordination structure to make their decisions in a timely manner. This paper will measure responsiveness by the levels of bureaucracy between local representatives and decision-making authority. Sending requests to senior decision-makers slows the agency's ability to respond to requests from other parts of the coordination group. Therefore, decision-making authority at the tactical level will be more advantageous in this analysis than coordination structures which do not include decision-making authority at the tactical level.

Finally, unity of effort is the amount to which the coordination structure brokers agreement between agencies in regards to objectives, prioritization of resources, and timelines.²⁹ Unity of effort can be measured by the degree to which the various agencies agree on missions: the strongest unity of effort would be in a structure with a single commander, with tasking authority over all the personnel in the structure. The weakest unity of effort would be a structure where only coordination of agency plans takes place.³⁰ This criterion is independent regarding which agency is in charge, as there are advantages and disadvantages to military vs. civilian-led coordination structures. Unity of

effort has been designated as critical to SRO by President Obama, in his designation of interagency coordination structures. It was the central focus of Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN McChrystal's "Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan." Unity of effort has also been espoused for all USG efforts in stabilization and reconstruction by the previous administration, beginning with NSPD-44 and continuing in later documents.³¹ At the tactical level, USAID's policy documents as well as military counterinsurgency doctrine emphasize the importance of unity of effort.³²

This chapter described the six coordination structures that will be analyzed in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The coordination structures are the Incident Command System (ICS), embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT), Provincial Reconstruction Team (Iraq PRT), USAID, and the Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support. This chapter also described the methodology for this evaluation, and which five criteria will be used to conduct the analysis: legitimacy, reach, expertise, responsiveness, and unity of effort. The next chapter will look at these criteria in turn, and identify advantages and disadvantages for each coordination structure with respect to the specific principles.

¹Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 15. <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm> (accessed 6 June 2010).

²Ibid.

³DCSINT Handbook 1-04, *Defense Support of Civil Authority* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), II-4.

⁴Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). *Quarterly Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 30 July 2007), 53.

⁵Col Bibby, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (Guest Speaker, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 February 2010).

⁶Ibid.

⁷Bensahel, Olikar, and Peterson, *Improving Capacity*, 46

⁸Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, LTC (Ret), Ph.D, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 9-22.

⁹Andrade and Willbanks, 16.

¹⁰Patrick Howell, “Unraveling CORDS: Lessons Learned from a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009), 18-21.

¹¹Ibid., 20-24.

¹²Ibid., 33-36.

¹³USAID, PD-ACL-777, 2-5.

¹⁴James Stephenson, “Military–Civilian Cooperation: A Field Perspective,” *Foreign Service Journal* (2006): 55-63.

¹⁵Foreign Service Institute, “Programmatic Integration of Civil-Military Teams” (2007).

¹⁶Gompert, 112-116.

¹⁷US Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 4-1 to 4-5.

¹⁸USAID, *Civil-Military Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-5.

¹⁹Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2009), 1-4.

²⁰USAID, *Civil-Military Reconstruction*, 2-5.

²¹Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 3-6.

²²USAID, *Civil-Military Reconstruction*, 2-5

²³Ibid.

²⁴Gompert, 9.

²⁵United States Government, *COIN Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2009).

²⁶Gompert, 249–277.

²⁷United States Institute for Peace, 32.

²⁸MG Bucknell, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (Guest Speaker, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 February 2010).

²⁹“Guest Speaker Series” (Guest Speaker, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 Mar 2010).

³⁰USAID, *Civil-Military Reconstruction*, 2-5.

³¹Bucknell, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams.”

³²US Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-5.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Evaluation of Coordination structures

The previous chapter described how six coordination structures were selected for evaluation, and gave a brief description of those structures: the Incident Command System (ICS), embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT), Provincial Reconstruction Team (Iraq PRT), USAID, and the Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support. Chapter 3 also described the selection of five criteria which will be used to evaluate those coordination structures, and the methodology for this evaluation.

This chapter will analyze those coordination structures in the light of five criteria. It will look at legitimacy, reach, expertise, responsiveness, and unity of effort in turn, and identify advantages and disadvantages for each coordination structure with respect to the specific principle. Once the coordination structures have been evaluated against the criteria, this paper will synthesize the assessments into conclusions and recommendations.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is one of DoS's principles of stabilization and reconstruction. The USG's Counterinsurgency Document, signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as by the USAID Administrator, states that "the perceived capacity of local government to provide for the population is critical to national government legitimacy."¹ US Army counterinsurgency doctrine describes legitimacy as the incorporation of

indigenous actors into the coordination and planning structure.² A RAND study on SRO reinforces the concept that “legitimacy and effectiveness do indeed work against insurgency,” and that a key way to achieve legitimacy is through a “combined indigenous-international undertaking.”³ Based on these definitions, this paper will evaluate legitimacy in accordance with how readily the coordination structure incorporates local personnel at the village level (usually as local hires), and the extent to which the coordination structure incorporates indigenous leaders at the village level into its decision-making process.

The ICS is designed to incorporate many indigenous actors. ICS is intended to be used in coordination with emergency response elements, whether belonging to DHS, local emergency workers, or to USAID’s DART teams. During recent humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti, however, difficulties arose in the use of the ICS.⁴ This occurred partially because host nation representatives and those from other US government agencies, not organized in the manner required by the ICS, were unable to integrate into the command system. Rather than being integrated into the planning and operations systems, local personnel were relegated to requesting specific forms of assistance, such as “bulk medical sundries.” This limited form of coordination resulted in “a closed system without intent to utilize outside talents and technical skills available,” whether interagency or host nation.⁵ The ICS coordination structure, however, could be modified to incorporate local government representatives into its already established structure.

