Special Operations Forces to the Twenty-First Century: What Threat, What Response
Abstract
One assumption underlying successful guerrilla or revolutionary war is that to be successful, it must be supported or sponsored by an outside power. For the last seventy years, the Soviet Union has been the prime sponsor of unrest. With the Soviet Union's economy in a shambles, and with it apparently in retreat around the world, the Soviet Union may no longer be capable or willing to sponsor revolutionary movements. If the Soviets no longer can, are there any other candidates capable or willing to fill that role? If so, who might they be and what is to be the United States' response? ISSUE: This paper conducts a brief overview of the history of Special Forces, including the present force structure. It examines the various levels within the spectrum of conflict, and does a region-by-region analysis of political, social and economic factors affecting the region; it assesses the likelihood and nature of potential conflict to 2010. It also estimates the likelihood of US involvement in such conflicts. The paper then examines the capabilities of Special Operations Forces and discusses current and potential problems with existing force structure, including the most pressing: Integration of the Reserve Special Forces fully into the US Special Operations Command. The Reserve problems include, but are not limited to: inadequate training time; multiple layers of command/control; varying, uncertain sources of funding; problems with existing law governing Reserve/Active Component relations. It addresses the USMC, which currently has units advertised as being "Special Operations Capable," but which are not in the US Special Operations Command. It briefly discusses the Drug War.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 24, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA529192
Entities
People
- Charles F. Coffin
Organizations
- Marine Corps War College