

Shaping the Mission, Role, and Structure of the United States Marine Corps 1990-2010 (Fenton)

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SHAPING THE MISSION, ROLE, AND STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1991–2010

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SHAPING THE MISSION, ROLE, AND STRUCTURE
OF THE
UNITED STATES MARINES
1991 - 2010

The crash and fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is often cited as one of the most symbolic testimonies that earmarks the end to the forty year old Cold War between the East and the West. Concurrently, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing removal of Soviet troops and arms from Eastern Europe have also dramatized this significant, yet drastic change. To this end the nations of the world are witnessing a metamorphosis of world change, particularly watching with guarded interest those changes affecting the infrastructure of the Soviet Union--the cornerstone nation of the Eastern bloc of the bi-polar world. The geostrategic implications of this new world state suggest that the Cold War is over, and infer an emergence of a multi-polar world with an increased potential for regional instability and conflict. Sensitive to this newly emerging world order, President Bush has suggested that our Nation's defensive policy for the future will embrace these changes:

"What we require now is a defensive policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing--without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War."¹

In the face of competing fiscal demands and a remaining, challenging, and dangerous world, the Bush administration has provided

¹ Remarks of President Bush in an address given in Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990.
a conceptual framework for our future forces:

"...[our new defense strategy] must guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to defend our interests and execute our global responsibilities. It must also guide our restructuring so that our forces are appropriate to the challenges and opportunities of a new era--able to ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward Presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, and to retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should this ever be needed."²
(Author' s emphasis)

Implied in this conceptual framework is that the Cold War is no longer the national point of reference for benchmarking the United States military arm, more specifically the services' missions, roles, functions, size and structures. This challenge of the 1990's has no precedence in history. Yet, already the U.S. Navy has initiated change within the context of this new world order by lessening the size of the navy from 600 to 450 ships. Generally stated, the Navy had structured as its primary arm a naval team consisting of two forces built around a 600 ship fleet: the carrier task force and the nuclear submarine force to counter the Soviet threat. The naval role-- containment of Soviet naval forces, capability for offensive nuclear strike, and global peacetime deployment-- had fit neatly into the twentieth century national defense paradigm of "defense of the free world". Today, the navy has begun reducing the size of the fleet to 450 ships. For the Marine Corps, the emphasis had been on amphibious warfare. Up through the mid-1980's, this emphasis on the amphibious mission,

² Draft White House publication, The National Security Strategy of the United States 1991, not dated.

which stemmed from a variety of military, political, and institu-

tional factors, had shaped the Marine Corps into a distinctively tailored "light" infantry force-- a force that was made readily deployable and adaptable to heliborne and amphibious ship operations only by a lack of armored fighting vehicles and heavy weapons.³ The Marines were essentially a very specialized force capable of forced entry from the sea. Responding to worldly events, the Marine Corps began during the mid-80's to reshape its force structure and expand its capability. The Marine Corps has since proclaimed to be a force expeditionary in nature, a force capable of much more than amphibious operations. Now the defense paradigm is shifting to a theme of stability. Accordingly, both the Navy and the Marines, in concert with each of the other armed services, have begun planning to tailor their roles, missions, functions, and structures to fit within this new paradigm of stability.

What must the Marine Corps do to prepare for the future? How does the Marine Corps best shape itself for the future in a world of uncertainty? The approach must provide a framework for issues that are germane in determining the nature of the Marine Corps for the next twenty years. From the top to the bottom (top•down), the approach must first encompass an understanding of the United States national interests. An understanding of these interests should be

³ Martin Binkin's book, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?, introduces this subject in his Introduction chapter.

followed by a look at the indicators of change ongoing about the

world and the nation today, and how these may affect our national interests. Given these dynamics, the spectrum of conflict is projected that might pose a threat to these interests. The approach then must extract the enduring principles and strengths of today's formulated strategy and allow it to serve as a framework for future strategy, with particular emphasis on the strengths of today's Marine Corps that will serve as the benchmark for shaping tomorrow's Corps. Lessons learned from past history and the most recent Gulf War must be respected. The final step is then to identify the center(s)of gravity within this new framework that most affect the shaping of the Corps. It is here at the center(s)of gravity that the Marine Corps should focus its energy and resources, honing an institutional ethos that serves the military arm as the tip of the spear. Throughout the approach, the "naval expeditionary force" theme remains the thread of continuity.

ENDURING NATIONAL INTERESTS⁴

The United States remains committed to global stability. Committed to her own survival, self-determination and autonomy, she has long had concrete interests in areas abroad that have had geopolitical significance or have had close historical ties to the United States; in areas that have provided the nation with crucial raw materials; or in areas that have had substantial American investments or markets for American goods. These macro interests are translated into key elements of a national security strategy:

- The **survival of the United States** as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure;
- A **healthy and growing U.S. economy** to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and **resources for national endeavors** at home and abroad;
- A **stable and secure world**, one where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish; and
- **Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies** and friendly nations.

Guidance from the President

Within the context of each of these key elements of the national security strategy, President Bush has enjoined a number of national objectives to be maintained, a number of which call upon the military element of power to foster conditions to promote stability. These specific objectives fall within the purview of

⁴ This section covering Enduring National Interests is taken in part from a draft copy of the White House publication, National Security Strategy 1991, not yet published.

the Department of Defense⁵:

- Survival of the United States

- deter any aggression that could threaten the U.S. and its allies, and should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack;
- deal effectively with threats to the security of the U.S. short of armed conflict, to include international terrorism;
- improve strategic stability;
- foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism;
- prevent the transfer of military critical technologies, especially NBC and associated hi-tech weapons;
- reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. by combatting traffickers abroad;

- U.S. Economy

- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space;

- Stable and Secure World

- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illegal drug trafficking;
- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance

The nature of these objectives is such that the United States remains the only state whose political, economic, cultural and

⁵ The objectives cited here, military in nature, are but a small subset of those outlined in the draft copy, The National Security Strategy 1991. Other objectives, not listed here, called for by the President are clearly economic, diplomatic, or political in nature.

military reach is truly global, and thus, as a maritime nation, she must remain globally committed to the fulfillment of these

objectives.

INDICATORS OF CHANGE-- THE WORLD

The most significant change in the world today has been the

disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. The focus typically had been one of containment of the Soviet bloc nations and the spread of communism. With this focus was a sense of certainty, comfortably associated with a bi-polar world power structure and a neatly defined threat. Accordingly, the U.S. Armed Forces were structured and poised to fight globally against the single Soviet threat. Yet with the weakening of her primary accepted enemy, the United States ironically finds before her now the potential for numerous regional threats. Key to this ominous change is that the United States must remain globally committed. Once able to focus primarily on a single adversary, now the United States must be responsive to any number of regional powers that threaten our national interests. Clearly, international turmoil, aggression, and conflict are not things of the past. Drives for regional hegemony, resurgent nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug trafficking, and terrorism poise new challenges to world peace, order, and stability as the bi-polar world yields to a multi-polar one. Global interests, global stability, and global commitment typically characterize why the United States remains a maritime nation. One goal remains steadfast for the Navy and Marine Corps team-- The Naval Expeditionary Force: to maintain maritime superiority well into the 21st century. As this nation moves into this new century, the comfort gained by the soothing of East-West relations is offset by the world disorder abound!

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

General War, the highest of three levels of conflict (low,

mid, and high-intensity conflict), typically encompasses an attitude of total war, and is often described in terms of nationally dedicated, full mobilization and is cited as the most-likely case for the use of nuclear arms. To this end, as long as nuclear weapons threaten or can threaten the destruction of the United States, the U.S. Armed Forces must maintain strategic forces capable of countering this threat. The most notable nuclear, general-war threat against the United States through the latter half of the 20th century was of course the Soviet Union. Today, the accepted unclassified figure for the number of countries with or with a near-term nuclear arm capability, or with a strong, suspected nuclear interest is about thirteen, not all of which are unfriendly towards the United States.

<u>EUROPE</u>	<u>AFRICA</u>	<u>MIDDLE EAST</u>	<u>ASIA</u>
SOVIET UNION*	LIBYA	INDIA*	PRC (CHINA)*
FRANCE*	S. AFRICA	PAKISTAN	N. KOREA
GREAT BRITAIN*		ISRAEL	
	IRAN		
	IRAQ		
* Demonstrated nuclear capability			

Nuclear-Oriented Countries
Figure 1

Although the threat of general war may have recently ebbed, the

proliferation of nuclear arms requires the U.S. Armed Forces to be keenly adept to counter this threat from other nations other than

the Soviet Union.

