

Unconventional Warfare And The Principles Of War

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SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Unconventional Warfare and the Principles of War

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Thesis: The Principles of War is an insufficient construct and has limited application on the unconventional battlefield.

Background: The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a basic paradigm shift with respect to world order. We are witness to the many faces of war as it rages across numerous continents in ubiquitous fashion, fueled by ethnic and religious intolerance; political and economic instability; and continued ideological challenges to emerging democracies. The new face of battle dictates that we view conflict studies from a sociological and intellectual perspective rather than traditional historical analysis. The majority of conflict in the 21st century will no doubt occur in the form of unconventional or low intensity conflict. This trend will force us to look at the international community as well as U.S. security interests in a new light, and the difficulties this presents are quite evident. We are attempting to understand the implications of this new world order on our national security policy, military security strategy, force structure and employment. We can be certain that U.S. military forces will continue to find themselves employed not only in traditional roles, but also more so in non traditional roles which are characteristically found at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Unconventional warfare differs qualitatively from conventional warfare. Thus, when employed in unconventional roles, it is imperative that U.S. military personnel fully understand these qualitative differences and how they impact upon our actions on the battlefield. The focus of this study is threefold: first it conveys the salient characteristics of unconventional warfare, particularly revolutionary guerrilla warfare; secondly, based on theoretical and doctrinal analysis it determines the validity of the traditional principles of war with respect to unconventional warfare and it derives a particular set of principles pertinent to guerrilla warfare; lastly, it constructively analyzes the principles of guerrilla warfare derived from the analysis with respect to counterrevolutionary warfare. The results indicated that the traditional principles of war, while applicable, are too limited in scope to be used successfully in unconventional warfare. The political and human dimensions of unconventional warfare go beyond the scope of the traditional principles of war.

Recommendation: Military doctrine should specifically address the limitations of the principles of war in unconventional warfare. It should also provide another construct which may serve as a guideline for the conduct of unconventional warfare.

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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union has come to an abrupt ending. In the wake of its termination lie the remnants of a once formidable and mighty adversary, whose contrasting ideology served to symbolize and characterize decades of what had come to be known as the bipolar struggle for power. The recent collapse and fragmentation of the Soviet Union has thus resulted in the creation of a new world order which left the United States not only as victor of the Cold War, but also an unrivaled power in the world political, military and economic arena. The events which unfolded since the demise of the Soviet Union have however, left us ill-prepared to deal with the nature and extent of armed conflict which now wreaks havoc on a global scale.

The current magnitude of low-intensity conflict and absence of the great Soviet threat has resulted in a basic paradigm shift with respect to how we perceive the international environment and U.S. national security interests. This shift necessarily impacts on the manner in which national policy and grand strategy is formulated, and how the employment of military forces is effected. "The new face of battle requires a new approach to conflict studies, an approach based more on social and intellectual than on traditional military history."¹

We are witness to the many faces of war as it rages across numerous continents in ubiquitous fashion, fueled by ethnic and religious intolerance; political and economic instability; and continued ideological challenges to emerging democratic governments. The most common type of conflict in past decades has come in the form of low intensity conflict. Much of it derived from communist supported insurgent movements directed against unstable governments within developing countries. Today we are challenged by a new variety of threats under the guise of low intensity conflict, which carry with them an equally insidious danger of usurping regional and global stability. The full scale and devastating impact of these conflicts may not be felt for decades, but they most assuredly will serve to set the stage for future violent struggles.

We can be certain that the dawn of the 21st century will be marked by an ever increasing and pervasive incidence of low intensity conflict. "Unconventional warfare is the primary method by which low intensity conflict is fought",² and in its many forms it will continue to plague nations throughout the world as the forces of modernization gnaw at the core of existing societies and cultures. Third World instability and reaction to these forces in the form of violence will continue to pose significant challenges to U.S. policy formulation and strategy in dealing with such issues. Although these conflicts are often localized, they have significant regional and global security implications. "Unfortunately, the kind of conflicts that are characteristic of the present decade defy simplistic solutions and virtually preclude any one set of policies or answers."³

A critical weakness in U.S. warfighting doctrine has been in the area of unconventional warfare. Numerous terms have been coined in an effort to encapsulize the spectrum of military activities which do not fit neatly under the rubric of conventional military conflict. The issue is clouded by an abundance of lexicons which have been used interchangeably to describe conflict at the lower end of the spectrum. The 1987 White House document on National Security Strategy listed fifty-six⁴ alternative terms for unconventional warfare. This list did not include the present day and most non-descriptive verbiage "operations other than war." With the expansion of military roles and missions, came an expansion of activities which may not necessarily be characterized by conventional force employment. Hence, a constant effort is made to better classify those activities under the pretext of current doctrinal concepts.

The conflicts which have come to comprise the spectrum of low intensity conflict are not wars of "trenches, front lines, and masses of men in uniform struggling against each other on bloody battlefields. Rather, [these are wars] of subtleties, nuances, intimidation, fear, political mobilization, terror and revolution - at times bloody but most times characterized by psychological warfare, political maneuvering and mobilization, disinformation, deception, assassination, and terrorism."⁵

The incidence and gravity of such conflicts will likely increase in the coming decades and our ability to adequately respond to these threats remains questionable at best; much like it has in the past. I believe this is the case for several reasons: the predisposition of the United States remains with the conventional military mindset; the structure and training of military forces is not maximized to deal with low intensity threats; we suffer from poor integration and dissemination of intelligence; lack a coherent policy, strategy, doctrine and tactics with respect to unconventional warfare; and most importantly, we lack a basic understanding of the nature of this type of conflict.

"...unconventional conflicts have a number of features that distinguish them from conventional conflicts. Among other things, unconventional conflicts are asymmetric. This means for the United States such conflicts are limited and are not considered a threat to its survival or a matter of vital interests. But for the indigenous adversaries, the conflicts *are* matters of survival, challenge vital interests, and are seen as "total wars." In no small way, these differences reflect deeper differences between U.S. and Third World systems in terms of strategic cultures, nature and character of political systems, and political-military systems.⁶

We have entered a new era where the once consistent and predictable bipolar world has been transformed into a highly uncertain and volatile multipolar world. This transformation has resulted in the necessary abandonment of conventional wisdom with respect to international relations and politics, defining the role of the United States in the new world order, and the structure and function of military forces to support its role.

In attempting to formulate cohesive military doctrine in the area of unconventional warfare it is necessary to consider it in the context of the principles of war which have served as a cornerstone of military thought for centuries, but like any other theoretical framework, it has not escaped considerable speculation and debate regarding its universal application in war. The utility and relevance of the principles of war have been a focus of military debate since their conception.

On one side of the debate lies the argument that they are scientific principles that should be adhered to at all costs. In contrast is the argument that the principles of war provide merely a

framework, construct or guide which requires their selective application as various situations may warrant. While many have accepted their relevance in conventional conflicts, their utility in unconventional conflicts have remained circumspect, and thus have led to more exhausting debate. There are those who hold to the notion that unconventional conflicts or guerrilla warfare must have their own guiding principles as reflected in the following statement by Israeli Defense Force Brigadier General Avraham Ayalon: "A principle of war is... a guideline for thinking about a war, directing a war and learning lessons from a war... The accepted principles are relevant for conventional warfare, while guerrilla warfare has principles of their own."⁷ An opposing viewpoint is provided by U.S. Army General Donn A. Starry in the following: "While any set of principles of war adopted by a nation has application across the entire spectrum of warfare, it must be understood that the principles are interdependent and interrelated. No single principle can be blindly adhered to or observed to the exclusion of others, and none can assure victory in battle without reinforcement from one or more of the others."⁸

"The principles of war have two epistemological roles, which are themselves reciprocal. They are guidelines for action and they embody the fundamental constructs of military thought."⁹ Although *principles* imply a kind of scientific or prescriptive formula for achieving success, the application of such principles must be exercised in the context of judgment, and therefore is highly subjective in nature. Quite simply, the proper application of the principles of war in order to achieve success on the battlefield is an art form rather than a scientific method.

The focus of this study will be threefold: first it will attempt to convey the salient points regarding the nature and dynamics of unconventional warfare, particularly revolutionary guerrilla warfare; secondly based upon theoretical and doctrinal analysis, it will attempt to derive *principles of guerrilla warfare*, and lastly, it will attempt to constructively analyze the application and utility of principles of war with respect to counterrevolutionary warfare. In so doing, if the conventional principles are found to be inapplicable or inadequate, an alternate

construct will be proposed as *unconventional principles of war*. Finally, two case studies will be explored to substantiate the findings of this study.

Unconventional Warfare Defined

Unconventional warfare is defined by DOD as: "A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace."¹⁰

To narrow the focus of this paper the principles of war will be considered specifically with respect to their application in revolutionary guerrilla or partisan warfare and also counterrevolutionary warfare. To begin from a common vantage point, the following definition of revolutionary guerrilla warfare is provided: Revolutionary guerrilla warfare is defined as "all aspects of a revolutionary effort to displace an existing government by force, and also to the efforts of a *de facto* government to defend itself against such displacement."¹¹ Guerrilla or partisan warfare is one of the categories of unconventional conflict as earlier defined, and normally takes place within the broader context of revolutionary warfare or insurgency.

Although by definition guerrilla warfare consists exclusively of military and paramilitary operations, it must be emphasized that it cannot be isolated from the political dimension it serves. The Clausewitzian *trinity of war* is no less applicable to the general category of low intensity conflict or guerrilla warfare than it is to conventional conflict. His dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" is even more apropos to unconventional conflict. Unconventional conflicts are political wars in the most literal sense. Thus, in framing a military

response to guerrilla activity, military actions must be coordinated with the other instruments of national power in order to provide a synergistic response and solution to the conflict.

THE DYNAMICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

The Third World has become a common breeding ground for guerrilla movements. The inability of many governments to meet even the most basic needs of its indigenous population as a whole or in part, is contributing to the widespread formation of guerrilla movements. It has become a common method for the oppressed, whether real or perceived, to effectively display their discontent toward governmental policies which are often viewed as self-serving and discriminatory. The efficacy of guerrilla warfare has been substantiated by numerous historical successes "...bullet for bullet, man for man, and yard for yard [it] may be the most effective type of warfare ever waged. Its goals are simple, its targets limited, its terrain familiar, its results immediate, and its satisfactions personal."¹²

This study will attempt to espouse and analyze the salient characteristics of revolutionary guerrilla warfare from the political, military and human perspectives. The military aspect will be analyzed using a slight variation of the battlefield operating system (BOS), since it is precisely this model which functionally serves as the current framework for U.S. military operations planning, integration and execution.

Background

Guerrilla wars are not unique in their political aspect, but the political dimension is highlighted by the fact that its political agenda is precisely what is used to fuel the conflict, Guerrilla organizations usually do not have any hidden agendas. Their political motivations and objectives serve as the collective unifying force for gaining popular support. Che Guevara, like Mao Tse Tung, emphasized that "guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses"¹³ and that an indispensable requirement of guerrilla warfare is gaining the support of the indigenous

population. In such conflicts, the population is the guerrillas' center of gravity; the hub of all power.

The Evolution of Revolution

Every war has its cause. Determining the underlying cause of a war will more often than not provide the analyst with a modicum of information regarding the nature and general characteristics of the conflict. This provides the military professional with requisite information necessary to accomplish the first step in the planning process -- mission analysis. This crucial step in the planning process serves as the foundation on which all subsequent activity should be based. Therefore, when considering the employment of military forces we should pay heed to the Clausewitz dictum that:

...the first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. At the outset of a war its character and scope should be determined on the basis of its political probabilities. The closer these political probabilities drive war toward the absolute, the more the [belligerents] are involved and drawn into its vortex, the clearer appear the connections between its separate actions, and the more imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last.¹⁴

Guerrilla warfare may be precipitated by any number of different societal factors which breed discontent. Discontent derives from oppression, whether real or perceived, and may come in many forms -- political, economic, religious, ethnic or ideological, which either singly or in tandem, may lend cause for inciting guerrilla movements. Simply stated, guerrilla warfare is an organized rebellion against prevailing conditions which are viewed by the indigenous population as a whole, or in part, to be repressive or alienating. In Mao's words "guerrilla operations are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance."¹⁵

In order for guerrilla warfare to begin and take hold, a society must be vulnerable or possess the conditions which make it ripe for an insurgency. The response to *vulnerability* can

vary from one of complete resignation to that of violence. The manner in which the response is given is based on a number of other variables such as general education of the population, traditional values and standards of the society, the nature of the government and the degree to which it will tolerate dissent, as well as activities occurring within other vulnerable societies.¹⁶

A vulnerable society is society of discontent which possesses a great deal of potential for social unrest and protest. It is within this vulnerable society that a guerrilla leader can stimulate mass support; and it is he that can provide the organization which converts their potential energy of protest into the kinetic forces of guerrilla warfare.¹⁷

Types of Guerrilla Movements

There are several types of guerrilla movements, and each have their own unique characteristics, based on the objectives they seek to obtain. Based on his research and analysis, Bard O'Neill has categorized seven types of guerrilla movements: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. The first four of these are considered to be revolutionary in nature because they "seek to completely change an existing political system."¹⁸ The importance of identifying the type of guerrilla movement and their associated goals is useful in the sense that it then gives some indication of the resources that are required by the guerrilla organization, since different goals place on them varying demands. Realizing their demands allows for the targeting of critical resources while preserving your own through economy of force. A brief synopsis of the various types are summarized in subsequent paragraphs.

