

AL QAEDA'S MILLENARIAN DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

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**AL QAEDA'S MILLENARIAN DOCTRINE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY**

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ABSTRACT

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The US is facing a new enemy who is guided by extreme, fanatical, and narrowly defined theocratic principles. Al Qaeda's tactics, techniques, and procedures may seem to mimic those of other terrorist groups but their end state objectives are radically different than other groups bent on establishing a homeland or replacing an existing government. Killing of innocent civilians is not something new for terrorist tactics and Al Qaeda is certainly no different in this regard. The difference lies with the fact that Al Qaeda is guided by a religious ideology in pursuit of apocalyptically guided objectives. These "millenarian" concepts portrayed by Al Qaeda make them unique when compared to other terrorist organizations. This study will focus on what makes Al Qaeda's movement millenarian or messianic in nature and then describe the new conditions facing the United States today as a result of having a fanatical actor as Al Qaeda as a belligerent. The analysis will use Norman Cohn's theory of millenarianism and that of other scholars like Dr. James Rinehart who have studied such movements. Finally, the paper provides a road map or strategy that the US could use to prosecute a war against such an actor.

AL QAEDA'S MILLENARIAN DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

Throughout the 20th century terrorist groups normally acted against a state entity in order to advance their interests. Normally, these interests are associated with territorial goals or aspirations for self-determination. Organizations such as Al Qaeda, whose relentless pursuit of their extreme and religiously guided political objectives have created a new playing field that has changed the rules of terrorism today. An organization like Al Qaeda brings a fanatical player to the mix which has challenged and broadened the current notion of terrorism today. The United States now faces a terrorist organization like one that has never been seen before and it must adapt its policies to properly address this new threat.

This study will first discuss the aspects of what we label classical terrorism and then address why Al Qaeda is different from other terrorist organizations. The study of millenarian concepts as posited by Norman Cohn and James Rinehart will help establish the uniqueness of Al Qaeda in relation to other groups. Their analysis will then lead to a discussion of fanaticism and the dangers of a fanatical actor within a millenarian or messianic movement. The study identifies America's present tenets vis-à-vis terrorism and introduces three concepts that must be incorporated in order to counter this new and unique form of terrorism. First, America has to give a clear purpose of the effort and create a war psychology at home. Second, policy makers have to re-define the notion of self determination abroad. Finally, America must redefine the notion of victory in this war. The days of unconditional victories normally

associated with state-on-state conflicts are over. Instead, the state must identify a viable objective and what can happen if that objective is not met.

Classic Terrorism

In a 1999 report the Department of State (DOS) identified seven countries that support terrorism (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan) and 28 terrorist organizations worldwide, to include Al Qaeda.¹ The report identifies terrorism as a “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually to influence an audience.”² As such, groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al Qaeda (which this study will argue represents a different type of terrorism) are linked under the same definition of terrorism. Classic terrorism has two steadfast principles: 1) Classic terrorists are more willing to negotiate to survive and advance their interests via a political process and 2) Classic terrorists, once in power, have shown that they are more willing to compromise their principles in order to serve more pragmatic interests. In essence, classic terrorist movements share common objectives that center on self-determination, control of territory, and the implementation of their ideology through a political process.

Most terrorist groups have nationalistic aspirations and some even have political wings that are part of the specific country’s political process. Examples of such arrangements are the Irish Republican Army’s political faction Sinn Feinn and HAMAS that was voted into office and is now accepted by the United States as the political representative for the Palestinian people.

The FARC, a Maoist-Communist oriented secular group, aims to overthrow the Colombian government and replace it with a communist one. Other terrorist groups like

the Shining Path in Peru or Basque elements under ETA in Spain also aim to overthrow their respective governments or create autonomous regions within the border of the state. Even HAMAS and Hezbollah (Party of God) have more secular territorial objectives in that they aspire to control their own destiny in Palestine and Lebanon respectively.

The FARC considers negotiations with the Colombian government an acceptable way to advance their interests. In 1999, they negotiated the occupation of a 42 thousand square kilometer area of Colombia to be declared a demilitarized zone (DMZ). The FARC then moved into the DMZ, an area the size of Switzerland, and were free from military attack. The Colombian government, whether they agreed with the FARC or not, understood their goals and used negotiations to secure concessions in exchange for territory.³

The fact that negotiations take place obviously means that the government and the terrorists are willing to make concessions. Spain and England have both negotiated with ETA and the IRA respectively in order to curb violence. Negotiations thus offer the state a way to end the violence and the terrorists see a way to advance their interests. Peter Neumann from Kings College in London states that “the first and most obvious question for any government considering negotiations is whether the terrorist it faces can make good negotiating partners.”⁴ He goes on to add that states must

draw a distinction between nihilistic terrorists who have absolute or even apocalyptic goals and for whom violence has become a perverted form of self-realization and more traditional terrorists, who are believed to be instrumental or political in their aspirations and so have the potential to become constructive interlocutors.⁵

The lesson here is that traditional terrorists may concede if the terms offered by the state are perceived to meet some of their demands. That is, they are willing to

compromise some of their values and goals in order to move their interests forward. This aspect has also been true of secular movements with millenarian characteristics that promise deliverance only after undertaking a violent struggle.

