The Joint Force: A Decade, No Progress
Abstract
Ever since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the gaze of Congress has been firmly fixed on the need for jointness. The conviction that 21st century operations will involve land, sea, and air forces is buttressed by the perception that technological advances combined with the genius of the American military will transform the Armed Forces into an information age joint organization. In theory, jointness is the means through which the National Command Authorities achieve unity of effort from diverse service competencies. Yet for many members of the military, the idea of jointness presents a Pandora's box of unattractive possibilities. Parochialism, not cooperation, remains the watchword despite the common deference to jointness. Although Congress has argued for years that increased jointness will produce a more efficient and effective military, Desert Storm together with the demise of the Soviet Union did not alter service attitudes. Operations against the former Yugoslavia offer further evidence that the single-service American way of war has changed little since the Persian Gulf War, leading Eliot Cohen to observe that there are has changed little since the Persian Gulf War, leading Eliot Cohen to observe that there are "four single-service warfighting establishments." These points notwithstanding, funding a Cold War legacy force, with its origins in the experience of World War II, may no longer be possible. It is not an accident that a budget of $300-plus billion is critical to maintaining services that are downsized versions of the same military that mounted Desert Storm. This is significant because jointness, transformation, and fiscal reality are on a collision course.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA525883
Entities
People
- Douglas A. Macgregor
Organizations
- National Defense University