The goal of the *anarchist* is to "eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements because they view the superordinate-subordinate authority associated with them as unnecessary and illegitimate."¹⁹

Egalitarian movements focus on the objective of imposing a new political system designed on the basis of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures which serve to

mobilize the population and radically transform the existing social structure. Political systems formed on the basis of this concept are normally authoritarian, repressive and elitist.

Traditionalist movements based on sacred or primordial values as a function of religious affiliation also have as their objective displacement of the current political structure. "The political structures they seek to establish are characterized by limited or guided participation and low autonomy, with political power in the hands of an autocratic leader supported by the nobility, army and clergy."²⁰

Pluralist movements have as their goal the establishment of a differentiated and autonomous political order which emphasizes the values of individual freedom, liberty and compromise.

The *secessionist* is perhaps the most common form of guerrilla movement at the present time. It is a characteristic of much of the ethnic unrest that recently has been unleashed across the globe. The goals of these movements are perhaps the most far reaching of any of the previous groups because they renounce the political community of which they are a part. Their aim is to withdraw from the present system and form a new, independent and autonomous political community.

The *reformist* represents the least ambitious type of movement. Their basic goal is to achieve more benefits (political, economic and social) for their constituencies without usurping the political community or political authorities.

The last type of movement, the *preservationist*, significantly differs from the others in basic orientation. Their desire is not to replace any existing political system but rather to preserve the status quo because they are the recipients of certain economic, social and political privileges from the current system. Thus, violent acts will be committed against nonruling groups which are viewed as a threat to the status quo by their potential to effect change.

Phases of a Guerrilla Movement

Generally speaking, most revolutionary movements transition through fairly distinct phases, although the number of these phases differ with particular guerrilla warfare theories. For the purpose of this discussion, I will outline five phases: the clandestine organization phase; psychological offensive phase; expansion phase; militarization phase and consolidation phase.²¹

The **clandestine organization phase** (also referred to as the preparatory or passive organizational phase) consists of organization, consolidation and preservation. Undergrounds provide much of the impetus for revolutionary guerrilla movements and they play a significant role in its organization and coordination, as well as in the conduct of psychological operations and in the collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence and scene-of-battle information.²² "The most important element in a guerrilla campaign is the underground political infrastructure... It becomes very difficult to eradicate an insurrectional movement once its large-scale underground political infrastructure has been set up."²³ Therefore, substantial effort is given during the preparatory phase toward establishing the political infrastructure -- the basis upon which mass mobilization is effected. This incipient phase offers the government the best possible opportunity for quelling an insurgency or potential insurgency at the lowest cost in resources, however, it is very unlikely to be eliminated in this phase. One of the reasons for this is that this phase is usually characterized by non-violent activities, thus giving it the appearance of not being a direct threat to the government. During this phase the government is either likely to ignore the movement, underestimate its power and significance, or it may in fact not be aware of it at all.

The second stage consists of the **psychological offensive phase**. In general, covert operations are conducted where activities in this phase consist of agitation and maneuvering, intense propaganda campaigns, and the formation of political, military and intelligence cells and cadres. Government and civilian positions of authority are infiltrated. Base areas are organized in remote and rugged rural areas where personnel are recruited, indoctrinated and politically

sensitized. In effect, a protective belt of sympathizers is formed around each base area made up of sympathizers willing to provide food, recruits and information while denying it to the enemy.²⁴ As the organization expands, particular effort is made to recruit personnel from professional sectors of the society. The aim is mass mobilization of the society.

Propaganda and psychological operations are aimed at winning the cooperation of the local people and efforts are directed toward discrediting and undermining trust and confidence in the government and security forces. The political and military intelligence network is established. Informants are pervasive; they are established within all sectors of the society and are expected to report on a wide variety of subjects, regardless of other tasks they may be assigned.

Undergrounds may also be instrumental in establishing provisional or "shadow governments." Provisional governments may be organized to provide the movement with an appearance of legitimacy. This in turn allows for the solicitation of assistance from foreign governments who may recognize it as legitimate. These "shadow governments" may be created to operate schools, health care facilities, and provide security in controlled areas in place of the incumbent government. Undergrounds are as important to the success or failure of revolutionary movements as guerrilla units themselves.

The pattern of the process in this phase is "clandestine, methodical and progressive"²⁵ and its thrust is to gain popular support and momentum. This literally could take years to accomplish, but time is on the side of the guerrillas.

The third stage, **expansion phase**, is characterized by active resistance where sabotage, coercion, terrorism and assassinations are conducted on a limited basis. Attacks are conducted on vulnerable military and security force outposts. The focus of activity during this phase is the procurement of arms, ammunition and other essential supplies.

"Military actions in early stage three are small hit-and-run attacks against convoys, military and economic installations, and isolated outposts. These scattered attacks are intended to

goad the government into adopting a static defensive posture and dispersing its forces in order to protect many potential targets."²⁶

Three operational levels often constitute the military organization in late stage two: regional, district and local. A central headquarters coordinates all three levels in pursuit of common military and political objectives. Often by this stage a parallel political hierarchy (or shadow government) and military organization is in place and is relatively secure. It is during this stage that guerrillas consider themselves to be in a position of strategic stalemate and so they usually will refrain from fighting positional battles or defending their base areas. "Military actions in late stage three are basically large-scale guerrilla attacks carried out from secure base areas [and] armed propaganda teams are dispatched to further undermine the enemy."²⁷

The fourth phase is the **militarization** (direct action or guerrilla warfare) **phase** where operations are conducted using guerrilla tactics by local units. The results of these activities are that guerrillas gain significant control of sectors of the population. The enemy is continuously harassed and put under constant pressure and areas directly under guerrilla control are expanded. Following the militarization phase, when guerrilla activity begins, the underground will play the additional role of providing all necessary support such as intelligence, recruits, food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, medicines and other supplies to support the guerrillas. They also conduct liaison for external support.

The final, **consolidation** (or open offensive) **stage**, begins when it is apparent that the balance has swung in favor of the guerrilla forces. It is during this stage that a significant portion of the guerrilla force is transformed into a conventional force capable of engaging the enemy in decisive combat and hence it is characterized by mobile conventional operations. The movement now assumes the form of a protracted people's war against the government. Guerrilla operations augment and continue in concert with conventional forces; extensive areas are dominated by the guerrillas. Conventional warfare methods will only be employed if and when adequate supplies of heavy equipment are obtained and sanctuaries can be attained for training regular forces. If the

results of this phase are inconclusive, the insurgents will move to consolidate their gains, and prepare for expansion at a later time.

The above description of the phases offers just one of a number of constructs to describe the evolution of a revolutionary guerrilla movement. Mao described the movement in three phases which combined the first three stages described above into one. Likewise in his book *Low-Intensity Conflict*, Gallagher uses a three phased approach to describing the evolution of revolutionary guerrilla movements which he identifies as: the latent and incipient phase, the guerrilla warfare phase and the war of movement phase. This very closely parallels Mao's description of its evolution from organization, consolidation, and preservation; progressive expansion; and decision or destruction of the enemy. It must also be emphasized that the distinction between the phases which were previously delineated, are not necessarily as sharp in practice as they are in theory and some phases may be incorporated into others, compressing the overall evolution of the rebellion.

Understanding the Nature of Guerrilla Warfare

To understand the nature of guerrilla warfare it is necessary to have a complete understanding of the interrelated dimensions and interplay of politics, the population and military activity, and how each of these factor into the dynamics of guerrilla warfare.

The Political Dimension

"The first and most important characteristic of a guerrilla movement is its political essence",²⁸ and waging guerrilla war is the vehicle by which partisans achieve their political goals or end-state. Mao wrote of the necessity not to lose sight of the political goal, because without it, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in nature."²⁹ In this respect, it may be said that "political mobilizers and cadres are more important in the long run than battlefield

soldiers."³⁰ "Political operations become a contest between the host government and insurgents. They concern political, social, religious, or economic issues and serve to promote or preserve legitimacy. The government and its representatives must present their program as the better choice."³¹ The principles derived from this aspect is **objective and legitimacy**.

The Human Dimension

"The public relations side of guerrilla war is the side most easily overlooked, for we all tend to think of war as a rather straightforward process of defeating an opposing armed force and destroying its power to resist."³² Mao's primary emphasis was on gaining the support of the indigenous population through the conduct of astute psychological warfare campaigns, and the importance he placed on this aspect of guerrilla strategy is reflected in the following: "Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist or flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation."³³ Thus gaining and maintaining the support of the masses is a necessary precondition for success of the guerrilla movement. Unlike Mao however, it makes little difference to the modern guerrilla whether winning the civil population is accomplished by kindness or terror. The principles derived from this aspect are those of mobilization and psychology.

The Military Dimension

Guerrillas operate in small, mobile units usually in the enemy rear area, disrupting supply, command and control, and attacking weak spots -- this is the foundation of guerrilla strategy. Historically, to U.S. planners, the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations necessarily implied fighting an asymmetrical battle -- the conventional against unconventional. It pitted the highly trained soldier against the unskilled soldier; the technologically advanced against the archaic. Even with all the seemingly great advantages that conventional forces have over the guerrilla in the way of weapons, training, and numerical superiority, the American experience on the unconventional battlefield has shown otherwise. For the conventional warrior, fighting the

guerrilla is an interminable contest because the enemy is often indiscernible from the rest of the indigenous population. "Both in its development and its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics."³⁴ In order to effectively apply principles of war in counterguerrilla operations, we must understand those distinctive facets which characterize it as such.

Intelligence

"Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations"³⁵ and thus, guerrilla organizations place a premium on the collection and exploitation of intelligence information. A great deal of effort is expended in establishing an extensive intelligence network which for them, makes a substantial payoff. It can be used to economize the use of their numerically inferior forces and as a force multiplier, capitalize on the element of surprise. The masses are the guerrillas' intelligence collection and dissemination platforms and every effort is made to exploit this resource "...intelligence resides in people - little people, insignificant people, but people without whose support the combatant in the 'little war' is bound to be defeated."³⁶

Guerrillas are expert in the area of collection and exploitation of human intelligence (HUMINT). Their intelligence infrastructure is not only pervasive but tightly knit, so that while operating in known guerrilla controlled areas, everyone must be suspect as an agent. Local cadres provide the link for direct access to information from the population and maintain constant pressure on everyone to provide information. "Because of superior information guerrillas always engage [government forces] under conditions of their own choosing."³⁷

In addition to their knowledge of the enemy, guerrillas have detailed knowledge of the terrain. They are not only knowledgeable of the difficulties in operating in certain areas or types of terrain, but specifically seek to conduct operations where mobility and maneuver is difficult because they use it to their advantage.

The physical environment plays a key role in those situations where the government is assumed to enjoy political-military supremacy at the beginning of hostilities... Rugged

terrain - vast mountains, jungles, swamps, forests and the like - is usually related to successful guerrilla operations, because it hinders movement by government troops and provides inaccessible hideouts for the guerrillas main bases.³⁸

Simply stated "... the terrain reduces the better equipped, better trained, and better armed regular force to a level where the partisan is its equal"³⁹ Although the importance of terrain is explicit, the guerrilla does not fight positional battles in order to seize terrain; i.e. terrain is never an objective but rather a factor which can be exploited in the attainment of an objective. Guerrilla strategy must constantly adapt to the enemy situation, terrain, existing lines of communication, relative strengths, weather and the population.⁴⁰ It is precisely for this reason that intelligence forms the backdrop against which successful guerrilla wars are waged. The principles derived are knowledge and adaptability.

Leadership

Effective leadership is required for the organization, coordination and control of guerrilla warfare. Thus, it is a vital element of the command and control system. Leadership is centralized for the purpose of coordinating strategy and unity of effort, but decentralized for operations. Leadership is a fundamental requisite of guerrilla warfare -- "power, in the guerrilla war, is measured not by mass alone, that great stylized operations by regiments and divisions are feckless blows in the air, [but in fact] power is, more than anything else, a function of skill and leadership."⁴¹ Thus leadership is integral to establishing an organizationally effective and cohesive movement. If the leader possesses the necessary organizational acumen, it will be reflected by the movement's unity of effort at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. Military leaders have two distinct yet related sets of responsibilities... the first being the traditional responsibility for their military mission and their troops, but also, beyond the mission of destroying an enemy, they must also exercise constructive influence to achieve larger political and psychological objectives.⁴² The principle derived is unity of effort.

Command and Control

Guerrilla tactics are normally employed by small, lightly equipped, platoon or squad sized elements who rely heavily on initiative and independent operations. Unlike conventional units, guerrilla units execute by way of decentralized command and decentralized control. "Guerrilla operations conducted over a wide region are necessarily decentralized... this decentralization is to some extent forced upon guerrillas because they ordinarily lack a well-developed system of technical communications."⁴³ Therefore, command and control at the unit level is simplistic; guerrillas do not rely on complex command and control systems. Command and control requires simplicity in order to support their highly mobile, hit-and-run raid tactics.

