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**LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN
ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S COLD START DOCTRINE AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE
SUBCONTINENT**

by

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June 2010

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STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT**

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ABSTRACT

In May 1998, both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices, adding new complications to an already volatile security environment. In the years since these tests, the Indian subcontinent has been the site of one war in 1999 and numerous other military confrontations, the biggest occurring in 2001 and 2002. The majority of these conflicts have risen from attacks in India and Kashmir carried out by non-state actors based in Pakistan. India thus faces a compellence problem in which it wants to force Pakistan to stop its perceived support of these actors, and yet it can only do so to a limited extent for fear of nuclear retaliation. India's answer, following the 2001/2002 military standoff with Pakistan, is the Cold Start doctrine, a strategy of limited war under the nuclear umbrella.

This thesis examines the efficacy of the Cold Start doctrine in the context of three major areas: Pakistan's principal-agent dilemma, historical escalation problems on the subcontinent, and domestic Indian civil-military and inter-service rivalry issues. Based on the findings regarding these areas, this study will show that Cold Start is not the answer to India's compellence problem. Rather, cooperation to combat a common foe is a more practical solution than mutual antagonism.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, antagonism and distrust have defined the relationship between India and Pakistan. The two nation-states have fought four wars in a span of little more than sixty years and escalated to the brink of war on numerous other occasions. Today, instability in the state security realm as well as the continued presence of terrorism, state-sponsored or otherwise, and the employment of proxies in a nuclearized environment combine to make the prospects of confrontation a harrowing one in the region. Neutralizing Pakistan's use of asymmetric warfare in this volatile climate is the core of India's compellence problem. It wants to punish Pakistan for perceived threats yet remain just short of the threshold that would trigger a nuclear war.

In an attempt to achieve a greater degree of flexibility for this purpose, the Indian military, specifically the army, has shifted to a more offensive posture with the creation of what it calls the Cold Start doctrine.¹ This strategy, unveiled in 2004, moves away from India's decades-long reliance on defense and corps centric action to a more flexible, rapidly deployable force structure that would be employed to punish Pakistan in the event of proxy attacks.² In theory, these independent forces would act both quickly to preempt any actions taken by domestic political leadership and the international community to avoid armed confrontation and also deliberately to force Pakistani compliance with Indian demands while remaining below the threshold of a nuclear exchange. India believes that its ability to respond quickly and decisively to third party attacks as well as inflict sufficient, punitive costs on the Pakistani military and state is necessary to deter Islamabad's support of anti-Indian terrorist organizations. Cold Start, thus, is India's answer to this problem of inflicting cost on Pakistan without triggering a nuclear war.

¹ Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 158. This strategy is discussed in detail in Chapter II.

² Ibid.

With the large efforts that India is pursuing to operationalize the Cold Start strategy, the following core question can be raised: Can Cold Start achieve the goals it is designed to accomplish or, in fact, do other factors including misplaced strategic targeting, historical escalatory issues, and domestic hurdles limit its potential and even make it dangerous for stability on the subcontinent by creating a greater possibility of general war in a nuclear context?

Accordingly, this thesis will explore the nature of the Cold Start doctrine to ask if it provides the optimum security framework for India, and if it offers the best guarantee of stability in South Asia. Three broad issues undermining the strategy's potential for addressing India's compellence goals are as follows:

1. For India, the application of its superior conventional strength as an imminent threat organized offensively is a logical course of action to deter a Pakistan-based threat under the nuclear shadow. However, as research will demonstrate, this argument is not sound. At the most basic strategic level, Cold Start fails to correctly solve the underlying principal-agent problem.³ Instead of pursuing the agent (proxies), India has chosen to counter the principal (Pakistan), operating under the assumption that Islamabad can rein in its agents. Therein lies the problem since, as recent events suggest, namely the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, Pakistan-based proxies pursue their own maximalist agendas, beyond the control of Pakistan.⁴
2. History shows that similar aspects of Cold Start strategy employed in past crises and conflicts have led to unintended escalatory consequences that neither nation can ignore. The blitzkrieg strategy and unforeseen Indian gains in the 1971 East Pakistan War, the deception and miscommunication in the

³ The principal-agent problem is primarily an economic-based explanation of a situation that arises when an agent employed by a principal oversteps his bounds and begins to pursue his own agenda. Obviously this model has great applicability to the dilemma facing India. For a thorough explanation of the principal-agent problem, see Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver G. Hart, "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," *Econometrica* 51, no. 1 (January 1983): 7–45.

⁴ Lydia Polgreen and Souad Mekhennet, "Militant Network Is Intact Long After Mumbai Siege," *New York Times*, 29 September 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/asia/30mumbai.html> (accessed October 2, 2009).

1986–87 Brasstacks episode, and the potential for escalation during the 1999 Kargil conflict despite the presence of nuclear weapons, each to be addressed in this thesis, are examples of similar flaws in the operational conception of Cold Start.

3. Finally, Cold Start is contradictory to the evolution of India's domestic institutions, both at the government-military relationship level and at the military inter-service level. Civil-military relations have been a complex issue in India since partition. Since 1947, the independence of the military has been limited and its input at the state level ignored. Thus, the Indian armed forces have existed in a state where they have not been fully trusted nor their capabilities understood. Cold Start, though, requires just the opposite and as such could create major issues for the civil-military divide in New Delhi. Historic inter-service rivalry also poses problems that could undermine the basic execution of Cold Start. Although an army-centric doctrine, the strategy requires the wide-ranging capabilities that can only be executed by the Indian Air Force and Navy. However, these two services see themselves as fully capable and not subordinate to another service. These attitudes as well as competition between the services for resources are major problems for Cold Start. The lack of an effective joint command only exacerbates the issue.

In the final analysis, Cold Start is not the panacea that New Delhi needs. Rather, a robust deterrence coupled with diplomacy and cooperation is a more practical and potentially successful approach. While this thesis is South Asia-centric, its conclusions have broad ranging implications in this era of proxy war and non-state actor.

B. IMPORTANCE

The study of "Cold Start" and its implications for strategic security on the subcontinent are of undeniable importance. Instability and security problems between India and Pakistan have been an issue for over six decades. Although the uneasy relationship between the two nations was a constant source of tension in South Asia, the international community virtually ignored South Asia except during shooting wars. That

all changed, however, with the testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998. As a result, South Asia became a central focus of concern for analysts and world leaders alike. In 2000, American President William J. Clinton called the region “the most dangerous place in the world.”⁵

While the introduction of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent heightened security concerns, the underlying dynamics remain the same. India, the status quo power, still wishes to resolve its disputes with Pakistan, namely that over Kashmir, on a bilateral basis. Pakistan, on the other hand, a relatively weak revisionist state with unsatisfied territorial issues closely related to its legitimacy as a Muslim homeland, sees nuclear weapons as a shield that allows it to utilize proxy and asymmetric attacks while deterring full Indian retaliation.⁶ Nuclear weapons also give Pakistan leverage on the international stage to demand a multilateral settlement over Kashmir, ideally in Pakistan’s favor.⁷

In this strategic environment, India’s problem becomes how to deter or even punish Pakistan for its use of proxies without triggering nuclear war. Operations and tactics used in the past lacked effectiveness, which became painfully clear as New Delhi discovered after the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001.⁸ The disposition and structure of the military was not ideal to mount a rapid response to perceived proxy threats or actual military aggression.⁹ Consequently, the Indian Army came up with the Cold Start doctrine to give it a more robust capability to deal with Pakistani-sponsored terrorists. From this standpoint, superior conventional forces could be used to deter continued Pakistani sponsoring of proxies intent on doing harm to India. The forces just had to be reorganized into a more robust and quickly deployable force

⁵ President Clinton Arrives in Bangladesh for Historic Visit, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/south/03/20/clinton.bangladesh/index.html> (accessed October 15, 2009).

⁶ S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 49, 169.

⁷ Ibid., 49, 169.

⁸ Praveen Swami, “Failed Threats and Flawed Responses: India’s Military Responses to Pakistan’s Proxy War,” *India Review* 3, no. 2 (April 2004): 147–170.

⁹ S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 88.

that was also agile, and capable of fine gradations of escalation that could punish Pakistan beneath the threshold of full scale war. Nevertheless, the shift of Indian forces to a more offensive stance capable of quick strikes into Pakistan is inherently destabilizing. As military analysts point out, Pakistan will not sit idly by while India increases its military capabilities.¹⁰ As a result, the potential of a security dilemma spiral between the two nations is a distinct possibility. In the end, instead of addressing the fundamental proxy nature of the threat, India has chosen to focus on state to state coercion, which, ironically, could make India more vulnerable.

While the significance of Cold Start is evident for the South Asia region, the study of its potential effects and its impact on warfare has broader implications. In the current era of warfare, the likelihood of a major state on state conventional war is declining.¹¹ Instead, because of the overwhelming capabilities of conventionally dominant states, those states are more likely to face asymmetric threats or state-sponsored proxy attacks since those avenues offer the best course of action for weaker powers desiring to inflict pain on their more powerful adversary.¹² This situation naturally raises the question: how does a state deal with such a threat? Is state to state coercion the answer when proxies are beyond state control? Or is state-to-state cooperation to mutually combat a shared problem a more logical, though difficult, course of action? Far from being regionally specific, this issue is one that potentially all powers, regional or global, may face.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

The Cold Start doctrine, in its current form, is designed to allow India to use its superior conventional forces to its advantage in the asymmetric warfare arena by deterring proxy attacks in the first place while inflicting swift, yet measured punishment on Pakistan should initial deterrence fail. In theory, by creating an offensive oriented

¹⁰ Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces," *Military Review* 84, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2004): 58.

¹¹ Thomas X. Hammes, "Rethinking the Principle of War: The Future of Warfare," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony McIvor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 269–270.

¹² Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005/06): 19.

force capable of rapid retaliatory strikes against Pakistan, New Delhi could compel Islamabad to alter its relationship with proxy terrorist organizations, thus ending the asymmetric threat to India. Logically, this makes sense, since the other option successfully targeting and eliminating elusive proxies and terrorists, is costly, time-consuming, and not one hundred percent effective. In reality, though, logic is often undermined by human factors, which is the case here. At the basic level, the question remains whether coercion through conventional forces, offensive in nature or not, gives India an actual advantage in this environment. Coercion is a useful tool if an opponent is coercible, or in this case, if that coercion can be translated effectively from principal to agent. While New Delhi may wish to blame every terrorist attack on Islamabad, it is unclear how much control Pakistan really retains over many of the radical groups it once sponsored.¹³ An entire strategy based on deterring or punishing a state for something it may not control is problematic, especially when that state faces internal unrest and its own terrorist threats.

Aside from fundamentals, on the operational level Cold Start has severe consequences if implemented in its current design. The components of its strategy, rapid deployment, misperception, and intentional deception, do not have a particularly good track record in past cases of Indo-Pakistani conflict. While India may claim to have limited objectives with its Cold Start doctrine, history demonstrates how claims, assumptions, and miscommunication can lead to catastrophic consequences.

A rapid, offensive, independent force envisioned under Cold Start also poses problems for India internally on government and institutional levels. Since independence, civil authorities in New Delhi have had a complex relationship with the military, often resulting in the marginalization of the armed services in the governmental decision making process because of historical mistrust of the military by the civilians. Consequently, the military has lacked the requisite strategic independence and initiative needed for bold, offensive operations. While politicians have refrained from intervention on the tactical level since 1962, they still control and limit military action at the political

¹³ Polgreen and Mekhennet, "Militant Network Is Intact Long After Mumbai Seige."

level. While this is certainly understandable in a democracy, this has raised consternation in the Indian military, which sees political maneuvering and debate during a crisis as weakness in the face of an imminent threat. A good example is the military's reaction to the 2001–2002 military standoff with Pakistan that occurred following the December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament. Slow mobilization allowed domestic debate and international intervention to limit military action. As a result, Cold Start was created to circumvent just such government action in the future and give the military the independence it needs to conduct rapid deployments and operations. The complex civil-military relationship, though, raises the question whether this strategy is a practical or even possible solution for the problems India faces. The complexities of Cold Start also require institutional-level inter-service cooperation and “jointness” to maximize its potential effectiveness. However, Cold Start was designed as a primarily army-centric doctrine and it remains unclear whether the Indian Air Force and Navy will freely accept subservient roles.¹⁴ Historically, the services have pursued their own agendas and doctrines to obtain limited resources due to the lack of an effective joint command structure and have resisted single service dominance. Consequently, service interoperability has suffered in the past and remains poor in the present, a major problem for Cold Start. Thus, while a theoretical Cold Start may seem executable, the fundamental problems internal to the Indian state tend to limit the doctrine's potential in reality.

The hypothesis, therefore, is that Cold Start is not the solution to the third party proxy challenge that India faces for the following reasons:

1. Fundamentally, it fails to address the nature of the principal-agent problem by transferring responsibility to Pakistan to pressure the agent.
2. Operationally, strategies and tactics that proved to be dangerous in the past form the heart of Cold Start and, if employed as designed, could unhinge the delicate security balance between India and Pakistan. Ironically, in creating

¹⁴ Y. I. Patel, “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra – a Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army's Doctrine,” *Bharat Rakshak Monitor* 6, no. 6 (May-July 2004), <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-6/patel.html> (accessed July 15, 2009).

an external threat to Pakistan's vital interests, Cold Start would force Islamabad to focus outward, drawing limited resources away from internal security that could combat terrorists and proxies, the same groups India wants Pakistan to stop. The resulting increased instability on the subcontinent would be a dangerous prospect considering the decade-long nuclearization of the region.

3. Finally, Cold Start raises complex issues of civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry that have yet to be resolved. Without a resolution, Cold Start could, in fact, be dangerous if the military presses to utilize a strategy that forces New Delhi's acquiescence to the demands of the armed services during a crisis.

As stated earlier, although Cold Start is a specific doctrine for localized conflicts on the Indian subcontinent, the assumptions behind it are applicable on the broader strategic landscape. If the hypothesis that Cold Start will not deter third party threats from Pakistan is correct, then other nations facing the same principal-agent dilemma may have to alter their fundamental suppositions regarding the use of state to state coercion as a solution to proxy challenges. Coercion, after all, is only effective if directed at the right target. In the end, only through multiple approaches, including properly executed coercion, can nation-states succeed in the asymmetric warfare era.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is no shortage of literature regarding Indo-Pakistani conflict. To address the relevant thinking, this review is divided into three conceptual groupings that discuss the literature surrounding Cold Start itself, asymmetric warfare and deterrence, and finally, terrorism deterrence. In the end, while a great deal of research has obviously been done on conflict on the subcontinent, there are gaps in the literature that this thesis will attempt to fill. As discussed earlier, the Cold Start doctrine, announced in 2004, is a relatively new concept. Because of this fact, as well as limited open source materials for operational security reasons, it has not been readily analyzed in academic circles. Despite this fact, the few articles that have been written have provided needed insight on

the strategy, namely Walter Ladwig's 2004 article, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," which addresses the strategy and discusses India's ability to implement the strategy at the present time.¹⁵ Writings by S. Paul Kapur and others also explore the nature of Cold Start and the issues surrounding its doctrinal formulation and implementation.¹⁶ The main argument that the bulk of these articles proffer is that Cold Start will be destabilizing to the region due to its likely creation of a security dilemma.

The majority of other articles come from the South Asia Analysis Group, an Indian think tank that, according to its Web site, seeks to "advance strategic analysis and contribute to the expansion of knowledge of Indian and International security and promote public understanding."¹⁷ Not surprisingly, most of the writing regarding Cold Start is favorable and contains a heavy Indian slant when addressing the necessity of the doctrine and its potential for success.¹⁸ From the Pakistani perspective, India's Cold Start doctrine provides the Indian army an offensive capability that "could decisively degrade Pakistan's military potential," but that advantage does not remain absolute as "a change as radical as Cold Start Doctrine necessitates a response from Pakistan."¹⁹ Pakistan is also aware of the nuclear dimension as "not violating Pakistan's perceived

¹⁵ Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?"

¹⁶ Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia;" Walter C. Ladwig, "The challenge of changing Indian military doctrine," *Seminar* 599 (July 2009): 33–37; S. Paul Kapur, "Deterrence and asymmetric warfare," *Seminar* 599 (July 2009): 52–56; Zachary Davis, Feroz Khan, and Rebekah Dietz, *Conference Report: Cold Start: India's New Strategic Doctrine and its Implications* (Monterey: Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008); Feroz Hassan Khan, "Balancing Military Contingencies: Cold Start and Pakistan's Strategic Dilemma" (paper presented at the conference entitled Cold Start: India's New Strategic Doctrine and its Implications, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, May 29–30, 2008).

¹⁷ South Asia Analysis Group, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/The%20Web%20Site.htm> (accessed July 18, 2009).

¹⁸ Subhash Kapila, "India's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed," <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html> (accessed July 19, 2009); Subhash Kapila, "Indian Army's 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed - Part II (Additional Imperatives)," <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1013.html> (accessed July 19, 2009); Subhash Kapila, "Indian Army Validates its Cold Start War Doctrine," <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers15%5Cpaper1408.html> (accessed July 19, 2009); Subhash Kapila, "India's 'Cold Start War Doctrine' Revisited," <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2293.html> (accessed July 19, 2009).

¹⁹ Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening," 58.

nuclear threshold emerges as one of the major constraints in any decisive application of Cold Start Doctrine.”²⁰ The *Defence Journal*, a publication focusing on Pakistani defense issues, also addresses Cold Start from the Pakistan’s point of view, naturally pointing out its flaws. Authors, such as its managing editor, Ikram Sehgal, identify the dangers an operational Cold Start strategy would pose for the subcontinent, specifically the potential for escalation spiraling to the nuclear level, which would have devastating consequences for both sides.²¹

Just as general academic literature regarding Cold Start is limited, the same is true when discussing asymmetric warfare, proxies, and deterrence. The vast majority of writing on war and conflict involves major state on state warfare, conventional or otherwise. Still, authors, such as Andrew Mack, T. V. Paul, and Ivan Arreguín Toft, have produced scholarly works that examine how and why weaker powers initiate and sometimes win conflicts against superior opponents.²² Kapur, in *Dangerous Deterrent*, addresses the nuclear weapons angle of this literature, explaining that nuclear weapons can enable weaker, dissatisfied states to confront more powerful states since nuclear weapons provide a shield against full retaliation.²³ The theories offered by these works can help shed light on the reasons why Pakistan, a weaker power, chooses to initiate conflict against a superior rival, India. Only through this understanding can a proper solution to this dilemma be created.²⁴ For Mack, the main issue with which to be concerned is the relative stake each side has in a conflict.²⁵ If a weaker power has a

²⁰ Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening,” 59.

²¹ Ikram Sehgal, “War-Gaming Nuclear Armageddon,” *The News*, 29 January 2009, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=159608> (accessed May 14, 2010); Ikram Sehgal, “Cold Start-ing Pakistan,” *The News*, 22 January 2009, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=158401> (accessed May 14, 2010).

²² Andrew J. R. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200; T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ivan Arreguín Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

²³ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, 55.

²⁴ Throughout this discussion, the nuclear dimension must be kept in mind as it adds another layer of complication for India’s ability to compel Pakistan to cease its asymmetric strategies. The nuclear backstop inherently limits India’s options to fully punish Pakistan. Cold Start theoretically opens other avenues of limited response under the nuclear umbrella.

