

Is The Navy On The Right Course And Speed For The 21st Century?

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SUBJECT AREA - Logistics

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Is the Navy on the Right Course and Speed for the 21st Century?

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Thesis: In 1992 and 1994, the Navy published white papers ...*From the Sea and Forward*...*From the Sea* respectively. These papers shifted the Navy's military strategy from a focus on the Soviet threat to a littoral or regional strategy. However, littoral strategy is not the Navy's main focus. In order to have positive change, reforming and reshaping must occur in five areas; they are: doctrine, culture, training, acquisitions, and promotions and recognition.

Discussion: ...*From the Sea and Forward*...*From the Sea* are virtually meaningless documents if the Navy's focus is not genuinely in actions, hearts and minds on the littoral strategy. The two white papers merely justify roles and missions, which in turn justify the Navy's fiscal budget allocations. The change to littoral strategy represented a significant or drastic shift from the previous way of doing business. The Navy must change to support its new strategy; it requires more than publishing two white papers or buying new technology. Genuine effective change to bring into fruition maneuver warfare and the navy expeditionary force concepts mentioned in the white papers, will not occur until the Navy makes fundamental organizational changes in the five areas..

Conclusions: Although there was evidence of small amounts of change, the Navy is at a stalemate with doctrinal issues, unaware of cultural incongruence, asymmetrical or business as usual in training, acquisitions, and promotion and recognition programs.

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Soviet Union caused a drastic shift in America's military strategy; this meant the Navy and the Marine Corps had to change its traditional approaches to warfighting. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations introduced in 1992 and 1994 respectively, via white papers . . . *From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* a new strategy, vision, and direction for naval forces now and in the 21st century. ...*From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* introduced the idea of "maneuver warfare" from the sea via a "naval expeditionary force." It implies that America has a new expectation and way of war for future wars and operations. The Navy and Marine Corps have an inextricable link; and they will now and in the future operate as a holistic, joint, expeditionary synergy of power and strength, coming equipped and prepared from the sea to the littorals. These forces will utilize expeditionary and maneuver warfare as warfighting tenets. Amphibious warfare is to be reborn.

For the Navy, in a holistic sense, littoral operations were new directions even though its amphibious element had always operated in the littorals with the Marine Corps. Open ocean deep water operations with the carrier battle group (CVBG) were traditional since World War II. Change has created a dilemma in the Navy; naval expeditionary force and maneuver warfare have an amphibious character based on the precept that in the future a high percentage of military operations will be operations other than of war in the littorals. These operations may include humanitarian, peacekeeping, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and noncombat evacuations. The obvious choice is amphibious ships with embarked marines and other expeditionary elements. How easy is it to change or shift from the old deep water strategy where the CVBG was the focus of effort to the new one? Does the Navy *really* have the commitment to

do so? Since publishing the two strategic white papers, what fundamental changes, if any, have been made to implement the new littoral strategy and bring to fruition the naval expeditionary force (NEF) and operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) concepts introduced in those white papers? In 1992, Navy Commander, Terry C. Pierce published in *Proceedings* an eloquent article "Maneuver Warfare From Theory to Practice." This article stated that the Navy and Marine Corps produced culturally different officers, and it dealt with the fundamental institutional and behavioral changes required to bring maneuver warfare into fruition. The article provided the basis and framework for a deeper study on implementing and responding to military strategic change and what may be necessary to reshape and refocus thought processes and efforts on the littoral. Merely publishing two white papers will not suffice.

In narrowing the focus, the Navy is a large organization that is no different in nature and character than any large organization in the private sector. The primary scope of the investigative research was in the Navy; however, where applicable, and practicable, there were parallels and comparisons made with the Marine Corps. Is the focus of the Navy still in the deep water strategy of Soviet containment? Are the wheels of change stifled by the inertia of the status quo? Is the Navy on the right course and speed, with a focus on correct vehicles to change in order to ensure maximum warfighting effectiveness? Are ...*From the Sea* and *Forward ..From the Sea* virtually meaningless documents if the focus of the Navy is not genuine in actions, hearts and minds on the littoral and regional strategy? The two white papers merely justify roles and missions, which in turn justify the Navy's fiscal budget allocations. Genuine effective change to bring into fruition maneuver warfare and the navy expeditionary force concepts will not occur until the Navy makes fundamental organizational changes in five respects or areas. They are

doctrine, culture, training, acquisitions, and promotions and recognition. "Fiscal realities and littoral naval focus require new thinking and a commitment to undertake challenging tasks."¹ These criteria have an interconnection and they interplay. Changes in one can negatively or positively affect one or more, or all of them. Changes will require the Navy to become refocused and reshaped to bring into fruition a seamless, cogent, highly effective, capable fighting force for the 21st century.

WHY THE STRATEGY CHANGED

(a new american way of war?)

Three significant events in the recent past fundamentally shifted the American military's focus and the way it conducts war. First, in 1989, the Soviet Union began to collapse as a communist super power and formidable military threat. Prior to this, the main military strategic effort in the post-World War II era was to contain and prevent the spread of global communism. America's Navy developed concepts and funded acquisitions primarily around a defensive strategy with a strong offensive counterattack capability. Troops deployed to Europe (mainly Germany) as a first line of defense. America introduced long range first strike missile technology for strategic and tactical strikes. Ships and submarines deployed to take the fight to the Soviet Union. Aegis radar technology in highly capable cruisers and destroyers was to counter Soviet long range missile threats forward deployed in the open ocean. Aircraft carriers provided forward presence and power projection. When the Soviet Union eventually collapsed, realistically, no other country had the threat capability to provide the impetus to keep America focused on the strategy of preventing the spread of global communism. The fallout of this realization was force

drawdown, fiscal reductions, and force restructures.

Second, the smart munitions and tomahawk missiles campaign in the Persian Gulf War has perhaps, introduced an unreasonable expectation from the American public that future wars or conflicts will involve few casualties. These weapons allowed us to soften and shape resistance before sending troops into a hostile environment. The nature of this type of campaign in the Persian Gulf War significantly reduced high casualties.

Third, and in tandem with the second point, technological advances caused an information explosion in communications media, and this has fundamentally changed the nature, character, and methods of conducting war. For example, Korea, and World Wars I and II did not have the benefit of Cable News Network (CNN) and instantaneous around the clock media coverages that can bring the realities and horrors of war to living rooms every night. The Vietnam War had media coverage, and it played a significant role in shaping public opinion against the war. Politically and militarily, future commanders will have to understand the economy of "national will" in utilizing the "economy of force."²

These three points raise issues for consideration. America no longer has the "stomach" and national will to endure a war that may result in large amounts of casualties. "When the wall came down in 1989, America lost its stomach for mass casualties. The American public will demand swift victories with minimum casualties."³ America will not tolerate a war of attrition in an era of austere budgets and force reductions. Simply put, will wars in the future be expected to be *brief brilliant, bloodless, and a bargain*, or what some characterize as the "four B" concept?⁴

First, will America expect wars to be *brief* because of its short attention span and a low tolerance for events that interrupt its culture? If so, then, the 100-hour ground war in the Persian

Gulf was perfect, because America applied overwhelming force to a less than formidable foe; compared to past wars, American casualties were low.

Second, does America expect wars to be *brilliant* and clean? Should it use the most lethal, and technologically advanced weapons to accomplish operations to reduce the horrors of war, collateral damage, and civilian casualties? America had phenomenal success in selective vice indiscriminate pin point targeting with tomahawk missiles and smart munitions in the Persian Gulf War. Will this perhaps be an expectation in the future wars or conflicts?

Third, and in tandem with the second point, does America expect wars for the most part to be *bloodless*? Has it developed a low tolerance and threshold for casualties, especially, if it does not view operations as critical and necessarily vital to its national interests? History shows a decline in will and in support of operations of this nature. For example, the loss of 18 soldiers galvanized support against the humanitarian and subsequent warlord search missions in Somalia and ended the operation. The outrage from the loss of 241 Marine Corps troops in a barracks in October 1983, sent troops home from peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon. The loss of over 58,000 men in the Vietnam War eroded America's national will to continue the protracted struggle. Fourth, does America expect wars to be a *bargain*? Will the bottom line always be how long will the war last, and how much will it cost?

There could be a successful argument that the "four B" concept is purely theoretical, and it requires validation by time and events. In other words, there has to be a serious encroachment or attack on American sovereign territories such as the egregious Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II to galvanize and solidify national will. This may be true, but today's global, strategic, and geopolitical environment has fundamentally changed, and there are clear

indications that the "four B" concept has some validity. Wars used to be between nation states; now wars are within states. From a military perspective, operations have fundamentally changed from a strategic environment of knowing and preparing for war with the Soviet Union to an environment of uncertainty. An amount of certainty and intelligence of who the Soviet Union was and how it would react was a known quantity; now, America may not know the enemy, neither can it predict where it will come from. Recently, America has seen the emergence of hostile regional powers, strife between religious fundamentalist movements, nationalist and ethnic conflict, and the availability and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia accentuate and emphasize this point.

More importantly, future operations will be operations short of or other than the *real* war (for example World Wars I and II) America has previously experienced, and they are still equally as dangerous. These operations may be important from a geo-strategic or geopolitical point of view to support America's national interests, but it is reasonable to conclude they mean nothing to the ordinary American. CNN will be on station, at the ready, to shape public perceptions and to report instantaneously every misstep, every act of violence, every crashed helicopter, and every action or operation gone astray.⁵ Military leaders must consider and think out these factors in planning and directing the way America will fight future wars and conflicts. America can no longer continue to conduct business as usual. In order to shift positively to the new military strategy requires change, because 21st century warfare will require forces that are readily deployable, sustainable, lethal, informed, and technologically superior. The NEF and OMFTS concepts are the right recipes, and they are in step with the new American way of war, because they will employ technology, save lives, save money, reduce costs, and espouse operations that

the Navy and Marine Corps can conduct rapidly. Future wars and operations will have to be decisive or indecisive based on this thought process and the will of the American people. The difficult task is how to start the change process to implement these concepts.

DOCTRINAL INCONGRUENCE

On the surface it appears that implementation of the NEF concept would be a relatively easy process in view of the fact that force structures of the CVBG and amphibious ready group and the special operations capable marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEUSOC) are for the most part in place. If OMFTS is to be successful, the key is to have unity of command and unity of effort in order to create synergistic forces in step and synchronized towards the completion of a common tasking. The deeper dilemma involved in completing the NEF concept requires taking two highly capable autonomous forces (CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC), where traditionally diametrically opposed doctrine, culture, training, and methodology have separated them and melding and integrating them into a consolidated warfighting effort. This is the new and formidable challenge which to date has not proven easy to accomplish.

"Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding."⁶ In order to maximize warfighting capabilities and have an adaptable battle force, the Navy must meld the CVBG and the ARG into one synergistic, integrated battle force, energized by a joint and operationally functional doctrine. In the past, the CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC deployed independently and conducted operations revolving around mission requirements. The CVBG used the composite warfare commander

(CWC) doctrine.⁷ On the basis of the Soviet threat, this doctrine was defensive in nature with an offensive strike and power projection element.⁸ The ARG/MEUSOC continued the use of offensive amphibious doctrine validated during World War II and Korea. With the exception of predeployment workups, once deployed, units rarely, if ever, operated as an integrated battle force.⁹ If operational demands called for a unified naval force, either the needed elements reported to the CVBG commander, or if the operations were sufficiently large and complex, the numbered fleet commander assumed direct control of all the forces as officer in tactical command (OTC). From an operational point of view, flimsy or loose sets of ad hoc command relationships and doctrine joined the integrated battle force structure.¹⁰ Incongruence occurs when the two entities operate together. The lack of consensus revolves around amphibious doctrine, and who is in charge of what. One burning issue is who is in charge of the amphibious objective area (AOA). More specifically, should there even be an AOA in operations other than war? The hot button question is who should be the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF)? Neither doctrine (amphibious or CWC) specifies where the CATF fits in an integrated total battle force operation, nor is CATF an integrated part of CWC doctrine. This is where feelings become tender and where entities draw battle lines. Perhaps a review of history will show how this environment evolved, and perhaps how the Navy should proceed to implement positive change.

the traditional CATF and CLF relationship

At the MEUSOC or special purpose marine-air-ground-task-force (MAGTF) level, the two principles in current amphibious operations are the CATF, who is currently a Navy Captain and is the amphibious squadron (PHIBRON) commander. The (CLF) is a Marine Corps Colonel and

is the marine expeditionary unit (MEU) commander. Commensurate with the size (marine expeditionary force (MEF) of an operational assault, these positions would increase in rank to one or two star or greater general and flag officers. The PHIBRON and MEU commander relationship represent normal routine deployed operations.

The five phases of a traditional amphibious operation are planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault (PERMA). CATF and CLF are equal during the planning and embarkation phase of an amphibious operation. This relationship ensures that they properly review and factor into the planning process all interests, considerations, and idiosyncrasies concerning an amphibious operation. Due to the rapidity of operation in the littoral and regional environment, the process is more likely EMPRA than PERMA. The relationship is still the same; CATF and CLF resolve any differences up a common chain of command via a common superior. Once the embarkation process is complete aboard Navy ships, CLF is subordinate to CATF. Traditionally, the CATF is the only Navy representative within the command and control operational relationship that exercises authority over the CLF; and this authority is implicitly clear and unambiguous. CLF assumes control of the landing forces when the beach head is secure, and he establishes control ashore.¹¹

early development of the CATF and CLF relationship

The *first modern* marine American amphibious landing was the Battle of Guadalcanal in August 1942; this battle was significant, because it expressly brought to the forefront command and control (C2) problems and dilemmas as to when and who was in charge of what forces. Guadalcanal exposed problems in command relationships between Vice Admiral Fletcher, the Navy Expeditionary Force Commander, Rear Admiral Turner, the Pacific Amphibious Force

Commander, and Major General Vandegrift, the Commander of First Marine Division. These disagreements were the underpinnings and eventually led to the development of the CATF and CLF relationship known today. The disagreements were on timing and utility of force. Turner planned to keep the carrier on station to provide air cover during offloading of the transports for five days. Having recently lost two carriers, Fletcher wanted to keep his carriers at the scene for only two days. Major General Vandegrift protested, and Fletcher agreed to remain on station for three days. Due to heavy losses taken by Navy fighter pilots, Fletcher went against his promise to Vandegrift, and he detached the carrier on the evening of the second day. This action outraged Vandegrift, because when the carriers departed his Marines were without air cover.

After Fletcher removed himself from the scene, command relationship problems developed between Rear Admiral Turner, now the senior naval officer present, and Major General Vandegrift. Vandegrift had taken command of the Marines ashore; Turner still had command of troops remaining on transport ships in accordance with current doctrine. He wanted to use them as a mopping up force to prosecute and invade nearby islands. Vandegrift intended to use these Marines to defend his perimeter at a nearby airfield. The issue raised the questions of who was in charge, and who actually had overall command of the Marines once the landing force commander established himself ashore. Admiral Halsey drafted a message to Admirals Nimitz his superior and Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations. He explained that the landing force troop commander should be equal and of the same rank as the naval attack force commander. He met with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Holcomb, who concurred with the proposal. This was the initial framework for doctrine supporting the battle and time-tested CATF and CLF relationship. Once the CLF assumed command of his forces

ashore, he did not report to the CATF but to a common superior in command of the operation.¹²

Guadalcanal exposed problems for the Navy and Marine Corps to learn key and significant lessons from the experience that are extremely relevant in the development of today's NEF concept with respect to C2 relationships. First, at Guadalcanal, the amphibious operation was not the main focus of effort in the mind of the Expeditionary Commander; he had a dilemma between the protection of the carrier and air assets and the landing force. This contributed to a lack of focus and unity of effort. There was a dilemma of desired endstate; written guidance did not give the commander autonomy or latitude to lose a carrier as a tradeoff for defending the landing force.¹³ Second, the ad hoc command setup ensured there was no direct unity of command and suggested the need for a doctrinal glue to bind the operations together. Third, it illustrated the importance of personality in command relationships in determining operational success. Fourth, Guadalcanal confirmed the commander's knowledge and expertise are critical to operational success. Fifth, all the commanders appeared to have different approaches to acquiring the endstate. These lessons are important, because in developing doctrine for NEF concept, they should not only be remembered as a part of history; they should be thoroughly understood. Guadalcanal exposed C2 problems and validated the need for a CATF and CLF relationship.

Navy professionals makes it work

The separate entities (CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC) being professionals, make command and control relationships work and will continue to do so, but people in the naval forces deserve something better.¹⁴ Ad hoc relationships have been adequate for success, but they also suboptimize positive change. For example, recent operations in Haiti established an ad hoc

command and control arrangement with a one star admiral and his staff embarked in a U. S. Navy (LHD) originally as the Naval Force Commander (NAVFOR). He was in charge of maritime interdiction operations, Haitian and Cuban boat recovery, and repatriation. Normally, these ships embark commanders of amphibious squadrons (COMPHIBRONs), and they are normally CATF for small scale amphibious assaults and MEUSOC operations. In this particular case, the PHIBRON commander and members of the staff were subsumed by the flag staff. The PHIBRON staff became a planning cell, and the PHIBRON commander became the one star's Chief of Staff. Once the Commander, Joint Task Forces (CJTF) arrive in theater, he assumed all duties previously handled by the one star and his staff. The one star became the CATF for the landing; a Navy captain, the PHIBRON commander, normally holds this position. During the operation, the CATF reported to the Commander, Joint Task Forces (CJTF) embarked in his flagship. The PHIBRON planned and executed the assault landing operation from start to finish; it was an operational success. The CATF (one star) relied heavily on the PHIBRON commander's knowledge and expertise.

There may have been hidden costs, From the PHIBRON and flag staff perspective a potentially contentious situation was successful, because they put mission accomplishment over command conflicts. However, this is not saying that it did not leave any negative feelings, nor was it a beneficial C2 process. Most amphibious warriors can empathize and understand what the flag's staff imposition did to the esteem of a PHIBRON staff. It should be clear that the admiral's staff was a group of highly trained professionals that superbly executed their mission; but, however, they lacked the knowledge and expertise, and they were not capable of conducting the amphibious assault portion of the mission.¹⁵ This ad hoc command relationship created an

unnecessary layer. More importantly, the command and control relationship encroached upon a time tested, time honored, battle tested CATF and CLF relationship. Did the Navy have to conduct the operation this way? There was nothing significantly different about this landing than what ships routinely do on deployments. Why was this landing not conducted by the PHIBRON commander? The force makeup was a three ship ARG with a special purpose MAGTF embarked. The Marine Corps did not change their rank structure; CLF remained a colonel. CATF was no longer an amphibious expert, and CATF and CLF were no longer equal. If this type of ad hoc command relationship continues in the future, this will present problems for the Marine Corps. If the Navy makes CATF a flag officer, then, the Marine Corps should make CLF a flag officer of equal rank.¹⁶

CATF and CLF more than a command structure

What some fail to understand thoroughly is that the CATF and CLF relationship are more than just a command structure; it is an intangible maritime way of life in which success of the operation and the CATF and CLF relationship have an inextricable link. In this success, CATF and CLF, for the most part, have mutual respect for each other, implicitly communicate with each other, are experts in amphibious warfare, and operate on the same ship in the same environment to work out any problems or disagreements. Interaction between Navy and Marine Corps staff is essential, because it espouses teambuilding and enhances implicit communication. "The planning process forms a close personal bond where the two get to know one another. The two staffs are the lifeblood to ensure a parallel and concurrent planning process is taking place. The process requires a lot of training and a lot of experience."¹⁷ CATF and CLF train on how to make contingency situations work. As a result, they become a synergy, a single melded fighting

force that connects and interplays via a time-tested doctrinal glue. Currently, the CVBG commander does not have the expertise, and his or her CVBG oriented, CWC trained, and focused staff will explicitly communicate. He or she will be aboard the aircraft carrier separated by great distances and potential communications problems could exist. The PHIBRON commander already has the requisite knowledge and expertise as well as a highly capable staff.

Some purport establishing a separate NEF commander with a staff of experts in amphibious warfare.¹⁸ This is not necessary; any additional staffs would only layer, inhibit, and suboptimize the CATF and CLF command relationship; they would be directive and duplicative in effort with the PHIBRON staff. This position supports MEU size assaults. Large operations may require additional staff support and the rank of CATF and CLF would rise commensurate with the size of the operation. Further, it plays against the maneuver warfare concept of centralized command and decentralized autonomous control and actions to make instantaneous command decisions in the fog of war. Guadalcanal exposed problems in command and control, and over time those problems have been resolved to create the consummate CATF and CLF relationship. Command and control relationships in the Scott 'O Grady tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) epitomize and accentuate this point. The carrier was on liberty in port at Corfu, Greece; commanders had complete trust in confidence in the officers at the "pointy end" of the spear (PHIBRON and MEU commanders). With a strategic focus placed on them, they took on a difficult mission and accomplished it flawlessly. In the process of defining and refining this command relationship, it is critical to exercise caution in making profound changes that can destroy this relationship. The Navy should remember what it learned from the Battle of Guadalcanal. If it does not learn from history, then, it is destined to make the same mistakes

again.

composite warfare doctrine

The composite warfare concept originated in the 1970's. Its purpose was to provide defense for the CVBG from the speed and potential lethality of modern warfare. The concept required defense in-depth, quick decision-making and integration of functional commanders into a synergistic formidable force. Its purpose was to provide the OTC and the CWC a complete and accurate picture of air, surface, and subsurface enemy contacts. Initially, four principal warfare commanders were responsible for keeping the threat picture and reporting all threats to the OTC and the CWC. The anti-air warfare commander (AAWC), anti-surface warfare commander (ASUWC), anti-submarine warfare commander (ASWC), and the electronic warfare commander (EWC) were responsible to the OTC and the CWC for countering specific warfare related threats.

