British Intelligence Operations as They Relate to Britain's Defeat at Yorktown, 1781
Abstract
This thesis examines the role of British intelligence operations during the American Revolutionary War as they apply to the British defeat at Yorktown. The thesis begins with a history of British intelligence starting with Henry VII in the 15th century followed by discussions of strategic collection against the burgeoning French-American alliance, preconceptions during the planning of the southern campaign, and the tactical intelligence operations of Lord Charles Cornwallis' army from the British victory at Charleston in 1780 through the defeat at Yorktown in 1781. It concludes that, at the strategic level, British intelligence accurately monitored French assistance to the Americans but had difficulty using the information to effect meaningful action against the Continental Army. At the operational level, General Sir Henry Clinton developed an accurate, reliable intelligence system in the northern colonies but was unable to transfer that success to the southern theater. At the tactical level, General Cornwallis suffered from initial misconceptions about the degree of loyalist support in the South, lacked a general knowledge of the physical terrain in the southern colonies, and failed to conduct proactive, deep reconnaissance during operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 11, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA524436
Entities
People
- Scott E. Conley
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College