Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security Strategy in the Middle East
Abstract
On the eve of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, then-Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Geneva to meet with Iraqi Foreign Secretary Tariq Aziz to convey to the Iraqis that any use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against coalition forces would be met with an overwhelming response. It was widely assumed at the time that this meant that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the coalition. Today, analysts still debate whether Iraq was incapable of using its chemical or biological weapons arsenal, never intended to use it, or was deterred by the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation. This debate will not end soon, as it is unlikely that Iraq's leaders will explain their reasons for not using their arsenal. Talk of overwhelming retaliation at the Baker-Aziz meeting represented just one chapter in American thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in defending U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The most famous U.S. policy toward the region was announced in January 1980, when President Jimmy Carter stated that the United States would use "any means necessary" to prevent a hostile power, i.e., the Soviet Union, from gaining control over the Persian Gulf. While the so-called Carter Doctrine did not specifically mention nuclear weapons, it was widely believed at the time that the threat to use nuclear weapons was part of the U.S. strategy to deter the Soviets from advancing south from Afghanistan towards the oil-rich Persian Gulf.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 09, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA524823
Entities
People
- James A. Russell
- James J. Wirtz
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School