The guerrilla warfare concept of command and control is expressed as follows:

Since a command echelon cannot direct each subordinate unit, it must rely on mission orders; that is, the central command issues orders describing the tactical objective and recommends activities that it believes can best accomplish the objective. Each of the subordinate units, which must place a premium on survival, can devise its own plan for carrying out the orders. Consequently, the subordinate units usually have the authority to make independent decisions on local issues, and to operate autonomously with only general direction and guidance from the centralized command.⁴⁴

The "cell system" organization facilitates simplistic command and control, as well as utmost security for the movement throughout all phases. Couriers and mail drops are used extensively for communications. Lateral communications with other guerrilla units or with the underground "cells" is accomplished using intermediaries.

"Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration and the alert shifting of forces."⁴⁵ Dispersed units are given definite responsibilities but then are basically left to their own devices to carry them out. The fact that guerrilla warfare depends more on opportunity than on timing allows command and control to be decentralized which facilitates other guerrilla warfare principles such as speed and flexibility. The principles derived are initiative, concentration and dispersion, and simplicity.

Mobility

According to Mao "mobility... is a prime requisite of the guerrilla force. When the situation is serious the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind."⁴⁶ The small, lightly equipped organization of guerrilla units allow rapid movement to be optimized. Mao Tse Tung identified the development of mobile operations as one of six essential requirements to conserve the strength of guerrilla forces while accomplishing the destruction of the enemy's. With respect to mobility, speed is also essential. "The speed of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware, and the action entered speedily."⁴⁷ The principles derived are speed and mobility.

Maneuver

Because guerrilla units are foot mobile and exceedingly light organizations they can maneuver through virtually any terrain unimpeded. In this respect they have a distinct advantage over conventional forces. The fact that they choose rugged and difficult terrain in which to train and operate gives them more than a passing familiarity with it and further adds to their advantage over conventional forces. This principle of maneuver needs no further elucidation.

Logistics

Sustainment and supply is as critical to guerrilla forces as it is to conventional forces. Guerrilla warfare is conducted on exterior lines, without a rear area. Because guerrillas operate on external lines of communications often at considerable distances from their bases areas, an extensive and elaborate supply system is required. During initial phases, supply comes from internal sources. The underground is essential in coordinating the procurement and distribution of supplies to guerrilla units. The guerrilla may at times, rely solely on what the peasants can provide him. As the movement grows most become dependent on external support. Supply lines are organized from distant areas, "departing and radiating from the guerrilla zones, lines of

supply will penetrate the whole territory",⁴⁸ facilitating the passage of materials. "For all lines of supply that pass through the country, it is necessary to have a series of houses, terminals or weigh stations, where supplies may be hidden during the day while waiting to be moved at night."⁴⁹

Fires

The weapons systems employed by guerrilla fighters are not firepower intensive like those of conventional forces until they intentionally reach the phase of transformation to mobile conventional warfare. Otherwise small arms and weapons systems are likely to be compact and light weight to facilitate transport by the foot soldier. This type of armament thus reinforces their basic principles of mobility, speed and surprise. They do not necessarily employ a "massing of fires" technique since they follow a small unit organization for patrolling and ambushing, and they operate on the principle of dispersion.

Aviation

Guerrilla organizations usually lack aviation assets. If available, they likely are to be used only in a logistics support role.

Other Characteristics

Guerrilla warfare has a number of other unique characteristics which differentiates it from the methods of conventional warfare. One of these characteristics is that of external support. Although Mao stressed the importance of self-reliance, most guerrilla movements have eschewed this notion until recently. Normally as the guerrilla movement grows, it is unable to gain all of its requisite resources from within the country, because in most cases the countries which sprout insurgencies are economically deprived countries. Therefore, "unless governments are utterly incompetent, devoid of all political will, and lacking resources, guerrilla organizations normally must obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed."⁵⁰

Various types of support can be provided: moral, political, material or sanctuary. In the past, those insurgencies which were based on a communist ideology were backed by support from the Soviet Union. A key point regarding external support is that it must be actively pursued by members of the guerrilla movement and since it is rarely offered for altruistic reasons, but rather for some self-serving purpose, the provider can decrease or terminate support at any time of his choosing. Obviously this reliance on external support if taken away, could prove devastating to maintaining momentum on the side of the guerrillas. It is for precisely this reason that Mao emphasized self-reliance. The Sendero Luminoso of Peru has adopted this same philosophy, and is believed to gain support through financing from drug traffickers. This drug trafficking connection may be viewed as having added a new twist to combatting modern day insurgencies. The Chiapas uprising in Mexico is believed to have a similar connection, possibly indicating a future trend in the methods of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

On the other hand, sanctuary provided by another country strengthens the guerrilla warfare campaign by allowing the insurgents safe haven for training and recuperation. Sanctuary provided by Laos and Cambodia to the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War proved instrumental to the success of guerrilla operations. It is evident from the discussion, that reliance on external support can be both a strength and a vulnerability of guerrilla warfare.

Security is another aspect of guerrilla warfare that differentiates it from conventional warfare. Although a principle of war, conventional forces, because of their size, disposition, weapons, communications and logistics infrastructure, often find it difficult to maintain complete operational security. For the guerrilla, it is woven into its organizational structure. Members know only what they are required to know in order to execute their particular tasks. All guerrilla activities take place covertly, and lateral communications do not take place within organizations. An elaborate and pervasive intelligence network is integral to the security function. Base areas are located in inhospitable terrain and operations are often conducted at night, all for the purpose of increasing security. Deception is also a hallmark of the guerrilla - - they "are masters of the

arts of simulation and dissimulation; they create pretenses and simultaneously disguise or conceal their true semblance"⁵¹ and their "ability to disappear and at times merge into the population and appear as peaceful citizens"⁵² affords them even greater security.

The last aspect of guerrilla warfare which is distinctive from conventional warfare is the element of time and timing. As earlier stated, time is on the side of the guerrillas and they will use time to their advantage. They wage a war of patience and finesse, and avoid decisive battle. The aim is to drain the government of its resources and morale over a period of time, and finally its will to resist. Above all, this requires patience and perseverance. The North Vietnamese General Giap was astutely aware of this requirement in the Vietnamese people's war:

The Vietnamese people's war... had to be hard and long lasting in order to succeed in creating conditions for victory. Conceptions born of impatience and aimed at achieving speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn them into great success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforming our weakness into power, and carrying off final victory.⁵³

Lastly, guerrilla warfare depends more on opportunity than on timing and hence, there is no real specific time table. Generally speaking such wars take years, sometimes decades, and the guerrilla must be patient enough to pursue his objectives for this length of time. Principles derived are security, deception and perseverance.

Guerrilla Strategy

A critical element in the political aspect of guerrilla warfare strategy involves "winning the hearts and minds of the people" which is achieved by intense information and propaganda campaigns. This effort will be carried out through all phases of the insurgency. Overall strategy is designed to weaken the political regime to the point where it no longer has the resources nor the will to resist. This is done by a gradual wearing down of the government and security forces by committing violent acts against them. Thus, strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility and the attack. "Guerrillas make themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is

not only exhausted but perishing."⁵⁴ This is the essence of guerrilla warfare.

Bard O'Neill has identified four general approaches to present day guerrilla strategy:

"...the conspiratorial, protracted popular war, military focus, and urban warfare. The conspiratorial approach emphasizes an elite small-scale organization and low-level violence; protracted warfare stresses political primacy, mass organization, and gradually escalating violence; the military focus approach emphasizes military primacy and concentrates on either guerrilla or conventional warfare; urban warfare involves small scale organization and low to moderate terrorist or guerrilla attacks in urban centers, with some proponents envisaging an eventual transition to warfare in the rural areas."⁵⁵

A variation to those strategies offered by Bard O'Neill are summarized from the Mirpur, Pakistan Defence Services Command and Staff College as right, left and mass strategy.⁵⁶ The terms right, left and mass strategy do not refer to a particular proclivity toward political affiliation. Though given a different title, they more or less describe the same methods outlined by Bard O'Neill.

Right strategy is described as primarily a political strategy of which the modus operandi is to infiltrate political and social organizations. Propaganda is used and sometimes accompanied by sabotage and terrorism in order to discredit the government, but violence is mostly avoided and little focus is directed toward forming armed elements. This strategy places an emphasis on organization, control and use of coalitions to influence political organizations and gain a position which will allow the government to be challenged. The objective is to induce government crisis, increase the insurgents' power and eventually take over the government when sufficiently weakened and discredited.

Left strategy is designed to create a revolutionary situation specifically through acts of violence. A specific incident may be used to incite a sudden uprising of the masses against the government. This particular strategy employs the guerrilla leaders in dual roles as political leaders and leaders of armed elements. Little if any attention, is given to formally developing mass organizations.

Mass strategy is Mao's version of protracted popular war strategy which emphasizes organization of the masses. It is characterized by a complex party structure based on a failsafe "cell system" of interlocking arrangements used to control all aspects of the guerrilla movement. The system is designed to ensure that members of a particular cell are limited in their communications to other members of that cell only to prevent compromise of other cells in the event of capture. Likewise, unit leaders only have contact with personnel directly in their chain of command, i.e. an immediate superior and immediate subordinates.

This strategy primarily uses mass civil organizations and armed elements to challenge the government with the ultimate goal being the usurpation of the incumbent government and takeover by the guerrilla movement. "Protracted popular war strategy is a demanding one because of the need to obtain extensive popular support and to create a complex organizational apparatus, tasks that usually require considerable time and secure base areas for insurgents. The strategy calls for directly or indirectly engaging increasing numbers of people in long term conflict with the government in order to control the countryside and thereby isolate the urban centers and wear down the government's will to resist."⁵⁷ "It is important to note that although the Maoist strategy of protracted popular war theoretically consists of an orderly progression through three phases, victory can come at any point if the government suddenly loses its will. "⁵⁸

The fact that a variety of strategies may be employed by guerrilla forces complicates counter guerrilla strategies. To further complicate a response, specific strategies may not be adhered to by guerrillas or they may be changed, as was the case with the Sendero Luminoso in Peru who changed from a protracted popular war strategy to an urban warfare strategy and then combined the two. From the perspective of military strategy, guerrilla strategy is focused on alertness, opportunity, mobility and the offensive or attack... "the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated."⁵⁹

Psychological Operations

Psychological warfare remains a requisite adjunct to guerrilla warfare. Intense propaganda campaigns are integral to mobilizing mass support and also function as a vehicle in which dissatisfaction is articulated, blame is placed on the government and alternate programs are offered which appeals to the sensitivities of the masses. Guerrillas step up mobilization of the population by exploiting and satisfying their aspirations.

Besides being directed at the population, psychological operations are also unscrupulously conducted against the government where propaganda campaigns, terrorism and assassinations serve to undermine the government's legitimacy, highlighting their inability to stop the violence. These actions also serve to frustrate the government which then leads them to resort to indiscriminate violence, a self-defeating activity for the world to see.

Guerrilla Tactics

Che Guevara succinctly stated the connection between strategy and tactics when he wrote "tactics are the practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives."⁶⁰ Hence strategy necessarily translates to the tactics employed. Strategically, the guerrilla aims at sustained warfare and at the attrition of the enemy's fighting power, supplies, and ultimately its will to fight. Tactically, guerrillas attempt to fight quick battles of annihilation. Positional battles are avoided because of their inherent weakness in relation to conventional military forces. For that reason, combined mobile and guerrilla warfare is conducted in an effort to destroy vital enemy forces while guerrilla warfare is waged for the purpose of confusing, distracting, dispersing and exhausting the enemy. Thus, the guerrillas' primary reliance is on ambushes and hit-and-run raid tactics.

Operations are conducted in the enemy's rear, cutting its lines of communications. Much effort is devoted to capitalizing on this "great weakness of a conventional force - its utter dependence on logistical support."⁶¹ Tactical flexibility, dispersion and speed are some of the other elements crucial to guerrilla warfare tactics. Of tactics, Mao writes:

In conventional tactics, dispersion of forces invites destruction; in guerrilla war, this very tactic is desirable both to confuse the enemy and to preserve the illusion that the guerrillas are ubiquitous...⁶² select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightening blow, seek a lightening decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.⁶³

Principles derived are offensive, unpredictability, flexibility and economy of force.

Principles of Guerrilla Warfare

Based on the foregoing summation of guerrilla warfare doctrine, a number of principles of guerrilla warfare can be extracted. Some of these principles are shared by conventional warfare, while others are specifically characteristic of guerrilla warfare. The principles derived from the analysis are as follows: **legitimacy, objective, psychology, mobilization, perseverance, knowledge, unity of effort, security and deception, economy of force, initiative, offensive, unpredictability, flexibility, adaptability, mobility, maneuver, concentration and dispersion, surprise, simplicity and speed.**

Although this set of principles was derived on the basis of analyzing the methods of unconventional warfare, it probably is not all inclusive in scope, and I would caution that like the traditional principles of war, they too, will not guarantee success on the battlefield. They must be adapted to the particular situation at hand, and it must be recognized that every guerrilla movement has its own peculiarities and nuances. Once again, following a set of prescribed principles, whether used as a checklist or framework for activity cannot replace good judgment and leadership on any battlefield.

