Why the Other Services Should Examine the Air Force's Counter-CW CONOPS
Abstract
Prior to Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. military personnel were not trained or equipped to fight in a chemical warfare (CW) environment. According to a 1991 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, "many soldiers have not been adequately prepared to survive and sustain operational missions in a chemical environment." The U.S. military drawdown of the 1990s made preparation to fight CW-armed adversaries even less of a priority. While U.S. forces remained unprepared to fight in a chemical environment, the likelihood of operating in that type environment increased. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review stated, "the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons is a likely condition of future warfare, including in the early stages of war to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics." The military was faced with a situation where it would likely fight in an environment where it was ill-equipped and ill-trained to win. To ensure continued mission success in an evolving threat environment, the U.S. military must organize, equip, and train its forces to carry out operations in a CW environment. In response to this changing threat environment, the U.S. Air Force developed its C-CW CONOPS, approved in January 2002. The C-CW CONOPS is a more flexible system, based on a variety of studies, allowing for localized areas of maximum wear of protective equipment and a quicker restoration of combat operations. This new system, however, has received a great deal of criticism in the defense community, especially from the Army. The crux of the debate concerns the persistence of chemical agents. The Air Force believes that new studies show that chemical agents, such as VX, pose a much more limited hazard than Army doctrine indicates.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA524908
Entities
People
- Lawrence Pravecek
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School