




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• QUARTERLY BULLETIN •

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JWFC Lessons Learned Points of Contact

The JCLL seeks to identify trends, issues, and lessons that impact our Joint Force capability. We rely on the inputs from you in the field. You are in the best position to know and report what may improve Joint Force capability. You work the issue every day, so let us know:

- What was supposed to happen?
- What happened?
- What went right?
- What went wrong?

If you or your unit have an input that could help others do it right the first time, send it to us. Don't wait until you have a polished article. The JCLL can take care of the editing, format, and layout. Do provide a short, one paragraph biography on yourself. We will acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your article in a publishable form with you as the author.

We want your e-mail address! We now have the capability to electronically disseminate the Bulletin to you when it is published. You can sign up for this service in the Bulletin section of our website listed below. See the inside back cover for details and instructions.

We have a staff ready to serve you. Below are the staff points of contact if you have a question we can help you answer.

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Message From the Commander

MajGen Gordon C. Nash, USMC
Commander, JFCOM JWFC

This issue of the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin continues on the theme of special operations (SO) begun in the March 2003 JCLL Bulletin (Volume V Issue 2). The Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) provided several of the articles in this issue, while the remaining two articles were student papers provided by the Joint Forces Staff College. Each article presents information on current initiatives within the SO community or proposes changes necessary to increase SO viability in support of mission accomplishment.

In the first article ***Information Operations (IO) in Support of Special Operations***, Major Bradley Bloom discusses the requirements for enhanced IO manning and needed staff organizational changes for both peacetime and contingency operations. He further recommends using the theater special operations center as the integrator for IO support to SO.

The next article, ***The Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center: The Next Evolution in Joint Integration***, by Major Eric Braganca, proposes the establishment of a new staff organization to manage and integrate personnel recovery. By establishing the personnel recovery (PR) center outside a single mission oriented focus, such as the joint force air component commander, Major Braganca believes the PR effort could be better integrated and tailored to meet the needs of both ground and air forces involved in the non-linear warfare of today.

Originally written as a paper for the Joint Forces Staff College and submitted as an article by SOCJFCOM, the third article, ***Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing***



the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer, discusses the importance of having dedicated joint special operations forces (SOF) personnel in the staff that are specifically educated and trained in the SOF operations field. Commander Schreiber, Major Metzgar, and Major Mezhir present the reader with a notional training guideline and training timeline for SOF qualified staff officers to fill this need.

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in a JTF: Is There a “Best Method?” looks at how to best organize and control SOF forces within a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). Citing examples from real-world operations, Majors Hulslander, Thomas, and Willis discuss the need to build a JSOTF around the theater special operations command to form a joint task force.

The final article, ***Joint Forces Command Special Operations Joint Training Program***, examines the JFCOM SOC joint training team (JTT) program. The authors, Commander Castro-Mendoza, Lieutenant Commander LaRue, and Major Moore, discuss the best method to ensure combat capability and readiness of the SOF forces through this training program, and recommend some possible modifications for improvement.

GORDON C. NASH
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander, Joint Warfighting Center
Director, Joint Training, J7



JCLL UPDATE

Mr. Mike Barker
Director, JCLL

Six months ago in the March 2003 JCLL Bulletin, we first featured “Special Operations” (SO). Through a focused effort from both Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) and the Joint Forces Staff College, we are again providing a focused Bulletin on special operations. In the future we’d like to print some articles on the SO/conventional forces integration, but from the conventional perspective.

Major changes are in store for USJFCOM and the joint community in the area of lessons learned. Back in early February USJFCOM established an active collection team, referred to as the Joint Lessons Learned Collection Team (JLLCT), of approximately 30 military officers ranging from a senior O-3 to an O-7, who went forward into the theater of operations. USJFCOM also established an analysis cell in the rear with approximately 20 civilian analysts. Through an agreement captured under a terms of reference (TOR) with USCENCOM, we were able to embed members of this team at all major headquarters three weeks before the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq. The team was able to observe the final planning and execution of that plan. Being in that position, the team was able to identify and quickly resolve a number of issues (Quick Wins) for the Commander. Returning after mid-May, this team has worked on developing the quick look report that among other things, identifies major issues that impact operational and strategic capabilities. Since then, BG Robert Cone, Director JLLCT, has briefed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress, Secretary of Defense, Vice President, and President of the United States on the findings and recommendations. Work continues, and more studies are being identified.

Using the JLLCT as a stepping-stone, ADM Giambastiani, CDRUSJFCOM, is evolving a new concept that will lead to an enhanced lessons learned cen-

ter. The “new” center will not only integrate the positive aspects of the original Joint Center for Lessons Learned, but will be primed to deploy to execute active data collection for operations, exercises, and/or experiments, and to conduct operational and strategic level analysis from findings derived from the active collection. As the concept and organization mature over the next several months, more information will follow. A decision brief is making its way to ADM Giambastiani. The outcome of the selection of a course of action will determine the actual size and command and control structure of the new organization.

In addition to maintaining situational awareness with the transition from Phase 3 into Phase 4 in Iraq, this team is also addressing how to collect findings as they relate to the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).

“The secret . . . is to analyze *what* went wrong and *why*, put it all into perspective, and then set about correcting the problem.”

Anonymous

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Information Operations (IO) in Support of Special Operations


Major Bradley Bloom, US Army

IO Relationship to Special Operations. The capabilities grouped under IO, when properly coordinated and employed can promote conservation of limited special operations forces (SOF) resources, reduce operational risk, and significantly enhance the accomplishment of special operations (SO) missions. The increase in SO OPTEMPO and employment demands since 9-11 and emerging US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) combatant command roles have added considerable impetus to the need for immediate and routine application of IO capabilities in support of special operators. While there are numerous examples of SOF units employing the capabilities of IO with notable success, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, IO still lack a broader acceptance and common application in SO staff organization, planning, and execution - particularly at the tactical level. The key to developing a truly effective special operations IO capability is the clarification of organizational requirements and responsibilities, the development of standardized planning capabilities and related manning, and the institutionalization of this process across operational headquarters (HQs).

IO Frame of Reference. Because of ongoing developments in doctrine and tactical application, it is useful to review the most current definitions and conceptual framework of IO prior to continuing. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3600.1 Version Six (DRAFT) provides an effective IO summary. Although this document is in draft form, it is a commonly used reference in DOD messages and doctrinal working groups. The directive defines IO as: "Actions taken to influence, affect or defend information, information systems and decision-making".

Directive 3600.1 goes on to identify five IO core capabilities: psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operational security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). IO supporting capabilities are intelligence and counterintelligence (CI), kinetic attack, physical security, and information assurance (IA). Public affairs (PAO) and civil military operations are identi-

fied IO related capabilities. Figure 1 shows these capabilities in a relational framework.



IO Support to Special Operations Missions. In its broadest context, IO facilitates or enhances SO mission accomplishment throughout the operational spectrum from strategic down to tactical levels. At the strategic level, IO support to SO may include such things as mission focused supporting actions by other government agencies, policy statements, broader regional engagement programs, and IO capability support from coalition partners. As a component of a larger joint force, the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) can also benefit from the results of the theater IO campaign and the secondary effects of friendly operations on enemy forces and civilians in the joint special operations area (JSOA). These events can significantly shape the SOF operational environment, and when properly leveraged, contribute to the accomplishment of the commander's objectives.

IO provides perhaps its most tangible benefit to special operations at the tactical end of the spectrum where boots meet terrain. As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the role that tactical level IO capabilities (outer ring) can play in the consecutive phases of a notional direct action mission (inner ring). To highlight key contributions: activities such as OPSEC, deception, and IA support SO planning and mission preparation by protecting the purpose, scope, timing, and location of the operation and operational forces. PSYOP can be used to condition the adversary, weakening his morale, and promoting the inevitability of defeat. During actions on the objective, EW and CNO can be critical to isolating the objective from outside communication and blocking warning or reinforcement calls, while tactical PSYOP




forces deter civilian interference. Following the operation, PSYOP and PAO can exploit mission success to increase popular support for US objectives and forces, thus reducing the adversary's freedom of operation in the future. The ultimate goal of the planning process is the integration of IO tasks on the mission synchronization matrix that reflect a specific friendly IO system or action (for example EC-130, EA-6B, PSYOP broadcast or leaflet drop, deception activity or INFOCON status change), the purpose of the action, target location, duration, and the anticipated IO effect related to other mission activities, decision points, timelines, and overall success criteria.

IO and the Operational HQ. While there are strategic, joint force headquarters (JFHQ) and tactical IO activities that support SO, there are significant challenges to planning and synchronizing actions in support of SO at these levels. At the strategic level, IO is conducted by a diffuse structure of national agencies and policy-making systems, all of which are encumbered with issues of global strategy and individual departmental priorities. Strategic level organizations seldom coalesce beyond a loosely constructed framework to produce a detailed engagement plan that adequately focuses on the needs of the operational military commander.

Higher conventional JFHQ IO is generally allocated in support of broader theater objectives and the dominant fire and maneuver components. Likewise, theater level IO staff planners often lack special operations expertise to provide focused IO support to the JSOTF or combined force special operations command (CFSOC). At the tactical level, troop units are challenged by lim-

ited staff size and deployment footprint, as well as access to and familiarity with the full spectrum of available IO tools. Leaders and staff officers simply “do not know what they do not know” with regards to IO capabilities. Tactical issues of manning and limited inherent IO capability are often magnified when maintaining a small SO footprint or conducting operations over a large geographic area. Finally, tactical unit resources and focus by nature and risk remain centered on mission essential task lists (METL) generally associated with kinetic operations.



The challenges listed above, as well as broader IO planning considerations and division of responsibilities shown in Figure 3 cause the operational level SOF HQ to emerge as the key node in IO planning and fusion. In the areas assigned to a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), the theater special operations center (TSOC) is the likely candidate to integrate IO in support of SO.

The TSOC as a Center of IO integration. In peacetime and during the development of theater security and cooperation plans (TSCP), the responsibility for SO planning and operational control (OPCON) of deployed forces rests with the TSOC. In a larger contingency, the TSOC may serve under a designated joint task force (JTF) as the HQ element of a JSOTF, or may fill a more complex role as a CFSOC with multiple subordinate JSOTFs, both US and coalition. Whatever operational level function the TSOC fills, the permanent addition of trained IO planners and processes is critical to maximizing the overall contributions of IO. The responsibility and requirements for operational level IO planning and execution are largely derived from the mission scope and task organization of the joint force. The scope of involvement becomes one of defining specific op-

erational requirements, with appropriate manning (permanent and augmented) to meet those requirements, and the appropriate staff organization to smoothly coordinate action.

TSOC IO in Peacetime. In peacetime, operational requirements in the TSOC are derived from the TSCP, generating or revising CONPLANS and OPLANS, and providing required input to higher HQ force development initiatives. Although not all IO capabilities are routinely employed in peacetime, the requirement to develop or revise standing CONPLANS and OPLANS would be more thoroughly met if addressed by permanently assigned IO expertise in each of the core capabilities. Besides enhancing the quality and completeness of planning, establishing and filling core IO billets in peacetime breeds a familiarity of personalities and procedures that rapidly transitions to enhanced performance in wartime, and avoids a dependence on joint manning document (JMD) fill with personnel of varying experience and capabilities. Finally, if an outside HQ such as a Army Special Forces Group or Naval Special Warfare Task Group stands up as the core element of a stand alone JSOTF in theater, the TSOC would possess a resident, theater specific IO planning cell that is capable of physically or virtually augmenting the JSOTF capabilities, while the JSOTF awaits their own JMD fill. (This “push” capability is currently resident as a special operations IO support team from the US Strategic Command Joint Information Operations Center, but there is only one “fire-team” available).

Peacetime Manning Considerations. The ability to generate and fill new positions within operational staffs and units is generally a “zero sum gain” for the larger SOF community or individual military service. Therefore, it is critical to strike a balance enhancing SO IO capability without degrading other capabilities. At the TSOC level, peacetime requirements could be met with a small IO cell under the supervision of a Deputy J3 (**D J3**) for IO consisting of personnel with PSYOP, EW, CNO, and intelligence (analysis) expertise. Although not a core IO capability, the skill set for gathering and analyzing IO relevant intelligence data requires additional training and familiarity beyond a traditional “synthesized intelligence” focus. The DJ3 for IO also serves as a core member of the TSOC J3 joint planning group (JPG), augmenting his capabilities with his subordinate functional experts when needed.

Related Positions. External to J3 IO, core capability

OPSEC and deception expertise could be drawn as needed from other staff sections in peacetime. As an economy of manning initiative, the command OPSEC position could be filled by a currently assigned J2 counter intelligence (CI) billet and augmented by the assignment of section OPSEC/information assurance officers or NCOs with the requisite functional training and standard operating procedures (SOPs). A J35 or J5 planner with a secondary expertise and education could meet peacetime deception planning requirements.

There are additional requirements for PSYOP and civil affairs (CA) (an IO related capability) personnel within the TSOC for other functions beyond SO IO planning. Under the Unified Command Plan, PSYOP and CA are designated as SOF components, and therefore subject to TSOC OPCON and theater coordination (in the absence of a standing JTF, joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) or joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF)) in the same manner as other service SOF. This generates a requirement external to the SO IO cell for the allocation of permanent PSYOP and CA billets not only in the TSOC J5 (Plans) section, but also in J3 (Ops) to meet specific theater driven requirements.