Warfare commanders would acquire detected threats and deal with them immediately and correctly within the rules of engagement. The OTC is overall in charge, but he focuses on the offensive battle while the CWC maintained the composite air, surface, subsurface, and electronic warfare threat focus. The CWC would check or disagree with the warfare commander's actions and control them by negation. This is a key point. There were other designated subordinates within the chain of command, but they function as coordinators. The significant difference between commanders and coordinators was that commanders had tactical control of forces assigned and the autonomy to initiate action in a decentralized manner, if threatened. Coordinators served support roles by managing warfare assets. A revision of the CWC concept added the strike warfare commander as a fifth warfare commander giving it an offensive strike

capability; it also changed the EWC to the Space Electronic Warfare Commander (SEWC). A final revision changed the SEWC to the command and control warfare commander (C2WC).

Interestingly, over the span of approximately twenty-five years, the CWC concept has doctrinally changed in order to stay in step within the framework and context of global, technological and strategic changes. What is most telling is that at no point in time was the amphibious element ARG/MEUSOC of the Navy ever considered within the context of the CWC concept as a viable option and method of employment and integration. Instead, for nearly fifty years, the CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC deployed as two independent autonomous forces. The winds of change have dictated with an awesome suddenness the necessity to integrate these two forces into an effective fighting force.

the Integrated Battle Group Organization concept

"The Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to examine the command and control doctrine and practices of U.S. naval forces. The goal of the study was to help commands understand how composite warfare and amphibious warfare concepts might better integrate with joint and multi-national operations."¹⁹ As part of the study, it thoroughly examined CWC and amphibious doctrines and their implementations.²⁰ In March 1995, NDC established a doctrine development working group to address the issues of incongruence between amphibious, joint, and CWC doctrine. The group met to establish doctrine that would integrate the CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC forces. The doctrine development working group in attempting to address these issues produced a draft concept paper called the integrated battle group organization (IBO). NDC provided the concept to naval elements in the fleet for feedback and consensus. It expressly raised additional concerns and issues, and there were a lot

more questions than answers; there was no consensus. Lessons learned was that doctrine does not mean anything if the fleet and marine units do not agree. The fleet and marine units did not feel as if they were part of the process or the solution. As previously mentioned, the most hotly contested issue was the CATF and CLF relationship.²¹

Why? Because, the IBO concept, in essence, strips away the doctrinal CATF and CLF command relationship established in amphibious doctrine (Joint Publication 3-02) and makes the determination of CATF a three step discretionary procedure by the OTC. First, the OTC would take on the function as CATF and operate in accordance with current amphibious doctrine. This setup would create some obvious problems. CLF would no longer be equal with CATF. The CATF would no longer be an expert in amphibious warfare; the PHIBRON commander has had an amphibious command track, and he has an expert staff. If the OTC delegates the amphibious assault operation to the PHIBRON commander and he remains CATF, then, the Navy unnecessarily layers the command and control relationship process. Second, the OTC could designate the traditional CATF the amphibious warfare commander (AMWC) and the CLF the landing force commander (LFC). This process is merely an exercise in semantics. The AMWC and LFC would still function in the traditional roles of CATF and CLF; the only elements that have changed are the names. This setup makes sense; in today's three-ship ARG arrangement, CATF will no longer command large amphibious task forces. Due to the new American way of war, tens of thousands of troops will probably never storm a hostile shore. They will be replaced by a process of mass, speed and concentration. The essence of amphibious warfare still remains, and technological advances in LCAC, AAV, harriers, amphibious assault ships and the MV-22 Osprey, coupled with joint forces will make amphibious operations a viable maneuver element in

then 21st century. Further, a frontal assault from the sea may be a viable maneuver option. If it is the only option, it is good to have that option.

The Center for Naval Analyses found that current amphibious doctrine still viable for deliberate planning operations (PERMA) but too rigid for rapid response operations (EMPRA). It recommended retaining the current doctrine for conventional operations and developing new doctrine for operations other than war, which are missions that require rapid planning, execution, withdrawal, and have time limits. This new doctrine should complement vice replace current doctrine and retain the principles of unity of command, unity of effort and flexibility embodied in current doctrine.²² Hence, the Navy should revise amphibious doctrine and keep its total capability as a viable option and tool in the toolbox of warfighting capability. Further, it is a prudent move; militaries can have all the troops, smart weapons and technology in overwhelming abundance, but to date, when it comes to decisive action, nothing has replaced putting troops on the ground.²³ It would be foolish to lose such a powerful capability coming from the sea.

Third, the OTC could designate the AMWC or the LFC supported and all others supporting. This solution appears to be stating the obvious. Historically and implicitly in the nature and character of amphibious and expeditionary warfare is the sole purpose of the Navy's amphibious ships are to put marines ashore. Marines are the "main battery" and "main effort" of amphibious ships. In amphibious operations, all other naval elements such as the CVBG, mine warfare, and combat logistics elements, to name a few, play an assigned supporting role. Littoral and regional operations are amphibious in nature.

The solution to the to the problem lies in point two. Since the future of the military is jointness, the Navy should keep CATF and CLF in their traditional roles, and appoint the

OTC/CVBG commander the NEF and/or the NAVFOR commander. Results from the latest 1995 Expeditionary Warfare Conference gives indications the Navy is considering that option. Naval expeditionary task force (NETF) will replace the term integrated battlegroup organization (IBO), and the term Commander of the Expeditionary Task Force (CNETF) will replace the term OTC. CATF and CLF should fall under the CNETF's CWC umbrella, and they would be his subordinates.²⁴ This arrangement would support joint doctrine and any integrated support situation. The CNETF/NAVFOR could assign forces from the CVBG to the CATF within the area of operations (AOA). He would fight the composite battle, while the CATF and CLF conduct an assault landing or other missions. Once the CATF establishes the AOA, CATF and CLF would become warfare commanders and warfighters within their respective domains just like their composite warfare counterparts. CLF would fight the land battle within the AOA. Both would report to the CNETF/NAVFOR as a common superior. The only major drawback to this command structure is that parochialism and egoism could interplay and produce negative results. When CATF stands up the AOA, he or she should have direct authority and control over all of the forces and actions within its boundaries. Once established ashore, the same applies to CLF. Units assigned to the CATF within the AOA would fall under his CWC umbrella or chain of command inside the AOA, and they would, in effect, work for CATF vice the CNETF. This concept deviates from the traditional way of doing business where supporting forces continued to function under the OTC's CWC umbrella. This is the real crux of the matter. The way to work positively through this issue is to focus on the mission and the main effort and who is supported and who is supporting. The problem is each entity wants to see itself as the main effort (egoism); but the CNETF/NAVFOR can quickly solve this problem when he issues his mission type

orders.²⁵ In amphibious operations, CATF and CLF require support, and this support is key to determining mission success.

obstacles to substantive doctrinal change

"Command relationships and 'rice bowl' battles inevitably hinder efforts to solve the current two doctrine dilemma." So observed Colonel William Rakow, USMC, in his article "MAGTF Operations in the Fleet in the Year 2000" in the July 1990 edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. Unfortunately today, it still holds true, and the wheels of change roll slowly along. The CATF and CLF relationship is a sticking point and emotional issue; the Navy is still trying to find common ground for all concerned parties.²⁶ Doctrine is the most difficult part of the change process. The CNA found the composite warfare doctrine outdated and contradictory, and recommended that NWP 10-1 be revised, but it stopped short of expressly stating that CATF and CLF should become part of composite warfare doctrine; it should. However, it recommended that the CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC be integrated in some fashion. NDC has the task of revising composite warfare doctrine. However, the command and control dilemmas are holding this revision in abeyance until there is some kind of resolution.²⁷ Currently the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic (EWTGLANT) has the task of revising Joint Publication 3-02, (amphibious doctrine). Once manned and funded for the tasking, EWTGLANT will revise Joint Publication 3-02 to include operations other than war and a rapid planning process.²⁸ It will not include any of the CNETF/NETF concepts until the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approves and codifies them.²⁹

In essence, doctrine drives training, training develops culture; culture is the impetus behind promotions and recognition and fiscal acquisitions. Hence, change in the best interest of some,

obviously, will not be in the best interest of others. The CVBG, amphibious community, and the Marine Corps want to cling to aspects of separate doctrine to protect their identity and status.³⁰ This is not the correct approach. Each entity tends to act in its own interest. Honesty is the key; as difficult as it is, each entity must ask itself tough questions and give itself honest answers for the greater aggregate good of the total force. Basically, are these entities recommending changes because of the geopolitical and strategic global shifts previously discussed have threaten their current roles, missions and status, and their ultimate survivorship is at stake? If yes, then, they are not acting in the best interest of America and its military. The answer cannot be how can each one best protect its turf and steal others.³¹ During the Cold War, before ... *From the Sea and Forward...From the Sea*, the CVBG would either detach units to proceed or escort amphibious units to the AOA, and it would not care about the amphibious operations or who was CATF or CLF.³² Now the Navy has a show stopping dilemma of who is really in charge. The underlying reasons are obvious; littoral operations are now the focus, and they are expeditionary and amphibious in nature and character. It is the essence of naval military strategy; everyone wants to play or have a significant part. To work through this dilemma, the focus must be what and who best serves the strategy and the mission, and therefore, make decisions that are best in the best interest of the military and America.

CULTURAL INCONGRUENCE

The Navy is a very large line and staff organization. The Navy is several line communities within its organization. There are Navy carriers and their air wings, cruisers and destroyers, submarines, mine warfare, combat logistics, and last, but certainly not least, the amphibious community. It is key to note that the cruiser and destroyer, mine warfare, combat logistics, and

the amphibious communities are part of the surface warfare navy. Naval air and submarine warfare are separate line communities.

Organizations have their own culture, and communities have their own unique and different subcultures within the larger organization. Culture comprises the norms, values, dress, beliefs, value system, attitudes, and thought processes that give organizations their uniqueness and identity. More specifically, culture is the way of life of a group of people; it is the configuration of all or more or less stereotyped patterns of learned behavior handed down from one generation to another through the measure of language and imitation.³³ This self identity produces a degree of pride and professionalism that is necessary, and simultaneously, it produces parochialism and institutionalism that are difficult to change and tends to suboptimize vehicles of change.