However, with the receding threat of global war, the United States may now concentrate its planning effort at the low to mid-area of the spectrum where conflict has historically occurred and the U.S. Navy and Marine forces have responded. In the new era of stability, the United States must enhance its capabilities for resolving multiple, unrelated crises. Regionally, three areas about the world have the potential for armed conflict at a mid-intensity level. Each of these areas can be considered volatile, each having the potential to escalate from aggravated demonstrations and riots into regional conflict. The armies mustered in these parts of the world have clearly the requisite arms to initiate and sustain a mid-intensity conflict:

- Eastern Europe: SOVIET UNION
 - political strife
 - economic depression
 - ethnic discord
- Southwest Asia: ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT, IRAN, and IRAQ⁶
 - control of access of major waterways
 - fundamental differences
 - border disputes
 - water
 - oil

⁶ The extent to which Iraq will be readily able to rearm to its pre-gulf war structure remains to be seen.

- Korean Peninsula: CHINA, NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA
 - economic depression
 - political strife

- ideological differences

Common to each of these areas are the time-distant factors associated with force projection. None of these areas are in the same hemisphere as the United States. Yet, the United States remains committed to the ensured stability of each of these regions. Because stability within each of these separate and discrete regions is vital to U.S. interests, yet each has been earmarked as a theater for mid-intensity conflict, the U.S. armed forces must remain capable of fighting the conventional war.

In the late 1980's, the Marine Corps was sensitive to the subtle world changes and focused a study on Third World nations and the threat. Concerning low intensity conflict, the Marine Corps published in March 1990 an unclassified report overviewing the instability in the Third World that could conceivably require military intervention in an expeditionary form.⁷ The report claimed that approximately one fourth of the world's nation were involved in armed conflict in 1989. Most of these nations are in the Third World. Thirty two countries were identified which involved countries of potential interest to expeditionary forces. (This potent-

⁷ See-- U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Study 1-89. Overview of Planning and Programming Factors For Expeditionary Operations in the Third World, Marine Corps Intelligence Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico Virginia 22134, March 1990.

ial interest is known as the expeditionary environment.) These conflicts were further categorized as 13 insurgencies, 10 regional conflicts, 4 drug-related conflicts, 3 civil wars, and 2 conflicts

involving government instability and repression.⁸ The conflict locations are depicted in figure 2.

The Third World threat can characteristically be described as significantly different from the relatively static threat posed by the nuclear and conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the now defunct Warsaw Pact. The nature of the "Emerging Threat", depicted in figure 3, is seen in terms of nontraditional challenges-- challenges that will require rapid crisis-action planning and forces expeditionary in nature. Drugs, Terrorism, and Gray Arms and Technology Transfer are the catalysts that precipitate the instability of the Third World.

Low-Intensity Conflict: The Drug Threat⁹

The drug threat to the United States exist both in the expeditionary environment and in other countries outside this environment. There are fifteen high threat drug-trafficking countries involved in drug production, processing, and transport, and thirty two mid-threat drug-trafficking countries serving as supporting

⁸ Ibid, U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Intel Study 1-89. No page numbers in report.

⁹ Ibid. The following sections on Drugs, Terrorism, and Technology Transfer are, in part, paraphrased from corresponding segments from the original source.

CONFLICT LOCATIONS				
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	MIDDLE EAST	AFRICA	ASIA	EUROPE
Columbia	Iran	Angola	Afghanistan	Poland
El Salvador	Iraq	Chad	Burma	Turkey &
Guatemala	Israel	Libya	Cambodia	Greece
Guyana	Lebanon	Ethiopia	China	
Haiti	Oman	Mozambique	Indonesia	
Honduras	Syria	Namibia	Korea (N/S)	
Nicaragua		South Africa	Laos	
Panama		Sudan	Malaysia	
Peru		Western Sahara	Pakistan	
		Zaire	Philippines	
		Zimbabwe	Thailand	
			S.China Sea	

Conflict Locations About The World

Figure 2

<u>CONVENTIONAL THREAT</u>	<u>EMERGING THREAT</u>
• Governmental • Conventional/Nuclear • Static Orders of Battle • Linear Battle • Rules of Engagement • Known Doctrine • Strategic Warning • Known Intel Assets	• Non-Governmental • Non-Conventional • Dynamic or Random • Non-Linear Battle • No Constraints (ROE) • UnKnown or No Doctrine • No Established I&W Net • Unlimited 5th Column

Nature of the Emerging Threat

Figure 3

establishments or involved in less significant drug production. Of all of these, twenty one countries are located in the Western

Hemisphere. A brief compendium of each country is provided in Annex A.

Low-Intensity Conflict: The Terrorism Threat

The terrorism threat, like the drug threat, is found both in and outside the expeditionary environment. Some of these countries, such as Libya and Iran, wage state-sponsored terrorism which may range from conducting actual terrorist operations to providing training, encouragement, support, and safe haven to terrorist groups. Other countries are associated with organizational terrorism by small groups incapable of developing popular support for their radical positions. Examples of these groups are the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) based in Libya, the Japanese Red Army based in Japan, and the Red Brigade based in Italy. Other countries carry out terrorism through insurgencies. The Philippine Communist New People's Army, Colombia's M-19 and FARC, and Peru's Shining Path guerrillas wage this form of terrorism. In 1988 there were 856 incidents of world-wide terrorism of which 185 were anti-United States oriented. The number of anti-U.S. incidents was up 23% over the number of similar incidents in 1987. Latin America was the focus of 60% of the incidents against U.S. citizens and property. About 20% of the anti-U.S. incidents took place in Asia while about 10% were in the Middle East and 9% in Western Europe. Nearly half the incidents were bombings, while armed attacks and arson

comprised about 40% of the incidents. Annex B provides a "by-country" summary.

Low-Intensity Conflict: The Gray Arms-Technology Transfer Threat

The Gray Arms-Technology Transfer to the Third World is rampant, exceptionally complex, and difficult to police. At stake is the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and manufacturing capabilities, to include the marketing of "Blue" (allied) weapons systems which cannot be countered without adverse impact on friendly forces. The sale of arms and technology to the Third World by both Western and Communist nations typically occurs through third party transfers. "Dual use" technology, technology that serves both commercial and military uses (e.g., computer components), are not adequately defined nor restricted during early production and sale. Consequently, "dual use" technology may have been legally transferred before the restrictions were in place. Individuals and companies operating in countries such as France, Israel, and Japan serve as either sources of arms for the Third World, or as conduits through which China, North Korea, Vietnam, Iran and Iraq illegally acquire restricted U.S. technology. Annex C provides a summary of "source" countries involved in the arms/technology transfer. Figure 4 lists those countries identified as sources, transit points, and buyers in the gray arms threat.

COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN GRAY ARMS & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
--

TRANSIT POINTS	BUYERS	SOURCES
Belgium	Belgium	Afghanistan
China	Bulgaria	Algeria
Finland	China	Angola
France	Cuba	Bangladesh
India	Cyprus	Colombia
Israel	Greece	Cuba
Italy	Hong Kong	Iran
Japan	Italy	Iraq
Netherlands	Mexico	Kenya
North Korea	Netherlands	Libya
Panama	Panama	Malaysia
Scotland	Portugal	Nicaragua
Sweden	Singapore	North Korea
Turkey	South Africa	Somalia
United Kingdom	Syria	South Africa
Vietnam	Yemen	Sudan
(West) Germany		Uganda
		Vietnam
		Yemen

Figure 4

Threat Overview

Twenty five nations in the Western Hemisphere pose some form of non-conventional threat to the United States, and about 75% of these countries are involved in two or more subversive activities--drugs, terror, or gray arms trade. Cuba, Mexico and Panama are involved in all three. In the Middle East, Syria poses the most significant threat while India is the most significant in Asia. Africa is the region with the lowest overall threat. The dynamics of the low-intensity threat portend of a conflict to come. Figure 5 presents a consolidated, low-intensity threat overview.