²⁵ Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 13–15.

strong interest in a given situation, then deterrence will be hard to effect. Paul argues that a weaker state will initiate conflict when it perceives it has ability to inflict pain over a short duration for limited objectives, despite the strength of its adversary.²⁶ Finally, Toft explains that while interests and relative power are important, the main factor to be considered is the strategy each side possesses and the way it is used.²⁷ While each has a different explanation for the causes of asymmetric war, all of these works, as does most asymmetric warfare literature, assume the rationality of the actors involved in a crisis, meaning that even though a power is weaker, its expected benefits of initiating a conflict outweigh the expected costs of such an action. This is an important point as to the potential effectiveness of a deterrence regimen in an asymmetric environment. In general, the absence of rational actors would mean the inability to apply a reliable deterrence strategy to a given situation.²⁸

Although asymmetric deterrence may be possible, the existing literature on the subject lacks a consensus of opinion on what form such deterrence should take or if that deterrence is possible at all. Scholars, such as D. Marc Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare, Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, and Catherine C. Langlois, utilize statistics, logic, game theory, and mathematical models to test the potential success or failure of asymmetric deterrence as a theory with variables such as credibility and time.²⁹ The results point to the success of asymmetric deterrence if threat credibility is high and the time span in which the threat would be employed is short. Otherwise, the results are mixed. Despite the uncertainty surrounding asymmetric deterrence, what is clear, however, is the fact that most academics see a limitation in the use of coercion as a solution to unconventional threats.

²⁶ Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts*, 13.

²⁷ Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 6.

²⁸ Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence against "Irrational" Adversaries: No Common Knowledge" in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 58.

²⁹ D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (May 1991): 305–344; Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (Mar 1993): 1–27; Jean-Pierre P. Langlois and Catherine C. Langlois, "Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2005): 503–527.

As previously discussed, Kapur and Ladwig see the potential for security escalation as a result of the implementation of Cold Start and are skeptical that the strategy will succeed.

Emanuel Alder goes further and identifies what he terms as a “deterrence trap,” where a strong actor cannot retaliate fully against a weaker actor because of negative social consequences that can actually bolster the weaker opponent’s position.³⁰ At the same time, the powerful actor cannot exercise restraint because the weaker actor would see weakness in the strong and thus instigate further hostilities. The question then that remains for all of these scholars is how a state can effectively deter a threat in an unconventional dominated environment. Cold Start attempts to deal with this problem in a much more complicated a nuclear environment. India sees potential success in such a strategy that would leverage its conventional superiority to punish the weaker Pakistani military and state while at the same time remaining below the perceived nuclear threshold. History and other factors discussed later show the potential flaws in this logic. In the end, by utilizing Cold Start, India’s compellence problem could, in fact, be made more difficult by encouraging aggressive Pakistani counter-balancing both conventionally and unconventionally.

The final area of literature that has relevance for this thesis is terrorism and its deterrence. Before 2001, the extent of the academic literature on terrorism was limited, yet after the attacks on Washington and New York, the interest on the subject grew immensely. The majority of academic writing focuses on what terrorism actually is, the definition of it, the causes of it, and whether it is a rational or irrational act. From these works arise obvious questions: How does one end terrorism? How can one prevent it? Can it be deterred? Scholarly works such as those by Robert Pape conclude that terrorism, even of the suicide kind, is a rational act. As a rational act, then, in theory, its

³⁰ Emanuel Alder, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era,” in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 85–86.

deterrence is possible.³¹ Pape points out the difficulty in trying to isolate and deter the sole bomber, instead advocating that foreign presence in a hostile area should be curtailed, thus, reducing the incentive for attacks.³² Other works, notably Max Abrahms' "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," explain the futility of terrorism as a coercive act, pointing out that terrorism often produces a greater likelihood of retaliation than state capitulation.³³ Despite the theoretical value of these works, general terrorism literature is too broad for the scope of this thesis. One of the few terrorism articles that is more specific and has more relevance is K. R. Singh's article, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy," which addresses such issues as the effects state-sponsored terror has on the target as well as the sponsor, the role that international law and the international community play in these cases, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism forces and deterrence in this environment.³⁴ Daniel Byman's *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* also provides insight on state-based proxies, their use as strategic instruments, and the often complicated relationship between the state and the proxy.³⁵

As for the deterrence, prevention and ending of terrorism, some authors, such as Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva's, contend that deterrence of terrorism is indeed possible because of the inherent rationality behind such acts.³⁶ However, the type of deterrence, namely military force, must be considered carefully in order to prevent the sympathetic rise of other terrorists who view heavy handed tactics as indicative of a state's more ambitious designs.³⁷ Others in academia see the solution to the terrorism

³¹ Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (Aug., 2003): 343–361; Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2005).

³² Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 357.

³³ Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Autumn 2006): 42–78.

³⁴ K. R. Singh, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy," *International Studies* 32, no. 2 (1995): 119–137.

³⁵ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³⁶ Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 87–123.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

problem not on the battlefield, but in the courtroom.³⁸ An effective justice system and law enforcement apparatus can be an effective deterrent if used properly. Finally, numerous studies have attempted to explain how terrorist groups end. The most recent and comprehensive was published by the RAND Corporation in 2008.³⁹ Its findings that most terrorist groups have reached an end through political means or police action have implications for this thesis and Cold Start itself. In the end, while all these works on terrorism and the deterrence of it are informative, their bearing is limited to the periphery of this project. As explained earlier, Cold Start, the focus of this thesis, is designed to forcefully compel a state actor to stop its perceived sponsorship of proxies while remaining below the nuclear threshold, not the individual terrorist. However, as the government of Pakistan loses more and more control over radical organizations than it once had, this strategy may prove to be impractical and ultimately limited in its ability to solve India's terrorism problem.

E. METHODOLOGY

In order effectively to analyze the limits of Cold Start as a viable instrument of compellence and deterrence for third party proxy warfare, the qualitative case study method was primarily used. To address the principal-agent problem that lies at the heart of India's dilemma, Pakistan's historical use of proxies as a tool to inflict cost upon India is examined, focusing on two broad periods that are divided by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Initially, the use of third party fighters seemed like an economically effective solution to Pakistan's security imbalance with India. Over time, however, those proxies have become more and more uncontrollable, creating their own agendas beyond the scope of Pakistan's original intentions, especially after 9/11 and Pakistan's alliance with the United States. It has become what Kapur and Ganguly term a "sorcerer's apprentice" problem.⁴⁰

³⁸ "Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War," *Harvard Law Review* 115, no. 4 (Feb 2002): 1217–1238.

³⁹ Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda* (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2008).

⁴⁰ Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (January 2010): 48.

As for escalation issues surrounding Cold Start, since the doctrine has not been fully developed or implemented, their effectiveness in the real world cannot be analyzed. For this reason, an historical case study approach is used to analyze similar events and issues that can be applied to Cold Start in order to identify the potential problems inherent in the doctrine.⁴¹ The first Cold Start specific case study to be addressed is the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War where a rapid, blitzkrieg attack was launched by India against East Pakistan. The lightning offensive nature of that war is remarkably close in concept to that proposed in Cold Start. In this case, Indian forces moved much quicker than expected and tactical decisions were made to advance farther and take more territory than originally planned. Pakistani forces, expecting a limited assault, were quickly overwhelmed. One can see how this could easily be repeated in a Cold Start operation designed for deception and rapid strikes. Unintended escalation and miscommunication coupled with the fog of war could result in Indian forces rolling into an important Pakistani city, only this time it could be Islamabad and not Dacca. The implications of such an act would be devastating considering the ever-present nuclear dimension. I also study the miscommunication and misperceptions that caused Exercise/Operation Brasstacks, an Indian military exercise designed to evaluate mass Indian mobilization and capabilities, to escalate to the brink of armed conflict. The very nature of Cold Start and its core logic of deception and the creation of confusion on multiple fronts lead to the very real possibility of a repeat of the Brasstacks episode.

Lastly, the 1999 Kargil conflict is examined as an example of the potential for escalation under the nuclear umbrella. Despite the peaceful resolution of the crisis, both sides had planned for an increase in military and combat operations with the possibility of escalation to a full scale war beyond the confines of the Kashmir mountains. Though nuclear weapons were on the minds of the leadership of the two nations, nevertheless, open combat was seen as a realistic option. In the end, these case studies will show that Cold Start may in fact create an even more dangerous environment on the subcontinent

⁴¹ The cases of the 1971 War, the Brasstacks episode, and the Kargil crisis are examined not only because of their similarities with a Cold Start operation but also because they each occurred during a different phase of nuclear weapons development on the subcontinent. These relevant cases show that escalation, misperception, miscommunication, and deception have continued despite the growing shadow of nuclear arms.

by threatening the Pakistan state in a provocative fashion rather focusing on the actual threat, the proxies. What may seem as a direct solution to the problem would actually be an indirect approach to the true danger. By centering on coercion of the state and employing similar strategies and tactics that have caused great harm and consternation in Pakistan in the past, India could, in fact, further destabilize the security relationship between the two sides. In other words, antagonizing the principal does not end the menace of the agent.

Finally, historical analysis is used to trace the evolution of Indian military and defense doctrine and its current iteration in Cold Start. This approach is utilized specifically to address civil-military relations, namely the lack of military independence and the absence of military input on the governmental level, and inter-service rivalry issues in order to show how these fundamental issues that have developed over the last six decades of Indian history undermine Cold Start's effective implementation.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is divided into two major conceptual categories and is broken down into six chapters. The first conceptual category lays out the problem India faces and the solution it has devised in Cold Start. This first part includes Chapters I and II. The second part of the thesis examines specific problems with Cold Start and concludes with alternative course of actions that both Islamabad and New Delhi should take to resolve issues that continue to plague their relationship. This second part included Chapters III through VI. A detailed chapter breakdown is as follows: following this first chapter, Chapter II will examine India's compellence problem under the nuclear umbrella and provide a detailed explanation of the Cold Start Doctrine. Chapter III will provide a background of the use of proxy conflict waged by Pakistan against India and trace the rise of the principal-agent problem that Islamabad faces in the present. The following chapter will address both deliberate and inadvertent escalation and present case studies that examine the potential consequences to stability in South Asia of an operational Cold Start. Chapter V will examine the evolution of Indian defense and military doctrine, discussing specifically the institutional problems of civil-military relations and inter-

service rivalries that undermine Cold Start's implementation. Lastly, the thesis will conclude with findings that an alternative course of action should be taken by India on the subcontinent and by other nations that face a state-based proxy threat, whether under the nuclear shadow or not.

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II. INDIA'S COMPELLENCE CONCERN AND COLD START

*The goal of this limited war doctrine is to establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on the Pakistan Army...[while] at the same time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level.*⁴²

—Walter C. Ladwig III

The preceding chapter established the conceptual foundation for this thesis. This chapter focuses on the core issue that this thesis is designed to address: India's compellence problem and its solution to that problem, the Cold Start doctrine. Since the early years of independence, India has faced a proxy threat from Pakistan, mainly as result of the unresolved status of Jammu and Kashmir. Both states feel equally entitled to the territory both for strategic as well as ideological reasons. Despite fighting two wars over the territory in the first two decades following independence, the issue became relatively dormant in the aftermath of the 1971 India-Pakistan War. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, though, the problem once again came to dominate the relations between the two states. Pakistan, the conventionally weaker power, renewed its interest in using proxy fighters as a way to inflict pain on India over the Kashmir issue. India responded in kind with its superior conventional forces though these actions became costly in lives, manpower, and resources. In 1998, the emergence of overt nuclear capabilities for both nations added another dimension to the ongoing crisis. India faced a new problem. It could no longer threaten full conventional retaliation against Pakistan because of fear of a nuclear response from Islamabad. The question then arises as how best to compel Pakistan to stop supporting proxies in Kashmir and India proper while at the same time remaining below the threshold of a nuclear war. In New Delhi, the idea of a limited war under the nuclear umbrella has emerged. Cold Start, the latest iteration of that idea, was unveiled in 2004.

⁴² Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 164.

This chapter will examine India's current compellence problem as well as the Cold Start doctrine, its present answer to this conundrum. This discussion will provide the basis for the remainder of the thesis that will critique Cold Start specifically and the notion of limited war in the shadow of nuclear weapons in general.

A. INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 2001, five militants driving in a car with Indian government markings breached security surrounding the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and opened fire using AK-47 assault rifles and grenades.⁴³ When the attack was over, the five militants were dead along with six Indian security personnel and one gardener.⁴⁴ Remarkably, although the Parliament was in session at the time, no member of the legislature was injured or killed. Almost immediately, Indian officials accused Pakistani based terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) of masterminding the assault.⁴⁵ On December 18, the order was given to mobilize the Indian military against what New Delhi saw as Pakistani-sponsored aggression. The subsequent operation, Parakram (Victory), resulted in the largest deployment of Indian forces since the 1971 War.⁴⁶ Pakistan responded with its own mobilization and was quickly able to match and counter the Indians' massive but cumbersome deployment. Though full scale war did not erupt, it would be ten months before forces on both sides returned to a less aggressive posture.

While the attack of December 2001 lasted roughly half an hour, the immediate repercussions of that event would come to dominate the Indo-Pakistani security dynamic in the short term while the long term impact of the assault and subsequent military standoff would help redefine India's military and security posture. Despite the presence

⁴³ Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The covert war in Kashmir, 1947–2004* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 207.

⁴⁴ Online NewsHour, "India Blames Pakistan-based Kashmir Separatist Group for Suicide Attack," http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/december01/india_12-14.html (accessed January 18, 2010).

⁴⁵ V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, *Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 61.

⁴⁶ Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 161.

of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent since 1998, India sees a real possibility in fighting a limited war in the shadow of nuclear weapons and currently plans for just such a contingency. The events of December 2001 and slow military response, however, created doubt as to just how such a limited war should be waged. Not only did the slow pace of mobilization result in a loss of strategic surprise, it also led to international intervention that pressured New Delhi to stand down from its war footing. In the end, despite maintaining its forces along the Pakistani border for the majority of the following year, India was unable to achieve its original objective of compelling Islamabad to cease its sponsorship of proxy fighters. As Kapur explains, regardless of American assurances to the contrary, “Pakistani compliance with Indian demands in the wake of the Parliament attack was mixed...[D]espite a temporary lull in cross-border infiltration, the flow of militants into Jammu and Kashmir by mid-2002 had begun to increase once again.”⁴⁷ Consequently, in 2004, a new limited war strategy known as Cold Start was unveiled.⁴⁸ Designed to correct the failures of Operation Parakram, this strategy is a marked departure from past Indian military postures and aims to put the military, specifically the Indian army, on an offensive footing capable of rapid, punitive responses to what India sees as Pakistani adventurism while remaining below the threshold of nuclear war.

In the following section, I address India’s compellence problem as it exists in the present. Later, I will explain the Cold Start doctrine in greater detail as the strategy India sees will solve this dilemma.

B. THE COMPELLENCE DILEMMA

As noted earlier, India has faced a Pakistan-based proxy war problem since 1947. The current iteration of this Pakistan strategy began in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Kashmiris began to revolt against increasing autocratic federal rule from New Delhi. Kapur explains the uprisings as the result of greater political awareness in Kashmir coupled with decaying institutions that did not provide a viable outlet for

⁴⁷ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, 136.

⁴⁸ Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed.”

increased political expression.⁴⁹ For Pakistan, these uprisings constituted an opportunity that it could exploit to its advantage. If the Kashmiris were fed up with Indian rule, then they would certainly turn to Pakistan. Also, Pakistan saw an opportunity to “bleed” India by forcing it to commit resources and personnel to combat a widespread insurgency.⁵⁰ With these assumptions in mind, the Pakistanis sent in proxies to aid those in revolt in Kashmir. What Pakistan soon learned, though, was that while the Kashmiris were angry at New Delhi, they did not want to cast their lot with Islamabad either. Rather, the Kashmiris wanted independence. Pakistan could not accept this proposition. Instead, it used its proxies, notably the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) to target the indigenous Kashmir rebel group the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which the HuM had originally supported. Although the HuM and other Pakistan-supported non-state actors eventually defeated the JKLF, they also alienated the local Kashmiri population. As a result, the Kashmiris aided the Indian security forces who had been sent to the region to quell these uprisings and attacks.

Throughout the 1990s, the Indians committed a large amount of forces and resources to keeping the peace in Kashmir. In 1993 alone, between 300,000 to 400,000 security personnel spent time in the region.⁵¹ Ongoing deployments became more and more costly, not only in personnel and resources but also in lives lost. Despite India’s commitment, it could not effectively deal with Pakistan’s proxies. Although full scale war was an option, it was not entirely feasible considering the presence of Pakistan’s assumed nuclear capabilities.⁵² This problem would continue to haunt New Delhi as the decade progressed.

In 1998, the significance of this problem grew exponentially when both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices that May. As a result, full scale military action against Pakistan to coerce Islamabad to end its support of non-state actors or for any other reason was now off the table. The question then was how to coerce Pakistan

⁴⁹ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, 94.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 99.

⁵¹ Ibid., 102.

⁵² Ibid., 106.

enough without triggering a nuclear exchange. Is it possible at all? For its part, Islamabad exploited its perceived advantage, knowing that India could not retaliate with a massive conventional attack for fear of a nuclear response nor could it use nuclear weapons for fear of international condemnation. In 1999, Pakistan was emboldened enough to infiltrate Indian positions in the Kargil sector of the Kashmir Line of Control (LoC).⁵³ In this case, India did not shy away from a conventional response to expel Pakistani forces. Because of the eventual success of the Kargil campaign, Indian planners felt that a limited war under the nuclear umbrella was possible. As Kapur points out, “In contrast to its previous restraint, India adopted a policy of compellence, vowing to launch limited conventional war against Pakistan if it did not curb cross-border violence in Kashmir.”⁵⁴ The 2001/2002 military standoff, though, exposed numerous flaws in that iteration of the limited war concept. The dated Sundarji Doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s had to be changed to allow for a more agile, controlled response that could punish Pakistan enough to compel it to cease its support for non-state actors while at the same time remain below the threshold of nuclear war. The desired answer would come two years later with the Cold Start doctrine. The following section will discuss this strategy in detail.

C. THE COLD START DOCTRINE

In the wake of the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan, the Indian military, specifically the Indian Army, moved to revise its strategy for fighting a limited war under the nuclear umbrella. Although the Kargil War demonstrated to New Delhi that a limited war was feasible, the doctrine to conduct such operations at that time was merely an extension of the Sundarji Doctrine formulated in the 1980s.⁵⁵ This doctrine, the brainchild of then Indian Chief of Army Staff General Krishnaswami Sundarji, was created to leverage India’s superior conventional forces against Pakistani aggression. Designed during the height of the Cold War and NATO’s showdown with

⁵³ For a full discussion of the Kargil War, see Chapter IV.

⁵⁴ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, 133.

⁵⁵ The Kargil campaign itself was limited in scope, confined to a small sector of the LoC in Kashmir and does not accurately reflect what would happen should a widespread conflict erupt.

the Soviets in Western Europe, the doctrine reflected the tendencies of the day toward massive retaliation with large mechanized units. Under this strategy, seven defensive corps, known as holding corps, were positioned along the India-Pakistan border and designed to blunt any Pakistani attack while buying time for the arrival of the strike corps should war erupt.⁵⁶ These three strike corps, the offensive muscle of the doctrine located in the center of the country, would deploy to the combat zone with the goals of smashing Pakistan's strike corps and then waging a war of attrition deep within Pakistan itself.⁵⁷ Clearly a product of its time, the force disposition under the Sundarji Doctrine was not ideal for new limited war aims.

Despite these limitations as shown, no new doctrine was created and when tensions grew after the terror attacks in December 2001 and Operation Parakram was executed, the military mobilized not according to a new strategy created to fight a limited war under the shadow of nuclear weapons but according to plans that were in place for a conventional war. Instead of a rapid mobilization, the Indian Army took more than three weeks to concentrate its offensive forces.⁵⁸ V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney explain the reason as follows:

The Indian Army is...capable of mobilising its holding formations in...(96 hours). The armoured formations and its accompanying logistics build-up, however...take between seven and 10 days to concentrate for war. This is because India operates on exterior lines of communication, as its strike formations are based deep inside the country.⁵⁹

The above represents the ideal mobilization evolution that did not occur in 2001. Still, even at this pace, mobilization for this kind of war would have been far too long. Thus, the Indians' plan to coerce Pakistan into ceasing its support for non-state actors through the threat of war was thwarted by the Indian Army's failure to mobilize rapidly. Not only

⁵⁶ Ladwig, "A Cold Start to Hot Wars?" 159.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 159.