IO Interface With SOF Troop Units. For planning and coordination purposes, the DJ3 for IO in a TSOC should have a designated table of organization and equipment (TO&E) point of interface in each force providing unit down to the Group/Squadron/Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) level. This point of contact (POC) should have a broad based knowledge of the capabilities and role of IO in support of SOF, and would ideally be a functionally designated and trained IO planner for their Service component (see endnote 1). Initiatives are currently under discussion in most Services to place a permanent IO planner at this level.

TSOC and JSOTF IO in a Contingency. The functions of a TSOC are substantially expanded by contingency operations in which the TSOC forms the core of a JSOTF or combined force special operations component commander (CFSOCC). In addition to sustaining peacetime responsibilities and maintaining broader theater situational awareness, the TSOC is now also responsible for OPCON of subordinate elements as part of a broader operational plan, battle tracking, operational level SO feasibility assessments, preliminary mission analysis, subordinate mission tasking, development

of orders and annexes, dissemination of commander's guidance, subordinate CONPLAN review and approval processes, vertical and horizontal liaison, deconfliction and review of supporting plans, participation in the targeting process, combat assessment and feedback, revising future operations, and developing future plans. All of these additional tasks apply not only to traditional elements of SOF combat power, but also to SO IO. Although the end product will often be a "layering effect" of IO capabilities in support of subordinate operations, in some cases, planners may devise an operation designed to achieve a non-lethal or psychological effect that is supported by other SOF core mission profiles. This in turn will be integrated into the broader JTF or theater IO plan.

Contingency Expansion of IO capabilities. In order to meet the substantial expansion of responsibilities in a contingency, the TSOC (JSOTF/CFSOCC) requires a corresponding increase in IO manning. Other situation-unique factors such as the operational scenario (geo-spatial, political environment, and rules of engagement (ROE)), enemy capabilities (C4I structure, weapon systems), and the composition of friendly forces (JTF with corresponding major subordinate commands (MSCs), number of subordinate JSOTFs, coalition partners, higher HQ battle rhythm) determine IO needs beyond a standard "doubling" of peacetime manpower to meet shift requirements. These requirements will generally be met through JMD fills or a request for forces from Service component IO capabilities.

Contingency Integration of the TSOC or CFSOCC IO staff. As far as contingency integration of the IO cell, there are many options. However, the most efficient seems to be a transition from a centralized cell operating under the DJ3 IO in peacetime to a distributed execution process that expands IO manning from a centralized IO cell to current operations (joint operations center floor), J2 analysis, the J3/J5 plans section, the joint fires element, and the special plans group (SPG) during contingencies.

Under this option, once a set level of capabilities and manning is reached through augmentation, the J3 IO section disperses key personnel to the other staff sections mentioned above to man permanent workspaces in those sections. The DJ3 for IO is responsible to make recommendations and adjustments to the placement of his personnel as the operational environment and manning level dictates. The remaining members of the cen-

tralized J3 IO cell would maintain responsibility for peacetime requirements, theater level operational oversight, and overall responsibility for integrating and deconflicting mission specific SO IO actions and effects with the larger operational IO plan. Although the DJ3 for IO is suited by training and background to fill a Deputy Chief of Plans billet, this temptation should be avoided. The assignment to another primary duty would detract from his ability to synchronize and deconflict the larger IO picture, or add his own influence to short suspense issues in a complex operational environment.

SO IO contingency augmentation and integration in tactical SOF units. Because of the demands already levied on IO force providers by higher headquarters, tactical units will have a difficult time filling a robust IO JMD in a manner similar to the TSOC/CFSOCC/CJSOTF. As with the TSOC, mission parameters will dictate what IO planning skills are essential for tactical mission accomplishment. To offset unit shortages, service component SOF forces have the ability to request IO support teams from Service specific IO commands.²

At levels subordinate to the CFSOC or JSOTF, the IO planner's primary responsibilities are mission analysis to identify desired IO effects, tentative support and targeting requirements, course of action refinement, and providing IO subject matter expertise to the commander. Their initial product to the JSOTF or CFSOC HQ is an IO support request that will be further developed into specific actions and asset allocations by the CFSOC/JSOTF IO planners. Once the JSOTF/CFSOC IO cell allocates available resources, the subordinate SOF IO cell integrates those resources into the tactical unit synchronization matrix. The critical interaction between IO cells that this requires is dependent on adequate command emphasis, training, collaborative tools, and liaison.

Conclusion. We must move forward to maximize the assets and capabilities that IO provides in support of SO. The challenges of today's operational environment cannot be met by a continued focus on actionless doctrinal debate, or the ad-hoc maintenance of a temporary or second tier staff element. This paper has provided a basic overview of the importance of IO in support of SO, recommendations and insights for SO IO manning, and staff organization considerations for peacetime and contingency operations. One may debate the applicability of these suggestions, and each of

you is encouraged to engage your own chain of command on the best solution for your organization's unique situational challenges and requirements. The critical issue is the rapid establishment of a long-term framework that facilitates the focused and coordinated application of SO IO capabilities in a manner that not only enhances SOF mission accomplishment, but also reduces risk to special operators.

Endnotes:

¹Ideally this would be an O-5/O-4 staff position filled by a broad based IO integrator function such as a US Army FA 30.

²US Army: 1st Information Operations Command, Land (formerly LIWA), US Navy: Fleet Information Warfare Center, USAF: Air Force Information Warfare Center.

About the author:

LTC Brad Bloom has been assigned as the SOCJFCOM PSYOP Observer Trainer for the last 18 months. His previous operational PSYOP and IO experiences include contingency deployments for Bosnia and Kosovo, and post 9-11 participation in the USSOCOM campaign support group. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), LTC Bloom worked with the USCENTCOM Staff, the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command and subordinate troop units. He also served as a member of the JFCOM Joint Lessons Learned Collection Team attached to CFLCC. LTC Bloom's other previous assignments include Gulf War service in the 3rd Armored Division, Company Command of Delta Company, 2-504 PIR and tours with the 6th and 9th Psychological Operations Battalions at Ft. Bragg. His next scheduled assignment is command of the 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion beginning in summer 2004.

The Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center

The Next Evolution in Joint Integration

Major Eric Braganca, USAF

Personnel recovery (PR)¹ has improved dramatically in the last fifteen years. At every level of the Department of Defense, PR is a priority mission, reflecting the high value American warriors place on our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Each service has devoted personnel, thought, and resources to this critical mission area to improve the joint force's overall capability and interoperability. Especially in the years since Operation Desert Storm, the military has purchased better radios, more sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, and improved training; all this with an eye to their impact on "one of highest priorities of the Department of Defense."² The success of this approach has saved lives in the battlefields since the 1991 war with Iraq—from the high profile rescues of downed F-117 and F-16 pilots over Serbia to the less renown, but more numerous missions in Afghanistan, and now even the high-profile prisoner of war (POW) rescue in Iraq. The collective efforts have yielded tremendous successes. We are, however, obligated to look into the future to develop new methods and envision tomorrow's battlefield, which may entail even more PR.


Improving our PR capability requires commanders to understand the tasks involved, delegate those tasks appropriately, and leverage the personal and organizational creativity latent in the force to accomplish them in the most effective and efficient way possible. Of course, changes must demonstrate significant improvement while maintaining current successes, all while remaining financially realistic.

Proposal

Joint force commanders (JFCs) should create a new entity in their staff—the joint personnel recovery coordination center (JPRCC)³—replacing the joint search and rescue center (JSRC)—to function in new ways to improve PR integration. By working for the JFC, the JPRCC will have better focus on operational warfare.⁴ It will also better focus the components on tac-

tical PR efforts, particularly the air component, and open up new possibilities for better joint integration, especially by using more flexible command relationships. None of these improvements will come at the expense of recent improvements, so there is no trade-off or "lesser-of-evils."

Figure One



*See acronym list at end of article

Current joint doctrine offers JFCs the option to retain the JSRC at his headquarters, or delegate it to a component commander.⁵ In practice, JFCs have routinely chosen to delegate this responsibility to their air component. However, this trend is changing⁶ and this change—to retain the JSRC at the JFC-level—is a positive change. It offers the potential to dramatically improve PR by better monitoring and coordinating all means of recovery, both combat search and rescue (CSAR) and others such as non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR). This new location is designed to help view PR more holistically and has spawned the new name (JPRCC versus JSRC), to indicate a broader view of the mission. This, too, is a positive, required change to indicate the new role that this new body will accomplish—less tactical control and more operational integration. The new joint PR doctrine (currently in draft) should change this to make the JPRCC part of the JFC's staff, and delineate the risks associated with delegating this to a component.⁷

This change will not decrease current tactical successes, but will open up new avenues for operational integration. Creating a JPRCC at the JFC's headquarter-

ters will significantly broaden PR options without slowing responsiveness or agility by retaining traditional CSAR activities at the component level, such as the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) rescue coordination center (RCC). It will retain current successes and simultaneously increase joint awareness and involvement in PR.

A new JPRCC will not require significant funding, nor will it significantly increase the personnel for the JFC or the components. While the JFC's headquarters will require an increase in personnel,⁸ the warfighting components will continue to function as they have, so they will retain the vast majority of their manning. More importantly, this new concept will not alter the PR/CSAR⁹ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for any service. This change will require some new approaches to operational thinking—demand which the small groups of military PR schools can meet. PR events are already included in most Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and theater exercises so this idea can be routinely practiced as well.¹⁰

Improved Operational Focus

The JSRC, routinely delegated to the JFACC, has become the focal point for all PR efforts. Its doctrinal charter is “to plan, coordinate, and execute joint search and rescue (SAR) and CSAR operations; and to integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape, and recovery operations with the geographic area assigned to the joint force.”¹¹ However, because the JSRC combines the JFACC's RCC tactical focus and the JFC's operational focus, its efforts are divided between tactical execution and operational planning. This dual-hatted nature has forced JSRCs to concentrate on essential tactical tasks and accept risk by losing focus on other means of recovery. Current JSRCs at JFACC level focus their efforts on developing and publishing special instructions (SPINs), communicating with components, as well as monitoring and (frequently) directing PR incidents. Maintaining control over PR tactical operations—a requirement of being a component RCC—hampers JSRCs. A JPRCC will unleash new potential by: developing PR-specific joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield (JIPB) allowing the JPRCC to generate a broad threat decision matrix; integrating PR themes into the JFC's psychological operations; including non-traditional military forces in planning; improving the links to inter-agency and non-conventional forces; and harnessing more flexible command rela-


tionships. JPRCCs, relieved of the RCC responsibility of controlling tactical operations (retained by component commanders), could concentrate more effectively on these operational links which can significantly improve our PR efforts by more effectively leveraging national power for this high-priority mission.

PR planners have struggled with how to recommend the timing and execution of PR missions. One of the current JSRC combat operations tasks¹² designed to make this easier is a PR decision matrix, tailored to the current threat, to aid PR decision-makers. JSRCs typically have no planners since they are usually located in the air operation center combat operations section and are prepared to tactically control a PR mission. With no ability to look beyond the current air tasking orders (ATOs), due to the numerous requirements of attending short-range planning meetings, JSRCs are forced to focus on the current fight. A JPRCC will more readily focus beyond the next few days into longer-term issues.

Psychological operations (PSYOPs), and information operations (IO) as a whole, allow warfighters to influence enemy forces and populations about friendly actions. This is particularly important to PR missions where isolated or distressed persons evade in enemy or neutral territory. PSYOPs can convince people in these areas not to interfere in recovery missions. Given favorable circumstances, PSYOPs may be able to convince neutral people to assist isolated personnel and return them to friendly control. The growing world of IO offers even greater opportunities to impact PR. Operational PSYOPs themes are usually developed and/or approved by the JFC—a JPRCC closer to this planning process will have a greater ability to harness the power of this non-kinetic firepower to improve PR effectiveness. Integrating PSYOPs into a comprehensive PR plan requires time—time that tactically-focused JSRCs don't have.

Integration with non-traditional military forces, such as civil affairs (CA),¹³ could also increase our PR efforts. While many view CA as those who enter a fight when the fighting is done to build bridges, repair infrastructure, and coordinate humanitarian relief operations, the modern truth is much different. Increasingly, CA operates side-by-side with combat forces as decisive operations and nation-building phases merge. Central Command introduced CA in Afghanistan, and now Iraq, long before combat operations were over; US forces

are simultaneously conducting nation-building and anti-terrorist operations. These CA gain local knowledge in their day-to-day dealings with the population and can provide key insights for PR planners and executors. CA also have routine contact with many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which further broadens their knowledge-base. While it is unrealistic for these forces to actively participate in combat rescue efforts, they provide valuable insights guiding a JPRCC's threat assessment or evasion guidance. Afghanistan and Iraq aside, not all military operations are combat operations. Frequently, US forces provide humanitarian relief in areas overwhelmed by natural disasters or internal strife, as happened numerous times in Africa in the late 1990s (Rwanda and Mozambique for example). But this change offers the JPRCC opportunities beyond the links to military forces.



A JFC headquarters has many boards, bureaus, cells, and offices¹⁴ (BBCOs) which fuse various elements of national power. These BBCOs frequently are the first place where diplomatic, information, and economic expertise mix with military forces to achieve strategic or campaign goals. An operationally focused JPRCC will easily tap into these rich sources of information to provide the warfighters with more tools and options for the entire force. Since PR includes concerns over prisoners of war (POWs), having access to an inter-agency working group (IAWG) will provide access to the diplomatic arm of US power to highlight the need to account and care for US and allied POWs/missing in action (MIA). The joint staff frequently deploys national intelligence support teams (NIST)¹⁵ to JFC headquarters to assist in harnessing the vast intelligence capability of all the various intelligence agencies. Just as with the IAWG, a JPRCC above the components will have ready access to these teams and be better able to leverage its power.