A group that displayed the classic messianic like principles seen in more religiously guided groups like Al Qaeda is Aum Shinrikyo. The group dispersed sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in March of 1995 in the hopes of starting a cataclysmic event that would bring on a war between the US and Japan. Like other terrorist groups, they hoped that violence would achieve their objectives. Their objectives were derived from religious or apocalyptic beliefs just like Al Qaeda.

Aum followers believed that the United States would attack Japan with nuclear weapons by 1996 and that they alone would survive the event. Shoko Asahara, the cult's leader, believed in this apocalyptic event and was considered by some as the basis for their decision to help usher in this war by using sarin in Tokyo. Moreover Asahara, believed that the "United States and the West were spreading rampant materialism and internationalism, which he saw as the root of Japan's problems."⁶ The cult seems to be different than the classical terrorist organization in the sense that their objectives can be characterized as extremely fanatical and unattainable. However, the difference that makes Aum Shinrikyo like many other terrorist organizations in the classical sense, is that they tried to change their stance in order to be accepted by the same society they injured.

As stated earlier, many terrorist groups in the list of 28 have created political factions in order to assimilate themselves legitimately into the electoral process. Many other terrorist organizations have laid down their arms to take part in the electoral

process and some have even made a point to separate their political wings from their military wings in order to make themselves more legitimate.

By 1999, Aum Shinrikyo's group leaders had apologized in public to the Japanese people for the attack in the hopes of establishing some relevance and re-association with society. This public apology served two purposes. First, Aum members may have considered it more important to be accepted by Japanese society again in order to be a part of the political process. Second, it may be that their core message of apocalyptic doom does not have the mass appeal needed by millenarian movements to support a viable base of followers. The result is that the message has to be diluted to keep attracting more followers who may not be apt to follow the more radical views. As the message is diluted, the apocalyptic or millenarian aspects of the message are lost. Could Al Qaeda face a similar process in the future?

The second aspect of classical terrorism is that these movements will bend their principles once they are in power. Secular millenarian movements such as the early Bolsheviks promised the reward of an egalitarian society that would be free from want. Soon after the Soviet revolution in 1917, Lenin promised a world where the proletariat or working class around the globe would rise in revolution. The Russian revolution represented an "international cause, and so long as a revolution does not take place in all countries...our victory is only half a victory, or perhaps less."⁷ As such, Soviet Marxist ideology called for a world revolution among the industrialized countries. Lenin further added that the "existence of the Soviet Republic alongside the imperialist states over the long run is unthinkable."⁸ Surely, such a policy would mean the Soviet Union would be at odds with every European state and America.

As the revolution took hold in the Soviet Union, Lenin soon realized that he would have to work with the same governments he believed would have to be overthrown to facilitate a worldwide egalitarian society. He had to make pragmatic decisions based on the interest of Russia as a state and not as a worldwide messianic movement. Immediately after the revolution Lenin signed the Brest-Litvosk Treaty with the Central Powers and effectively took Russia out of the First World War. He also allowed Trotsky to negotiate with the French government who supplied the newly established Soviet Union military advisers to rebuild the Red Army. He also sought assistance from American, Italian, and British missions.⁹ He clearly understood that regardless of the Marxist rhetoric which the party subscribed to, the Soviet Union would have to “work” with imperialist governments in order to survive. Lenin had to bend his views in order to work within a political order. The grand messianic objectives of a classless world society would have to take a back seat to more pragmatic objectives. Subsequent Soviet leaders like Stalin also pursued pragmatism as was evident with his collusion with Hitler prior to World War II.

There are numerous examples of organizations in the DOS report that have classical terrorist traits; however, one organization in particular is different and can be distinguished from the others in its goals and means to achieve them. The problem with linking all terrorists under one definition is that it tends to overlook the complexity of religiously guided messianic movements and the traits which make them different from classical terrorists. That is, the religious aspects of the movement may serve to make the supporters of such a group more fanatical and less restrained.

