Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations
Abstract
To Paul Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the essential challenge for policy officials is to make sound decisions amidst inherent uncertainty about the character of pending threats to and opportunities for US security interests. To succeed in these circumstances, policymakers must become, in effect, the senior analyst on their core accounts. Above all, they must become adept at the analytic techniques for doing battle with incomplete information and contradictory assumptions. Policymakers need support from intelligence to help deal with uncertainty. Thus, policy officials come to respect and rely on analysts and managers who appreciate this aspect of the decision process. Analysts and their analysis are deemed most useful when they: 1) Clarify what is known by laying out the evidence and pointing to cause-and-effect patterns. 2) Carefully structure assumptions and argumentation about what is unknown and unknowable. 3) Bring expertise to bear for planning and action on important longshot threats and opportunities. By the same standard, the heavily engaged policymaker has little use for intelligence products that emphasize prediction over explanation and opinion over evidence. The policymaking process is particularly ill served by assessments that trivialize the challenge of uncertainty by burying honest debate in compromise language and by ignoring high-impact contingencies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA525681
Entities
People
- Jack Davis
Organizations
- Central Intelligence Agency