Conducting Counter-Guerrilla Operations

Counterinsurgency or counterguerrilla operations consist of "all military and other actions taken by a government to defeat and insurgency. These actions are based on the internal defense and development strategy (IDAD) - the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. Thus,

IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy against insurgency."⁶⁴ The IDAD strategy model is contained in Appendix C.

The military represents only one instrument of national power, therefore it needs to be integrated with others (such as political and economic) in order to provide an effective national response to revolutionary guerrilla warfare. As such, the military will normally play a supporting role, working in concert with civilian authorities to secure and maintain a lawful atmosphere while socio-political development programs are initiated and implemented.

The role of the military in counterrevolutionary guerrilla operations can be quite varied, ranging from strictly an advisory role, minimum augmentation of security forces, or full-scale combat of guerrilla forces. Doctrinal employment of U.S. forces basically limits the role of the United States in host nation counter-guerrilla operations to an indirect rather than a direct role in the form of providing training, equipment, services and combat support. Combat operations will be undertaken however, in those exceptional circumstances where U.S. national interests cannot be protected by any other means.

Current military force structure and doctrine is reflective of our past involvement and likely future participation in unconventional conflicts. But despite our past involvement and the likelihood of increased future involvement in conflicts involving Third World countries, which are historically unconventional in nature, our force structure is not by any stretch of the imagination optimized to operate efficiently in these probable scenarios. Unconventional conflict is not a preeminent consideration in either the structuring of U.S. military forces or doctrinal planning, as evidenced by the numerous flaws which can be found in each. There are several reasons for this.

For over forty years the United States was strategically oriented toward the Soviet Union -- attempting to contain the expansion of its communist ideology on the one hand, and deterring any potential nuclear exchange on the other. This focus on the Soviet threat served as the paradigm on which we framed our national policy, national security strategy, military force

structure, doctrine and training. It was this paradigm that defined our world, delineated the world order and defined our role in it. The threat was clear, unambiguous and calculable. Localized conflict short of Soviet involvement was merely regarded as a distraction to our main purpose in life. Now, in the absence of the Soviet threat we have temporarily lost our direction and focus. While the order of the world has in fact changed, and the players which may have an impact on our national security are more numerous, we are stuck in the mindset of a single adversary and the great conventional battle. We have looked with renewed vigor at North Korea as our next formidable adversary.

The U.S. security strategy of forward presence is still predicated on a scenario of being able to effectively deal with two major regional conflicts simultaneously, though the recent bottom up review and downsizing of the military "in the face of a declining threat" has left serious doubts in the minds of our top military leadership as to whether this is in fact feasible. Even in light of these weaknesses, which will be outlined in subsequent discussion, the very fact that they have been identified and are being debated, reflects the notion that we are quite conscious of our continued and probable increased involvement in unconventional warfare.

In analyzing the planning and execution of counter-guerrilla operations, a top-down approach will be used beginning with U.S. National Security Strategy and proceeding down through the tactical application of the traditional principles of war.

U.S. national security objectives "constitute the fundamental rationale for all our domestic and international undertakings."⁶⁵ The basic precept on which our national security interests are based is that "the United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions and people. From this precept, four objectives have been enunciated:

- **Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress.**

One of four goals outlined in order to support this objective is that the U.S. will work "to avoid conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and violence.

- **Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide.**
- **An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants.**

- **An enduring global faith in America - that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises.** This objective further stipulates that "we cannot shirk our responsibility to help",⁶⁶ but it is also realized that there are limits to what the U.S. can and should do, so selectivity and discrimination are the watchwords with respect to our global undertakings. However, "we cannot ever allow our stated preference for multilateral action to become simply an excuse for American inaction."⁶⁷ With specific reference to low-intensity conflict, the 1987 National Security Strategy identified the particular threat of low-intensity conflict to U.S. interests. These threats were enunciated as:

- interruption of Western access to vital resources
- gradual loss of U.S. military basing and access rights
- expanded threats to key sea lines of communication
- gradual shifting of allies and trading partners away from the United States into positions of accommodation with hostile interests.

These objectives clearly articulate the requirements for deducing a military security strategy which is capable of responding to a multiplicity of threats worldwide, and across the entire spectrum of conflict. In light of this, the U.S. military must be able to respond to the full spectrum of conflict from the high end (conventional war) to the low end (peacekeeping operations). The White House Report to Congress in December 1987 stipulated that "the entire range of non-nuclear forces within the military structure has potential application in the low-intensity conflict situations." These forces include combat maneuver forces (tactical air, ground and naval forces of the conventional force structure), special operations forces, and combat support/combat service support forces.

The 1990 annual national security strategy statement given by President Bush stated: "Low-intensity conflict involves the struggle of competing principles and ideologies below the level of conventional warfare. Poverty and the lack of political freedoms contribute to the instability that breeds such conflicts."⁶⁸ Given this, "the United States may very well be compelled to engage in unconventional conflicts to protect its security interests over the long run."⁶⁹ Using this capability as the yardstick then, the adequacy of the existing military force structure must be examined.

In view of the recent downsizing and restructuring of military forces, there has been considerable controversy surrounding the services' capability in two simultaneous or near simultaneous major regional conflict scenarios. Without getting bogged down into too much discussion on this point, this is a requirement which cannot be fulfilled with the current force structure for rather obvious reasons. Additionally, it casts serious doubt, although for different reasons, as to whether the U.S. military can capably deal with conflicts at the low end of the spectrum, particularly in unconventional warfare scenarios.

If we view the current state of affairs with respect to the incidence of low-intensity conflict as the trend of the future, the United States could be in an uncomfortable position for a long time to come. Even with the current increased level of this sort of conflict, they have largely remained matters of only secondary importance. "There is a prevailing disposition in the U.S. that places conflicts in the Third World in a distinctly subordinate position."⁷⁰ This in part is due to the inability of our national political leadership to easily discriminate between what is, and what is not, of vital national interest in these areas and then properly articulate it to the American public. Even when properly articulated however, it does not mean that the American people will necessarily be supportive in this regard.

The Weinberger doctrine spells out a fundamental problem with U.S. foreign policy, and that is, it is for the most part a reactive policy, which fluctuates with the whims of the American people who in turn, respond only to the political propaganda they are fed by the news media.

Another stumbling block to U.S. involvement in Third World Conflicts is that Americans are impatient and want things done quickly, with minimum effort and minimum resources. Thus, the U.S. has traditionally lacked the staying power that is required for the patient and protracted nature of low intensity conflict. The American psyche also has little tolerance for casualties, so when we do become engaged in these sort of conflicts, we can expect American support to wane directly in relation to the increase in body count of American servicemen. This is not meant to be critical, but rather to highlight the difficulties these factors pose for adopting strategies and doctrines in order to deal with at best, variable and often untenable threats. It is compounded by a common perception that conflicts in the Third World do not pose even a minimal threat to U.S. national security and thus, unless it appeals to the humanitarian side of our consciousness, it does not warrant U.S. involvement, and even then, only in a very limited and indirect kind of way. Nonetheless, when the U.S. participates in a conflict with a policy of limited involvement, often the course of events beyond our control makes it virtually impossible to avoid escalation of conflict. As in the case of Somalia and perhaps Bosnia, what might appear at first to be a simple humanitarian or peacekeeping mission can be transformed into a scenario where we find ourselves embroiled in bitter battle.

Policymakers will be hard pressed to identify in these low-level conflicts those conditions that can lead to instability that can adversely affect U.S. national security, however. The ability to identify potential areas of escalated conflict in a confused and diffused arena of localized conflict will be crucial if the United States unilaterally, or preferably in concert with other states, can assist in defusing conflicts before they become regionally significant.⁷¹

In his book *The New Battlefield*, one of the salient points that Sam Sarkesian makes with respect to the causes of revolution is that "the most that can be said about the causes... is that there are many and they are varied; however, there seems to be a general agreement that systems striving to modernize provide the most fertile ground for revolution..."⁷² and "the complex and broad nature of the modernization process leads to difficulties in trying to pinpoint specific

revolutionary causes."⁷³

This poses a unique dilemma in regard to strategy formulation for the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations. First and foremost, in an attempt to formulate an effective solution, the underlying causes must be identified, otherwise it is like trying to treat symptoms without knowing the underlying cause of a disease. In the past we thought the revolutionary syndrome could be cured by massive doses of material resources and firepower; the kind of stuff that we bring to bear on the conventional battlefield. After failing in Vietnam however, it was evident that the conventional application of firepower and tactics would not work in the revolutionary guerrilla warfare scenario. One of the hard learned lessons of guerrilla warfare was that "the guerrilla warfare enigma [could] not be solved by dropping a nuclear weapon on it. The military leader, experienced only in conventional warfare, must learn to adapt his thinking to this new problem, or be defeated."⁷⁴

Perhaps the gravest error which can be made in conducting counter-guerrilla operations is in not realizing the nature of the conflict and placing the military in a position of primacy over the political aspect, or attempting to solve the problem using purely military options. Since the genesis of revolutionary guerrilla warfare is a political one, such a narrowly focused response would in fact be inadequate and reach only a temporary solution at best. "The primary challenge in unconventional conflicts is political-psychological, multidimensional, and rarely susceptible to single-component strategies or orthodox political-military options."⁷⁵ But even in strictly a military sense, we may fail to understand the critical differences between conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare, and thus be unable to make the necessary adjustments in our thinking and methods when fighting the guerrilla on his terms and turf.

United States military forces may be assigned any one of four functions in low-intensity conflict: support for an insurgency or counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations or peacetime contingency operations. The implications this has with regard to military strategy, force structure, doctrine and tactics is that they must be flexible enough to respond to

these diverse missions throughout the spectrum of conflict.

In the following analysis, only the function of counterinsurgency (or counterrevolutionary warfare) support will be discussed and the difficulties commonly encountered in this area, specifically with respect to doctrinal issues such as the application of the traditional principles of war. "Currently a void exists in published and distributed LIC doctrine for the various branches and echelons."⁷⁶ Although current policy is such that U.S. forces will not normally be committed to combat in counterinsurgency operations, our role in assisting the host nation to defeat the revolutionary movement and eliminate the conditions which caused it, requires a comprehensive understanding of all aspects of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

Strategic Concepts and Principles

The main theme found in most literature concerning low intensity conflict is that it differs significantly from conventional conflict, and that the main differences are qualitative differences rather than quantitative. From this perspective one would infer, and correctly so, that the employment of the instruments of national power in response to low intensity conflict, because of its distinctive nature, would be quite different from how they might be employed in conventional conflict.

Government response is critical not only to the final defeat of guerrilla movements, but also as to how long it might ultimately take to defeat them. In its attempt to develop a viable counter guerrilla strategy, the government must determine the type of guerrilla movement, their strategy and most importantly, their goals. Once these critical elements are determined, then the government can begin to take those actions which may serve to frustrate their strategy.

Intelligence is critical to any conflict. "Experience has demonstrated that good intelligence is the most important element when responding to low intensity conflict - both in framing a response to the particular case and in the execution of the plan."⁷⁷ Whoever has the

better and more efficient intelligence system capable of collecting, exploiting and disseminating intelligence information, has the advantage on the battlefield, and the unconventional battlefield is no different. In light of this, intelligence must be used as the backdrop against which all other activity is directed and performed. Thus, organization of the national intelligence collection system is of paramount importance. It must be able to be responsive through all echelons and synthesize the efforts of all national instruments of power.

On the operational and tactical levels, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is essential and serves the same function as in conventional warfare. The U.S. Army uses a modified IPB process using LIC specific products such as a population status overlay and a trap overlay. The graphic depiction of these overlays are contained in Appendix B. "IPB in LIC... addresses social (cultural), economic and political information on the area of operations and on surrounding states and those states supporting the opponent, and U.S. and international political thought and sensitivities that can affect the situation."⁷⁸ The key factors to the IPB process in LIC therefore are the nature of the threat, the civilian population, and the host nation government and military. The IPB process is the same as that for conventional warfare and consists of battlefield area evaluation, terrain analysis, weather analysis, threat evaluation and threat integration. Situation and event templates are derived as part of the threat integration process.

Additionally, every effort must be made to disrupt the enemy's intelligence gathering capability and this is probably most easily done by targeting the underground. The significance of the underground's role in supporting the combatants, the guerrillas, has been iterated in previous discussion.

Another critical aspect to consider with respect to support of the guerrilla movement is that of determining foreign assistance or external support. Isolating the country and eliminating external support could be a critical first step in paralyzing guerrilla operations. In some instances, the employment of naval forces to aid in isolating the country could prove essential to this effort.

One of the points already made was that of acknowledging the primacy of politics over

military instruments, and that regardless of how successful military operations might be in actual combat against the guerrilla, it is unlikely to result in decisive victory for the government unless the actual causes of conflict are determined and eliminated. This requires that the government acknowledge the grievances of the population and in all likelihood, it must be prepared to make some concessions in order to mobilize the population in their favor.