Why? Because organizational cultures are systemic processes. Within an organization two cultures normally exist. The overt or open cultural system is the purported structure, skills, expectations and, goals or what the organization says it is all about. The covert or closed cultural system is the people aspect of organizations that harbor the attitudes, opinions, norms, thought processes and feelings of a particular group or subcommunity.³⁴ It is in a covert system that people in organizations fundamentally resist change, and it is this system that the Navy must confront for positive change to take place. How the Navy accomplishes this is key to a successful change process. Merely publishing two documents and stating this how it is going to be will not successfully induce positive change.

developing two cultures within the surface warfare community

In order to understand thoroughly cultural incongruence the way it exists in the Navy today, and to prepare for the future, the Navy must fundamentally appreciate and understand the past

and how this incongruence has evolved. Modern amphibious warfare had its beginning in World War II. America's national and military strategic focus took a drastic shift. Amphibious operations were undoubtedly key to success in World War II, but World War II ended with the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb became the weapon to end all wars and the start of the Cold War and atomic and nuclear age. MacArthur proved the value of amphibious operations at Inchon in the Korean War by using maneuver vice attrition style warfare to encircle and envelop the North Korean Army. MacArthur stated that the day of the frontal assault was over.³⁵ Critics questioned the feasibility of amphibious operations as warfare and weaponry grew more lethal and technologically sophisticated during the Cold War missile buildup.³⁶

An amphibious operation, although a highly effective power projection force, is an "ugly art" in execution. It is a very complex operation but a slowly developing process. Operations involve loading troops into slow moving assault craft that attempt to land on a hostile shore. Given a choice compared to the cruiser and destroyer subcommunity within the Navy, most officers were not thrilled by its slowness and somewhat antiquated art form. This is evident in personnel policies. An examination of Naval Academy graduates going to surface ships showed that most midshipmen finishing in the upper 50 percentile of the graduating class chose the cruiser and destroyer community.³⁷ Ship type became a status symbol, because amphibious ships were not the ship of choice. A naval officer interested in status, prestige and upward mobility to flag rank could only see limitations in the amphibious community. The very idea of troops and transport ships sitting seaward of a hostile beach, while troops went ashore in slow landing craft seemed ludicrous in the face of modern weaponry.³⁸ This thought process will undoubtedly change with the implementation of OMFTS, which intends to use technology, speed, and momentum to

deliver decisive results.

The Navy did not apply technology in amphibious ship acquisitions. The offensive troop capability of the amphibious ships did not glamorously emerge and was not in vogue. These ships were slow compared to its carrier, cruiser, and destroyer counterparts. They lacked offensive and defensive capable guns and missile systems, lacked self-protection compared to the guns on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The combatant was the future. Many questioned the practicality of the amphibious assault.

The Navy also lost interest in amphibious art; it atrophied as the Navy became preoccupied with preparing to contest and prevent Soviets aggression in forward deployed seas.³⁹ National and military strategies produced missile and submarine technology to counter Soviet strategy by attacking with long range anti-ship, anti-air and ballistic cruise missiles. Many of the modern aircraft carriers, Aegis cruisers and destroyers are technological acquisition concepts and final products of the strategic effort to prevent global communism.

The military and strategic successes of the Cold War created the existence of two command and control doctrines previously discussed for naval warfare; one optimized fleet defense in sea control operations for the CVBG, and the other optimizes amphibious power projection for the ARG and MEU/SOC. This evolutionary process created two separate cultures within the surface cruiser and destroyer and amphibious communities. The CVBG, which consisted of elements of submarine, naval air, and the cruiser and destroyer community were the Nation's premier fighting force. The amphibious community took a secondary role in all aspects of naval life from esteem, fiscal funding, acquisitions, training, and rewards, promotion and recognition. . . . *From the Sea and Forward...From the Sea* military strategies made the Navy and Marine Corps team the

Nation's premier fighting force with an inextricably link.⁴⁰ How can a cultural process that took nearly 50 years to produce be changed? The Navy can do this by changing the force mindset. It will have to be an evolving process over time.

signs of change

There is evidence of substantive change in this area. The new LPD- 17 class, the Navy's newest amphibious ship, will be capable of self-protection. The ship will be able to fight and survive. Its significantly reduced radar cross section makes it less susceptible to missile attacks. If attacked, for protection, it will counter with a 16-cell vertical launch system (VLS) with 64 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) that give it extended range. Additionally, it will have two Rolling Air Frame Missile (RAM) launching systems, two close-in-weapon systems (CIWS), active and passive electronic countermeasures, AN/SPS 48E radar for detecting air contacts, AN/SPQ-9B radar, and the Cooperative Engagement System that will give it interoperability with other unique combat systems platforms.⁴¹ These types of defensive protection systems are unprecedented in the amphibious community with respect to the LPD and smaller classes of ship. Comparatively speaking, the LPD-17 will be a true combatant.

Efforts are being made to remove the stigma. At the Naval Academy and Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) there is no longer a distinction between cruisers and destroyers and amphibious ships as combatants. Now the Navy considers all three ship types as combatants.⁴² These changes contribute to positively changing the culture and create an environment of inclusion and teamwork vice divisiveness and competition. Knowledge is power; if the Navy is to be an effective expeditionary force, subcommunities must become generalists instead of specialists and know more about what each other functionally does. The Navy's top surface

warrior, Rear Admiral A.J. Krekich has an opinion on the generalist versus the specialist issue. He believes that surface officers should be generalists. The "cross-pollination" of surface warfare officers will be a stronger, smarter, and diversified officer that not only benefits his or her community but the entire service.⁴³

There are other signs of change. Both the April 1995 Surface Warfare Commander's Conference and the May 1995 Surface Warfare Flag Officer's Conference conducted a bottom up review of the surface warfare career path for all surface warfare officers in the surface navy in the 21st century. Specifically, the conferences addressed essential elements such as career development, leadership, diversity of experience and fleet readiness. They introduced a new sequencing plan, and its purpose is to promote diversity of experience by having more than one division officer tour on a ship in a different community, primarily cruiser destroyer or amphibious communities. Under the new plan, all division officers will complete a 24 month tour and then split tour to a different ship, staff and/or community.⁴⁴ Twenty-one percent of the officers from the cruiser and destroyer and amphibious community will go to tours with an amphibious nature other than a ship such as: assault craft units, beach masters units, special boat units, and gunnery liaison officer as second tours. Four percent will have second tours on carriers.⁴⁵ The Navy expects this new division officer plan to phase in over the next three years. This serves to broaden the experience base of the officers. Actually, it does more than that; it culturally educates the surface officer. Amphibious and cruiser and destroyer officers are cross pollinated in experiential knowledge, culture and education about each other's subcommunity. This positively effects cultural and knowledge bases and develops understanding and appreciation.

culture influences warfighting

"Culture influences warfighting."⁴⁶ The Navy must, in essence, change the way its surface subcommunities think about each other within the organization; it must think this way from the top to the bottom of the chain of command. Subcommunities must stop looking at themselves in a vertical (stovepipe), parochial sense, and as status symbols, but in a holistic, teambuilding sense to support whatever higher authority determines the main effort to be. Our leaders should speak highly and with pride of the Navy and Marine Corps *team* as one naval service. In other words, at a point in time, all of the line subcommunities will have a job to do; they are equally important, all are competent professionals, and when required, they will execute their missions and do their jobs well in a synergy with the Marine Corps. The message should be one of inclusion vice exclusion.

TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL INCONGRUENCE

consensus and teambuilding

"The way to change organizations is to integrate people in the military society so they learn and experience things together."⁴⁷ One of the best ways to determine if the Navy has a true commitment to change is to examine the ways it is attempting to implement littoral strategy in training programs. Methodologies in training drive the way an organization envisions its goals and endstate. As stated earlier, in the past, the CVBG and ARG rarely if ever, operated with each and knew little about each other. This contributed to the divisive culture. Operations in recent years have attempted to change this old counterproductive way of doing business at least in the workup predeployment phase of training. The Navy invokes the old status quo of disunity as soon as units chop into their deployed areas of operation.⁴⁸ This way of operating should change. Naval forces need to train the way they fight, and they should fight the way they train as a

complete battle force. Further, NEF and OMFTS are thought processes and different ways of thinking. In order to maximize the Navy and Marine Corps NEF and OMFTS concepts, the Navy must get away from the idea of CVBGs and ARG/MEUSOCs operating as separate forces within a force or a force makeup. Instead, the Navy must *think* of both of them as one complete battle force.⁴⁹ The battle force should be cross pollinated in mission and operations as well as knowledge. This recommendation does not espouse that the CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC should operate together all the time as one unit. Reasonably, there are times when this may not be applicable or practicable, but as a single battle force in mindset. Each entity in thought process, culture and training should think of itself as part of a complete force.

This idea would closely parallel in character the Marine Corps "single battle" concept. In this concept, there is one single four dimensional battlespace, and depending upon the mission, any element of the MAGTF could be the main effort. One element in the MAGTF functionally is no more important than the other. In fact, they are interconnected, interplay and rely heavily on each other. Failure in one functional element will most likely result in the failure of another and the eventual success or failure of the operation. The single battle concept fully employs the functional operational levels of war. For example, if humanitarian operations are the focus of effort, then the service support group (SSG) could be the focus of effort, and all other elements would be supporting. Key to the concept is that the battlespace is not territorial; it is holistic. Forces fight a single battle, with a single force, focused toward a shared endstate. The Navy could do the same with its subcommunities fighting from the sea using the sea as battle and maneuver space. Instead of the different subcommunities approaching mission requirements such as naval gunfire support, minehunting and sweeping, close air support or anti-submarine warfare

as vertical, territorial missions, they would view their missions as in support of the main effort. This would optimize and enhance mission readiness, force adaptability and capability.

Current training creates a vertical process where subcommunities are highly competent and extremely proficient within their domains, but are completely unaware, ignorant, or know very little about how each subcommunity affects the whole. Direct operations in the Mediterranean with the submarine JAMES K. POLK (SSN-645) and the USS KEARSARGE (LHD-1) ARG/MEUSOC in JTF 95-2 was a first.⁵⁰ This shows progress; equally it expounded and accentuated just how much the amphibious and submarine communities know very little about each other's warfighting capabilities. These operations were successful, but there were simple nuances in terminology, communications and understandings about each other's operational limitations. Without these problems, obviously operations would have gone smoother.⁵¹

The Navy is making some progress in this area. Another example of progress was in 1989 the CVBG and ARG conducted interoperability and predeployment training together; prior to this, they always conducted separate training. July 1993 marked the first time the CVBG commander and his staff attended the PHIBRON and MEU workshop in preparation for deployment.⁵² Now it is the norm for doing business. This same CVBG commander realized the deficiency and submitted it as "lessons learned." This effort ensured that several members of subsequent staffs (ideally two aviators and two surface warfare officers) would attend the navy expeditionary planning course, which includes amphibious planning, amphibious warfare tactical training, landing force staff planning, and the MEUSOC workshop prior to workups for deployment.⁵³

Contributing to this, initially, the mission of Tactical Training Group, Atlantic (TACTRAGRULANT) only involved training and preparing primarily the CVBG for

deployment; now PHIBRONs and MEUs are key players in the wargaming and the predeployment workup process.⁵⁴ The Navy should continue to break down barriers. In the future if the norm is to be crisis response, then, implicit knowledge and communication could buy valuable time and perhaps save lives.

professional intermediate training

In the same vein, the Marine Corps and the Navy need to know and understand in deeper thought each other doctrinally, conceptually and culturally with respect to implementing NEF, OMFTS and new amphibious warfare concepts. First, as asserted by William S. Lind in his article "Preparing for Maneuver Warfare," in the June 1984 *Marine Corps Gazette*, the Navy needs to educate officers in operational art. These officers need to know the art of advantageously using tactics or refusing to give battle to strike at the enemies center(s) of gravity. This is important, because excellence in operational art and maneuver allows a smaller force to defeat a larger one, and it saves lives and resources.⁵⁵ Following Lind, Commander Terry Pierce has pointed out that from a cultural point of view, the Navy and Marine Corps produce entirely different officers. A cultural understanding is important; at some point in their career progression flow point, officers need to undergo the same institutional socialization.⁵⁶