A New and More Dangerous Enemy

Dr. James Rinehart identifies this different type of terrorist phenomenon as “new terrorism” and he states that it differs from the older form of terrorism along two important dimensions: “source of ideology (secularism versus religious millenarianism) and scope (modest, regionalized goals versus worldwide massive devastation).”¹⁰

Al Qaeda’s ideology is not nationalistic; instead, it’s founded on millenarian principles that place emphasis on the creation of a desired change or transformation by means of a violent process.¹¹

An important factor that contributes to such a social healing is the boundless utopian-seeking quality of millenarian beliefs. Such beliefs allow the potential for ideological foundations to be shaped into a call for complete, unqualified and, if necessary, violent, total societal change that will seemingly rectify all social maladies.¹²

Al Qaeda’s objectives are far more involved and pronounced than most of the organizations on the State Department list. Al Qaeda wants to remove all western powers from Muslim countries and to replace seemingly pro-western and secular governments with ones that practice Sharia law under a Caliphate.¹³ After all, Al-Zawahiri a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and later, the more radicalized al Jihad in Egypt, became Al-Qaeda’s second in command. He served jail time in Egypt for his alleged participation in the assassination of President Sadat who was accused by Islamic radicals as being pro-Israeli and American.¹⁴

Al Qaeda now embodies the essence of a broader and international, radical Islamic movement whose far reaching political objectives derive from religious principles. “Hence, in the absence of a proper political strategy, politics is identified with religion, and activism is seen as a religious duty.”¹⁵ In the end, they want to establish a Caliphate and unite all Muslim countries under one system of governance. “[Al Qaeda]

believes that it is entrusted with an internal mission to lead the world into the apocalypse by making use of conflicts between religions and civilization.”¹⁶ Using Dr. Rinehart’s two dimensions of source of ideology and scope, it is evident that Al Qaeda’s objectives are different and that its apocalyptic flavor is exactly what makes them a millenarian movement of extreme danger.

The Millenarian Link

Norman Cohn describes the tenets of millenarian movements as seeing salvation as:

Collective, in the sense that it is to be enjoyed by the faithful as a collectivity; Terrestrial, in the sense that it is to be realized on this earth Imminent, in the sense that it is to come both soon and suddenly; Total, in the sense that it is to transform life on earth; Miraculous, in the sense that it is to be accomplished by, or with the help of supernatural agencies.¹⁷

Cohn also describes millenarian movements as having unprecedented goals and who see their struggle “not as a struggle for specific, limited objectives, but as an event of unique importance, different in kind from all other struggles known to history, a cataclysm from which the world is to emerge totally transformed and redeemed.”¹⁸

Dr. Rinehart links Cohn’s millenarian tenets to Al Qaeda in four ways: “1) their belief in an idealized future; 2) perceptions of a serious and pervasive threat – one so dangerous that it imperils the very survival of the community; 3) the availability of a potential deliverer or savior, and 4) a search for community renewal or revitalization.”¹⁹

This sense of danger and pervasive threat as identified by Rinehart has been gradually emerging as colonial control receded. Al Sayyid Qutb a radical Islamist jailed by Egyptian President Nasser from 1954 to 1964, had lived, studied, and taught in America during his youth. He developed a hate and distrust of the west and identified

the importance of Muslims rejecting a western system of governance. In 1965, a year before Qutb was executed by the Nasser government, he stated that:

humanity is heading for the deep, awful precipice of destruction. The sages are ringing the bell calling for the help and rescue (and) searching for a „savior’ with certain imagined features and properties. But these features and properties belong to this religion of Islam and to nothing else.²⁰

Qutb’s message went far beyond the notion of Arab nationalism espoused by terrorist groups such as PLO, HAMAS, Black September, or Hezbollah and instead linked nationalism not to a secular idea, but Islam.²¹ That is, “what emerges from this idea is the feeling that every territory under the shelter of Islam is the homeland of all Muslims and they are all its citizens.”²² This notion is what Rinehart would call the identification of the idealized future, a steadfast millenarian principle.

Qutb further linked the notion of Jihad to the rejection of western principles in order to establish a system of Islamic governance where Sharia law ruled and he identified obstacles such as the power of the secular state and the social environment as needing removal, by force if necessary.

[Islam] ordained by God for all human beings, whether they be rulers or ruled, black or white, poor or rich, ignorant or learned. Its law is uniform for all and all human beings are equally responsible within it..... [Thus] jihad in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this system of life dominant in the world.²³

Qutb’s teachings inspired a new generation of radical Muslims who readily identified with his millenarian message of a Muslim community in peril with its number one enemy being the west. Zawahiri was one of those radical Muslims. He was 15 when Qutb was executed and already a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Zawahiri’s uncle, Mahfouz Azzam, had been Qutb’s personal lawyer and had established a lifelong friendship with him. He routinely talked to Zawahiri about Qutb and the young boy was

enamored with Qutb and called his ideas “the formation of the nucleus of the modern Islamic jihad movement in Egypt.”²⁴

Qutb believed that the world is in ignorance of the “divine guidance” and a “small vanguard to initiate a movement of Islamic revival to lift this veil of ignorance and bring the wayward home to their community.”²⁵ Radical Islamists, to include Al Zawahiri, were deeply influenced by Qutb’s millenarian principles. Al Qaeda’s mission to establish a caliphate under Sharia law, based on millenarian principles, can be traced to Qutb’s influence. More importantly, it establishes the birth or starting point of what Rinehart describes as “new terrorism”.