3RD WORLD NATIONS
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
CONSOLIDATED THREAT OVERVIEW

NEGLECTIBLE

1 OF 3

2 OF 3

ALL

AFRICA	Algeria	Angola -T		
	Djibouti	Kenya -D		
	Ethiopia	S. Africa-G		
	Liberia			
	Madagascar			
	Namibia			
	Somalia			
	Sudan			
	Tunisia			
	Uganda			
	Zaire			
	Zimbabwe			
ASIA/ PACIFIC	Bangladesh	Burma -D	Afghanistan-D,G	India
	N. Guinea	Indonesia-D	N. Korea -T,G	
	S. Korea	Japan -T	Pakistan -D,T	
	S. Pacific Is.	Malaysia -D	Philippines-D,T	
	Spratly Is.	Sri Lanka-T	PRC D,G	
		Thailand -D	Vietnam T,G	
EUROPE/ MED	Denmark		Italy -T,G	Greece
	Norway			Turkey
	Yugoslavia			
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	Grenada	Argentina-D	Columbia -D,T	Cuba
	Surinam	Bolivia -D	Costa Rica -D,T	Mexico
		Brazil -D	El Salvador-D,T	Panama
		Ecuador -D	Guatemala -D,T	
		Jamaica -D	Honduras -D,T	
		Bahamas -D	Nicaragua -D,T	
		Belize -D	Peru -D,T	
		Costa Rica-D	Venezuela -D,T	
		Dom. Rep.-D		
		El Salv. -D		
		Guatemala-D		
		Haiti -D		
		Nicaragua-D		
		Paraguay -D		
MIDDLE EAST/ SOUTHWEST ASIA	Bahrain	Egypt -G	Iran -D,T	Syria
	Iraq	Libya -T	Lebanon -D,T	
	Kuwait		Yemen -T,G	
	Oman			
	Qatar			
	Saudia Arabia			
	UAE			

KEY:

D= DRUGS

T= TERROR

G= ARMS/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Figure 5

The spectrum of conflict bares a wide-breath. Clearly, there exists a low current of subversive activity about the world that either directly or indirectly, strikes at America's interests and/or her own natural survival. Whereas high-intensity and mid-intensity conflict typically have warning signs of war buildup and reactive time to respond, the low-intensity threat is in continuous motion. Yet, as the United States experienced in the mid-intensity Persian Gulf War, those wars that are fought are often those wars not foreseen. At the highest level of conflict--general war-- the Soviet weaponry that posed the single global threat just five years ago has not been destroyed or neutralized and today stands ready threatening the survival of the United States. Given the ongoing state of instability and the proliferation of arms in the world today, the United States must retain the capability to fight across the spectrum of conflict. Given the foreseeable threat, what elements from our 20th century strategy and structure provide a foundation for roles, mission, and structure for the next decade and the 21st century?

ENDURING PRINCIPLES OF TODAY'S STRATEGY

Within the framework of the National Security Strategy, the

President has outlined a future U.S. defense policy based on four major principles:

- Deterrence
- Forward Presence
- Crisis Response
- Force Reconstitution

With respect to each of these four principles, each service of the Armed Forces has a responsibility and role to fulfill. Each service has unique capabilities which suites it well for a particular requirement. In the broadest sense, these capabilities are presented in figure 6.

Deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is provided by the Navy the Air Force. The Navy maintains a fleet of forty one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSMNs) with 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) while the Air Force maintains 1,000 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in addition to a formidable strategic bomber force.¹⁰ Cruise missiles, capable of being launched from sea-based or air-frame platforms, also have a nuclear capability. Theater nuclear weapons, predominantly primed as a deterrent in the European scenario (the theater seen as the most explosive theater that could lead to general war), no longer play an important role now that the Cold War has ended. Plans to modernize existing weapons, produce a follow

¹⁰ James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's Best Interest", proceedings/Naval Review, May 1991, p.117.

<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>ARMY¹</u>
• Tactical Air*	* Sustained Combat Operations Ashore

- Military Airlift

- Strategic Air Nuclear Strike**

Navy

- Surface Combatants
- Submarine and Anti-submarine Warfare

- Carrier Strike*

- Sealift

- Strategic Sea Nuclear Strike**

Marines

- Expeditionary, combined-arm air-ground task forces capable of forced entry from the sea

* in support of sustained combat operations in joint theaters of war, the Omnibus agreement ensures unified air mission performance through integrated air operations.

** together, via ground, air and sea delivery platforms, the Air Force and the Navy provide the strategic nuclear deterrent known as the TRIAD.

UNIQUE SERVICE CAPABILITIES

Figure 6

¹ The Army also has four light divisions which are earmarked for rapid response in crisis situations.

on to the Lance, upgrade nuclear artillery, and develop tactical air-to-surface missiles are dead or in limbo. In fact, President Bush has unilaterally offered to remove nuclear artillery and commence negotiations on Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF).¹¹

Forward Presence. Each of the service deploys forward forces outside of the continental United States (CONUS). At a macro-level perspective, the Army and Air Force have forces poised in both the European and Korean theaters. The Marines have a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (-) deployed to Okinawa, Japan. The Navy maintains two active fleets, the 6th and 7th fleets, sailing the globe. All of these forces were earmarked for one of two specific contingencies, e.g., either the local regional threat or the global Soviet threat. The Army forces were primarily geared to fight conventional war, while the Marines were deployed as advanced forces for the security of forward naval bases and as sea-based expeditionary forces.¹² The force disposition designed in light of the global Soviet threat provides the framework for future potential regional conflicts with one exception-- there is no land-based presence in the Middle-East, the third regional area described as unstable enough for mid-intensity conflict. And from the sea, the carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are the cornerstones of

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Marine Expeditionary forces have also been deployed in the Atlantic and Mediterranean as part of the 6th fleet.

the Naval forward deployed forces.¹³

Crisis Response. All four services proclaim to be readily able to respond to a crisis. The Persian Gulf War was a demonstration of force projection for a mid-intensity crisis. Unique to this war was

the ability of the United States to gain time over a six month period to deploy and employ the requisite forces for sustained offensive operations. Yet, this war is only a snapshot of a particular crisis within the spectrum of conflict. On the broader spectrum, the Marine Corps, in concert with the Navy, specifically proclaims to be the force-in-readiness.¹⁴ To meet the demands of the national security strategy, the Navy-Marine team possess a wide-range of capabilities:

- Sea-based strategic forces, for continued deterrence of nuclear attack;
- Surge forces, for rapid reaction to any crisis;
- Forward-deployed expeditionary forces, for world-wide deployment; and
- Sea-based maritime prepositioned forces, for rapid force projection of Marine forces based in CONUS.

The Army also has reasonable claims as a force-in-readiness capable of responding to low-intensity conflict as demonstrated in

¹³ Garrett, H. Lawrence, Secretary of the Navy, etal., "The Way Ahead", supplement to the Marine Corps Gazette, April 1991, p. 7-8.

¹⁴ See the April 1991 supplement to the Marine Corps Gazette, "The Way Ahead", a special feature article authored by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, articulating the capabilities of the Naval-Marine team and the need for a maritime strategy.

Operation Just Cause. According to General John W. Foss, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,

"Some within the Marine Corps over the past have tried to make the case that they are the only force that can do low-intensity conflict. The Army has always done low-intensity conflict and will continue to do it.

"The Army is in fact designed to do low-intensity conflict

much better than the Marine Corps because [those conflicts] include special forces and all types of forces to support a nation, such as engineer units."¹⁵

Critics of the Army's ability to rapidly respond in low intensity conflicts quickly point out that the continental United States served as the logistics hub for Operation Just Cause, and that they Army may be less responsive over greater distances. Never-the-less, the Marine Corps touts itself as the expeditionary force-of-choice for crisis-response contingencies and is publicly hailed in well-known slogans such as "Send in the Marines".

Force Restructure. Guidance is yet forthcoming from DOD, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is considering for proposal a force restructure that encompasses a new Unified Command Plan. One draft plan much publicized in the papers and professional journals entails having only four CINCs, a paring of the present command structure from the current ten down to four-- Pacific, Atlantic, Contingency, and Strategic Forces. Concurrently, but in typical support of the proposed President's Budget, each armed

¹⁵ Statements attributed to General Foss, as quoted by Colonel John C. Scharfen USMC (Ret'd), "The U.S. Marine Corps in 1990", Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1991, p. 135.

service has now begun to consider courses of actions for paring down their own service forces. For the Marines, the guidance from the OSD is to plan a 18% force reduction. The Marines have been instructed to plan for an active duty end strength of 159,100 for FY 1997, down from the FY 1991 193,735 end strength of today.

Unofficially at issue for Marine planners is whether or not the Marine Corps can reasonably field three division-wing teams as stipulated in Title 10 without harshly cutting from the supporting establishments and other security force missions presently assigned to the Marines.

As the nation restructures it's military arm, careful and deliberate planning need to shape our future forces. Certain precepts from our present day strategy must remain imposed upon the restructure planning process.

