The Effect of Decoys in IED Warfare

Abstract

This report examines two forms of decoy that may arise in warfare involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first is a fake IED, which costs less than a real IED and wastes the time of route-clearing patrols that investigate it. The second is an understaffed surveillance tower, which may provide some deterrence to insurgent activities, as from the outside the tower appears to be fully operational. For each form of decoy, we formulate mathematical models to study the optimal strategies for both the insurgents and the government forces. We use numerical examples to demonstrate our models, and to point out the situations when these decoys may play a significant role in IED warfare.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 2010
Accession Number
ADA528332

Entities

People

  • Alan R. Washburn
  • Kyle Y. Lin

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter IED
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Algorithms
  • Deterrence
  • Equations
  • Explosive Devices
  • Explosives
  • Game Theory
  • Governments
  • Improvised Explosive Devices
  • Mathematical Models
  • Models
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Surveillance
  • Systems Engineering
  • United States
  • United States Military Academy
  • Zero-Sum Games

Readers

  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.
  • Munitions and Ordnance Engineering
  • Systems Analysis and Design