Embedded PRTs do not include either a specific local hire program or another particular way to integrate indigenous actors into either its operations or decision-making

structure. According to a GAO assessment, ePRTs do have the capability of coordinating with local nationals, but the degree to which they do so varies significantly based on ePRT leadership.⁶

According to the ISAF *Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook*, PRTs, unlike their embedded counterparts, do have a local hire and integration program. GAO also noted that this program integrates indigenous actors into the execution tasks of the Iraq PRT, but only infrequently into the decision-making level.⁷

CORDS, created for the specific context of Vietnam, had a significant inclusion of indigenous actors in its programs and organization. For every American working on pacification, there were 100 Vietnamese, even without counting the hamlet self-defense troops.⁸ The challenge with a CORDS-type organization is in recruiting and building personnel and structure. The creation and integration of CORDS took two years from the President's initial dictate to the final agreements between agencies and implementation of CORDS as a unique entity.⁹ CORDS also included local leaders as part of the decision-making process at the tactical level, giving them both the authority and the responsibility for protecting and stabilizing their village or district. This focus on placing locals at the forefront of the operations, whether military, agricultural, economic, or governance based, contributed tremendously to the success of the pacification efforts.

USAID policies are based on incorporating local citizens and needs into its basic coordination structures. According to *Making Cities Work: USAID's Urban Strategy*, consulting with communities about their needs is an important step. USAID also notes that "programs are more likely to succeed if the intended beneficiaries participate as stakeholders in the program's design and implementation," and that local residents will

become even more involved as improvements take place.¹⁰ In established, permissive environments, USAID's process appears to be successful, according to a Government Accountability Office inspection.¹¹ Most USAID ventures overseas are run by local residents under USG lead. This gives those local professionals input and relevance to the decision-making process. In Bolivia, for example, USAID funds 29 development projects. These projects have hired 772 staff to implement these activities, 97 percent of whom are Bolivian personnel. This large number of local personnel includes both workers and professionals who are incorporated into the decision-making process.¹² In Afghanistan, due to security concerns, USAID has personnel in only 19 of 34 provinces. USAID has one representative on each of the PRTs in other provinces, and relies on this field officer to provide assistance with potential USAID programs in those areas.¹³

The CMOC is set up and resourced by military personnel. It has a structure which is designed to add various agencies into a coordination center, including a rapid incorporation of indigenous actors into a USG coordination structure.¹⁴ This coordination, however, is not required to include planning or operations. Due to concerns for the sensitivity of mission planning, operational details and intelligence are rarely released to CMOC partners. As part of this restriction of information, local leaders are not included in the CMOC's decision-making process. One military unit setting up a CMOC during Operation Iraqi Freedom found that "facilitating the Iraqis access to our CMOC was by far the most important of all our activities –and one of the most challenging."¹⁵ The challenge, in this case, was incorporating non-military elements into a coordination structure when the military goals and leadership differed significantly from the NGO, local national and interagency goals and leaders.

Table 4. Legitimacy		
	Advantages	Disadvantages
ICS	Includes indigenous actors at a working level, and may include them at the decision-making level ¹⁶	Would require adaptation to overseas environment.
ePRT	Ability to coordinate with indigenous actors	Not necessarily integrated ¹⁷
Iraq PRT	Local hire and integration program.	Generally integrated at the working level, not necessarily integrated at the decision-making level ¹⁸
CORDS	Local hire and integration program.	Integrated at a working decision-making level ¹⁹
USAID	Local hire and integration program.	Integrated at a working and a decision-making level ²⁰
CMOC	Open to broad spectrum of interagency and indigenous participants.	No integration at the decision-making level ²¹

Source: Created by author.

Considering legitimacy, therefore, the greatest advantage lies in the coordination structure that is able to incorporate indigenous actors into the decision-making process, followed by those that utilize local hires at a working level, and finally by those coordination structures with no provision for the inclusion of indigenous personnel at all. In this case, USAID's ability to incorporate indigenous participants into its internal decision-making process provides the greatest legitimacy of the coordination structures analyzed. Another advantageous structure is CORDS, which also incorporated indigenous actors into its decision-making processes. Adapted to fit the overseas environment, the ICS could also incorporate indigenous actors into its decision-making process as well. These coordination structures are followed by the Iraq PRT and CMOC,

which can incorporate local hires or volunteers, respectively, into their coordination structures, but not as part of the decision-making team. The final coordination structure, in terms of legitimacy is the ePRT, which has no provision for incorporation of indigenous actors into its coordination structure, either as local hires or at a decision-making level.

Reach

Geographic reach relies on security. Security of an area and a civilian agency's ability to operate effectively in that area have an important relationship. When security is too low, agencies find it difficult to operate effectively – they have fewer volunteers to deploy to a hostile area, they spend more time in safer areas, and they have to expend money and other resources toward protection, rather than against their core missions.²²

It is difficult for civilian agencies to operate effectively in an area where hostilities continue. This is a critical contribution that the military provides to SRO, since DoS, USAID, USACE, and the many other governmental and non-governmental agencies require a basic level of permissiveness to operate at all, let alone effectively. But military leaders too often overlook the dangerous other side of the curve. As security increases, there is a “happy medium” of the security environment – where local civilians, civilian agencies, and NGOs alike can operate in a zone of high effectiveness. This can be seen in some of the provinces in Iraq in 2009, where many civilian agencies are now able to thrive, expending only minimal resources on protection for their people and operations.²³ “Oversecurity,” and a curtailment of reach, occurs when military or civilian security forces impose martial law, unnecessary curfews, or other limits on basic human activities such as travel, expressing personal opinions, congregating in public places, and

sharing of information via the media. At this extreme of security, agencies again become unable to operate effectively, since they are as constrained as the local civilian populace. Some civilian leaders consider our initial earthquake relief operations in Haiti an example of oversecurity, where military restrictions on movement and issuance of food became a cause for alarm - and curtailed reach- among civilian agencies. In a recent Associated Press article, “Ted Constan, chief program officer for Partners in Health, said that ... “the real solution is to deliver services . . . rather than turn Haiti into a military state.”²⁴ Imposing security measures that are too extreme for the situation does reduce the effectiveness of civilian agencies in an area. Balancing security against freedom of action is only one of the critical tasks of stabilization and reconstruction.