Al Qaeda’s ideological foundation of ejecting all western powers from the Middle East, replacing secular governments in the area with religious ones, and the eventual establishment of a caliphate, make it a dangerous organization. Al Qaeda is notably different from classical terrorist organizations that have shown a propensity to bend their principles and negotiate in order to advance their interests. This makes Al Qaeda unique and a terrorist organization that the US has never faced.

A New Fanatic

In his study of fanaticism, Maxwell Taylor describes the term fanatic as one who exhibits “behavior which is excessive and inappropriately enthusiastic and/or inappropriately concerned with significant life purpose, implying a focused and highly personalized interpretation of the world.”²⁶ Yet one can argue that most terrorist organizations on the DOS list have fanatics within their ranks that have no reservation about taking the life of innocent people to express commitment to their cause. In that sense there is no difference between a FARC terrorist who places a bomb in a crowded nightclub in Bogota and an Al Qaeda operative who flies a jet liner into the World Trade

Center. Both willingly take life believing that it will further the cause of their organization. The obvious difference is that the Al Qaeda operative went into the act knowing that he would not survive. The FARC terrorist understands the danger involved in the act but does not intend to commit suicide in order to accomplish his mission.

Rinehart's notion of new terrorism implies that there exists varying degrees of fanaticism or commitment. Taylor describes two distinguishing qualities of a fanatic "in terms of the intensity of the behavior and the degree of violence expressed."²⁷ A HAMAS or Al Qaeda suicide bomber displays the same intensity of behavior and one far above the FARC operative. Organizations that exhibit this extreme fanaticism are far more dangerous and unpredictable. Moreover, this type of behavior can usually trace its motivation to a source based on religion.²⁸

Another and more notable difference between Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations is Talyor's second quality of a fanatic, the level of violence expressed. Extreme fanatical organizations like Al Qaeda will have a difficult time showing any restraint in the pursuit of their goals. This notion of restraint will be defined as the decision making process within a terrorist organization that links the type of attack vis-à-vis its sense of legitimacy, consideration for domestic and international opinion, and fear of retaliation. For example, it can be argued that the FARC would not be inclined to use sarin against a target in Bogota for fear of alienating themselves from the same people that it wishes to govern. Even Hamas would not take this level of action against Israel in Tel Aviv because it would risk its legitimacy worldwide and it would also open itself to

a fierce Israeli retaliation. The Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo caused such a backlash that it forced the cult to apologize. Al Qaeda on the other hand, would not care.

Al Qaeda has demonstrated time and again, that it is willing to go to any means regardless of the civilian impact, to meet its millenarian objectives. Clausewitz describes the use of maximum force as necessary in battle and does not sugar coat the violent nature of conflict, but does add that

If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the state themselves and their relationships to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it.²⁹

Clausewitz assumes that the condition of war is more predictable and restrained if fought between two state actors. One can easily change the word savages in his description with this study's definition of a fanatic when describing Al Qaeda. With Al Qaeda, there is no state apparatus to restrain or as Clausewitz put it, moderate the level of violence.

Even a tyrannical Nazi regime understood that using chemical weapons against the US would bring the same retaliation on its own forces and people. Saddam Hussein also came to the same conclusion and did not use chemical weapons against the US in the Gulf War. It may be argued that this same principle kept the US and USSR from waging a war that could lead to a nuclear confrontation. Deterrence is not effective today when dealing with Al Qaeda because they would employ weapons of mass destruction if given the chance. As such, America has to redefine the way it looks at terrorism.

Another unique feature of Al Qaeda is that their effort is international in nature. Although, there are examples of organizations like Black September, Hamas,

Hezbollah, and others that have committed acts of violence in other parts of the world to bring attention to their cause, their objectives have largely been to secure a nation state of their own. Like Qutb, Al Qaeda considers the whole Muslim world a single community and should not be bound by limited boundary based territorial objectives like HAMAS. The key is how nationalistic organizations like Hamas, that may openly support Qutb's notion of a tight knit Muslim community in principle, would respond in practice. Would Hamas subjugate themselves and their territory to a ruler chosen by Al Qaeda?

Furthermore, Al Qaeda can operate in ungoverned areas under the control of weak governments in failing or failed states. These governments either choose not to engage the terrorist organization or lack enough power to engage them. In the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, they harbored Al Qaeda because they shared mutual interests and ideologies.