⁵⁸ From the time Operation Parakram was launched to the time the mobilization was declared complete, nearly 25 days had elapsed. See P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007), 153; Sood and Sawhney, *Operation Parakram*, 59.

⁵⁹ Sood and Sawhney, *Operation Parakram*, 73–77.

was surprise lost but the window of opportunity to conduct a punitive response also closed as Pakistan was able to counter India's mobilization by way of its much shorter interior lines of communication.

Because of this growing tension and before Indian forces were fully online, the international community, most notably the United States and Great Britain, intervened in order to avert a full scale war. The United States had two main reasons for its involvement: first, it wanted to prevent escalation to a war where nuclear weapons could be utilized, and second its war on terror in Afghanistan could not afford a diversion of Pakistani forces to counter a massing Indian threat.⁶⁰ The ensuing 25 days from call-up to full mobilization also allowed the government in New Delhi to rethink its options, eventually deciding to hold the Indian military back from open war with Pakistan. Consequently, the Indian Army found itself in a 10-month morale-draining showdown with Pakistan that culminated not in an invasion but a quiet withdrawal that damaged the prestige of the Indian Army.

In late April 2004, the Indian Army unveiled Cold Start, which was designed to correct operational and organizational problems that came to light with Operation Parakram.⁶¹ This strategy would define the way India would wage a limited war under the nuclear umbrella against Pakistan in the future. One of the main objectives of the doctrine is to reduce the time it would take to mobilize the Indian Army from weeks to a matter of days and hours. As the failure of Operation Parakram showed, a rapid military response to a crisis situation was crucial if India was to maintain the initiative. However, the force disposition of the Indian Army at the time restricted the rapidity of force deployment. The best time the Army could fully mobilize in was a week to ten days. Mobilization for Operation Parakram took more than three weeks. Under Cold Start, though, the Army would be able to mobilize its forces and conduct required operations in seventy-two to ninety-six hours.⁶² Consequently, this rapidity would not only increase

⁶⁰ Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 164.

⁶¹ Kapila, "India's New 'Cold Start' War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed."

⁶² Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 165.

surprise and confuse Pakistan but it would also prevent the intervention of outside powers and limit the ability of the government in New Delhi to rethink its actions after the order to mobilize had been given.⁶³

Of course, the Indian Army would not simply be able to mobilize its forces faster because it was put into doctrine. Rather, the Cold Start doctrine envisioned a new organizational structure for the army that would allow for rapid deployment timetables. Under the Sundarji Doctrine, the Indian Army was organized into seven holding corps, primarily defensive in nature, stationed along the India-Pakistan border and designed to hold back a Pakistani invasion. The offensive power came in the form of three strike corps, located in the center of the country, capable of launching devastating counterattacks into Pakistani territory, mainly through the Rajasthan desert.⁶⁴ In the Cold Start future, the Indian Army's offensive forces would be reorganized from three corps into eight smaller, more flexible division-sized "integrated battle groups" (IBGs).⁶⁵ Along with being smaller in size that inherently reduces mobilization time, these battle groups would also be positioned closer to the international border allowing for a quicker response in a crisis situation. As Ashraf explains, "Locating offensive elements close to their launching pads for attacks against Pakistan would reduce reaction time and early warning normally available to Pakistan. Placing offensive elements where they could immediately launch an offensive would permit the Indian Army to achieve surprise."⁶⁶

Aside from the length of time to fully mobilize three strike corps, the Indian Army under the Sundarji Doctrine lacked the flexibility required for a limited war strategy. The offensive strike corps were designed for "sledgehammer blows" against Pakistani military forces in Pakistani territory rather than achieving limited goals of "shallow territorial gains," or inflicting measured pain on the Pakistani military.⁶⁷ On the

⁶³ Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 166.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 159–160.

⁶⁵ Walter C. Ladwig, "The Development of the Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine" (paper presented at the conference entitled Cold Start: India's New Strategic Doctrine and its Implications, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, May 29–30, 2008), 8.

⁶⁶ Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening," 57.

⁶⁷ Sood and Sawhney, *Operation Parakram*, 81; Ladwig, "The Development of the Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine," 9.

defensive side, the holding corps did not have the offensive firepower necessary to launch counterattacks. Thus, the organization and composition of massive mechanized corps hindered their ability to execute rapid movement necessary in a dynamic, limited war environment. The use of these types of forces also tended to signal the willingness to escalate to total war with the objective of destroying the Pakistani state. As Y. I. Patel points out, “by employing or threatening to employ the entire might of its offensive power, India would be signaling an intent that may be far disproportionate to its actual objectives.”⁶⁸

The IBGs, on the other hand, would be constructed for the purpose of limited war. These division sized units would “combine mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor in manner reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s operational maneuver groups.”⁶⁹ With these combined capabilities, these more numerous, smaller sized units would be able to attack on multiple axes, adding to the element of surprise and confusing their Pakistani counterparts. The smaller size would also signal the limited extent of Indian objectives since an IBG would not have the same offensive power as a strike corps and could not “deliver a knockout blow.”⁷⁰ The IBGs could also launch attacks on multiple axes, confusing Pakistani command and control and limiting their destruction by nuclear weapons should Islamabad decide to employ them. The Sundarji holding corps too would be remade with the addition of armor and artillery to their primarily defensive force structure. These offensive capabilities would allow the holding corps, now “pivot corps,” to conduct limited strikes of their own, laying the groundwork for follow-on operations conducted by the IBGs.⁷¹

Though primarily an Indian Army strategy, Cold Start would not be successful without the integration of elements from both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. As Kapila explains, “the ‘Cold Start’ eight or so ‘battle groups’ cannot undertake ‘blitzkrieg’ type military without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air

⁶⁸ Patel, “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra.”

⁶⁹ Ladwig, “The Development of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine,” 8.

⁷⁰ Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 166.

⁷¹ Ibid.

support.”⁷² The Air Force, then, would be tasked with providing that close air support to advancing ground forces along with other duties including primary responsibilities such as achieving air superiority. The Indian Navy would also provide aviation assets to aid in the execution of a Cold Start operation, giving ground forces what Walter Ladwig describes as “mobile fire support.”⁷³ The navy’s contribution would not be limited to just air power, however. The maritime service would also be able to blockade Pakistani ports and possibly conduct amphibious operations to open a third front, further splitting Pakistan’s defense capabilities.⁷⁴ In the end, a joint integration of the Indian military services is critical to the success of the Cold Start doctrine.

While Cold Start may seem like the ideal strategy for limited war considering both the failures of Operation Parakram and the current environment on the Indian subcontinent, the strategy does have its drawbacks. First, its aim for quick mobilization could increase instability in South Asia, since Pakistan would have to increase its readiness to counter any possible Indian attack.⁷⁵ Second, because of the reduced time to move forces, the ability of the Indian government to reconsider its actions would be limited as would the ability of the international community to intervene to prevent escalation.⁷⁶ As a result, a minor crisis could potentially balloon into a full scale war. Finally, Cold Start, though a strategy for limited war under the nuclear umbrella, could actually make the possibility of a nuclear exchange more likely. The increased capabilities of the Indian military would put the Pakistani military at more of a disadvantage than it already is, thus possibly lowering the threshold required for Pakistan to employ its strategic arsenal.⁷⁷ According to S. Paul Kapur, “Brig. Gen. Khawar Hanif, Pakistan’s defense attaché to the United States, argues...‘the wider the conventional asymmetry...the lower the nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan.’”⁷⁸ In the end,

⁷² Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed.”

⁷³ Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 165.

⁷⁴ Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed.”

⁷⁵ Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” 90.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 169.

⁷⁸ Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” 90.

Cold Start as a limited war doctrine has advantages as well as disadvantages. Ironically, the push for a more mobile force that is capable of rapid reaction and measured responses may in fact increase insecurity between India and Pakistan.

D. CONCLUSION

India continues to face a compellence problem vis-à-vis Pakistan and the conduct of non-state actors based in Pakistan. While it has had to deal with this problem in the past, the addition of nuclear weapons to the mix makes the compellence dilemma that much more complicated. Because of the presence of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, India cannot leverage its conventional superiority for full scale retaliation purposes against the Pakistani state. Still, New Delhi cannot allow non-state actors to terrorize its citizens with impunity. For Indian military planners, the answer then is limited war under the nuclear umbrella, specifically the Cold Start doctrine. In theory, this strategy would allow India to utilize its conventional forces in a rapid, yet controlled manner to compel Pakistan to end its support for proxies and non-state actors who target Indian forces in both Kashmir and India proper. The efficacy of this doctrine will be examined in the remaining chapters of this thesis.

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III. PROBLEM 1: PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPAL-AGENT DILEMMA

*The government of Pakistan might have abandoned jihad but we have not. Our agenda is clear. We will continue to wage jihad and propagate it till eternity. No government can intimidate us. Nobody can stop it...*⁷⁹

—LeT operative Nasr Javed

While Chapter II explained India's compellence problem and its Cold Start solution, this chapter will explore the Pakistani side of this issue, specifically the development of Pakistan's reliance on proxies as a tool with which to combat the perceived Indian menace and the consequence of such a strategy on both regional stability as well as stability within the state of Pakistan. While there is no doubt that Pakistan once sponsored extremist organizations to carry out proxy actions on behalf of the state, the question remains as to whether or not those groups are still controlled by the state, or if they now have their own agendas, which are damaging to the state. This chapter will attempt to show that a principal-agent problem does accurately define Pakistan's perilous situation in the post-9/11 period as groups once controlled by Pakistan have now indeed gone off the reservation, and pursue their own goals, often to the detriment of Pakistani policy. It is counterproductive, then, to assume that a threat to the state will compel Islamabad to do what it simply cannot do. In this sense, the fundamental idea of a state-centric strategy such as India's Cold Start doctrine is flawed.

This chapter will begin with a discussion of the principal-agent theory and how it applies to Pakistan. Next, two broad time periods will be analyzed. The first, the period from partition to 9/11, will trace the evolution of Pakistan's use of proxy fighters against India. The second time period will cover from 9/11 through the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, showing that a principal-agent problem has begun to develop in Pakistan.

⁷⁹ Nasr Javed, quoted in Kanchan Lakshman, "The Expanding Jihad," *South Asia Intelligence Review* 6, no. 32 (February 18, 2008), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_32.htm (accessed January 26, 2010).

A. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, Pakistan found itself facing a host of problems, one of the most pressing being a military disadvantage compared to its hostile neighbor to the east, India.⁸⁰ This situation was particularly troubling considering the unresolved Kashmir issue, which would come to the forefront of Indo-Pakistani relations in the fall of that year. Because of this security disparity, Pakistan turned to proxy fighters, which could carry the fight to the enemy and also afford the Pakistani government a level of deniability for its involvement in a conflict.⁸¹ Over the years, Pakistan has employed this strategy in multiple cases as a cost-effective way to inflict pain on India, offsetting its conventional military superiority while forcing New Delhi to expend blood and treasure in remote areas it can ill afford to lose.⁸² In the 1980s, Pakistan was able to use this experience to funnel money, equipment, and training to the mujahidin who were fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

In recent years, however, the groups that Pakistan once controlled have begun to carry out brazen attacks independent of their former masters. The agendas of such organizations as Lashkar-e-Taiba, often maximalist in scope, threaten the fragile stability in South Asia and, at times, Islamabad itself.⁸³ This situation has major implications for security and development on the subcontinent. Below, I explain principal-agent theory and then show how it applies to Pakistan's use of non-state actors.

B. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY

The origins of the principal-agent theory can be found in the 1960s, and the 1970s, when economists and management scholars began to explore the implications of

⁸⁰ As will be noted later, Pakistan faced a shortage of money, personnel and equipment. The specific military ratio after partition was about 2:1 in favor of the Indians. See Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 7.

⁸¹ Ganguly and Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 48.

⁸² Sudhir S. Bloeria, "Kargil, A Window of Opportunity," in *Terror and Containment Perspectives of India's Internal Security*, ed. K. P. S. Gill (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2001), 329.

⁸³ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2000): 116.

agency theory.⁸⁴ Agency theory was an outgrowth of risk-sharing research concerning how cooperating parties view risk, understand its implications, and often come to different conclusions on how to deal with that risk.⁸⁵ According to Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency theory broadened this risk-sharing literature to include the so-called agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and divisions of labor.”⁸⁶ Within agency theory itself arose the specific idea of the principal-agent problem, where not only is risk shared by cooperating parties but also by a principal, who assigns certain tasks or functions and an agent, who is then charged with carrying out those assignments. As Eisenhardt further explains:

Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the *agency problem* that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the *problem of risk sharing* that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preference.⁸⁷

Thus, the principal-agent problem shows the lack of control that a principal can wield over an agent, especially if the agent is designed to act relatively autonomously from the principal. Consequently, when goals are changed or purposes realigned, it can be that much more difficult for the principal to reel in the independent agent.

Over time, the principal-agent theory has been applied to more complex issues that cover a wide variety of fields from management and economics to insurance, contracting, and stock markets. However, the principal-agent problem and its explanatory power are not limited to issues of economics and business. In fact, one can see the logical use of such a theory in international relations and the complex relationship

⁸⁴ Barry M. Mitnick, “Origin of the Theory of Agency: An Account by One of the Theory’s Originators,” University of Pittsburgh, January 2006.

⁸⁵ Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” *The Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 1 (Jan., 1989): 58.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

that can develop between an international organization and its state members, or, in the case of conflict studies, the relationship between a government and the proxies it may use to carry out its agendas. Often the principal and the agent in these dyadic associations do not see a given situation in the same context and instead pursue actions that satisfy their own self-interests despite the overarching common goal that brought the parties together in the first place.

The United Nations, the European Union, and NATO and their respective association with their member states are all examples of the principal-agent issue that exists in international organizations. In these cases, the organization becomes the agent in the relationship, a fact that may seem counterintuitive but is logical when one considers the sources of funding and resources for the organization are the individual member states.⁸⁸ The organization can have its own goals and policy where it tries to foster unity for a common cause yet such aims can be at odds with those of the member states, the principals, as is often the case in the principal-agent dynamic. Since the member states provide resources, the organization is thus limited in action by what those states provide.⁸⁹ For example, member states may not want their forces employed in a manner that is counter to the national will of their populace. As a result, the functionality and success of the organization, the agent, is severely restricted by the actions of the member states, the principals.

In the case of security and conflict issues involving a state and proxies, the opposite situation exists. Here the overarching power, the state, is the principal and the proxy is the agent. The proxy relies on the state for resources to be able to carry out the missions assigned to it by the state. However, as history has shown, proxies can expand beyond the realm of the state, developing their own goals and agendas. As Byman explains regarding the case of Syria and its sponsorship of Palestinian guerillas, “despite its utility in the struggle against Israel and for regional leadership, the Palestinian cause was a two-edged sword. As Syria learned, Palestinian guerilla attacks could escalate into

⁸⁸ Tad D. Vannaman, “European Security and Defense Policy: The Dialectics of Autonomy” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 16.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

an all-out war that Syria would lose.”⁹⁰ Proxies, which no longer need the apparatus of the state for resources and instead have their own sources of funding, can become extremely problematic for the state to control. In the worst case scenario, the proxy can turn on the sponsor state itself, seeing the attempts at control to be contradictory to the fundamental nature and independence of the proxy, especially when the goals of the proxy have gone beyond that of the state.

The case of Pakistan and its relationship with proxies since independence in 1947 clearly shows the evolutionary trend as described above. Initially, Pakistan saw the benefits of using proxies due to its conventional military imbalance with India. However, as time progressed, these proxies gained greater autonomy through outside funding and began to act according to their own goals, which were no longer consistently aligned with those of Islamabad. Later, these groups began to target the Pakistani state itself, seeing the government not as a sponsor any longer but as another enemy that threatened their existence. The following sections will trace this evolution of non-state actors in Pakistan, explaining how groups once nurtured by the state now exist independently of the state and thus cannot be reined in by the state, despite Pakistan being pressured to do so by India and others.

C. THE PRE-9/11 PERIOD

Following the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan found itself at a great disadvantage compared to its neighbor to the east. Not only did India receive a larger proportion of military forces, a roughly 2 to 1 ratio favoring the Indians, it also retained the majority of monetary assets, fixed installations, and industry, the result of the British Empire focusing on the center of its dominion rather than the peripheries, one of which Pakistan would come to occupy.⁹¹ Of course, this distribution was not because of some nefarious design to keep Pakistan weak but merely a consequence of the fact that India possessed a larger expanse of territory and a larger population. Still, the fact remains that Pakistan was considerably weaker militarily and economically than India.

⁹⁰ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 125.

⁹¹ Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 7.

Pakistan's small geographic size also afforded it little in terms of strategic depth, an issue not only for planners looking at the intentions of India but also those who saw a potential threat from Afghanistan.⁹² Along these lines, Kashmir, the small princely-state that would come to dominate the India-Pakistan relationship, was seen as potential strategic equalizer that could help offset an aggressive India.⁹³ As a result of all these factors, Pakistan was predisposed to use non-state actors and proxies to help balance out its weak circumstance in South Asia. The first use of these actors occurred not longer after tumultuous summer of partition itself.

One of the first interstate security conflicts between India and Pakistan was the outgrowth of the unsettled nature of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, a small princely state sandwiched between the two nations. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, wanted to maintain independence from both countries and thus dithered on his decision to join either India or Pakistan when the British Empire granted self rule on the subcontinent.⁹⁴ Both sides tried to persuade the maharaja to accede to their respective sides but to no avail. The situation was complex and highly charged for both nations with the territory becoming more than just a geographic location but a statement of identity for both nations. India, a secular nation, saw the accession of Kashmir as necessary to prove its fundamental nature as an inclusive, tolerant state.⁹⁵ Pakistan, on the other hand, viewed Kashmir and its majority Muslim population as a logical piece of Pakistan that was founded as a secular Muslim state. As Sumit Ganguly points out, "in essence, Pakistan's claim to Kashmir was and remains irredentist."⁹⁶

By the fall of 1947, the situation turned violent as Pakistan saw an opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue in its favor. Pakistan-supported proxies crossed the border

⁹² Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 7.

⁹³ Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 86.

⁹⁴ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 16.

⁹⁵ Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of war, hopes of peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

with Kashmir in late October to aid a tribal rebellion that had begun in the northwest region of the territory.⁹⁷ Pakistani soldiers in tribal garb traveled with the proxies, mainly Pathans.⁹⁸ The invaders quickly swept through the minimal defenses of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces and were pressing onward to Srinagar, the capital, when the maharaja realized the dire situation he faced. Only two days had passed since the tribesmen crossed into Kashmir. The maharaja quickly called on New Delhi for aid to repel the invasion. New Delhi agreed to send troops but only after Hari Singh agreed to sign the Instrument of Accession, which would make Kashmir a part of India.⁹⁹ A plebiscite was to be held at a later date to ratify the accession. Once the document was signed, forces from India were dispatched to the beleaguered region. Combat broke out between the Indian and the proxy militias in November 1947.¹⁰⁰ Indian forces were able to halt the invasion and drive back the militias, though they were unable to totally rid Kashmir of the threat. In January 1948, India officially filed a complaint with the United Nations over the situation.¹⁰¹ Fighting continued throughout much of the year, with the Pakistani Army assuming more responsibility of a combat role as time progressed. By the end of December, both parties had agreed to the terms of a ceasefire. In the end, the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 resolved nothing. Neither side achieved a palpable victory in this first war between India and Pakistan. For the Pakistanis, ironically, as Ganguly points out, “Pakistan may well have been able to obtain Kashmir if it had not acted so precipitously.”¹⁰²

The case of the First Kashmir War is notable for this study for two reasons. First, one can see the direct hand of Pakistan in the crisis supporting its proxies. According to Arif Jamal:

⁹⁷ Arif Jamal, *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir* (Brooklyn: Melville House Publishing, 2009), 45; Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 9.