In the short term, the Navy can accomplish this by requiring executive officers who will follow the amphibious track to receive exposure to Marine Corps concepts at Quantico, Virginia.⁵⁷ Marine Corps battalion executive officers and commanders should receive exposure at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. The Navy has paid very little attention to this area of training and education. In academic year 1995/6, 110 Marines attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, (MCCSC) Quantico, Virginia. The Navy assigned 25 officers to

attend the same class (the Navy has 24 confirmed billets). These officers had varied backgrounds. The composition of these officers were: five aviators, four intelligence, two supply, two medical service, one chaplain, two fleet support, six surface warfare, one navy seal, one submarine, and one nurse corps. Of the six surface warfare officers only four had a background in amphibious warfare.⁵⁸ The Navy should eliminate filling billets with a higher percentage of staff officers to allow room for screened executive officers with cruiser and destroyer and amphibious backgrounds.⁵⁹

A random poll of 80 percent of the navy officers asked why they attended the MCCSC. The primary reason was because they either owned a home, had a family in the area, or had completed a Washington tour and wanted to remain in the area for ten additional months. Their reasons had to do more with personal agendas and convenience than professional military education. Seeing MCCSC as upward mobility to flag rank was not a consideration.⁶⁰ Possibly contributing to this, is the Navy's view on joint professional military education (JPME). With its emphasis on sustained superior performance at sea as the overarching measure of an officer's success, JPME is not given the detailing of personnel consideration that is required to ensure the effective use of billets have a beneficial endstate. Since JPME is not a requirement unless an officer is aspiring to flag rank, officers are detailed if it fits their professional plans and rotation windows. Further, since 1989, at MCCSC, Navy quotas have increased from 12 to 24, but the number of surface warfare officers has decreased. Over a six year period, the average has been eight surface warfare officers; fifteen was the high for 1990-91 academic year.⁶¹ As it stands now, seventy-six percent (19 out of 25) of the navy officers assigned to the MCCSC will not operate in a way to directly effect cultural socialization or operational implementation of

OMFTS and NEF concepts. The six surface warfare officers can.

In the long term, for change and a real commitment, the Navy should increase billets to support a one for one tradeoff of Navy and Marine Corps officers at Newport and Quantico at no expense or loss to each of the colleges. There is no dollar value placed on the cost of an officer's education; the measure is in billets lost by commands these officers would have been detailed to if they did not attend the war colleges.⁶² The Navy should make a fiscal commitment to educational resources and building more infrastructure to support the training. The Navy should fill these quotas with more surface line officers; through training and education, these officers can operationally and culturally effect positive change.

For example, if the Navy raises its 24 confirmed billets to 36, then 24 could go to the surface navy. The additional 12 navy billets would be sufficient to support all other navy officers. There would be two officers per class room to meet the 12 seminar classroom requirement at MCCSC. Of the executive officer screened cruiser and destroyer and amphibious officers, there should be one amphibious and one cruiser and destroyer officer. Of the navy 25 officers at MCCSC, only one has a background completely in the cruiser and destroyer community.⁶³ The cruiser destroyer officers normally attend the Naval War College; they see it as a more prestigious way toward upward mobility and flag rank.⁶⁴ In academic year 1995/6, of the 14 surface warfare officers attending the Naval War College, only one had amphibious experience; he served a split department head tour on an amphibious ship.⁶⁵ This is a mistake; amphibious and cruiser and destroyer officers will bring different experiences and perspectives to enhance classroom learning; this will assist in breaking down cultural barriers and stereotypes between the two communities; and it will tightened culturally, operationally, and in mindset the bond between the

Navy and Marine Corps team.

Additionally, these two colleges should be academically in step and focused at the operational level more on littoral and regional warfare, which is the current strategy. Currently, the two academic approaches are asymmetrical. MCCSC teaches theory and nature of war, strategic level of war, operational level of war, warfighting, and operations other than war all in the span of months. Excluding the four week course at the strategic level, it focuses at the operational level of war.⁶⁶ Conversely, the Naval War College Command and Staff (intermediate level) teaches a 12 week course called Joint Military Operations. This course consists of operational art, operational concepts, a Leyte Gulf historical case study and military operations. For the rest of the time, (70 percent) the course focuses at the strategic level by teaching Strategy and Policy for 12 weeks and National Security and Decision-making for 14 weeks in order to roll the intermediate and senior courses together.⁶⁷ MCCSC devotes more time (89 percent) at the operational vice strategic level of war.

This process actually suboptimizes positive change. The Navy and Marine Corps are supposed to be a *team*, but culturally and educationally, they will produce officers who think and act differently. Navy and Marine Corps officers graduate not really having an in-depth appreciation for each other's capability. This is especially true with the cruiser and destroyer community. In this era of jointness, future command relationships in littoral and maneuver warfare will require the execution of the commander's intent and decisive endstates via decentralized command and control. Future operations will require commanders to think similarly and make instantaneous decisions based on their knowledge, experience and understanding on the mission endstate. This would ease and resolve the communication process

via implicit communications, which is an ability to communicate through shared mutual understandings of key phrases, knowledge, experience, thought processes, familiarity and trust.⁶⁸ Common ground in understanding and training contributes to this process. The Navy should espouse this methodology to explicit, procedural methods of conducting operations. Phrases such as center of gravity, critical vulnerability and capability, main effort, commander's intent, surfaces and gaps and their applications should be the norm not only educationally but also in application.

pre-commissioning and preparatory training programs

In moving from mere concept to actual practice and a way of doing business, the Navy needs to start as early in the officer's developmental process as possible. The Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) and Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) should continue to require midshipmen and candidates to read and have a conceptual knowledge of *FMFM-1 Warfighting*, *Navy Doctrine Publication 1, . . . From the Sea*, and *Forward...From the Sea*.⁶⁹ The Naval Academy issues *NDP-1* to all first year midshipmen, but it does not issue *FMFM-1 Warfighting* to its Marine Corps option graduates.⁷⁰ It should do so. The Marine Corps Basic School in Quantico, Virginia issues *FMFM-1 Warfighting* to its graduates, but it does not issue *NDP-1*.⁷¹ It should do so. This would be a step in a positive direction; these documents provide a total focus on the Navy and Marine Corps team.

NDP-1 and *FMFM-1 Warfighting* education should be required at enlisted boot camps. Currently, this is not the case; the emphasis is on adjusting people to military life. The expectation is that this type of conceptual training will occur in technical schools, service schools and leadership continuum courses.⁷² There is validity to this expectation, in March 1997, the

Navy plans to implement "leadership continuum training," in which military strategy and concepts in "...*From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* will be taught in service schools and Surface Warfare Officer School Basic Course. Completion of this leadership continuum will be required for those persons advancing to E-5 and E-6.⁷³

Naval training programs should teach NEF, operational art, OMFTS and operations other than war once these concepts become doctrinal reality. Surface Warfare designated Ensigns should have these concepts reemphasized at the Surface Warfare Basic Indoctrination Course. This course prepares them for their first operational division officer tour in the fleet. This training should be reinforced at the Department Head, Executive Officer, and Commanding Officer courses. Currently, there has not been a significant curriculum change because of the stalemate that exists in doctrine previously discussed. This is a key point; until these concepts have been approved and codified, commands are reluctant to commit efforts and resources towards training and education⁷⁴

On the other hand, since the USMC published its OMFTS concept, Marine Corps Second Lieutenants should continue to receive conceptual training at the Marine Corps Basic School and/or the AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL (AWS). Currently, AWS is teaching the OMFTS doctrine, but it is still tactically teaching ship to shore vice ship to objective maneuver due to technological difficulties in communications and acquisitions still being worked out.⁷⁵ Similar to the MCCSC in size, the academic year 1995/6 class consisted of 176 marines and six navy personnel. The breakdown of navy personnel was as follows: two nurse corps, one surface warfare, one aviator, one construction man (seabee), and one medical service corps.⁷⁶ This is not the best use of billets; in the short term, the Navy should give priority to amphibious and cruiser

and destroyer line officers. Moreover, just like the war college, there should be a commensurate increase of navy billets at no expense to the Marine Corps with a cruiser and destroyer and amphibious subcommunity mix. This process allows for more in-depth conceptual training and enhances the integrated operational and cultural socialization process.

The Expeditionary Warfare schools on the east and west coasts should teach NEF and OMFTS concepts. All aviation and surface line naval officers should attend this school at some point in their career path. These officers at a minimum should attend amphibious warfare indoctrination, and if practicable, the expeditionary warfare planning course. EWTGLANT and EWTGPAC revised these courses to espouse expeditionary and littoral warfare.⁷⁷ Currently, the Amphibious Indoctrination course has billets for 40 persons for each class and holds nine classes per fiscal year. Of the 40 billets, the school holds 20 for active duty Navy and Marine Corps officers combined and 20 for Marine Corps reserves. The Expeditionary Warfare Planning course has billets for 30 persons per class and holds nine classes per fiscal year. Of the 30 billets, the school holds 15 for active duty Navy and Marine combined, and 15 for Marine Corps reserves.⁷⁸ In the short term, the reserve billets can operationally better serve the active duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel. The Navy should increase these billets as soon as fiscal constraints allow.

The intent of these recommendations is threefold. First, the attempt is to eliminate a culture and an institution driven by bias that tends to suboptimize any effective change. The effort is to produce an environment of supported and supporting relationships, mutual respect, teamwork, and esprit de corps. Second, the benefit to this is that the entire Navy and Marine Corps would genuinely be functional on one accord, one interoperable and integrable battle force supporting

one focus of effort; and those involved would know and understand doctrinally and educationally why. Third, and probably most important, the intent is to develop a commander through an evolutionary process who understands operational art and has the courage and knowledge to fight at the operational level of war. He or she must have an appreciation for the capabilities of all the Navy subcommunities, Marine Corps MAGTF elements, and joint interoperability, and not hold one in higher esteem than the other, but on the contrary, understands they are all part of the winning team effort.

ACQUISITIONS INCONGRUENCE

(the Persian Gulf War mode!)

The Persian Gulf War is an excellent example of atrophy in a capability and shows how the lack of technology in a warfare area can seriously inhibit or even prevent a warfighting component from performing its mission. On February 18, 1991, while in Persian Gulf waters during operation Desert Storm, the Aegis cruiser USS PRINCETON (CG-59) detonated an Iraqi bottom laid Manta influence mine, which disabled it to the point where a unit had to tow it from the area. Shortly afterwards, the amphibious helicopter carrier USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) struck a moored contact mine that reduced its seaworthiness and capability. It was a bad day for the Navy, and it profoundly brought to light the "Achilles' heel" of landing force operations. The result was that amphibious landing forces aboard ship did not execute an amphibious landing in Kuwait, primarily because of the mine threat seeded along Kuwaiti beaches, shallow areas, and approaches. As it turned out, the mere threat of an assault landing was enough to fix seven to eight Iraqi divisions; however, if a landing had been required, the result could have been high

casualties by troops attempting to force across a defended beach. Today, mines are cheap force multipliers.⁷⁹ The mere threat of a mine can bring operations to a halt and render million dollar platforms unable to perform their missions. It would be both embarrassing and unconscionable to allow this to happen again.