From the military perspective, unconventional warfare differs with respect to the application of firepower. Many more restraints are imposed on the unconventional battlefield because of the political ramifications which could result from its indiscriminate use. Since a primary aim of both the guerrillas and the government is to win over the people, restraint and judiciousness must prevail to ensure that only the minimum amount of force required is used. Thus, rules of engagement may differ significantly in conventional and unconventional warfare. First, because guerrilla warfare is not a declared war between two warring nations but rather internal unrest within a nation, a certain degree of restraint must be imposed. Indiscriminate violence on the part of the military against the indigenous population will do little toward winning their hearts and minds. Historically, and particularly where the U.S. is concerned, there has been a tendency of over reliance on technology ... however, "heavy firepower and large-unit maneuvers are irrelevant, are not cost-effective, and are sometimes counterproductive." ⁷⁹

Operational and Tactical Concepts and Principles

I believe that historically the fundamental problem confronting the conventional soldier on the unconventional battlefield was that he found himself slave to the conventional principles of war. As pointed out earlier, there is considerable debate surrounding not only the utility of these principles, but also their application. Jomini has been credited with the first attempt to derive a set of principles from historical study of warfare. The present day principles of war adopted by numerous military forces more or less reflect refinements made to the original principles proposed by Jomini in 1803:

- That strategy is the key to warfare
- That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles;
- And that these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker

enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory.⁸⁰ As didactic as Jomini was regarding the necessary employment of these principles for success, he understood they did not apply in unconventional conflict. In his writings on strategy, Jomini

admitted one great exception to the fundamental principle of massed, offensive action against a single point. The exception he variously called civil, religious, or national war or wars of opinion. These were armed struggles not with regular armies on both sides, but wars in which an entire people was aroused and active... Wars like these, in his view, were "dangerous and deplorable" - "they always arouse violent passions that make them spiteful, cruel and terrible." Any soldier prefers warfare "*loyale et chevaleresque*" to the "organized assassination" of civil, national, and ideological wars.⁸¹

Jomini had no solution for this type of conflict and no framework on which to propose a set of principles. Much can be said of his ability to understand the nuances which made this kind of war different.

"Every organization and social profession inculcates its members with a coherent set of constructs and categories through which they are expected to interpret their professional world",⁸² and the military profession is no different in this respect. As alluded to earlier, the principles of war have been a cornerstone of military thought for centuries, and the young officer is indoctrinated early in his career that his world is to be interpreted by the immutable construct of the principles of war. Even military command and staff colleges "base their teaching of strategic thinking on the principles of war, providing a body of rather convincing evidence for the connection between the application of the principles of war and the achievement of great victories, and conversely, between breaching these principles and classic military defeats."⁸³ It stands to reason then, that making the mental adjustment for unconventional conflicts is no small feat and really only part of the answer.

Before delving into other areas which need to be addressed, let me briefly discuss why I

believe the conventional principles of war are perhaps both inadequate and in part inapplicable in framing a response to revolutionary guerrilla warfare. First, as determined by the foregoing discussion, the principles of guerrilla warfare which are herein derived from the analysis of guerrilla warfare theory and doctrine, are more than twofold those of the conventional principles of war. This is due to the complex nature of guerrilla warfare on the strategic and operational levels, and to the fact that other dimensions, besides that of the military, are integral to defining its nature, i.e. the political and human dimensions.

I will now turn to a discussion of the traditional principles of war adopted from J.F.C. Fuller which are utilized by U.S. military services today: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity and their utility on the unconventional battlefield. I have already alluded to their inadequacy with respect to addressing the political and also in many respects, the human dimension of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, so the following will concentrate on the military aspect.

OBJECTIVE. *Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.* The principle of objective is not only applicable but perhaps more important in counter guerrilla operations. Objectives are derived from the desired end-state, which in the case of counter guerrilla operations means several things. The strategic objective is to maintain or restore the legitimacy of the incumbent government. Operational objectives include mobilization of the population to regain or maintain their support; providing security for and preventing indiscriminate violence against the indigenous population; locating, isolating and destroying or neutralizing the insurgent leadership or organizational structure; if applicable, reducing or eliminating external support; and although not a military objective, alleviating the conditions which precipitated the revolutionary movement -- the underlying cause or causes. These objectives must be continually reviewed to ensure they are consistent with the political

objectives. Objectives can become clouded by frustration or may need to be revised based on intelligence information. Revolutionary movements associated with drug trafficking are particularly challenging because in a sense, two wars are being fought at once --the revolution and the drug war, and thus there may be different objectives associated with each.

OFFENSIVE. *Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.* This is one of the most important aspects of counterguerrilla operations. The offensive allows for gaining momentum and maintaining initiative and freedom of action. This too, is a goal of the guerrillas. Guerrilla warfare is wholly offensive and of the most dynamic sort, where battle is declined unless they possess superiority at the point of contact. It is important for counter-guerrilla forces to be as offensive in nature as the guerrilla forces so that at the right time, the initiative can be seized from them. The limitations of offensive should be realized on the tactical level however. As the British found in the Malaya emergency, sometimes chasing small guerrilla bands around the countryside is not the way to economize one's assets and rarely produces resounding results. The majority of forces may best be utilized to allow the government to begin or resume functioning in once-contested or guerrilla controlled areas.

MASS. *Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.* At the operational and tactical levels this means concentrating superior combat power at the decisive place and time in order to achieve decisive results. The problem in trying to apply mass on the unconventional battlefield is that first and foremost, guerrillas avoid decisive battle, and therefore, it is almost virtually impossible to apply this principle. The massing of numerically superior troops and firepower on the unconventional battlefield does little but waste valuable resources (which is contradictory to the principle of economy of force), and leaves one vulnerable elsewhere to ambush and the hit-and-run tactics of small guerrilla units who are usually much more mobile and maneuverable.

This principle does however, have applicability on the strategic level because governments fighting guerrillas must be able to commit significant political, economic and military resources to combat revolutionary movements. Several sources have been cited which indicates that in order to defeat guerrillas, manpower must be massed at a ratio of between ten and fifteen-to-one.⁸⁴ This has a different connotation than massing a division against a guerrilla platoon, however. What this means is that for every guerrilla, 10 or 15 security force personnel are needed to continue civil law enforcement and security functions dispersed throughout vast rural areas, as well as conduct combat operations against guerrilla units. The resource requirement for counter guerrilla operations increases dramatically, so in order to be effective, the government must be willing to commit those resources.

ECONOMY OF FORCE. *Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.* The most efficient deployment of forces should be effected in order to meet the various missions with respect to providing security to the government and the population, as well as to allocating sufficient forces to actually function in a combat role against guerrilla forces. Some forces may be involved in drug enforcement areas if the revolutionary movement is believed or known to have a connection with drug trafficking. "This places a premium on the need for flexibility of thought and action"⁸⁵ and requires that only the minimum force be employed commensurate with the mission or task. This not only conserves critical personnel resources but also limits possible alienation of the population by controlling the risk of collateral damage and indiscriminate violence by using unnecessary force.

This principle also has another aspect in counter guerrilla operations. If a host nation does not have sufficient security forces to respond adequately to the guerrillas (i.e. they do not have the ten or fifteen-to-one ratio), and foreign assistance is required, only the minimum assistance necessary should be provided to refrain from (in the case of support received from the United States) "Americanizing" the conflict. The danger of foreign assistance is that "...outside

intervention forces are aliens whose presence may not be understood, and may be resented by local population groups upon whom the [counter-guerrilla] forces must depend for intelligence and other forms of support."⁸⁶ If foreign assistance is too evident, it might also serve to undermine the legitimacy of the government, making it in the eyes of its people, incapable of handling its internal affairs.

MANEUVER. *Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of maneuver.* In the strategic sense, the principle of maneuver is composed of three interrelated factors: flexibility, mobility and maneuverability. "At the operational level, maneuver is the means by which the commander sets the terms of battle, declines battle, or acts to take advantage of tactical actions."⁸⁷ This principle may be as critical to successful counter guerrilla operations as it is to guerrilla operations, and it goes hand in hand with the principle of offensive. Maneuver avoids the static defense which makes a unit more susceptible to ambush and attack

UNITY OF COMMAND. *For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.* It is with this principle that a crucial distinction exists with respect to guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare. Since guerrillas do not seek to fight a single decisive battle but rather a series of independent "small wars," command and control is necessarily decentralized to support small unit (platoon and squad) sized actions. Unity of command exists primarily at the strategic level only. Because the aim of guerrilla warfare is to harass and demoralize the enemy rather than to seek decisive battle, numerous independent actions at the operational and tactical levels that are not necessarily connected or related, can result in the guerrillas achieving their goals. More important in the context of counter guerrilla operations is unity of effort, particularly between civilian and military organizations with respect to their combined roles in the counterrevolutionary effort.

SECURITY. *Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.* This principle is paramount at all levels of war, and regardless of the spectrum of conflict. But it is of particular importance when fighting the guerrilla, while being perhaps the most difficult to achieve. "All the history of guerrillas indicates their dependence on the ability to disappear and at times merge into the population and appear as peaceful citizens."⁸⁸ Not knowing who and where the enemy is makes it difficult to bring force to bear against him, and for obvious reasons this is particularly frustrating for any force conducting counter guerrilla operations because of the security dilemma it poses. The guerrilla operates in familiar territory and often has had years to organize his intelligence network, establish cells and infiltrate key government and civilian positions.

As described in the section under "Intelligence" the guerrilla always has an edge with respect to security not only because of his intelligence but also because of his *modus operandi*, of how he organizes and fights. The frustration of guerrilla warfare is made evident in the following comment: "Fighting guerrillas is a demoralizing kind of war. The enemy is all about, silent and invisible, faceless, hitting and disappearing into the jungle. He seems to know all about us while we never know when and where he will strike. His agents are everywhere."⁸⁹

The absolute necessity for operations security in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations is obvious, and "the only way of achieving this security is the constant use of imaginative and inventive cover and deception operations."⁹⁰ The intelligence effort for counter guerrilla operations is as equally important as it is for the guerrilla, and it is "as much a struggle with an enemy as is armed combat; the difference is in the means employed."⁹¹

Security also implies the conduct of counterintelligence operations which consists of those measures taken to deny the enemy information of value. All methods of security (physical, communications, emanations, operations) should be employed along with deception to increase the security of one's forces.

SURPRISE. *Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared.*

The principle of surprise is a force multiplier. Striking the enemy unprepared serves to provide a psychological edge over the opponent, as it also works to ensure security of government forces. The relationship between these principles is self-evident. Deception, security and intelligence are important adjuncts to surprise. Pseudo-operations, where counterguerrilla forces mirror guerrilla forces, have been employed and have proven their effectiveness in infiltrating guerrilla organizations and gaining a psychological advantage.

SIMPLICITY. *Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.* There is nothing simplistic about conducting counterguerrilla operations. Many have made the mistake of utilizing this principle at the strategic level by attempting to solve revolutionary guerrilla wars with the military instrument only, and using conventional operational principles. This method is very simplistic but counterproductive. As discussed earlier, revolutionary guerrilla movements cannot be solved without integrating all the instruments of national power: political, economic and military. This requires an extensive, synchronized and well orchestrated effort at all levels aimed at reducing or eliminating the root cause or causes of the guerrilla war.

For the most part, the traditional principles of war have either significant or limited applicability in unconventional warfare, however, their value is in the selective method in which they are applied. It must be realized that guerrilla warfare is qualitatively different from conventional warfare, and if viewed in this light, the principles of war must be applied accordingly. Although the traditional principles are to some degree applicable, they are not adequate. They do not account for the primacy of politics in the revolutionary guerrilla movement, nor do they take into consideration the role of external support or government response. They also fail to address geo-political or human factors such as grievances, or culture,

which are inherently important in such conflicts. Hence they are substantially inadequate in scope.

The tactical principles derived from the preceding analysis of guerrilla strategy and tactics would seem to indicate that the traditional principles of war do not cover the full scope of guerrilla warfare. Moreover, these traditional principles are only applied from the strategic down to the tactical levels of war. In order to beat the guerrilla we must learn to fight as he does using some of the unique or more important principles in guerrilla warfare such as psychology, deception, flexibility, adaptability, knowledge, etc. Although some of these are used in conventional battle, they are not considered "principles of war" per se. But because of their primacy in guerrilla operations, they must be considered principles of war for the guerrilla, and thus, they comprise the *unconventional principles of war*.

The salient characteristics of these principles will be summarized with respect to their significance in unconventional conflict.

LEGITIMACY. *Act in accordance with the law, avoid indiscriminate violence, and attempt to accomodate the grievances of the people.* Maintaining or restoring the legitimacy of the government will represent one of the most consuming aspects of counter guerrilla operations. Legitimacy is determined to a great extent by the people. Therefore, a government must be willing to recognize grievances and make every reasonable effort to improve the factors or conditions on which grievances are based. Guerrilla movements will attempt to undermine the legitimacy of a government by exploiting grievances and offering solutions to them. The government then, must be willing to invest the necessary resources that will offer a more appealing solution to their grievances than will the guerrillas'. An important aspect of maintaining or restoring legitimacy is to function in accordance with the law, and avoid the use of indiscriminate violence. Security forces must always be viewed as protectors of the people,

never as oppressors. The earlier the government attempts to reinforce its legitimacy in the eyes of the people, the sooner it will be able to undermine the efforts of the guerrillas to mobilize the population. The government has the best opportunity for success and a rapid defeat of the guerrilla movement during the earliest phases of the movement.