⁹⁸ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, 94.

⁹⁹ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 51.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 55–56.

¹⁰¹ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 11.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 13.

It is unclear when the planning for the operation began, but it was clearly the work of elements of the Pakistani military... Pakistani army personnel...ran the Kashmiri militants' radio operations. They used army receivers to relay messages and organize encampments inside Pakistan. The Army also supplied food, uniforms, arms, and ammunition through a variety of off-the-books methods, including 'such subterfuges as the 'loss' of ammunition shipments.' The minister of health in Sindh also appealed 'to all trained and demobilised soldiers to proceed as volunteers to the Kashmir front.'¹⁰³

Unlike future crises, the Pakistani military was directly involved in the support of its proxies as they carried out operations that the state directed. Despite this involvement, the conflict also foreshadowed the problems that could arise when relying on forces not fully answerable to the state. In Kashmir, the invading militias carried out countless atrocities against the civilian population, including robbery, rape, and murder.¹⁰⁴ As a result, the local populace, rather than welcome the invaders as liberators, turned against them in many villages that were subjected to such mayhem.¹⁰⁵ In the end, the First Kashmir War showed the extent and limitations of non-state actors used in the service of the Pakistani state.

In 1965, Pakistan once again turned to proxies to further its policies in Kashmir. To Pakistan, India was in a weakened state following the death of Prime Minister Nehru in 1964, and having lost a war to China in 1962.¹⁰⁶ The situation in Jammu and Kashmir had also deteriorated. Although Nehru had promised to hold a plebiscite to fully legitimize Kashmir's accession to India following the 1947–48 War, conditions on the ground never materialized, which would guarantee such an action would favor India.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, during the years since the 1947–48 War, Kashmir had become an “inseparable

¹⁰³ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 45–46, 49–50.

¹⁰⁴ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 10; Jamal, 52–54.

¹⁰⁵ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 53.

¹⁰⁶ After the 1962 debacle, India realized its military shortcomings and began to rapidly acquire new capabilities from the West. This was yet another reason why Pakistan saw an opportunity to launch a campaign in 1965. The window to do so was closing quickly. If Pakistan did not act before India bolstered its military, its ability to solve the Kashmir problem in its favor in the future militarily would be severely limited. See Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 54.

¹⁰⁷ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 48.

and integral part of the India,” and thus, by 1964, a popular referendum was no longer seen as necessary.¹⁰⁸ India took actions to remove the special political status of Kashmir, in the process angering the Kashmir populace.

Pakistan saw an opportunity in the growing disenchantment with Indian rule to foment a popular uprising in Kashmir. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Ahmed “saw that India was in a highly vulnerable position. A feeling of popular revolt...was sweeping the valley, making India’s position indefensible. If the Indian forces were diverted by sabotage and subjected to armed harassment...Kashmir could soon be liberated.”¹⁰⁹ Armed clashes in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 demonstrated to Pakistan that India lacked the will to respond in force to a territorial incursion and thus inferred that an Indian response to similar actions in Kashmir would be minimal and restrained.¹¹⁰

Consequently, Pakistan decided to move forward with Operation Gibraltar, a military plan designed to create a widespread rebellion within Kashmir. In August, forces consisting of guerrillas and irregulars led by Pakistani military officers crossed the ceasefire line into Indian-controlled Kashmir.¹¹¹ Almost immediately, these forces encountered difficulties. Some were turned in by locals to Indian authorities while others foundered against the harsh mountain terrain.¹¹² Although a few guerrilla forces were successful in their attacks on Indian forces, by mid-August the Indian military had countered the infiltration and gained the upper hand. Pakistan subsequently launched Operation Grand Slam, a conventional operation, to help buy time for the forces operating under Operation Gibraltar.¹¹³ Once again, though, the Indians countered, this

¹⁰⁸ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 42.

¹⁰⁹ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 77.

¹¹⁰ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 55.

¹¹¹ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 79.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 82.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 84.

time combining actions in Kashmir with an invasion across the international border in Punjab.¹¹⁴ War between Indian and Pakistan raged for two and half weeks, ending with a ceasefire on September 23, 1965.¹¹⁵

In the end, the 1965 War showed that Pakistan still was more than willing to use proxies to further its goals in Kashmir. Planning and discussion of operations such as Gibraltar continued to occur at high levels of the Pakistani government.¹¹⁶ The use of non-state actors was clearly seen as another tool in the arsenal of Pakistan's foreign policy. However, Pakistan did learn from the First Kashmir War. Unlike that episode, Pakistan kept firm control over its non-state actors, as evidenced by the lack of atrocities committed by these forces. The goals of such interventions still eluded Pakistan. Despite dissatisfaction with Indian rule, the Kashmiris did not rise in revolt in conjunction with the arrival of guerrillas from Pakistan.¹¹⁷ Regardless of this outcome, Pakistan continued to try to influence public sentiment in Kashmir by sending clandestine operatives into the region long after the 1965 War ended.¹¹⁸ By the 1980s, though, external events would allow Pakistan to expand its sponsorship of non-state actors from a Kashmir focus to a more regional approach.

On December 24, 1979, the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan. The impact of the subsequent occupation was a boon for the Pakistani defense and intelligence establishments. Over that decade, mujahedeen fighters, resources, and money would pour into Pakistan, the base for operations against the Soviets. The United States and Saudi Arabia were the main contributors to the effort.¹¹⁹ Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence agency (ISI) and military reaped the benefits of the increase in funding and by the end of the Soviet occupation, Islamabad was in a position to shape the post-war environment in its favor. Through its support of the mujahedeen fighters, Pakistan

¹¹⁴ Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, 6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 48.

¹¹⁶ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 78–79.

¹¹⁷ Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, 57.

¹¹⁸ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 86–87.

¹¹⁹ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 89.

gained leverage not only in Afghanistan but in Kashmir as well. Islamists that had defeated a superpower could now be redirected against Indian rule in Kashmir.¹²⁰ According to Mariam Abou Zahab, the early 1990s “witnessed an ‘Afghanization’ of the struggle.”¹²¹ Training camps established for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan became training camps for volunteers who wanted to fight a jihad in Kashmir. As Steve Coll points out, “the Kashmiri volunteers trained side by side with the Arab jihadists... Kashmir guerrillas” used “weapons siphoned from the Afghan pipeline.”¹²²

In Afghanistan itself, Pakistan tried to find a mujahedeen faction to back that could potentially become a proxy for Islamabad in Kabul. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, without a common enemy, the various Islamist groups turned on each other, vying for positions of power. Initially Islamabad, specifically the ISI, supported Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction, a group that had received the majority of funding from the ISI during the war. However, as time progressed, Hekmatyar appeared less and less likely to emerge as an influential leader in Kabul. By the mid-1990s, an upstart group known as the Taliban began to sweep across Afghanistan, consolidating power at a surprising pace. Islamabad, wanting to maintain its influence in Afghanistan, moved to support them.¹²³ By the end of the 1990s, the Taliban occupied the majority of the Afghan state. Though Pakistan now had influence in Kabul, its links to the Taliban government would soon become a liability.

Although Pakistan increased its influence regionally in the 1990s through its use of proxies, ironically, that decade also saw greater autonomy exercised by those proxies. Eventually, those proxies would come to threaten their masters in Islamabad. In Kashmir, as stated earlier, Pakistan was able to use the fighters and resources it had

¹²⁰ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 437.

¹²¹ Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books, 2002), 121.

¹²² Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 221.

¹²³ Internal issues also contributed to this shift, notably Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s desire to back a group that challenged the ISI’s power domestically and in Afghanistan. See Thomas H. Johnson, “Financing Afghan Terrorism: Thugs, Drugs, and Creative Movements of Money,” in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 97.

nurtured during the 1980s to once again encourage separatist elements within the state to take action against Indian forces. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an increase of discontent in Kashmir as a result of the domineering Indian policy toward the region. Local organizations, such as the JKLF, pushed back against Indian rule, not desiring accession to Pakistan but a separate state altogether.¹²⁴ Despite these differences, Pakistan and the ISI gave resources to the JKLF as a way to gain leverage within the independence movement and hopefully sway it to Pakistan's favor. When that did not happen, the ISI shifted its support to the HuM, which supported Pakistan's quest for Kashmir.¹²⁵ HuM and other jihadi organizations, including LeT, brutally attacked the JKLF and other pro-independence groups as well as moderate Muslim Kashmiris.¹²⁶ Although Pakistan supported these jihadi groups with funding and training, the consequences of a relationship with such groups became evident when, in 1993, the United States threatened Islamabad with the possibility of declaring Pakistan a terrorist state if it could not "rein in militant organizations in Jammu and Kashmir."¹²⁷ While the ISI tried to increase its power over the organizations by forcing them to join political parties, the jihadis, especially HuM, balked at the maneuver and began to cut ties with Islamabad.

Similar experiences occurred with the Taliban. During the years following the Taliban's establishment of a government in Kabul, Pakistan tried to gain favor by helping to rebuild infrastructure, including roads, airports, telecommunications, and other services.¹²⁸ Economic assistance was also provided. Although Islamabad had some influence, the Taliban did not respond well to attempts at direct control. As Ahmed Rashid explains:

Despite these efforts to help and control the Taliban, they were nobody's puppets and they resisted every attempt by Islamabad to pull their

¹²⁴ Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad*, 178.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 179–180.

¹²⁷ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 150.

¹²⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 185.

strings...As the Taliban movement expanded, it became increasingly unclear as to who was driving whom. Pakistan, rather than being the master of the Taliban, was instead becoming its victim.¹²⁹

Even with the intransigence of the Taliban, Pakistan continued to support them as a means to achieve “strategic depth” in the region.¹³⁰ This notion was not driven solely by military considerations, though. A stable Afghanistan would also help reduce tensions in Pakistan’s border provinces, and encourage economic development between the two nations, thus reducing overall security concerns. Ironically, Pakistan’s backing of the Taliban for this purpose would result in just the opposite.

In sum, the period preceding the turn of the twenty-first century witnessed Pakistan’s use of proxies and non-state actors as an extension of its defense and military policy. Logically, such a strategy made sense for a nation facing a conventional military deficit when compared with its archrival neighbor. However, the use of proxies also posed particular problems, as these groups increasingly acted on their own, often in opposition to the interests of Islamabad. Despite these underlying issues, as well as outside pressure to curtail proxy activities, Pakistan continued to offer covert support to its non-state actors. It was not until the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the start of the American military action in the region that forced Islamabad to change its course regarding proxies. As a result, a principal-agent problem that had been developing between Pakistan and its proxies came into full realization.

D. THE POST-9/11 ERA

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, American leaders moved to bolster support in South Asia for its eventual strikes against the Taliban supporters of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. The United States put enormous pressure on Pakistan, informing Islamabad that it could either stand with America or the terrorists.¹³¹ If Pakistan chose the latter, it would be subject to the wrath of the United

¹²⁹ Rashid, *Taliban*, 185–186.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹³¹ Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, 217.

States. President Pervez Musharraf weighed his options and subsequently fell in line with the Washington's demands.¹³² The Pakistani Army, on the other hand, did not want to abandon the Taliban completely. As Saeed Shafqat explains, "The military...was not fully prepared to make a total break from the Taliban, whom they had supported since 1994."¹³³ Still, with Musharraf on its side, the United States assumed that Islamabad would be able to coerce the Taliban into extraditing bin Laden. The truth about Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan, as explained earlier, was just the opposite. Delegations sent to Mullah Omar and Taliban were rebuffed.¹³⁴ Diplomacy had failed.

With the hope of a peaceful resolution dashed, the United States moved forces into the region for its attack on Afghanistan. At the same time, wishing to solidify his standing with Washington, Musharraf began to make domestic changes towards Pakistan's relationship with extremists.¹³⁵ Although actions had been taken against militants in the past, their effects had been limited.¹³⁶ This time, though, Musharraf aimed to make a more concerted effort. As Hassan Abbas points out, "Leaders of religious political parties like Fazl ur-Rahman (Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam) and Qazi Hussain Ahmed (Jammāt-i-Islami) were arrested, and many Pakistani and Arab militants who were returning from their sanctuaries in Afghanistan were taken into custody."¹³⁷ Musharraf also replaced the head of the ISI, the chief supporter of many of the extremist proxy organizations that the president was now attempting to disband.

As a result of these actions, the principal-agent problem reared its head. Militants once sponsored by Pakistan, now turned against the state. Musharraf himself became the target of assassination plots.¹³⁸ Also, jihadi groups began to carry out more attacks that were in line with their own internal interests, which were often maximalist in nature, as

¹³² Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, 219–220.

¹³³ Saeed Shafqat, "Pakistan: Militancy, Transition to Democracy and Future Relations with the United States," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 98.

¹³⁴ Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, 221.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹³⁶ Jamal, *Shadow War*, 225.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 224.

¹³⁸ Ganguly and Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 53.

opposed to the limited aims of the Pakistani state. In October 2001, for example, terrorists attacked the parliament in Kashmir. Later, in December, these same terrorists launched a brazen assault on the Indian parliament in New Delhi. As a result, a tense military standoff developed between Pakistan and India, which nearly resulted in full scale war. The United States and other members of the international community intervened to prevent unnecessary escalation between the two newly nuclear nations.

Although it was later determined that LeT and JeM were responsible for the attacks, India held Pakistan accountable for the actions of these terrorist groups.¹³⁹ While Musharraf had taken steps to outlaw such organizations after 9/11, India was not satisfied and demanded Pakistan completely sever its ties with its proxies as well as hand over those responsible for the attacks. Islamabad refused to turn over the accused terrorists to India but, under pressure from the United States, Musharraf did promise to take action against the extremist organizations that threatened the already tense relations between India and Pakistan.¹⁴⁰ On January 12, 2002, Musharraf publicly announced to the Pakistani people that five militant and sectarian organizations, including JeM and LeT would be banned. He also declared that “he would not allow Pakistani soil to be used as a launching pad for terror against India or any other country.”¹⁴¹ New Delhi was cautiously optimistic about the statements but kept its army positioned for war. In the following months, while the leaders of the outlawed groups along with some of their rank and file members were arrested, the desired outcome was not achieved. Pakistan’s half-hearted attempts to deal with the problem were merely meant to appease India and the United States. They did not have a lasting effect. In May 2002, despite these actions taken by the Pakistani government, LeT launched more attacks, this time targeting families of Indian soldiers stationed in Kashmir.¹⁴² Though New Delhi was able to keep its military restrained despite their posture, the effects were clearly damaging to

¹³⁹ Ganguly and Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” 51.

¹⁴⁰ Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, 225.

¹⁴¹ Ganguly and Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” 51; See also Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 303.

¹⁴² Ganguly and Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” 51.

Pakistan's publicly professed stance against terrorism. In the end, the entire 2001–2002 standoff was resolved without open combat though high tensions would remain for some time between the two nations.

In coming years, India would endure more terrorist attacks from Pakistan despite Islamabad's public opposition to terrorism. Although LeT was disbanded following the 2001 attacks on New Delhi, it resurfaced under the auspices of a new group, Jammat-ud-Dawa, and continued its activities. Two major attacks in 2006 and 2008 would firmly establish the reputation and objectives of LeT as a terrorist power in South Asia. On July 11, 2006, LeT and JeM operatives detonated a series of bombs on trains and in train stations in Mumbai at the height of the evening rush hour, killing over 200 people and wounding hundreds more.¹⁴³ While Pakistan immediately condemned the attacks, the fact that LeT and JeM were able to orchestrate such chaos showed the Islamabad had lost its influence with these organizations. Nascent peace talks that had been slowly growing between India and Pakistan following the 2001–2002 standoff were postponed and once again tensions dominated the fragile relationship.

Even more brazen than the train bombings of 2006, though, were the cold blooded attacks carried out by LeT terrorists in Mumbai in late November 2008. For three days starting on November 26, armed gunmen paralyzed Mumbai as they deliberately murdered 172 people. A few days before the attacks began, the terrorists hijacked a fishing vessel and thus were able to enter Mumbai via the sea rather than pass through the multiple security stations that they would have encountered on a land route.¹⁴⁴ Once ashore the ten attackers formed four teams, each with separate targets and armed with a large number of weapons including assault rifles, pistols, grenades, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).¹⁴⁵ The first team attacked the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, the central train station in Mumbai, and then moved on to the Cama and Albess Hospital,

¹⁴³ "Mumbai death toll tops 200," *The Guardian*, July 12, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/12/india> (accessed February 23, 2010).

¹⁴⁴ Angel Rabasa and others, *The Lessons of Mumbai* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 3–4.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4, 5.

while the second team stormed the Nariman House, a center for local Jewish community.¹⁴⁶ The third and fourth teams attacked the Trident-Oberoi Hotel and the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel.¹⁴⁷

All of the chosen targets were “soft” targets with minimal security, which allowed for maximum shock value at minimal cost to the terrorists. The largest target, Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, containing the famous Leopold Café, ensured that media coverage would be constant, guaranteeing that the attacks would reach a large audience. Along with target choice, the various attacks were coordinated to occur simultaneously in order to sow panic and confusion among the populace and the responding Indian security and police forces, which they did. By the time the attacks were over on November 28, nine of the terrorists were dead, and one was in custody who, when questioned, named LeT as the organization responsible for sponsoring the attacks.

As in 2001 and 2006, the Pakistani government immediately and forcefully condemned the attacks. Despite Indian statements to the contrary, the Pakistani government and the ISI denied any involvement or foreknowledge of the attacks.¹⁴⁸ In an op-ed published in the New York Times, President Zardari states:

Pakistan is committed to the pursuit, arrest, trial and punishment of anyone involved in these heinous attacks...Pakistan will take action against the non-state actors found within our territory, treating them as criminals, terrorists and murderers. Not only are the terrorists not linked to the government of Pakistan in any way, we are their targets and we continue to be their victims.¹⁴⁹

In the following months, arrests were made, including Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed, the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, though he was later released in June 2009 for lack of evidence.¹⁵⁰ While the Pakistani government is publicly opposed to such attacks and has

¹⁴⁶ Rabasa and others, *The Lessons of Mumbai*, 5.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁴⁸ Bruce Riedel, “The Mumbai Massacre and its Implications for America and South Asia,” *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 120.

¹⁴⁹ Asif Ali Zardari, “The Terrorists Want to Destroy Pakistan, Too,” *The New York Times*, December 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/opinion/09zardari.html?_r=1 (accessed February 12, 2010).

¹⁵⁰ Ganguly and Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” 51–52.

taken some initiative to hunt down those responsible, the past has shown the Pakistan is either unable or unwilling to sustain such operations and, as a result, groups such as LeT can reconstitute themselves relatively easily, even without support they once enjoyed from the government. As Stephen Tankel points out, “After the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan cracked down on Lashkar and its above-ground social welfare wing, Jammāt-ud-Dawā. But as has historically been the case, the crackdown appears to have been aimed at controlling rather than destroying the group.”¹⁵¹

Despite the limited follow-through on targeting LeT in the wake of Mumbai, as Zardari’s statement above shows, the 2008 attacks on Mumbai were not in the interests of the Pakistani government or the state. In fact, Zardari as well as scholars point out that the target of the attacks was probably not specifically India at all but the growing India-Pakistan peace movement, which had stalled following the 2006 Mumbai train bombings. As Zardari explains, “The Mumbai attacks were directed not only at India but also at Pakistan’s new democratic government and the peace process with India that we have initiated.”¹⁵² Bruce Riedel concurs, stating “One of the key targets of LeT in Mumbai, if not the key target, was the India-Pakistan peace process itself.” Obviously, disrupting a peace process backed by the Pakistani state is not in line with the goals of the state. Again, this is a clear example of the principal-agent problem as it has been manifested in Pakistan.