This study will now focus on how America should fight Al Qaeda by developing a sound and relevant strategy that incorporates the reality of Al Qaeda's unique millenarian ideology. A good place to begin is by identifying America's present policy vis-à-vis terrorism.

US Objectives: The DOS Effort

In 2005, President Bush established US policy against Al Qaeda as the following: 1) fighting the enemy abroad; 2) denying terrorists state support and sanctuary; 3) denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction; and 4) spreading democracy.³⁰

The aforementioned policy seems to point the country in the right direction; however, this study argues that America must focus on the following three concepts in order to fight a protracted war against radical millenarian Islamists.

Concept 1: Create the War Psychology with Americans

The American people must know that they are in a war for national survival. During World War II, the US identified the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany as the necessary condition that must exist to satisfy the political objective of winning a war of national survival. The unconditional surrender of the axis powers was linked to the survival of America. US leaders did not discuss the notion of a quick exit strategy but instead, properly prepared the nation for a difficult and lengthy war and subsequent occupation of Germany and Japan. The objective was clearly stated and the American people understood that a high level of sacrifice was required to meet the end state. The government created the required war psychology and forged a consensus.

The failure of the Bush administration to create the war psychology after 9-11 was again repeated when he prematurely declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq in May of 2003. Six years later, the US remains in Iraq and fighting an insurgent campaign. Instead of using the attacks of 9-11 to prepare the nation for a war of national survival, President Bush tried to reassure America that all was going to be as it was before. On 20 September, 2001, President Bush addressed the nation and sternly warned America's adversaries; however, instead of preparing the American people for a long struggle linked to its national survival, he asked the American people to "live their lives and hug their children." This study argues that this would have been a great time for the President to plant the seeds of the war psychology with the American people.

The announcement of an end to combat operations emphasized the notion of an exit strategy and gave the average American false hope that the conflict in Iraq was over. The US government must consider the notion, when fighting a millenarian terrorist group like Al Qaeda, of preparing their citizenry for realistic end states rather than short term and unrealistic exit strategies. A Rand study on this put it best by stating that

The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed. The real question for the United States should not be how soon it can leave, but rather how fast and how much to share power with Iraqis and the international community while retaining enough power to oversee an enduring transition to democracy and stability.³¹

America must establish this war psychology and clearly delineate its objective in an overt manner for the following reasons. First, its adversary must know the level of its resolve. Second, the domestic population must have a clear understanding of the endeavor or effort in front of them and more importantly, what is at stake. Finally, the international community must clearly understand how the US will accomplish its goals as the conflict against Al Qaeda will be international in nature.

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush identified the destruction of Al Qaeda as the objective and warned that any nation harboring the terrorist organization within their borders would be considered a belligerent. As Clausewitz would have put it, President Bush had made the destruction of Al Qaeda a “political objective” and committed the nation to armed conflict or war.³² Clausewitz sees this as pivotal by saying “when whole communities go to war-whole peoples and especially civilized peoples-the reason always lies in some political situation, and the decision is always due to some political object. War therefore, is an act of policy.”³³ Once the purpose or object is clear, the nation must address how it will do it and what is at stake.

This aspect of what is at stake is extremely crucial. The citizenry of the nation must accept the effort and believe that the struggle and price to be paid to obtain the political objective have a value that is commensurate to the sacrifice. Most Americans would support a protracted fight against Al Qaeda if the government could convince them that losing such an effort would forever change their way of life. The state must not only link the achievement of the political objective to what the citizen can stand to lose but also be able to describe what the effort will accomplish in the end. In Vietnam, the failure to create the war psychology at home was echoed by Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State during the Johnson administration:

we never made any effort to create a war psychology in the United States during the Vietnam affair. We didn't have military parades through cities.....We tried to do in cold blood perhaps what can only be done in hot blood, when sacrifices of this order are involved.³⁴

The Johnson administration failed to convince the American people of the importance of achieving the political objective (defense of South Vietnam).

The importance of establishing the war psychology can be illustrated by a comparison of World War II and Vietnam. Towards the end of the war, as casualties were mounting and America was looking at lengthy occupations and rebuilding of Germany and Japan, President Truman reiterated the importance of the effort by stating that

should we lose the free countries of Europe and Asia then we would be isolated from our sources of supply and detached from our friends. Then we would have to take the defense measures which might bankrupt our economy, and change our way of life so that we couldn't recognize it as American any longer.³⁵

America's losses in World War II were low compared to European countries; however, rest assured that the loss of 450 thousand dead Americans in four years showed a level of commitment by a united America that had never been seen before or since.

The 9/11 attack was the worst attack faced by America in terms of death toll and damage. Moreover, this study has established that Al Qaeda is not likely to show any restraint and will use any weapon to attack Americans at home. The country faces a peril like never seen before yet the country, for the most part, does not have the necessary war psychology for such an effort.