The Strategic Forces

Strategic forces are required so long as nuclear weapons threaten the destruction of the United States. A major error in regard to shaping our strategic forces could mean the loss of our country in a single afternoon. The TRIAD upon which our nuclear deterrent is built is sound. The platforms themselves --sea, air, and landbased-- have been the subject of much debate. However, what does remain accepted is that the Air Force and the Navy are the instruments of implementation. For the Air Force, long range penetrating bombers, or air frames with stand-off nuclear/conven-

tional missiles from delivery points unknown in the sky, give depth to the TRIAD strategy . The Navy's the SSBN force provides an around-clock deployed capability that is in continuous motion, capable of striking in-close from the depths of the sea. The third leg --land-based missiles-- remains the responsibility of the Air

Force. Nuclear deterrence must remain the top Priority.

Conventional Ground Forces

Army forces are suited for large scale land campaigns. The Army's institutional ethos has historically centered on sustained combat operations ashore involving force-on-force, and occupation of territories. Three regional areas have the earmarkings for this type of conventional war. The perception that in the next decade the United States will not have to deploy large ground forces was shattered by the most recent Southwest Asia operations, Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In addition to their "heavy" forces, the Army does possess forces that are light and capable of rapid intervention, as demonstrated in Operation Just Cause, but these forces are in a minority.

In addition to the six U.S. Army divisions that fought in Southwest Asia, the U.S. Marines had two divisions employed in combat. Unique to their own ethos --in part, forward presence as part of a Naval Expeditionary Force-- the Marines provided the baseplate-in-the-sand that allowed for the follow-on force buildup. Coupling with their Maritime Prepositioning Ships, the Marines

built from a rapid-response expeditionary force into two Marine Expeditionary Forces-- one employed on land in support of sustained ground combat operations, while the other poised ready to strike from the sea. True to the public's expectations, the Marines were first to be sent in.

Conventional Air Forces

As evident in the Persian Gulf War, U.S. air forces from all four services were highly integrated and equally effective. While the Navy and Marine air performed missions in support of their own service early on during the initial deployment and buildup, once on station as part of the joint air component, all were integrated to fly missions in support of the theater commander.¹⁶ It appears that jointness worked well in the mid-intensity conflict, each air arm contributing to the total effectiveness of the air campaign.

Force restructuring, a function of budget cuts, will significantly impact on the roles and missions of each of the services. Yet Desert Storm poignantly stressed the need for the United States to maintain creditable conventional forces even in the wake of the Cold War. And though the once casual shift in focus to the low-intensity arena may be challenged with the recent reality of the mid-intensity fight of Desert Storm, it is foolish to believe that there will be any diminution in the roles and missions controversy.

¹⁶ All service air performed missions in support of not only the theater commander, but in support of the respective services, e.g., Naval air flying combat air patrols over naval vessels.

General Carl Mundy, the next Commandant of the Marine Corps, has put it this way, "There is a truism in Washington that the battle for roles and missions is indirectly proportional to the size of the budget...it's that simple."¹⁷ The Marine Corps' challenge then is to present a force structure package that fits neatly within the

context of the national security strategy and articulate it's role within the spectrum of conflict.

The Marine Corps MAGTF

The Marine Corps' Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept is the organizational force package by which Marines plan to deploy and operate in support of the national security objectives. Annex D provides an overview of the MAGTF concept. The appealing strength of the concept is that the MAGTF, in its combined-arms capability to range in size from small special purpose forces to Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), to Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), and finally to Marine Expeditionary Force (MEFs), has the flexibility to adapt to the non-conventional, dynamics of low-intensity conflict yet remaining responsive to conventional fighting indicative of mid-intensity conflict. Figure 7 depicts the operational capabilities of the Marine Corps throughout the spectrum of conflict.

¹⁷ E. Donovan, interview with Lt. Gen. Carl E. Mundy, "Marines ready to defend against an Army takeover of its Fast Attack Mission", Navy Times, 8 January 1990, p. 25.

MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR	MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN GENERAL WAR		GENERAL WAR
LIC		MIC	HIC
STABILITY OPERATIONS	LIMITED OBJ OPERATIONS	CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPNS	GENERAL WAR
Presence/Amphib Ops Humanitarian Asst. -deliberate ops -disaster relief -civic action Mobile Tng Teams Security Ops Peacekeeping Ops Spt Counter-Narc Counterinsurgency	Peacetime Con- tingency Ops -NEO -Amphib Raid -Seizure Etc. Counter Ter- rorism Ops	Amphibious Operations & Sustained Operations Ashore	

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Figure 7

In the joint arena, the power projection forces of the Navy and Marine Corps pave the way for the introduction heavy Army divisions and Air Force wings. As the responsibility for widening an operation is transferred from naval forces to Army combat forces and Air Force tactical wings, The CINC has the option of reforming

the Navy and Marine Forces into a regional reserve for use elsewhere within the campaign, or holding them for some other contingency.

Three of the principles of the National Security Strategy-- Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response-- are well-seeded in the present day force composition and mission framework. The institutional ethos of each armed service reflect unique capabilities that must not be degraded when budget cuts force the tailoring of the force structure. Unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are designed specifically to be complementary, enabling, and enhancing.¹⁸ Together, they provide the means to generate rapidly needed combat power tailored to the mission across the spectrum of conflict. Figure 8 depicts the complementary and enhancing roles of the armed services.

As planners embark on shaping the mission, role, and functions of the Marines for the next twenty years, it is important and wise to draw upon not only experiences of the most recent war but also upon the historical past when Marines had to shape their future in the shadows of the critics who proposed that the Marine Corps was no longer a viable force.

¹⁸ General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Annual Address Before the House Armed Services Committee, 21 February 1991, p.5.

LESSONS LEARNED

The Persian Gulf War was a tremendous national success both domestically and internationally. Clearly today, the United States military might remains unchallenged having employed a exceptionally well-trained, highly motivated force to wield a plethora of highly technical, lethal weapons capable of main destruction. Yet each of the services will review, study, analyze and reform procedures, functions, weapons, and doctrine to make themselves better warriors for future conflict. The Marine Corps is no exception and has tasked its Warfighting Center to assess the lessons learned from the recent conflict. While the study team is presently still in the process of making its assessment, a number of critical observations was presented to Lieutenant General E.T. Cook USMC, Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) by a subordinate general officer Brigadier General P.K. Van Riper, Deputy Director of the Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center, MCCDC. General Van Riper had seen temporary duty in the SWA war and was assigned in a liaison capacity to CENTCOM, and in his own words, "because my official duties were not demanding I was able to travel throughout the area and to see all elements of I MEF and much of the Joint structure in operation...I [was able to serve] as a 'MCCDC representative-at-large'...[which] enabled me to gain a comprehensive view of the various organizations and insights that... will be of value to MCCDC's mission."¹⁹ General Van

¹⁹ Memorandum from Brigadier General P.K. Van Riper to Lieutenant General E.T. Cook, "Observations Made During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm", dated 9 March 1991.

Riper's memo detailed numerous constructive criticisms covering a wide breath of subjects from specific weapon platforms to broader subjects such as logistics, intelligence, training and education, and organization and employment of the Marine Expeditionary Force.²⁰ While all the criticisms merit review, the latter subject of organization poses the most meaningful questions impacting on the roles, missions and force structure of the future Marine Corps. Key issues underpinning the organization and employment of the MEF as the Marine Component of the joint command structure highlight the complexity of the issue²¹:

- Is the command element of the MAGTF²², specifically the MEF, a coordinating or warfighting headquarters?
- The MEF lacks organizational structure and equipment.
- What role does the MEF command element play in the FMF structure, i.e.,
 - will the staff perform component function or war-fighting functions, or both?
 - how should it be staffed and organized?
 - From what other Marine Corps billets should wartime staffs be drawn?

In the face of force reductions, the Marine Corps is challenged

²⁰ The Persian Gulf War was the first time the Marine Corps employed a MEF size unit in combat as a MEF. Within the context of the Marine Corps doctrine, the MEF is structured for the MIC and HIC environment.

²¹ The I MEF staff, once deployed, was augmented by over 900 personnel. Its peacetime size was less than 100.

²² MAGTF: a Marine Air-Ground Task Force of various sizes-- MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit): 2,700 personnel; MEB (ME Brigade): 18,000 personnel; MEF (ME Force): 51,000 personnel.

with shaping the MAGTF structure and each of the elements, and

discerningly the command element which found itself ballooning nine-fold in size during the height of the Persian Gulf War.