Aside from attacks in India, as the 2000s progressed, terrorist attacks also increased within Pakistan proper. Ironically, rather than free itself from terrorism by ending its sponsorship, Pakistan invited more terrorism on itself. As a result of Pakistan’s support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, militants and extremists opposed to Islamabad’s actions launched attacks against the symbols of the state including the military, police and government officials. In the most shocking example, former Prime

¹⁵¹ Stephen Tankel, “A Year After Mumbai, Lashkar’s Threat Has Only Grown,” *RAND Corporation*, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/11/25/RAND.html> (accessed February 22, 2010).

¹⁵² Zardari, “The Terrorists Want to Destroy Pakistan, Too.”

Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while campaigning in Rawalpindi in December 2007. Pakistan's "cosmetic" changes clearly did not go far enough to solve its burgeoning extremism problem.

Despite the rising menace, Pakistan did not make a truly concerted effort to combat internal terrorism until the latter half of the decade when "Talibanization" emerged as an imminent threat to the state.¹⁵³ Pakistan was also pressured to take action by the United States, which viewed the border regions of Pakistan as another front in the war against the Taliban insurgency.¹⁵⁴ Data compiled from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) in Figure 1 shows the uptick in total terrorist attacks in Pakistan during this time period. Figure 2 displays data from the same timeframe, but is limited to attacks carried out against state targets.




Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan: 2004–009 (total). Data from *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System*, <http://wits.nctc.gov/> (accessed February 11, 2010).¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Shafqat, "Pakistan: Militancy, Transition, and Future Relations," 97.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁵⁵ The data in this graph was not filtered for any specific type of attack or victim. Instead, I wanted to show the overall trend of terrorism in Pakistan as Islamabad has moved to take stronger action against militants and extremist organizations. (Note: WITS data only exists for incidents that occurred from January 1, 2004 through September 30, 2009.)

Both charts clearly show the reaction to increased Pakistani activity against militants who pose a significant problem for the state. Rather than accept increased state control, these groups have targeted the state itself. As Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur point out, “Differences between the goals of the Pakistani state and the Islamist groups it helped nurture have severely undermined Pakistani security...”¹⁵⁶




Figure 2. Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan: 2004–2009 (state targets). Data from *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System*, <http://wits.nctc.gov/> (accessed February 11, 2010).¹⁵⁷

While of course not all of these attacks can be linked to organizations that were once sponsored by the state, the majority of militants conducting these attacks have directly or indirectly benefited from the support Pakistan once provided to its proxies.

¹⁵⁶ Ganguly and Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” 53.

¹⁵⁷ To narrow down the overall data from Figure 1 to what I call “state targets,” I selected specific “victim” types available for advanced searches on the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System Web site. The types chosen to represent the state apparatus were “government official,” “military,” “police,” and “top government official.” While other types could be included under a definition of “state targets,” I wanted to limit the possible inclusion of non-state victims which may be present in those other categories. Thus, while the numbers included on the chart may be low, they still show a definite trend of increased terrorism against the state as Islamabad has moved forcefully to curtail militants and terrorist organizations.

For instance, the Taliban in Afghanistan and its factions in Pakistan, namely the Tehrik-e-Taliban, directly challenged its one time sponsors in Islamabad when they exercised control over Pakistan territory in the border regions.¹⁵⁸ While some political solutions were attempted, the steady escalation in terrorist attacks and militancy led to the introduction of Pakistani military personnel into the volatile area.

In any case, the control that India claims Pakistan has over militants and extremists within Pakistan is a far from accurate. In fact, the data from WITS shows that Pakistan has become a victim of terrorists and extremists once deemed important to the state. Still, India has not been satisfied with Pakistan's commitment against homegrown terrorists, which is understandable considering Islamabad's history of half measures aimed at dealing with extremism. As the report from a recent conference on Cold Start held at the Naval Postgraduate School explains, "...while we want Pakistan to be tougher on terrorism, about a year ago Pakistan deployed two divisions and simultaneously cracked down on the Red Mosque and terrorism increased almost ten-fold as a result. If this is the case, Pakistan is not the problem..."¹⁵⁹ Indian Army General Gurmeet Kanwal, however, "believes that Pakistan's...fight against terrorism on its own territory is insufficient."¹⁶⁰ Ironically, though, India's hardline view on the matter impacts Pakistan's ability to fight the terrorism that India accuses it of controlling. For example, any terrorist attack in India could result in an escalation in tensions that would force Pakistan to move troops away from unstable areas to counter any threatening posture assumed by India. As a result, forces that could be used to combat the Taliban or other militants and help Pakistan solve its internal terrorist problem would be removed, therefore increasing the likelihood of further terrorism. In the end, it remains to be seen if Pakistan can make a sustained concerted effort to counter terrorism, despite the risks the government will face with such a policy.

The post-9/11 period has plainly shown a shift in Pakistan's policy toward its once-sponsored proxies and terrorism carried out by those groups. As a result of

¹⁵⁸ Ganguly and Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 53.

¹⁵⁹ Davis, Khan, and Dietz, *Conference Report: Cold Start*, 11.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 11–12.

Islamabad's volte face under pressure from the United States and the international community, a definite principal-agent problem has emerged. While Pakistan faced minor issues with its proxies in the past, this new era has shown that Pakistan has lost control over those one-time agents, which now conduct attacks according to their own interests, and not those of the state.

E. CONCLUSION

Since partition, Pakistan has had a complicated relationship with proxy fighters. Initially, it sponsored these organizations and used them as an extension of state policy. Recently though, these groups have begun to threaten their former masters, either directly by targeting the state, or indirectly by their maximalist agendas that affects Pakistan's volatile relationship with India. While Pakistan can clearly be held responsible for creating such groups, it is far from clear that such a statement can be made regarding the actions of these organizations today. This principal-agent problem has come to define Pakistan in recent years and will likely continue to do so for some time. It must be realized both by India and Pakistan that this threat to regional stability cannot be solved by accusatory rhetoric or posturing. Instead, cooperation is needed to truly solve the problem.

However, considering the historical animosity that dominates the relationship between these two countries, cooperation is hard to achieve. Peace talks are undermined by a principal-agent problem intensified by enmity. Since India sees Pakistan as being responsible for its homegrown terrorist groups, dialogue can easily be disrupted when attacks beyond the control of Islamabad occur. Despite developments over the past decade, India still sees Pakistan as the one who pulls the strings of extremist and militant groups. Thus, when a terrorist attack occurs, Islamabad is almost immediately blamed though it likely has had no role in such an attack. Naturally, these types of accusations ratchet up the security tensions between the two nations. If allowed to go too far, open war could be the end result, a nightmare scenario between two nuclear nations in which it would be difficult to control escalation. Further exacerbating the issue is India's Cold Start doctrine, created in the wake of the 2001–2002 military standoff between the two

nations. Such a doctrine would allow the Indian military to move to an offensive footing, thereby, increasing the likelihood of war in the event further terrorist attacks occur, whether Islamabad is responsible or not. In the end, Pakistan's principal-agent issue complicates an already complex situation on the subcontinent.

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IV. PROBLEM 2: ESCALATION ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

*A lot of viable options (beginning from a strike on camps to a full conventional war) are available. We can do it....If we go to war, jolly good.*¹⁶¹

—Indian General Sundararajan Padmanabhan

This chapter will explore the impacts of an operational Cold Start doctrine on the security and precarious stability that exists between India and Pakistan. As the previous chapter has explained, Pakistan retains limited, if any, control over terrorists within its borders. Cold Start, though, is aimed at coercing Islamabad to rein in these organizations through limited, punitive strikes while remaining below the nuclear threshold. This misdirected strategic targeting is only one flaw though. Even if this issue is resolved, Cold Start still poses a major challenge to future India-Pakistan relations because of its provocative, offensive stance and the historical legacies of escalation, misperception, and deception. Two major instances, the 1971 East Pakistan War and Exercise/Operation Brasstacks in 1986–1987, clearly show how events can quickly spiral for each side in both outright armed conflict as well as military exercises. With this in mind, the question remains as to whether or not Cold Start would be an operational liability for New Delhi should such a case arise where it would be employed. This chapter will show that because of the offensive nature of the doctrine, past experience suggests an operational Cold Start would drastically increase the likelihood of escalation in a future conflict between India and Pakistan. Thus, rather than solving India's security concerns, Cold Start would exponentially increase them.

This chapter begins with a broad discussion of escalation, both deliberate and inadvertent. The following three sections will address, respectively, the 1971 India-Pakistan War, the 1986–87 Brasstacks episode, and the 1999 Kargil War.

¹⁶¹ Sundararajan Padmanabhan, quoted in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 99–100.

A. INTRODUCTION

Since partition, the conduct of warfare on the Indian subcontinent has been a complicated affair. While complex conflicts are certainly not limited to India and Pakistan, the colored history of antagonism between these states has created an environment in which minor crises have the potential to escalate to full scale war. This idea is particularly troublesome today considering the fact that both India and Pakistan have known nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a “limited” conflict that would have remained conventional in scale and escalation in the past could now result in a nuclear exchange that would be devastating for both Islamabad and New Delhi. While theorists of nuclear weapons proliferation debate the likelihood of escalation to the nuclear level during an armed conflict, the fact remains that Pakistan and India have willingly put themselves in the position to wage full scale war on more than one occasion despite the presence of said weapons. India’s new Cold Start doctrine, though limited in its aims, pushes the envelope even farther in this context. India’s shift to an offensive stance increases the potential for escalation, intended or not, by bypassing the channels that could help defuse a crisis at an early, manageable stage.

Despite the recent unveiling of the Cold Start strategy, aspects of the doctrine are not entirely new. One can see parallel tactics utilized in past conflicts and crises, namely the 1971 War, the Brasstacks episode, and the 1999 Kargil conflict. Rapid blitzkrieg operations during the 1971 War allowed the Indian military to swiftly and decisively overwhelm and defeat Pakistan forces in both East and West Pakistan.¹⁶² Brasstacks demonstrated the impact of deception and misperception on a crisis and the possibility for escalation to occur when the motives of an adversary are unclear. Finally, despite the limited extent of Kargil, Indian officials planned to widen the conflict as necessary, regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons.¹⁶³ In each of these cases, deception, misperception, and escalation played a significant role. Cold Start’s incorporation of all of these ideas coupled with the fact that it is designed to bypass civil and international

¹⁶² John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 205.

¹⁶³ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 96.

interference makes an operational Cold Start a worrisome proposition on the subcontinent. Rather than intimidate Pakistan, based on past experience such a strategy could invite a dangerous response from Islamabad in the event of the execution of a conflict based on the Cold Start model.

Below, I address general escalation concepts and their roles in the India-Pakistan security dynamic.

B. ESCALATION: DELIBERATE AND INADVERTENT

The cases of the 1971 East Pakistan War, Operation Brasstacks, and the 1999 Kargil conflict all demonstrate the potential escalation, both deliberate and inadvertent, both before and during a crisis. In the following sections of this chapter I will examine those cases in greater detail. However, a basic understanding of escalation and its effects are necessary to understand the implications of those crises in the overall context of Cold Start.

Escalation in general refers to the notion that, during a crisis or conflict, an actor will reach the realization that by increasing his forces, attacks, or posturing the potential for victory will also increase. Of course, in most cases, the actor will not be operating in a vacuum and his actions will likely worry his opponent. As a result, the actor's opponent could either attempt to counter the first move toward escalation by increasing his own forces in response or stand down. Assuming escalation occurs, as Herman Kahn puts it, "there is likely to be a 'competition in risk-taking.'"¹⁶⁴ Consequently, by raising the stakes, an escalation spiral could result that would ultimately be costly and dangerous for both sides. Despite the spiraling effect, escalation will only continue as long it is possible to afford it, whether economically or psychologically. Kahn explains this effect through the metaphors of a union strike and a game of "chicken." In both scenarios, one side eventually realizes the futility of continuing to escalate and backs down.¹⁶⁵ This

¹⁶⁴ Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 3.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 9–14.

type of escalation and the resulting consequences are what I call deliberate escalation.¹⁶⁶ While certainly destabilizing, both sides are presumably consciously upping the ante for a specified purpose. In theory, deliberate escalation could be controlled. This is not necessarily the case with inadvertent escalation.

Inadvertent escalation, for the purpose of this thesis, is defined as escalation that results from unintended actions that occur beyond the control of a central command or government.¹⁶⁷ Inadvertent escalation is inextricably linked to deliberate escalation. Commanders in the field, already on high alert because of the initial stages of a conflict, can easily overstep the mandate of their original orders causing unintentional consequences. This idea is not new. As Barry Posen explains, “There are many historical examples of militaries striking out on offensive actions unbeknownst to their civilian superiors...Even when the intensity of a crisis or conflict increases civilian efforts to intervene..., soldiers often interpret policymakers’ injunctions in ways that allow them maximum operational discretion.”¹⁶⁸ As opposed to deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation is much harder to control since autonomy and independent decision-making are what caused the escalation to occur in the first place. Aside from military adventurism, inadvertent escalation can come from the inherent uncertainty of warfare or the “fog of war.”¹⁶⁹ Under the fluid circumstances of combat, orders can be misconstrued, intelligence can be ill-founded or misinterpreted, and enemy intentions can be overestimated. Consequently, military leaders can push for escalation whether it is warranted or not. In this case, civilian leadership, already overwhelmed by conflict, could lose strategic control of the situation, allowing for greater increases in escalation beyond their initial goals.

¹⁶⁶ See Stephen A. Smith, “Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 6–7.

¹⁶⁷ Morton H. Halperin describes the distinction between deliberate and inadvertent war as the difference between how a “central war” erupts whether that be from an “explosion” that neither side wants (inadvertent war) or from the deliberate action taken by the losing side (deliberate war). While generally informative, these ideas are peripheral to my discussion on escalation. See Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1963), 11.

¹⁶⁸ Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 17.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 19–20.

In the nuclear world, both types of escalation are dangerous. Deliberate escalation during a crisis could easily proceed beyond the original intentions of the main actors. Inadvertent escalation, stemming from deliberate escalation, could easily result in an out-of-control situation, which could then develop into a nuclear war, the cost of which would be catastrophic for the parties involved. Despite Kenneth Waltz's claim that, "in a nuclear world any state—whether ruled by a Stalin, a Mao Zedong, a Saddam Hussein, or a Kim Jong Il—will be deterred by the knowledge that aggressive actions may lead to its own destruction," there are instances where states have pursued aggressive actions under the shadow of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), notably the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Soviet-Chinese confrontation along the Ussuri River, and the actions taken by Iraq prior to both Gulf wars.¹⁷⁰ For India and Pakistan, this is especially troubling considering their past experiences of deliberate and inadvertent escalation, three of which will be analyzed in the following sections, and the future implementation of Cold Start, which as described earlier, would significantly increase the likelihood of both deliberate and inadvertent escalation on the subcontinent.

C. EAST PAKISTAN AND BLITZKRIEG

In 1971, the crisis that had been slowly building between West and East Pakistan over ethnolinguistic issues, government representation, and general condescension of the West toward the East reached a boiling point. In March of that year, West Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight to disarm would be Bangladeshi separatists in the hopes of preventing a move for independence.¹⁷¹ However, the operation had just the opposite effect and East Pakistanis took to the streets in a combination of protest and mutiny. In the course of the fighting that was to erupt in the days after Searchlight was executed, West Pakistani troops killed over 30,000 people in an orgy of violence.¹⁷² With the writing on the wall, East Pakistanis began to flee into India by the thousands where a resistance was formed to fight the West Pakistani incursion.

¹⁷⁰ Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 117.

¹⁷¹ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 146.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 168.

For its part, India became concerned with the amount of refugees streaming into the country. With the influx of such a large amount of people, the majority of whom were Muslim, New Delhi became anxious that India would not be able to successfully absorb the new immigrant population into a nation already stretched for resources and services. Also, there was fear that a large Muslim population taking up permanent residence would upset the ethnic balance in the border states, which could lead to separatist movements or communal hostility.¹⁷³ Consequently, the Indian leadership felt compelled to provide assistance to the East Pakistani resistance and later to launch a military invasion of East Pakistan itself.

In late November and early December, the fighting between the Indian army and Pakistani forces began in earnest. As Owen Bennett Jones points out, “The first Indian attacks were limited to strikes on Pakistani forces followed by rapid withdrawals back into Indian territory.”¹⁷⁴ However, following an attack by the Pakistani air force on Indian positions on December 3, Indian forces responded with strikes against Pakistani air bases in Karachi, Sargodha, and Islamabad and the war escalated.¹⁷⁵ Along with naval operations including bombardments of key ports and a blockade of both the West and the East, the army executed what can be termed as blitzkrieg attacks into East Pakistan.¹⁷⁶ Supported by air power, six divisions composed of mechanized armor supported by infantry pushed into East Pakistan on multiple fronts with unmatched speed and firepower as depicted in Figure 3.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 61.

¹⁷⁴ Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 172.

¹⁷⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 68.

¹⁷⁶ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 206.

¹⁷⁷ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 68.




Figure 3. India's plan for its 1971 attack on East Pakistan. Reprinted, by permission, from John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 207.

By December 8, forces from the south reached Dacca with forces from the north arriving a few days later. On December 16, after successfully crushing what remained of the Pakistani forces, the Indian army moved into Dacca and the next day a unilateral cease-fire was announced by New Delhi that was echoed by Islamabad, thereby ending the war.¹⁷⁸

With the above description of the 1971 War, one can see clear implications regarding the foundations of Cold Start. Like the Bangladesh War, Cold Start envisions a joint, multi-axis, offensive strike that can quickly and effectively grab limited amounts of territory and defeat the Pakistani army.

¹⁷⁸ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 68.




Figure 4. Author's conception of a Cold Start attack. Map modified from Google Maps, <http://www.google.com/mapmaker?ll=29.171349,75.849609&spn=10.980816,27.861328&t=m&z=6> (accessed April 10, 2010).

As Figure 4 shows in a generalized, hypothetical Cold Start operation, a multi-axis attack similar to the 1971 assault on East Pakistan would pose a multitude of problems for the Pakistani military. Although envelopment is not possible in this case, the multiple fronts could cause confusion in Islamabad and raise questions among the military leadership as to whether such an operation would really be limited in its aims. However, the real danger arises when the Indian army moves so fast, as it did in 1971, that it finds itself taking more and more territory than it originally planned. While this scenario was different in the 1971 War, as initial plans for a “limited aims” strategy were changed in favor of the total defeat of all Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, the fundamental pathologies with a rapid advance still hold.¹⁷⁹ As Cohen explains regarding the capture

¹⁷⁹ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 205.

of Dacca, “Even though the Indian defeat of the Pakistan Army seemed to be well planned, in fact no orders were actually issued for the capture of the capital of East Pakistan, Dhaka. It was later revealed that a senior Indian general took it upon himself to make the decision.”¹⁸⁰ In this case, the Pakistanis who were planning for a limited Indian assault were outmatched and quickly overrun. In the context of a Cold Start operation, a coordinated, rapid assault on the heartland of Pakistan such as this could easily trip “red lines” in Islamabad, thus, resulting in a massive retaliation that would be a greater catastrophe than the proxy war India was trying to deter.

Problems with an offensive strategy can also be seen with the Pakistani misinterpretation of India’s goals. According to Mearsheimer, Pakistan only massed a “forward defense to meet an Indian offensive, because they expected the Indian’s to pursue a limited arms strategy.”¹⁸¹ This faulty assessment surely is not lost on military planners in Islamabad. Despite the professed limited goals to be pursued in a Cold Start attack, how can Pakistan be sure that India will not shift its aims to something more maximalist or, even with limited goals, how can it be sure that the Indian army will stop once the operation has begun and both commanders, soldiers, and the public are whipped to a fever pitch.