How did the Navy get in this situation? The two principles that caused it to happen were doctrine and fiscal funding. Cold War doctrine involved protection of America's forces along its coast out to the 100 fathom curve primarily by the naval reserves. Once in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces were to provide mine countermeasure protection of forces; the Navy had no organic forces in theater. Post Cold War strategy now requires that naval forces be able to hunt and clear mines at any place, anytime, anywhere.⁸⁰ The Navy was not prepared for this new strategy. The lack of developed technology and limited funding dedicated to mine countermeasures was the major problem. The Navy has approved funding and developing technology is on the way.⁸¹ The critical dilemma is whether the Navy has a committed focus in the littorals, and if so, where is the concept that will drive doctrine, training and technology.

On 22 March 1996, a meeting held between the CNO's Strategic Study Group and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command answered this question and contributed significantly in supporting the thesis of doctrinal incongruence previously discussed exists. A construct of OMFTS is that there will be a seamless transition between land and sea when coming from the sea. During the maneuver there is to be no "operational pause" to conduct mine sweeping or hunting operations. If this is so, then, the Navy should address the problem in a concept. Senior Marine Corps representatives consistently asked senior Navy representatives for their concept for

the new technologies and missions they were trying to sell. Navy representatives waffled badly on this question and finally admitted that they did not have a concept that rolled into, paralleled, or supported OMFTS and littoral warfare. It appeared that their efforts, focus, and direction were threat vice concept based.⁸² The Strategic Studies Group did not base its purported ideas and technology on NEF or OMFTS concepts introduced in the two white papers; instead, with no factual support or concept, they derived them from contingencies and perceived threats.

surface navy ships

Another area of acquisition incongruence is in Navy surface ships. With respect to aircraft carrier construction, nothing significantly has changed from deep water to littoral strategy. The Navy commissioned JOHN STENNIS (CVN-74) in 1995; HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN-75) is under construction and is due to be commissioned in 1998; RONALD REAGAN (CVN-76) is under construction and is projected to be commissioned in 2002; an unnamed modified carrier (CVN-77) may employ lessons learned from littoral warfare, women at sea and environmental waste disposal at sea, and may be commissioned in 2013; and a new CVX concept is being developed. There is no doubt carriers are important vehicles in power projection and expeditionary warfare. However, it takes seven to eight years to build a carrier at the cost of \$4.5 billion apiece; the nuclear carrier has a service life of 50 years. Current plans stabilize the total number of carriers at 12.⁸³ If this is so, then, it would seem reasonable to build fewer carriers or put the program off for ten years. During this timeframe, the Navy could reallocate money to build more amphibious ships. For what it would cost to build one aircraft carrier, the Navy could build three more Wasp class LHDs at a cost of approximately \$1.2 billion dollars apiece.

The same could be said of Aegis cruisers and destroyers, which were built primarily for the

Soviet threat. The Navy built 26 Aegis cruisers; they have a projected service life of 40 years. Currently, the Navy has constructed or has under contract 26 Aegis destroyers. The plan is to build three per year, which is scaled down from the original plan of five per year.⁸⁴ The final total will be 50 at a cost of \$700 million dollars apiece to replace the 963 class destroyer (aging DD), the 993 class guided missile destroyer (DDG) and the FFG-7 class. They all have a service life of 40 years.⁸⁵ There has been no scale down on the building of these ships or reallocation of funds since the publication of . . . *From the Sea and Forward... From the Sea*. The Navy did not reallocate money from the Aegis program towards building more amphibious ships even though its strategy claims the enemy most likely will be a littoral Third World threat.

In comparing shipbuilding in the post Vietnam era, excluding the ships previously mentioned, the Navy built six Nimitz Aircraft Carriers, 31 Spruance class destroyers, 54 guided missile frigates, four Kidd class guided missile destroyers and recommissioned, refurbished, and decommissioned four battleships. What is most telling about this is that the American people are not getting what they paid for. The guided missile frigates (FFG-7) class are being transitioned to the fleet reserves.⁸⁶ The Navy built these ships (FFG-7) in the early to mid eighties. They have an expected service life of 40 years.

Conversely, in the seventies and eighties, the Navy built five Tarawa class landing helicopter assault ships (LHA), eight Whidbey Island class landing ship docks (LSD). When completed, it will have seven Wasp class LHDs, and 4 Harper's Ferry class LSDs. "A large number of the vessels in the fleet have been in the service for almost 39 years and are nearing the end of their projected service lives. This fact is reflected in the rising age of the fleet, which averages 18 years in FY 1996, growing to 21 years by FY 2001."⁸⁷ If the Navy could justify that the disparity

between the two was to support efforts to prevent the spread of communism, then, what is the reason now? The Seawolf class submarine is another Cold War acquisition program that will cost a total of approximately 9 billion dollars total to build three. The 1996 Navy budget included an additional \$1.5 billion to complete the funding for the third Seawolf submarine.

More obvious incongruence is in the new LPD-17 class ship. Currently, the LPD-17 will replace four classes of ships (LST, LKA, LPH, and LPD) that are already decommissioned, or they will be decommissioned when the new class comes into operation. It will do so with a lift deficit.⁸⁸ The Marine Corps measures amphibious lift by using five factors: troop capacity, vehicle square footage, cargo capacity in cubic feet, helicopter capacity in CH-46 equivalents and landing air cushion (LCAC) capacity. The Marine Corps has a warfighting capability lift requirement of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). The Navy constrained the LPD 17 to meet a 2.5 MEB lift requirement.⁸⁹ "The self imposed Navy constraint has been made in light of competing naval surface, subsurface, and littoral programs."⁹⁰ Recent congressional inquiries on the 2.5 MEB lift deficit caused the Navy to include reserve elements to meet the requirement. How can this be? Combatant commanders desire ARGs in Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Oceans. This does not include contingency operations such as Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda that can overburden a heavily tasked amphibious force.⁹¹ Funding for LPD-17 will not start until the 1996-2001 time frame. The lag created by amphibious ships that the Navy expects to commission and decommission will take lift requirements below 2.5 MEB, which is a lesser standard to begin with; and it will not stabilize until approximately 2009 when LPD-17 is expected to be completely on line.⁹²

"The greatest challenge facing the LPD-17 program is the Navy's historical preference to

aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers and submarines. Amphibious shipping has always been secondary."⁹³ Proponents could argue that it still is, and that this needs to change. Now it should be the primary focus. How can America justify building more carriers and submarines at an tremendous cost when it has a lift deficit in a platform that supports its overall strategic mission? The Navy has enough cruisers, destroyers, frigates and submarines to cover any significant threat for the next ten years. Efforts to build more amphibious ships are not encouraging; the 1994-1997 Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion account totals approximately 20 billion dollars; only five percent is for the amphibious community. The 1994-1997 aircraft conversion account totals approximately 21 billion dollars; only 4.7 percent is for organic amphibious support aircraft.⁹⁴ Acquisition programs are politicized processes tied to workers who need jobs, politicians who are seeking reelection and have defense facilities in their districts, preventing a dwindling industrial base, and whether the roles and missions of affected forces will survive in spite of strategic military changes. The Navy does not always buy what it needs; and if the need is not there, it appears it can find a reason and a need. The Navy needs more amphibious ships and technology to support NEF, OMFTS and littoral warfare. Plainly, fiscal military decisions have not been made in the best interest of the Nation.

PROMOTIONS AND RECOGNITION INCONGRUENCE

(how can the amphibious navy become attractive to an ensign?)

One of the fundamental ways to effect positive change in an organization is to change its system of rewards and recognition.⁹⁵ The Navy has to induce change by manipulating what causes officers to want to aspire towards a certain success during the impressionable years at the Naval Academy and NROTC programs at universities. In the Navy there is tradition and lineage;

sons and daughters of admirals who want to become admirals will choose the most direct and successful path to achieve that goal. It would be ludicrous to do otherwise. In comparing and contrasting cruiser and destroyer and amphibious subcommunities, there is clear incongruence. First, if one looked at how the Naval Academy details midshipmen prior to commissioning, it is a process that unintentionally fosters divisiveness and parochialism, and it does not give the Navy a total quality spread of officers. At the Naval Academy midshipmen are assigned to the surface community based on an order of merit score. The order of merit score consists of conduct, physical readiness and academic grades. The Naval Academy interviews the officer to determine what he or she wants to be and to assess desirability in his or her selection. They give the officer a desirability score that determines the total order of merit based in class ranking. The officers with the higher order of merit score get premium choice in ship type off a list of ships on a blackboard. Officers in the top of the class tend to choose cruisers or destroyers.⁹⁶ This process does two things that can suboptimize efforts for a healthy culture. First, it ensures there is no quality cut across the entire spectrum of communities within the surface navy, which ensures that one community is top heavy with a perception of quality officers from the Naval Academy. Second, at the most impressionable time in their careers, these midshipmen, as previously mentioned, are basically forced to look at ship type as a status symbol, because they do not see the amphibious community as a path to flag rank. Because of the "down trodden" image of the amphibious community, those who are in the top of the class make an effort not be one of the officers who has to choose an amphibious ship. Because of the divisive culture, if that happens, that midshipman is not considered a "fast tracker." The same detailing diversity process applied at the second division officer tour previously discussed, should be applied here. Top midshipmen

should go to the amphibious community as well as the cruiser and destroyer communities and other surface communities.

Midshipmen at NROTC universities use the conventional detailing process. They are assigned ships based on one large class slate. The process considers the type of student and class standing, but does not give it the same amount of weight. Comparatively speaking, it is the better way, because it takes the midshipmen out of the selection process. The detailer assigns the ship to the person based on a preference card and needs of the Navy; this provides for more of an unbiased quality spread.⁹⁷

the path to flag rank

Officers with amphibious backgrounds are less likely to make flag rank. This is a change within the last 15 years, where these officers had virtually no chance of making flag rank. The Navy selects most surface warfare flag officers from the cruiser and destroyer community. A review of officers selected to flag rank within the last ten years (1984-1994) shows that out of 112 officers selected to flag rank, only eight, or seven percent had ever commanded amphibious ships. They had all been commanding officers of carriers, cruisers, destroyers, battleships, and frigates. Of all the officers selected to flag rank, none attended the MCCSC.⁹⁸ Rear Admiral J.B. LaPlante was a true amphibian selected to the flag rank, in that, five of his tours including executive and commanding officer were aboard amphibious ships. In an interview with *Proceedings*, November 1992, he spoke candidly of ways to improve the amphibious community's (gators) down-trodden image. Implied in his response was there is a cultural and systemic bias that exists at the flag level, commander level, junior officer, and department head level. The Navy needs to seriously address the problem at all levels. The Navy must change the

amphibious officer's image by making the community attractive to an ensign by selling a positive story of what the amphibious community does and is all about. The Navy must make significant changes that inhibit chances to make flag officer in the selection process. One change that the Navy made was to make the surface officer LHD/LHA tour an initial vice sequential tour so that these officers are in the flag eligibility window much sooner in order to increase their chances for selection. Another drawback to the surface navy is that officers must compete with the navy air community for LHD/LHA command tours, therefore limiting their chances the make flag⁹⁹

CATF and CLF promotion incongruence

The naval strategy is in the littorals and officers who are warfighters in the littoral should become our flag officers of the future. The Navy should select more amphibious officers to flag rank. Between the Navy and the Marine Corps there is incongruence in the flag selection process. The Marine Corps makes its best officers CLFs. The majority of Marine Corps officers who aspire to flag rank must have a combatant specialty such as an infantry or artillery officer. Once selected for the rank of colonel, they screen to become MEU commanders where they will perform as a MEU-size CLF. MEU commanders who have successful tours place themselves in good positions to become generals. No PHIBRON commander or CATF has made flag rank in the past ten years no matter how successful he might have been. The PHIBRON commander's assignment is usually a sequential command tour. By the time an officer completes this type of tour, he more likely has passed his flag selection eligibility. Would the results be different if this were an initial tour?