A JPRCC at the JFC headquarters will have easy access to all these elements of power and the perspective, relieved of the tactical concerns, to use them.

Better Tactical Focus

JFACC staffs will similarly find the change an improvement over the current method. As already mentioned, JFACC staffs struggle with dual tasking as the component RCC and a joint operations area (JOA)-wide¹⁶ operational JSRC. This situation works due to the incredible effort by the dedicated men and women who man these staffs. We no longer have to require so much work from so few people, or rely on the good graces which have recently made our PR efforts so successful, especially when the price of greater capability is so low.

In the years preceding and immediately after Operation Desert Storm, PR predominantly meant rescuing downed aircrew (CSAR to most people). Using this thought, it made great sense to place the JSRC at the air component. However, in recent conflicts, new realities have emerged where ground troops operating in rear areas or border guards on a peacekeeping mission, for example, are vulnerable. CSAR procedures, designed and tested for and by aviators, do not always work. Ground forces face different realities, such as phase lines and surface boundaries, which airmen have difficulty understanding. JSRCs, used to transmitting information rapidly via the secret internet protocol routing network (SIPRNET) to secure airbases and to airmen with a common vision of the battlespace, now struggle to understand land warfare where infantrymen patrol. A JPRCC, with representation from all the components,¹⁷ is better suited to make procedures for the entire joint force. This will allow the JFACC to concentrate on PR for airmen and not on the unfamiliar field of land warfare.

Current staffs struggle with many of the less-obvious tasks involved in PR. Repatriation is routinely overlooked. What to do with a survivor once friendly forces regain control has always been a thorny issue with few easy answers. When the survivor is a pilot, the answer is easy because the JFACC RCC/JSRC has complete control over the repatriation process, as well as the survivor. However, when the survivor is from another component, such as the three US Army soldiers captured in Kosovo in 1999, the situation is much more difficult. Under a JPRCC, the JFACC will no longer

be responsible for enforcing policies on a sister component. Likewise, the other components will view PR as part of their joint responsibilities and no longer solely as their contribution to the JFACC's process. If the JFC owns the process (created with input from all components) through his JPRCC, then no component can circumvent it.

One reason this change will be transparent to most warfighters is the shift in responsibility required by this approach. The JPRCC will not be a command and control element. Instead, the JPRCC will plan and integrate the joint force, leaving the tactical tasks to the warfighting components. During a PR event, the JPRCC will monitor actions to maintain situational awareness in the event the affected component requires assistance, or is incapable of performing the PR tasks required. In such a case, the JPRCC—acting as the JFC's agent and with his guidance—will act as the broker for the components, nominating a supported component and, with JFC approval, designating other components to support. The tactical control of the PR event will remain with the warfighting component, as it is now. This will retain the current successes and, by limiting the JPRCC's role in tactical operations, prevent undue influence on Service-specific TTP. This offers a win-win scenario for JFACC staffs—the JFACC retains his air component RCC while relieving him of the responsibility to integrate all the other elements of military power not directly related to airpower. There are, however, greater advantages to creating the JPRCC.

Better Joint Force Integration

The single greatest improvement from such a move is the ability to use more flexible command relationships. Currently, most JSRCs assume tactical control (TACON)¹⁸ of any elements conducting PR missions. While this relationship has worked for air-dominant PR, the TACON relationship is usually not clearly defined (e.g., when does it begin and end?) and other component commanders have been highly reluctant to hand over control of their assets to the JSRC when their components have their own warfighting missions to accomplish and fear being forced to use another component's TTP. TACON also creates more problems when trying to fuse warfare across mediums—land, air, and sea. Creating a JPRCC at the JFC headquarters and using the more flexible command relationship of “support”¹⁹ could eliminate both of these concerns.

For more than ten years, JFACCs have taken TACON of the other components' air sorties to incorporate them into a seamless air campaign. This works because JFACC staffs have great capacity to integrate those other components' airpower. JSRCs have translated this concept to PR because PR has frequently meant the recovery of downed pilots solely using airpower. Since those downed pilots belonged to the JFACC, TACON was the right command relationship. Recent contingencies have challenged this paradigm and opened gaps in the TACON approach. For example, the number and reach of special operations forces (SOF) introduces a more complex battlefield with small teams throughout the battlefield with unique PR challenges and requirements. A special operations commander with a team in distress should be able to tap into the JSRC for expertise without automatically passing control of the mission to another component. When a JFACC pilot is the survivor, the JFACC commands the survivor who is unfamiliar with his environment and requires detailed direction for recovery. A SOF team has dramatically greater situational awareness of its environment and capability to make decisions favorable to its recovery. A SOF commander may require limited assistance to recover his team—close air support (CAS) and/or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—but has frequently been forced to pass control of his force (air and ground) to leverage the support of another component. While this hasn't caused mission failure in recent years, this friction has significantly delayed missions²⁰ while the special operations component and JSRC resolved the issues. This friction will be eliminated by a JPRCC designating one of the components as the supported command and the others as the supporting commands. Regardless of which one is supported, none will lose tactical control of their assets. The supported commander will dictate the priority, timing, and effects, while the supporting commander retains control of his TTP to accomplish the mission.

This principle's greatest test comes as conventional forces operate in less linear ways. Using the US Joint Forces Command experiment Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02) as an example, conventional forces leaped over pockets of resistance to attack key nodes required to achieve the desired effects.²¹ This created a non-linear battlefield with pockets of friendly forces—similar to the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq today. An air component JSRC trying to assume TACON of non-JFACC forces for PR is frequently unaware of the overall cam-

paign and the impact that taking TACON of some elements will have on the surface fight.²²

Commanders are reluctant to pass TACON to other components because other components may not understand those forces. Air Force and Navy airpower is typically under the control of a single airman to exploit its similarities. Army and Marine Corps ground power is frequently under the control of a single ground commander to synchronize their operations. These forces are able to conduct air-ground operations without passing TACON between the air and ground components because they recognize their common efforts and their dissimilar abilities. CAS is a great example of this. Air commanders provide CAS to ground commanders to assist them in achieving ground objectives without passing TACON of the aircraft to the ground commander. Air commanders develop specialized command and control elements to provide this support while retaining control of their assets. This works since ground commanders have little or no ability to control airpower. This same thinking should be applied to PR.

Changing PR command and control to “support” will be a shift in favor of the rest of joint warfighting. This may seem like a radical change, but this really is the broader joint approach. A JPRCC above the components will be able to effectively use this technique, as delegated by the JFC, because of their ability to view the broader implications of joint warfare. It is this ability to improve the command and control of PR that offers the greatest potential to increase our capability without any additional forces or cost. Simply allowing other component commanders to retain control of their assets, while controlling or assisting PR operations, will dramatically increase their willingness to participate.

The Cost of Training

The cost of this improvement in capability is additional battlestaff training. JFCs and component commanders must incorporate this shift into their battlestaff training. Since these are recurring events, both within the Services and jointly, there is little financial cost to this proposal. This change will not levee any new training requirements or tactical training and, hopefully, this will improve the quality of PR training. All that’s needed is a mental shift to align more closely with the rest of joint warfighting.

Conclusion


PR must remain a high priority mission for Americans because of our values. This isn’t a US military theme, but an American theme that we share with many of our allies. So the challenge for PR planners and operators is to create a system which harnesses the massive talents of our military without setting aside so much power to impede the primary mission, whatever that might be. Creating a JPRCC at the JFC’s headquarters will do this more effectively.

The JPRCC at the JFC’s headquarters will better focus on the core functions of integration. It will be relieved of the necessity of tactical operations—true for all BBCOs—allowing it to concentrate on operational issues such as a PR-specific JIPB, including both ground and airpower. A JFC-level JPRCC will be better positioned to integrate with non-conventional elements of US power such as PSYOPS, CA (where appropriate), and inter-agency groups. And since a JPRCC will not be assuming control of tactical operations, the warfighting components will not lose any control over their own forces or TTPs, which will retain all the advantages of recent successes. Without adding funding or forces, PR will have added perspective and reach on the joint battlefield. But the greatest improvement is the shift toward true joint warfighting.

Using more flexible and responsive command relationships will better integrate the components toward a truly joint PR operation. Many components fear the loss of control and capability when the only option offered is to pass TACON of key assets to another component. By creating a JPRCC and eliminating any tactical role, the future of PR might look like this (Figure Two): the air component providing ISR and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) with Joint Surveillance Target Attack Warning System (JSTARS) and E-3 aircraft, the land component providing a ground armored reconnaissance element, the maritime component providing the recovery vehicle with HH-60s, and the special ops component providing a SEAL team moving the survivor to a link-up point. The JPRCC role in such a mission will simply be to designate the supported component and then monitor operations. While this is an extreme possibility, it highlights the potential interaction possible when command relationships cease to become impediments to PR operations. This will only be possible when the JPRCC is no longer a warfighter and becomes a facilitator. Today’s fluid battlefield with lin-

ear and non-linear warfare intermixed require more agile responses. Moving the JPRCC away from the warfighting components offers just such agility.

Figure Two



Many good men and women have struggled for years to improve PR and bring us the successes seen over the last few years. This change will capture their hard work and excellent results. It will also offer greater opportunities for more innovation and improvements to make sure every American goes into combat knowing their nation and its forces will do everything possible to bring them home alive no matter what their situation.

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Endnotes:

¹ JP 1-02 definition—the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others designated by the National Command Authorities. PR is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm's way. PR includes, but is not limited to, theater search and rescue; combat rescue and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other US Government approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these.

² DODD 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, Dec 2000, para 4.1.

³ The new term proposed for the next version of JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Recovery (now in Final Coordination) is Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). This acronym conflicts with the existing Joint Personnel Reception Center, so I've altered the term to be unique and avoid greater confusion. JPRCC is a more accurate name and should become the standard term—I will use to help indicate this new role, distinct from the one most people associate with the current JSRC model.

⁴ JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes operational warfare as the level linking tactics to strategic objectives and focusing on the operational art (p II-2).

⁵ JP 3-50.2, p III-1.

⁶ European Command has created a Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell at its Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has moved the JSRC function from its air component to the SOUTHCOM headquarters.

⁷ JFCs always have the option of altering their force and staff structure, however. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (Jan 99).

⁸ JP 3-50.2, Chap VI, lists the doctrinal JSRC requirement (15 personnel in 3 shifts); in practice, each JSRC is task-organized in line with METT-T considerations. Therefore it's not realistic to precisely predict the number of personnel required for this new JPRCC, however the additional manning will most likely not be significant.

⁹ There are significant differences in the meanings of Personnel Recovery and Combat Search and Rescue. PR covers the theater or JOA-wide holistic mission while CSAR revolves around the combat tactical task performed by desig-

nated rescue forces. Since CSAR is a subset of PR, I will use *PR* as the broader, more-appropriate umbrella term.

¹⁰PR exercises are either stand-alone service events or are additions to existing JCS or theater exercises. In the latter case, they are usually minor events which could greatly improve by creating the JPRCC on the JFC staff.

¹¹JP 3-50.2, para 2b.

¹²*Ibid.* Ch I, para 3b.

¹³According to US Special Operations Command, “Civil Affairs” are the forces and “civil affairs operations” is the mission.

¹⁴BBCOs are staff elements of a JFCs headquarters focused on a specific facet of the operation such the Joint Movement Center, Joint Information Bureau, and Joint Targeting Coordination Board. JP 5-00, lists more.

¹⁵NIST—usually has elements from various US intelligence agencies such as Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, etc.

¹⁶JOA—Joint Operating Area. An area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (taken from JP 1-02 definition)

¹⁷A JPRCC will gain its perspective from both augmentees (as JSRCs do now) and from liaison officers which all components send to the JFC. While JSRCs have always requested augmentation and liaison officers from other components, the other components frequently have only sent their air planners viewing the mission as CSAR and not PR.

¹⁸Command authority limited to the detailed and local direction and control over movements and maneuvers necessary to accomplish specific missions (taken from JP 1-02).

¹⁹JP 3-0 lists “support” as a command authority where one command should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action and can be used at any command echelon below combatant commander (SecDef frequently uses this between combatant commands, as well).

²⁰Problems with the TACON relationship caused hours of delays for both rescues during Operation Allied Force (Kosovo in 1999). In the case of the downed F-16 pilot, the delay nearly caused the rescue force to attempt the mission under less-than-optimal daylight conditions in a medium threat environment when such risk wasn’t necessary had the command relationships not been a problem.

²¹18th Airborne Corps was the original Joint Task Force (JTF) for Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02), and they planned on experimenting with retaining the JSRC at the JTF. However, when contingency operations prevented their participation late in the preparation for MC02, this was cancelled.

²²This also eliminates the potential of a PR mission running counter to another component’s operation. During the rescue of Bat-21B (Lt Col Hambleton) in the late stages of Vietnam, ground forces felt their mission was sacrificed because

the air component focused solely on the rescue of a downed airman. While the PR mission probably didn’t cause any true disruption of the ground mission, the perception was that each component was fighting independent and contradictory battles.

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Acronym list:

BBCO	boards, bureaus, cells, and offices
CSAR	combat search and rescue
IAWG	inter-agency working group
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JIPB	joint preparation of the battlefield
JPRCC	joint personnel recovery coordination center
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSRC	joint search and rescue center
NIST	national intelligence support teams
RCC	rescue coordination center

Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer

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The events of September 11th 2001 and the subsequent War on Terrorism (WOT) have resulted in a significant expansion of the roles and missions of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its assigned special operations forces (SOF). In addition to the expanded roles and missions, USSOCOM has been tasked with the unfamiliar role of a supported combatant command at the direction of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).¹ This combination of expanded roles and missions, higher demand for SOF assets and capabilities, and increased command responsibility poses a daunting challenge to USSOCOM and SOF forces. The natural reluctance to change must be overcome in order to adapt to this new reality.