In the end, with a force and strategy remarkably similar to what was used in 1971, namely division strength units with battalion support and coordinated air cover executing multi axis, lightning-type strikes, Cold Start poses a significant challenge for Pakistani planners.¹⁸² No doubt, India views this as the most effective way of deterring proxy assaults under the shadow of nuclear weapons but from the Pakistani point of view, this puts Pakistan in an untenable situation to where the very existence of the Pakistani state may be threatened. Thus, in all likelihood, Pakistan will rely more on asymmetric tactics rather than less, build up a conventional force to counter that of India, and possibly lower

¹⁸⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 135.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹⁸² Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 68; Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 206.

its nuclear threshold to prevent any Indian incursion that could destroy the state, thus destabilizing the already unstable subcontinent.¹⁸³

D. MISPERCEPTION AND BRASSTACKS

From mid-1986 through early 1987, the Indian military executed a series of exercises known as Brasstacks. Beginning in May-June 1986, the exercises, four in total, progressively increasing in complexity, realism, and jointness, were designed to employ the bulk of India's military on a coordinated scale not before witnessed in South Asia.¹⁸⁴ Taking place in a politically charged atmosphere, which was causing unease in both Islamabad and New Delhi, Brasstacks set off a chain of events that would lead the subcontinent to the brink of war. While the first three exercises were important, their relevance for this paper is limited to the fact that they set the stage for the fourth exercise, Brasstacks IV. It was this fourth exercise, renamed Operation Trident, when there was fear that Pakistan may in fact launch an offensive to counter what it saw as an imminent Indian strike that created the majority of tensions in this whole episode.¹⁸⁵

With the execution of Brasstacks IV, relations between India and Pakistan, already strained, became even more unstable. In response to Indian movements in previous months, Pakistan executed its own winter exercises, dubbed Saf-e-Shikan, and later Sldegehammer.¹⁸⁶ Despite reassurances from the Indian government that the exercises were benign and that New Delhi had no offensive designs on Pakistan, Islamabad was not willing to gamble its existence on reassurances when India's military was putting strike capable forces in positions that could devastate the Pakistani state.

¹⁸³ Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 169.

¹⁸⁴ The Brasstacks scenario was aimed at an uprising in Kashmir that had reached untenable levels. Ironically, that scenario would become a reality in little more than three years time. The immediate reasoning behind the exercises is unclear, though many point to the fact that Rajiv Gandhi was "fascinated" by the "bigness" of such an operation and wanted to "strike a heroic posture and impress the neighbors." See Kanti P. Bajpai and others, *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (Urbana: ACDIS, 1995), 20. Aside from grandstanding, the political environment involving Pakistani support for the Sikh insurgency was also a large factor in the decision to execute Brasstacks. See Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 85.

¹⁸⁵ Bajpai and others, *Brasstacks and Beyond*, 21.

¹⁸⁶ Devin Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 99.

Even more worrisome from the Pakistani side, for over forty days, beginning on December 8, the hotline between the director generals of military operations in Pakistan and India (DGMOs) inexplicably was not used.¹⁸⁷ An already unstable situation became even more volatile. In mid-January, the Pakistani military moved its own forces into positions, which to the Indian military brass, signaled its intent to launch a pincer movement into Indian territory near Amritsar in support of Sikh separatists.¹⁸⁸ The Indian military responded in kind and moved its own forces to counter the Pakistani threat. As the prospects for war became imminent, both sides decided to open a dialogue in order to prevent further escalation. Through successive diplomatic talks, the crisis was resolved by mid-February 1987. As a side note, in the near the end of the crisis, unconfirmed information came to the forefront from Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadir (A.Q.) Kahn that Pakistan was in possession of a nuclear bomb and prepared to use it in defense of the Pakistani state.¹⁸⁹ Although this revelation had little impact on the crisis, coming when it did, it did add a new dimension to the tensions that remained between Pakistan and India.

Like the East Pakistan War of 1971, one can see the parallels between the Cold Start doctrine and Brasstacks. For Cold Start, aside from its main offensive features, one of the most important elements for its success is misperception. The main reason for the multi-axis deployment/attack strategy is to confuse and paralyze Pakistani decision making abilities so as to slow Pakistani response, prevent the concentration of Pakistani forces, and inhibit Pakistan's effective use of its nuclear arsenal against a multi-front, unpredictable Indian offensive.¹⁹⁰ By achieving surprise through the creation of misperception, India would be more likely to rapidly and convincingly achieve its military and political aims. However, this intentional deception could also send signals the Indian military did not intend. In the case of Brasstacks, Indian leaders told their counterparts in Pakistan that the exercises were routine and of a benign nature even

¹⁸⁷ Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation*, 99.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 100.

¹⁸⁹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 87.

¹⁹⁰ Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?" 166–167.

though, from the Pakistani perspective, actions taken by the Indian military seemed to tell another story. The Pakistanis responded in kind with their own exercise, which created dangerous escalation. With Cold Start, this pathology also holds. Despite what the Indians may state are their limited objectives, actions could prove otherwise as described in the above section regarding the 1971 War.

Also, although unacknowledged publicly, another important aspect of Cold Start is the limitation of civilian leadership intervention in military operations. However, the example of Brasstacks does not bode well for this proposition. As described in *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia*, “Inadequate communications between the Prime Minister...and his Minister of State for Defense, and the Service Chiefs appears to have developed as the crisis unfolded.”¹⁹¹ According to some, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) “was deliberately kept uninformed about key elements of Brasstacks because ‘they could not be trusted to keep a secret.’”¹⁹² Also, the Ministry of Defense was “kept on the peripheries.”¹⁹³ Thus, while certainly not all of the civilian leadership was kept out of the loop, those who were involved with the crisis did not have a full range of opinions available with which to judge their actions.

As seen with Brasstacks, misperception can lead toward a rapid escalation of brinkmanship that is hard to defuse. According to *Brasstacks and Beyond*:

Many lessons can be learned from Brasstacks and consequent developments. Perhaps the most important is to realize that the gap between the perception of the two sides as to the intentions and actual moves of the other reached very dangerous levels. Both seem to have immediately resorted to adverse interpretations of each other’s intentions...Since the two countries nearly came to blows because of this misreading of intentions, the...perception is that it is imperative that India and Pakistan should not only reduce their reliance on the use of force...but must evolve some type of institutional framework to check the tendency to drift towards catastrophic confrontation.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Bajpai and others, *Brasstacks and Beyond*, 32.

¹⁹² Ibid., 32.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 46.

Despite these lessons, with Cold Start, India intends to use deception and the creation of misperception to its advantage operationally. In sum, rather than discouraging proxy attacks, Cold Start may in fact force Pakistan to reposition its own forces and utilize more non-state actors in order to counter Indian developments of which their intentions, from the Pakistani perspective, cannot credibly be attained.

E. KARGIL AND THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

In 1999, barely a year after both India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices, the two states plunged into conflict in a sector of the Kashmiri LoC called Kargil.¹⁹⁵ The main cause of the crisis was the deliberate incursion of Pakistani regular forces, as well as Kashmiri insurgents across the LoC into Indian Kashmir at Kargil in attempt to return the issue of Kashmir to the world's attention. Indian intelligence failed to anticipate such a movement because of the formidable terrain and altitude of the area.¹⁹⁶ All of this occurred less than three months after Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, met in Lahore to establish a new era of cooperation and stability on the subcontinent.¹⁹⁷

The conflict escalated to war when Indian forces responded to the Pakistani incursion and attempted to remove the Pakistani military units from their entrenched positions above the Srinagar-Leh Highway.¹⁹⁸ Initially, the Indians could not eject the Pakistanis because of bungled leadership, poor logistics, and the lack of experience in the terrain. As Ganguly points out:

The initial Indian reaction was clumsy due to a lack of good information about the intruders' strength, disposition, and capabilities...because of the lack of ground cover and the intruders' command of the heights, the advancing Indian troops became easy targets for Pakistani snipers and gunners. After taking substantial casualties, the Indians realized that they

¹⁹⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 114.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 114.

¹⁹⁷ Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 118.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 118.

would need considerably greater firepower to dislodge the Pakistani intruders...Logistical, organizational and topographic limitations significantly hobbled Indian military operations.¹⁹⁹

However, once air power was authorized, the Indians were able to utilize that advantage coupled with artillery support and an overall better operational plan to eventually drive the Pakistani troops from their positions.

With the utilization of greater force, the possibility for escalation dramatically increased. Although Pakistan did not respond in kind to Indian conventional attacks, Islamabad did authorize an increase in the alert status of its nuclear arsenal and hinted at the possible use of such weapons.²⁰⁰ As Sagan explains, “Pakistani political authorities...made nuclear threats during the crisis, suggesting that nuclear weapons would be used precisely under...conditions” of Indian escalation.²⁰¹ On the Indian side, plans were made to deliberately escalate the conflict if its war aims were not met. Beyond simply increasing firepower available to Indian forces in Kargil and changing its operational tactics to allow its air force to intervene, New Delhi entertained the possibility of widening the war beyond Kashmir. Mechanized forces were moved into Rajasthan to facilitate a counterattack should the operations in Kargil fail to eject Pakistani forces, a move that concerned Islamabad.²⁰² According to Kapur, “Pakistani leaders...took the possibility of Indian...escalation seriously. [Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz] Sharif, for example, publicly worried during the...crisis that India might not merely undertake a limited cross-LoC attack but ‘was getting ready to launch a full-scale military operation against Pakistan.’”²⁰³ In the end, though, outside intervention, namely that of the United States, helped bring about a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.²⁰⁴ While nuclear weapons may have given the leaders in Islamabad and New Delhi pause regarding their courses of action, they did not prevent escalatory posturing by both sides.

¹⁹⁹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 116–117.

²⁰⁰ Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 99.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid., 96.

²⁰³ Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent*, 130.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 121–122.

According to Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “It would appear that India’s decision to not escalate the crisis had more to do with the success of international pressure on Pakistan that with...nuclear threat[s].”²⁰⁵

The overall outcome of Kargil conflict, as well as the impact of the actions taken at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, all have three major implications for a conflict fought according to the Cold Start doctrine. First, while the military in Pakistan blamed the political leadership in Islamabad for waffling under international pressure and prematurely withdrawing Pakistani forces from combat, a so-called “stab in the back,” New Delhi, on the other hand, saw its conduct of the war and the threats of escalation as the causal factors for Pakistan’s retreat.²⁰⁶ Thus, rather than demonstrating the fallacy of limited war under the nuclear umbrella, Kargil proved to India just the opposite: such a war could be fought and it could even be escalated if the circumstances required it. For the Indian Army, Cold Start would help further India’s capabilities to fight and win such a war, regardless of the potential for escalation, which India saw not as a detriment but instead as a useful tool to intimidate Pakistan. Second, the intervention of the international community that proved to be instrumental in ending the Kargil conflict and, two years later, in the reduction of tensions during the military standoff following the December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament is no longer seen as beneficial to Indian strategic aims. Consequently, Cold Start is precisely designed to undercut just such outside interference. As described earlier, by launching an attack against Pakistan within seventy-two to ninety six hours after mobilization notification, the Indian military would afford the international community little, if any, opportunity to play a role in a Cold Start executed conflict.

Finally, the decision made by Islamabad to increase its alert status on its nuclear arsenal shows just how seriously Pakistan took the Indian threat. In a Cold Start scenario, the threat posed by the Indian military would be even more severe for Pakistan. As explained in the section on the 1971 War, it is not beyond reason for Pakistan to think

²⁰⁵ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Keeping Peace in Nuclear South Asia,” in *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century*, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 193.

²⁰⁶ Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 97.

that a limited war could expand into a wider conflict with larger aims assumed by forces in the field or by the leadership in New Delhi. While India claims to be aware of so-called Pakistan nuclear “red lines,” it is unclear how Pakistan would view Indian operations in reference to those tripwires. Those red lines, as described by Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai of the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division, are as follows: “India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilization or creates large-scale internal subversion in the country.”²⁰⁷ Clearly, when facing the uncertainty, rapidity, and aggressiveness of a Cold Start attack, Pakistan could determine that these red lines were in imminent danger of being breached and launch its nuclear weapons, which would most likely be in a high state of readiness as evidenced by Kargil and the 2001/2002 military standoff. In the end, the Kargil War shows that escalation in the face of nuclear weapons is not necessarily taboo. Building on this conflict, Cold Start would, in fact make escalation, more likely and thus more dangerous.

F. CONCLUSION

Cold Start evolved out of the inability of the Indian military to mobilize rapidly in response to perceived Pakistani aggression. By shifting its strategic posture from defensive to offensive, by reorganizing its forces from large corps to more agile divisions, and by emphasizing speed, maneuverability and deception, the Indian military hopes that it has at last found a way to effectively respond to any Pakistani-based adventurism. However, as shown above, the key aspects of Cold Start are not wholly new and can be found in past crisis between the two subcontinent states. Speed and an overwhelming offensive force in 1971 created the opportunity for India to split Pakistan in two. In fact, movement occurred so quickly that the Indian army made large gains it had not fully anticipated. Pakistan was expecting limited aims from India and thus the

²⁰⁷ Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 168.

defense employed was ineffective.²⁰⁸ Therefore, even with the limited incursion rhetoric surrounding Cold Start, Islamabad cannot rely on statements when the past has shown another precedent.

Deception, misperception, and miscommunication all combined to create an escalating crisis in late 1986 and early 1987. While India claimed its Brasstacks exercises were of a benign nature, Pakistan was not confident in those statements. Instead, it looked at the posture of Indian forces and concluded it had to respond with its own exercises and subsequent military deployments.²⁰⁹ Consequently, military exercises spiraled into a crisis that nearly resulted in armed conflict. Again, the past shows that one of the key components of Cold Start, deception and misperception, unintended or otherwise, can lead to undesired outcomes. With the history of animosity between the two countries, this lack of trust is a flaw in the deterrence capability of Cold Start. Lastly, Kargil 1999 demonstrates how escalation under the nuclear umbrella is not only possible but was anticipated and planned for by both sides, raising the specter of a similar situation in a future Cold Start operation. Under Cold Start, though, the international community, the main impediment to uncontrolled escalation in this case, would be unable to intervene quickly and effectively. In the end, as stated earlier, with the uncertainty of India's intentions coupled with the potential for unmitigated escalation, an already uneasy Pakistan could become emboldened to increase its conventional forces and lower its nuclear threshold in anticipation of any move by India. Thus, on the whole, goals India is hoping to achieve through Cold Start may actually be undermined by the very foundations of Cold Start.

²⁰⁸ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 206.

²⁰⁹ Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation*, 99.

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V. PROBLEM 3: THE LEGACIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY

*Cold Start Doctrine moves from the erstwhile defensive mindset the Indian Army has maintained since independence, shifting to the offensive and requiring significant adjustments in leadership and...philosophy, which is easier said than done.*²¹⁰

—Pakistani Air Commodore Tariq M. Ashraf

While the previous two chapters addressed the Pakistani principal-agent problem and escalation issues, this chapter will address the domestic, institutional hurdles to implementing Cold Start. Specifically, this chapter will focus on two major concerns, the first of which is the complex civil-military relationship that exists between New Delhi and the military. While this issue is not of the magnitude that affects Pakistan, the fact that the Indian civilian leadership has a history of isolating the military from the decision making process and curtailing its independence is relevant to the discussion of a strategy such as Cold Start. This type of strategy, as will be shown, requires tight civil-military cooperation for it to be effective and yet measured in its execution. The second concern involves the Indian military's historical inter-service rivalries that could hinder the effective execution of a Cold Start operation, an operation that requires robust, joint coordination to achieve its goals. While other factors such as infrastructure issues as well as technology and equipment shortcomings are important, those are tangible things that can be solved with appropriate planning, spending, and procurement. The questions concerning civil-military relations and joint service interoperability, however, go to the heart of India's offensive doctrine for limited war. These hurdles may prove to be too great to overcome.

This chapter will begin with an historical overview of the evolution of Indian military strategy and defense policy. Following that discussion, civil-military relations will be examined in the context of Cold Start. Finally, inter-service rivalries will be addressed.

²¹⁰ Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening," 59–60.

A. INTRODUCTION

India emerged from the rule of the British Empire as a polyglot, multicultural nation-state. Unlike its neighbor, Pakistan, India was able to reap the lingering benefits of British rule, namely industry and, more importantly, robust institutions of democratic government. While Pakistan languished under the unequal distribution of the spoils of partition and faced turmoil following the death of its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, not long after independence, India established a relatively stable democratic government headed by its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's primary goals during his years in power were to increase India's economic growth and industrial capability while maintaining a "nonalignment" policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union during the nascent years of the Cold War. Nehru's governance in the first decade and a half of independence would establish the superiority of civilian rule in India. While Pakistan would face alternating military and civilian rule and subsequent instability, India's government would remain stable and civilian run at the expense of military power. Thus, the Indian military, despite its prominence during the years of the British Raj, was relegated to subservience in the independence era. Rather than play a role in formulating policy, the military was isolated. Also, instead of creating a unified command structure that could potentially acquire too much power and possibly threaten civilian rule, the separate armed services were given an equal footing amongst themselves, enabling competition and infighting for resources and influence, establishing the notion of rivalry that continues to this day. Thus, by eliminating the specter of military rule in its early years, India's civilian government established the opposite precedent, one of a military hamstrung by New Delhi and faced with inter-service competition.

These issues, complex civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry, have major implications for the implementation of the Cold Start doctrine. India's new limited war doctrine, a shift from a decades-long emphasis on defense to one of offense, requires a close civil-military relationship based on trust and military independence. The strategy also requires joint, integrated forces to fulfill its goals of rapid, punitive strikes against

the Pakistani military. The development of these institutional relationships remains inadequate, however. As such, Cold Start's potential for success is limited in the current domestic environment.

In the following section, the historical development of Indian defense doctrine and strategy is examined.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE

When India achieved independence from the British Empire in August 1947, it faced many challenges, not the least of which was security and defense. While institutions of the state that had been established by the British remained, fundamental issues of general policy, economics, and foreign relations, among others, were unresolved. The process of creating a viable state was key to the success of independence. Partition naturally added to the complexity of the situation, especially when it came to the issue of security and defense. Although some effort was made to establish a common defense force for both India and Pakistan prior to partition and in the immediate years following the division, the bloody aftermath of partition and developing antagonism between the two states prevented such an arrangement.²¹¹ Instead, the regionally integrated military, which had existed in British India, was split into two forces that would become the Indian and Pakistani armies. The resulting division of assets, equipment, and personnel between India and Pakistan yielded a force ratio of 2 to 1 in favor of the Indians.²¹² Superiority in numbers, however, did not guarantee security for India. As events later in 1947 would show, Pakistan was more than willing to commit its smaller forces to a cause it deemed of fundamental importance to its identity as a state. This issue, the unresolved state of the territory of Kashmir, would come to define the India-Pakistan relationship in subsequent years with events surrounding the territory eventually precipitating two more wars.

²¹¹ Lorne J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 31, 35.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 82.

As for the rest of the region, India was at ease with its immediate neighbors, signing friendship treaties with Bhutan, Nepal, and Burma.²¹³ China, for the leadership in New Delhi, posed little military threat because of the towering Himalayas, which offered a natural barrier from the Chinese.²¹⁴ Globally, the nascent Cold War brewing between the Soviet Union and the United States affected India's outlook beyond South Asia.