The ICS, designed for use within the United States, does not have any specific provisions for either mobile security, which allows participating agencies to maintain their reach across their assigned area or village, or for fixed site security, which provides a secure location for meetings and coordination between agencies and local partners. The ICS inclusion of a Defense Coordinating Officer, who provides the link to military forces, would provide an avenue for tasking military units to provide security as necessary to facilitate achievement of the joint objectives.²⁵

Both ePRTs and PRTs essentially have the military contingent built into their structure. The ePRT’s co-location with a BCT provides a secure fixed site, and the military security platoon provides mobile security for ePRT and Iraq PRT members as they move within the village area. This ensures that they are able to coordinate and supervise the execution of projects, even in a hostile area.²⁶

Since CORDs included a significant military component, including both US and Vietnamese forces, it contained many of the same advantages as the PRTs. CORDS included several significant programs designed to improve the security of the area, and capitalized on those programs to extend the reach of civil works projects.²⁷ These programs ranged from CIA-sponsored targeted attacks on insurgent leaders, to Vietnamese village garrison forces which were responsible for the security of their own hamlets.

Unlike their representatives on the PRTs, USAID has no security built into its coordination structures. This resulted in USAID's cancellation of over \$5 million of road construction projects in Afghanistan, due to an inability to conduct quality control checks in the area.²⁸ USAID operates in only half of the provinces in Afghanistan, due to the lack of security. USAID has no projects in any of the districts of Afghanistan labeled "red," or hostile.²⁹ In some of the other provinces, however, the USAID representative on the PRT is able to assist the USAID structure with providing support to the Afghan population, due to the PRT's greater mobility in a semi-permissive environment.³⁰

Finally, the CMOC, as a simple coordination cell, provides no security for its non-military participants. Run by the military, though usually not on a main military base, it does ensure fixed site security at the CMOC location. Agencies must provide their own mobile security, however, and this can result in reduced participation, especially among NGOs.³¹

Table 5. Reach		
	Advantages	Disadvantages
ICS	May be able to coordinate within the structure for mobile and fixed site security ³²	Based on coordination rather than built-in assets
ePRT	Access to military security for mobile and fixed site requirements ³³	
Iraq PRT	Access to military security for mobile and fixed site requirements ³⁴	
CORDS	Created with integral security ³⁵	
USAID		Neither mobile nor fixed site protection built in to structure ³⁶
CMOC	Military fixed site security ³⁷	Mobile security depends on individual agencies ³⁸

Source: Created by author.

The coordination structures with integral mobile and fixed site security, such as the ePRT and CORDS, have the broadest reach in SRO. Coordination structures with access to security, such as PRTs and the ICS, still have significant reach. The CMOC, with access only to fixed site security, is limited in the reach that it can ensure. And USAID, as seen in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, is limited to operations only in more permissive parts of the area of operations.

Expertise

The RAND study *Integrating Civilian Agencies into Stabilization Operations*, describes the importance of technical expertise, both USG and indigenous, that is available. “Civilian agencies have a depth of expertise, or at least knowledge of and

access to expertise that the military realistically cannot develop in all areas. Accessing and employing that expertise can lead to gaining greater efficiency and effectiveness in SSTR operations, which is also in the national interest.”³⁹ Military personnel do provide expertise in security, but this expertise does not necessarily translate into other technical areas. This paper will look at the number of areas of expertise that are contained in a coordination structure in order to evaluate its expertise. The second area that this paper will evaluate is the ability of the coordination structure to transfer expertise to the local population through long term training or partnership programs. A coordination structure with a large variety of expertise and a long term training program would be the most advantageous.

A look at the success of our six coordination structures does reveal some important points of comparison. The ICS incorporates experts at all levels of its coordination structure, depending on the need and the operation in question. Both ePRTs and the original, non-embedded version were designed to bring experts in diplomacy, agriculture, and other areas into the theater of operations. The Iraq PRT concept was effective enough in Afghanistan that PRTs were adopted into Operation Iraqi Freedom as well.⁴⁰ One issue with the expertise of both ePRTs and PRTs was the deployability of civilian personnel. For example, while there were numerous Department of Agriculture employees with the expertise needed to assist with agricultural development in Afghanistan, they were not required to deploy. As a result, members of the National Guard with requisite background from their civilian jobs ended up filling those assignments to bring the expertise to Afghanistan.⁴¹

CORDS used a similar methodology, incorporating experts into its organic structure.⁴² This provided tactical-level CORDS units with agricultural, engineer, geology, and business expertise.

