Carrots or Sticks? Libya and U.S. Efforts to Influence Rogue States
Abstract
The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether it is possible to successfully apply a behavior modification strategy to rogue states. The dramatic changes in the international system since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the more recent post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement are viable against new threats. If these strategies are viable, how should they be used to influence the most immediate and pressing threats-rogue states trafficking in terrorism or weapons of mass destruction? This analysis will examine United States' efforts through four U.S. presidential administrations (1986-2004) to convince Libya to cease its support for both international terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In this particular case the United States was attempting to convince the target state, Libya, to stop an action already underway (support for terrorism and/or production of WMD in existing facilities and with existing resources) and also deter future support and production. As such, U.S. influence strategy necessarily combined, at minimum, compellence (efforts to stop an action already underway) and deterrence (efforts to prevent future action). Additionally, the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations also used positive incentives in a conditional fashion after Tripoli demonstrated a willingness to change its behavior.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA524907
Entities
People
- Jamie A. Calabrese
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School