The issue of restructuring is not entirely new to the Marines. In the post World War II era, the Marines struggled with two issues that impacted on the fate of the Marine Corps-- the unification fight of 1940's-50's and the nature of amphibious operations in the atomic age.²³ In 1946, the Commandant of the Marine Corps General A.A. Vandegrift appointed a special board to determine "the broad concepts and principles which the Marine Corps should follow" to enable it to conduct successful amphibious operations in the future.²⁴ In 1956, General R.M. Pate, CMC, appointed Major General R.E. Hogaboom as president of a board of officers to "conduct a thorough and comprehensive study of the Fleet Marine Force and make recommendations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the optimum organization, composition, and equipping of the FMF in order to best perform its mission".²⁵ The lessons to be gleaned from these historical boards is that the former focused its efforts on ways and means for viable force projection while that latter

²³ For a well-documented discussion, see C&SC research paper: Major Bill R. Beauchamp, USMC, "The Challenge of the Post-World War II Era: the Marine Corps, 1945-1957", dated 15 May 1989.

²⁴ Ibid., Beauchamp, p. 38. Beauchamp cites: Montross, Lynn, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 50; and Rawlins, E.W. LtCol USMC (Ret'd) Marines and Helicopters, p.12.

²⁵ Ibid., Beauchamp p. 61. Beauchamp cites: "Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board Appointment Letter", 30 April 1956.


focused on a balanced force of combined arms suited for either

general or limited war given an anticipation of what warfare would look like in the following decade.

The issues presented by General Van Riper and those challenges addressed by the special boards of yesteryear reflect similar challenges that face today's future Marine Corps planners-- only the weapons of destruction and the nature of the threat have evolved. The size and nature of the authorized force and the anticipated nature of the future threat are two major considerations that will drive the shaping of the Corps.

UNCOVERING THE CENTER OF GRAVITY

To determine those issues that most affect the shaping of the Corps, the final step is to identify the center(s) of gravity germane to the salient points of each of the topics addressed in the top•down approach:



The salient points are summarized as follows:

NATIONAL INTERESTS: The United States must remain globally committed;

WORLD CHANGES: The defense paradigm has shifted from Soviet Containment to world stability;

The geostrategic implication is such that the threat to the United States is now multi-polar vice bi-polar;

SPECTRUM OF
CONFLICT: The dynamics of world stability portend a continuous, on-going low-intensity threat with three regional volatile areas for mid-intensity conflict

Force projection is required given the world locations of potential threats to U.S. interests

ENDURING
PRINCIPLES OF
TODAY'S MILITARY: Each service has unique capabilities which suites it well for a particular requirement; institutional ethos

TODAY'S USMC: The strength of the Marine Corps is its combined-arms expeditionary MAGTFs suited and Configured for the LIC and MIC environment;

LESSONS LEARNED
FOR THE MARINES: The Marines have no doctrine for organizing the MEF command element for warfighting (which encompasses the issue of compositing);

Historical lessons from the twentieth century suggest that force protection and a balanced force are the critical elements for mission accomplishment.

The underlying theme to be gleaned from the top•down approach is that the Marines have a viable mission of protecting the United States' national interests abroad **in the projected threat environment**. However, what does this mean and how does it translate in

terms of mission, role, and structure?

THE FUTURE MARINE MISSION

The Marine mission has not changed, nor does it need to change for the future. Each of the military services are organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific combat functions. The statutory basis for these combatant functions is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and codified in Title 10, U.S. Code. The law prescribes that the Marine Corps will include:

"...not less than three combat divisions, and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps...shall perform such other duties as the President may direct."

THE MARINE ROLE

Remain the National Force-In-Readiness, expeditionary in nature and capable of forced-entry from the sea as part of an integrated strategy that necessitates combat power projection;

In layman's terms, the Marine Corps role should be that to anchor the baseplate in the sand for the introduction of follow-on

forces. This is the very nature of the traditional amphibious operation. Yet, the amphib operation can be typically described as nothing more than a means for force projection ashore. The "means"

are now evolving, as seen with the advent of Maritime Prepositioning Ships and the expanded role of airlift, as witnessed in the most recent Persian Gulf War.

But because the Marine Corps is a "light" outfit expeditionary in nature, the Corps is a limited means of conflict resolution. In the LIC environment, the United States can exert force and resolve conflict without the Nation being committed to war. Although no "hostile" action incurred, the recent Operation Sharp Edge (the evacuation of the American embassy in Monrovia, Liberia) is a good example. The Army, on the other hand, is a "heavy" outfit charged with the responsibility for prosecuting land warfare. It is a people's army. And as specified in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, only Congress (rather than the President) has the authority for declaring war as well as the responsibility for raising and supporting it.

As an air-ground team on a smaller scale, the Marine packages a force that mirrors the nation's larger services-- the Air Force and the Army. If the nation must commit to force and employ its military arm, then the build up occurs where the Marines have anchored. Simply stated, the Marine Corps' role is to be the point of the spear for the nation's military arm.

THE MARINE FORCE STRUCTURE

The mission of the Marine Corps has not changed; and the role of the Marines is to be the point of the spear of a joint combat

force. Yet the questioned unanswered then is what should the Marine's force structure be? This question is key. **The center of gravity for shaping the Corps is the nature of the total (Marine Corps) force structure.** Two critical issues address the nature of the Marine's force structure:

- Force Projection
- Authorized End Strength

Force projection

Force projection takes many forms and takes place in one of two environments: hostile or benign. And because the United States is a maritime nation and has a spanning global influence, force projection occurs over and on the sea. Marine expeditionary forces deploy by amphibious ships, strategic airlift, maritime prepositioning or a combination of all three means. Depending on the situation, the Marines exercise their flexible response by task organizing a force which maximizes the capability of each option:

- the utility, forcible entry capability, and endurance of amphibious lift;
- the capacity and sustainability of sealift; and
- the speed of aircraft.²⁶

Maritime Prepositioning and Strategic Air have worked well for the

Marines, and both have in been in the limelight in the recent Persian Gulf War. Amphibious Lift, however, has been scrutinized, criticized, and questioned by many both in and outside of the military profession. The issue is whether or not there is a valid operational need for two-division size amphibious assault. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified before Congress that,

"We believe that our operational requirement remains unchanged: enough amphibious shipping to lift two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) simultaneously. This allows us to land a Marine Expeditionary Force and still retain the flexibility to meet other worldwide operational requirements. Although budget constraints will not permit us to achieve this goal, it is the benchmark for measuring the difference between requirements and capabilities."²⁷

The Marine Corps is concerned by the potential block obsolescence of amphibious shipping. Over 50 amphibs are slated for retirement by the year 2010, the bulk of these in the first decade of the new century.²⁸ However, kinder predictions have been made-- "without an aggressive ship building program the current inventory

²⁶ Airlift really takes two forms for the Marines-- the first in the form of combat ready air-alert contingency battalions, and the second in strategic airlift to marry up with MPS.

²⁷ Op Cit., Gray, p.8-9.

²⁸ United States Marine Corps publication, Concepts and Issues 1990, section 5, page 4.

of 63 ships will shrink to 38 ships by the year 2010."²⁹ The real-world planning figure and authorized budget is for 45 ships, enough lift for the assault echelons of two and one half MEBs. (See

annex E for a notional amphibious footprint.)

The significance of the amphibious lift is that it can impact on the types of active forces deployed out on the cutting edge, and ultimately impact on the type and mix of active and reserve forces comprising the Marine Corps total force structure.

Authorized Strength

Presently, the Marines are under direction from OSD to plan to reduce their active duty strength to 159,100 personnel by 1997. Their current end strength is 193,735 for FY 1991. This cut represents an 18% force reduction. (The Total Force Structure Matrix reflecting the cuts from 1991 through 1997 is reflected in Annex F.) The concern with the OSD-directed force size is that the Marines may not be able to fulfill the three division-wing team mandated in the Title 10 code and still be able to maintain the supporting non-FMF structure and required additional duties (e.g., security forces, embassy duty, etc.). For planning purposes, the Warfighting Center considers the following figures valid:

²⁹ K. Thompson, "Is the Marine Corps the Navy's Unloved Stepchild?", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1990, p. 56.

Total End Strength

(Active and Reserve)

220,000

Capability

Fully man 3 active and 1 reserve division-wing teams and the supporting estab-

	lishments to include the required additional duties;
193,700	Maintain the status quo: man, with a mild degree of degradation, 3 active and 1 reserve division-wing teams and the supporting establishments to include the required additional duties;
177,000	Minimal acceptable number (bare bones): man, with a fair degree of degradation, 3 division-wing teams and a partial reserve division-wing team and the supporting establishments to include the required additional duties;
159,000	Restructure reserve-active forces to provide 3 division-wing teams' combat capability, with significant degradation to the supporting establishments and the required additional duties.