USAID, especially with the incorporation of civilian reservists who provide significant expertise without the challenge of short-notice recruiting, can also muster a wide range of experts for its deployments. USAID's Development Leadership Initiative (2009) may help further expand the agency's human resources. This would allow USAID to hire 300 additional foreign service officers, moving USAID toward its goal of a 100 percent increase in deployable staff during the next three years.⁴³ USAID's policy is to hire local experts or subcontractors to provide oversight of various programs and projects. The recent use of CRC personnel in Haiti to augment USAID relief efforts does show that the system works for humanitarian assistance missions.⁴⁴

Finally, the CMOC is run by military Civil Affairs (CA) companies. Originally these officers were supposed to possess significant technical expertise as engineers, lawyers, and agriculturists. In order to expand the CA capabilities of the Army, however, this expertise was eliminated as a prerequisite. As a result, few of the CMOC staff are experts. Experts from non-military sources may readily be incorporated into this structure but are not organic.⁴⁵

Table 6. Expertise		
	Advantages	Disadvantages
ICS	Incorporates USG and local government leaders and emergency responders	No long term training or partnership program
ePRT	Designed to partner and transition with local gov't; contains some civilian expertise.	
Iraq PRT	Designed to partner and transition with local gov't; contains some civilian expertise.	Some positions may be filled by less expert military representatives.
CORDS	Created with significant civilian expertise.	Include long term training programs.
USAID	Designed to partner with local gov't, contains significant civilian expertise	Long term training programs.
CMOC	Can incorporate local gov't and civilian experts.	No long term training or partnership program

Source: Created by author.

Considering expertise, therefore, the coordination structures that contain long-term training programs, paired with significant technical expertise, are the most advantageous. These are both key aspects of USAID's coordination structure. Provincial Reconstruction Teams and CORDS contain similar expertise but with less focus on long-term training. The ICS, ePRT and CMOC are difficult to evaluate in this arena, as their incorporation of civilian expertise may vary significantly from village to village, depending on the participants in the particular structure. None of these three coordination structures includes a long-term training plan.

Responsiveness

Responsiveness is the pace at which decisions can be made in SRO.⁴⁶ According to the Army's manual on *Stability Operations* the organization "must remain responsive to a dynamic environment while anticipating the needs of the local populace."⁴⁷ With respect to coordination structures, responsiveness equates to decision-making capacity at the tactical level. Agency representatives who have to request permission from higher authority to share information or commit resources delay the responsiveness of the USG efforts in the village or district. This evaluation criterion is based on the organization of each of the coordination structures.

The ICS "unified command team" does have the authority to make decisions but many of these (such as a use of personnel in a non-standard role) must be sent outside the coordination structure to the individual agency involved. Used at a village level, the ICS would appear as in figure 1. In the case of SRO, local and state level officials would be representatives of the village and district government, or citizens with similar authority in the host nation culture. Thus, using this structure, decision-making authority could rest in the unified command team, comprising host nation, interagency, and military personnel.⁴⁸ Some decisions, though, would still require individual agency permission.




Figure 1. ICS framework at the tactical level

Source: Created by author, using data from Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington DC, Government Printing Office: 2005), 63.

Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams vary somewhat in their size and structure. The ePRTs report directly to BCT task forces. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, they are led by a team leader, who manages an interagency team which includes a USAID development specialist, a cultural advisor, and 8-10 additional civilian specialists. The ePRT also has a military component, usually consisting of an engineer, security advisor, military liaison officer, and a civil affairs team. The BCT may also incorporate a military officer as the deputy ePRT commander, who then can command the military personnel assigned to the ePRT. Though the team is embedded within the BCT, there is no single individual with authority and responsibility for directing the actions of all ePRT personnel. USAID and other specialists still report to individual agency chains and receive guidance from different authority than the BCT.⁴⁹




Figure 2. Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team structure

Source: Created by author, using data from GAO, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office: 2009), 7.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, unlike their embedded counterparts, are led and staffed mainly by civilians, with military personnel contributing civil affairs and engineering support. The Iraq PRT leader is usually a senior Foreign Service Officer, with a military deputy who serves as his chief of staff, as seen in Figure 3 on the next page. Thus, though the Iraq PRT coordinates with military units within its province, the structure requires that to gain civil-military coordination, the Iraq PRT must go outside its structure and conduct informal talks with local military commanders. This removes the

military from the Iraq PRT's decision-making process, and lengthens the interagency response time to a situation.




Figure 3. Provincial Reconstruction Team structure

Source: Created by author, using data from Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Handbook 07-34* (Washington DC, Government Printing Office: 2007), C-1.

The DATs and PATs of CORDS possessed the ability to take operational control (OPCON) of ARVN units as the mission required. This was possible in accordance with military doctrine since both the CORDS Advisors and the Combat Advisory Teams fell under the operational control of a Corps-level commander. Coordination, advisory relationships, and operational control all played a significant role in the coordination structure used by CORDS, as seen in figure 4. Advisory team leaders were vested with decision-making ability at the lowest level, and their structure can be seen in figure 5. Since CORDS was interagency at the operational level as well as the tactical level, decisions would only travel up one chain of command, and remain within the coordination structure.⁵⁰




Figure 4. CORDS structure

Source: Created by author, using data from George Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control* (Washington DC, Government Printing Office: 1974), 58.




Figure 5. District Advisory Team Structure (under CORDS)

Source: Created by author, using data from George Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control* (Washington DC, Government Printing Office: 1974), 58.

