Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough

Abstract

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act strengthened the role of the Chairman with one hand and weakened it with the other by failing to provide adequate resources in four crucial areas. CJCS is charged with developing joint doctrine but is so understaffed and underfunded that doctrinal development must be passed to the services, which seem unable to handle it. Further, the Chairman must assess service capabilities, yet a more rigorous evaluation is needed. Joint training also poses a dilemma: the services train forces for joint operations, but no one has responsibility for training CINCs and their staffs to use those forces. Finally, the Joint Staff evaluates preparedness (readiness) under a uniform system that is not up to the job. Among the answers to such problems are inviting retired CINCs to rate active ones, enhancing exercise evaluations, enacting legislation to bolster the doctrine process, and lifting the manpower cap on the Joint Staff.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1995
Accession Number
ADA528916

Entities

People

  • Charles W. Stiles
  • Franklin D. Hitt Jr.
  • Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Organizations

  • National Defense University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Computer Simulations
  • Congress
  • Department Of Defense
  • Doctrine
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Joints
  • Law
  • Military Advisors
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Standards
  • Students
  • Task Forces
  • Training
  • Universities
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Systems Analysis and Design