Attacker Detection Game in Wireless Networks with Channel Uncertainty
Abstract
Identification and isolation of attackers in a distributed system is a challenging problem. This problem is even more aggravated in a wireless network because the unreliable channel makes the actions of the users (nodes) hidden from each other. Therefore, legitimate users can only construct a belief about a potential attacker through monitoring and observation. In this paper, we use game theory to study the interactions between regular and attacker nodes in a wireless network. We model the attacker node detection process as a Bayesian game with imperfect information and show that a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is attainable. Further, we show how an attacker node can construct a nested belief system to predict the belief held by a regular node. By employing the nested belief system, a Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is reached and the equilibrium postpones the detection of the attacker node. Simulation results and their discussions are provided to illustrate the properties of the derived equilibria.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA527714
Entities
People
- Kevin Kwiat
- Mainak Chatterjee
- Wenjing Wang
Organizations
- Air Force Research Laboratory