The structure of USAID does not mandate specific coordination methods, other than USAID must interact with military and interagency representatives as necessary. The USAID focus is on building programs that can be administered by direct-hire professionals from the host nation, and providing financial assistance for the maintenance of these programs. USAID also trains leaders and community members on technical skills, including agriculture, construction, water quality, and other quality of life issues. USAID focuses on building long term working relationships through extended service tours in a given area.⁵¹ USAID field missions consist of 9-15 Foreign Service Officers, with varied specialties from management to program operations to technical expertise in areas such as health or engineering. USAID's field missions also include approximately 40-50 foreign service national employees, recruited in the host nation, who serve as contacts with ministries and other host-nation decision-makers. Thus, USAID's default coordination structure is a liaison coordination structure that ties USAID's host nation professionals to their government and private industry counterparts.⁵² For significant projects and policies, USAID projects may require Congressional and executive branch approval and oversight, making it one of the least responsive of the coordination structures under evaluation.




Figure 6. USAID's "bridge" coordination

Source: Created by author, using data from USAID, *USAID Primer* (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC: 2006), 1-4.

A Civil-Military Coordination Center does not have a specific task organization. It provides a location and a forum, administered by a military Civil Affairs company, for coordination between agencies. This loose organizational structure does allow for the incorporation of USG, village level leaders, NGO, military, and any other agency that wishes to take part. A disadvantage to the lack of structure, however, is that is not a particularly responsive organization, as there is no decision-making authority of capability vested either in the CMOC itself or in any of the participating agencies.⁵³

Table 7. Responsiveness		
	Advantages	Disadvantages
ICS	Decisions may require coordination with individual agencies outside the structure. ⁵⁴	Parallel decision-making chains.
ePRT	Decisions may require coordination with individual agencies outside the structure. ⁵⁵	Parallel decision-making chains.
Iraq PRT	Decisions may require coordination with individual agencies outside the structure	Military coordination requires outside liaison.
CORDS	One leader able to direct multiple agencies simultaneously. ⁵⁶	Long initial time for agencies to accept single leader, required Presidential intervention. ⁵⁷
USAID	May require significant coordination outside the structure. ⁵⁸	Limited coordination, not tied to single leader at any level. ⁵⁹
CMOC	Limited decision-making, required significant coordination outside the structure.	Multiple agencies have different levels of decision-making authority. ⁶⁰

Source: Created by author.

Responsiveness was evaluated in terms of decision-making speed. The most responsive of the coordination structures are those with decision-making authority at the lowest level, such as CORDS. Coordination structures with decision-making authority that requires outside coordination with individual agency leaders, such as the ICS, ePRT and Iraq PRT are also significantly responsive. USAID, which uses a long term, deliberative decision-making process, and may require Congressional approval for some decisions, is not very responsive. And the CMOC's limited ability to make decision at all renders it the least responsive of the coordination structures.

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort can be achieved only by “true integration” of civilian and military components at multiple levels.⁶¹ Ideally, this integration would include a single command team or single leader with the ability to plan and coordinate the execution of initiatives across the stabilization and reconstruction fronts. In the interagency realm, “unity of command” refers to the agreement by consensus of the major agency representatives, as defined by the particular coordination structure.⁶² This is in contrast to the military concept of “unity of command,” which refers to a single individual with tasking and administrative authority over all subordinate units.⁶³ This paper will use the interagency definition because it has the broadest applicability to the interagency arena.

The Incident Command System, as seen in figure 1, has a “unified command team,” which much achieve consensus among the three major agencies providing assets to the mission—usually DoD, DHS, and State agencies. If used in an international environment, this unified command team would probably consist of DoD, DoS, and USAID representatives, depending on the security level of the district or village. The

Defense Coordinating Officer, in this case, would not have direct authority over military units assigned to that particular mission.

Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, though they have a single team leader, usually a Foreign Service Officer, operate in much the same way as the ICS. Though the Iraq PRT commander holds the bulk of the power, according to several studies of ePRTs in action, the DoS and USAID representatives do provide significant input into the decision-making process. The DoS and USAID representatives also report separately to their “stovepipe” leadership in the country of operations, and bear certain responsibilities to those leaders in terms of reporting and focus. In an ePRT, the team leader works with the military BCT commander, building a consensus for actions which the two elements conduct in concert.

Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams also have a single designated “leader,” who like the ePRT commander, directs the majority of operations. This leader is typically a DoS Foreign Service Officer, responsible to the Chief of Mission. The USAID representative, like the one in the ePRT, continues to take direction from USAID leadership (who is also subordinate to the Chief of Mission). The deputy Iraq PRT leader, usually a military representative, does not usually have a command relationship with military units operating in the area.

In the Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support program, the CORDS advisor at the District or Mobile level had “operational control” of not only the personnel within his team, including writing their evaluation reports, but also of host nation military units operating in his area of responsibility. The American military units that conducted offensive operations were not included in this village-level structure, but

did fall under the same Corps-level commander. American units and CORDS advisors did coordinate and synchronize actions within their particular areas of operations.

Though USAID has a single mission director who works for the DoS Chief of Mission, the agency's coordination with host nation representatives, leaders, and private contractors is broader and based more on personal relationships than the previously discussed coordination structures. According to USAID's country documents, its methodology is to hire local professionals and interns, and use these personnel as "bridges" between the USG goals in the country, as represented by USAID, and the host nation.⁶⁴ USAID does not have structures that dictate relationships with the military or with other agencies operating in its area.

Finally, as discussed in the previous section, the CMOC has no "command" authority over participating agencies. Though run by a single, military leader, there is no requirement on the part of the military or other agencies to participate in either a directive or a collaborative process. The CMOC can be very useful in disseminating information among participating agencies, but it contains no requirements for contribution or agreement among agencies.

Table 8. Unity of Effort		
	Advantages	Disadvantages
ICS	Consensus among unified command team.	Does not necessarily incorporate other agency efforts.
ePRT	Leader-driven consensus.	Does not necessarily incorporate other agency efforts.
Iraq PRT	Leader-driven consensus.	Does not necessarily incorporate other agency efforts.
CORDS	Operational control.	
USAID		Direction only.
CMOC		Coordination only.