Because of the perceived lack of potential security issues on the horizon, the new leadership of India, primarily Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, pursued the peaceful development of the state economically, industrially, and socially, rather than formulate a strategic security policy or spend on military defense. As Stephen Cohen points out:

Nehru...focused most of India's postwar energies on building state power, but not state military power. He took seriously his own statements about the priority of internal economic development, so defense budgets remained stagnant... Nehru and his confidants saw defense spending as detrimental to both economic growth and civilian dominance... Indian defense planning was virtually nonexistent, an afterthought.²¹⁵

Nehru's poor opinion of the military in general also colored his view on security matters. The prime minister and his adviser's did not want to push the military beyond its limited capabilities and thus pursued minimal security and defense goals.²¹⁶ Also, Nehru's own reservations regarding the use of force, similar to that of Mahatma Gandhi, resulted in a stunted military policy.²¹⁷

However, events such as the 1947 Kashmir War and growing tensions with China eventually forced Nehru and his administration to formulate a general defense policy. Because of Nehru's desire for "nonalignment" with the superpowers during this period,

²¹³ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 130.

²¹⁴ The reliance on the Himalayas as a defense measure eventually lulled the Indians into a sense of complacency regarding China. The unforeseen 1962 confrontation between the two powers shocked Nehru and undermined the Indian people's confidence in him. See Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 131.

²¹⁵ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 128.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

emphasis was placed on military independence and self-sufficiency.²¹⁸ Various reports and recommendations produced by advisors to Nehru attempted to show how India could maintain this independence and also meet all of its defense needs at a low cost.²¹⁹ As a result of these factors, ideas, and inputs, and the importance placed on political and economic development as well as the limited capabilities of the Indian armed forces, logically military policy became one based primarily on defense.²²⁰ Concern was focused on the northwest and the ability to defend against further incursions Pakistan might make in Kashmir. To the northeast, China, though emerging as a potential threat, was still seen as a diplomatic challenge rather than a military problem.²²¹

All of this would change in October 1962 when the Indian military along the disputed northeastern boundary with China was overrun by Chinese military units. Both sides had antagonized each other during the period preceding China's actions but for Nehru and his administration in New Delhi, the minor incidents that occurred did not amount to much and Nehru felt any standoff could be resolved diplomatically. The prime minister severely underestimated the Chinese position, however.²²² As a result, China's military response caught Nehru and the Indian military off guard and only China's unilateral decision to cease fighting prevented an invasion of the subcontinent.²²³ This disaster not only revealed the inadequacies of military doctrine, training, and leadership, but it also showed the weakness of Nehru's reliance on diplomacy as a preferred course of action in a volatile situation.

When the smoke cleared, New Delhi realized that a purely defensive national military strategy focused solely on Pakistan was not practical considering the dual threat

²¹⁸ Chris Smith, *India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defense Policy?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 48.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 48–54.

²²⁰ Despite policy, though, military procurement continued, reflecting the conflicted nature of Nehru's idealism as a statesman and realism as the leader of a new nation which required an adequate military to provide security. The military, clinging to its European roots, also helped stave off actions which would be detrimental to its existence. See Smith, *India's Ad Hoc Arsenal*, 72–73.

²²¹ Smith, *India's Ad Hoc Arsenal*, 54.

²²² Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 131.

²²³ Ibid., 132.

it now faced. Consequently a new strategy was adopted that would enable the military to respond to a two-front crisis and unlike the period immediately following independence, military and defense spending was no longer ignored. This shift was not entirely in opposition to Nehru's emphasis on economic development. In fact, according to Cohen, "leading Indian strategists argued not only that defense spending was necessary for military security, but that it made a positive contribution to economic development."²²⁴ India also moved toward acquisition of weapons and materiel from both superpowers to sustain its buildup, a shift from the push for self-sufficiency in the previous decade.²²⁵

While New Delhi sought to correct its defense deficiencies vis-à-vis China, its push for greater security capabilities also worried Islamabad, which saw the Indian buildup as a threat to its own security.²²⁶ In 1965, sensing weakness in the wake of Nehru's death and yet fearing a widening military gap with India, Pakistan decided to act.²²⁷ Proxy and regular forces from Pakistan were sent into Kashmir in the hopes of settling the recurring issue. The Indian response was swift and widespread, encompassing a larger front than just the territory in dispute, which reflected India's aim to make such a conflict unreasonably costly for Pakistan.²²⁸ Despite the designs of both sides, neither military performed particularly well. In the end, a standoff emerged between the two states, with the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union preventing the potential for further escalation.²²⁹ A subsequent ceasefire was reached, ending the war. Although India could be considered the victor in this war, current strategies needed to be revised. As T. V. Paul points out, "until 1965, India's defense

²²⁴ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 133.

²²⁵ Smith, *India's Ad Hoc Arsenal*, 82–83.

²²⁶ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 38.

²²⁷ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 134.

²²⁸ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 39, 44–45.

²²⁹ Smith, *India's Ad Hoc Arsenal*, 85.

posture against Pakistan was based on ‘matching capabilities,’ but since 1965 India’s policy has been to maintain ‘sufficient deterrence’ or a ‘slight edge’ in its force deployments vis-à-vis Pakistan.”²³⁰

Following the 1965 War, the new Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, moved to bolster India’s military status on the subcontinent. Whereas Prime Minister Nehru had advanced the idea of “nonalignment” with the superpowers as a basis for defense policy, Mrs. Gandhi focused her efforts more on the regional level.²³¹ Still, during this period, India maintained its strategy to fight two simultaneous wars. However, unstable relations with the superpowers following the 1965 War caused uncertainty regarding weapons procurement and the ability to credibly execute a two-war strategy. By the end of the 1960s, though, India strengthened its alliance with the Soviet Union, a move that would enable India to pursue its defense objectives with an adequately equipped military but would also come to harm India when Soviet policy became contrary to that of India.²³²

The 1971 War between West and East Pakistan created an opportunity for India to increase its power in the region. Though a civil war, India justified its intervention because of the refugee crisis created by the fighting. According to Sumit Ganguly:

By mid-May [1971] the number of refugees in India had grown to an estimated ten million. The presence of refugees in West Bengal and in other northeastern Indian states was both an economic and a political onus for the government in New Delhi. India, a poor country, already sandbagged with a turgid population, could not afford to permanently absorb another ten million disadvantaged individuals.²³³

Over an eight-month period, India built up its forces and in December executed a coordinated attack against West Pakistan forces in both East and West Pakistan. John J. Mearsheimer rightly called the assault on East Pakistan a blitzkrieg-type operation.²³⁴ In

²³⁰ T. V. Paul, “Causes of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry,” in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13.

²³¹ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 135.

²³² Smith, *India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal*, 92.

²³³ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 61.

²³⁴ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 205.

short order, the Indian military defeated Pakistani forces. Through these actions, India became firmly entrenched as the dominant power in South Asia.

As a result of the victory in the 1971 War, Mrs. Gandhi was able to introduce a new doctrine for the region that became known as the Indira Doctrine. Similar to the American Monroe Doctrine, the Indira Doctrine held the basic premise that South Asia was India's backyard and no undue influence from outside powers would be allowed in the region without India's approval.²³⁵ India's entry onto the nuclear stage in 1974 with its detonation of a "peaceful nuclear explosion" further added to its regional supremacy.²³⁶ Despite these developments, India's unchecked dominance was not long lived. Pakistan, though demonstrably weakened by its defeat in 1971, was rapidly rebuilding its military to counter India's power. India also found itself increasingly isolated from the international community. The United States pressured India to accept the terms of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act even though no such demands were made on Pakistan, which Indian believed was pursuing its own nuclear program.²³⁷ Actions taken by its partners in Moscow, especially USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, embarrassed India politically.²³⁸ Doubts were also raised regarding the overall effectiveness of Soviet weapons systems that had been purchased by India due to their poor performance in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.²³⁹

Because of these increased challenges, India once again had to rethink its military and overall defense strategies. During the 1980s, with suspicions in India growing about Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear weapon and the growing Sikh insurgency in the Punjab that was thought to be backed by Pakistan, the Indian military embarked on a new strategy of conventional deterrence that would utilize its superiority in manpower and

²³⁵ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 137–138.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 138.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 140.

²³⁸ The Soviet invasion also had the indirect effect of increasing funding to Pakistan. In order to help defeat the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the United States, Great Britain, and Saudi Arabia all funneled large amounts of money to Pakistan and the Afghan mujahedeen. Consequently, Pakistan was able to increase its overall security capabilities which became a threat to India.

²³⁹ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 139.

mechanized equipment.²⁴⁰ Known as the Sundarji Doctrine, the strategy was put into practice with the execution of Exercise Brasstacks in 1986–87.²⁴¹ Although designed to test the efficacy of the Sundarji Doctrine, the amount of military forces massed by India, coupled with their activity and maneuvers, and the subsequent Pakistani response, caused events to quickly escalate as both sides misconstrued each others' intentions.²⁴² Pakistan saw the exercise as the prelude to an Indian invasion while India maintained it had no such designs.²⁴³ In the end, open combat between Indian and Pakistan was averted through diplomatic channels, but the potential for inadvertent escalation was clear for both sides.

The idea of the Sundarji Doctrine would continue to serve as the basis for Indian military strategy for the next decade and a half. With manpower and technological superiority, New Delhi felt its military was up to the task of countering any Pakistani threat that India would face. The burgeoning Kashmir insurgency would undermine that confidence. In April 1990, Pakistan and India came close to war as a result of accusations by both sides concerning their respective roles in the crisis in the disputed region.²⁴⁴ War was avoided but the tensions remained. During the remainder of the decade, Pakistani-sponsored proxies in Kashmir emerged as a new enemy that would eventually threaten India itself. These groups, former mujahedeen who had successfully defeated a superpower in the Soviet Union, were now directed to aid in the struggle over Kashmir. By the end of the 1990s, the insurgency in the disputed region had developed into a costly affair for the Indians financially and militarily, tying down a significant portion of Indian military and security forces in Kashmir.

Strategy on the subcontinent took another twist in May 1998 when both India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices, announcing the addition of overt nuclear capabilities to

²⁴⁰ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 147.

²⁴¹ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 85.

²⁴² For a full description of Brasstacks and its outcome, see the previous discussion found in Chapter III.

²⁴³ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 86.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 91–94.

the already complex rivalry between the two states.²⁴⁵ Although some believed, and still do, that nuclear weapons would stabilize relations between India and Pakistan, the fact remains that the region remains volatile and unstable. In 1999, barely a year after the nuclear tests, India and Pakistan faced off in open combat over the small mountain town of Kargil in Kashmir. The conflict began when Indian forces discovered that Pakistani forces had crossed the LoC and entrenched themselves in positions high in the slopes above Kargil.²⁴⁶ The Indians naturally responded but were initially hampered by inadequate intelligence, equipment, and training. Eventually, the Indians prevailed and drove the Pakistani forces from their positions.

While the details are important, this discussion is more concerned with the overall ability of Pakistan and India to wage a limited war under the shadow of nuclear weapons. In this instance, both sides understood the high stakes of the game that was being played and avoided escalation though both side contemplated it.²⁴⁷ Despite the avoidance of escalation in Kargil, the question remains as to whether restraint can be guaranteed in all forms of conflict. In the nuclear era, this question is of utmost importance.

In sum, since independence, Indian defense and military strategy has followed a complicated path to its present condition. While initially neglected, strategy evolved into a defensive mindset directed toward a single enemy. Events later forced strategy and policy to deal with a two front war. Although India gained dominance on the subcontinent in 1972, it eventually faced a resurgent Pakistan. As a result of technological improvements, India pursued a large scale mechanized solution to meet its security needs, a strategy it maintained until the early 2000s. The advent of nuclear weapons and its continued compellence problem under the umbrella of those weapons led India to contemplate the possibility of fighting a limited war with controlled escalation. Consequently, Cold Start was developed to give India leverage in this environment. As shown above, though, the history of Indian defense strategy and doctrine indicates a defensive mindset within both the Indian military and government, just the opposite

²⁴⁵ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 101.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 116.

²⁴⁷ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 153.

required by Cold Start. A radical change, then, to an offensive mindset would require a shift not only in force disposition but also in longstanding government and military notions of independence, jointness, and cooperation. The following sections will explore two of these core issues, the civil-military divide and inter-service rivalry dimensions of the defense establishment.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

As explained earlier, at partition, India inherited a military that had been trained by the British Empire. As a result, the armed forces, the Indian Army in particular, was a professional force, cognizant of its role in a civilian-led society.²⁴⁸ However, the government of the new nation-state did not fully trust the military. Unlike revolutionary armies such as the communist army in China, which later became the People's Liberation Army, the new Indian military was not an extension of the anti-colonialist movement. To Nehru and other nationalist leaders, the military was a holdover of the British Raj.²⁴⁹ They did not forget that the army was often used to quell nationalist uprisings during the decades leading up to independence. As Cohen points out, "the limited contact of politicians with the military before 1947 reinforced their suspicion of the motives and loyalties of those who had voluntarily served under the British."²⁵⁰ The 1958 military coup in Pakistan put Nehru further on guard against the development of excessive military power and influence.²⁵¹

To ensure that the armed services of the new Indian republic were firmly under civilian control, the government took extraordinary measures to reduce the prestige and influence of the military. First, the position of the Commander-in-Chief was reduced in stature during the years immediately before and following independence, and in 1955 the

²⁴⁸ Kotera M. Bhimaya, "Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan" (Ph.D. diss., RAND Graduate School, 1997), 69.

²⁴⁹ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 128.

²⁵⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 172.

²⁵¹ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 129.

position was abolished all together.²⁵² Next, the heads of the Indian Air Force and Navy were elevated to the same level as that of the Army despite the smaller size of these two services. In this case, the government did not want one branch of the military dominating the others and thereby having undue influence. Also, the military was made subordinate to a new Defense Minister.²⁵³ Obviously this move was a logical extension of civilian control and organization over the armed forces. Still, the military was unfamiliar with this position in the hierarchy. According to Venna Kukreja, “during British times, the ranking army officers had direct access to the executive.”²⁵⁴ Now though, the military brass had to send their ideas and recommendation through civilians, the Defense Secretary and Defense Minister, before they would reach top government leadership. As a result, the military became isolated from the civilian government in New Delhi and was often kept out of the decision-making process.

Also complicating matters in the years following independence, as stated earlier, was the general neglect of defense policy and military strategy. Prime Minister Nehru and the other leaders of the government were more concerned with economic development and growth than creating and formalizing military doctrine. Because of this neglect, the post of Minister of Defense was not a highly regarded position in New Delhi and the ministry as a whole had limited power. As Lorne Kavic explains:

The appointment in Defence was not politically attractive because the appointee ‘has to get into something that he knows nothing about...and...he always faces criticism if anything goes wrong with nothing to compensate for it...It [the Defense Ministry] remains a neglected ministry, run mainly by the civilian secretariat staff. The minister in such cases remains a nonentity influenced by party politics...His decisions are due more to political and financial considerations than to a mature understanding of military problems. He cannot therefore be convincing enough or force an issue amongst his colleagues.’²⁵⁵

²⁵² Venna Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), 209.

²⁵³ Ibid., 210.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Kavic, *India's Quest for Security*, 147.

In the end, the lack of influence of the Defense Minister, combined with the new subservient role of the military, would have major consequences for the security and defense of India as would be seen during the 1962 confrontation with the People's Republic of China.

In 1962, as described earlier, the Indian and Chinese military faced off over territorial and boundary disputes. Fighting lasted only one month but by the end of it, the Indian Army had suffered a humiliating defeat, with the Chinese ending hostilities unilaterally. This military disaster was a result of the isolation of the military and the lack of understanding in New Delhi about the capabilities of the military. The civilian leadership, while trying to negotiate with the Chinese, took control of military strategy and tactics despite their lack of knowledge of these matters. As Cohen points out, "Nehru directly supervised the placement of individual brigades, companies, and even platoons, as the Chinese and Indian forces engaged in mutual encirclement of isolated outposts. Neither [Defense Minister] Menon nor Nehru had any earlier military experience, and the Indian Army still harbors an extraordinary amount of bitterness at their use of troops as essentially political pawns."²⁵⁶ Clearly, the dominance of the civilian leadership hampered the military in this case.

In subsequent wars, the military was given somewhat greater autonomy but still had limited input on the decision-making process prior to the commencement of combat. The Indian Army's intervention in Sri Lanka during the 1980s is a good example of the military being used as a political pawn in regional conflict at the same time being kept out of the information loop. According to Cohen, the military had been assured "an easy victory" in Sri Lanka although it was kept in the dark regarding the role that Indian intelligence services had in training the enemy the army would come to face.²⁵⁷ The Indian Army was angered over what it saw as a misuse of military power by civilian agencies, which had helped create the problem in the first place.

²⁵⁶ Cohen, *The Indian Army*, 176.

²⁵⁷ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, 149.

The events of 2001–2002 show the persistence of civil-military distrust and its impact on the employment of military force. Starting off, the civilian government did not provide the military with clear objectives as to desired end state.²⁵⁸ Slow mobilization also created problems concerning this debate. First, as described earlier, it allowed New Delhi to rethink its course of action, eventually deciding to delay an attack on Pakistan. Even after further provocation in May 2002 when terrorists attacked an army encampment, the military was held back.²⁵⁹ Second, slow mobilization also limited the options available to the civilian government. Had the army mobilized quickly, the civilian government may have entertained the idea of limited strikes into Pakistan. However, that course of action was not open to New Delhi.

The specter of continued civil-military problems has large ramifications for the Cold Start doctrine. First, Cold Start requires a relatively independent, well informed military force coupled with a trusting civilian government. According to Mearsheimer, this kind of blitzkrieg-type operation “demands a flexible command structure peopled from top to bottom with soldiers capable of exercising initiative in combat situations...Boldness is essential, even when information is incomplete, so that the offensive can maintain the initiative.”²⁶⁰ However, past cases show that the military has little input when it comes to defense policy and civilian dominance and mistrust has stifled creative thinking. As Patel points out:

Independent India fights its wars with very close political oversight and control. A doctrine that calls for rapid response and initiation of intense combat operations raises the possibility that political controls may become less effective, and that the combat commanders would have far greater latitude for independent initiative than would be deemed acceptable. Cold Start would be a non-starter without civilian institutions that can develop the political framework and objectives to support a rapid response doctrine, and without a politico-military command structure that can withstand the increased decision making tempo generated by the intense combat operations.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Ladwig, “The Development of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine,” 16.

²⁵⁹ Sood and Sawhney, *Operation Parakram*, 82–83.

²⁶⁰ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 41.

²⁶¹ Patel, “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra.”

Without boldness, dynamic campaigns such as Cold Start cannot be launched successfully. This continuing lack of proper civil-military cooperation is shown with the fact that Cold Start was unveiled by the army publicly to encourage open debate.²⁶² Before this time, the civilian leadership alone decided the merit of a strategy.

Next, clear objectives need to be established at the start of a limited war campaign, yet as was seen in Operation Parakram, poor civil-military relations resulted in the execution of an operation that “lacked clear objectives and terminated with inconclusive results.”²⁶³ Instead of launching an invasion for which it mobilized, the Indian Army found itself in a ten-month standoff that resulted in minimal gains for the security of India as a whole. Finally, a strategy as intricate as Cold Start needs a civilian government that intimately understands the capabilities and limitations of its military force. However, the civilian leadership in New Delhi has a poor track record that continues to the present when it comes to comprehending the complex nature of the armed forces.²⁶⁴ Without such knowledge in a Cold Start operation, the government, on the one hand, could overestimate its chances at success and commit an incapable force to a monumental problem, thus inviting disaster and defeat.²⁶⁵ On the other hand, the government could underestimate the possibility for victory and allow its force to dominate the battlefield that could result in unwanted escalation. In the end, as the past shows, civil-military relations have colored India’s defense capabilities. These issues are not easily corrected and will affect the way Cold Start is implemented.

D. INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY

Along with civil-military issues, inter-service rivalry remains a large obstacle to a Cold Start strategy. As noted earlier, not long after partition, the position of Commander-in-Chief was removed from the military and became the responsibility of the president of India. Through the removal of the Commander-in-Chief position, the military was not

²⁶² Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening,” 56.

²⁶³ Ladwig, “The Development of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine,” 16.