In looking at a snapshot of an east coast PHIBRON incongruence is clear; the unit deployed with 22 MEUSOC in 1993, and the MEU commander was selected to brigadier general; the same

PHIBRON commander deployed with a special purpose MAGTF in 1994 during the landing at Cap Haitian, Haiti, and the MAGTF commander has been selected to the rank of brigadier general. The PHIBRON commander was not selected to flag rank. Interestingly, the commanding officer of the LHD, an aviator, was selected to flag rank; he was a subordinate of the PHIBRON commander. Later, the same PHIBRON, with a different commander on his initial vice sequential command tour, deployed with 24 MEUSOC in March 1995. 24 MEUSOC was a brigadier general-select at the beginning of the deployment, and to date, the jury is still out as to whether the PHIBRON commander will or will not make flag rank. The Scott O'Grady tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) rescue involved these PHIBRON and MEUSOC commanders. It was a difficult evolution and people performed flawlessly, but it may not be enough to make the PHIBRON commander a flag officer. However, it appears it would be enough to make the PHIBRON commander's contemporaries general officers. The PHIBRON commander had no less responsibility than the MEU commander, but the rewards in promotions and recognition are vastly different.

Promotions and recognition should change to reflect our new strategy, and based on this, the Navy should select a commensurate percentage of amphibious officers. If the Navy is not putting its *best* people in the position of PHIBRON commander, then, it should start. The PHIBRON (CATF) and MEUSOC (CLF) commanders will play pivotal roles in future operations. This way the ensign can see a way to the top; the amphibious community will have a voice and representation in the decision-making process, and most importantly, it will enhance cultural change, which in effect, enhances future warfighting capability.

CONCLUSION

a need for real change

Is the Navy on the right course and speed for the 21st century? An accurate depiction is that it is underway, in the middle of the ocean, floundering about at three knots. Current approaches will not take the Navy where it needs to go. Change is painful, but it is a necessary process. There must be a realization and understanding for change in order for real productive change to occur. Research found incongruence in doctrine, culture, training, acquisitions, and promotions and recognition. There is a interconnection; all five areas require change in order to produce positive results for an effective fighting force in the 21st century.

There is a stalemate in doctrine. The Navy is yet to publish the NEF concept. The Marine Corps has published its OMFTS concept, but it can only cautiously proceed as it waits to see how the NEF concept will parallel, support and seamlessly fold into OMFTS. The Navy must find common ground quickly; it has wasted enough time with this dilemma. The stalemate interconnects and interplays around a two divisive cultures created by nearly 50 years of separation. Integration of the two is the only way to solve the cultural incongruence and bring the *true spirit of the Navy and Marine Corps team* concept into fruition. Since there is no recognition of the problem and need to change, the Navy basically conducts training as "business as usual." The Navy's acquisition strategy does not support littoral and regional warfare; instead, it is a politicized process, a jobs program that elected officials cater to with the vested interest of getting reelected. Hence, aquisitional efforts are not in the best interest of the Nation. The amphibious community suffers from a down trodden image not because it has poor quality of officers. History shows that operations involving amphibious elements are done exceptionally

well. The problem is there is no representation at the senior level to tell the correct story and place the emphasis on amphibious community in a positive light. The current culture tends to select flag officers who are homogeneous. If the new strategy is truly littoral, then, more officers with amphibious backgrounds need to make flag rank.

The Navy and Marine Corps must be reshaped from the top down in order to operate on one accord and have a cultural and educational understanding. With the exception of doctrine and fleet training, the CNA revealed it had conducted no studies on the effects of culture, acquisitions, and promotions and recognition as change agents for the future. The Navy should task the CNA to conduct some studies and provide beneficial recommendations. To waffle on fundamental changes in these five areas will only cause the Navy to spin its wheels and waste valuable time and resources as it attempts to shift from conceptual to practical. Change will have to be an evolutionary process. Training and education are keys to the future. Generals and Admirals have to be the smartest people in the battlespace; they are responsible for winning or losing wars; and today, more than ever, winning is not merely a desired result, but an expectation with unreasonable restraints and constraints. Hence, it is a new *American way of war*, and its time to know and understand that really means its time to change.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AAAV	ADVANCE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE
AAW	ANTI-AIR WARFARE COMMANDER
AMWC	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE COMMANDER
AOA	AREA OF OPERATIONS
ARG	AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP
ASUWC	ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE COMMANDER
ASWC	ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE COMMANDER
AWS	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL
C2	COMMAND AND CONTROL
CATF	COMMANDER OF THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE
CIWS	CLOSE IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS
CJTF	COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCES
CLF	COMMANDER OF THE LANDING FORCE
CNA	CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES
CNETF	COMMANDER, NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE
CNN	CABLE NEWS NETWORK
CNO	CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CVBG	CARRIER BATTLE GROUP
CVN	NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIER
CVX	CONCEPT CARRIER UNNAMED
CWC	COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER

DD	DESTROYER WITHOUT SURFACE TO AIR GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEMS
DDG	DESTROYER WITH GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEMS
EMPRMA	EMBARKATION, MOVEMENT, PLANNING, MOVEMENT,
ASSAULT	
EWC	ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMMANDER
EWTGLANT	EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE TRAINING GROUP, ATLANTIC
EWTGPAC	EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE TRAINING GROUP, PACIFIC
"FOUR B" CONCEPT	BRIEF, BRILLIANT, BLOODLESS, BARGAIN
FFG	FRIGATE WITH GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEMS
IBO	INTEGRATED BATTLE GROUP ORGANIZATION
JPME	JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
LCAC	LANDING CRAFT AIR CUSHIONED
LFC	LANDING FORCE COMMANDER
LHA	LANDING HELICOPTER ASSAULT
LHD	LANDING HELICOPTER DOCK
LPD	LANDING DOCK TRANSPORT SHIP
LPH	ASSAULT HELICOPTERS
LSD	LANDING SHIP DOCK
LST	LANDING SHIP TANK
MAGTF	MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE
MCCSC	MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
MEB	MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE

MEF	MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
MEU	MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NAVFOR	NAVAL FORCES COMMANDER
NDC	NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND
NEF	NAVY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
NETF	NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE
OMFTS	OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA
OTC	OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND
PERMA ASSAULT	PLANNING, EMBARKATION, REHEARSAL, MOVEMENT,
PHIBRON	AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON
SEWC	SPACE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMMANDER
SOC	SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE
SSG	SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP
TRAP	TACTICAL RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL
VLS	VERTICAL LAUNCH SHIP

NOTES

¹ "..."From the Sea Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," Department of the Navy White Paper, 1992, p.14.

² Carl E. Mundy, General, USMC, "Reflections on the Corps Some Thoughts on Expeditionary Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1995, p. 27.

³ "Theater Missile Defense," lecture presented by an Army Lieutenant General at the U. S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, March 12, 1996.

⁴ "The Impacts of Down-sizing," lecture presented by a Marine Corps Lieutenant General at the U. S. Marine Corps Command And Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 17 January 1996. The speaker introduce the new American expectation of war. In the future, Americans will expect wars or conflict to be brief, brilliant, bloodless, and a bargain (four B) concept.

⁵ Mundy, p. 27.

⁶ FMFM-1 Warfighting, Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, p. 43.

⁷ Maureen Wigge and George Walne, "Doctrinal and Operational Issues in Naval Command and Control," Center for Naval Analyses Publication 94-171, October 1994, pp. 11-20. The U. S. Navy adapted composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine in 1974 for the CVBG as primarily a defensive measure to counter the Soviet threat forward deployed in the open ocean. The focus of the doctrine protected forces from the air, surface and submarine threat, while simultaneously the force maintained the ability to project decisive power ashore via air and surface strikes and naval gunfire support.

⁸ "The composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine," lecture presented by a Navy Rear Admiral at USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 29 February 1996.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ T. J. Mckearney, Commander, USN Retired, "CNEF Arriving," Proceedings, January 1996, p. 36.

¹¹ Maureen Wigge and George Walne, pp. 4-5.

¹² Barry P. Messina, "Development of U.S. Joint and Amphibious Doctrine," 1898-1945, Center for Naval Analyses Publication 94-103, September 1994, pp. 61-66.

¹³ S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1956.

¹⁴ Burton C. Quist, Colonel, USMC, "Naval Expeditionary Warfare Update," Marine Corps Gazette, March, 1996, p.41.

¹⁵ "Operation Support/Uphold Democracy" The author was a member of the PHIBRON staff that conducted the landing at Cap Haitian, Haiti, September 1994.

¹⁶ "The CATF and CLF relationship between the 11th MEUSOC and PHIBRON FIVE," lecture presented by a Marine Corps Colonel and a Navy Captain at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 22 January 1996.

¹⁷ "The CATF and CLF relationship between the 15th MEUSOC and PHIBRON THREE," lecture presented by a Marine Corps Colonel and Navy Captain at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 28 February 1996.

¹⁸ Mckearney, p. 37.