Several course of actions are considered when the cuts are planned.

Two broad approaches are considered:

- **Force Structure Cuts**

- Horizontal Cuts cut a % across the Corps (e.g., each division cut a predetermined number of marines from every or selected function(s))
- Vertical Cuts each division cuts a slice from its structure (e.g., each division cuts an infantry regiment)

- **Functional Cuts** cut a functional area from the structure (e.g., tanks will no longer be part of the force structure)

Force Structure cuts are designed to shrink the force evenly attempting to minimally degrade the overall capability, whereas functional cuts are designed to cut a specific capability in order to fully maintain another. When the cuts are planned, several

issues need to be resolved that affect the Total Force Structure. Specifically,

- What is the benchmark unit for measuring the extent of the cut? (See Annex F)
- Will/should the reserve force mirror-image the active force?
- What is the trade-off between Force Structure and Capability? What is the benchmark unit in terms of capability? Is there a concern for creating hollow forces?
- What input into the planning process to the various CINCs provide?³⁰

The present plan being drafted by the Warfighting Center calls for the Reserves to augment and reinforce the active forces, particularly so because together, at the 159k active duty manning level, they must provide three MEFs' (division-wing teams) combat power. The Commandant's guidance has been to maintain three MEFs' combat capability in the total force structure. The cuts being planned are Force Structure (horizontal) Cuts. In doing so, it appears that the forecasted Ground and Combat Service Support reserve structure outlined in the Total Force Requirements Development

³⁰ In pursuit of answering this question, there appeared to be no immediate relationship between what the CINCs may have asked for in their annual Initial Priority Lists (IPLs) and the force structure planning being conducted at the Warfighting Center. However, casual comment suggested an awareness that CINCPAC had asked specifically for Marine forces.

worksheet does mirror the active forces for example:³¹

SELECTED GRD CMBT ELE. <u>UNITS</u>	BASE LINE <u>MEF</u>	3 MEF <u>REQT</u>	159K ACTIVE <u>FORCE</u>	FY 97 SMCR <u>STRUC</u>	DELTA OVER <u>RQMT</u>	RESERVE PER - <u>CENTAGE</u>
Rifle co	36	108	63	27	-18	30%


Future Btry M198	20	60	40	20	0	33%
Tank co	4	12	6	3	-3	33%
AAV co	4	12	9	2	-1	18%
LAI co	4	12	12	4	4	25%
Truck co	1	3	0	0	-3	---
 <u>SELECTED CMBT SERV SPT UNITS</u>						
G/S Maint co	1	3	2.6	0.6	0.2	19%
Ammo co	1	3	2.2	1	0.2	31%
Eng Spt co (Hvy)	1	3	2.1	1	0.1	32%
Eng Spt co (Lt)	0	0	0	1	1	100%
Eng co	3	9	5.3	3	-0.7	36%
Bulk Fuel co	2	6	1.6	4	-0.4	71%
Truck co	0	0	0	1	1	100%
LS co	3	9	5	2	-2	29%

³¹ The reserve air component, the 4th Wing, is supported by roughly 50% active duty personnel due to the highly technical nature of the aircraft. Because of the unique relationship between the active and reserve component, a detail review of the mix was not pursued.


It appears from the nature of the cuts, that the Marine Corps is orienting towards the LIC environment; heavy combat items typical of MIC conventional war and a significant portion of the CSS element are being placed in the reserves. For example, in the GCE,

the number of tanks companies will be 25% less than what is needed to maintain a three division-wing team capability. (The USMC M1A1 tank purchase was drastically cut from 465 to 215 tanks.) **At a 159K manning level, the Marine Corps can no longer fulfill an initial commitment to war without calling up the reserves.** Such a readiness posture has never been acceptable to the Marine way of thinking; such a posture runs counter to the Corps' proclamation, the nation's Force-in-Readiness.

The key end strength figure of 177K appears to be the threshold at which the Marine Corps becomes dependent upon their reserve if a conventional war is to be fought. At those levels below 177K, rather than scale down our present structure to a mirror composition of two-thirds active one-third reserve, it may be worth investigating a concept of **flexible force structure**. The idea would be to investigate the merits focusing on the conventional aspects of war (active and reserve together) on a cyclic system, rather than attempting to be all from year to year. The active forces would have a LIC orientation, while the reserves have a MIC. Programmed interaction in both training and exercises between the active and the reserves ensures an integrated force, yet provides a reservoir of combat power for conventional war.



The Reserve training program may be structured accordingly:



The foregoing concept is just that-- a concept. The point is that the Marines must think about the force structure, rather than pare down the capabilities, particularly when a "capabilities" threshold is known.

Force Projection and Total Force Structure are the critical links in shaping the Force Structure of the Marines. There is no simple solution in grasping the dynamics of a Force-in-Readiness, the platforms from which the force is to be deployed, nor the structure and composition of the force itself. However, critical elements such as the threshold, the benchmark, and the need for certain types of forces are an integral part of the planning.

OSD and JCS planners cite four pillars for military planning that are the cornerstone for a strong military arm that can ensure stability:

- Force Structure
- Sustainability
- Readiness
- Modernization

In searching for the center of gravity that will have a significant impact on shaping the role, the mission, and the force structure of the Marine Corps, this paper suggests that the center of gravity is that manning level threshold crossed when the Marines must become dependent upon a reserve call-up to meet an initial commitment to arms. When that threshold is crossed, the Corps should consider alternatives to paring down capability if it is to maintain a viable fighting force. The United States' interest remain global in character; forward presence is an integral part of the national security strategy and it is key to global stability; and the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force capable of projecting combat power forward. Drawing upon history, force projection and a balanced combined-arms force are the keys shaping the Marine Corps future.

ANNEX A

DRUG TRAFFICKING THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES³²

High Threat: High-threat in drug trafficking: drug production, processing, precursor chemicals, money laundering, and transit point

Mid Threat: Mid-threat in drug trafficking: less significant drug activity.

Western Hemisphere

High Threat

- Argentina
 - Cocaine refining and transit center
 - Source of precursor chemicals
 - High potential for money laundering
- Bolivia
 - Second largest producer of coca
 - Major location of cocaine laboratories
- Brazil
 - Emerging coca producer and processor
 - Transit country for Andean traffickers
 - Producer of precursor chemicals
- Columbia
 - Third largest producer of coca
 - Center of South American cocaine trafficking
 - Largest producer of marijuana
- Ecuador
 - Fourth largest producer of coca
 - Transit point for cocaine enroute to U.S.
 - Transit center for precursor chemicals

³² Source: U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Study 1-89. Overview of Planning and Programming Factors For Expeditionary Operations in the Third World, Marine Corps Intelligence Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico Virginia 22134, March 1990.

ANNEX A

- Jamaica

- Produced about 405 metric tons of marijuana in 1988
 - Transit point for cocaine
- Mexico
 - Large source of heroin
 - Second largest source of marijuana
 - Leading transit point for cocaine
- Panama
 - Principal money laundering center
 - Transit site for cocaine and precursor chemicals
- Peru
 - World's largest cultivator of coca
 - Major supplier of past for Colombian cocaine refiners

Mid Threat

- The Bahamas
 - Major transit country for cocaine and marijuana entering the U.S.
 - Money laundering center
- Belize
 - Produced 120 metric tons of marijuana in 1988
 - Transit point for cocaine and marijuana
- Costa Rica
 - Cocaine transit country
- Cuba
 - Drug transit center and support to traffickers
- Dominican Republic
 - Staging area and refueling sit for cocaine traffickers
- El Salvador
 - Cocaine transit point
- Guatemala
 - Transit point for narcotics and precursor chemicals
- Haiti
 - Weak, unstable government unable to control drug trafficking and transshipment

ANNEX A

- Nicaragua
 - Suspected cocaine transit point
 - Government officials may be engaged in trafficking

- Paraguay
 - New government's commitment against drug trafficking is questionable
- Venezuela
 - Transit point for precursor chemicals and cocaine
 - Suspected large quantities of marijuana produced and exported to Colombia

Middle East/Southwest Asia

High Threat

- Iran
 - Produced 200-400 metric tons of opium in 1988
 - Transit point for drug flow
 - Does not cooperate in efforts against drugs