As this study has stated, Al Qaeda will pursue even more spectacular attacks and show no restraint vis-à-vis type of weapons and who is targeted. The US government must make this very clear to the American people. The US government, like the Truman administration did before, has to make it clear that the nation is in a contest for national survival. Unfortunately, it may take more spectacular attacks here at home to make this point.

Concept 2: Self Determination Does Not Necessarily Mean Democracy

The notion of spreading democracy, although a noble effort, can easily overlook complicated tribal, religious, and sectarian realities. For example, history has shown that authoritarian governments like the ones seen in Yugoslavia and Iraq have some advantages when governing over territories with diverse ethnic, tribal, and or religious make up. Indigenous populations in North and South America were conquered not by democratic principles, but instead by a kinetic effort that would have violated America's present policy of spreading democracy. The history of Africa, a continent divided by European powers based on colonial boundaries, has seen constant tribal strife as evidenced in Rwanda where Tutsi and Hutus showed an inability to collaborate together

and as a result, almost a million people perished. America's present effort in Iraq has incredible challenges ahead as Kurd, Sunni, and Shia aspirations and differences, once mitigated by Saddam's extreme brutality, are now expected to be properly managed by a pluralistic government based on democratic principles. Afghanistan presents some of the same challenges.

One of the main tenets of democracy is majority rule with minority rights. This notion of democracy can exist when there is trust that the government will provide security for all and more importantly, rule in a manner that allows the minority some influences or share of power. Moreover, all governed must accept that, from time to time, they may be forced to accept decisions that may not be in their best interest.

America should broaden its notion of self determination beyond that of a democratic government and instead promote a plan of governance based on the region's historical and traditional methods. The result, for places like Africa or the Middle-East, can still be governments based loosely on democratic principles under some form of tribal governance. This concept then gives America the ability to continue to identify ungoverned areas where Al Qaeda operates and to establish friendly governments that are accepted and trusted by their people. These governments do not necessarily have to be democratic.

For example, America's policy objective in Iraq may be to forego the existing established boundaries set by the British in the early 1900s and work to establish three separate autonomous areas governed under an article of confederation or to establish three separate countries. Obvious disapproval may come from Turkey and Iran that do not wish to see an independent Kurd nation but efforts can be made to quell their fears

by placing UN forces much like those employed in the Sinai. An American policy of supporting tribal government may serve to ease the friction that has existed for many years, establish countries more willing to work with America, and more importantly, give each of those governments a vested interest in denying Al Qaeda safe haven.

Al Qaeda's millenarian principles are based on having a threatened Muslim society or umma whose destiny and way of life is being compromised by western principles. America's objective of establishing democratic regimes is such a principle that can be used by Al Qaeda to prove to their supporters that they fight a just war. In essence, the overt policy objective of establishing democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan may serve to alienate an area of the world where tribal leadership may work better than western democratic principles. Why not use Qutb's very notion of Muslim community against Al Qaeda by emphasizing the importance of tribal solidarity as a viable form of self determination and self governance?

Qutb, like Al Qaeda now, placed emphasis on the notion that the entire Muslim community is a tribe and therefore a group capable of being united under one set of theocratic principles. In reality, tribes within the Middle-East are complex and have separations based on interpretations of religion, political, and territorial disputes. Muhammad saw the divisions within the tribes of the umma and tried to unite them under a sort of "pax Islamica".³⁶ However, as suggested by Middle-East expert, Bassam Tibi, even Muhammad had difficulties in establishing a singularly united Muslim community:

..we must reach the conclusion that the Islamic state from its inception had a fragile structure. It failed to dissolve tribes; instead, it adapted to them the structure of the new state. Viewed from this angle, the Islamic umma can be seen as a super tribe that evolved from a tribal federation. It was

not a homogeneous community. This federation was susceptible to fragmentation when its underpinnings were weakened....the divisive forces of the body politic in early Islam were both tribal and ethnic.³⁷

Qutb and Al Qaeda's notion of this the entire Muslim community as a "super tribe" is flawed because it fails to identify the differences that exist today due to tribal influences. Al Qaeda's myopic view of an umma that can be united as a "super tribe" will help undermine their very cause as it will fail to transcend their differences. Likewise, America must be cautious in its use of the institution of western democracy as a method of transcending these very same differences. As noted earlier, this study suggests that nation states in the Middle-East succeeded only because organizations like the Ba'ath party in Iraq and Syria kept control through oppressive means. Does this mean that democracy, managed by a state, is doomed to fail in Iraq and Afghanistan? This study posits that it will fail if it's not done in an incremental manner.