¹⁹ Wigge and Walne, p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

- ²¹ "CWC doctrine" lecture and Quist, p. 40.
- ²² Wigge and Walne, pp. 37-38.
- ²³ Fred E. Haynes, Major General, USMC retired, "What If There Is Never Another Opposed Landing?," Amphibious Warfare Review, Fall 1978, p.7. The tactical emphasis on surprise and maneuver on landing where the enemy is absent or unprepared, blurs the traditional distinction between opposed and unopposed landings. Marines must still come ashore ready and prepared to fight and win. Richard Simcock, Major, USMC, Paraphrased statements in seminar at USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 14 February 1996. In order to achieve decisive action, troops must be place on the ground with the enemy.
- ²⁴ Quist, p. 41.
- ²⁵ "Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)," lecture presented by a U.S. Navy Commander at USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 27 February 1996.
- ²⁶ "Navy Expeditionary Task Force" Telephone interview with member of Naval Doctrine Command, 15 March 1996. This interview brought out that the NEP/NETF concept was held in abeyance until three pressing dilemmas can be resolved. First, who will be CATF and CLF? Second, is an AOA required for operations short of war, if so, third, who will be the CATF? The difficulty is getting a consensus of agreement.
- ²⁷ "The revision of Joint Publication 3-02 and NWP-10-1," Telephone interview with member of the Naval Doctrine Command of 22 March 1996. This interview confirmed that Joint Publication 3-02, amphibious doctrine will be revised to include operations other than war and a rapid and deliberate planning process (EMPRA and PERMA). The Naval Doctrine Command plans to revise NWP 10-1, but these plans are on hold until there is a consensus on the NETF doctrinal issues. A General and Flag officer review board will address these issues possibly at the next Expeditionary Warfare Conference.
- ²⁸ "The revision of Joint Publication 3-02," Telephone interview with member of the Joint Combined Coalition Warfare Department, EWTGLANT, Norfolk, Virginia, 12 March 1996. EWTGLANT is the primary reviewing authority for the revision of Joint Publication 3-02, but it is currently not manned or funded for this tasking.
- ²⁹ "The revision of Joint Publication 3-02 and NWP-10-1
- ³⁰ William M. Rakow, "MAGTF Operations With the Fleet in the Year 2000," Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1990, p. 19.
- ³¹ "The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense," lecture presented by a Major General at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 29 January 1996.
- ³² "CWC doctrine," lecture.
- ³³ Nancy L. Adler, "Organizational Development in a Multicultural Environment," The Journal of Applied Behavior Science, Vol.19, No. 3, 1983, p. 349.
- ³⁴ William Steeves Jr., Ed.D., "Case Study Analysis A Model for Practical Use," lecture presented at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 18 March 1996. The lecture brought out the fact that two cultures (overt and covert) normally exist in an organization. Problem-solving and change normally occurs in the covert culture.
- ³⁵ "Offensive Ground Combat Operations," lecture presented by a Marine Corps Colonel at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 16 January 1996.
- ³⁶ Bernard E. Trainor, Lieutenant General, USMC, Retired, "Still go-ing...Amphibious Warfare," Proceedings, November 1992, p. 30.

- ³⁷ "Midshipmen initial assignments," Telephone interview with a Navy Lieutenant of the Ship Selections and Assignments Branch, Division of Professional Development, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 14 March 1996.
- ³⁸ Ibid., p. 30.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Jeremy M. Boorda, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations "The Navy-Marine Corps Team: Looking Ahead," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1995, p. 108. Admiral Boorda also reiterated the Navy-Marine Corps team concept as a premier fighting force during his visit to the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico Virginia, 28 February 1996.
- ⁴¹ Thomas E. Lloyd, Major, USMC, Retired, "LPD-17: From the Sea in the 21st Century," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1996, p. 20.
- ⁴² "Midshipmen initial assignments" interview.
- ⁴³ "The Surface Warrior" Published interview with Rear Admiral A.J. Krekich, USN, Surface Warfare, Draft for Winter Issue, 1996. Question: How do You feel about specification verses generalization for SWOs? Do you think that "track specialization" -separate career paths for Engineers, Operations, and Combat Systems types--should be allowed or even prescribed? Answer: (paraphrased) In discussing whether officers should be generalist or specialist," I am firmly on the side of continuing our policy of developing a generalist who is familiar with all facets of the surface warfare profession and is ready to command a ship at sea. Consider the new changes in the surface warfare officer's career path; officers will be exposed during their division officer tours to at least two departments as well as two platforms within the surface community. The result of the cross pollination is a stronger, smarter officer community that is ready to assume leadership roles. If this leads one to believe I have come down on the side of the generalist, then, you are correct!"
- ⁴⁴ "Conference Results of the New Division Officer and Department Head Sequencing Plan," Perspective. July, 1995, p. 8. Memorandum of Understanding to all Navy Surface Warfare Officers on the Division Officer Career Path Development, November 1995, p.1.
- ⁴⁵ "Officer Sequencing Plan," Memorandum From the United States Naval Academy, Division of Professional Development, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 14 March 1996. "Midshipmen initial assignments" interview.
- ⁴⁶ "The CWC doctrine" lecture.
- ⁴⁷ "Curriculum Changes at EWTGLANT," Telephone interview with a member of Curriculum and Curriculum Standards, EWTGLANT, Norfolk, Virginia on 12 March 1996.
- ⁴⁸ "CWC doctrine" lecture.
- ⁴⁹ "Warfighting" lecture_by a Marine Corps General at USMC Command and Staff College, 4 January 1996. This lecture suggested that we should stop operating as separate forces (CVBG/ARGMEUSOC) and operate as one complete battle force in mindset and thought processes.
- ⁵⁰ "Amphibious Ready Group Operations," lecture presented by a Navy Captain at the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 30 January 1996.
- ⁵¹ "Amphibious Ready Group Operations" The author was a member and watchstander of the squadron (PHIBRON) that deployed and operated with the submarine James K. Polk.
- ⁵² "Changes in training between the CVBG and the ARG/MEUSOC," Telephone interview with member of the Joint Combined Coalition Warfare Department, EWTGLANT, Norfolk, Virginia, 12 March 1996.
- ⁵³ "CJTG Staff Need More Amphibious Warfare Training," Navy Lessons Learned Database, 20 November 1994. This was a lesson learned during CVBG and ARG/MEUSOC workups for deployment during fleet exercise 1994 (FLEETEX 1-94) held November-December 1993.

⁵⁴ "Changes in training between the CVBG and the ARG/MEUSOC" interview.
⁵⁵ William S. Lind, "Preparing for Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1984, p 48.
⁵⁶ Terry C. Pierce, "Maneuver Warfare From Theory to Practice," Proceedings, November 1992, p. 64.
⁵⁷ Ibid.
⁵⁸ Memorandum of Student Background Information. Office of the Registrar, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 20 September 1995.
⁵⁹ Pierce, p. 67.
⁶⁰ A survey conducted by the author, of Navy officers at Marine Corps Command and Staff.
⁶¹ Memorandum From the Bureau of Naval Personnel (442D) of Navy Surface Warfare Officer Attendees to USMC Command and Staff College, 19 March 1996.
⁶² Ibid.
⁶³ Memorandum of Student Background Information
⁶⁴ "Surface Flag Select FY 84-94." Surface Warfare Magazine, various months, 1984-1994, pp. various. A canvass of flag selections reveals that in ten years 112 surface officers, including reserves, were selected to flag rank. Out of those 112, 8 or 7 percent had a commanding officer amphibious tour. None of those amphibious officers attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Those with joint professional military education either attended the Naval War College, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia or not at all.
⁶⁵ "Surface Warfare Billets at the Naval War College," Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Service College and Placement (440), Telephone interview with a member of the Directorate, 12 April 1996.
⁶⁶ T. E. Donovan, Colonel, USMC, "Symmetry Between USMC Command and Staff and the Naval War College," Personal interview with the Dean of Academics, USMC Command and Staff College, 21 March 1996.
⁶⁷ "Naval War College Curriculum," Telephone interview with an Executive Assistance to the Dean of Academics, Naval War College, Newport Rhode, Island, 21 March 1996.
⁶⁸ FMFM-1 Warfighting, pp. 62-3.
⁶⁹ Debbie Hallye, "Naval ROTC Curriculum Development," Telephone interview with Director of Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, Chief of Naval Education and Training Pensacola, Florida, 13 March 1996.
⁷⁰ "Midshipmen Curriculum Review," Telephone interview with member of Seamanship and Navigation Directorate, U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 14 March 1996.
⁷¹ "Marine Corps Basic School Curriculum Review," Telephone interview with member of the Operations Department, Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, 15 March 1996.
⁷² "Recruit Training," Telephone interview with the Director of Recruit Training, Chief of Naval Education and Training, Pensacola, Florida, 14 March 1996.
⁷³ "NEF and OMFTS as training concept," Telephone interview with Naval Leadership Program Manager, Chief of Naval Education and Training, Pensacola, Florida, 13 March 1996.
⁷⁴ "Curriculum Changes" Telephone interviews with Director of Curriculum Development for Navy Surface Department Head and Basic Division Officer's Course, Newport, Rhode Island, 7 March 1996.
⁷⁵ "Curriculum Changes" Telephone interview with the Curriculum Manager of Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Virginia, 15 March 1996.
⁷⁶ Ibid.

- ⁷⁷ "Curriculum Changes at EWTGLANT," interview.
- ⁷⁸ "Amphibious and Expeditionary Warfare School Quotas," Telephone interview with member of Quota Control Directorate, EWTGLANT, Norfolk, Virginia, 15 March 1996.
- ⁷⁹ Thomas L. Blickensderfer, "Amphibious Mines: Silent Enemy of the Landing Force," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992, p.84.
- ⁸⁰ "Mine Countermeasures in the Littorals," lecture by a Navy Captain at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 1 March 1996.
- ⁸¹ Blickensderfer, p. 85. "Mine Countermeasures" Telephone interview with a member of the Expeditionary Warfare Directorate, Naval Operations, Washington, D.C., 20 March 1996. This interview confirmed that funding has been approved, but the key is not to waste money on bad technology.
- ⁸² "Operational Maneuver From The Sea," Conference Between the CNO's Strategic Studies Group and Member of the Marine Corps Combat Developing Group, Quantico, Virginia, 22 March 1996.
- ⁸³ "The Future of the Carrier," Naval Sea System Command, Surface Ship Directorate (Carriers), Telephone interview with member of department, 20 March 1996.
- ⁸⁴ Paul E. Spear, "The DDG-51 Program: Recapitalizing the Surface Force," "Center for Naval Analyses, pp. 1-2. This study found the DDG-51 a reasonable program to meet the requirements for maintaining peacetime presence, responding to crises, and fighting regional conflicts. Additionally building three ships per year was a reasonable building rate.
- ⁸⁵ "The DDG-51," Naval Sea Systems Command, PMS 400D, Aegis Program Office, Telephone interview with member of the department, 25 March 1995.
- ⁸⁶ William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March 1996, p. 163.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., p.162.
- ⁸⁸ Joel R. Powers, "The Amphibious Lift Deficit: Is it Necessary?" Marine Corps Gazette, March 1996, p. 16.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 17.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid..
- ⁹¹ Ibid..
- ⁹² Ibid., p. 18.
- ⁹³ Lloyd,p. 21.
- ⁹⁴ Memorandum From the Department of the Navy Assistant Secretary of the Navy Office of Budget, "FY 96/97 Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy Six year Plan, tables, 1, 14, 15 18 and 19.
- ⁹⁵ Larry Lerer, Dr., "Behaviors Factors in Management," lecture presented at USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia who is Professor of the Education Department of Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 11 March 1996.
- ⁹⁶ "Detailing the Midshipmen," Telephone interview.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ "Surface Flag Select FY 84-94."
- ⁹⁹ "The Path Ahead for "Gators" and Marines" Published interview with Rear Admiral J.B. LaPlante, USN, Proceedings, November, 1992.

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