USSOCOM's expanded roles and missions in the WOT increase manpower requirements for SOF personnel who have the "ability to plan at the strategic level."² As more SOF "operators" are drawn out and trained to perform strategic planning duties, SOF units risk losing capabilities.³ Recalling the essential "SOF truths": humans are more important than hardware, competent SOF cannot be created or mass produced in an emergency, and quality over quantity - the expanded requirement for operators and planners puts USSOCOM in a dilemma.⁴ How do we educate the SOF planners necessary for the expanded mission without compromising SOF capabilities and violating the "SOF truths?" We cannot simply strip tactical SOF units, already critically short of experienced manpower, to meet the demand for educated SOF strategic planners that can function effectively on a combatant commander's staff or on a joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

Outside of intermediate service school (ISS), SOF field grade officers have no formal education process preparing them for joint special operations at the operational level.⁵ The lack of joint special operations formal education limits the ability of these officers to contribute and integrate SOF's particular attributes to joint

staffs. To address these limitations, SOF officers must be introduced to joint special operations early in their careers, either through formal joint special operations classroom instruction or distance learning, in preparation for eventual service with a regional combatant commander, theater special operations command (TSOC), joint task force (JTF), JSOTF, or joint staff.⁶

The current shortfalls in joint SOF education, training, and operational experience among SOF officers are not new phenomena. Over the past decade, many SOF leaders have recognized and attempted to address this problem by developing SOF officers well versed in Service and joint doctrine. However, these efforts have fallen short in meeting the increasing demand for the unique skills and experience of a joint educated and trained field grade SOF officer. Therefore, given the gravity of the situation concerning the WOT, increased emphasis must be placed on developing joint SOF staff officers that can effectively communicate the capabilities and requirements of SOF in a joint environment.⁷ In particular, the SOF staff officer must be able to rapidly transition from being an operator to being an effective member of a JSOTF.⁸

Defining the Problem

Joint doctrine is authoritative and "will be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise." In the weeks following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, operational planners at US Central Command (CENTCOM) tasked Special Operations Command-Central (SOCCENT) to prosecute the opening phase of the campaign in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After conducting an initial mission analysis, SOCCENT immediately tasked the Middle East oriented 5th Special Forces Group (5th SFG) to form a JSOTF, which eventually became known as Task Force Dagger (TF DAGGER).⁹

Although the SOCCENT Commander's decision to form a JSOTF in this manner from the 5th SFG (an O-6 level Army command) appears to have been successful, with much pain and augmentation by Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) and other SOF units, it put the special forces group commander in a role as the JSOTF commander, a role he was doctrinally unprepared for at the start of the campaign.¹⁰ Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint

Special Operations Task Force Operations states that “the core of the JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the theater SOC staff or existing SOF component with augmentation from other Service SOF.” The SOCCENT Commander’s decision to form the JSOTF with an existing Service component impeded operations for the TF DAGGER Commander by placing him in the unenviable position of both planning major joint operational level functions and tactical level Service tasks simultaneously. As one former special forces group commander noted, this is the least preferred course of action because the commander does not have an organization of joint staff officers accustomed to working with the combatant commander’s staff at the joint operational level.¹¹

Doctrine for Army Special Forces and other SOF is nested in joint doctrine; however, the SFG headquarters, is rarely, if ever, manned with joint qualified essential staff officers (graduates of the Joint Forces Staff College or joint professional military education level II (JPME-II)). For example, during operations in Haiti in 1993, the 3rd SFG Commander attempted to form a temporary JSOTF. Upon receipt of the tasking, he immediately determined there were no joint qualified officers in his headquarters to fill essential positions; thus hindering initial start up. The 3rd SFG Commander later stated that “we thought we could do it all, but found that we could not.”¹² The officers who form the majority of the SFG or naval special warfare group (NSWG) staff functions: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistical, and communications are normally composed of newly promoted field grade officers (O-4) with minimal or no joint experience. Some of these officers are recent graduates of ISS (resident and non-resident course), and may have served temporary duty with a joint headquarters during a previous deployment as a company grade officer (O-1 to O-3). Fewer still, have attended any individual education at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) or a collective JSOTF training exercise hosted by SOCJFCOM. Considering these facts, what can SOF commanders do to enhance the knowledge of joint operations for assigned field grade officers?¹³ The answer lies in joint SOF education and training. One senior SOF officer with several previous joint tours noted, “Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures must be learned (educated) and practiced (training). Learning can conceivably be done in Service schools; practice must be done in joint training exercises, experimentation, testing, and finally operations.”¹⁴

SOF Individual Training Requirements

According to JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, “SOF requires a combination of basic military training and specialized skill training to achieve operational proficiency. SOF specific training includes both individual skill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness.” Title 10, USC Section 167, charges the USSOCOM Commander with the training of all special operations forces. This training should include interoperability with conventional and other SOF forces, particular special operations individual training, and professional military education. Joint training of SOF is shared with the regional combatant commanders who, through their TSOC, articulate SOF mission-essential tasks supporting theater campaign and security cooperation planning.¹⁵ The sooner SOF officers are educated and trained at the operational strategic level of joint operations, the better prepared they will be when they find themselves assigned to a TSOC or other joint staff responsible for SOF integration.

Since SOF units can be employed unilaterally or in support of a conventional force at all spectrums of conflict, they must understand this unique role and retain their company-level skills developed prior to moving into special operations. Not only must the company grade officers know the mission-essential tasks of SOF, they must continue to hone skills for integration into conventional force operations in support of theater objectives.¹⁶ In August 2002, the Army War College hosted a group of 51 representatives (Army major commands, Army Staff, Center for Lessons Learned, Center for Military History, RAND corporation, and inter-agency representatives) to give their initial impressions on the WOT, and to capture “lessons learned.” One key lesson stated “better SOF - conventional integration and more joint training, must be executed to husband ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces] for the many essential missions they will perform in the ongoing war against terrorism.”¹⁷

According to USSOCOM Publication 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, “Training and education are the twin pillars of special operations professional development. Training is designed to produce individuals and units that have mastered the tactics, techniques, and procedures through which units accomplish their missions. Through education, individuals learn the art and science of war and peacetime operations, and develop military judgment necessary to apply initiative

and creativity to the solution of problems and challenges.” This education and training must also focus at the operational strategic level of warfighting in a joint environment. These same skill sets can be directly applied to the campaign planning required for the current WOT.

SOF personnel must complement their formal training with education. Specific education goals and requirements are outlined in USSOCOM Directive 621-1, Joint Special Operations Education System. As part of the education process, SOF personnel usually attend a host of joint and Service courses such as ISS. Selected SOF officers may attend an advanced military studies program (Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, or the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies). Others may choose to attend joint SOF education courses offered at the JSOU at Hurlburt Field, Florida. However, this is about as far as most SOF officers take their education requirements. USSOCOM acknowledges, “The majority of a serious professional development program must be self-development.”¹⁸ This approach leaves it up to the individual SOF officer’s initiative to obtain follow-on and advanced education and training. With the current focus on USSOCOM expansion, it is time to change the requirement for “self-development” and ensure that SOF officers receive, as a minimum, focused education and training in some of the critical joint warfighting skill sets derived from recent experiences in the WOT.

Operations in Afghanistan yielded some noteworthy issues requiring address in formal SOF education and training. Although not all-inclusive, the following are subjects needing immediate exposure in SOF individual education and training; joint fire measures and integration/deconfliction of the air and battlespace, special activities and compartmented operations, information management and technologies, joint special operations doctrine and linkages to the theater campaign plans, and JSOTF manning requirements - particularly reserve forces. In addition to these skill sets, joint SOF officers must be educated and trained in joint operations and planning, full spectrum and unconventional approaches to operations ranging from small-scale contingencies to high intensity conflict, the synchronization of joint operations to achieve a synergistic effect with sister Service capabilities, and SOF and conventional force interoperability.

Joint SOF Officer “Skill Sets”

The first skill is joint fires and battlespace deconfliction. This is too broad of an issue for the confines of this paper, but has significant effects on SOF planning and employment. For the last several years, SOF has become proficient in the use of tactical fires at the training centers such as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the National Training Center (NTC).¹⁹ Prior to operations in Afghanistan, most SOF only incorporated organic Service fires (organic attack aviation or artillery platforms). Several recent scenarios at the training centers have attempted to employ time-sensitive targets and bombers performing close air support. However effective the training was at the tactical level, these scenarios do not train SOF group staffs or JSOTF commanders who usually have little practice or experience in the joint fires process and synchronizing the battlespace at the operational level. In some cases, the training at JRTC and NTC may have left some conventional and SOF commanders with false expectations of SOF doctrine and employment.²⁰

Initial analysis from Afghanistan indicates that airpower, coordinated with SOF and maneuvering indigenous forces - “was a joint air-land struggle in which the ability to combine fire and maneuver by diverse arms made the difference between success and failure.”²¹ However new and appealing this concept may seem, these principles as demonstrated in Afghanistan are consistent with previous SOF employment, only relearned with the current generation.²²

In the current operational environment, airpower will continue to play an important role in support of SOF assets. The flexibility of airpower, particularly from aircraft carriers that do not rely on land bases, can quickly provide SOF with operational fires such as what occurred in Afghanistan. The strategic bomber also emerged as one of the preeminent weapon systems in support of SOF. The B-52s and B-1s have the advantages of long loiter time, all weather operations, reduced short-range foreign basing requirements, large numbers of near-precision guided weapons, and large crews able to man a number of communications radios. As some airmen noted, “Many of these capabilities are critical in this phase of the campaign, and even more so in the future phases.” A pillar of success here is the understanding of what joint assets can bring to the fight for the joint SOF operator and planner. In the current WOT, Navy and Air Force assets will be the most responsive

joint fire support for SOF.

The critical link to access joint fires and to deconflict battlespace remains with the special operations liaison element (SOLE).²³ The role of the SOLE is to integrate all SOF air and surface operations in the combined air operations center (CAOC). The SOLE is the JSOTF commander's representative responsible for the JSOTF commander's intent being accomplished within the joint forces air component commander's (JFACC) combat plans division (CPD) who initiates the joint air tasking order process. Efforts to exploit SOLE integration and doctrine must continue through research conducted by airmen and SOF in their ISS, education and training of JSOTF staffs, and experimentation with agencies such as the combined air operations center-experimental (CAOC-X) at Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

Along with the education and training of the SOLE, future JSOTF commanders might ask for and integrate an air support operations center (ASOC) within their JSOTF staff. The ASOC is a JFACC asset normally attached to an Army corps headquarters operating as a JTF. There is a shift toward this thinking as demonstrated in the recent final coordination draft of JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. According to this draft, "ASOCs can help the SOF Commander request and integrate air power into all the JFC's [joint force commander] special operations."

The modern JSOTF can be employed in many ways; it can be stand-alone, working in conjunction with the interagency process (joint interagency task force—or JIATF), or part of a JTF. The JSOTF becomes the interface between conventional and unconventional compartmentalized operations. Every SOF operator knows that security is paramount to successful special operations. However, in the recent campaign in Afghanistan "stovepipes" created by some zealous SOF staff officers hampered operational requirements such as logistical support to the Northern Alliance and coordination of some critical air support. These "stovepipes" must be eliminated as SOF expands the WOT. This is not to suggest that all special operations are disclosed, and certain special operations will require compartmenting to avoid compromise. Nevertheless, SOF staff officers must ensure that their key theater counterparts in which they rely on for air, logistics, intelligence, etc. are "read-in" to adequately plan and leverage the required theater support. As the WOT con-

tinues, joint SOF officers must continually identify who must participate in planning at the theater level, and critically assess the impact of operational security (OPSEC) in accomplishing the overall campaign plan.

Within the context of compartmented operations, the interagency process significantly effects SOF operations. SOF operations, perhaps even more so than conventional operations, can have impacts on national prestige and objectives.²⁴ Examples of this importance lie in case studies such as the Son Tay Prison Raid, as compared to flawed operations such as the failed rescue attempt of U.S. hostages held in Iran. In the WOT, some of SOF's roles appear to be shifting closer to roles normally associated with other government agencies. Education must address this apparent paradigm shift. Key areas to address are the unique requirements of Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code (USC). With SOF's geographic and cultural orientation, SOF personnel must have an understanding of the theater security strategy for each country they could find themselves operating in.²⁵ As USSOCOM develops the strategy for the WOT, they must continue to synchronize their overt and covert effort within the interagency arena and regional combatant commander area of responsibility.

Information management and technologies must be included in advanced SOF education and training. Today's technologies allow for streamlining traditional linear or sequential planning processes through collaboration tools that allow for interactive and dynamic interface between a JSOTF and its components or JTF.²⁶ In the ad-hoc nature of today's JSOTF, there are gaps in "knowledge of national level intelligence support, operators for systems which provide the common operational picture and sufficient personnel to sustain combat operations in the future operations and plans cell of a JSOTF."²⁷ One recent study concerned with the technological challenges of the WOT stated "integration of ARSOF and the leveraging of multi-lateral capabilities more seamlessly with conventional forces operations must be another priority."²⁸ The recent joint experiment MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE-02 (MC-02) debuted a number of collaborative tools for future JTF and JSOTF headquarters. As technology increases, these collaboration tools will only grow more efficient and have greater capability.²⁹ However, proficiency in these techniques and technologies is perishable and continually changing. Reliance on technology alone without a system of back ups must be explored fully, or

they will become a millstone to the JSOTF staff when they falter or are disrupted. At the start of MC-02, selected personnel had as many as three train ups on the systems and procedures. Those coming into the process late, with little or no training, were overwhelmed with the numerous demands of an information based JSOTF (i.e., telephone, e-mail, net-chat, radio, television, video teleconferences, web pages, and on-line collaboration). SOF must take advantage of the advances in information management and technologies to remain relevant in the ever-increasing complex environment of joint operations.