Source: Created by author.

Summary

This chapter identified advantages and disadvantages of the six coordination structures, with respect to the criteria of legitimacy, responsiveness, reach, effectiveness, and unity of effort. The next chapter will synthesize conclusions and recommendations.

With respect to legitimacy, the coordination structures were evaluated according to their ability to incorporate indigenous participants into their structure, either at the execution or decision-making level. Using this evaluation criterion, USAID's coordination structure provides the greatest legitimacy of those analyzed, followed by CORDS, which incorporated indigenous actors into only some of its decision-making processes. ICS has positions available to incorporate indigenous actors into its decision-making process as well. Less advantageous in terms of legitimacy are the Iraq PRT and CMOC, which can incorporate local hires or volunteers, respectively, into their

coordination structures, but as providers of input rather than as decision-makers. Finally, the ePRT has no provision for incorporation of indigenous actors into its coordination structure, either as local hires or at a decision-making level.

Considering expertise, the coordination structures that contain long-term training programs, paired with significant technical expertise, are the most advantageous.

USAID's coordination structure is strong in both these elements. Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams, embedded PRTs, and CORDS contain similar expertise but with less focus on long-term training. The ICS and CMOC are difficult to evaluate in this arena, as their incorporation of civilian expertise may vary significantly from village to village, depending on the participants in the particular structure. None of these three coordination structures includes a long-term training plan to create experts in technical areas. The ICS is exercised domestically, but this does not currently replace technical training in specialty areas.

In terms of geographic reach, the coordination structures with integral mobile and fixed site security, such as CORDS, have the broadest reach in SRO. Coordination structures with access to security, such as ePRTs, PRTs and the ICS, still have significant reach. The CMOC has access only to fixed site security, which limits its reach. Finally, USAID is limited to operations only in more permissive parts of the area of operations.

Responsiveness was evaluated in terms of decision-making speed. CORDS was the most responsive of the coordination structures, as it has a single decision-maker who can make decisions without external coordination. Slightly less responsive were the coordination structures that require external coordination with individual agencies, such as the ICS, ePRT and Iraq PRT. USAID's requirement of Congressional oversight and

approval of projects makes it less responsive. The CMOC requires participants to coordinate outside its structure for even routine issues, making it the least responsive of the coordination structures.

Unity of effort was evaluated considering that consensus-driven structures and structures with operational control of subordinate units achieve a greater amount of unity of effort than structures which provide for coordination only. Thus, the ICS, ePRT, Iraq PRT, and CORDS all create and foster greater unity of effort than the coordination-only based structures of USAID and the CMOC.

Table 9. Summary		
	Strengths	Weaknesses
ICS	Unity of Effort; Responsiveness; reach	
ePRT	Responsiveness	Legitimacy
Iraq PRT	Unity of effort; expertise	Legitimacy
CORDS	Legitimacy; unity of effort; reach; expertise	
USAID	Legitimacy; expertise	Reach; responsiveness; unity of effort
CMOC		Reach; unity of effort; responsiveness

Source: Created by author.

The next chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis performed above.

¹United States Government, *COIN Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009).

²US Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 7-4.

³Gompert, 9

⁴Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “After Action Report, Haiti,” (February 2010), 1-3.

⁵FEMA, 4.

⁶Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), 4-5.

⁷*Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁸Howell, 23.

⁹Howell, 27.

¹⁰USAID, *Making Cities Work: USAID’s Urban Strategy* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2001), 6.

¹¹Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, 3-7.

¹²USAID, “Bolivia,” <http://bolivia.usaid.gov/US/7Faq.htm> (accessed 4 April, 2010).

¹³USAID, “Afghanistan,” <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.31.aspx>, (accessed 5 April 2010).

¹⁴US Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).

¹⁵Robert Davis and John Kullman, “ILARNG’s 2-130 in FSE as a battalion-level CMOC in Iraq,” *Field Artillery Journal* (September 2006).

¹⁶FEMA, 4.

¹⁷International Security Assistance Force, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Handbook,” (October 2006), 13-31

¹⁸International Security Assistance Force, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Handbook,” (October 2006), 13-31

¹⁹Howell, 22-27.

²⁰FEMA, 4.

- ²¹US Army, FM 3-07.
- ²²Gompert, 5-8.
- ²³Government Accountability Office, 1-3.
- ²⁴Associated Press, “U.S. troops withdrawing en masse from Haiti,” http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35752825/ns/world_news-haiti_earthquake/ (accessed 7 March 2010).
- ²⁵Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), *National Response Framework* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 18-22.
- ²⁶Henry Nuzum, “Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of ‘Unity of Effort’ in American Counterinsurgency” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 18.
- ²⁷Howell, 33.
- ²⁸Government Accountability Office, 1-8.
- ²⁹Nuzum, 28.
- ³⁰Government Accountability Office, 1-8.
- ³¹Nuzum, 30.
- ³²IMS, 18-22.
- ³³International Security Assistance Force, 14-18.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, 14-18.
- ³⁵Howell, 31.
- ³⁶Government Accountability Office, 28.
- ³⁷US Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), II-5.
- ³⁸*Ibid.*
- ³⁹Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, and Zachary Haldeman, *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 137
- ⁴⁰Government Accountability Office, 27-28.

⁴¹Jim Garamone. —Mullen Addresses Need for ‘Whole Government’ Approach. *American Forces Press Service*, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52978> (accessed March 1, 2010).