With the exception of Israel, there are no other countries that can boast of having successful western style democracies in the Middle-East. The region does not have a history of democracy; instead, it has one of tribal leadership, regional governance, and empires, such as Persian and Ottoman, led by absolute rulers. America must see this and resolve itself to work with the institutions that have proven effective. America has had a long history of working with non-democratic governments to advance its interests. Working with Saudi Arabia, pre-1979 Iran, Marcos' Philippines, and Pinochet's Chile are just a few examples of how acceptable this has been to the American people and government. If this is the case, why push democracy in an area of the world where America has had a long history of working with non-democratic governments? Although, there is danger in working with despotic regimes as their downfall can create

long term problems, the reality is that there are places in the world where democracy does not work very well.

The risk of dealing directly with autonomous tribes at the expense of establishing strong democratic and pluralistic institutions is that the former structure may still have the underlying conditions for conflict without a central government to adjudicate or arbitrate their differences. Saddam Hussein and the secular Ba'ath party succeeded in running a state by keeping tribal groups down via a ruthless security apparatus. He brutally quelled insurrections and set up a repressive system of governance that limited any sectarian problems. Now, without a strong central government, the result may be smaller conflicts which can still be used by Al Qaeda to pit one group against the other. However, as America enters into the 9th year of war, it can be argued that the pursuit of establishing strong democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan has not succeeded and the risk of this option may be worth the effort.

This risk of working with tribes or sects first rather than charging immediately to democracy can be mitigated by working in an incremental manner. For example, America's process to go from a loose confederation to a nation united by a constitution was difficult and worked only when issues such as slavery were ignored to be dealt with later. What is to say that such a process in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be done incrementally also? First, it may be prudent to use the established tribal system of governance with the hope that it leads to a more united country in the future. In the end, America wants friendly governments that are supported by their people and not necessarily weak democratic governments with elusive mandates that are not trusted by their own populace.

The notion of spreading democracy should be a goal based on the specific region's socio-political make up, history, and religious beliefs. The American strategic message should emphasize a process of self-determination that will one day lead to a democratic institution. The US should establish democratic institutions as a bench mark but apply an incremental process given the area of the world.

Concept 3: America Must Re-Define What Victory Will Look Like

America must abandon the notion of complete victory against Al Qaeda and focus more on shaping the conditions that will effectively counter their apocalyptic message. There will be no Al Qaeda delegates signing a declaration of unconditional surrender on the deck of an American battle ship as was done by the Japanese. As was posited in the first concept, America is in a long term effort against Al Qaeda and whatever organizations will follow them afterwards. The fight against apocalyptic and radical Islam will be a long term effort. As such, America may need to consider success as being the absence of spectacular attacks rather than the elusive pursuit of the total destruction of Al Qaeda. To accomplish this, America must do two things.

First, America must continue to prosecute the kinetic fight wherever Al Qaeda masses for training or attacks. That is, it must aggressively pursue the enemy in areas of the world where they train and organize to fight. The notion that there will always be someone who needs to be killed is sound; however, as many American commanders have stated already, America cannot kill its way to victory. Second, America must build a permanent and comprehensive, whole of government, effort around the globe with the mission of identifying Al Qaeda organizational support links and creating programs that will help dilute Al Qaeda's millenarian message that the Muslim community is threatened.

The first part has been done with extreme effectiveness. Most experts will agree that Al Qaeda is unable to plan and coordinate attacks as it did prior to 9-11.

Bin Laden and Zawahiri are now living like fugitives in caves rather than like presidents or military commanders in compounds in Afghanistan. Other Al Qaeda leaders have been killed or captured, and the organization's ability to communicate globally and to finance major operations has been significantly reduced.³⁸

Furthermore, the absence of spectacular attacks on the US mainland proves that Al Qaeda has been unable to organize effective follow-on attacks of the magnitude of 9-11. America needs to continue this effort but must complement it with a world wide effort of mitigating the conditions that facilitate the growth and appeal of the terrorist organization.

The non-kinetic fight against Al Qaeda is being waged by embassy staffs across the world. State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office for Foreign Development and Aid, Drug Enforcement Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and military organizations are just a few of the agencies represented in many overseas locations. To execute this non-kinetic effort properly, there has to be an overarching plan that can be used by these agencies in order to properly nest their efforts. The result will be a coordinated effort with maximum unity of effort. America's efforts may force Al Qaeda to lie dormant, but they, or organizations like them, will never completely go away. America must establish a worldwide, whole of government effort united under one mandate and set of overarching goals.

This worldwide effort must identify two main objectives. First, there has to be an overarching plan that addresses Al Qaeda's lines of support. That is, an effort must be made to continuously maintain awareness of Al Qaeda's financial and logistical efforts around the world. Relationships among nefarious actors have to be linked in order to

properly trace enemy cells to their funding and logistical sources. Many of these sources may include legitimate businesses in friendly nations. This link analysis process must be coordinated at the highest level and America's efforts against these sources must include a military and inter-agency effort executed by embassies around the world. Resources, personnel, and efforts have to be focused on disrupting Al Qaeda's critical nodes of support under one overarching campaign plan.