Mid Threat

- Egypt
 - Important consumer of opium, heroin, and hashish
 - Transit point for drugs intended for U.S. and European markets
- Lebanon
 - Leading producer of hashish
 - Syria conducts trafficking in the Bekaa Valley
- Syria
 - Transit point for illicit narcotics
 - Heroin refining center
 - Profits from trafficking in the Bekaa Valley

Asia/Pacific

High Threat

- Afghanistan
 - A principal but political inaccessible source of opium
 - Returning Afghan refugees may cause opium production to increase

ANNEX A

- Burma
 - World's leading producer of opium
 - Reports indicate production will increase
- Laos
 - Expanding opium production

- Government facilitates narcotics trafficking
- Pakistan
 - Expanding opium production
 - Major producer of hashish
- Thailand
 - Producer and processor of opium
 - Active trade in precursor chemicals

Mid Threat

- People's Republic of China (PRC)
 - Transshipment of Golden Triangle heroin
 - Traffic in precursor chemicals
- Hong Kong
 - Financial and money laundering center
 - Transit center for Golden Triangle heroin
- India
 - Diversion from licit opium production
 - Transit route for Pakistani and Burmese heroin
- Indonesia
 - Transit site for heroin, opium, hashish, and precursor chemicals
 - Increased trafficking in Bali
- Malaysia
 - Major heroin conversion and transit center
- Nepal
 - Transit point for heroin produced in Pakistan and the Golden Triangle
 - Gold market related to narcotics smuggling
- Philippines
 - Produces and exports marijuana
 - Transit point for heroin and cocaine
- Singapore
 - Transshipment point for Southeast Asian heroin
 - High potential for money laundering

ANNEX A

Europe

Mid Threat

- Bulgaria
 - Vital transit country for illicit drugs
- Cyprus

- Major trafficking center for Middle East drug trade
- Greece
 - Important transit point for heroin
- Turkey
 - Important route between Asian drug producers and U.S./European markets

Africa

Mid Threat

- Ivory Coast
 - Transit point for heroin, cocaine, and marijuana enroute to Europe and the U.S.
- Kenya
 - Transit point for Southwest Asian heroin
- Morocco
 - Producer of hashish and marijuana for European and African markets
 - Transit point for heroin and cocaine
- Nigeria
 - Major heroin and cocaine transit country
- Senegal
 - Expanding domestic drug problem
 - Some narcotics trafficking

ANNEX B

WORLD-WIDE TERRORISM THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES³³

High Threat: Those countries known to have a significant association with terrorism either through state-sponsored terrorism, organizational terrorism, or insurgent terrorism, or a combination of the three.

Mid Threat: Those countries known to have a serious involvement with terrorism, but to a lesser extent than those considered High Threat.

Low Threat: Those countries characterized by internal revolutionary activity and related incidents

Western Hemisphere

High Threat

- Colombia
 - Terrorist organizations include the 19th of April Movement (M-19), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and at least three others
 - Narco-terrorism is a serious threat
- Peru
 - Shining Path fanatic guerrilla movement

Mid Threat

- Cuba
 - Sponsors terrorism in Latin America and elsewhere
- Mexico
 - Provides safe haven for Salvadoran and Guatemalan terrorist groups
- Panama
 - Major transit point for terrorists
 - Banking facility for M-19 and other terrorist groups
 - Source of weapons and explosives acquired illegally

³³ Source: U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Study 1-89. Overview of Planning and Programming Factors For Expeditionary Operations in the Third World, Marine Corps Intelligence Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico Virginia 22134, March 1990.

ANNEX B

Low Threat

- Chile
 - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) presents a threat to the Government and U.S. interests
- Costa Rica
 - Terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens
- El Salvador
 - Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) operates in this country and is sponsored by Cuba, Nicaragua, USSR, and Vietnam

- French Guyana
 - Libya supports radical groups against French authority
- Guadeloupe
 - Libya supports radical groups against French authority
- Guatemala
 - Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) group conducted assassinations and sabotage
- Honduras
 - Several terrorist groups supported by Cuba and Nicaragua
- Martinique
 - Libya supports radical groups against French authority
- Nicaragua
 - Sponsor terrorist groups in Latin America
- Puerto Rico
 - Macheteros group conducts terrorist operations in support of Puerto Rican independence
- Venezuela
 - Ba dera Rja (Red Flag-GBR) terrorist group operates along the Venezuelan-Colombian Border

ANNEX B

Middle East/Southwest Asia

High Threat

- Iran
 - Supports surrogate Hizballah movement in Lebanon
 - Uses terrorism as a basic tactic against the West, to further Islamic fundamentalist revolution and to intimidate Arab states in the Persian Gulf
- Lebanon
 - Hizballah and other Middle East factions promote terrorism
- Libya
 - Notorious for state-sponsored terrorism
 - Hosts the most extreme Palestinian terrorist group, the Abu Nidal Organization
- Yemen
 - Continues to serve as a major terrorist training base
- Syria
 - Sponsors terrorism in the Middle East and Western Europe

Mid Threat

- Iraq
 - Past sponsor of Abu Nidal Organization
 - Sponsored three assassinations in 1988
 - Embraced the Palestine Liberation Organization during the 1991 Gulf War

Africa

High Threat

- Mozambique
 - National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) has killed over 100,000 civilians between 1986-1988

Mid Threat

- Angola
 - Provides a support base for African National Congress (ANC) terrorists

ANNEX B

- Zambia

- Provides a support base for ANC terrorists

Asia

High Threat

- Afghanistan
 - Ministry of State Security, WAD, has sponsored violent terrorist bombings in Pakistan
- India
 - Sikh terrorism is both domestic and international
- North Korea
 - Conducts terrorist acts against South Korea
 - Has provided training to various international groups
- Sri Lanka
 - Tamil separatist insurgents use terrorism as a wide-spread, often indiscriminate tactic

Mid Threat

- Japan
 - Chukaku-Ha and Japanese Red Army conduct domestic and international terrorism
- Pakistan
 - Training base for Afghan terrorists who attack Pakistani civilians
- Vietnam
 - Sponsor of Salvadoran terrorists

Low Threat

- Philippines
 - New People's Army (NPA) uses terrorism to intimidate the population and eliminate key government officials
 - NPA has recently attacked Americans

Europe

High Threat

- Greece
 - Revolutionary Organization 17 November attacks U.S. interests and Greek government installations

ANNEX B

- Ireland
 - Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is sponsored by Libya

- Italy
 - Red Brigades terrorist group is highly structured and attacks the U.S. and NATO

Mid Threat

- France
 - Terrorist violence continues from internal and external sources
- Spain
 - Largest number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe
- Turkey
 - Intermittent terrorist attacks by the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) and other radical groups
- Germany
 - Red Army Faction and Revolutionary Cells use terrorism against the state and U.S. interests

Low Threat

- Belgium
 - Transit site for terrorist groups

ANNEX C

GRAY ARMS & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SOURCE COUNTRIES³⁴

CHINA

- Provided arms to Cambodia's Khymer Rouge
- Equipped Afghanistan's Mujahideen guerrillas

- Sold high-technology missiles to Saudi Arabia
- Sold Silkworm missiles to Iraq

FRANCE

- Sold arms and technology to Iran, Iraq, Argentina, and other Third World countries

JAPAN

- Sold technology to the Soviets which helped them develop quieter submarine propellers

INDIA

- Builds major systems for the Soviets

ISRAEL

- Sold missile technology to China
- Sold nuclear arms technology to South Africa

NORTH KOREA

- Sold large quantities of major weapons to Iran

PANAMA

- Provided arms and explosives to Colombian terrorists

TURKEY

- Offered to sell Pakistan F-16 jet fighters belonging to General Dynamics Corporation

UNITED KINGDOM

- Sold radar equipment to Iran
- Aided Iraq in building a factory to produce nerve gas

(WEST) GERMANY

- Sold ammunition production plant to South Africa
- Aided Iraq in building a factory to produce nerve gas
- Aided Libya in building a factory to produce chemical agents

³⁴ Source: U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Study 1-89, Overview of Planning and Programming Factors For Expeditionary Operations in the Third World, Marine Corps Intelligence Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico Virginia 22134, March 1990.

ANNEX C

VIETNAM

- Cycled captured U.S. weapons into Latin America

ANNEX D

THE MARINE CORPS AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

Marine Special Purpose Force (MSPF) The smallest and most specialized MAGTF is the MSPF. Assigned very specialized missions.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) The most basic form of the standing MAGTF organizations. Remains afloat as part of an Amphibious Ready Group. A MEU is deployed simultaneously in both the Pacific and Atlantic/Mediterranean Oceans.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Normally the first MAGTF to deploy during a crisis.