In order for SOF and conventional forces to synchronize, they must understand the language and idiomatic expressions used by each Service. This is achieved by understanding both Service and joint doctrine. Unfortunately, military culture tends to discount doctrine more than adhere to it. After every major conflict, we seem to re-invent the wheel, and this conflict is proving no different. Because we tend to slight doctrine and education, we “lack the training, equipment, and manning to rapidly and effectively establish what are now ad-hoc headquarters at the joint operational level.”³⁰ What do we sacrifice by not knowing our doctrine better? The answer is simple, a lot of time and energy! We also sacrifice developing “warrior-scholars” with a balanced set of skills for employment at all operational levels. SOF personnel must read, understand, and implement what is in our national security, combating terrorism, and military strategies, and how it fits into our joint operational doctrine and capabilities. We must use these documents to build our SOF strategy to prosecute the WOT. SOF personnel must have a working relationship with sister Service doctrine that incorporates and synchronizes their capabilities into the support and supporting operational relationships required in operational planning.

No examination of joint operations would be complete without manning. As experience has demonstrated, establishing a JSOTF is the easy part, but manning it with qualified joint personnel is extremely difficult. To paraphrase one JSOTF commander during his attempt to fill a joint manning document; “I can handle all of the operational stuff, it is this log and commo that I don’t see anyone helping me out on.”

Since the complexities of current and future JSOTFs are not going away any time soon, SOF must do a better job of educating and training their officers, espe-

cially communications, intelligence, and support field grade officers, in joint SOF operations. In addition to education and training, we must find ways to track and recall SOF officers who have expertise in joint SOF operations as they move back and forth from SOF to conventional units. Crucial to SOF is the role of the Reserve and National Guard SOF and conventional personnel supporting SOF. Before conducting JSOTF operations in Afghanistan, the 20th SFG (National Guard) conducted several train-ups and participated with SOCJFCOM in MC-02. This provided an excellent “shakedown” prior to their deployment. Nonetheless, with the OPTEMPO and potential [Editor’s note: Conflict has occurred] conflict in Iraq, few JSOTFs will have the luck and timing of the 20th SFG. Also, prior to September 11, 2001, major headquarters and combatant command staffs were operating at a reduced level. Currently, most headquarters are reliant upon augmentees that have little experience working together as a team; therefore, they have no unit cohesion until they have spent some time on the staff. Manning with properly educated and trained teams must be paramount while preparing for the prolonged conflict or “long haul” that the WOT will require.

Now that the issues have been raised, how can SOF eliminate the following problems? There are several solutions, both near and long term, which seem applicable in this case.

Recommendations

SOF will not arrive at a simple, one-size fits all, solution which will meet the need for more educated and trained joint qualified SOF officers at the operational level. This will require USSOCOM to have creativity, perseverance, and a long term, broad strategy. A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) survey acknowledged that the Department of Defense (DOD) “in order to develop an effective strategic plan, it needs greater flexibility and that leveraging new educational technologies would facilitate its ability to prepare officers for the joint environment.” For SOF personnel there are currently two agencies that can address this education and training requirement.

In the near term, USSOCOM must leverage the capabilities of both the JSOU and SOCJFCOM. This will mean ensuring that quality people are assigned with the right operational and educational backgrounds, that lines of operations are clearly delineated, and that

Level 1 Training Audience	Level 2 Training Audience	Level 3 Training Audience
This training should include all staff officers, NCOs, and personnel, including AC and RC augmentees who may serve on a JSOTF HQ or who are in the process of being assigned to a theater SOC. It may be conducted using a compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM) computer based mode for individual self-paced training. The Joint Special Operations University is responsible for maintaining and updating Level One JSOTF training.	This training should include the theater SOC commander, potential theater SOC commanders, and selected key and primary SOC or JSOTF identified personnel. It is conducted in a formal instruction environment at the Joint Special Operations University.	This training should include staff officers, NCOs, and personnel assigned to or supporting a theater SOC or JSOTF HQ in support of a JTF or higher joint force. The focus of this chapter, particularly the selection on AARs, is on the Level Three training audience. USSOCOM-sponsored SOF training teams conduct Level Three training.

It should be noted that this effort is a shared responsibility of both JSOU and SOCJFCOM, and that USSOCOM is the executive agent charged with ensuring that all education and training is conducted in accordance with established USSOCOM policy and standards. The role of SOCJFCOM is to “evaluate the execution of SOF- related joint doctrine in support of USSOCOM’s collective training program...through US Joint Forces Command’s joint training infrastructure.”

[illegible]

One recommendation is to provide a joint special operations doctrine and procedures overview to new SOF personnel attending courses such as the Special Forces Qualification Course. The intent is not to make them doctrinal experts, but to address jointness early in their careers; this would normally occur during the officers' fourth or fifth year of service. By the seventh or eighth year of service, most officers have progressed to a point where they are no longer commanding operational detachments or platoons, and normally move to assistant staff positions in the special forces battalions, groups, or NSWG headquarters. Others may opt for an assignment such as JRTC Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD) or the Special Warfare Training Center. Here is where a concentrated effort should begin to expose them to joint SOF doctrine in preparation for ISS and advancement to field grade officer rank. The proposed model, depicted in Table 2, is similar to one originally established back in 1989, with a few modifications to account for updated doctrine.³² The core education objectives must focus SOF personnel at the joint operational level. This course should fall under the direction of the JSOU, which would be taught in residence, or by mobile education teams (METs) traveling to outlying SOF duty stations. In the

long term, some selected instruction might occur by CD-ROM/interactive web based learning during personnel self-development time.³³

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER COURSE		
Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
- National Security Strategy - Elements of Power - National Interests - POTUS/SECDEF - National Military Strategy (QDR) - Foreign Policy Theory and Practice - Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) - Joint Officer's Guide (JFSC Pub 1) - Other Agencies	- Operational Concept (SOCOM Pub 1) - Regional Combatant Commanders Role - USSOCOM Commander Roles - Mission/Mission Activities Comparison - Service Components and doctrine • Army • Navy • Air Force • Marine Corps - Command Relationships - Full Spectrum Operations - Synchronization of Joint Ops - Joint Fires - SOF / Conventional Forces Interoperability	- Joint SOF Doctrine • JP 3-05 • JP 3-05.1 • JP 3-07 (FID) • JP 3-0 • JP 3-33 - Joint Doctrine (Operational) • JP 2-0 Intel Support • JP 4-0 Log Support • JP 2-01.3 JIPB • JP 4-01.8 JRSOI • JP5-0 Joint Operations • JP 0-2 UNAAF • JP 3-50.2 CSAR • JP 3-53 PSYOP • JP 3-13 IO - Training Doctrine - Campaign Planning

Table 2: Model for Joint Special Operations Staff Officers' Course

Another area where joint SOF education can be injected is in the ISS. One model is currently in practice at the Army Command and General Staff College, where an estimated 75% of all SOF ISS students attend each year. There is an established "SOF track" which will include over 200-hours of instruction supported by JSOU. It will include both "core" and "graduate" level tasks taught in four tracks (civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces, and special operations aviation). JSOU efforts are currently expanding to include greater SOF instruction at the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force ISS colleges and with their respective advanced military studies programs. High payoff targeting according to one SOF officer responsible for ISS education, is putting a larger number of SOF officers in the advanced military studies programs, and follow on placement in areas where they can make the greatest contributions to SOF and the joint community. In addition, emphasis and programs must continue to be developed for those officers who are selected to fill joint billets, but were not selected by centralized Service boards to attend resident ISS.

According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint education program.³⁴ A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report noted, "The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), from which most officers receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its 906-seat capacity." One possible solution is to have SOF personnel attending

ISS, go on temporary duty en-route to the JFSC and then report to their unit. This would put more SOF JPME-II graduates into the units, joint educated and ready in the event they are designated to participate as part of a JSOTF. This will require the personnel system to flex, but the cost of having a JPME-II qualified staff officer in SOF tactical units, headquarters, or joint staffs would be invaluable to the operations and planning teams. This would be a great investment and benefit both SOF and conventional forces over the long term. These are near term solutions; however, consideration of a long-term plan is crucial too. Focused joint education and training for SOF officers is an essential element for operational success in a joint or JSOTF environment.

Another question is does USSOCOM need to have a separate ISS? Many pros and cons come with this type of question, which is beyond the scope of this current study. This subject is for another day and only after careful consideration, weighing the pros and cons, with USSOCOM and sister Service representatives. After all, it would be useful to note as one senior SOF officer pointed out, that in the 1930's airmen worked through the theory and mechanics of airpower application at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama. From their efforts, and in a time when global war struck, much of their theories and experiments eventually gave birth to a separate air arm—the United States Air Force. This change came about because the Army could no longer provide the education, training, and resources airmen required. Obviously, USSOCOM is far from establishing its own ISS, or for that matter a separate "SOF Service." However, with the current national security strategy and national strategy for combating terrorism that relies on "pre-emptive" actions, and the expanding role of SOF, it would be premature to rule out just such a possibility in the coming decade.

With USSOCOM's and SOF's expanded roles and missions in the WOT, and the requirement to conduct operations in a joint environment, field grade SOF operators and planners must be educated and trained at the operational and strategic level of joint operations. The education and training must be focused to enable SOF officers to function effectively on a combatant commander's staff or on a JSOTF. This joint SOF staff officer training should be accomplished at the senior O-3 to O-4 point in an officer's career and should focus on, but not be limited to, the following skill sets:

joint operations and planning, full spectrum operations, synchronization of joint operations, familiarity with all Service components' doctrine and capabilities, joint fires employment, SOF/conventional force interoperability, and JFACC/air tasking order coordination. An ideal place to conduct this standardized joint training would be at each Service's ISS as part of the required curriculum for SOF officers. If this is not feasible, the education and training could be conducted by JSOU and SOCJFCOM in residence, or by mobile education and training teams. USSOCOM, with JSOU and SOCJFCOM, must be the lead to ensure unity of effort and standardization.

As Major General Sidney Shachnow stated in October 1995, "Undoubtedly, some people will point to the magnificent manner in which SOF have succeeded in meeting all challenges to date. These same people will remind us not to fix something that is not broken. My response is, show me a thoroughly satisfied man, and I will show you a failure. Of all our human resources, the most precious is the desire to improve."

Endnotes:

¹ Refer to the following: Scarborough, Rowan. "Rumsfeld Bolsters Special Forces." *Washington Times*, 6 January 2003, pg. 1; Scarborough, Rowan. "Special Ops Gets OK To Initiate Its Own Mission." *Washington Times*, 8 January 2003: pg. 8; and Goodman, Glenn W. "Expanded role for elite commandos." *Armed Forces Journal International*, February (2003), 34-38.

² Goodman, pg. 36. Refer also to JP 5-0 (Second Draft), Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 10 December 2002, pg. IV-5 which refers to Global Campaign Planning, a new addition to joint doctrine.

³ Experienced commanders in SOF are hesitant to expand higher headquarters, unless there is a direct contribution to those responsible for executing SOF missions in the field. Otherwise, expanding headquarters is seen as bureaucratic and wasteful of critical manpower assets.

⁴ Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Washington: GPO, 17 April 1998.

⁵ Intermediate Service School are the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS; Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; Marine Corps Command and General Staff College at Quantico, VA; and the Navy War College at Newport, RI.

⁶ It is important to note that not all SOF officers have the ability attend a resident ISS. Only the top officers from year groups actually attend. Officers not selected to attend in residence are required to complete ISS by correspondence, missing the opportunity to "network" during a year of residence.

⁷ COL Michael Findlay, current Commander, SOCJFCOM stated: "The nature of modern warfare and the theater-engagement plans of the United States demand that U.S. forces know how to operate as a joint team. No other forces require this particular knowledge more than U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF." See Findlay, Michael. SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forces. Special Warfare. Spring 2000, pp. 10-17, and Bucci, Steven P. "Fighters vs. Thinkers." *Special Warfare*, Spring 1989; 33-37.

⁸ To paraphrase USSOCOM Directive 621-1 (9 March 2001), Joint Special Operations Education System, page 5, there are four USSOCOM education goals: 1) Understanding of strategic, operational, and tactical utility of SOF, 2) Provide people with the necessary analytic tools, 3) Facilitate a broad exchange of experience and lessons learned, and 4) Provide people with an educational foundation that reinforces warrior spirit, character, and ethical decision-making.

⁹ TF DAGGER was designated a "JSOTF" by SOCCENT planners in order to leverage resources that are normally assigned to joint headquarters (i.e., joint communications assets, etc.). Planners assisting SOCCENT argued to have TF DAGGER designated a "Special Operations Task Force" (SOTF) rather than JSOTF. However defined and debated, on 18 June 2002, JSOTF TF DAGGER was awarded a Joint Meritorious Unit Award for actions in Afghanistan from 8 October 2001—28 February 2002 (Joint Staff Permanent Order J-ISO-0199-02), leaving many of those unfamiliar with joint doctrine to think the 5th SFG was a JSOTF.

