Presidential Decisionmaking and Use of Force: Case Study Grenada
Abstract
The 1983 military intervention in Grenada was quickly followed by a flurry of articles and studies analyzing its various features and dimensions. Presidential actions under the War Powers Act, the legitimacy of the intervention under international law, media relations, foreign policy implications, and the performance of the military were all exhaustively analyzed and criticized. Yet the processes at the presidential level that ultimately led to the decision to use military force in Grenada remain largely unexplored. Though much remains unknown, enough time has passed to allow us to probe this angle with some degree of historical detachment. Operation Urgent Fury serves as an excellent case study of one administration's response to a crisis. What can the Grenada experience teach us about presidential decisionmaking and use of force at such critical times? First, was Grenada a "crisis" at all? Some have questioned whether the events surrounding the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop were only a pretext for a military intervention, already planned and rehearsed A careful review of the events leading to President Reagan's "Go" memorandum of 23 October 1983 suggests that while a predisposition to oppose further communist expansion in Latin America was undeniably present, real fears for the safety of American citizens prompted the US response. Certainly the Grenada intervention was no Cuban missile crisis, but the elements of perceived danger to Americans, direct Cuban and Soviet involvement, and an already strained and tense superpower relationship created an explosive mixture--particularly when interpreted by an ideologically committed administration determined to avoid the imprimatur of weakness which had crippled its predecessor.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA527983
Entities
People
- Richard D. Hooker Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College