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JFQ Forum

SFOR honor guard,
Tuzla.
1st Combat Camera Squadron
(David W. Richards)



NATO

European Security
and Beyond

NATO, European Security, and Beyond

Introduced by HANS BINNENDIJK

Long-discussed change in European security architecture is underway. While it may lack elegance and simplicity, this “new order” should prove useful in meeting security problems that face Europe. Its strengths are inclusiveness and a NATO core, and its potential weaknesses are dissatisfaction by lesser included nations and lack of political cohesion to deal with new threats. This JFQ Forum examines a range of security considerations that have been clarified in the wake of summit meetings over the last few months.

The new architecture can be seen as five concentric circles, with NATO command structure and military capa-


realities of Europe and have been tested by the NATO experience in Bosnia. With adroit diplomacy and political cohesion, this architecture can provide agile responses and can evolve into an even more inclusive system.

Despite a reduction of more than two-thirds in the number of U.S. troops based in Europe, NATO is the most capable military organization in the world. The United States is committed to the continuing deployment of about 100,000 troops. And while NATO retains some of its Cold War structure—including large armor and mechanized formations—it is adjusting to a new era with emphasis on mobility, rapid reaction, and peace enforcement.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe is German. Mechanisms have been established to strengthen political control over military operations. Moreover, as General Joulwan notes in his article, a new array of concepts such as the combined joint task force, Partnership Coordination Cell, and ACE Mobility Coordination Center were put in place to deal with new partners and new missions.

Closely related to the NATO core is the process of making the relationships among Alliance members more equitable. While Europe continues to struggle with monetary union and a common security policy, articles on European security and identity and the Western European Union (WEU) in this issue note that progress has been made in creating a “separate but not separable force” based on a revived WEU. Now that the future rests squarely on NATO, analysts on both sides of the Atlantic applaud enhancing Eurocorps and efforts like the Italian-led operation in Albania. But some transatlantic problems remain, as highlighted by the Franco-American dispute over who commands at Allied Forces Southern

Europe. Theater commands are much more important today than during the Cold War, and relinquishing the only theater command in Europe under American leadership could



bilities at the center, surrounded in turn by a NATO-based European security and defense identity, NATO enlargement to include new members, an enhanced Partnership for Peace program, and NATO agreements with Russia and Ukraine. Most of these arrangements have been formalized through various institutional relationships between the nations of Europe and the NATO core. They reflect the



NATO is being both streamlined and Europeanized. Headquarters staffs have been cut by a third and the number of commands has similarly declined. Even with downsizing, 75 percent of senior military positions are now held by European officers. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who has responsibility for strategic planning and European-led operations, is British and the chief of staff at

undercut public support for NATO in the United States.

Enlargement forms the next concentric circle. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are seen as consensus candidates for early membership in the Alliance at the Madrid summit while Romania and Slovenia have garnered strong support within Europe. Some


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critics argue that enlargement is unnecessary for central Europe and dangerous for relations with Russia, but time has proven them wrong. The process of

qualifying for membership in the Alliance has solidified democracy as well as civilian control of the military in candidate countries. In addition, it has eased ethnic and border tensions among candidates as they realize that Europeanization is more critical than local politics. And Russia, though still uneasy about enlargement, has acquired a number of security advantages under the Founding Act that it might not have gained otherwise. But the debate about enlargement is far from over as legislators on both sides of the Atlantic determine what price they must pay for ratification. The cost is estimated to be about \$30 billion over the next 12 years, of which the United States would pay less than 10 percent. The debate will probably start in the Senate, and Europeans will wait to see if President Clinton gets the required two-thirds vote. In the end, the Senate will probably support enlargement, but the debate could start a new transatlantic burden-sharing dispute that the rapidly changing Alliance ought to be spared.

Most central and east European nations will be left out of the first round of enlargement, and measures must be taken to promote reform and security enhancement in the region. Although the process will remain open, many countries will take little comfort from this promise since they fear that some time must pass before the Alliance adjusts to the first tranche. Future candidates can be divided into four groups. First, Romania and Slovenia were strong contenders in the first round of expansion, but their membership is expected to be delayed. They need a clear perspective for



further membership. Second, former neutrals such as Austria, Sweden, and Finland will be admitted when they become convinced that neutrality within the new Europe is an anachronism. Third, the Baltic States have made significant economic and political progress, but their status as former republics of the Soviet Union could create such a negative reaction in Russia that overall security might not be helped by their membership. And fourth, Balkan nations such as Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Albania may need a decade or longer to prepare for membership. To help maintain security among these groups, NATO will depend on enhancing the Partnership for Peace. With enlargement, however, this program could be weakened as its key members join NATO. So a larger-than-planned effort—including significant funding—may be required to shore up security for countries that face a long period of preparation. The new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will help if it does not become moribund as did its predecessor, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Finally, NATO has established a new relationship with Russia, formalized by the signing of the Founding Act in Paris. The act builds on NATO's earlier 16-plus-1 consultative arrangement with Russia and on close NATO-Russian military cooperation in Bosnia. Although NATO made no concession that allows a veto of non-article V operations, Russia will have a voice through the Joint Council. Those critics of the Founding Act who generally support enlargement, such as Henry Kissinger, fear that once Russia is formally a member of NATO-related councils, it

may use the consensus process to its advantage by convincing other nations to oppose proposals that it does not favor. NATO must make it clear to Russia that any abuse of the new council will not be tolerated. Ukraine too has negotiated a new agreement with NATO and with Russia as well.

The major test of the emerging European security architecture will be Bosnia. Differences of opinion exist on both sides of the Atlantic on when Stabilization Force should be terminated and what to do in the interim. Many Americans want the mission to end on schedule next summer and be replaced by a European-led force. But it is highly unlikely that many Europeans will revise their "in-together, out-together" stance, so an all European force for Bosnia may be stillborn. A complete withdrawal is likely to reignite conflict among Bosnia's ethnic groups. Meanwhile, we must avoid the pitfalls of Somalia—taking sides and expanding the mission as force structure declines.

This JFQ Forum also examines issues that are likely to confront the Atlantic Alliance in the future including the continued presence of U.S. dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in Europe and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, the articles that follow cover both the high and low ends of future NATO security problems. The new security architecture will need to deal with a broad array of threats in order to succeed. **JFQ**