¹⁰ For more information concerning the pros and cons of establishing a JSOTF, refer to Special Operations Forces Joint Training Team Joint Special Operations Insights, June 2002. Available on SIPRNET Website: <http://138.165.46.253>

¹¹ COL (USA, Retired) Ed Phillips, Electronic mail message to authors, 6 February 2003. While commanding the 7th SFG, COL Phillips conducted a unique education and training opportunity, organizing the 7th SFG into a JSOTF configuration and executing a JRTC rotation based upon the Regional Engagement Force concept in June 1998.

¹² Boyatt, Mark (COL, USA). Haiti—Unconventional Operations. 1994. Videocassette. COL Boyatt commanded the 3rd SFG during its operations in Haiti.

¹³ This is based on the premise that the model established by the 5th SFG in Afghanistan will remain, that is SF Groups acting as JSOTFs in the near term. With actions pending against Iraq, SOCCENT might have to establish as many as four JSOTFs. SOCCENT certainly does not have the manpower to make four subordinate commands and cover down on regional responsibilities. [Editors note: This paper was written prior to commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom]

¹⁴ Greg Jannarone, (Col., USAF, Ret.). Electronic mail to authors, 10 January 2003. Col. Jannarone retired from the USAF after 27 years of assorted joint SOF assignments, and currently is assigned as a contractor working on USAF doctrine concerning psychological operations. He also has been a guest lecture at several ISS and the JSOU.

¹⁵ The recently released National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism (February 2003) list the global goals and objectives for defeating terrorism as; (1) Defeat Terrorist Networks and Their Organizations, (2) Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists, (3) Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit, (5) Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad. All of these goals have direct military tasks tied to them at the operational level for SOF mission sets (i.e., UW, FID, SR, DA, and CT). Copies of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism can be obtained at www.whitehouse.gov.

¹⁶ One of the principal missions of US Army Special Forces is Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Units such as the 7th SFG have been conducting FID training in Colombia and a majority of this training is in areas such as light infantry tactics, employment of mortars, fire and maneuver, etc. In order to perform the FID mission, the trainer must be thoroughly versed in infantry. See Robinson, Linda. "Warrior Class: Why Special Forces Are America's Tool of Choice in Colombia and Around the Globe." U.S. News and World Report, February 10, 2003, pp. 34-46.

¹⁷ Center for Strategic Leadership. The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operation Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle. Carlisle, PA: October 2002.

¹⁸ US Special Operations Command. USSOCOM Pub 1. Special Operations in Peace and War. McDill Air Force Base, FL: 25 January 1996. pg. C-6.

¹⁹ This has focused primarily around Army Special Forces, Rangers, and Special Operations Aviation assets (ARSOFA) training at the training centers, with some occasional rotations incorporating Naval Special Warfare (SEALS).

²⁰ One case in point is a recent article, which stated that the Army Chief of Staff during a 1998 visit to the JRTC commented, "The brigade has the opportunity to interface with special operations forces through the SOCCE." This SOCCE-brigade match up is one that is questioned by many in SOF, since by doctrine the SOCCE is attached to a JTF or JFLCC for C2 of SOF operating in the JFLCC/JTF AOR. See Odom, Thomas P. "SOF Integration: A JRTC Tradition." On-line. Internet, 18 Feb 2003. Available from: Center for Army Lessons Learned, <http://call.army.mil/products/trngqtr/tq4-02/odom.htm>.

²¹ Biddle, Stephen. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy. Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002 and Chipman, Don D. "Airpower and the Battle for Mazar-e Sharif." Air Power History, Spring 2003, pp. 34-45.

²² For one case in point, refer to Peers, W.R. "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma." Military Review, July 1948, pp. 12-20.

²³ Another critical link for battlespace deconfliction is the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), assigned to the JTF or JFLCC Headquarters. For a detailed description on the SOCCE roles and mission, refer to FM 100-15 Corps Operations, FM 3-05.20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations.

²⁴ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 April

1998.

²⁵ It should be noted that not all SOF are regional and culturally oriented. Only the US Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs, and the AFSOC 6th SOS units conduct this extensive training. To a lesser degree, some Navy SEALs undertake some training when conducting FID.

²⁶ SOC-JFCOM. Joint Special Operations Insights: Issues and Lessons Learned. Norfolk, VA: June 2002.

²⁷ Rehorn, Wes, LTC. Personal interview, 12 Feb 2003. LTC Rehorn is the current J-3 at SOCJFCOM. During the initial start up of TF DAGGER, LTC Rehorn was the acting J-3.

²⁸ Center for Strategic Leadership. Ibid., October 2002.

²⁹ One of the highlights of MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE-02 was when the JTF Commander used a C-17 with a suite of computers and communications equipment that allowed him to travel across the country and still take briefs and issue planning guidance as if he were in his headquarters.

³⁰ Rehorn, 12 Feb 2003.

³¹ JPUB 3-05.1 identifies a "training audience" as officers and NCOs, including designated AC and RC augmentees who may serve on a JSOTF HQ. They should be Service and branch qualified, but they may not necessarily be joint or SOF qualified (pg. IX-2).

³² This model is an updated version of an original POI, which was proposed back in 1989. See "Fighters vs. Thinkers: The Special Operations Staff Officer Course and the future of SOF." Special Warfare, Spring 1989, pp. 33-37.

³³ One recent RAND report noted that, "DL (distance learning) media support asynchronous learning (that is, learning whenever an individual chooses to) and allow learning programs to be redesigned and offered as modular units, thus tailoring the material to current skill levels, new assignments, and time constraints of individual soldiers. Moreover, DL can more easily provide refresher training and "just-in-time" training, allowing soldiers to remain proficient in a wider range of skills or to have proficiency restored when and where needed. See "Army Distance Learning Can Enhance Personnel Readiness," RAND Arroyo Center Research Brief, on internet at <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3028>.

³⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office. Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach is Needed. (GAO-03-238) Washington: GAO, December 2002.

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Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in a JTF: Is There a “Best Method?”

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Thesis

A joint special operations task force (JSOTF), with rare exception, is most efficient and effective when its nucleus is established, in whole or in part, around the theater special operations command (SOC).

Introduction

The fundamental operational level organization established to carry out theater objectives in crises or times of war is the joint task force (JTF). Special operations forces (SOF) are important components of this joint team and, if employed skillfully, can accomplish missions or objectives beyond the ability of conventional forces assigned to the JTF. Doctrine guides the joint practitioner in the establishment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), subordinate to the JTF, to provide command and control of SOF efforts within a theater of operations or joint operations area (JOA). Deliberation within the special operations community on how best to organize the JSOTF is at the heart of this paper. What or who actually comprises the JSOTF is the critical consideration affecting the success of all special operations (SO) within a JOA. Although current doctrine allows ample flexibility, questions of suitability persist. Advocating a more singular approach to the selection of a core organization, around which the JSOTF is formed, although optimal in the opinion of the

authors, is not without certain challenges. To that end, identified challenges must be addressed, as well as ongoing training and augmentation initiatives that can mitigate shortcomings. Other SOF task forces, such as joint psychological operations task forces and civil-military operations task forces will not be addressed separately in this paper.

Historical Background: Special Operations Forces, Organizations and Purposes

Following Congressional recommendations for improved SO employment and the failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW at Desert One, the Cohen-Nunn amendment to the FY87 National Defense Authorization Act was passed, forcing a change to the way SOF was managed. As a result of this amendment, the President established the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and assigned the new unified command the responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping SOF. According to General Henry Shelton, Commander, USSOCOM (Feb 96-Sep 97):

“The essence of SOCOM is joint interoperability approached in three dimensions. First, forces are trained and equipped to work together. Second, a framework of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) effectively guides SOF employment. Finally, *standing organizations* exist to ensure that the full utility of SOF is realized across the continuum of military operations “.¹

In the early 1980s, there were initial efforts within the SO community to informally integrate special operations experience into the unified command staff. With the maturity of joint doctrine and through legal mandate, these initial efforts became the *standing organizations* referred to by General Shelton, the theater SOCs. The SOCs were designated as sub-unified component commands within each theater, i.e., the Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC). Primary responsibilities included advising the combatant commander on the employment of SOF and command and control (C2) of SOF operating within the theater. The former of these two responsibilities is the principle duty of the SOC commander, while the latter is a function of his staff

Advantages of SOC-based JSOTFs

While joint doctrine regarding the establishment of a

JSOTF is not prescriptive, neither does it fully examine why one method should be preferred while others avoided. The most commonly acknowledged and agreed upon method of forming the JSOTF is to form it around the existing theater SOC. Another method entails forming the JSOTF as a complete package from outside the theater, while yet another suggests standing up a JSOTF from a single-service SOF component. Indeed, such flexibility may be considered a strength. However, only in circumstances where there is no alternative, should the theater SOC not be the core of the JSOTF. The compelling argument for assigning the SOC the responsibility for establishing the nucleus of a JSOTF is its inherent strengths compared to other organizational models:

(1) A trained and experienced joint SO staff that understands the capabilities of each service, with available command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) resources and is used to working together;

(2) Long-term, knowledgeable theater centric orientation and well-developed working relationships with allies;

(3) Designation of the theater SOC commander as the JFSOCC.

Utilizing the preceding three points as over-arching themes, the rationale for advocating SOC-led JSOTFs more often than not should become apparent. The theater combatant commander usually forms a JSOTF during contingencies where SO units are employed. This task force is a temporary joint headquarters that provides C2 over joint SOF in a specific theater of operations, or for a specific mission.² Joint doctrine states, "When C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the SOC, a JSOTF is established." As previously noted, "... the JSOTF may be formed from single-Service SOF units, as a complete package from outside the theater, or by augmenting the elements of a SOC".³ It is apparent doctrine recognizes the fact that although a capable organization, the SOC may not be robust enough by itself to be designated a JSOTF. However, the value of continuing to use as much of the SOC as practical is also evident. This idea is furthered in practiced success stories at establishing JSOTFs for recent operations. European Command used their SOC to form a JSOTF for Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) conducted in April 1996 in Monrovia, Liberia; and Operation FIRM RESPONSE, another NEO conducted in June 1997 in Brazzaville, Congo. Both operations have been referred

to as unqualified successes in the responsiveness and C2 of SOF.

In July 1997, a coup in Cambodia endangered American citizens prompting the ambassador to request evacuation support. US Pacific Command (PACOM) responded with Operation BEVELLED EDGE, in which Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) conducted a stand-by, non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). In Operation BEVELLED EDGE, PACOM used their SOC as the core for establishing JTF 510 (a JSOTF with an added marine security element (MSE)). The addition of the MSE inhibits the designation of the organization as a JSOTF, but the majority of the C2 is still drawn from the SOC and tailored to unique aspects of the mission which was more special operations than not. Although military force ultimately was not required, SOCPAC's capability to plan and conduct an opposed or unassisted NEO was an option quickly made available to the ambassador. The rapid response and deployment of SOCPAC as a JTF (pseudo JSOTF) can be directly attributed to its training and ability as a standing joint SO team. The SOC's ability to C2 SOF and other attached forces under the most demanding conditions has resulted in PACOM designating SOCPAC as the crisis JTF/JSOTF for their theater standard operating procedure.⁴

Inherent Qualities Make the SOC an Optimal Choice

Although not specifically chartered to do so as designated JSOTFs, theater SOCs are well-suited to provide C2 of SOF during a crisis. The inherent characteristics of the SOC are what make it the ideal body to form the JSOTF nucleus. The SOCs are joint in nature and their personnel have a significant amount of SO experience and theater knowledge. Each SOC consists of a *built-in* joint staff of personnel experienced in both the theater and joint SO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. This experience is diverse and ranges from in-depth theater orientation to joint SO planning and execution of tactical through strategic operations, as well as the C2 of such operations. Moreover, personnel of the SOC staff train and are focused specifically on *theater* SOF requirements. Theater perspective, knowledge, and ally relationships are significant capabilities inherent in the theater SOC. The typical member of the SOC has a significant amount of theater-specific knowledge obtained through personal study, military training, cultural experience, and long-

term relations with allied forces. SOC personnel are typically mid- to senior-level special operators who have personally participated in multiple exercises and/or operations in their respective theater. Normally, most SOC personnel spend years as members of a SOF team conducting tactical level operations in theater before ever getting assigned to a SOC. Once assigned, the qualities of such experienced operators manning the SOC, while seemingly intangible, are nonetheless critical. This extends to the long-term relationships developed between themselves and allied special operators. Many SOC personnel work directly with senior allies, and even have had personal contact with adversaries within the theater. Such activity undeniably leads to a unique understanding of coalition and enemy capabilities, leadership, and planning/execution factors. The working level relationship with allied forces builds “honor and trust” between the U.S. and coalition forces that yields tangible results during crisis planning and mission execution.⁵

Such experience and knowledge of the theater, its political/military history, and the key players combine with enhanced levels of experience making members of the theater SOC invaluable to the mission of any theater JSOTF. With the knowledge acquired by participation in the development of the theater campaign and operation plans, the SOC staff can immediately start matching unit capabilities to missions and support critical time-sensitive planning. This last point is especially important since JSOTFs are typically “stood up” in response to theater crises. As such, the level of planning expertise and area orientation demanded cannot afford to be hamstrung by an ad hoc planning staff. JP 3-05 states “Commanders should [also] provide for *sufficient staff experience and expertise* to plan, conduct, and support the operations”.⁶

A decisive point with regards to organizing the JSOTF around the theater SOC is an issue of efficient and responsive C2. The unique organization, mission, and employment of SOF require a dedicated C2 structure that is organized based on their unique requirements and capabilities. Current joint doctrine supports this premise by stating commanders exercising command authority over SOF should “provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command. Most importantly, commanders should match mission capabilities with mission requirements”.⁷ The use of the theater SOC at the core of the JSOTF is an efficient way to meet these requirements. Since the SOC commander has

day-to-day operational control (OPCON) of SOF assigned to the theater, the chain of command is already clear and understood. Using a staff other than the theater SOC increases the risk of complicating this arrangement by designating a JSOTF from an organization that lacks a true joint staff or real familiarity with the theater of operations.