KNOWLEDGE. *Know the nature of the conflict; know your enemy and his culture, beliefs and attitudes; and know the terrain..* "Knowledge is power," particularly on the battlefield. The successful application of all remaining principles begins with this one. Its significance is found in both the writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Only until you have a complete knowledge and understanding of the nature of the conflict, the terrain, and your enemy will you know how to fight him. You must know the way he thinks and what his motivations are -- what makes him tick so to speak.

PSYCHOLOGY. *Use propaganda to either mobilize the enemy to gain his support, or demoralize and break his will to fight.* All methods of psychological warfare should be employed in an effort to gain and maintain support of the population. This will probably be one of the most difficult and labor intensive aspects of counter guerrilla operations, since first a counter-propaganda campaign must successfully undermine the guerrillas' propaganda efforts, and then the propaganda efforts directed against the guerrilla movement must be effective enough to win over the people.

MOBILIZATION. *Direct psychological operations toward winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous population..* Mass support is as necessary for successful counter-guerrilla operations as it is for guerrilla operations. In order to mobilize the population, their grievances must be identified and measures must be taken to rectify them as soon as possible. Counter-guerrilla

strategy therefore must respect the aspirations, values and beliefs of the people to have any hope of winning their support, and the government should be willing to make some concessions if necessary. Perhaps even more important is the ability of security forces to provide enough security in rural areas to either maintain or regain government control and ensure the safety of the population. The ability to provide this security will serve to reinforce the government's legitimacy.

UNITY OF EFFORT. *Coordinate civil-military relations and integrate all the instruments of national power.* As with any other operation, every commander must clearly articulate his intent to ensure unity of effort. Unity of effort is working toward a common goal or objective. This is particularly important in counter guerrilla operations because of the necessity of coordinating civil-military efforts toward a common goal, while at the same time, attempting to integrate all the instruments of national power as a means to achieve an objective. National political, economic and military strategies must therefore be complementary. The coordination of this effort is even more complex in situations where foreign governments provide assistance to a host nation. The variables are numerous and complex, each having to be integrated into a focused and synergistic effort toward the accomplishment of common objectives and goals.

PERSEVERANCE. *Assess risk and be reasonably assured of success; pursue goals with patience and diligence; avoid being overly ambitious at the cost of security or surprise.*

"Perseverance is the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them."⁹² It is easy for conventional forces to get impatient in a protracted, unconventional conflict where technology is often indecisive. Numerous "small" battles may be won and yet decisive victory may be illusive because of the nature of the conflict. Hence it is also a difficult scenario in which to maintain high morale. Perseverance "involves a physical and

moral commitment" which allows for maintaining the focus necessary to achieve stated goals, however distant or elusive they may be. Perseverance underscores the concept of presence, persistence and patience suggested by Larry Cable in his counterinsurgency writings.

DECEPTION. *Make the enemy commit his resources against constructive units and dummy positions while maintaining secrecy of real unit intentions and locations.* "Deception is the attempt to mislead an adversary's intelligence analysis concerning the political, military or economic situation he faces and to induce him, on the basis of those errors to act in a way that advances one's own interests rather than his. It is considered a form of counterintelligence because it attempts to thwart a major purpose of the adversary's intelligence operations..."⁹³

INITIATIVE. *Exploit opportunity to gain an advantage.* Initiative allows for the exploitation of unexpected opportunities. Commanders must always be prepared to maximize situations to his advantage when the situation presents itself and then to act decisively. Initiative in battle requires a great deal of self-confidence and independence.

UNPREDICTABILITY. *Avoid consistency in activity that would allow the enemy to predict future actions.* Unpredictability supports security and freedom of movement. It also keeps the enemy at a psychological disadvantage by having to play on hunches rather than observable predispositions. The U.S. military has difficulty with this principle because we typically will formulate standing operating procedures on which to base our operational activities. While SOP's simplify coordination efforts on our part, they play into the hands of the enemy by their inherent predictability. The results can be very costly in human terms as we learned in Somalia, after following the same exact helicopter flight procedures seven consecutive times, the Somalis were lying in wait for the next occasion.

FLEXIBILITY. *Redirect activity to respond to evolving situations and missions.* Flexibility offers a certain degree of compensation for the "fog of war." Flexibility keeps the guerrillas off balance and prevents it from developing effective tactical operations. Flexibility is an integral element of adaptability and allows for carrying out unplanned contingencies. The enemy will not always react as anticipated or expected so we must be able to respond quickly and effectively against any action he may take, whether or not it is predictable. Thus, flexibility involves planning for the unexpected.

ADAPTABILITY. *Be able to function effectively in any environment under any condition.* Adaptability must be practiced on all levels from the strategic to the tactical, for it is crucial when responding to the various threats posed by guerrillas. At the strategic level an effective strategy must be capable of coordinating countermeasures to respond to a variety of threats, as they may change over time. At the tactical level, military units must be able to adapt to all conditions of the environment, both mentally and physically.

CONCENTRATION. *Mass forces at a time and place against an enemy critical vulnerability in order to achieve decisive results.* Concentration is the antithesis of dispersion, however, they are not mutually exclusive. While forces or units may be dispersed, the flexibility to be able to mass them when and where required through responsive command and control, should be retained. This principle too, like dispersion, can be a strength or a vulnerability depending on precisely how and when it is employed.

DISPERSION. *Locate forces to avoid predictability but retain ability to react to enemy attack* Dispersion can of course be a strength or a vulnerability. Its strength is resident in the fact that it

allows for operation over a wide area and therefore permits flexibility and avoids predictable patterns. Its weakness lies in the fact that it increases coordination problems particularly in the areas of command and control, and logistics, and necessitates a certain degree of autonomy. If used correctly, it can be an important adjunct to speed, mobility and surprise. It is extremely supportive of small unit tactics on which the principles of guerrilla warfare are based.

SPEED. *Create a high operational tempo to force the enemy into a reactive vice proactive mode.* Speed is an important concept in maneuver warfare doctrine and applies equally in counter guerrilla operations. FMFM 1 describes the role of speed in warfighting as "rapidity of action... a weapon... superior speed allows us to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of combat, forcing the enemy to react to us. Speed provides security. It is a prerequisite for maneuver and surprise.

In order to be truly effective on the unconventional battlefield, we must learn to integrate these new unconventional principles with the traditional principles of war, when and where they may be applicable. But it must be cautioned that these principles are not prescriptive or immutable, i.e. they do not guarantee success. Nor are they intended to take the place of leadership or good judgment on the battlefield. The effective and successful leader must possess a kind of intuitiveness to apply them in the proper combination where and when required. Moreover, it must be recognized that certain conflicts may in fact be without solution or result in a final victor.

Many of these principles that were derived from my analysis of guerrilla warfare are not strictly confined to the unconventional battlefield but have utility across the entire spectrum of conflict. This notion has been offered by a construct proposed by Dr. Joe Strange, professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College. He has recognized the strategic shortfalls of the traditional principles of war (which he refers to as the "principles of war even as they relate to conventional conflict. It is Strange's contention that although the principles of war may be

successfully applied at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, "they might not yield final victory" because they do not adequately cover the scope of the political and grand strategic levels of war (capital "W" war). He has therefore proposed a set of principles which augments the traditional principles. These augmenting principles, referred to as "the Principles of War (W)"⁹⁴ are summarized below:

- Know your enemy and yourself
- Determine the nature of the conflict
- Know the limits of military power (both political limits and physical limits)
- Identify enemy and friendly centers of gravity and associated critical vulnerabilities
- Appraise the following: the relationship between military victory and political end state; assumptions (their validity and criticality); alternative strategies in case of failure; and the odds for victory
- Proceed with or without modifications; or do not proceed
- Operate in accordance with holistic and synergistic military effectiveness and coherent actions at all levels of war (political, strategic, operational and tactical)
- Operate in accordance with the appropriate small "w" principles of conventional war, unconventional war, or operations other than war

These principles, unlike the traditional principles of war, do in fact have applicability across the entire spectrum of conflict, and many of these principles are reflected in a number of paradigms which are used for analyzing low-intensity conflicts such as guerrilla operations. Additionally, a correlation can be drawn between some of the principles of unconventional war and the principles iterated by Professor Strange.

If the principles of war were expanded to include these "Principles of War (W)" we would be well on our way to being able to engage more effectively in any level of conflict, at

least from a military perspective. But even the application of all of these principles do not cover many of the nuances of revolutionary guerrilla warfare however, because of the underlying political and human forces at work.

Several researchers have developed paradigms for analyzing insurgencies (revolutionary guerrilla warfare) such as Bard O'Neill and Max G. Manwaring. Both are comprehensive and adequately cover the scope of such conflicts. The Manwaring paradigm provided herein will be used in subsequent analysis as the framework for outlining two case studies: the Malayan Emergency of 1948 and the Philippine insurrection of 1946.

The underlying premise of the paradigm is that "the ultimate outcome of any counterinsurgency effort is not primarily determined by the skillful manipulation of violence in ... many military battles." Rather, the outcome will be determined by (1) legitimacy of the government, (2) organization for unity of effort, (3) type and consistency of support for the targeted government, (4) ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents, (5) intelligence (or action against subversion), and (6) discipline and capabilities of a government's armed forces.⁹⁵

All of the factors which fall outside of the military dimension are included in the Manwaring paradigm, which is where the principles of war fall short. Analysts such as Manwaring and O'Neill recognize the fact that "eliminating armed insurgents is not in itself, a solution to revolutionary war."⁹⁶ The guerrilla maintains the flexibility to revert to any stage in the conflict at virtually any time, thus he may go underground for long periods of time in an effort to "wait you out" -- and he will. Thus,

The application of military force must be aimed at promoting and protecting the host government while it eliminates the social, economic, and political tensions that may have caused the revolution in the first place. If social, economic, and political reforms are required, the counterinsurgency strategy should be aimed at holding the conflict to the lowest possible level of violence while these reforms are being established.⁹⁷

CASE STUDIES -- MALAYA AND THE PHILIPPINES


"The success or failure of any revolution is closely linked to the effectiveness of counterrevolutionary actions."⁹⁸ Both the Malaya Emergency of 1948 and the Philippine Insurrection of 1946 represent failures of revolutionary guerrilla movements. In subsequent

analysis an attempt will be made to outline the manner in which the British and Philippine governments responded to these crises, and the factors which contributed to forcing the insurgents in both cases to abandon their respective causes.

The Malaya Emergency 1948-1954

In June 1948, a guerrilla movement emerged in the primitive jungle of Malaya, and the then ruling British government declared a state of emergency that was to last six years. Malaya's population which consisted principally of three different ethnic groups was sharply divided: the Malays and the Chinese were about equal in number while the Indians represented a minority group in Malaya. The Chinese were primarily urban dwellers and came to dominate the commercial industry of Malaya. The Malay community was an agrarian based society, tied closely to the cultivation of their land. Though the Chinese dominated much of the industrial enterprise in Malaya and represented a significant portion of the population, British colonial policy favored the Malay community, thereby alienating the Chinese.

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) emerged after WW II as one of the strongest communist parties in Southeast Asia. It rose to power in the trade union movement and was more or less ethnically homogeneous, consisting predominantly of Chinese. The Chinese in Malaya believed that their association with communism would compensate for the discriminatory practices of the political system in Malaya. Because of their favorable status with the British government, most Malays subscribed to supporting the British government, so they resisted other groups who attempted to undermine British rule. This support would prove instrumental



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in Britain's counterrevolutionary campaign efforts.⁹⁹

The following analysis will serve to substantiate some of the critical elements of successful counter guerrilla operations, specifically keying on the factors outlined in the Manwaring paradigm and to the greatest extent possible, the unconventional principles of war.

Legitimacy of the Government

A government's perceived legitimacy in counter guerrilla operations is mostly determined by its response. Numerous problems initially plagued an efficient government response and the Chinese guerrillas were able to gain strength early during the organizational phase when, if the British government had been prepared, they quite easily could have been disrupted. Even though the British government responded quickly in declaring an emergency and augmenting the police forces with army units, they did not have a coordinated plan for the conduct of the campaign. The guerrillas were allowed to get a firm hold on the rural area because the government initially ignored them, and when the government finally did respond, it lacked the unity of purpose on which to base its operations.

"Malaya was but one among many issues facing the British government after World War II."¹⁰⁰ Hence the issue of Malaya was relegated to the Colonial Office. The High Commissioner Sir Edward Gant was determined to take appropriate action but he was often indecisive. There was also a gap in this position when Gant was killed in a plane crash and several months elapsed before the position was filled, resulting in a lack of clear guidance and unity of effort during this timeframe and for some time to follow.

