Reserve Force Training After the Gulf War
Abstract
Amidst the near-universal acknowledgement of the success of the deployed reserve force units' during the Gulf Crisis is the unresolved dispute over the delayed mobilization and nondeployment of three National Guard combat brigades. Accusations were leveled and misinformation proliferated as the debate raged regarding their actual levels of preparedness. It is our position, based on overwhelming evidence, that the Total Force policy is a success and that most reserve force units approach desired levels of readiness. It is in the realm of training that some adjustments are required. Having achieved considerable success in manning and equipping reserve units, the Army must now devote more attention to training, which is probably the largest readiness detractor confronting both active and reserve units. Unlike active units, reserve force units typically train collectively only 39 days per year; many Reservists and Guardsmen devote additional time during the year to individual training both in their specific military specialties and in broader professional development. Some Army missions cannot be adequately trained in that time and should not be assigned to reserve force units. Beyond that problem, the critical variable for reserve units is time management: using the available training time better to improve unit readiness. This article will offer proposals to improve reserve training through better time management.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA528266
Entities
People
- Abbott A. Brayton
- Lawrence D. Richardson
Organizations
- United States Army War College