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) The largest of the standard three MAGTFs, it is the source for all Marine Corps task organizations, and is normally employed in the MIC and HIC environments.

CORE UNITS OF THE MAGTF ELEMENTS

Element	MEU	MEB	MEF
ACE	Air det.	Sqdrn(+)	Wing
GCE	Inf. Bn.	Inf. Regt.	Rifle Div.
CSSE	CSS det.	BSSG	FSSG

ACE = AIR COMBAT ELEMENT

GCE = GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT

CSSE= COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT

MAGTF FINGERPRINT

	<u>PERS</u>	<u>SQ</u>	<u>CUBE</u>
MEU	2,758	62,615	136,376
MEB	18,102	597,412	2,743,160
MEF	50,956	1,828,261	8,585,977

ANNEX E

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING

<u>Amphib Ship*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Retirement Years</u>	<u>First ship commissioned</u>
LPD-1	2 ships	1996 – 1998	1962
LPH	7 ships	1996 – 2005	1961
LPD-4	11 ships	1999 – 2007	1695
LKA	5 ships	2003 – 2005	196x
LST	20 ships	2003 – 2007	1969
LSD-36	5 ships	2003 – 2009	196x
LCC	2 ships	2005 – 2007	196x
LHA	5 ships	2011 – 2015	1976
LSD-41	10 ships	2020 – 2030	1985
LHD	5 ships	2024 – 2030	1989

* Service life of a ship is estimated to be 35 years

MAGTF AMPHIB FOOTPRINT

AE = Assault Echelon

AF0E = Assault Follow-on Echelon

- Troops, vehicles, aircraft, fuel equipment and supply required to sustain the assault
- Not required to initiate the assault

NOTIONAL MEF

	PERS	SQ	CUBE
AE	33,737	827,135	1,139,652
AF0E	<u>17,219</u>	<u>1,001,126</u>	<u>7,719,325</u>
TOTAL	50,946	1,828,261	8,858,997

REQUIRED SHIPPING

LHD	10
LX	22
LSD 41 CLASS	8
LSD 41 CV	<u>15</u>

55 ships

ANNEX E**NOTIONAL MEB**

	PERS	SQ	CUBE
AE	11,758	283,792	509,988
AFOE	<u>6,345</u>	<u>313,620</u>	<u>2,233,172</u>
TOTAL	18,102	597,412	2,743,160

REQUIRED SHIPPING

LHD	4
LX	6
LSD 41 CLASS	4
LSD 41 CV	<u>6</u>

20 ships

NOTIONAL MEU

PERS	SQ	CUBE
2,758	62,615	136,376

REQUIRED SHIPPING

LHD	1
LX	1
LSD 41 CLASS	1
LSD 41 CV	<u>2</u>

5 ships

ANNEX F

MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE ANNEX

TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE MATRIX

Enclosure (1)

BASELINE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Enclosure (2)

TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE MATRIX

	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97
ACTIVE END STRENGTH	193735	188000	182200	176400	170600	164800	159100
P2T2	32218	34496	32750	32886	29788	29553	29105
NON-FMF STRUCTURE	47360	47124	46007	45547	44788	44788	42147
FMF STRUCTURE	131275	126958	123293	119429	114722	109313	108093
CADRE STRUCTURE	5375	8377	9243	10278	11973	14688	14688
TOTAL ACTIVE STRUCTURE	216228	216955	211293	208140	201271	198342	194033
RESERVE END STRENGTH	43900	40900	38900	36900	34900	34900	34900
SMCR END STRENGTH	36451	33899	32639	31329	29869	29569	26569
IMA	1400	1157	957	807	607	607	607
PTE	2401	2170	2130	2080	2050	2050	2050
NON-PRIOR SERVICE	3448	3474	2974	2474	2474	2474	2474
DRILLING HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
RESERVE TROOP LIST STRUCTURE	40612	36376	35711	34807	33389	33389	33090
TOTAL RESERVE STRUCTURE	48061	43377	41872	40478	38720	38720	38421
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	264289	260332	253265	248618	239991	237062	232454

BASELINE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

COMMAND ELEMENT		GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT		COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT		AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT	
UNITS	NUMBER	UNITS	NUMBER	UNITS	NUMBER	UNITS	NUMBER
MEF CE (NUCLEUS)	1	RIFLE CO, INF BN	36	GRD MAINT CO, MAINT BN	1	HQ MAW	1
MEF H&S	1	WPIS CO, INF BN	9	MT MAINT CO, MAINT BN	1	MHS	1
		H&S CO, INF BN	9	ENGR MAINT CO, MAINT BN	1	SSCT	1
MEB CE	2	HQ CO, INF REGT	3	ELMA CO, MAINT BN	1	HQ, MACB	1
MEU CE	2	M198 BTRY, D/S BN	9	G/S MAINT CO, MAINT BN	1	MWCS, MACB	1
		HQ BTRY, D/S BN	3	H&S CO, MAINT BN	1	MACS, MACB	1
SRI HQ	1			RATIONS FLT, SUPPLY BN	0	MATCS, MACB	1
SRI H&S CO	1	M198 BTRY, G/S (TOMED) BN	6	SUPPLY CO, SUPPLY BN	1	MASS, MACB	1
INTEL CO	1	HQ BTRY, G/S (T) BN	2	AMMO CO, SUPPLY BN	1		
SCAMP	1	-OR 1 GS (T) BN AND		MED/LOG CO, SUPPLY BN	1	H&S, LAAD BN, MACB	1
CI TEAM	4	1 MLRS BTRY-		H&S CO, SUPPLY BN	1	LAAD BTRY, LAAD BN, MACB	3
TOPOGRAPHIC FLT	1						
FIU	1	HQ BTRY, ARTILLERY REGT	1	ENGR CO, ENGR SPT BN	3	H&S, LAAM BN, MACB	1
TACTICAL DECEPTION FLT	1			ENGR SPT CO, ENGR SPT BN	1	LAAM BTRY, LAAM BN, MACB	3
INTER/TRANSLATOR UNIT	1	COMBAT ENGR CO, CEB	4	BRIDGE CO (2 FLT), ES BN	1		
		ENGR SPT CO, CEB	1	BULK FUEL CO, ENGR SPT BN	2	H&S, MWSS	1
FORCE RECON CO	1	HQ CO, COMBAT ENGR BN	1	H&S CO, ENGR SPT BN	1	MWSS (FW), MWSS	2
						MWSS (RW), MWSS	2
ANGLICD	1	TANK CO, TANK BN	4	L S EQUIP CO, LS BN	1		
		TOW CO, TANK BN	1	BEACH & TERM OPS CO, LSB	1	HQ, MAG(FW)	2
RFV CO	1	H&S CO, TANK BN	1	LANDING SPT CO, LS BN	3	MALS, MAG(FW)	2
				H&S CO, LS BN	1	VMA	3
COMM CO, COMM BN	2	ASLT AMPH CO, ASLT AMPH BN	4			VMA(AW)/VMFA(AW)	2
SPT CO, COMM BN	1	H&S CO, ASLT AMPH BN	1	G/S MOTOR TRANSP CO, MT BN	1	VMFA	6
H&S CO, COMM BN	1			D/S MOTOR TRANSP CO, MT BN	2		
		LAI CO, LAI BN	4	H&S CO, MT BN	1	HQ, MAG(RW)	2
RADIO CO, RADIO BN	2	H&S CO, LAI BN	1			MALS, MAG(RW)	2
H&S CO, RADIO BN	1			MEDICAL CO (SURG), MED BN	2	HMH(A/D)	1
		RECON CO, RECON BN	4	MEDICAL CO (CAC), MED BN	4	HMH(E)	2
CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP	1	H&S CO, RECON BN	1	H&S CO, MED BN	1	HMM	6
						HMLA	2
		DIV HQ, HQ BN, DIV	1	DENTAL CO, DENTAL BN	3		
		HQ CO, HQ BN, DIV	1	H&S CO, DENTAL BN	1	VMO	1
		MP CO, HQ BN, DIV	1			VNGR	1
		SERVICE CO, HQ BN, DIV	1	SERVICE CO, H&S BN, FSSG	1	VMAG DET	1
		COMM CO, HQ BN, DIV	1	COMM CO, H&S BN, FSSG	1		
		TRUCK CO, HQ BN, DIV	1	MP CO, H&S BN, FSSG	1		
				H&S CO, H&S BN, FSSG	1		
				BSSG HQ (NUC)	2		

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