Despite its numerous problems initially, the legitimacy of the government was never in question during the Malaya Emergency. Though the British government was initially slow to initiate a plan and severely underestimated the threat posed by the guerrilla movement, it was persistent in its efforts to eliminate the threat once it was realized. However, "from June 1948 to

April 1950, the government moved from one ad hoc solution to the next,"¹⁰¹ until finally a comprehensive plan, referred to as the Briggs Plan, was developed. For the first several years the government experienced a number of setbacks in organizing and coordinating efforts to undermine the movement, but initiation of the Briggs Plan which gave responsibility of coordinating counter guerrilla efforts to the civil authorities, in conjunction with reorganization efforts, improved the coordination and efficiency among government agencies and security forces in countering guerrilla strategies. Integration of civil-military efforts were improved to an even greater extent in 1951 with the appointment of Sir Gerald Templer as Higher Commissioner,¹⁰² while he also retained his post as Director of Operations for the army. Persistence in the conduct of their counter guerrilla efforts enabled the British to factor out some of the measures that proved ineffective so they could economize and focus on those actions that appeared to be working.

Organization for Unity of Effort

Unity of effort suffered early in the crisis. First and foremost, the government was totally unprepared, and even when the first indications of a problem were received, the severity of the problem was gravely underestimated. The intelligence organization was "so skeletal and disarticulated that it could not provide sufficiently accurate information"¹⁰³ on which to coordinate activities. The armed forces were immediately placed in support of civil power but they were not coordinated, and the army, like the intelligence service and the police, were not prepared for counter guerrilla operations. The intelligence service, police and armed forces, in addition to comprehensive and timely planning, form the basis of the government counter. The intelligence service was inexperienced and unresponsive, the police were understrength and demoralized due to their inability to quell a growing crime problem, and the military was untrained. Reports indicate that the police often acquired useful and important information but had no systematic method to report it. Since all of the security forces were ill-prepared to cope

with the situation and lacked decisive guidance from the High Commissioner, unity of effort was non-existent for most of the first two years.

As indicated in earlier discussion, effectiveness of the strategy improved in 1951 when some key strategy and organization decisions were made. The Briggs Plan which established a Federal War Council designed to ensure coordination of the various civil, military and police activities, began to take hold at about the same time Templer was appointed as High Commissioner. Also about this same time, a Home Guard was organized which had a significant psychological impact on the guerrillas. Templer's concurrent appointment as Director of Operations for the army gave the civil-military relation the unity of effort and impetus it had so desperately needed. "War by committee proved to be an effective counterrevolutionary structure"¹⁰⁴ and the Briggs Plan provided a coherent strategy which gave the British the momentum it needed to repress the guerrilla movement.

Type and Consistency of Support for the Targeted Government

Support was, provided to the government by passive means. As previously mentioned it was difficult for the MCP to gain any support from other than the Chinese sector of the population, and even they were divided. It was a definite benefit to the government that they did not have to expend a great deal of effort attempting to mobilize the population for support. The Malays were in fact hostile to the insurgency and the Indians were more or less indifferent since they were accepting of the status quo. By June 1950 Great Britain began receiving support from the King's African Rifles and the Fijian Regiment.

Ability to Reduce Outside Aid to the Insurgents

This did not require substantial effort on the part of the British government during the Malaya Emergency. Virtually no help reached the guerrillas from external sources. Naval forces were employed in concert with the police for use in establishing coastal patrols. This operation

ensured that no weapons or military supplies reached the guerrillas from the outside, hence they were successfully isolated from external support.

Intelligence

"If a government is to be forewarned of a challenge to its authority it must have an effective intelligence service..."¹⁰⁵ Intelligence was a weakness of the counterguerrilla effort for some time. After the war against the Japanese, the MCP openly declared itself as a legal party proclaiming a radical but not revolutionary platform. The government's intelligence service was aware of the existence of an underground organization, but the extent of it was not known.

The government had no method or agency capable of detecting subversion in the rural areas of Malaya. Two days before the emergency was declared, the Malayan Security Service submitted a report to the High Commissioner which read that the immediate threat to the internal security of Malaya was minimal. By underestimating the threat of the MCP, the administration was lulled into a false sense of security.¹⁰⁶ "However maladroitly they had done so, the insurgents had set up a parallel hierarchy which was competing for the adherence of the people. The government had failed to realize that they were in competition."¹⁰⁷

Discipline and Capabilities of the Government's Armed Forces

Although the British military had some experience with counterguerrilla operations in the past, the army was largely untrained and unprepared for the Malaya emergency. They lacked a common tactical doctrine and few of the troops had experience in the harsh terrain of the jungle and jungle fighting. Tactics had to be adapted to the terrain. The army experienced a constant turnover of personnel which exacerbated the problem of retaining trained personnel. There were often conflicting concepts of operations espoused by the military leadership. For instance, initially the military made efforts to drive the guerrillas into the jungle and then their objectives were changed to where they attempted to drive them out of the jungle. This wavering resulted in

years of wasted effort.

Often lacking good intelligence at the tactical level, many units encountered guerrillas only by chance, "and then only after hours and hours of fruitless speculative patrolling."¹⁰⁸ Opportunities for taking the offensive were few. Numerous techniques were employed to kill off the guerrillas but often, even when contact was made, only a few at a time would be found. Large-scale search and clear operations were for the most part unsuccessful since the army would not remain long in the area and the guerrillas would return after the army left. Major R.E.R. Robinson said of large-scale operations that "the bigger the operation, and the higher the level at which it was planned, the less its chance of success; the preparations were impossible to conceal, the troops were difficult to control in the jungle, the insurgents simply vanished."¹⁰⁹

The army later implemented two primary methods of trying to deal with the guerrillas, one was known as Federal Priority Operations consisting of large-scale food denial operations which also were unsuccessful for the most part, and Framework Operations which consisted of patrolling and ambushing. Federal Priority Operations failed due to a lack of available intelligence; guerrilla food supplies were grossly underestimated so the army did not stay long enough in an area to have their denial operations take hold.

Tactics were changed so they consisted primarily of Framework Operations -- patrols and ambushes, and were designed to operate within very restricted areas. Rather than sweeping through an area, these small units would stay for a longer period of time in order to gain control of an area. This "saturation patrolling" allowed the small company-sized units in restricted area operations established a good working relationship with local administrations and police.

The military experienced numerous setbacks, some of which were placed on them by high level leadership. But with much perseverance and discipline they were able to appraise objectively their strengths and weaknesses, and implement positive measures which enabled them to become more efficient and effective by having the flexibility to adapt their operations and tactics, as well as train their troops for the task at hand.

British military forces found that technical advances had very little effect on tactical operations. Although aviation assets were employed, they were restricted to either a logistical support role, observation of fires, or reconnaissance roles, as the British recognized that their utility in an offensive fire support mode would be very limited at best. Helicopters were primarily employed in lift and transport of supplies, and also were assigned auxiliary tasks such as leaflet drops, use as communications platforms, and medical evacuation.

Operational and Tactical Principles Employed

Of those principles which can be applied in guerrilla or counter guerrilla operations, several were successfully employed by the British during the Malaya emergency. First, they understood the qualitative differences between conventional and unconventional conflict. The government observed, according to Sir Robert Thompson, the cardinal principle of counterinsurgency operations throughout the campaign -- it functioned in accordance with the law.

Because Malaya was under British colonial rule for some time, the British had a good deal of knowledge about the people and the terrain. By using small unit tactics and small arms, they were able to retain a certain degree of speed and mobility. This organization also allowed for decentralized command and control, as well as greater flexibility and initiative on the small unit level. Jungle training was finally provided to many of the troops and aided them in adapting to the conditions of jungle warfare. Deployment of small forces also enabled the military to mesh with the civilian population and police within a given area, thereby fostering unity of effort. Of all the principles observed, perhaps the most important factor contributing to their success was that the military refrained from an over-reliance on technology and the use of indiscriminate firepower. "Restraint, the highly selective use of force, is absolutely vital to the success of counterinsurgency operations, which require the security forces to strike at the insurgents without harming the larger population in which they hide."¹⁰

General Assessment of the Malaya Campaign

"The Malayan conflict was considerably affected by its pluralist society, dividing Chinese and Malaysians... it was the political relationship between the Malays and the Chinese that shaped Malaya's internal dynamics and ultimately the character of the conflict."¹¹¹ Although the British got off to a relatively slow start, they were able to implement several initiatives in both strategy, organization and tactics that eventually served them well in countering the guerrilla threat. It is difficult however, to say just how much of the success of the counterinsurgency campaign can be attributed to sound British policy and strategy, and how much can be attributed to the numerous weaknesses, particularly with respect to strategy, of the Chinese communist guerrillas. The guerrillas made a fundamental error in a protracted war strategy when, frustrated by their inability to make any noticeable impact, they shifted their tactics from activities against security forces in rural areas to a "campaign of terror and coercion against civilians."¹¹² They convinced themselves that continued subversion and terrorism would serve to undermine the British government. The British on the other hand, invoked a policy which was politically sensitive to functioning within the law. Moreover, Britain had established a policy of independence for its colonies, including Malaya, so that it was subsumed in Britain's overall political structure.

The Philippine Insurrection 1946-1955


The Hukbalahap (Huk) Insurrection which began in central Luzon, Republic of the Philippines in 1946, was the result of literally decades of economic, political and social repression of the peasantry invoked by the Philippine government. This eventually spawned a growing frustration and anxiety among the peasantry in response to what they viewed as a corrupt and unconcerned government. The social, political and economic infrastructure perpetuated the inequities between landowners and peasant farmers, and the chasm between the "haves" and "have nots" grew exceedingly greater with each passing year and each new

incumbent regime.

"After the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, U.S. economic and political policy did little to alleviate the basic Philippine problems of poverty and land-tenure... internal distribution of wealth remained much as it had been. Landlords grew rich at the expense of the peasant farmer who found it increasingly difficult to repay loans for seed or lease money made by the landlord."¹¹³ The landlord controlled nearly every aspect of the peasants' life.

The growing displeasure with the Philippine government coincided with a growing affinity of some toward communism, and in 1930 the Philippine Communist Part (PKP) was established under the leadership of Crisostomo Evangelista. It was not long after its birth that the PKP was outlawed by the Philippine government. In its place, the Philippine Socialist Party was formed along with the militant Worker and Peasant's Union (WPU) and became the new organization which gained the allegiance of former PKP supporters.¹¹⁴

After several years and in the wake of violent protests, Evangelista, who had been imprisoned along with other PKP members, was released and subsequently merged the PKP organization with the Socialist Party in November 1938 to form a united Socialist front referred to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). This organization, led by Evangelista, had at its goal the "overthrow [of] American imperialism in the Philippines."¹¹⁵ The threat of



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Japanese invasion in 1941 forced Evangelista into a temporary truce with the Commonwealth and they offered their support to the government to fight against the Japanese.

Then President Quezon, being suspicious of the CPP refused their support. The CPP however, decided to exploit the Japanese invasion to further their cause by waging an independent struggle against them. With this in mind, the CPP expanded its support base in Luzon. "The Japanese invasion.., provided the impetus that enabled a small number of untrained, unorganized, communist rebels to become an effective guerrilla."¹¹⁶

Legitimacy of the Government

Following the defeat of the Japanese, the Philippines was granted independence by the United States and the central government was restored under the leadership of President Osmena. The new government was viewed by the peasantry as a return to the pre-war status quo where their condition had not improved. The legitimacy of the government came under serious question when, immediately after the war, communists were refused seats in the newly formed Parliament to which they had been elected. Additionally the government had not lived up to promises made with respect to providing veterans benefits and back pay to those who had fought in the war against the Japanese. In short, the government had alienated the people and they seriously undermined their own legitimacy.

The tide turned when President Quirino was elected in 1949 and immediately instituted an executive reform program which included economic, political, social and military reform. But it was not until 1950 when Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Defense Minister that the government began to gain some substantial credibility. Magsaysay was completely attuned to the legitimate concerns of the peasants, and his frequent trips into the villages to monitor the progress of reform measures did much to gain a measure of confidence in the government which it had consistently lacked in previous decades.

Organization for Unity of Effort

The government marshalled 24,000 paramilitary police forces of the Department of the Interior's Constabulary to fight against the guerrillas.¹¹⁷ But, being poorly equipped, they were no match for the Huks, even though the latter were significantly outnumbered. When Magsaysay was appointed in 1950, the military had recently begun to reorganize, and under Magsaysay's leadership, the Philippine military matured and was refined with respect to its role and function. Units were more appropriately realigned from conventional style organizations to smaller unit organizations, battalion combat teams (BCT's), which reflected an unconventional force structure with its associated small arms firepower.

While actively pursuing the guerrillas, Magsaysay initiated and followed through on his stated political, judicial, economic and military reform. He also guaranteed that the 1951 elections would be legitimate, and posted guards at the ballot boxes to ensure its legitimacy as promised. He solicited from the people their genuine concerns about corruptness within government offices and ensured them that those officials who had abused their positions and responsibilities would be brought to justice. He urged all citizens to report complaints in the event they were to witness inappropriate behavior among government troops or officials.

Magsaysay also replaced the poorly trained and equipped Constabulary as the primary counterguerrilla force and placed this responsibility in the hands of the regular army, moving the Constabulary from the Department of the Interior and placing it under the command of the Department of Defense.

Magsaysay, who was politically and socially sensitive, as well as astute, was thus able to adeptly integrate all aspects of national power into the counterguerrilla effort. Unity of effort was achieved by Magsaysay who, although taking the lead militarily as Defense Minister, realized that social and political reform was not only instrumental in defeating the insurgency but absolutely essential.