Second, this overarching campaign plan should be managed by the military. Now, this study does not propose that all embassy efforts vis-à-vis their respective host nation will fall under a military campaign plan. Instead, it does suggest that the effort against Al Qaeda can be better coordinated if executed under a military operational plan that has an established command type relationship. That is, that all efforts, kinetic or non-kinetic abroad, be managed by Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC).

The staff capabilities of GCCs and Theater Special Operations Commands provide excellent platforms that can properly integrate interagency augmentation and provide for a holistic and overarching planning effort. For example, USAID country plan for Indonesia or Paraguay are approved by the ambassador who will always have final say and this should not change. This new proposal would allow a GCC commander to task USAID to provide monies or resources to projects that complement the efforts against Al Qaeda in those countries. Furthermore, this effort would require extensive staff augmentation from the inter-agency to the GCCs. If done correctly, this would give the military executive agency and more importantly, a command type of relationship with federal agencies abroad that would truly synchronize the whole of government effort.

Both the kinetic and non-kinetic fights, as described above, will be a long term effort. By long term, this study suggests that Rinehart's notion of "new terrorism" will be a permanent condition faced by America and other states around the world. Americans have to accept that they will be under war conditions for the foreseeable future. The notion of victory must be re-defined as a process of executing the aforementioned kinetic and non-kinetic effort efficiently. Victory will now be considered as episodic time periods in between major attacks against the homeland. America must learn from each attack or failed attack and continuously adjust its kinetic and non-kinetic response apparatus to meet the evolving enemy.

Conclusion

Al Qaeda was at war with America long before America realized it. Like Qutb, Al Zawahiri and Bin Laden see America as the ultimate oppressor and the major obstacle to the establishment of their millenarian goals. According to their view, the umma across the Muslim world is threatened and the only solution is the establishment of an Islamic regime that unites all Muslims under a strict interpretation of Sharia law. Their aspirations are grand, utopian, and their mandate is based on narrowly interpreted divine principles. In spite of this, their motivation is unwavering and their commitment is truly genuine. However it is this very narrow interpretation of a proud religion which may be their ultimate undoing.

This study has suggested that Al Qaeda's vision is unique and their millenarian goals, coupled with a rare level of fanaticism, make them extremely dangerous in regard to the level of violence and lack of restraint. To effect their goals of an Islamic state under a Caliphate, they will have to topple many established governments in the Middle-East that have established systems with strong roots (Turkey, Iran, Syria, Jordan, and

until 2003, Iraq just to name a few). Moreover, their unique message appeals to only a committed few.

This is not to say that there are many Muslims in the Middle-East who hate America or even tacitly supported Al Qaeda's 9-11 attacks. However, many of these same people would probably not support a Taliban type government in their own country. Moreover, would organizations such as HAMAS or Hezbollah give up their sovereignty to a messianic like leader envisioned by Al Qaeda? HAMAS has a hard time sharing power with other Palestinian organizations which has caused violent infighting. As such, it can be argued that Al Qaeda's unique message of a Caliphate resonates very well on paper but will be hard to execute.

The concepts identified by this study are more inclined to help America fight a war of attrition and to wait out the eventual demise or more than likely, the transformation of Al Qaeda to something less sinister. Establishing the war psychology at home, changing our notion of self determination abroad, and re-defining victory will help guide America to navigate the dangerous waters for the next 100 or so years. Rinehart's notion of "new terrorism" represents a new playing field which has forever altered the rules of conflict. The United States must adapt to fight a protracted war that it may never win, but one that it cannot lose.

Endnotes

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⁵ Ibid.

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¹⁰ James F. Rinehart, "Rebirth, Islamic Revitalization, and the 'New Terror': An analysis of the Al Qaeda phenomenon" (Troy University, Department of Political Science), 2.

¹¹ James F. Rinehart, *Revolution and the Millennium: China, Mexico, and Iran* (Westport, Praeger, 1997), 3.

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¹³ Sharia or Islamic law is a religious code practiced by some Muslims. Fundamentalists consider Sharia as a way of life and should be part of society. A strict adherence to a subjective interpretation of Sharia was seen in Afghanistan under the Taliban.

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²⁶ Maxwell Taylor, *The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence* (London, BPC Whetons, LTD, 1991), 33.

²⁷ Ibid., 18.

²⁸ Organizations like the Tamil Tigers have also exhibited a propensity to conduct suicide attacks. Yet, they have modest territorial goals as described by Rinehart and, therefore, do not fully meet his definition of new terrorism.

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