Mitigating Problems Associated with Non-SOC led JSOTFs: “Split-based” Operations

There may be any number of reasons why the JSOTF designating authority employs elements other than the SOC as the core of a JSOTF. Perhaps the SO missions envisioned may be accomplished by *almost* exclusively single service SOF components. Perhaps organizations are given a mission and the label of a JSOTF but lack the doctrinal qualities of true “jointness.” Regardless, the Secretary of Defense, theater combatant commander, or the JTF commander may task another SOF element to establish the JSOTF. For example, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) tasked their attached Army special forces group headquarters to establish a JSOTF (Williams: interview). During Operation RESTORE HOPE, an Army special forces headquarters unit (FOB 52) was again chosen and deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) with responsibility to command and control all special operations there.⁸

There are varied problems with this alternative. Foremost, the headquarters staffs of these units are not “inherently joint,” and they have no experience planning at the operational level. Therefore, they require joint augmentation from sources such as USSOCOM active and/or reserve staff; and this augmentation is most often required throughout the contingency operation. They also require on-the-job, “crash-course” training on joint doctrine and SO JTTP.⁹ Likewise, these units do not have access to or training on the C4 systems required to conduct joint operations, such as the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES). For example, during OEF, communications augmentation to form the JSOTF was identified as a shortfall. The joint communications support element and the 112th Signal Battalion, both with limited assets, combined to provide the necessary joint communications support for this operation.¹⁰ Most importantly however, the single-Service SOF unit’s operations tempo (OPTEMPO) pro-

hibits the headquarters staff from obtaining training on joint doctrine and SO JTTPs. There literally is not enough time for this training (Williams: interview). According to a 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on SOF, officials at the unified commands stated “the combatant commanders consider SOF the force of choice for many diverse combat and peacetime missions.” “And during an average week, between 2,000 and 3,000 SOF personnel were deployed on 150 missions in 60 to 70 countries”.¹¹

Ultimately, what typically suffers in the single-Service approach to establishing a JSOTF is planning at the operational level of war. Staffs not used to working as joint at this level will be hampered by lack of familiarity with processes, formats, and systems that drive contingency planning for the theater commander. If they are additionally not well-acquainted with the theater itself, in terms of geography and threat, the “spin-up” time is simply time lost that can never be recovered. The advantages of designating a particular organization a JSOTF must clearly outweigh such risks. Additionally, what cannot be underestimated in the designation of the JSOTF is the commander. Do his rank, knowledge, and experience match the needs of the mission given to the JSOTF? Keep in mind once designated, the JSOTF commander, along with the staff, must participate in crisis action planning procedures *concurrently* with the complex task of establishing the JSOTF.¹²

Joint Publication 3-05 states the theater SOC commander’s principal roles are to advise the theater commander and other component commanders on the proper use of SOF, exercise operational control over joint SOF in the theater, and fill the position of JFSOCC when designated by the joint force commander.¹³ Additionally, the JFSOCC *usually* serves as the commander of the JSOTF. But, fulfilling his role as principle advisor to the theater combatant commander is problematic if the SOC commander deploys forward with a JTF to assume command of the JSOTF and the combatant commander stays in the rear. This is what is implied by the term “*usually*,” as highlighted above. We previously noted PACOM developed JTF 510 as its standard response to a crisis. The core of JTF 510 staff was the SOCPAC staff led by the Pacific JFSOCC. As a result, additional support from the PACOM staff, reservists, or U.S. based personnel augmented the JTF as required. Each of the theater SO components further complemented the JTF assigned forces available to the commander. During deployment,

the SOC’s responsibility to support the combatant commander was maintained by leaving a small staff augmented with reservists. This formula has been continuously successful through as many as five exercises and/or operations per year.¹⁴

Several key advantages were identified in PACOM’s implementation of JTF 510 during Operation BEVELLED EDGE:

- A SO experienced flag officer commanded the JTF
- The JFSOCC’s close working relationship with the combatant commander elicited immediate support with logistics, communications, and equipment
- SOCPAC planners were experienced, well-trained, and deployed as a team (detailed operations were planned en route to the forward operating base located in Thailand)
- The close relationship between many of the SOC staff members and Thai senior officers quickly garnered permission to use facilities and equipment for training and rehearsals¹⁵

Where the mission requirements exceed the capabilities of the SOC, the core of the JSOTF can, and should, continue to capitalize on the inherent qualities of the SOC. SOCPAC’s approach to Operation BEVELLED EDGE stands as a case in point. That is, the core of the JSOTF should be comprised of as large a cross section of the SOC as possible. This can be referred to as “split-based” operations. In many instances where the role of the SOC commander, as principle advisor to the combatant commander (CC), competes with or negates his ability to act as the JSOTF commander, such “split-based” operations can facilitate his primary responsibilities as the JFSOCC. The SOC commander is able to remain co-located with the CC as his advisor, or deploy with the JSOTF/JTF while the SOC (minus), perhaps under the deputy SOC commander, fulfills the SOC commander’s other functions, as was evidenced during BEVELLED EDGE. The advantages identified here would likely not be seen if the JSOTF were formed from a single service or out-of-theater headquarters. The success of JTF 510 was a direct result of the SOC forming the core of the task force.

Key Challenges to SOC-led JSOTFs

Still, there are basic challenges to utilizing theater SOC’s for forming the core of JSOTFs. The first stems from the theater SOC’s requirement to exercise C2 of all SOF within the geographic theater. The loss of key

SOC staff personnel to the establishment of a JSOTF may impact the SOC's planning and execution of other missions or operations on-going within the theater.¹⁶ The second challenge is directly related to the SOC commander's role as advisor to the theater combatant commander: an advisory role that, depending on OPTEMPO, cannot be fulfilled without a robust planning staff.¹⁷ Although almost always manned at 100 percent, the theater SOC's are hostage to the needs of the theater. That is, during crises and/or war, the OPTEMPO demands placed on the SOC staff are normally out of proportion to its modest size. As a result, the SOC usually cannot perform all primary functions appropriately. A key recommendation from lessons learned during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM (DS/DS), was to increase the manning authorizations at the theater SOC. Observers noted the SOC simply did not have sufficient manning to complete the functions required during the contingency—although they were assigned at 100 percent of authorized positions (SOCCENT J3). Obviously, during DS/DS a more robust approach was required than even “split-based” operations could address. This brings us back full circle to the doctrinal admonishment that “*When C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the SOC, a JSOTF is established.*” However, in doing so, we forfeit the advantages the SOC provides unless it actually becomes the JSOTF nucleus.

Permanent Training and Augmenting Cells for JSOTFs: The SOCJFCOM Model

The JSOTF is the crucible around which ultimate success, or failure, of SO during operations is determined. If the SOC cannot amply supply the requisite number of personnel, a method to augment the JSOTF with experienced, theater-centric, joint SO planners must exist. USSOCOM and SOCJFCOM have trained resources and the ability to augment the SOF Service headquarters or use deployable joint task force augmentation cells (DJTFACs) to form the core of the JSOTF. For Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, SOCJFCOM assisted a Service-led JSOTF for approximately 2 to 3 months, guiding each key component by the hand. Such intervention to assist the JSOTF was necessary due to the fact that the initial structure was not built around SOCCENT, and lacked a true built-in joint SO planning staff and the requisite experience. In essence, SOCJFCOM established a deployable joint *special operations* task force augmentation cell (DJSOTFAC). This important step in the ability to

augment an inexperienced JSOTF was made possible by an initiative begun four years ago. Col Michael Findlay, writing in *Special Warfare*, Spring 2000, relates the following: “In July 1998 the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, requested that USJFCOM facilitate the USSOCOM mission of providing joint training to SOF headquarters and units. USJFCOM agreed, and now SOCJFCOM responds to training needs identified both by conventional joint force commanders and by joint SOF commanders.”¹⁸

In his article Col. Findlay underscores the focus of that training...“SOF now has a joint command focused on supporting joint training in special operations. The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, or SOCJFCOM, supports both the training of conventional joint commanders and staff in the employment of SOF, and the training of prospective commanders and staffs of joint special operations task forces, or JSOTFs.”¹⁹ SOCJFCOM soon reorganized to form a SOF joint training team, or SOF JTT, to support these training activities. Training JTF commanders to employ SOF's unique capabilities to optimum effectiveness is the primary job of the SOCJFCOM JTT. To accomplish this, the SOF JTT works hand in hand with the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) conducting upwards of 15 joint exercises a year, as well as running additional academic seminars within priorities established by the regional combatant commanders. Recognizing the criticality that the JSOTF plays in the C2 of in-theater SOF, the training “focuses on scenarios in which SOF is subordinate to a conventional JTF.” Why? Because, as Col. Findlay states “...*almost without exception*, the JFC forms a JSOTF in order to provide centralized control of SO.”²⁰ To understand that the theater SOC's were explicitly created to be the *standing organizations* around which the JSOTFs were most likely to be formed, it makes the greatest sense that the theater SOC's are at the top of the priority list to benefit from this training, as well as receive augmentation as required during crises and/or other contingencies. And indeed, the SOCJFCOM JTT has made the SOC's their top priority for training.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The data supports the premise that JSOTFs formed from theater SOC's have a higher rate of success. The critical factor is directly linked to the SOC's providing a standing joint task force *capability* for each regional command. As *standing organizations* they exist to

ensure that the full utility of SOF is realized across the continuum of military operations.²¹ They provide a clear chain of command for in-theater SOF, with the staff expertise to plan, conduct, and support joint special operations unilaterally, in conjunction with conventional forces or coalition partners. This capability comes from the composition, experience, training, and resources uniquely available to the SOC. Yet, examples also show that three primary courses of action are still frequently employed:

- (1) The theater SOC (in its entirety) is designated the JSOTF
- (2) A portion of the SOC (split-based operations) is used to comprise the nucleus of the JSOTF
- (3) Little or no use of the SOC in the JSOTF

The first, best choice, for forming a JSOTF is to use the standing theater organizations formed for that purpose, the theater SOCs. To ensure JSOTFs (i.e., with a SOC nucleus) contain the requisite skills, further development with concomitant funding to support USSOCOM and SOCJFCOM JTTs should be pursued. Support to both a SOCJFCOM and USSOCOM standing DJSOTFAC, as was initiated with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, should likewise be continued and results codified in JTT. This latter recommendation is a crucial stopgap measure that allows more time to adequately train the SOCs to fully assume their roles as JSOTFs in a JTF. Further, it additionally provides critical augmentation to an undermanned SOC, and/or provides another JSOTF nucleus for a possible near-simultaneous contingency in another theater.

The central limiting factors for not always defaulting to the theater SOC are largely issues of manning, advisory and C2 responsibilities of the JFSOCC commander (which may inhibit a robust deployment/use of the SOC as a JSOTF), and an inability to predict exactly how large a role SO will play in any given theater contingency(s). SOCJFCOM's establishment of a standing DJSOTFAC may be able to positively address some of the current inadequacies. Nevertheless, what is still required in this new age of asymmetric threats is the ability to think, plan, and fight *joint* and be able to do it rapidly. The main premise of this paper has been that with very few exceptions, the theater SOC is best suited to provide that sort of experience to a JSOTF with the least amount of time wasted getting oriented. Col. Findlay sums up the level and type of expertise required for this kind of joint SO planning and execution:

How better to succeed than by understanding your boss's concerns, priorities and perspectives? JSOTFs should know how to operate within the battle rhythm of a JTF headquarters, with its associated joint boards (e.g., the joint target coordination board and the intelligence collection synchronization board), its groups (such as the joint planning group), its centers and its cells.²²

In other words, JTFs and JSOTFs speak a particular language that can ill afford any kind of inexperience or parochialism. The theater SOCs provide the single best source of joint SO and theater experience for the JSOTF. A wise commander will advocate their use.

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Joint Forces Command Special Operations Joint Training Program

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Introduction

The Department of Defense should increase funding and resources necessary to sustain the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) current joint training program (JTP) that supports the regional combatant commander's (RCC) and special operations command (SOC), sub-unified command. This program must receive intensified command emphasis from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure warfighting readiness of RCC warfighting joint staffs, joint task forces (JTFs), and joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs). The JFCOM SOC training program must receive the requisite funding, personnel, and equipment in order to support their current training program to RCCs.

General Anthony Zinni (USMC, Ret.) and Mr. James R. Locher III, while speaking as guest speakers for Joint Forces Staff College Class 02-3I, Hofheimer Lecture Series, confirmed the need for increased joint training among the Services. General Zinni believes that the fallout in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was a lack of emphasis on joint training. Even though the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act spelled out the priority for joint training, DOD did not follow through and did not place enough emphasis on joint training. Mr. Locher, former member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and author of *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, stated that a priority for a possible Goldwater-Nichols II should be that USJFCOM receive their own separate funding line to ensure RCC's joint training initiatives can be better executed.¹

Joint Forces Command Training Program

The joint training system (JTS), initiated in 1994 by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the joint community's framework for identifying training requirements, devel-

oping training plans, executing the training, and assessing joint training events.² The current system provides adequate joint training to special operations forces (SOF) staffs – it has been in place since 1999. In 1999, Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM) and Commander, USJFCOM agreed to provide joint training and operational support to RCCs, their JTFs, and joint SOF staffs.³ Subsequent to this agreement, the SOC formed the SOF joint training team (SOF JTT) to support, (1) RCC and JTF HQ training for employment of SOF, (2) JSOTF HQ training, and (3) joint experimentation and transformation initiatives.