Type and Consistency of Support for Targeted Government

The Philippine government's counterguerrilla campaign was supported by the United States through the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)-Philippines. JUSMAG originated as the Joint Advisory Group in November 1947 for the purpose of providing modest U.S. military assistance to the Philippines following the war in concert with U.S. economic programs. What began as a small group of military advisory personnel eventually expanded because of the growing threat posed by the Huk rebellion to the internal stability of the Philippines and the incumbent government. The U.S. government's growing concern regarding the apparent ineffectiveness of the Philippine armed forces in dealing with the Huks also resulted in an increased role of the JUSMAG to include support of the Philippine government in their battle against the Huk guerrillas. Under the JUSMAG, the Philippine armed forces were able to be increased in size and efficiency through training and supervision, and rather than being an oppressor of the people, it became their protector.

Military surplus goods were provided at cost and a grant which provided military aid was allocated under the Military Defense Assistance Act.¹¹⁸ It was recognized that defeat of the Huks would require broad-based U.S. assistance which focused on implementing progressive social and economic forms, which in turn, would motivate the peasantry to shift their allegiance from the guerrillas to the government. In 1951 the JUSMAG was increased in size, reorganized, and designated as the executive agent for military assistance to the Philippines. Following reorganization the JUSMAG was assigned the following responsibilities: providing advice and assistance to key members of the military under the guidance of the American ambassador, administration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program which financed end items, training the AFPO and standardizing organization, policies and procedures within it.¹¹⁹ The support which was provided to the Philippines through the JUSMAG was integral to the government gaining the initiative and beginning the defeat of the Huk guerrillas. The military and economic assistance provided to Ramon Magsaysay in the war against the guerrillas enabled him to devote

most of his country's resources to land reform and social programs which included community projects to build schools, roads and health clinics in areas where they were most needed.

Ability to Reduce Outside Aid to Insurgents

Unlike many communist insurgencies which were sustained by external support, this was not the case with the Hukbalahap insurrection. While there has been some discussion generated with respect to whether or not the Huks were supplied with arms by the Chinese, evidence to suggest they were is unsubstantiated, and the fact that the guerrillas constantly experienced severe shortages in arms and ammunition leads one to believe, that if receiving external support, it was negligible. The Huks almost exclusively relied on support from the peasant population. Arms and ammunition stockpiles, which were always insufficient, were largely created from captured equipment from the regular army. Hence, where isolation of the guerrillas from external sources of supply and assistance is often a major consideration in fighting these types of conflicts, the government was relieved of this taxing and difficult venture by the fact that little, if any external support was received.

Intelligence

When appointed Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay realized that "intelligence was the key that could reverse the course of the insurrection."¹²⁰ Determining the Huk order-of-battle became his first priority for the intelligence collection effort, and his commanders were tasked to gather information on local Huk intelligence and logistics nets. Area specific information was consolidated at AFP General Headquarters. Intelligence was developed via intensive interrogation of guerrilla family members and acquaintances, and they were also coerced to urge the guerrillas to abandon their cause.

A variety of unique methods were used to transmit intelligence information from the peasants in rural areas to the government intelligence service. "One method [used] was to fly a

reconnaissance plane over a farm where the farmer had arranged farm equipment or other commonplace possessions in such a way as to transmit information about guerrilla strength and direction of movement."¹²¹ This allowed the government to maintain a widely distributed network of agents over a large rural area, who could quickly provide information about guerrilla activity without being compromised as informers. The government also successfully used pseudo gangs in counterintelligence efforts by infiltrating the Huk underground which reinforced the impact of the psychological warfare efforts.

Discipline and Capabilities of the Government's Armed Forces


Early in the campaign the government's armed forces which consisted of approximately 24,000 personnel, lacked resources, were poorly trained and equipped, and severely lacked morale and discipline. Because resources were scarce, they often preyed upon the peasants for food and supplies which caused them to be viewed as oppressors rather than protectors of the people, taking what little the peasants had to provide for their own families. Under the leadership of Magsaysay, government security forces (both the police and military) were greatly strengthened and reorganized. But most importantly, Magsaysay understood that regardless of the strength and however efficient the organization, the Huks could not be defeated without integrating military action into a comprehensive national policy and strategy to deal with the underlying causes of the rebellion.

Just as Mao espoused that guerrilla warfare is just one aspect of the total war, so too the counterinsurgent must realize that military action is just one instrument of national power which must be fully integrated with the others in order to achieve success or decisive victory. In other words, every tactical engagement may be won, but the "war" may be lost if one loses sight of its political primacy. Thus, it is absolutely imperative that military personnel be politically sensitive to the nuances of unconventional conflict. Magsaysay's philosophy concerning the use of the military was that each soldier was an ambassador to the people. He used the military to perform

civic and social welfare missions besides conducting military operations against guerrillas. Each military unit was assigned a civil affairs officer who acted as a liaison to the local barrio police and civilian home guard units. This method promoted the integration and unity of effort among the various government and quasi-government organizations involved in counterinsurgency efforts.

Operational and Tactical Principles Employed

Several operational and tactical principles were employed which proved effective and instrumental to the success of counterinsurgency operations against the Huks. One of the most important was that counterinsurgency forces had extensive knowledge of the enemy and the terrain. "The American advisors and planners easily understood that the Huks, despite an overlay of communist rhetoric, were garden variety insurgents of the land to the landless, power to the impotent sort."¹²² Thus counterinsurgency operations could be designed on the basis of preemptive reforms and psychological operations to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the government. "The U.S. enjoyed the same major advantage in the Philippines that the British had in their successful counterinsurgent campaign in Malaya, a lengthy colonial experience. As a result of this both the American and British counterinsurgent planners had the necessary knowledge of the human terrain upon which the struggle would be played."¹²³



Psychological operations were aggressively pursued by government long range patrols known as "Force X." They constantly maintained psychological pressure on the Huks to keep them on edge, particularly with respect to some of the methods employed such as the "eye" leaflet and the use of pseudo gangs. Many of these psychological operations capitalized on the element of surprise as well.

Unity of effort also served a crucial role in promoting the efforts of civil and military organizations alike, and provided the synergism necessary to focus all the instruments of power toward a common goal. The military was used by Magsaysay in the administration of several civic programs such as the Economic Development Corps, (EDCOR) and others. In nearly every endeavor the civil-military relationship was closely linked and well-integrated.

The principle of unpredictability was followed by government forces in patrolling operations, where they were conducted on an irregular time schedule. They also remained in the field for several days at a time rather than following their previous procedures of returning before nightfall.

Government forces under Magsaysay's leadership were well trained as well as flexible and adaptable to any situation they might be confronted with by the Huks. The organization of the BCT's underscored his requirement for adaptable and flexible units capable of delivering firepower when needed or dispersing and concentrating forces when necessary.

"Within a BCT's defined area, companies or other smaller units were deployed to conduct independent operations, or the entire battalion could join quickly with others into larger formations when needed."¹²⁴

General Assessment of the Philippine Counter guerrilla Campaign

There appears to have been two key factors which contributed significantly to the successful elimination of the Hukbalahap insurrection. The more important of the two was the leadership of Ram6n Magsaysay. This was a man of incredible intelligence and foresight that not only understood the nature of the conflict and what fueled it, but was genuinely concerned with the plight of the peasant farmer, and dedicated to eliminating the existing social and economic inequities between the social classes which precipitated the conflict. He was astutely aware that the government's efforts would be futile if the problem was addressed exclusively in military terms, with the only objective being that of eliminating armed guerrillas. Magsaysay knew that the solution would have to come in the form of a totally integrated social, economic and military endeavor to invoke reforms which would guarantee peasant rights, and afford them protection of their land and homes.

The other key factor was the consistent support provided to Magsaysay by the U.S. through the JUSMAG. This assistance allowed Magsaysay to implement and integrate requisite social and economic programs which were essential to help turn the tide of peasant support from the guerrillas to the government.

Conclusion

Unconventional warfare is a complex phenomenon. This study attempted to outline the numerous complexities of unconventional warfare beginning with the lack of consensus on descriptive terminology. The difficulties in dealing with unconventional conflict

begins with its very nature -- it defies the logical, geometrical and technological aspects of conventional warfare as well as its principles; it is often difficult to determine if we are winning or losing, or who, in the end, is the ultimate victor; it is outside our "comfort zone" to deal with.

The difficulties presented in conceptualizing the phenomenon as well as in implementing procedures derived from incoherent policy and doctrine, have been addressed at length. Incoherent policy translates to incoherent strategy formulation and insufficient or inappropriate operational principles down to the lowest echelon of activity on the battlefield. Viewed in this light it is evident why the principles of war do not adequately guide the employment of forces in unconventional conflict.

One of the difficulties encountered with respect to formulating responses to unconventional conflict is that they all differ in some respects. Though generalizations can be formulated about such conflicts, the circumstances that surround the initiation of a particular conflict are never exactly replicated in other conflicts. Hence "each conflict has its own genesis, unique environment, aim and methodology for combatting such movements. Each insurgency problem requires requires a different kind of approach, strategy, training and leadership. All too often, we apply the same tactics, techniques, and lessons learned from one conflict onto another movement. While the broad underlying principles can be enunciated, there can be no "templatization" of such experience."¹²⁵

Additionally, the political and human dimensions of guerrilla warfare complicate not only the formulation of an effective response but also the prosecution of it, since it requires integration of all the instruments of national power and coordination of civil and military activities. An extraordinarily comprehensive unity of effort is required in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Since insurgencies are carried out by unconventional methods and are an element of unconventional warfare, it becomes evident that in formulating a response, the solution requires one that is beyond the scope and capability of military means to solve. Insurgencies are characterized as primarily political phenomena.

Some have argued that the traditional principles of war define their own immutability on the battlefield. To a certain extent this is true. But it must be recognized that the application of these principles in and of themselves will not necessarily lead to success. The principles are only as good as the commander who uses them wisely, with the necessary emphasis at the proper time, and in the proper combination.

I hope to have adequately substantiated the limitations of the traditional principles of war, not only in unconventional warfare but also in conventional warfare. Recognizing these limitations in no way lessens their utility, as they will continue to provide a useful mental construct in which to think about warfare regardless of the spectrum of conflict. But these traditional principles, though applicable to unconventional warfare to some extent, are much too narrow in scope to cover the complexities of revolutionary guerrilla warfare adequately, particularly when viewed in its total context which includes a political as well as human dimension. Since the political dimension has primacy over the military in this type of conflict, it differs qualitatively from conventional warfare.

Although I was able to derive a set of principles applicable to unconventional warfare on the basis of analyzing its methods, these principles are probably not all inclusive in scope, and I would caution that like the traditional principles of war, they too, will not guarantee success on the battlefield. The *principles of unconventional warfare* derived from the analysis of guerrilla warfare theory and doctrine are: objective, offensive, maneuver, mobility, unity of effort, economy of force, security and deception, speed, surprise, simplicity, knowledge, psychology, dispersion, concentration, flexibility, initiative, unpredictability, mobilization, legitimacy, perseverance and adaptability. Principles of war, whether conventional or unconventional, are "not like laws of natural science, where the observance of specific conditions produces a predictable result; nor are they like rules of a game, the breach of which entails a prescribed penalty. Rather they are guides to action or fundamental tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning, but their relevance, applicability and relative importance

change with circumstances."¹²⁶ They must be adapted to the particular situation at hand, and it must be recognized that every guerrilla movement has its own peculiarities and nuances. Once again, following a set of prescribed principles, whether used as a checklist or framework for activity cannot replace good judgment and leadership on any battlefield.

In closing I've listed some of the basic requirements, outside of the principles of unconventional warfare, which are deemed necessary for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Regardless of the mission assigned in low-intensity conflict, understanding the nature of the conflict is the first crucial step in mission analysis. I would hope that our doctrine capture these important concepts to provide a common starting point for the military planner and executor. These requirements are as follows:

1. Substantial effort must be devoted to promoting the government's legitimacy.
2. The threatened government must recognize that the insurgency is not primarily a military problem, and it must recognize and address the legitimate grievances of the people.
3. Campaigns must rest firmly on civil-police apparatus with the military in a support role.
4. Sound intelligence is imperative in unconventional warfare and the intelligence apparatus must be responsive to all echelons and organizations involved in the counterinsurgency effort.
5. Forces should be deployed on an area basis, junior officers should be allowed considerable initiative, and tactical flexibility is paramount.
6. Restraint must be exercised.
7. Patience is necessary. A counterinsurgency campaign may take years rather than months.
8. Government security forces must be able to afford protection to the population and the government's instruments of political control and influence. They must also

be able to perform non-coercive, quasi-military and military activities to mobilize public support.


Conventional Versus Unconventional Principles of War


Conventional Principles


Objective
Offensive
Mass
Maneuver
Unity of Command
Economy of Force
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

Unconventional Principles

Legitimacy
Knowledge
Psychology
Mobilization
Objective
Perseverance
Unity of Effort
Security and Deception
Economy of Force
Initiative
Unpredictability
Offensive
Flexibility
Adaptability
Mobility
Maneuver
Concentration and Dispersion
Surprise
Simplicity
Speed







TRAP OVERLAY

woods/jungle

built-up area

wells

lakes

roads

logistics source


W water source

landing strip

bridge

power or commo site

P government installation



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