⁴²Howell, 25.

⁴³Henrietta H. Fore, “Aligning Soft with Hard Power,” *Parameters* (Summer 2008): 14-26.

⁴⁴Joint Field Office personnel, Interview by author, 4 April 2010.

⁴⁵US Army, FM 3-24.

⁴⁶Bucknell

⁴⁷US Army, FM 3-07, II-8.

⁴⁸FEMA, *National Response Framework*, 63.

⁴⁹Government Accountability Office, 1-3.

⁵⁰George Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1974), 58.

⁵¹OIG, 28.

⁵²USAID, *Primer*, 28-32.

⁵³US Army, FM 3-07, II-8.

⁵⁴FEMA, *National Response Framework*, 63.

⁵⁵Government Accountability Office, 7.

⁵⁶Howell, 35.

⁵⁷Howell, 35.

⁵⁸USAID, *Primer*, 28-32.

⁵⁹USAID, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-5.

⁶⁰US Army, FM 3-24, II-5.

⁶¹USG – ICP, 2.

⁶²FEMA, *National Response Framework*, 5.

⁶³US Army, FM 3-24.

⁶⁴USAID, Bolivia, <http://bolivia.usaid.gov/US/7Faq.htm> (accessed 4 April, 2010).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This paper began with a primary research question, “what are the best interagency coordination structures for use between DoD and other agencies in stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO) at the tactical level?” To answer this question, this paper began by identifying current and possible interagency coordination structures: the Incident Command System (ICS), embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRT), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Iraq PRT), the Civil Organization for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the DoD Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). This paper then identified five relevant criteria that were used to evaluate the coordination structures, based on current SRO policy and doctrine: legitimacy, reach, expertise, responsiveness, and unity of effort.

In evaluating the coordination structures in terms of legitimacy, the coordination structures were evaluated according to their ability to incorporate indigenous participants into their structure, either at the execution or decision-making level. USAID, the ICS and CORDS incorporate indigenous actors into both their decision-making processes and into the working level. The Iraq PRT and CMOC can incorporate local hires or volunteers into their coordination structures, but at the working level rather than as decision-makers. Finally, the ePRT has no provision for incorporation of indigenous actors into its coordination structure, making it the least advantageous in terms of legitimacy.

The coordination structures with integral mobile and fixed site security, such as the ePRT and CORDS, have the best geographic reach in SRO. Second are those coordination structures with access to both types of security, such as PRTs and the ICS. The CMOC has access only to fixed site security, which limits its reach. Finally, USAID is limited to operations only in more permissive parts of the area of operations.

The coordination structures that contain long-term training programs, paired with significant areas of technical expertise, are the most advantageous in expertise. USAID's coordination structure is strong in both these elements. Provincial Reconstruction Teams and CORDS contain similar expertise but with less focus on long-term training. The ICS, ePRT and CMOC incorporation of civilian expertise varies in different implementations of the coordination structure. None of these three coordination structures includes a long-term training plan to create experts in technical areas.

Responsiveness was evaluated in terms of decision-making speed. The most responsive of the coordination structures are those with decision-making authority at the lowest level, such as CORDS. Coordination structures with decision-making authority that requires outside coordination with individual agency leaders, such as the ICS, ePRT and Iraq PRT are also significantly responsive. USAID, which uses a long term, deliberative decision-making process, and may require Congressional approval for some decisions, is not very responsive. And the CMOC's limited ability to make decisions at all renders it the least responsive of the coordination structures.

Unity of effort was evaluated considering that consensus-driven structures and structures with operational control of subordinate units achieve a greater amount of unity of effort than structures which provide for coordination only. Thus, the ICS, ePRT, Iraq

PRT, and CORDS all create and foster greater unity of effort than the coordination-only based structures of USAID and the CMOC.

Overall, CORDS and the ICS showed the most advantages of any of the coordination structures under evaluation. CORDS showed advantages in legitimacy, unity of effort, reach, and expertise. ICS was advantageous in unity of effort, responsiveness, and reach. Neither coordination structure had a significant disadvantage in terms of the evaluation criteria.

This study also addressed several secondary research questions. The first was “how do agencies currently coordinate with one another in SRO at the tactical level?” This study detailed some of the differences between interagency coordination. Generally, however, agencies rely on a combination of structures and personalities, as there is no directive authority in interagency coordination structures.

Other coordination structures were also identified. The proposed United States Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) and Forward Advance Civil Team (FACT) were two such structures, which have not yet been used in SRO. USOCO is a CORDS-like program which is unlikely to garner sufficient support for implementation in the near term. FACTs, on the other hand, are similar to the Iraq PRT and may be incorporated into SRO in the future.

The final secondary research question asked “what criteria are relevant to evaluation of coordination structures in SRO?” This study identified criteria based on principles which were reflected in both DoS and DoD documents as important for SRO, and which were discussed in outside assessments as strengths or weaknesses of interagency coordination. The criteria originated in three sources: principles of SRO that

are part of DoS policy; principles of stability operations in accordance with DoD doctrine; and the overarching principle of “unity of effort” as directed by presidential guidance and as identified by several assessments as critical to SRO. These criteria are legitimacy, reach, expertise, responsiveness, and unity of effort.

Recommendations

Based on the identification of the ICS as one of the best coordination structures, as evaluated in terms of widely accepted SRO criteria, this paper recommends the adaptation of the ICS to overseas interagency coordination structures. Currently, the ICS is mandated for use by emergency responders, state emergency operations, and federal emergency response. Adapting an already-proven system of interagency coordination to SRO would not be an easy task, but could solve some of the significant challenges that tactical-level leaders face in SRO. A sample ICS-based interagency coordination structure at the tactical level could appear as below.