The training provided by the SOF JTT and the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is based on the JTS model: identify requirements, develop training plans (joint mission-essential task list (JMETL) development), execute the training, and provide assessments on warfighting training proficiency.⁴ Specifically, the training provided by the SOF JTT is centered on a three-phase approach: (1) Phase 1 is a self-taught method using materials distributed via CD-ROM; (2) Phase 2 is a JSOTF course taught at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) located at Hurlburt Field, Florida; and (3) Phase 3 training is provided by a SOC JTT to theater commanders and SOCs, which is tailored to meet the specific needs of the command.

SOF JTT training for RCC and JTF HQ includes seminars on the integration of SOF and crisis management. The JTT also provides RCC and JTF HQ support through exercise training and analysis. Feedback is provided via after-action reviews.

In addition to providing support to exercise design, planning, and preparation, the SOF JTT training for JSOTFs is provided via a series of academic training seminars, staff exercises, after-action reviews, and through senior mentors who facilitate the training exercises. Training seminars focus primarily on intelligence, operations, plans, personnel, logistics, information management, and crisis management. If the JSOTF identifies special training requirements, the JTT can develop a training program and tailor the scope of effort to specifically address the warfighting shortfalls of the JSOTF. No other training support unit—joint or Service specific—can perform this critical task. This is significant since each JSOTF HQ is uniquely manned and mission focused on regionally specific tasks, functions, command and control (C2) requirements, coalition considerations, and political limitations imposed by the country in which they

will operate. Only the JSOTF HQ can identify these specific training parameters, and only in dialogue with a SOC JTT can a regionally specific and tailored training support program be developed to meet their warfighting requirements.

Additional training can be provided through executive-level seminars. For example, such training was provided by a mobile training team (MTT) while the units were on deployment in Afghanistan. Task Force (TF) DAGGER and TF K-BAR personnel were provided with information management and joint intelligence training. The training proved invaluable, and although it is difficult to measure in concrete terms, was essential and probably saved lives.

Shortfalls

Arguably, the SOC JTT program has increased the warfighting proficiency and joint training levels of SOC and JSOTF staffs, but significant shortcomings and challenges remain to maximize the staffs' training. Challenges arise from the decision on how to provide C2 of SOF forces during a crisis. Specifically, the decision on which staffs will act as JSOTFs will impact the number of training events the SOC JTT will need to perform. The decision to form an "ad hoc" JSOTF, assigning a slice of the manpower limited SOC HQ to act as the JSOTF, or assigning a Service O-6 level command, augmented with joint officers to perform the duties of JSOTF, each has unique operational and training implications. Additionally, SOF JTT manpower shortfalls severely limit the frequency, scope, and number of exercise and "hands on" staff training events that can be performed in a given period.

Before determining if JSOTF HQ staffs are adequately trained, the decision on how the JSOTF is to be optimally organized must be addressed. Historically, the formation of JSOTF HQ has fallen into the following categories: (1) form the JSOTF from a portion of the theater SOC (TSOC) HQ, (2) form a JSOTF from a Service O-6 level command, and (3) form a completely "ad hoc" JSOTF.

(1) Forming the JSOTF with slice elements of the SOC HQ has serious implications in long-term crisis response. The SOC commander has limited manpower, and SOC ability to act as the RCC's special operations advisor and to maintain a theatre wide focus is diminished. Augmenting the SOC HQ to per-

form the JSOTF role reduces the manpower strain, but presents training challenges to increase proficiency. Due to many operational requirements, SOC's have difficulty in maintaining their staff proficiency in performing as a JSOTF HQ.

(2) While JSOTF HQ have been formed from Service O-6 level units with some success during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), significant training issues must be resolved to make this a viable option in the future. Service O-6 level commands lack JMETL elements designed to enhance the commands JSOTF HQ staff functions.

During OEF, several O-6 level commands, Naval Special Warfare Group One (TF K-BAR), 5th Special Forces Group (TF DAGGER), and a unit out of Air Force SOC (JSOTF South), were the core of JSOTFs, but none of these commands had previous training to be a JSOTF.⁵ While the SOC JTT played a vital role in preparing these staffs to act as JSOTFs, they were misused during OEF. Training was provided in theater to JSOTF staffs. Due to the time critical nature of operations, the staffs lacked the ability to act as the JSOTF effectively.

As a result, several SOCJFCOM personnel were required to fill critical positions during OEF: joint operations center (JOC) chief and deputy joint planning group (JPG) director, instead of performing their critical training facilitator roles. Had the tasked O-6 level command staff received JSOTF training earlier, the SOC JTT would not have been tied up performing staff functions for an extended period of time. The limited SOC JTT manpower resources would have been more efficiently used to provide refresher training for a shorter duration and then move on to training other staffs. "Training of staffs must precede conflict otherwise Joint Training Team members will essentially assume staff roles vice provide training."⁶

(3) Forming a completely "ad hoc JSOTF with personnel outside the SOC is the least desirable option due to the lack of proficiency, non-existent standard operating procedures (SOP) and team cohesion."⁷ Clearly, the SOC JTT has no ability to provide pre-conflict training for "ad hoc" JSOTFs as there is no way to identify potential trainees.

The manpower and resource levels of the SOC JTT are currently unable to meet training demands. The

shortfall will become more critical as training demands increase. All SOCs are responsible for operating as a JSOTF HQ and require frequent SOC JTT training.⁸ Given the recent trend to form JSOTF staffs from Service O-6 level commands, the training audience for the SOC JTT has expanded greatly. The already manpower constrained SOC JTT will have a far greater demand for training services.

“These commands are not traditionally manned, equipped, nor trained to perform as a JSOTF HQ. Additional resources and training opportunities are required for these commands to reach a minimum level of proficiency. The required resource enhancements and training standards have not yet been determined. However, based on current practice, it is reasonable to expect these commands to be designated as JSOTFs in the future.”⁹

The challenge for the SOC JTT is to provide these staffs effective training to practice perishable skills on a regular basis. The training must be conducted frequently enough to maintain warfighting ready status. Normal rotation of key staff officers also necessitates frequent training to establish proficiency in newly reporting personnel. “On average the JFCOM SOTF JTT will provide training to targeted staffs once every other year. Ideally, training would be conducted on at least a yearly basis, however, current SOC JFCOM manning levels and operations tempo prevents the JTT from maintaining training levels at desired proficiency levels.”¹⁰ Given the potential increase in the number of staffs requiring training in the future, the SOC JTT’s ability to maintain current training frequency of training every other year will be unobtainable without increasing manpower and resources. The ability to maintain JSOTF staff proficiency at the “warfighting ready” level, given current resource levels of the JFCOM SOC JTT, is in serious jeopardy.

Garrison Experience vs. Operational Experience

RCC and SOC staffs must be afforded the opportunity to train to their wartime mission as prescribed in their joint mission essential task (JMET). Because there are currently no standing joint task forces for the regional commands, RCC and SOC staffs must receive their preparedness through other means. RCC’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) training exercises are an excellent vehicle in which joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can be practiced and established.

JFCOM’S JTTs are the perfect choice to facilitate RCC’s warfighting staffs, JTFs, and JSOTFs to meet their wartime mission. To properly function as a member of JTF or JSOTF staff prior to war requires operational experience. Operational experience comes through training, or actual involvement in contingencies or wartime missions. RCC and SOC staff jobs require experience in two categories: (1) garrison and (2) wartime mission. In order to perform the latter, RCC and SOC staffs must conduct training that addresses JMETs and joint TTPs that address all phases of operational missions: pre-deployment, deployment, employment, transition, and redeployment. Moreover, joint warfighting staffs must conduct training in accordance with (IAW) the JTF HQ master training guide (MTG) to better prepare JTFs and JSOTFs for their operational mission. Training should be conducted regionally in order to obtain situational awareness and establish relations in one’s area of operation (AOR).

Just because an assigned Service member knows how to perform part (A), garrison responsibilities of his job, doesn’t necessarily mean he can execute part (B), wartime responsibilities, of his assigned duties. Garrison functions and responsibilities vary from wartime functions and responsibilities. While some responsibilities may be carried out in war, conversely jobs and boards such as joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs), joint planning groups (JPGs), joint operation centers (JOCs), future planning cells, fusion cells, and joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) are in most part, not executed and trained to in a garrison environment. In garrison, we fill other collateral duties and responsibilities: physical security, safety, special action officer, etc. The set up, execution, and maintenance of these various cells requires extensive training and hands on experience, which in return would produce operational experience. During OEF, there were numerous personnel initially untrained in the above listed functions and boards.¹¹ Joint personnel and organizations must train in peacetime on the skills that will make them proficient in areas required of them during wartime. Joint training teams are an excellent tool for RCCs to help prepare their staffs for operations while ensuring readiness.

Mechanism to Insure Readiness for RCC JTFs and JSOTFs

DOD Directive 7730.65, DOD Readiness Reporting System, dated 3 June 02, is the current policy govern-

ing readiness for military forces. In order for RCC warfighting staffs to meet readiness requirements, as stated earlier, they must train. There should be a mechanism in place to help RCCs and SOCJs prepare their staffs to meet wartime requirements. The Army currently has training programs in place for tactical commanders to train their forces and staffs to mission essential task lists (METLs). These existing programs help units and staffs at the division level and below maintain unit readiness. These programs include the battle command training program (BCTP) for division, corps, and Service component HQ, and the combat training centers (CTCs) for brigade level and below training. Other programs include the joint readiness training center (JRTC), located in FT Polk, Louisiana, which trains 0-5 level commands (battalions) and sometimes brigades. This program helps commanders train their units to METL standards as well as assess their readiness. The Department of the Army also sponsors two great programs located in FT Leavenworth, Kansas, to train brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs to wartime METLs. Finally, the National Training Center (NTC) allows brigade maneuver units and staffs to receive training and assessment through an external evaluation.

All of the aforementioned programs provide a tool and a forum by which commanders and their staffs can train to meet wartime requirements. These programs help commanders assess where their units really stand in terms of unit readiness. RCCs should be provided a viable program that would afford them the same opportunity to prepare their joint warfighter staffs, JTFs, and JSOTFs for their wartime mission. In contrast, JFCOM's JTTs should serve as subject matter experts (SMEs) in joint warfighting staff training for RCCs and SOCJs, providing annual training and selective external evaluations. At end state, RCCs and SOCJs warfighting staffs, JTFs, and JSOTFs will be better prepared to meet the requirements in DOD Directive 7730.65.

Conclusion

JFCOM's current SOC JTT program provides an excellent program of instruction to better assist RCCs prepare their warfighting staffs, JTFs, and JSOTFs for their wartime mission. As the combat training centers act as doctrinal SMEs for tactical commanders performance oriented unit training, so too can the JTT cadre act as a doctrinal SME for RCCs. The JTT acts as the joint warfighting staff doctrine SME to assist command-

ers in conducting performance oriented training IAW JTF HQ MTG. USJFCOM must be properly staffed to fulfill this requirement. Twenty-three personnel are required in order to properly man a full team for SOCJFCOMs JTT, and an increased budget would allow them to properly support each RCC. This program should receive strong backing and emphasis from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure readiness of theater RCC warfighting joint staffs, JTFs, and JSOTFs. This program should be properly resourced to insure that requisite number of personnel stated above and equipment are made available for JFCOM to support this initiative. Doing this would allow the Joint Warfighting Center and the JTTs to increase the frequency of training visits to each theater to once a year at a minimum. This will offset the constant personnel turn over, resulting in a higher level of readiness—band of excellence.

The support of this initiative will also preclude JFCOM personnel from filling critical billet assignments on RCC joint manning documents during wartime. The support of this program will result in trained warfighting staffs capable of meeting their wartime JMETL standards. They in return can act as a well-trained nucleus for augmentees to center on during contingencies and war.

Footnotes:

1. Joint Forces Staff College Hofheimer Lecture Series.
2. *The Joint Training System: A Primer for Senior Leaders*. Joint Staff: Washington, D.C. 1998.
3. *Joint Special Operations Insights*, June 2002, p1.
4. Ibid, p12
5. Ibid, p11
6. Interview with LCOL Pulsfer, USAF, SOC JFCOM, Norfolk Va, 13 Aug 2002.
7. *Joint Special Operations Insights*, June 2002, p3.
- 8 Ibid, p 11.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 LTCOL Pulsfer, USAF, SOC JFCOM. Interview at SOCJFCOM, 13 Aug 2002.
- 11 MAJ Moore served as staff member of the Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command during OEF.

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1. Joint Forces Staff College Hofheimer Lecture Series.
2. *The Joint Training System: A Primer for Senior Leaders*. Joint Staff: Washington, D.C. 1998.
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4. *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, Joint Spe-

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5. DoD Directive 7730.65, *Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*, Washington DC, 3 June 2002.

6. Interview with LCOL Pulsfer, USAF, SOC JFCOM, Norfolk Va, 13 Aug 2002.

7. Lecture by COL Mike Findlay, CDR SOCJFCOM, Joint Forces Staff College, 14 August, 2002.

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