²⁶⁴ Ladwig, “The Challenge of Changing Indian Military Doctrine,” 37.

²⁶⁵ While of course this situation could occur with any military doctrine, Cold Start’s failure as India’s key strategy to coerce Pakistan could invite disaster politically and militarily for New Delhi.

only reduced in stature on the national stage but it also faced a leadership vacuum with the absence overarching uniformed command. As Cohen explains, “India had always had a Commander-in-Chief, and he had hitherto been the single source of military advice for the Indian government. (The navy and air chiefs were his subordinates.)”²⁶⁶ Now, “the three chiefs were...collectively the professional military advisers to the government.”²⁶⁷ Coupled with this action was the elevation of the Indian Air Force and Navy to an equal level with the Indian Army. While the army continued to dominate the military in terms of personnel, equipment, and the budget, the equal status granted to the air force and navy meant that these two services could more adequately compete for resources and influence. Although logical considering the new government’s desire to firmly entrench civilian leadership over the military, these two actions helped precipitate inter-service rivalry that has continued to adversely affect the armed forces for over six decades. An alternative course of action that should have been considered would have been the establishment of a joint service command, subservient to the civilian government, but which would have had the power to direct the development of all three services toward the same unified ends.

Still, while the equality of each service and the absence of a single military head have allowed inter-service rivalry to continue, the failure of the civilian government to establish overall military doctrine has further exacerbated the situation. As explained earlier, the civilian leadership in New Delhi has a poor record of understanding the nature, capabilities, and limitations of the armed forces. Consequently, no solid direction has been provided for military development as a whole. As Ladwig explains:

...the civilian leadership has not provided the kind of national vision or grand strategy on which the military can base its concepts for future missions and the forces they require. As a result, the armed services are often left to develop their strategies and plans without significant political direction—a practice that is unlikely to result in the fusion of strategic and military goals.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ Cohen, *The Indian Army*, 171.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ladwig, “The Challenge of Changing Indian Military Doctrine,” 37.

In other words, because of lack of central direction, each service has had to create its own doctrine to fulfill what it sees as its role within the Indian defense construct. Although the outbreak of war has tended to unify the armed forces because of commonality in purpose, this unity has tended to last only for the period of combat operations and quickly regresses to the prewar status quo.

With the adoption of separate doctrines, each separate service has had to compete over limited resources in order to implement those doctrines. The Indian Army, the largest service by far, has tended to receive the most funding annually. As a result, the air force and navy have lagged behind the army in terms of doctrinal development. Figure 5, a graphical snapshot of a 14-year period from 1984–1998, clearly shows this budget allocation trend.




Figure 5. Indian defense expenditures: 1984–1998. Reprinted, by permission, from Jaswant Singh, *Defending India* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), 227.

Figure 6, a similar compilation of data, covers a span of seven years from 2007–2014. Despite an intervening decade, the sector spending ratio has remained relatively comparable, a trend projected to continue in the near future. This point is significant

when one realizes that Cold Start is an army-centric doctrine with the air force and navy performing supporting roles.²⁶⁹ The more the army dominates and is able to push its doctrines on the other two services, the less likely that the historical funding trend for these services will change. It is far from certain that the air force and navy will accept a supporting role in what would be a major shift in military doctrine.




Figure 6. Indian defense expenditures: 2007–2014. Data from Jane’s Defence Budgets, <http://jdb.janes.com/jdb-web/countryBudget.do?action=dashboard&country=India> (accessed March 12, 2010).²⁷⁰

As Ladwig points out, “Cold Start’s full implementation is challenged by...inter-service rivalries...India’s air force, and to a lesser extent its navy, have sought to escape the army’s shadow, and are unlikely to willingly embrace a new war-fighting doctrine that

²⁶⁹ Patel, “Dig Vijay to Divya Astra.”

²⁷⁰ This data was converted from U.S. dollars to Indian Rs crores using the foreign exchange rate for March 12, 2010. While exchange rates fluctuate from day to day, the specific variation is not important as the general trend which would hold constant regardless of a given monetary value. For official Indian foreign exchange rates see the Reserve Bank of India Web site, http://www.rbi.org.in/SCRIPTS/BS_NSDPDisplay.aspx. Note: for ease of comparison, the format of this chart was replicated from the chart used in Figure 3.

places them in a subordinate combat role.”²⁷¹ In 2001, the Indian government created an Integrated Defense Staff to improve inter-service relations but ensuing debates over centralizing military power have weakened its stature.²⁷²

In the end, a history of inter-service rivalries will hamper the successful implementation of Cold Start. A lack of unifying leadership and clear direction has led to bitter rivalries over doctrine and funding. As a result, each service has developed its own ways of fighting that often do not mesh with those from the other services.²⁷³ While an Integrated Defense Staff was created to foster jointness, it lacks the capabilities and resources to do so. Even with legislation, it is hard to see a joint atmosphere emerging in the Indian military in the near future. This fundamental problem is a major roadblock to a strategy such as Cold Start.

E. CONCLUSION

In the six decades that have passed since independence, Indian military doctrine has understandably undergone many iterations due to the changes in both the regional and international security environments, as well as shifts in its own defense outlook. The Cold Start doctrine is the latest iteration in this process and poses many challenges to the both the Indian military and the Indian government. By moving to an offensive strategy that requires rapid mobilization and independent decision making by military commanders, the Indian military has exposed fundamental problems in the Indian defense apparatus that have persisted since partition. These issues, civil-military distrust and inter-service rivalries, continue to define the way defense policy and doctrine is created and implemented. Ironically, while India prides itself on strong civilian control over the military because of what it has seen develop in Pakistan, civil-military problems are almost as detrimental in New Delhi as they are in Islamabad. Inter-service rivalries, a derivative of civil-military distrust, also plague doctrinal shifts, depending on the service emphasis of a given doctrine. In the end, Cold Start, while innovative, shows how the

²⁷¹ Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 185–186.

²⁷² Ibid., 187.

²⁷³ Ibid., 182–183.

Indian military and its relationship with the government are still mired in the past. Without considerable effort, it remains uncertain whether Cold Start or any strategy like it can be successfully implemented in South Asia.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. CONCLUSIONS

The 2004 unveiling of the Cold Start doctrine marked the beginning of a new direction in the evolution of the India-Pakistan security dynamic in the nuclear world. While the detonation of nuclear devices in 1998 by both nations understandably heightened security concerns, many experts saw the introduction of overt nuclear capabilities on the subcontinent as a stabilizing factor for the region. Deterrence, which kept the guns of the United States and the Soviet Union silent during the tense years of the Cold War could do the same for India and Pakistan. India's Cold Start, though, undermines the potential stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons by planning for a limited war under the nuclear umbrella, thus increasing the likelihood of undesirable outcomes of future crises despite the presence of nuclear arms. India sees the potential threat of fighting a war under the shadow of nuclear weapons as a credible way to counter the perceived sponsorship of terrorism against the Indian state by Pakistan. As this thesis has shown, though, the idea that Cold Start is the panacea for the current iteration of the India-Pakistan conflict and rivalry is fundamentally flawed for three major reasons: Pakistan's principal-agent dilemma, escalation problems on the subcontinent, and civil-military and inter-service rivalry issues within India.

First, with Cold Start, India has strategically targeted the Pakistani state itself as the responsible party for continued terrorism in India. Chapter III points out, though, that while Pakistan once utilized unconventional, asymmetric warfare as a way to balance India's dominant military prowess and capabilities in the region, in recent years Islamabad has publicly moved to distance itself from extremist organizations that have launched terror attacks in Kashmir and against India proper, though that distancing has been "cosmetic" and relatively weak. As a result, a principal-agent problem has developed in which radicals in Pakistan once sponsored by the state now act independently of the state and have agendas that not only are counter to that of the state but also threaten the state itself. Statements by both Pakistani officials, as well as

terrorists themselves, attest to this fact. Thus, Pakistan's firm, direct control of radical organizations it once supported is now doubtful. Cold Start, therefore, identifies the wrong target strategically. By increasing pressure on Islamabad and holding Pakistan accountable for every terrorist attack in India, New Delhi has created undue hostility between itself and Pakistan. In fact, by specifically targeting the state, India has forced Pakistan to maintain a large military force on its eastern border to counter the increased Indian threat. Ironically, these forces could be used to fight the very extremists, radicals, and terrorists that India accuses Pakistan of supporting. Instead, the heightened security environment limits Pakistani capabilities in this regard, thus increasing the potential threat of terrorism against India.

Next, the Cold Start doctrine is flawed operationally. This offensive strategy brings to the forefront inherent problems that have plagued the India-Pakistan armed crises since partition in 1947, namely escalation, misperception, deception, and mistrust. As Chapter IV shows, all phases of conflict, from merely posturing with exercises to full scale war, have the potential for escalation beyond original plans, whether done deliberately or unintentionally. While dangerous in a conventional environment, the continuation of this historical trend in the Cold Start doctrine is potentially catastrophic in the nuclear world.²⁷⁴ In the first case examined, the 1971 War, India intentionally escalated what was an internal conflict between two regions of Pakistan to a full scale war. During the subsequent fighting, though, the rapid increase in escalation was unexpected. The Indian pace of combat and advance was much quicker than anticipated and the resistance of Pakistani forces was much weaker than expected. As a result, the Indians achieved a lopsided victory and Pakistan suffered an ignominious defeat. In a Cold Start scenario one can certainly expect a much fiercer Pakistani defense posture yet the potential for unexpected Indian gains remains. A multi-axis approach could easily limit the Pakistani response, regardless of their prowess, thus forcing Islamabad to

²⁷⁴ While India has declared a "no first use" policy in regards to nuclear weapons, Pakistan has made no such statement. Instead Islamabad sees benefits in remaining ambiguous regarding its potential employment of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Consequently, any crisis could easily escalate to the nuclear level if Pakistan deems it in its best interest to launch nuclear weapons first to prevent the destruction of the state. See Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace: Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 39.

consider the use of nuclear weapons to avoid a catastrophic defeat along the lines of the 1971 bifurcation. In such a scenario, defeat would not mean the splitting of the Pakistani state but the end of the state itself.

The Brasstacks case demonstrates how easily misperception by both sides can lead to escalation despite intentions to the contrary. Here, because of the history of mistrust, neither side believed the other when each said its military deployments and counter-deployments were simply part of an exercise. Instead, both New Delhi and Islamabad took actions that not only failed to diffuse the crisis but exacerbated it instead. While diplomatic actions between the two sides eventually led to a resolution of the confrontation, the potential for future misperception has remained. Such misperception could lead to major consequences in a Cold Start operation where deception is a key aspect, if Pakistan does not believe the professed limited nature of such an operation. As a result, escalation to the nuclear level could result based on Islamabad's fear of more nefarious Indian aims.

In the Kargil conflict, the first war under the nuclear umbrella between India and Pakistan, New Delhi and Islamabad took actions toward escalation despite the possession of nuclear arms by both sides. India planned to launch a counter-attack into Pakistan through the Rajasthan Desert, if its actions to remove Pakistanis forces from the mountains surrounding Kargil were ineffective. Pakistan, fearing the potential of an Indian assault, increased the alert status of its nuclear weapons, a course of action it also took during the 2001–02 military standoff with India. Clearly, neither side was averse to upping the ante regardless of the increased possibility of a nuclear exchange. Although the international community was able to assist in the resolution of the issue before the conflict escalated beyond the point of no return, a Cold Start crisis would not have that safety net. As explained earlier, Cold Start is specifically designed to limit such international intervention in a crisis. Consequently, a Kargil-like conflict in the future could easily escalate to the nuclear level, especially if Pakistan sees its existence threatened and raises its nuclear alert status as it did in past conflicts with India.

Finally, the Cold Start strategy faces major institutional obstacles within India. As Chapter V explains, the new doctrine would be a major shift from India's military posture of the past from one of primarily defense-orientation to one focused mainly on offensive warfare. Consequently, not only would forces have to be shifted geographically but mindsets would also have to change. The rapid deployment and multi-axis attacks envisioned by the planners of Cold Start require both a military force capable of independent decision-making that is trusted by the civilian leadership in New Delhi as well as a military that can operate jointly across all services regardless of parochial interests. History, however, does not show favorable trends in either case. Not only has the civilian government distrusted the Indian armed services and interfered with military operations, the military has also been isolated from the governmental decision-making process. Thus, the military lacks independence as well as the ability to understand what the government is trying to accomplish in a given scenario. The case of the 2001–2002 military standoff with Pakistan is a good example of this ongoing tension. The Indian military was unsure of expected role and hamstrung by government limitations. As a result, Cold Start was designed to bypass this perceived interference. However, during a time-sensitive crisis such as a Cold Start operation, the desire on the military's part to act without government input could increase the both the potential for exacerbated civil-military mistrust and, in the extreme case, possible unwanted military action, thereby fueling an already untenable situation. Further, not only does the government not fully communicate its intentions, it also does not understand the full capabilities of the military force, therefore creating situations where military forces are employed unnecessarily or inadequately.

The military also has a poor track record regarding inter-service cooperation. The Indian Army has always been the dominant service for logical reasons and as such has received the lion share of funding and has heavily influenced the development of Indian military doctrine. Increasingly, though, the Indian Air Force and Navy have begun to push their own agendas and assert their independence from army-centric strategies. With the lack of a single joint command structure, the history of rivalry is unlikely to abate in the near future and remains a major barrier for the planners of Cold Start, who envision a

significant use of joint operations to accomplish their aims. In the end, the institutional problems inherent to India's defense apparatuses undermine the future success of a Cold Start waged conflict.

In conclusion, while an innovative approach created by India to deal with the new strategic environment on the subcontinent, Cold Start is not the right type of strategy that India should pursue for the reasons discussed above. Beyond South Asia, these conclusions have relevance as well. States attempting to formulate strategies to fight limited wars in the presence of nuclear weapons need to carefully examine all aspects of such an approach in order to determine if that strategy is the best solution for their security problem. While these possibilities may seem remote, increased proliferation of not just weapons but nuclear technologies that could then be utilized to make weapons may make for an uncomfortable reality in the near future. Returning to South Asia, the next section will pose alternative solutions to address the conundrum that both India and Pakistan face.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Pakistan — Move to End Internal Terrorism and Extremism

Pakistan must aggressively pursue, capture, and prosecute terrorists and extremists within its own borders.

As described above in recent years, Pakistan has taken important steps toward combating terrorism and extremism within the borders of the state. However, Islamabad must do more to isolate and destroy terrorist networks that reside within Pakistan. The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 shows that while the government recognizes potential threats, often it fails to act to effectively counter them or prosecute the offenders.²⁷⁵ For example, LeT, while hunted by the government to some extent, has been allowed to resurface under different names and fronts and still function

²⁷⁵ U.N. report: Benazir Bhutto's assassination was preventable, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/04/15/pakistan.bhutto.report/index.html> (accessed April 17, 2010).

openly in the state. For perceptions regarding Islamabad's relationship with terrorists and extremists to change both regionally and internationally, the practice of "catch and release" of terrorist leaders must end. Islamabad needs to recognize that while it used extremists and the like to further its agenda in Kashmir in the past, that time is now over. Pakistan must understand that its future security depends on this change in policy, not only internally but also externally in its relationship with India. As already mentioned, India sees little difference between terrorists in Pakistan and the Pakistan state. By curtailing terrorist and extremist activities, Pakistan can greatly lower the incentive for India to launch an attack. In the end, while the costs of such a policy will be high as the data above shows, Pakistan has no alternative if it wishes to appear as a responsible state in the international community. The United States can encourage this shift through increased funding and training of Pakistani counterterrorism forces.

2. India — Focus on Internal Security and Counterterrorism

India must focus on internal security and counterterrorism as opposed to conventional strategies against Pakistan.

Although India may blame the Pakistan state for terrorism in Kashmir and India proper, the connection between the two is not entirely clear. Thus, India must shift its stance from targeting the Pakistan state that faces its own terrorist and extremist threats to targeting the true threat, terrorists. Of course India cannot do "nothing" when dealing with threats from an adversary. As explained earlier, having no response when a threat arises encourages threat tactics to continue. India must maintain a credible deterrence, but one that Islamabad can understand and appreciate, not one that has the potential of crushing the Pakistan state and thereby creating a security dilemma. India must also revamp its internal security apparatus both to help prevent terrorism such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks from occurring in the future, as well as respond more effectively when those terrorist attacks do occur. As shown in Daniel Reed's documentary *Terror in Mumbai*, Indian police and security forces were dumbfounded by the 2008 attacks and

failed to adapt adequately to the challenges posed by only ten terrorists.²⁷⁶ Consequently, the attacks dragged on for three days and 172 people lost their lives. This loss of life is unacceptable not only morally but politically as well. When attacks of this type occur with a similar death toll, an angry population will demand a response. In a democracy like India, it is hard to ignore those demands for very long. As a result, the government could be forced to act in a counterproductive way toward its most likely target, Pakistan, whether the state is responsible or not. By increasing security and counterterrorism efforts, this situation and the accompanied possibilities of crisis escalation can be avoided.

3. India and Pakistan — Cooperate to Fight a Common Enemy

India and Pakistan must move beyond decades of antagonism and instead cooperate against a common enemy, which threatens peace and stability between the two nations and in the region.

With the introduction of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent, India and Pakistan have a major incentive to resolve crises prior to the outbreak of hostilities, yet both sides continue to antagonize each other. Although peace dialogues have been initiated over the years since the 1998 tests, they have been derailed by military maneuvers or terrorism. Islamabad and New Delhi must come to understand the precarious nature of their current relationship and take constructive steps to establish lasting peace. One way to do this is to cooperate on an issue that affects both nations, namely terrorism. Terrorism anywhere is a scourge but in South Asia, terrorism threatens the stability of the region since India and Pakistan have tended to take counterproductive stances toward the issue. As explained above, Pakistan has hunted terrorists only minimally while India has targeted Pakistan as the mastermind behind various incidents within India and Kashmir. As a result, antagonism and mistrust has grown as has the audacity of terrorists who have an incentive in destabilizing the region and undermining potential peace overtures. Islamabad and New Delhi must reverse this trend by cooperating to combat this common

²⁷⁶ *Terror in Mumbai*, first broadcast 19 November 2009.

foe. Such a proposition is not without precedent. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated on the initial development of a nuclear nonproliferation regime that both saw as being mutually beneficial.²⁷⁷ Even on the subcontinent, cooperation on a strategic issue is not without precedent. Beginning in the 1960s, both India and Pakistan were able to reach agreements on water and river rights in the Indus basin that have continued despite the outbreak of wars and crises.²⁷⁸ Ironically, such a resource issue could be seen as even more important than disputed Kashmir because of the strategic value of this water source. In the end, through cooperation on a common issue, India and Pakistan can start to move beyond their historical animosities.

Without cooperation, the possibility of fighting a full scale war over terrorism according to the Cold Start doctrine increases greatly. Rather than correcting the problem, the threat of this strategy would destabilize the region further in two major ways. First, military forces used to combat extremism and terrorism in the frontier regions of Pakistan would be moved to counter a potential Indian invasion. As a result, the terrorism would likely increase in both Pakistan and India. Ironically, by threatening to attack Pakistan because of terrorism, India would make itself more vulnerable to terrorism. Second, as in the past, Pakistan would most likely increase its nuclear alert status during a Cold Start crisis. In this status, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would be vulnerable to terrorists who could not only find and attack those sites but also steal an intact weapon. The consequences of the theft of a nuclear weapon in Pakistan could be catastrophic regionally and globally. Of course, these propositions are but a few of a wide range of others that could create instability in a Cold Start era. Suffice it to say, cooperation is imperative to avert future crises and bring lasting peace and stability to the subcontinent.

²⁷⁷ Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 30.

²⁷⁸ Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay and Julian Schofield, "Institutional causes of the India-Pakistan Rivalry," in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 243–244.

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