Figure 7. ICS framework applied to SRO

Source: Created by author, using data from Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington DC, Government Printing Office: 2005), 63.

The ICS would be easier to adapt to SRO than CORDS as the ICS is currently in use by many of the same agencies who also conduct SRO. But, as the analysis shows, CORDS has significant advantages as well. From a USG perspective, there would be an undeniable advantage of developing an interagency CORDS-like coordination structure for use in SRO. Overall, the CORDS coordination structure had the strongest advantages from the perspective of stabilization and reconstruction principles, especially in the areas of unity of effort, responsiveness and reach. It is worth noting, however, that the time required to build this type of coordination structure is considerable. In the case of CORDS, 2 years were required to build the interagency coordination structures, which required Presidential emphasis and executive order. Due to the time and personnel requirements for such a system, this paper recommends that the ICS coordination structure, rather than CORDS, be adapted for interagency coordination in SRO.

Despite the time and personnel requirements, CORDS-type coordination structures do have support at the national level. The recently published Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) report recommends the establishment of an interagency, unified command for “contingency operations,” which would plan, oversee, and execute SROs much as CORDS did in Vietnam. The report did not directly reference CORDS, but the proposed United States Organization for Contingency Operations (USOCO) mission and structure show a strong resemblance. The report describes this potential CORDS-like structure, which could plan and direct SROs at the operational and tactical level, as a simple and straightforward remedy to a complex problem. The SIGIR report also states that former National Security Advisor LtGen Brent Scowcroft believed that USOCO would work. In addition, the SIGIR report states that Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and former USAID mission Director in Iraq James Stephenson both found the concept of USOCO “worthy and sensible.”¹

Just as the original CORDS structure met with significant resistance on the part of the Secretaries of State and Defense, so the USOCO proposal is considered problematic by both the Under Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, and by Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew.² Nonetheless, it is significant that a CORDS-like coordination structure has been proposed to Congress and to the Cabinet as a potential solution for operational and tactical challenges in SRO.

An ICS-based unified command would potentially be a practical and feasible alternative to creating a wholly new structure that requires significant interagency leadership. The ICS coordination structure is untested in SRO, but has been widely used in emergency response and humanitarian assistance missions. This ICS coordination

structure could incorporate civilian expertise from agency augmentees, deployed Civilian Response Corps personnel, or indigenous leaders from village and district governments. Using this type of structure instead of a CMOC coordination structure also deserves serious consideration from a military perspective, as it would better epitomize the Army's own stability operations doctrine than the coordination structure currently in use.

Recommendations for Future Study

Based on the identification of CORDS and the ICS as the two best coordination structures, as evaluated in terms of widely accepted SRO criteria, this paper recommends further evaluation of the applicability of these two structures to our current SRO organization. The recommendations that follow this paper's conclusions are:

1. Evaluate the applicability of the Incident Command System (ICS) to interagency coordination in SRO. Recent humanitarian operations in Haiti could assist in identifying the ability of the system to adapt to overseas missions. This coordination structure has been used in the United States, domestically, since 2005, and appears to be readily applicable to overseas operations as well. Using an ISC-type structure could greatly improve interagency coordination at the tactical level.

2. Evaluate the potential for development of a CORDS-like system for use in areas with long term civil-military campaign plans. Development of the USOCO concept could be further illuminated by parallels with CORDS. This analysis appears to mirror some of the conclusions in the February 2010 report of the Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction, and the two coordination structure concepts could provide insights to one another.

3. Evaluate the potential for replacing a CMOC with an ICS-type coordination structure for use by the military in stability operations. This recommendation is based on the analysis of the military CMOCs disadvantages in terms of the SRO criteria. Even if ICS were not incorporated as a coordination structure for the entire interagency, DoD could adapt the ICS to improve its own coordination by replacing the CMOC. DoD already participates in the ICS, during defense support to civil authority missions in the United States, which might increase the feasibility of this transition.

Significance of Thesis

Interagency coordination in stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO) is a critical concern for improving the effectiveness of USG activities. This study evaluated six different coordination structures used for interagency coordination in SRO, and identified that adapting the Incident Command System to SRO would be the best method for improving interagency coordination. The ICS is a proven system that has been used domestically for the past five years, and is certainly adaptable to SRO. It would provide a better structure for coordination among interagency personnel to improve USG legitimacy, reach, expertise, responsiveness, and unity of effort in SRO. This study recommends a manner in which the ICS could be adapted in SRO and used for better interagency coordination.

¹Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to Congress*, 31.

²Ibid., 34-37.

GLOSSARY

- Civil-military operations:** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian authorities, and the civilian populace (Joint Publication 3-57).
- Indigenous actors:** Tribal, village, and other host nation leaders and personnel who should be involved with (or even lead) reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
- Reconstruction:** The process of rebuilding the economic and physical infrastructure of a country or territory where it has been damaged or destroyed to create the foundation for longer term development (The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Pamphlet 5 Dec 2005)
- Stabilization:** The process of making a country or territory unlikely to return to conflict or upheaval through the provision of public security (S/CRS Pam).
- Stability operations:** Military operations outside the continental United States in conjunction with other elements of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstitution, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)
- Tactical level:** Military forces operating at Brigade, Battalion, and lower levels (FM 3-0).
- Unified action:** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).
- Unity of effort:** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not part of the same command or organization (JP 3-16).
- Village level:** Operations conducted with village and tribal leaders. This includes all aspects of reconstruction and stabilization efforts, whether conducted by DoD or other agencies.

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